Submarine with ballistic missiles

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Russian Delta IV class boat
Ohio-class American SSBN
French redoutable as a museum ship

Submarines with ballistic missiles or strategic submarines are submarines that are designed to carry and shoot ballistic missiles , especially submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). From the beginning, nuclear submarines (in this case English ship submersible ballistic nuclear or SSBN for short, French sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins or SNLE for short) were intended for this purpose. Conventionally powered missile submarines ( English ship submersible ballistic (SSB), French sous-marins lanceurs d'engins balistiques ) are the exception to the missile submarines with nuclear propulsion .

In 1944 the German Navy experimented with ballistic missiles supported by submarines. In 1955, the Soviet Navy put its first ballistic missile submarine into service. Series production of strategic submarines began around 1960 in the Soviet Union and the USA . During the Cold War , they developed into an important component of nuclear deterrence , because in the event of a first strike on the respective enemy side, submarines would be difficult to identify and destroy and therefore - if a reactive command system (C³) is still in place - they would be able to retaliate execute. These submarines are able to carry missiles close to the enemy coast and thus reduce the enemy's ability to defend themselves and react.

All states that put nuclear submarines with ballistic ICBMs into service during the Cold War still have these weapons systems to this day. In addition to the USA and Russia as successors to the Soviet Union , these are Great Britain , France and China . India put its first SSBN into service in 2016, China and Russia are building more SSBNs, and Great Britain plans to build new boats in the 2020s. North Korea is said to have put an SSB into service between 2012 and 2015.

There are currently more than 30 ballistic missile submarines in service worldwide, all of which are nuclear-powered. These are up to 170 meters long and regularly displace over 15,000 tons. Each of these submarines carries up to 24 ballistic missiles, each of which in turn can carry up to twelve independently targetable nuclear warheads . These are hydrogen bombs . The explosive power of each individual warhead is now usually over 100 kilotons of TNT equivalent , compared with the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 that was around 13 kT. In 1987, during the Cold War, around 130 rocket submarines were active, including around 15 conventionally powered units on the Soviet side.

history

development

During the Second World War , German researchers developed the A4 (V2), the first ballistic missile. Towards the end of the war, a V2 version was developed at the Peenemünde Army Research Center , which was to be towed in a starting container behind a submarine. Each submarine was supposed to pull up to three of these 36-meter-long containers manned by ten soldiers through the North Sea. Before England the container would have been brought to the surface and the missiles would have been fired. Prototypes were tested on the Baltic coast before the project had to be abandoned in 1945 with the evacuation of Peenemünde. At this point, three containers were already under construction. The commander of the Army Research Center Walter Dornberger described the project as "not unpredictable".

First missile submarines

Early Soviet golf class boat

Shortly after the war, East and West began development work with the aim of equipping submarines with ballistic missiles. The Cold War accelerated development. The Soviet Navy made the first tests. According to captured German documents from Peenemünde, five Zulu-class submarines were converted into missile carriers. In 1955, a submarine of this class fired a ballistic missile for the first time.

From 1959, both the United States Navy and the Soviet Navy completed the first ships planned as missile submarines. The United States put the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) into service in late 1959 and another four George Washington-class units by 1961 . The hulls of these boats were actually intended for Skipjack-class fighter submarines . But by adding launch tubes for the rockets, the first SSBN were made from them. Only weeks later, the Soviet Union put the first boat of its Golf class into service, which, like the Zulus, implemented a diesel-electric drive in a missile submarine. These remained the only conventionally powered missile submarines. In 1961 the Soviet Union finally put a nuclear-powered submarine with ballistic missiles into service; it belonged to the hotel class .

The Soviet boats had to emerge to launch the missiles and then be stabilized on the surface, which took around 90 minutes in total. The US Navy, on the other hand, was able to launch its missiles from submerged submarines. On July 20, 1960, the George Washington shot down a ballistic missile for the first time submerged. In October 1961, the Soviet Navy fired a submarine-supported missile with a thermonuclear warhead for the first time , and six months later the US Navy too. From the mid-1960s, the Soviet Navy also converted its submarine fleet to underwater launch missiles.

These first missiles had a very limited range. On the American side, the different versions of the UGM-27 Polaris with ranges between 1000 and 2500 nautical miles were used, the Soviet Union used the R-11 and R-13 , which could reach targets at distances of up to 370 nautical miles. The R-21 , used from 1963 onwards, flew 750 miles.

Series production

Launch of the American Theodore Roosevelt

The Soviet Navy manufactured rocket submarines in large numbers in the following years. By 1964 it had around 30 Golfs and hotels in service. This succeeded because the conventionally powered Gulf-class boats could be produced much faster than the larger, more complex nuclear-powered submarines. In 1964, the US Navy owned only 15 boats, in addition to those of the Washington class , five boats of the Ethan Allen class and the first boats of the Lafayette class . China acquired the Golf plans and manufactured a class boat.

As early as 1960, however, the Soviet Navy had postponed the development of new SSBNs and shifted its focus to land-based missiles, from the golf and hotel classes only the units that had already been ordered were completed. At the end of 1959, Khrushchev created the Strategic Missile Forces as an independent armed forces and concentrated the strategic nuclear missiles within them. Strategic submarines were considered unnecessary by him. In the US Navy, however, the construction speed increased in the following years with increasing experience, by 1967 it had 41 SSBN in service. This fleet, with thoughts of the intended function of the nuclear deterrent, 41 for Freedom , so 41 for freedom , called.

In the mid-1960s, the Soviet leadership revised its stance on rocket boats, and in 1967 the first unit of Project 667A was put into service, which technically approached Western designs for the first time. In the following years 33 more boats of this class were added to the early boats. In 1971, as a result of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a limitation of the SSBN came into effect. The Soviet Navy with 740 launch tubes on nuclear-powered rocket submarines was allowed to increase to 950 launchers on 62 boats, but only when older boats or land-based ICBMs were decommissioned at the same time. The US Navy was allowed 44 boats with 710 launch tubes under the same conditions.

Project 941 Soviet submarine

From 1972 the Soviet Navy supplemented its fleet with the boats of the type Project 667B (Delta I), which received 36 units in the expansion stages 667BD (II) and 667BDR (III) until 1982. Since they deactivated only a few hotel and golf class submarines and later Yankee class or converted them to hunting submarines, they outnumbered the US Navy, which still only used its 41 for Freedom , in terms of rocket boats soon by far.

In Europe, too, the construction of submarines with ballistic missiles began in the early 1960s. In 1967 the Royal Navy put its first Resolution-class SSBN into service, followed by three more by 1969. The French navy made the Gymnote (S 655) until a conventionally powered submarine with four missiles, which served as a test vessel for the subsequent SSBN class, and turned off in 1971, the nuclear-powered Redoutable class in service, to 1980 five boats received.

The first SSBNs came to the fleets from the early 1980s and will continue to be in service well into the 21st century. On the Soviet side, this affects the six boats of the Project 941 and the seven units of the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV). The US Navy completed the 18 Ohio-class SSBN from 1981 , which replaced the 41 for Freedom . At the same time, the People's Republic of China launched its first Xia-class SSBN .

The missiles used on these boats reached intercontinental range for the first time . The American UGM-96 Trident I had a range of almost 5000 nautical miles, the improved UGM-133 Trident II from 1990 onwards 7000 miles. These are also used by the Royal Navy. The Soviet R-29 also flew up to 5000 miles in its variants, the R-39 was slightly less. With the M 4, France had an SLBM with a range of 2700 nautical miles; China's first missile, the JL-1 , just flew 1100 nautical miles.

After the cold war

British SSBN HMS Vanguard (S28) of the Vanguard class (1994)

The Royal Navy put the Vanguard class, the first SSBN class after the Cold War, into service in the early 1990s , but it was still being developed during this phase. The situation was similar with the French Triomphant class , which entered service from 1997. The M 45 with a range of 3300 miles was developed for these .

The now Russian Navy took over the SSBN fleet of the Soviet Union, consisting of over 60 nuclear and 15 conventionally propelled missile submarines in 1987, but was unable to sustain operations financially. The still active Golf , Yankees and Delta I and II were decommissioned until 1995, later the first Typhoon and Delta III . The US Navy also considered deactivating four of their Ohios , but then converted them to cruise missile submarines (SSGN).

Russia and China made the first new SSBN in the 21st century. Russia revived the Borei class , the planning of which had already begun around 1990. In January 2013, the "Yuri Dolgoruki" was the first unit to go into service. China is building the Jin class , progress is unknown. To this end, China maintains a conventionally operated Golf-class unit as a test platform. The status of the atomically powered Xia class is unknown. With the Bulawa (range up to 5600 mi) and the JL-2 (5000 mi), both nations also developed new missiles.

In 2012, the US Navy operated 14 Ohio-class SSBNs , the Royal Navy four Vanguards and the French Navy four Triomphant-class boats . The situation in Russia and China is only vaguely known. Russia had about 10 boats. Three of them belonged to the Delta III class , six to the Delta IV class . The boats of the Delta III class will be gradually deactivated. There are also one or two active Typhoon-class boats , which can only be kept ready for use with enormous economic outlay. How many SSBN China operates is unknown. The first Jin-class boat is expected to be ready for use in 2011, and more are in development.

future

Russia and China are currently building the Borei and Jin classes , respectively , whose units can remain in service until the middle of the 21st century. France's SSBN fleet is also quite new, the commissioning took place between 1997 and 2010, so no plans for new boats are known.

The US Navy is now assuming a service life of 42 instead of 30 years for its Ohio class after it has been determined that the boats are less worn than previously thought. Accordingly, the deactivation would begin around 2026, the last boat would go out of service in 2039. According to the US Navy's 2003 shipbuilding plan, procurement of the SSBN (X) class is to begin between fiscal year 2019 and 2023. The Ohio-class units are to be replaced by the Columbia-class .

The Royal Navy, on the other hand, announced in 2006 that the Vanguard class will have to be replaced from around 2022, the lifetime is therefore assumed to be 25 years. The plans for the replacement are already underway. The UK plans to spend 15 to 20 billion pounds sterling at the 2006/2007 monetary value rate to build four boats. However, instead of 16, as on the predecessors, these will only have 12 missile silos.

India laid down its first SSBN, the INS Arihant , in 2009 . The boat was completed in December 2014 and put into service in August 2016. It is equipped with Sagarika - type ballistic missiles , but they only have a range of around 400 miles. In 2016 the INS Aridhaman was completed. It is scheduled to go into service in 2018. Two more units in the class are under construction.

North Korea is said to have developed the Sinpo class between 2012 and 2014 . It will carry the medium-range rocket Pukguksong-1 and be a further development of the diesel-electric Golf class .

Number of SSBN and SSB 2017

commitment

mission

The main task of submarines with ballistic missiles is to ensure the ability of a nation to strike back ("assured destruction") in the event of an enemy attack, since the submarines are seen as the most viable part of the strategic nuclear arsenal at sea.

The ability for a first strike was not possible or not wanted in American rocket submarine systems (official name FBM - "Fleet Ballistic Missile Program": program for ballistic missiles of the fleet) until the introduction of the Trident II D5 in 1990 . The technical reasons lie in the area of ​​the difficult communication with the submarines on the high seas, as well as the poor accuracy of the missiles (due to the difficulties in determining the exact position and speed of the submarine when launching the missile, earth gravity fluctuations and limiting factors the control system on board the missile). In the case of the Poseidon C3 , a role against hardened targets was considered for the first time (a so-called "counterforce" option, i.e. the possibility of destroying heavily protected military installations) and thus creating a first strike capability in principle. However, this met with great resistance from parts of the US Navy, which wanted to clearly differentiate itself in its role from the SAC of the US Air Force through the pure second strike capability , as well as in the US Congress, in which many MPs viewed such a weapon system as a destabilizing element in times of crisis . It was feared that sea-launched missiles capable of fighting Soviet missile silos could induce the Soviet Union to adopt a "use them or lose them" response in the event of severe tensions with NATO. Thus, star sensors to improve accuracy and more powerful warheads were not introduced in the Poseidon . However, the evolutionary development of the existing technologies in the development of the Poseidon still led to a considerably improved accuracy compared to the previous systems, which meant that it could be used against "medium-hard" military targets, as was the successor system Trident I C4 . Since there were not too many targets from this target category, this was of little importance in the military planning within the framework of the SIOP and the submarines remained pure second-strike weapons against urban-industrial (i.e. "soft") targets.

This changed fundamentally with the development of the Trident II D5. For the first time, a high accuracy and "counterforce" capacity was specified as a requirement in the development, while with the previous missiles, the accuracy was only a development goal, in which the need for other requirements and the weapon system were compromised. In contrast to the development of the Poseidon, there was hardly any political resistance to the Trident II D5, as the skeptical MPs had already zeroed in on the development program for the land-based MX Peacekeeper , and the political climate in the USA in the early 1980s did not could afford to speak out against both projects. For the counterforce role, the W88 warhead was developed for the Trident II D5. The US Navy was even preferred in the allocation of highly enriched uranium for the warhead, as this was not enough for the production of both warheads, the W88 and the W87 of the MX. For the first time in its history, the US Navy received a more powerful strategic warhead at 475 kt than its land-based counterpart in the Air Force, which had to be content with "only" 300 kt. However, since the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility had to cease production in 1989 due to safety concerns, only a limited number of W88 warheads could be produced. After the introduction of the Trident II D5 in 1990, only 4 of the 18 submarines were able to set sail with missiles that carried this warhead and thus had a counterforce or first strike capability. The remaining Trident missiles on the other Ohio-class boats were equipped with the weaker W76 warheads with Mk.4 re-entry bodies like on the Trident I C4, which could only be used against "soft" targets. At the moment, however, these warheads are being modernized to the W76-1 / Mk4A standard, which also gives them capabilities against hard targets. Thus the US Navy received its strategic “counterforce” capacity only after the end of the Cold War. This also includes the British Vanguard-class submarines, which carry the American Trident II D5 missiles and whose warheads are also brought to the W76-1 / Mk.4A standard.

The task of the Soviet submarines with ballistic missiles is in principle the same as that of the US boats, ensuring the second strike capability in the event of an American first strike against the land-based strategic troops. Unlike in the US, the capabilities of Soviet submarine-based strategic weapons remained modest until the late 1960s. The Soviet military leadership was initially very skeptical of this weapon system. This was partly due to the limited capabilities of the first Soviet missile submarines and their armament with very short range and accuracy.

Another problem was the lack of communication with the boats in action. At that time, the Soviet Union had no means of communicating with submerged submarines on the high seas, which greatly limited its military use. On the other hand, the Soviet leadership was very critical of sending submarines with nuclear weapons on board without any form of negative control outside of their sphere of influence. Strategic submarines were only assigned greater importance in the Soviet Union from the late 1960s. The Soviet Union introduced long-range missiles on their submarines from the 667B class (Delta I) onwards in the early 1970s. With these weapon systems they developed the so-called bastion strategy, whereby the boats patrolled in heavily secured waters near the Soviet coast (Barents Sea, White Sea, Sea of ​​Okhotsk) or under the Arctic pack ice, where they were protected by other units of the Soviet Navy. They also remained on missile readiness in port, which significantly increased the contribution of the Navy to the overall strategic potential of the Soviet Union. But like the American strategic submarines, they retained their role as a second strike weapon until the end of the Cold War and were not seen as "counterforce" weapons. The latest versions of Russian submarine-launched missiles of the R-29RM family for the Project 667BDRM class (Delta IV) as well as the R-30 for the Borej class may have such a capacity.

American drawing of a Delta IV rocket launch in a polynya (1985)

Mission profile

A subway tender loads missiles into the silos of the USS Francis Scott Key

The main objective of a ballistic missile submarine is to remain undetected while on patrol so that it can fulfill its nuclear deterrent role. With its nuclear missiles it is sent on patrol into the vastness of the oceans. In secret places, the boat creeps its courses and waits for the order to shoot down its nuclear missiles. A voyage takes two to three months, during which the submarine does not normally appear once.

A patrol trip can essentially be divided into 4 sections: leaving the home port, the passage to the patrol zone, the actual patrol in the given operational area and the return to the home port. Leaving home port is an important part of a successful patrol trip. Usually the submarines' home ports are under satellite surveillance of an opposing state. Since surveillance satellites can only pick up a port every one to three days, depending on the flight path, these overflight gaps are used to leave a port. Furthermore, the departure is accompanied by a heavy use of anti-submarine units to detect enemy submarines in the vicinity of the port. During the Cold War, the USA monitored the Soviet ports with attack submarines in order to detect Soviet strategic missile submarines as they sailed. To make this more difficult, the process usually took place in bad weather and at night.

The second phase of the mission was the passage to the actual patrol area. For the first generations of short-range missile submarines, the passage took up to several weeks. A Project 667A submarine, for example, had an average speed of 12 to 14 knots and took 11 to 13 days to reach its operational area. Due to its geographical position, the Soviet Union was at a clear disadvantage compared to the capabilities of the American Navy. The US Navy was able to station its SSBN in advanced bases in order to shorten the journey time. Were used Rota in Spain and Holy Loch in Scotland and Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and Apra Harbor on Guam. These ports were specially equipped so that nuclear weapons could also be used there. Among other things, submarine tenders were permanently stationed there. The Soviet Navy, on the other hand, had to cross the entire ocean in the Pacific from its ports on Kamchatka . The situation was even worse in the Atlantic, which the boats could only reach from their ports on Kola by crossing the GIUK gap . Accordingly, NATO had secured this area with hunting submarines, ships and aircraft for submarine hunting and with the SOSUS network . In this way, many Soviet SSBNs could be tracked and possibly torpedoed before they could launch their missiles. For example, the hunting submarine USS Batfish (SSN-681) was able to track a Project 667A boat (Yankee class) in 1978 for 44 days and nearly 9,000 miles. With the increasing range of the younger generations of missiles, the patrol zones could be relocated closer to the home ports and the passage time could be significantly reduced.

The third phase of the mission is the actual combat patrol. In this phase the boat is always ready to deploy its missiles after receiving a valid deployment order. To make this part of the mission successful, three things are important: the protection against the detection of the boat by the enemy anti-submarine reconnaissance, the reliable communication of the submarine with the relevant high command of the respective state as well as the exact position determination with it in the event of a deployment order, the missiles can be programmed with the corresponding data. In order to avoid detection, great resources have been invested in reducing the noise level of the submarines by all states operating these boats. The US was a leader in this for a long time, while the Soviet submarines were known for their high noise levels until the 1970s. The latest generation of strategic submarines is said to be barely distinguishable from the background noise of the ocean on both the American and Russian sides. In their patrol areas, the boats only move at a maneuvering speed of 4 to 5 knots in order to further reduce noise.

Communication with the submarines was a problem for the Soviet Union, especially with the first generations of strategic missile submarines, which is why the Soviet leadership initially gave preference to land-based strategic missile forces. In the USA, too, the US Navy justified its withdrawal to the pure second strike role until the introduction of the Trident II D5 with the fact that the communication with the boats that was necessary for a first strike weapon could not be ensured. The main problem is receiving commands or sending messages on the submerged submarines at a great distance from home. A boat can do this from the surface of the water, but it would reveal its position, rendering the purpose of the boats obsolete. From the end of the 1950s, the USA set up a global network of long wave (VLF - Very Low Frequency) and long wave (LF - Low Frequency) radio transmitters to communicate with their submarines. The American submarines were equipped with tow antennas or buoy antennas. However, these restricted the diving depth, maneuverability and speed and made them easier to detect. The US Navy also developed the TACAMO system in the 1960s, EC-130 aircraft with VLF towed antennas, which circled over the oceans. The VLF systems proved to be partly unreliable and it often happened that the submarines never received messages intended for them. Submarine communication was later supplemented by short and ultra-short waves (HF and UHF). In order to receive this, however, a submarine has to extend an antenna at periscope depth and is therefore easy to spot. The American boats therefore look for messages in the VLF band in regular operation and only use higher frequencies if there are no messages. Since the 1950s, the US Navy has also been researching in the field of extreme long waves (ELF - Extremely Low Frequency), a band that promised greater range, greater penetration depths in seawater and less susceptibility to jammers. However, the data transmission rate is very low, the transmitters required are very large and require large amounts of energy (the first project proposal at the end of the 1960s envisaged an antenna length of 10,000 km with a transmission power of 800 MW). The latter two points together with the associated costs made such systems the subject of political controversy in the USA and the first transmitter in the USA did not go into operation until 1989.

Like the US, Russia today uses a wide range of frequencies and specialized transmitters to communicate with its submarines. This ranges from UHF to VLF of land, air and satellite based transmitters. The messages to the boats are transmitted on several frequencies simultaneously to ensure reception. In 1985 the Russian Navy introduced the Tu-142MR , which is comparable in its function to the American TACAMO aircraft. Russia also has ELF channels. Since the data transfer rate over the ELF band is very low, only short coded messages are sent over it, which mean, for example, "Appear to receive orders for weapons use".

One of the greatest challenges in developing a sea-based deterrent has been the development of accurate navigation systems. So that the on-board computer of a rocket can calculate the flight path to the target, the exact position and speed of the launch platform and the earth's gravity field must be known. With a permanently installed land-based system this is relatively easy to measure, with a moving and submerged system this posed major problems for the developers. For this purpose, inertial navigation systems were developed for the submarines, which were continuously improved. However, these navigation systems need regular updates (once a day in the first generation) to compensate for deviations. In the early 1960s, the US Navy built its own satellite-based navigation system, Transit , through which the American submarines could determine their position. Today the US Navy uses GPS while Russia uses the Parus and GLONASS satellite systems. For the determination of the earth's gravity field, extensive ship- and satellite-based ocean floor mapping programs and gravity field measurements were undertaken. Doppler sonars are used in the Ohio class to determine the speed of the submarines.

In the case of the first submarines of the Soviet Navy up to the Project 667A class, a package with the exact details of the launch area would have been opened after receiving a launch order. The boat would then have gone to this area and the commanding officer would have opened a second package from his personal safe containing the codes for the fire control and aiming system to launch the missiles. Before entering the codes, the authenticity of the order had to be verified independently by the commander of the submarine and his first officer. In the 1970s the procedure was changed and the necessary codes for the rocket launch were transmitted together with the deployment order, so they were no longer on board. After the boat arrived at the launch area, it went to depth of fire, the position of the boat was fine-tuned, the missile system was tested and the destination was entered. This procedure took about an hour for the first generation of Soviet submarines. With modern Russian boats, this only takes about 15 minutes thanks to extensive automation. The first generation of Soviet submarines could fire their missiles at intervals of 15 to 30 minutes. The Project 667A class could fire 4 missiles in one salvo, with a launch every three seconds. There was less than 3 minutes between the first and second volleys. After the second volley, about 30 minutes were needed to be able to fire the last two volleys, since the position of the boat had to be redefined and it had to be realigned. The later Russian submarines can fire their entire stock of missiles in a single salvo. After a rocket strike, the Soviet submarines should be loaded with new missiles either on their bases or by special ships at sea and then go back to sea in order to be able to wage an extensive nuclear war.

On American submarines, after receiving an emergency action message (EAM) , two officers have to check it for authenticity. After that, two more officers open a double-door safe. Only one officer (and one substitute) has the code for each of these doors. The safe contains the key to activate the fire sequence and is handed over to the captain of the boat by the two officers. Furthermore, the weapons officer has to open another safe that contains the trigger required to launch the missiles. Once the fire control system has been activated, it starts the inertial control systems on board the missiles. In contrast to land-based ICBMs, these are not kept permanently active with sea-based ICBMs, but the inertia gyro of the control systems must first be revved up. The control system on board the rocket then receives the necessary data from the fire control system to execute the correct flight path to the target. Then the control system of the rocket is switched to independent operation and the rocket to internal power supply and can be fired.

Since the US Navy introduced the strategic submarines, they have operated in so-called "chains" of three submarines each. Two sets of goals are assigned to each chain. After about half a patrol of the first boat in the chain, the second boat in the chain takes over its old target set. When the first boat completes its patrol, the third boat in the chain moves up, coming from the supply ship or home port. This approach allowed the first short-range missile boats to permanently keep two sets of targets under threat, but was also retained for the younger generations of longer-range missile submarines. However, this also makes it necessary for the submarines to be standardized in terms of armament (type of missile, number of warheads per missile, their explosive power).

France and Great Britain send their boats from Île Longue and Faslane-on-Clyde to patrol the North Atlantic. Nothing is known about the mission profile of the Chinese Navy. The new Jin-class boats will be stationed at the Sanya naval base on Hainan ; the Chinese Navy may have a similar bastion in the Gulf of Bohai as the one established by the Soviet Navy.

Patrol frequency

After the end of the Cold War, the number of active strategic submarines declined in both the US and Russia. While the US Navy was able to maintain its frequency of use per boat, the number of relocations in the Russian Navy fell sharply.

At the end of the 1960s the US Navy made 130 trips a year, over the next three decades an average of around 100. In the 21st century the number fell from around 60 to 31 in 2008. Of around 100 patrols by the Soviet Navy annually in 1984, the number fell Number over 20 trips in 1994 to none at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2008 the boats again completed ten patrols, which means that Russia could have achieved continuous sea-based deterrence at sea for the first time since 1998. France and Great Britain achieve such a permanent presence of nuclear missiles under the water surface with 6 patrols each per year. The Chinese Xia was never sent on patrol, nor was any of the Jin-class boats until 2009 .

The US Navy thus carried out more missions with SSBN in 2008 than all other states combined. The total of 59 missile submarines of the US Navy completed between the first patrol of George Washington on November 15, 1960 and 2009, an aggregate of almost 3900 patrol trips, 1000 of them with Tridents on board.

crew

Immediately after arriving, the crew of the USS Henry M. Jackson takes over provisions

For the crews, the service on missile submarines differs significantly from that on other warships. The western navies assign two complete crews to each SSBN, the Soviet Union later also adopted this concept. In this way, the time spent in port can be reduced significantly. Every US boat goes on patrol for 70 to 90 days, then comes into port and changes the crew, which can go back on patrol after a short time. The Ohio class spends 74 to 77 days at sea, followed by a 35 to 38 day bunkering phase. This means that they are in use around 70% of the time. In contrast, with the advent of ICBMs, the Soviet Navy kept the majority of its missile submarines in port with a high degree of readiness and only allowed a small part to patrol. In this way it saved personnel costs and reduced wear and tear.

During the Cold War, nuclear missiles could at least be launched on American missile submarines without the need for external authorization. When the radio operator had received the order to launch the rockets, two officers had to confirm this and verify the code transmitted. Then the commanding officer gave the order to arm the rockets and could then fire them. Frank Barnaby drew a scenario on this basis in 1984, in which only the radio operator and the captain of an SSBN would have had to conspire to start a nuclear war. It was not until 1997 that a system was introduced with the Trident Coded Control Device , which firmly binds the launch to the presence of a code that was sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff . All other states with SLBM at sea with the exception of Great Britain have implemented a similar system. On the ships of the Royal Navy, however, the crew is still able to shoot down nuclear missiles of their own accord.

The work on SSBN is also psychologically stressful. Seafarers on these boats can expect to survive a nuclear war, but have to attack cities and military facilities with nuclear weapons. In addition, the home bases where family and friends live are the primary targets of the other side.

Share in missile forces

Both the USA, Russia and China have SLBMs as well as land-based ballistic intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The US Navy maintains more than half of all American strategic warheads. In contrast, as in the Soviet Union, Russia's land-based missiles form the greater part of the strategic deterrent force. The proportion of warheads on SLBM in the Chinese People's Liberation Army navy is unknown. The Xia were seen as a prototype rather than part of the strategic deterrent force, but this is likely to change with the advent of the Jin .

France built 18 medium-range ballistic missile silos in the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence department in the 1970s and owned short-range mobile missiles. However, both types were disarmed in the mid-1990s. Britain never used land-based nuclear ballistic missiles. France also bases its nuclear deterrent on the air force.

technology

Hull and drive

Underwater launch of a Trident

Technically, submarines with ballistic missiles are essentially equivalent to normal (nuclear) submarines. The most important change is the additional section to accommodate the missiles. For example, for the first SSBN of the US Navy, the hull of a hunting submarine under construction was cut open and a 40-meter-long section was used at this point.

The first Soviet hotel and golf class missile submarines housed three ballistic missiles in a row in the tower . With such a configuration, the submarine was not significantly larger, only the tower was stretched a little aft.

Missile bays of the Ohio
The opened missile bays of the USS Sam Rayburn

However, all subsequent submarines of all navies are designed differently and carry significantly more missiles, between 12 (Xia class) and 24 (Ohio class) . These can be fired while submerged. The ballistic missiles are housed in a section that is located amidships, mostly behind the tower. This makes sense because it keeps the submarine quite stable during missile launches. Depending on the diameter of the fuselage and the length of the rockets, many submarines have a clear hump under which the rockets are standing vertically in individual launch tubes. Due to this additional section, however, the SSBN are also much longer and heavier than hunting submarines. The largest representatives of the rocket submarines are over 170 meters long, while hunting submarines measure only 100 meters. They regularly displace more than 15,000 tons when submerged, which is why the term “boat” is sometimes felt to be inappropriate. Some authors use something like "U-Schiff" instead. Due to their size, SSBN lose a lot of maneuverability and speed, which is why, if they are detected by hunting submarines, they have little to do with them.

Due to their operational profile, speed is not a decisive criterion for rocket submarines anyway; they have a much slower top speed than, for example, hunting submarines. Instead, in order to fulfill their task, it is essential that they develop as little noise as possible at slow and medium speeds, which the enemy could detect via passive sonar and thus locate the boat. Modern reactors therefore implement the principle of natural convection , in which no pumps are required to pump coolant through the reactor during crawl speed, thereby eliminating a significant source of noise from nuclear submarines.

Clearly visible rocket hump of the Delta III class

Due to the size of the boats, optimal hydrodynamics are important for the performance of the boats. All American boats are made in a teardrop shape based on the model of the test boat USS Albacore (AGSS-569) , the rocket humps are far less clearly visible than in individual Soviet designs. This is also due to the fact that the Trident II are between one and one and a half meters shorter than their eastern counterparts R-29 in the Delta class , which requires a significant increase in the deck area behind the tower for their missiles. Because of this structure and its flow resistance, all Soviet boats from the hotel to the Typhoon class need two reactors. This means more reactor noise, the irregular hull structure generates flow noise.

With the Typhoon class , the Soviet navy entered new dimensions. Although it is about as long as previous designs from all nations, it is around twice as wide, and it is roughly twice as long as the Delta IV or Ohio class . This was achieved by using two separate pressurized envelopes enclosed by the outer hull. There is another small pressure hull amidships for the command center under the tower. The R-39 missiles are more than two and a half meters longer than the Trident , their launch tubes are between the pressure hulls and in front of the tower. The design has been optimized for use under the pack ice.

Armament

A Trident I from launch to re-entry of each of the eight multiple warheads of two missiles

Missiles are intended to be the main armament of submarines of this type. However, they are also equipped with torpedo tubes for self-defense . Since rocket launches are easy to locate optically, acoustically and by radar, a submarine also reveals its position when it is launched and may therefore need to be able to defend itself.

While the first Soviet strategic submarines had to go to the surface of the water to launch the rocket, more modern boats from all countries can fire the rockets submerged at a periscope depth of around 20 meters. To do this, they use a process known as cold launch : a gas is pumped into a free space under the rocket, at the start the rocket breaks through a protective cap and rises to the surface of the water, protected from the water pressure by the gas. Only there does the rocket engine ignite. The first SLBM, on the other hand, worked on the principle of the hot launch , in which the boat had to surface, the rocket was lifted a little out of the silo and then its engine started directly from the silo. After a rocket has been launched, the now empty tube fills with water to compensate for the weight loss and to keep the submarine in trim.

Today's SLBMs can each carry multiple warheads. These individual warheads of a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) can each be programmed for their own targets. After the warheads have detached themselves from the MIRV, they control different, preset coordinates. The Russian Bulava is the first SLBM to use the maneuverable reentry vehicles (MARV). Even after being separated from the launch vehicle, the weapons are able to carry out steering maneuvers and not only obey the predictable ballistics. This makes them much more difficult to intercept.

Multiple warheads give each SSBN a very high destruction potential. Each Trident II on board the Ohio and Vanguard class can carry twelve warheads, the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) allows eight warheads for the USA, so that each submarine can attack up to 192 targets. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty calls for a further reduction in warheads by 2012, which is why the US Navy has limited itself to six warheads per missile since 2005, with further reductions to follow. Even with six W88 warheads, each missile still achieves an explosive force of almost 3 megatons of TNT equivalent . The explosive power of a rocket equipped in this way is 200 times that of the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima . Equipped with six W76s , the explosive force is still 600 kilotons. In fact, there is a mix of both types on board every US submarine. During the Cold War, every US missile submarine was destructive enough to destroy all Soviet cities with populations over 200,000.

During the Cold War, the number of warheads stationed on SSBN rose sharply. While there were around 650 American and 300 Soviet warheads for SLBM in 1970, their number had risen to around 5,600 (USA) and almost 3,000 (USSR) by 1988. This increase was made possible primarily by the introduction of multiple warheads in the 1970s. The US Navy was able to increase the number of warheads without a significant increase in launch tubes, and the tenfold increase in Soviet warheads is not based solely on fleet expansion. With the end of the arms race, these numbers fell again, so in 2009 the USA had around 1,150 and Russia around 600 operational warheads stationed on their SSBNs.

France and Russia use warheads with similar performance as the W76, so that the destructive power of a missile with multiple warheads is around 500 kilotons TNT equivalent. The Royal Navy equips each Trident with three warheads of 100 kilotons each. No MIRVs are used on the Chinese rockets; the explosive force is 200 to 300 kilotons per rocket. The Indian Navy wants to equip its SLBM with a warhead of around 500 kilotons.

In 2006, on the advice of the National Research Council , the United States Department of Defense proposed developing a version of the Trident II with conventional warheads and deploying it on Ohio-class boats in order to be able to handle non- long-range nuclear missiles to attack terrorists. However, Congress refused to fund the project, partly out of concern that Russia and China might mistake the launch of such a conventional Trident for a nuclear strike. The partial disarmament of nuclear warheads would increase the risk of nuclear war.

costs

For the first generation of the American Fleet Ballistic Missile program, the US Department of Defense under Robert McNamara estimated in 1961 that each Polaris A1 on station (including the allocated costs for the submarines) costs 9.7 million USD in comparison to $ 5 million per scheduled land-based mobile minuteman and $ 3.2 million per permanently stationed minuteman. Despite the higher cost per missile, the program was considered very benevolent and cost-effective within the ministry as the Polaris weapon system was considered invulnerable.

For the Soviet Union, the cost in the late 1970s / early 1980s was 150 million rubles per Project 667BDR boat (Delta III), a Project 941 boat (Typhoon) cost the country about three times as much, making it the most expensive ever by the Soviet Navy Service submarines were.

The construction of an Ohio-class submarine cost 1.8 billion US dollars in 1985, the last boats. The first unit was valued at $ 740 million, the eighth in 1980 at $ 1.12 billion. For the Trident II program, the US government's Congressional Budget Office, including the development and construction of the missiles and the construction, operation and maintenance of the submarines, has budgeted costs of over 100 billion dollars between 1987 and 2030 at 1987 prices.

The Royal Navy's much smaller Trident fleet is expected to cost around £ 15 billion at 2007 prices over its lifetime. The replacement for the Vanguard- class could swallow up to £ 76 billion over its lifetime.

A single Trident II nuclear missile costs around $ 30 million to buy.

The annual costs for the French SSBN fleet are around 1.5 billion euros. The production order for the latest generation of French M51 submarine missiles to EADS in 2006 was worth around 3 billion euros.

Accidents

The reactors of the first SSBN of the Soviet hotel class were only extremely inadequately shielded compared to western standards and far more error-prone. Accordingly, there were problems from the start. The K-19 suffered in 1961, shortly after its commissioning, a leak in the cooling water circuit of the reactor, when she drove off Greenland. A core meltdown could only be prevented by eight seamen going straight into the contaminated reactor chamber and installing an improvised emergency cooling system. Both these eight and 13 other sailors were so badly exposed that they died as a result of the radiation. In 1968, the K-129, a diesel-electric missile submarine of the Golf class , sank in the Pacific for unknown reasons. The Soviet Navy only noticed the lack of radio messages from the boat, but could not find the wreck. The US Navy, on the other hand, had detected an explosion via SOSUS and localized the place of destruction. The CIA then had the Hughes Glomar Explorer built under the highest level of secrecy and tried in 1974 in the Azorian project to salvage the wreck from a depth of 5000 meters, which was partially successful.

A Chinese Xia-grade SSBN was reported to have sunk in 1985, but this has never been officially confirmed. In 1986 one of the ballistic missiles exploded on the Soviet submarine K-219 after a seawater leak in a silo. After reactor problems subsequently arose here too, the seaman Sergei Anatoljewitsch Preminin had to go to the reactor chamber to manually shut down the reactor and thus prevent a core meltdown . He succeeded in doing this, but he too died of radiation. After floating on the surface for three days, the K-219 eventually sank.

There were far fewer serious accidents on the western side. The USS George Washington (SSBN-598) rammed the Japanese freighter Nissho Maru on April 9, 1981 during an emergency ascent drill in the East China Sea . The submarine submerged again after the collision, the captain stated that the ship was apparently not in distress. Through the hole that the submarine had made in the hull, water streamed into the engine room and the ship sank. Two crew members died, thirteen more were rescued in a lifeboat after 18 hours. The incident angered the Japanese public, President Ronald Reagan had to officially apologize for the behavior of the US Navy, the US later paid compensation.

Due to the applied strategy of tracking submarines with ballistic missiles whenever possible, collisions between fighter and missile submarines were not uncommon, especially during the Cold War. Well-known examples are the collisions between the USS Augusta (SSN-710) and the K-279 (Delta-I class) in 1986 or the USS Grayling (SSN-646) and the K-407 (Delta-IV class) in 1993.

The collision between two missile submarines is an absolute exception, as these rarely operate in units. A collision between the British HMS Vanguard (S28) and the French Triomphant (S 616) in February 2009 in the Atlantic became known. According to the Royal Navy, both boats drove at slow speed, the damage that became known suggests that the Triomphant rammed the Vanguard amidships. The accident is evidence of how quiet modern SSBN have become, as the two boats apparently could not locate each other by sonar despite the short distance.

literature

  • Norman Friedman: US Submarines since 1945 . Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1994, ISBN 1-55750-260-9 (English)
  • David Miller, John Jordan: Modern Submarines. 2nd Edition. Stocker Schmid, Zurich 1987, 1999, ISBN 3-7276-7088-6 .
  • Norman Polmar, Jurrien Noot: Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718–1990 . Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991, ISBN 0-87021-570-1 (English)
  • Norman Polmar, KJ Moore: Cold War Submarines: The Design and Construction of US and Soviet Submarines, 1945-2001 . Potomac Books, Dulles VA 2003, ISBN 1-57488-594-4 (English)

Web links

Commons : Ballistic Missile Submarines  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Polmar, 2003, p. 103 f.
  2. ↑ Polmar, 1991, p. 153.
  3. ↑ Polmar, 2003, p. 110.
  4. ↑ Polmar, 1991, p. 295 f.
  5. ↑ Polmar, 1991, p. 169.
  6. ↑ Miller, Jordan, 1999, p. 20 and Polmar, 1991, p. 300.
  7. ↑ Text from SALT I on fas.org (English)
  8. ^ Miller, Jordan, 1999, p. 12.
  9. ↑ Strategic fleet on russianforces.org (English)
  10. ^ Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2011 . (PDF; 3.0 MB) Office of the Secretary of Defense of the United States, p. 3, 34.
  11. ^ A b Andrew S. Erickson: China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force . US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 2007, ISBN 978-1-59114-326-0 , pp. 137 f. (English)
  12. ↑ Navy Needs To Begin R&D For Next SSBN In FY '10 To Keep Pace With Deactivations . ( Memento from July 8, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) Defense Daily (English)
  13. ^ Norman Polmar: Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the US Fleet. US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2005, ISBN 1-59114-685-2 , p. 64.
  14. ^ The Future of the United Kingdom's Nuclear Deterrent . (PDF) mod.uk (English)
  15. ^ UK to reduce missile payload of Successor SSBNs . Jane's Information Group
  16. ↑ India's nuclear submarine plan surfaces . Asia Times, February 20, 2009 (English)
  17. ^ Agni-5, INS Arihant to be ready for induction next year. livemint.com, February 7, 2014 (English)
  18. ^ North Korea building secret ballistic missile submarine base . The Telegraph, July 22, 2016
  19. ↑ Sinpo / Gorae-class ballistic missile sub . Global security
  20. ↑ a b c d e f g G. Spinard: From Polaris to Trident: the Development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile Technology. Cambridge Studies in International Relations. Cambridge University Press, New York 1994.
  21. ^ British Submarines to Receive Upgraded US Nuclear Warhead
  22. ↑ Report on the Mk4A's new ignition system on British warheads
  23. ^ Report on the nuclear plans of Great Britain. fas.org
  24. ↑ a b c d e f g h i P. Podvig (ed.): Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. MIT Press, 2004, ISBN 0-262-16202-4 .
  25. ↑ a b c d e S. J. Zaloga : The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword - The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000. Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001, ISBN 1-58834-007-4 .
  26. ↑ a b Undersea Warfare: Cold War Strategic ASW ( Memento of the original from June 18, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.navy.mil
  27. ↑ a b c Chinese nuclear forces, 2008 . ( Memento of the original from November 19, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / thebulletin.metapress.com
  28. ↑ a b U.S. Strategic Submarine Patrols Continue at Near Cold War Tempo . Federation of American Scientists Blog
  29. ↑ Russian Strategic Submarine Patrols Rebound . Federation of American Scientists Blog
  30. ↑ Chinese Submarine Patrols Doubled in 2008 . Federation of American Scientists Blog
  31. ↑ Friedman 1994, p. 196.
  32. ↑ a b Senior Leaders Salute Milestone Trident Submarine Patrol . DefenseLink (English)
  33. ↑ Undersea Warfare: A New SSBN Operating Cycle for Kings Bay ( Memento of the original from June 3, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.navy.mil
  34. ↑ a b "We have order to launch" . In: Der Spiegel . No. 49 , 1984, pp. 134 f . ( online ).
  35. ↑ British nukes protected by bicycle lock keys . BBC (English)
  36. ↑ Trident force reaches milestone .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Navy Times@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.navytimes.com  
  37. ↑ a b Russian nuclear forces, 2008 . ( Memento of the original from January 30, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / thebulletin.metapress.com
  38. ^ Farewell to the club . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1992, pp. 172 ff . ( online ).
  39. ^ A b French nuclear forces, 2008 . Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
  40. ↑ a b British nuclear forces, 2006 ( Memento of the original dated May 3, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.sipri.org
  41. ↑ Miller, Jordan, 1999, pp. 20 f.
  42. ↑ Appendix to the START-I contract ( memento of the original from March 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.state.gov
  43. ^ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions . nuclearfiles.com (English)
  44. ^ US nuclear forces, 2008 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (English)@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / thebulletin.metapress.com  
  45. ^ Indian nuclear forces, 2008 .  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (English)@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / thebulletin.metapress.com  
  46. ↑ Non-Nuclear Warhead Urged for Trident Missile . Washington Post
  47. ↑ Chris and David Miller: Modern Warships. Verlag Stocker-Schmid, Dietikon / Zurich 1990, p. 135.
  48. ^ Stefan Terzibaschitsch: Sea power USA. Bechtermünz-Verlag, ISBN 3-86047-576-2 , p. 486.
  49. ^ Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and Alternatives. ( Memento of the original from March 12, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Congressional Budget Office, p. 18 (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.cbo.gov
  50. ^ The Future of the British Nuclear Deterrent. ( Memento of the original from November 21, 2006 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. House of Commons Library, p. 16 (English) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.parliament.uk
  51. ^ New Trident system may cost £ 76bn, figures show . The Guardian
  52. ↑ Fact file: Trident missile . BBC (English)
  53. ^ H. Kristensen: France . (PDF; 1.3 MB) In: Assuring Destruction Forever - Nuclear weapon modernization around the world. 2012, pp. 27-33, Reaching Critical Will
  54. ↑ Tom Clancy: Atomic Submarine: Journey into the Interior of a Nuclear Warship . Heyne, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-86047-267-4 , p. 72.
  55. ↑ Peter Huchthausen: K-19. National Geographic, Washington DC 2002, ISBN 3-934385-88-5 , pp. 214ff.
  56. ↑ Xia class at the Foundation of American Scientists (English)
  57. ^ Sub accident eerily similar to 1981 incident . Honolulu Star Bulletin
  58. ↑ Huchthausen 2002, p. 220ff.
  59. ↑ Nuclear Nightmare . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 2009, p. 135 ( online ).
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