Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus

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Modern statue of Fabius Maximus "Cunctator" ( Schönbrunn Palace , Vienna)

Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus ( Verrucosus means “warty” in Latin ), called Cunctator , “the hesitant” (but in a positive sense) (* around 275 BC; † 203 BC ), was a senator and general of the Roman Republic , five times consul (233, 228, 215, 214 and 209 BC) and twice dictator (221 and 217 BC). His nickname Cunctator refers to his tactics of slacking resistance, which the Roman troops used in the Second Punic War (218–201 BC).

swell

The oldest and best of the preserved sources is the historical work of Polybius . His third book, the war against Hannibal (including prehistory) from 219–216 BC. Chr. Describes, is still completely available today; Books 6–15, which dealt with the subsequent course of the war, are, like all other books, only available in excerpts and excerpts up to the end of the Polybian work. Another source is the extensive history of Titus Livius (ab urbe condita) . Books 21–30 are about the Second Punic War and have been preserved in their entirety. But Livy depends partly on the more recent annals and is therefore often unreliable. The Greek biographer Plutarch dedicated a book of his own to the life of Fabius, which he put “in parallel” with that of Pericles . It is very similar to the representation of Livy, but sometimes tends to agree with the latter if Livy deviates from Polybius. It is difficult to answer the question of which author Plutarch is based on. Finally, the Elogium of Fabius, with which his honorary statue was inscribed on the Augustus Forum, is an important source for his life. There is only a small remainder of the original, but a copy from Arretium (today Arezzo ) which is undamaged except for the first line .

ancestry

Fabius came from one of the five leading Roman patrician families who legitimized their claim to power with their alleged descent from mythical heroes and legendary heroic deeds of their ancestors. For example, 306 members of the Fabians, who can be traced back to Herakles in 477 BC. To have fallen in heroic struggle against troops of the city of Veji ; only one boy survived, becoming the progenitor of the later Fabier (cf. Kaeso Fabius Vibulanus ). Today Plutarch's statement is considered to be certain that Fabius was the great-grandson of Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus , grandson of Quintus Fabius Maximus Gurges and son of the consul of the same name , who was not particularly prominent and who died in office from 265 BC. Was. His great-grandfather and grandfather had achieved great military successes for Rome and several times achieved the highest state offices, so that he found the best starting conditions for a successful career in office.

Nickname

For many ancient authors (e.g. Cicero ) Fabius uses the Cognomen Maximus , which his great-grandfather already wore. The epithet Verrucosus is first passed down by Cicero and explained by Plutarch with the fact that Fabius had a small wart over his lip. The predicate Cunctator was assigned to him long after his death because of his defensive, but precisely because of that, successful war strategy against Hannibal (see below).

Early career

Little is known about Fabius' early career, as the second decade of Livian work has not survived. However, as a young man he must have participated in the First Punic War (264–241 BC), even if no details are known about it. According to the testimony of his ologium, he was first twice in the military tribune , then he began his cursus honorum around 237 BC. With a two-time bursary , then became a curular aedile and entered his first consulate in 233 BC , skipping the praesture . BC (together with Manius Pomponius Matho ). He was able to celebrate a triumph because of victorious wars against the Ligurians . The temple of Honos consecrated by him was discovered by Marcus Marcellus in 208 BC. Another consecration. In Rome, Carthage was accused of inciting the Ligurians and Sardinians to unrest. As a sign of peace and war, Fabius sent a herald's staff and a spear to the Punians, who, however, asked the Romans to choose for themselves which relationships they wanted to maintain with them. The parallel between this story and the later one, 219 BC, is suspect. Embassies were made to the Punians. Fabius also resolutely opposed Gaius Flaminius' agricultural reforms and later remained his bitter opponent.

To censor Fabius was v 230th Elected (together with Marcus Sempronius Tuditanus ), consul for the second time in 228 BC. BC (together with Spurius Carvilius Maximus Ruga ).

All in all, one can attest Fabius an extremely steep patrician career. For example, contrary to the general law that a consul could only be re-elected to this office after ten years, he became consul for the second time after four years. The fact that he was able to celebrate a triumph against the Ligurians despite moderate successes was extraordinary, since most of the other Roman generals fighting against this tribe had to forego such an honor.

The Fabians had had good contacts with Greece before. Accordingly, Fabius too had received a good education in Greek culture and is likely to have deepened the relations between Rome and the Hellenistic world in the years after the First Punic War . It could be due to his initiative that Romans were allowed to take part in the Isthmian Games for the first time in his second consulate .

The office of dictator , which was limited to about six months, was probably exercised by Fabius in 221 BC. For the first time.

Prehistory and beginning of the Second Punic War

When the Carthaginian general Hannibal left the Spanish city of Sagunto, allied with Rome, after an eight-month siege in 219 BC. According to a very old tradition, Fabius, as the influential spokesman for a senate group, opposed an immediate declaration of war on the Punians and first demanded diplomatic steps. Even Polybius had violent criticism of this version, which Friedrich Münzer considered probable but was rejected by Hans Beck . Perhaps he was the leader of the ambassadors sent to Carthage who told the Punic that he could bring them war or peace. The Carthaginians replied that the choice was his and that they promptly received a declaration of war. This story is not mentioned in the Elogium or by Plutarch, while it is recited by Polybius and Appian without mentioning names. Livius names the head of the embassy, Quintus Fabius, without giving any details, the poet Silius Italicus only names him Fabius . In contrast to this, he is called Dio Marcus Fabius by Cassius ; this name can only refer to Marcus Fabius Buteo . Both Fabius and Marcus Fabius Buteo treated here were equally suitable in dignity and age to lead this legation, so that both are eligible. Apparently the ancient authors were already in the dark about his person, since apparently some important senators did not want their position at the time to be made public and the first Roman historian Quintus Fabius Pictor sometimes deliberately did not explain their roles exactly out of respect for these wishes.

Dictatorship 217 BC Chr.

After the consul Gaius Flaminius had lost his life in the Battle of Lake Trasimeno , which was devastating for Rome , the emerging world power found itself in a deep crisis. In this exceptional situation, the people chose Fabius as dictator because this seemed necessary to stabilize the situation. Up until now only consuls had the right to appoint a dictator, but one consul had fallen and the other ( Gnaeus Servilius Geminus ) cut off from Rome, so that Fabius' election (like that of his Magister equitum Marcus Minucius Rufus ) was made by an extraordinary popular resolution became necessary. Constitutional concerns of earlier annalists cited by Livius that Fabius could not have achieved the full powers of a dictator because of his popular election are completely groundless, but are also reflected in Plutarch's report and other sources. The fact that the cavalry colonel was not appointed by the dictator but by the people was also a sharp contradiction of tradition. Only Polybius then makes the correct statement, confirmed by a dedicatory inscription found in 1862, that some time after their appointment Fabius and Minucius were even put on an equal footing by being elected as dictators for the same purpose - a violation of the normally applicable law that is unique in Roman history which is not cited by all recent sources. Overall, the complete presentation of Polybius about the dictatorship of Fabius is very credible, while Livius and Plutarch only embellish individual striking episodes from it, but bring little new or corrective information.

Before Fabius took to the field against Hannibal in his new office of dictator, he took some measures to flank the war in Rome. For example, he had the city walls reinforced, the monetary standard reduced to preserve the state treasure, many new recruits recruited to increase the strength of the army and, in particular - in a sharp departure from the measures taken by the fallen consul Flaminius - promote a return to the ancient Roman religion. The supposedly angry gods were to be appeased by strict observance of religious traditions and atonement, and so the trust of the Romans in their leaders was to be restored. The Sibylline books were consulted and, according to their instructions, a supplication and a meal of the gods were organized. The protection of the goddess Venus of the mountain Eryx (Sicily) was invoked by Fabius by vowing to dedicate a temple to her. In addition, a "holy spring donation" ( ver sacrum ) should be carried out, that is, all products of the next spring (e.g. young animals) should be sacrificed to a deity if the Roman Empire could assert itself against Carthage in the next five years.

Fabius made full use of the power of his office - for example with regard to the surviving consul Servilius - which had not happened in Rome for a long time and which certainly created many enemies for him. He ordered that the newly drafted recruits should gather in Tibur (now Tivoli ) near Rome. In Narni he took over the two legions of Servilius, then in Tibur the two newly established legions and turned to Apulia . On the way, he ordered that residents should evacuate unfortified villages and that all places threatened by Hannibal should be burned.

In Apulia, Fabius pitched his camp at Aikai (Troia), not far from that of Hannibal. He used his well-known defensive tactic not to dare open field battles, but always with his army that was ready for action at all times from a safe distance - mostly from mountains - to watch the enemy and wait for their possible nakedness. By raids on scattered Carthaginian contingents, which had been sent out to procure food, Fabius wanted to slowly wear down and wear down the enemy. The Punians had to fight in the homeland of their enemies, while the Romans hoped for constant supplies from the Italian tribes allied with them. Fabius probably also wanted to wait for a favorable moment in order to undertake a decisive attack in a terrain advantageous to him; he therefore tried above all to avoid a battle on flat land. Although he made a few mistakes and initially had to take a lot of criticism because of his defensive strategy, which many Romans regarded as a weakness, after later further heavy losses in an offensive manner of fighting against Hannibal, his tactics were generally recognized and praised.

Since Hannibal could not induce Fabius in Apulia to accept a field battle, he crossed the fertile fields of Samnium and Campania scorching and burning , but could not dissuade the Roman dictator from his tactics. Of course, many officers did not like to stand idly by the destruction of their homeland and were dissatisfied with the strategy of their general. Even if many Italian peoples were still loyal to the Romans, they were put to a severe test by the devastation of their landscapes and, moreover, by the fact that Hannibal posed as the liberator of the Italians from the Roman yoke, further shaken. Hannibal is said to have increased his dissatisfaction even further by sparing the Fabius estates that had been made known to him by deserters during the destruction of the fruit and wine fields in the Falerner area, in order to create the discrediting impression that he had reached a secret agreement with the dictator .

In autumn the Punians wanted to return to their winter quarters in Apulia with the treasures they had captured from Campania. But Fabius had the Casilinum , located near Capua , previously occupied and thus barred the Volturnus valley, while Minucius militarily secured a narrow section of the Via Appia north of Sinuessa . Hannibal could only withdraw from Campania through a narrow valley near Callicula . Fabius stationed 4,000 soldiers there and camped with the main army in the mountains that dominated this valley. But Hannibal used the nightly darkness to fasten dry wood to the horns of numerous captured cattle; then he let the animals drive towards the hills bordering the narrow valley and light the wood on the horns as torches. The crew of the bottleneck let themselves be fooled by the lights, believed in an attempted breakthrough by the Punians, left their position and ran to the cattle, which were difficult to identify because of the distance and darkness. This ruse enabled Hannibal to march unhindered over the pass. When the deceived Romans wanted to at least defeat the rearguard of the Punians the next morning, they suffered a serious setback.

After this failure, Fabius returned to his old tactics. He watched as the enemies took the place Geronium ( also "Gerunium" ) on the border between Apulia and Samnium and fortified it for their own purposes. Then Fabius had to leave for Rome to carry out religious duties and urged his cavalry colonel Minucius, who was now in command, to adhere to defensive warfare, which the Magister Equitum had already sharply criticized. The displeasure in the army and also in Rome about the dictator's moderate successes was nevertheless great. He also had to be liable with his own capital in order to be able to enter into contracts to buy prisoners with public money without the permission of the senators. During Fabius' stay in Rome, Minucius, who did not obey the order, achieved a greatly exaggerated victory in a battle against the Punians. This news increased the bitterness about the dictator's previous approach so much that after deliberations in the Senate and in the People's Assembly, his Colonel was given the same powers as himself and therefore had equal rights towards him (see above). Fabius was not allowed to elect the consuls for the next year as usual, but only a suffect consul , Marcus Atilius Regulus , for the deceased Flaminius.

According to Polybius, Fabius offered two options, either that the two dictators should alternate regularly in command of the entire army, or that the army should be divided in two with separate camps; Minucius opted for the second variant. On the other hand, all later authors turn the roles around with little credibility: According to them, Minucius left the choice up to his colleague and Fabius rejected the first option. Minucius apparently immediately seized the opportunity to distinguish himself through offensive warfare and was in great danger. Fabius came to his aid in good time with his part of the troops and freed him from the predicament. Perhaps the sober account of Polybius telling this episode is already somewhat colored, and the later historians describe in exaggerated detail how grateful the initially belligerent Minucius was to Fabius, who was shown to be magnanimous and forgiving for his rescue. It is unhistorical that Minucius gave him the honorary name pater .

Apparently the two dictators continued to keep their troops divided. In any case, her term of office would soon end. But how they resigned from office is again reported differently by the various authors in detail.

Role from the Battle of Cannae to 210 BC Chr.

According to the statements of late Republican annalists on whom Livius, Plutarch and other authors rely, Fabius is said to have advised the consuls and other leading Roman generals to wage war carefully. In general, this may well be true, but it is questionable to what extent these authors drew on genuine traditions. The one consul of the year 216 BC BC, Lucius Aemilius Paullus , is described as being just as careful as Fabius and is said to have been instructed accordingly by him, while the other consul, Gaius Terentius Varro, also advocated open field battles like the former Magister equitum of Fabius. In any case, the Romans had deviated from defensive tactics again and wanted to risk an offensive fight again. This led to the catastrophic defeat by Hannibal in the Battle of Cannae with tens of thousands of fallen Romans. Thus, in retrospect, Fabius's strategy had proven to be correct and now earned him general recognition. When great consternation and fear broke out in Rome, Fabius is said to have helped a lot with clever advice to restore calm and to cope with the difficult situation.

In the next few years, Fabius became the dominant figure in Roman politics. He solved still in 216 BC He made his promise as a dictator to dedicate a temple to Venus Erycina, and was also accepted under the pontifices . This demonstrates his abundance of power at that time, because he sat for many years in the two most important priestly bodies (12 years pontiff, allegedly 62 years augur); a comparable position could later only achieve Gaius Julius Caesar . He also used his influence ruthlessly to secure his election to the highest office of the state more often in the following years, mostly at the expense of plebeian candidates. Because this would tarnish his image, Livy glossed over this procedure.

Since Lucius Postumius Albinus had died in the war before he took up the consulate, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the second consul in 215 BC, was named. Chr., Marcus Claudius Marcellus as a suffect consul aside. But the augurs canceled the election due to allegedly unfavorable omens and thus helped Fabius to get his third consulate. Since Fabius himself was an augur, it seems reasonable to assume that he had the elections manipulated in order to promote his own career. According to Hans Beck, the augurs wanted above all to prevent two plebeians from holding the consulate, since they did not have the spiritual authority of a patrician; but this would have raised concerns in religiously uncertain times.

Allegedly out of fear of unfavorable Omina, he stayed in Cales instead of fighting the enemy in Campania, then conquered three places on the border with Samnium, which had changed sides, and caused destruction at Capua, but without because of its still defensive nature Tactic to be able to celebrate bigger successes. After all, he had Puteoli (now Pozzuoli ) strongly defended because he recognized the strategic importance of this city.

When, after the first ballot, two candidates practically became consuls in 214 BC. B.C., the election coordinator Fabius canceled the vote, since the two applicants were not up to Hannibal militarily, and managed to get him again (with Marcellus) elected consul. Livy, who was so well-meaning to Fabius, also indicates that the former dictator had to accept sharp criticism for his ruthless securing of power. Nevertheless, he was able to enforce the immediate rise of his son Quintus Fabius Maximus from the curular aedile to praetor.

214 BC So Fabius became consul for the fourth time and Marcellus for the third time. They had done best against the seemingly invincible Hannibal. Many ancient writers therefore described them together as the most successful Roman generals against the great Punier and Plutarch in particular gave the apt description of Fabius as the shield and Marcellus as the sword of Rome , which was adopted from the Greek philosopher and historian Poseidonios . This primarily describes the tactics followed by the Romans after the battle of Cannae, that Fabius continued to avoid any open fight against Hannibal and only involved him in small skirmishes, while Marcellus ruthlessly, especially in southern Italy, those cities that had fallen away from the Romans haunted.

In addition to carrying out the election of the censors, the consuls, who had been tried and tested in war, were primarily concerned with reinforcing the troops through new levies, but could not do much together against the Carthaginians and their allies; they only succeeded in taking Casilinum. Then Fabius, fighting alone again, is said to have conquered a number of fallen cities. Back in Rome, as an election officer, he was able to ensure that his son in 213 BC Became consul. To this he gave his army. Allegedly, the son demanded from the father the honors he was entitled to as consul and the father recognized this claim with praise. Fabius is said to have made himself available to his son as proconsul. He was also allegedly significantly involved in the war decisions, while it is doubtful whether he took part in the fighting at all.

When Hannibal in 211 BC In BC went to the siege of Rome in order to lure away the Roman troops opposed to Capua, Fabius had seen through this plan of war and had successfully spoken out against a recall of the army for the protection of Rome; because of this the Punic ruse finally failed. In the power struggles to obtain the consulate of the year 209 BC In addition to Quintus Fulvius Flaccus , Fabius is also likely to have eagerly mixed in again; in any case, both were elected to the highest office of the state.

Capture of Taranto

So Fabius could 209 BC His fifth consulate. Although, according to the previous legal Titus Manlius Torquatus to Princeps Senatus should have been appointed because he was the oldest living Censorier, Fabius received this high rank by the censors Publius Sempronius Tuditanus awarded. This choice shows once again the tremendous influence of Fabius.

As consul, Fabius was supposed to conquer the last important city in Italy that was still owned by the Punians, namely Taranto . The other Roman generals initially involved Hannibal in battles so that Fabius could arm his army extensively without being disturbed. Then he went to the siege of Taranto, but did not seek to conquer this city militarily, but negotiated secretly with grossers who Hannibal had left behind as a garrison alongside his own troops. In this way, the five-time consul managed to get the grossers to treacherously open a city gate for him. After the capture of Taranto, however, he had the traitors murdered so that his less than decent approach to achieving this goal could be concealed and, rather, the appearance of a clean military conquest could be created. Without consideration, defenseless people were also massacred, not only enemy Punians but also ordinary residents of Taranto, and around 30,000 people were sold as slaves. The treasures captured by the Romans from Taranto went partly to the state treasury and partly to the soldiers. Among the numerous works of art that were deported to Rome, a large statue of Heracles by Lysipp was particularly noteworthy, which Fabius had placed next to his own equestrian statue on the Capitol . Heracles was the mythical ancestor of his race; and similarly allusions to Aeneas were made in the temple at the Capitol, consecrated to Venus as the patron goddess of Sicily . With this pictorial connection to two mythical ancestors, Heracles and Aeneas, Fabius wanted to underline the prominent role of his family in the Roman nobility. Some huge statues of gods were not stolen, supposedly because the Tarentines were to be left to their angry gods. The truth was different: the statues were simply too big and heavy to be able to take with you without further ado.

The narrative that Hannibal wanted to deceive Fabius by sending him forged letters from which it could be inferred that - like Taranto before - the city of Metaponton could also be treacherously conquered is unhistorical . But Fabius either discovered the dizziness by looking at bird signs or by comparing the writing of the forgery with that of a real letter. The statement that he was allowed to celebrate a triumph for the conquest of Taranto should be taken with caution, since Livy does not report anything about it and Marcellus was only granted one Ovatio despite significantly greater military successes .

Last years of life and death

After 208 BC After both consuls died, Titus Manlius Torquatus presided over the elections for the consulate for the next year. Fabius is said not to have been re-elected only because with Gaius Claudius Nero a patrician was already practically certain as the new consul. Marcus Livius Salinator was now second to the highest office of state and, when he wanted to go to war, is said to have brusquely refused a warning from Fabius to fight defensively; evidently he pursued a different war strategy than the deliberate procrastinator, as he was generally not on good terms with his compatriots.

In general, it can be stated that Fabius' power has been in power since about 211 BC. And the Senate decided again for a more offensive way of fighting, because only then was a definitive victory over Carthage possible. The young Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus , who also came from one of the leading families in Rome and increasingly determined the strategy of warfare , was the bearer of hope . He arrived in 205 BC. To the consulate and was fought violently but unsuccessfully by Fabius. The latter vigorously rejected Scipio's plan to bring the war to the Punic's own land. Of course, Fabius' long speech on this subject and Scipio's answer are freely painted by Livius. As of 204 BC When the legate Quintus Pleminius was accused of looting in Lokroi and other crimes, Fabius is said to have demanded an extension of the indictment to Scipio as the superior of his legate. Plutarch explains the opposition between Scipio and Fabius with further examples and also describes the then still young Cato as a supporter of the politics of the much older Fabius, so that both men would have made a common front against Scipio. These supposedly so close political ties between Cato and Fabius may have been invented, but could nevertheless be derived from a number of facts. Like many other senators, Cato was actually very enemies of Scipio, and the war philosophy of the chairman of the Senate, Fabius, was diametrically opposed to Scipio's offensive strategy. The contrasts were sharpened and further elaborated by later writers and this time old Fabius was portrayed as a scheming handicap of the war hero Scipio, so his hesitation was now interpreted negatively.

Fabius was born in 204 BC. Re-elected Princeps senatus and gave his deceased son the funeral oration, which he published as the only one of his speeches and which came to posterity, but is lost today except for an uncertain fragment. 203 BC BC, before Scipio's decisive victory in the Battle of Zama , Fabius himself died. Although he did not receive a state funeral, he was said to have received a very honorable one from public donations.

evaluation

Cicero judges Fabius' oratorial gift rather positively based on his own reading of the published funeral oration of Fabius on his son. Maybe she was in the style of of Thucydides traditional Pericles favor speech held. The speeches of Fabius handed down to Livius and other authors are spurious, as are most of the sayings ascribed to him.

As a general, Fabius was stylized in the later, legendarily reshaped tradition as the model of the slow, tenacious Roman ( Ennius : unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem - “a man restored the state to us through his hesitation”). His own military successes were small (exception may be the reconquest of Taranto), but he did not suffer any major setbacks and successfully maintained Rome's resilience after Cannae. Accordingly, Cicero praised his wisdom. But this was only correct for the general Fabius; on the other hand, as a person and a politician, he was by no means as humane and wise as Cicero and, building on him and drawing on him, Plutarch depicted. So he tried ruthlessly to maintain the prerogatives of the patricians over the plebeians in the not yet completely ended class struggles. The ancient compression of his character, which began since Ennius, primarily to his responsible hesitancy, must be replaced in today's science by a differentiated picture that takes his behavior in its various functions into account.

Afterlife

Fabius is treated in many works of world literature (for example by Niccolò Machiavelli and Molière ). His caution is the origin of the term Fabianism (see also Fabian Society ) in British politics at the end of the 19th century. In general, he is seen in modern times as a role model for a principled and persistent politician.

literature

Web links

Remarks

  1. ^ CIL 11, 1828 = Attilio Degrassi : Inscriptiones Italiae 13, 3, No. 80.
  2. Plutarch, Fabius 1, 3; 24, 5; Accordingly, the statement by Livius (30, 26, 7f.) that Fabius was the grandson of Rullianus is wrong (e.g. Neuer Pauly , vol. 4, col. 372).
  3. Livy 30, 26, 7f. u. a.
  4. Cicero, Brutus 57; Plutarch, Fabius 1, 4 (with citation of the further, invented cognomen Ovicula = " little sheep" because of its alleged gentleness in youth); Livy and the Elogium do not mention the cognomen Verrucosus .
  5. Fasti Capitolini ; Triumphal fasting; Plutarch, Fabius 2, 1; u. a.
  6. Cicero, de natura deorum 2, 61.
  7. Gellius 10:27 , 3-5; Zonaras 8, 18.
  8. Cicero, Cato 11.
  9. Fasti Capitolini; Elogium; u. a.
  10. Beck (see lit.), p. 83.
  11. Beck, p. 83.
  12. Narrated by Silius Italicus (1, 676–694) and Cassius Dio (fragment 55, 1–9; Zonaras 8, 22)
  13. Polybios 3, 20, 1ff .; Münzer (see Lit.), Col. 1817; Beck, p. 84.
  14. Polybios 3, 20, 6ff .; 3, 33, 1ff .; Appian, Iberica 13.
  15. Livy 21:18 , 1-14; Silius Italicus 2, 3-6 and ö.
  16. Cassius Dio, fragment 55, 10; Zonaras 8, 22.
  17. ^ So Münzer, Sp. 1817f.
  18. Polybios 3, 87, 6-9; Livy 22, 8, 6.
  19. 22, 31, 8-11.
  20. Polybios 3, 103, 4; CIL 1, 607 .
  21. ^ Livy 22: 8, 7.
  22. Pliny , Natural History 33, 45.
  23. Polybios 3, 88, 7f .; Livy 22, 11, 1ff. 12, 1f .; Plutarch, Fabius 4, 3; u. a.
  24. Only briefly outlined by Polybios (3, 88, 7), but shown in great breadth by Livius (22, 9, 7ff.) And Plutarch ( Fabius 4, 4ff.).
  25. Livy 22:10 , 2-6.
  26. Polybios 3, 88, 8; Livy 22:11, 5f .; Plutarch, Fabius 4, 3.
  27. Livy 22:11 , 4f.
  28. Münzer, Col. 1820; Beck, pp. 86f.
  29. Polybios 3, 89, 1ff .; Livy 22, 12, 2ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 5, 1ff .; u. a.
  30. Polybios 3, 90, 7ff .; Livy 22, 13, 1ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 5, 1ff .; u. a.
  31. Polybios 3, 92, 4; Livy 22:14, 3-15; Plutarch, Fabius 5, 6.
  32. This is only reported by younger authors: Livius 22, 23, 4; Plutarch, Fabius 7, 4f .; u. a.
  33. Polybios 3, 92, 10ff .; Livy 22, 15, 11ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 6, 4ff .; u. a.
  34. Livius 22, 18, 5ff .; u. a.
  35. Polybios 3, 94, 8ff .; Livy 22, 18, 8ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 8, 1; u. a.
  36. Livy 22, 23, 5ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 7, 5ff .; u. a.
  37. Polybios 3, 100, 1-3, 102, 11; Livy 22, 23, 9-22, 24, 10; Plutarch, Fabius 8, 2f., U. a.
  38. The relatively sober presentation in Polybius (3, 103, 1–5) is given by Livius (22, 25, 1ff.), Plutarch ( Fabius 8, 3ff.) And others. a. heavily embellished by long, constructed speeches by Fabius and other participants.
  39. Livy 22:25 , 16.
  40. 3, 103, 6-8.
  41. Livy 22, 27, 1-11; Plutarch, Fabius 10, 5-11, 1; u. a.
  42. Polybios 3, 104, 1-105, 11; Livy 22, 28, 1-22, 29, 6; Plutarch, Fabius 11, 1-12, 6; u. a.
  43. ^ Livy 22, 29, 7-22, 30, 10; Plutarch, Fabius 13, 1-9; u. a.
  44. Elogium; Livy 22:29, 10; 22, 30, 2f .; Plutarch, Fabius 13, 5; u. a.
  45. Polybios 3, 106, 1; Livy 22:31, 7; Plutarch, Fabius 14, 1; u. a.
  46. Livy 22, 38, 13-22, 39, 22; 22, 40, 1-3; Plutarch, Fabius 14, 4-7; u. a.
  47. Livy 22:55, 4-8; Plutarch, Fabius 17, 6-18, 5; u. a.
  48. Livy 23:21 , 7; 23, 30, 13f .; 23, 31, 9.
  49. Livius 23, 31, 12ff.
  50. Beck, p. 88.
  51. Livius 23, 32, 14f .; 23, 39, 5-8; 23, 46, 8-11; 48, 1f .; u. a.
  52. ^ Livy 24: 7, 10.
  53. ^ Livy 24, 7, 11-24, 9, 8.
  54. Cicero, de re publica 1, 1; 5, 10; Livy 24: 9, 7-11; Plutarch, Fabius 19, 2-7; Marcellus 9, 2f .; u. a.
  55. Livius 24, 11, 1ff .; 24, 19, 1ff.
  56. Livy 24:20 , 3-7.
  57. Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius (6th book, fragment 57) in Aulus Gellius 2, 2, 13; Livy 24, 44, 9f .; Plutarch, Fabius 24, 1-4.
  58. Livy 24, 45, 4-9.
  59. Livy 26: 8, 3-5.
  60. Livy 27: 6, November 3.
  61. Livy 27:11 , 9-12.
  62. Polybios 10, 1, 10.
  63. Livius 27, 7, 7ff .; 27, 8, 11ff .; 27, 12, 1-6.
  64. With decorations Livius 27, 15, 9ff .; Plutarch, Fabius 21, 1ff. u. a.
  65. glossed over by Livius (27, 16, 6) and Plutarch ( Fabius 22, 5).
  66. Livius 27, 16, 1ff., Plutarch, Fabius 22, 6; u. a.
  67. Plutarch, Fabius 22, 6; Strabon 6, 3, 1; Pliny, Natural History 34, 18.
  68. Beck, pp. 89f.
  69. Livy 27:16 , 8; Plutarch, Fabius 22, 7; u. a.
  70. Pliny, Natural History 34, 40.
  71. So Livius (27, 16, 11-16) and Plutarch ( Fabius 19, 8f.), Who put the religiosity of Fabius in the foreground as the cause of the recognition of the deception.
  72. So rationalistic Zonaras 9, 8.
  73. So Elogium; Plutarch, Fabius 23, 2.
  74. ^ Livy 27, 34, 9.
  75. Livy 27:40, 8f .; u. a.
  76. 28, 40, 1ff.
  77. Livy 29, 19, 1ff.
  78. Plutarch, Fabius 25, 2-26, 4; Cato the Elder 3, 6ff. (based on Cicero, Cato maior 10-12).
  79. Münzer, Col. 1828; Beck, p. 90.
  80. Elogium; Livy 29, 37, 1.
  81. Livy 30:26 , 7; Plutarch, Fabius 27, 2.
  82. Plutarch, Fabius 27, 3; not mentioned by Livy.
  83. Cicero, Brutus 57; Cato maior 12.