K-219
 Yankee class submarine
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K-219 was a nuclear submarine of the Soviet Navy . It belonged to the type Project 667A , NATO designation: Yankee I class . As missile submarine (SSBN), it was the task of the 1971-built 219 K , under the nuclear deterrent submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) before the East Coast of the United States to wear to the event of a nuclear war , a possible to ensure short response times.
On October 3, 1986, around 680 nautical miles northeast of the Bermuda Islands in the Atlantic Ocean, one of the rockets detonated in its silo, and the rocket chamber filled with water. The K-219 then emerged and floated on the surface for three days. On October 6th, the submarine finally sank for an ultimately unexplained cause. Four crew members died and the rest of the crew was rescued.
Data
period of service
The Central Design Bureau Rubin ( Russian Центральное конструкторское бюро Рубин, Zentralnoje Konstruktorskoje bjuro Rubin ) was responsible for the design of the boat , with Sergei N. Kowaljow as chief engineer.
The K-219 was on the naval shipyard in Severodvinsk on the White Sea left in 1971 with the yard number 460 of the stack and on 31 December 1971 as a 21 unit of the Yankee class in the naval base Gadzhiyevo on the Kola Peninsula put into service, bringing them to Northern Fleet belonged.
Technical specifications
As a unit of the Yankee class, the K-219 was almost 130 meters long and 12 meters wide, and its crew consisted of 120 men. The pressure hull was divided into nine compartments, from the torpedo room via the rocket room (compartment 4) and the reactor and engine rooms (no. 7 and 8) to the emergency exit hatch aft. The hull was constructed as a two-hull construction and consisted of weakly magnetic steel in order to make detection by submarine search planes with a magnetic anomaly detector more difficult.
The drive consisted of two pressurized water reactors of the type OK-700 . Their cores of the type WM-4 delivered an output of 90 megawatts each . The two five- blade bronze propellers were driven by two shafts , the output per shaft was 20,000 hp (14,710 kW). The armament consisted at the beginning of 16 nuclear missiles of the type RSM-25 , each of which could carry a nuclear warhead and had an estimated range of 2000 kilometers. After the rocket launch complex was modernized from the standard D-5 to the D-5U in the 1970s , the K-219 was able to fire the improved RSM-25U with three warheads and a range of around 3000 kilometers. For self-defense, the K-219 also carried torpedoes that could be ejected through six bow torpedo tubes .
Mission profile
The Yankee-class boats were designed to carry submarine-based ballistic missiles with a range of approximately 3,000 km. They were designed as hidden first-strike weapons or as a second-strike capability . The standard area of operation of the Yankee-class comprised a good 600,000 km² and was, extending in a north-south direction, 2,800 to 3,600 kilometers off the east coast of the USA. A patrol lasted three months, with one month each being needed to travel to and from the area of operation.
Accidents on board before the last trip
On board the K-219 there were problems with the nuclear missiles or their silos and their muzzle flaps from the start.
On August 31, 1973, the seal on the muzzle flap of rocket silo No. 15 was torn, allowing water to enter the silo. This formed aggressive nitric acid with leaked rocket fuel ( dinitrogen tetroxide ) , which damaged the fuel line of an RSM-25 rocket. The resulting mixture of two fuel components exploded, a man was killed and the missile compartment of the submarine was completely flooded. After the accident, silo 15 was permanently shut down by welding the mouth flap shut.
In January 1986, there were problems with firing a missile during practice shooting at a target area near Novaya Zemlya . It took the crew several hours to launch the rocket. As a result, however, the mouth flap of tube no. 8 could no longer be closed. As a result, the boat had to surface and return to port in a force 8 storm on the surface.
Crossing under the Atlantic in September 1986
On September 3, 1986, the K-219 cast off from its home port of Gajijewo to sail westwards towards the coast of the United States of America. There she was to go on patrol , armed with 15 nuclear missiles .
Shortly after diving in the Barents Sea , Silo 6 began to leak, but the officer in charge Petrachkov did not report this to Captain Britanov, in order to prevent his department from being responsible for an early return to the home port.
The submarine was detected by the SOSUS eavesdropping system in the North Atlantic in the GIUK gap between Great Britain and Iceland . The United States Navy was thus informed of his presence in the Atlantic. Captain Igor Britanov tried to avoid this discovery by crossing the SOSUS buoys anchored on the seabed in the "noise shadow" of a freighter. A few hours before the K-219 arrived in its patrol area 680 miles northeast of the Bermuda Islands in early October , it was located by a Los Angeles-class submarine - the USS Augusta (SSN-710) . However, this had also been noticed on the K-219 , so that there was mutual pursuit of both submarines until October 3, 1986.
The accident on October 3rd
Explosion on board
The problem with the defective seal on silo 6 was still there on October 3rd; the silo had to be pumped out roughly twice a day. In the early morning hours of the day the seal tore completely and the silo filled with water. The attempt to empty the silo failed. As in the accident in 1973, nitric acid formed there and attacked the shell of the rocket. Weapons officer Petrachkov therefore asked that the submarine be brought up to a depth of 50 m so that the missile shaft could be vented and the missile ejected. The change in depth was necessary to protect the sensitive rocket from being crushed by the high water pressure at great depths. The process of floating an RSM-25 took approximately five minutes on Yankee-class boats . Since the gas mixture ignited while swimming, the rocket exploded while still in the silo, tore open the silo on the seaside and damaged the missile's nuclear warheads . Parts of it were thrown into the sea as well as into the full rocket room, and gases from nitric acid spread in the rocket room.
As the missile room located amidships behind the tower filled up, the boat immediately sank to a depth of about 300 meters near the boat's maximum diving depth. Since it was not moving at the time of the explosion, there was no pressure on the oars , which is why the boat could not be steered. At a depth of about 350 m, Captain Britanow decided to blow all the diving and control cells of the submarine with the compressed air on board in order to displace the water from the tanks. The resulting buoyancy initiates the so-called emergency ascent, in which the submarine shoots at a steep angle to the water surface. This maneuver also saved the K-219, which broke the surface just two minutes after the explosion.
Division 4, the missile room , was closed by the watertight bulkheads after the crew had left the half-flooded room, which was permeated with toxic gases. In contrast to the 1973 accident, the nitric acid formed ate its way through the rubber seals of the bulkheads towards the bow and stern. This divided the boat into two halves, as it had become impossible to enter the missile room: the command center and torpedo room in the bow in front of the missile room and the medicine station, reactor room and control room and turbine room in the stern behind it.
Impending meltdown
The crew was ordered as far away as possible from the explosion site in the bow or the stern; Respirators were issued. Soon afterwards the temperature indicators of the WM-4 nuclear reactors showed very high temperatures, the flow of the cooling liquid in the reactor continued to decrease. The data only suggested that a core meltdown was imminent. However, the reactor could not be switched off from the control station on the port side as intended, because either the spreading gases had attacked the pipes or the intense heat had damaged the trigger on the control rods . For this reason, the reactor shutdown had to be carried out manually in the reactor chamber itself, where a high dose rate prevailed. The protective contamination suits on board were not able to protect the sailors, in particular from the strong gamma and neutron radiation in the vicinity of the reactor core.
The first to go into the reactor chamber was the officer of the reactor department, Nikolai Belikov, to perform the reactor emergency shutdown. When Belikov emerged exhausted from the reactor chamber, he had lowered three of the four rods of the port reactor. This was a job that required great physical strength, as the holders of the bars had meanwhile been severely bent from the prevailing heat. Then the 20-year-old seaman Sergei Preminin went into the reactor chamber and was able to stop the beginning meltdown after two attempts. When he wanted to leave the reactor room exhausted (or already marked by radiation sickness ), he could no longer open the bulkhead because a pressure difference had built up between the reactor chamber and the reactor control station behind it. Preminin died in the hot reactor chamber; the rest of the crew had to keep moving towards the stern to escape the poisonous gases that were spreading in the boat. Preminin was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star .
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Meanwhile, the K-219 had made contact with the Soviet cargo ship Fyodor Bredichin , which was approaching the scene of the accident. Other ships on site were the Powhatan , a civilian tug for the US Navy, and the Augusta . The site was also overflown by P-3C Orion patrol aircraft from the US Naval Air Base in Bermuda.
Attempted towing maneuver
At this point in time, there were plans in both the US Navy and the Soviet Navy to tow the K-219 . Under the veil of emergency aid, the Americans wanted to obtain precise plans of the boat and the weapons. The Fyodor Bredikhin stretched ropes that were attached to the tower and at the bow of the submarine. However, these tore after a while in tow. While some sources report that the Augusta cut the ropes with her tower, there are other reports that the submarine lost buoyancy as a result of falling water and thus sank deeper and the increased water resistance ultimately led to the ropes breaking.
Replacement equipment dropped by Soviet planes sank on the spot because no floats had been attached to the boxes. The USNS Powhatan offered help over and over again was turned down because the motive of the US Navy was too obvious.
Because of the accelerating spread of the toxic gases on board the K-219 , the entire crew was evacuated to the freighter Fyodor Bredichin , only Captain Britanov remained on board the submarine. The USS Augusta also carried out disruptive maneuvers during the evacuation . She drove towards the lifeboats with the periscope extended , either hoping to get pictures of the interior of the boats with the video camera or with the intention of capsizing the boats.
The downfall
On October 6th, orders came from Moscow. In it, the crew of the K-219 was ordered back on board to drive the submarine back to the Soviet Union on the surface , since towing was no longer possible. Before the crew could return, however, the K-219 sank in the early morning hours with 14 nuclear missiles and two reactors to about 5,550 m depth of the Hatteras Depression . It is possible that Captain Britanov sank the K-219 , knowing that returning to the boat would mean death for his crew. To do this, he could have opened a torpedo tube and saved himself through the front emergency exit hatch. It is more likely that the K-219 sank from the water that broke into the missile room. Britanov was found on a life raft and boarded the Fyodor Bredichin .
Four men died on board the K-219 . They were the weapons officer, Captain 3rd rank (Korvettenkapitän) Alexander Petrachkov, machinist Igor Chartschenko, sailor Nikolai Smaglyuk and reactor technician sailor Sergei Preminin. Four other crew members who had survived the disaster died later: chief engineer, captain 2nd rank (frigate captain) Igor Krassilnikow, captain 3rd rank (corvette captain) W. Markov, captain lieutenant W. Karpachev and Starshin first level (chief mate) R. Sadauskas.
Reactions from the navies
The Soviet Navy announced that the rocket explosion was caused by a collision with an American submarine. This thesis was supported by the fact that the USS Augusta entered its home port, the Naval Submarine Base New London in Groton , Connecticut , at the end of October 1986 with collision damage . However, it is likely that in the confusion after the sinking of the K-219 the Augusta collided with a Soviet submarine from Project 667B , the K-279 , which returned to the Soviet Union a short time later with collision damage. Igor Britanov also said in a conversation with members of the US Navy after the end of the Cold War: “There was no collision”. ("There was no collision.")
Both the American and Soviet governments published reports of the disaster during October 3rd. The US Navy held a press conference showing maps of the area at risk of contamination. Both marines stated that at no point was there a risk of a nuclear explosion or contamination of the area.
The timing of the accident was particularly critical. For this reason, too, both sides held back with concrete accusations - especially in comparison to earlier as well as later similar events such as the loss of the K-141 Kursk in 2000. The reason for this was those that took place on October 11th and 12th, 1986 Disarmament talks between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Iceland. It was about the disarmament of medium-range missiles stationed in Europe.
The US Navy later issued the following statement on the allegations in response to book publications:
"The United States Navy normally does not comment on submarine operations, but in the case, because the scenario is so outrageous, the Navy is compelled to respond. The United States Navy categorically denies that any US submarine collided with the Russian Yankee submarine (K-219) or that the Navy had anything to do with the cause of the casualty that resulted in the loss of the Russian Yankee submarine. "
“The United States Navy does not normally comment on submarine operations. In this case, however, the Navy feels obliged to respond because the circumstances are so outrageous. The United States Navy firmly denies that a U.S. submarine collided with the Russian Yankee-class submarine (K-219) or that the Navy had anything to do with the course of the accident, the loss of the Russian Yankee Submarine ended. "
consequences
After his return to the Soviet Union, Captain Britanov was accused of breach of his duty of care, high treason and sabotage ; he awaited his trial in what was then Sverdlovsk until he was acquitted of all charges in May 1987 by the new defense minister, Dmitri Yasov .
The wreck of the K-219 was never raised; it is still around 5,500 meters deep today. In 1986 and 1987 the Soviet Naval Institute sent a deep submersible with a camera to the wreck. Allegedly this is said to have taken hundreds of pictures, which are still subject to confidentiality today (as of 2010).
The missiles on board the K-219 contained a total of 30 nuclear warheads containing around 91 kilograms (200 lbs ) of radioactive material. According to scientists at the Russian nuclear weapons research institute Arzamas-16, the plutonium was destroyed by the explosion and the increasing pressure during the sinking. Radioactive traces were found on wreckage collected after the sinking.
The submarine wreck sank into a kind of clay soil. Tests showed that it is able to absorb plutonium. In addition, since the movement of water at these depths is very slow, it is likely that hardly any radioactivity has spread. Nothing is known about further spread through the food chain .
reception
The former naval attaché at the US embassy in Moscow, Peter Huchthausen , wrote the factual report Hostile Waters , 1997 , together with the former first officer of the K-219, Igor Kurdin, who got off the boat right before the last voyage of the K-219 published in English by Arrow Books Verlag. In January 2003 the book was published in German as In feindlichen Gewässern - Das Ende der K-219 by Mittler & Sohn Verlag , Hamburg. There were also several publications in other non-fiction books, for example in Jagd unter Wasser by Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew, published in 2000 by Goldmann .
Also in 1997 Warner Bros. released the HBO film Hostile Waters (German title: Im Fahrwasser des Todes ) starring Rutger Hauer , Martin Sheen and Max von Sydow , which was released in Germany on VHS cassette and DVD . Captain Britanov took legal action against this film because he did not have permission to portray himself. He won the case in August 2004 and was awarded an undisclosed amount of damages.
literature
- Peter Huchthausen, Igor Kurdin: In hostile waters - The end of the K-219. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg 2003, ISBN 3813206882 (German).
- Peter Huchthausen, Igor Kurdin: Hostile Waters. Hutchinson, London 1997, Arrow Books, London 1998 (English original edition), ISBN 0091802202 , ISBN 009926966X .
See also
Web links
- Article in Undersea Warfare, Fall 2005, Vol. 7 No. 5 Loss of a Yankee SSBN by Igor Kurdin and Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grasdock, USN (English)
- Transcription of the Politburo meeting with the topic K-219 (English)
Individual evidence
- ^ Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew: Hunt under water. The real story of submarine espionage. Bertelsmann Verlag, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-570-00425-2 , p. 231.
- ↑ quoted from an article in Undersee Warefare, Fall 2005, Vol. 7 No. 5 ( Memento from July 23, 2013 in the Internet Archive ), referenced there as Captain Igor A. Britanov, interview by Lt. Cmdr. Wayne Grass Dock. Aug. 5, 1998.
- ↑ Official statement of the US Navy ( Memento of August 18, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) (Eng.)
- ↑ San Francisco Examiner Science Writer on the Consequences (November 24, 1996 )
- ↑ Russian submariner, 'Hostile Waters' blockbuster prototype, makes Hollywood producers pay him in Pravda of August 18, 2004 (Eng.)
