Second Congo War

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Second Congo War
Part of: Congo War
Division of the country among the warring factions from 2001 to 2003
Division of the country among the warring factions from 2001 to 2003
date August 2, 1998 - June 30, 2003
place Democratic Republic of the Congo , especially in the east of the country
Casus Belli Rift between the Congolese government and Rwanda
output Withdrawal of foreign troops and formation of an all-party government made up of government and rebels
Territorial changes no
Peace treaty Peace of Pretoria
Parties to the conflict

Congo Democratic Republic 1997Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo Angola Zimbabwe Namibia Ex-FAR / Interahamwe May-May FAP RCD-ML
AngolaAngola 
ZimbabweZimbabwe 
NamibiaNamibia 
unknownunknown
unknownunknown
unknownunknown
unknownunknown

Supported by: Chad Central African Republic Sudan Libya North Korea Israel
ChadChad 
Central African RepublicCentral African Republic 
SudanSudan 
Political system of the Libyan Arab JamahiriyaPolitical system of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Korea NorthNorth Korea 
IsraelIsrael 

Rwanda 1962Rwanda Rwanda Uganda Burundi RCD MLC UNITA Local Banyamulenge and Tutsi militias RCD splinter groups and splinter groups: RCD-G RCD-K RCD-N
UgandaUganda 
BurundiBurundi 
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of UNITA.svg
unknownunknown
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg

Commander

Congo Democratic Republic 1997Democratic Republic of Congo Laurent-Désiré Kabila (1998–2001) Joseph Kabila (2001–2003) José Eduardo dos Santos Sam Nujoma Robert Mugabe Idriss Déby Ange-Félix Patassé Mbusa Nyamwisi (RCD-ML, 2001-)
Congo Democratic Republic 1997Democratic Republic of Congo
AngolaAngola
NamibiaNamibia
ZimbabweZimbabwe
ChadChad
Central African RepublicCentral African Republic
unknownunknown

Rwanda 1962Rwanda Paul Kagame James Kabarebe Yoweri Museveni Pierre Buyoya Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (RCD, 1998–1999) Emilie Ilunga (RCD-G, 1999–2000) Adolphe Onusumba (RCD-G, 2000–2003) Azarias Ruberwa (RCD, 2003-) Ernest Wamba dia Wamba (RCD-K, 1999-) Roger Lumbala (RCD-N, 2001-)
Rwanda 1962Rwanda
UgandaUganda
BurundiBurundi
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg

Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg

Troop strength
Congo Democratic Republic 1997Democratic Republic of Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo : 56,000 Angola : 1,000 - 2,000 Zimbabwe : 11,000 - 13,000 Namibia : 1000 - 2000 Chad : 2,227 Central African Republic : 850 Ex-FAR / Interahamwe : approx. 25,000 (2003) May-May / FAP : approx. 20,000 - 30,000 RCD-ML : k. A.
AngolaAngola 
ZimbabweZimbabwe 
NamibiaNamibia 
ChadChad 
Central African RepublicCentral African Republic 
unknownunknown
unknownunknown
Flag of None.svg
Rwanda 1962Rwanda Rwanda : approx. 15,000 - 22,000 Uganda : approx. 10,000 - 15,000 Burundi : approx. 1000 RCD / RCD-G : 10,000 RCD-K : 3,500 RCD-N : ns. A. MLC : 10,000
UgandaUganda 
BurundiBurundi 
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
Flag of Congo-Léopoldville (1963-1966) .svg
losses
unknown. Projections assume more than three million direct or indirect war victims.
Troop numbers are vague estimates from 1999/2000, the time of the heaviest fighting.

The Second Congo War took place from 1998 to 2003 on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo . Several quarreling rebel groups tried to overthrow the government in Kinshasa , which had only come to power in 1997 in the first Congo War . Both sides received massive support from several other African countries. A ceasefire was agreed in 1999, but it was not actually observed until 2001. After further lengthy negotiations, a peace treaty was signed in 2002, and an all-party government began work in 2003, holding free elections in 2006.

In the Congo the government referred to the war as "war of aggression" ( French guerre d'aggression ) or "war of occupation" (French guerre d'occupation ), and the rebels called it "war of rectification" (French guerre de rectification ). Due to the involvement of numerous African states, the term “ African World War ” or “ Africa's (First) World War ” was also used internationally .

The exact number of war victims is unknown: projections vaguely assume more than three million deaths as a result of the war, with only a small minority of them actually being victims of violence. Assuming that the projections are accurate, the Second Congo War would be the bloodiest war since the Korean War .

The peace treaty of 2002 and the 2006 elections did not end the conflicts in the Congo. A militia war, largely independent of the first and second Congo wars, has been taking place in the eastern provinces of Kivu and Ituri since 1994 and was not taken into account in the peace treaty. This conflict escalated into the third Congo War in 2007 , which was settled in 2009, but the armed conflict in Eastern Congo has continued in a reduced form until today (2017).

prehistory

Internal and external dissatisfaction with Kabila

Some time after Laurent-Désiré Kabila came to power on May 17, 1997 in the course of the First Congo War, dissatisfaction with the new government increased both inside and outside the borders of the DRC. On a global level, Kabila was in an ongoing conflict with the United Nations throughout his term of office, which wanted to clarify (among other things) allegations that parts of Kabila's AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaïre) during and immediately after First Congo War systematically carried out massacres against members of the Hutu. Kabila tried again and again to hinder investigations into this matter, which, in addition to diplomatic resentment and criticism among its own population, also resulted in the retention of urgently needed funds by foreign donors.

In terms of domestic politics, contrary to initial hopes that the AFDL's takeover of power would also mark the departure from Mobutu's authoritarian style of rule, he was guilty of the promised far-reaching democratic reforms. Instead, for many observers, political developments revealed signs of a continuation of Mobutu's kleptocracy. For example, in May 1997 the government issued a ban on all opposition political activities and public demonstrations in the capital; reporting critical of the government was also made a criminal offense. At the same time, the government's economic policy efforts were largely unsuccessful. It did not succeed in noticeably improving the precarious economic situation - largely a relic of decades of mismanagement under Mobutu. This, in turn, contributed to the increasing erosion of the presidential power base that ran through Kabila's entire tenure.

Dealing with the Kivu provinces and relationship with Rwanda

President Kabila found himself in a constant tension between the honoring of Rwandan interests and those of his own people. In the eastern Kivu provinces in particular, many saw him as an extended arm of Rwanda, which led them to resist the government. For example, they were able to refer to the continuing Rwandan troop presence in the country, which the Kabila government had even contractually guaranteed to Rwanda (and Uganda); also on the deployment of several high-ranking Rwandans in strategically important positions, specifically for example the appointments of James Kabarebe as chief of staff and Jackson Nzinza as chief of security, who had previously headed the Republican Guard and Rwanda's secret service. In the capital, too, there were increasing voices that were critical of Rwanda's military influence.

For Kabila, however, a defection from Rwanda turns out to be extremely difficult (apart from the fact that it did not initially seem necessary to him). Right from the start, the president lacked a significant political or military power base, which is why he had to rely on foreign military personnel as guarantors of power. At the same time, Rwanda itself had a strong interest in pacifying the eastern provinces and curbing attacks by Interahamwe (Hutu) militiamen and ex-FAR forces (members of the former Hutu Army of Rwanda - Forces Armées Rwandaises ) on both Congolese and Rwandan Tutsi, especially since Kabila's installation in the First Congo War was also intended to achieve this goal. Since the defeat of the Rwandan Hutu leadership by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the summer of 1994, which ended the genocide in Rwanda , around a million Hutu have moved to the neighboring Kivu provinces, where they met in refugee camps, organized and organized attacks on Tutsi as well as cross-border attacks against Rwandan targets. In this respect, Kabila constantly had to fear that Rwanda would withdraw his support and even intervene in the eastern provinces. Indeed, President Kagame always reserved such a possibility and even alluded to it publicly.

Hutu refugee camp near Goma on the Rwandan border (1994)

In addition, there were ongoing conflicts in the Kivus between the Tutsi sections of the Congolese army FAC (Forces Armées Congolaise) and the local population, which was sparked by the imperious demeanor of the soldiers; For example, they often gave the (rest of) the Congolese population derogatory names, committed criminal acts and refused to respect traditional tribal leaders. In addition to the Rwandan RPA troops, members of the Banyamulenge , who made up large parts of the FAC in the Kivus, were also involved. As a result, the nationality conflict was mixed with an ethnic one, as the Banyamulenge and RPA soldiers - partly supported by soldiers from the Burundian army - (Hutu) Interahamwe militiamen and ex-FAR troops opposed themselves. These conflicts were exacerbated by the establishment or reactivation of numerous May-Mai militia groups in the two Kivu provinces, who also defended themselves against the perceived "colonization" by Rwanda and repeatedly carried out attacks against Rwandan and FAC soldiers ( the Congolese army at that time was closely on the side of Rwanda); they were also responsible for the violent attacks on Bukavu in December 1997. The continued clashes caused thousands of Tutsi from North Kivu to flee across the eastern border into Rwanda. Between the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998, this in turn encouraged cross-border attacks by militias close to Hutu from the Kivu provinces, as well as attacks on the Tutsi refugee camps in Rwanda by soldiers of the (Rwandan) army.

This also worsened the already extremely tense security situation in western Rwanda. Because in the wake of the attacks by AFDL sympathizers and the Rwandan army on Eastern Congolese Hutu camps in the First Congo War, several hundred thousand Rwandan refugees who had left their homeland for the west during and after the Rwandan genocide pushed back to Rwanda, including around 10,000 to 15,000 Ex-FAR / Interahamwe units. The security situation, which was already difficult because of the ongoing cross-border attacks since 1994, escalated to an even higher level. In the north-west of Rwanda, the return of the Hutu population, according to some observers, even led to a de facto resurgence of the Rwandan civil war , even if the balance of power had now been reversed as a result of the Tutsi taking over the government.

Kabila's reactions

In the Congo towards the end of 1997, an anti-Tutsi mood spread more and more, which brought Kabila increasingly into distress. This was also taken into account in the distribution of power within the AFDL and the government. In the AFDL, which was originally influenced by the strong influences of the Tutsi, Rwanda and Uganda, members of the Luba-Katanga , an ethnic group mainly located in the north of the Katanga province, gained power, partly at the instigation of Kabila Group to which Kabila himself belonged.

This development finally manifested itself in the government. Kabila, who repeatedly issued provocations against his former allies Uganda and Rwanda, for example by accusing them of involvement in the exploitation of natural resources, for example by assuming that they were involved in the exploitation of natural resources, in view of the fierce criticism from his political opponents in June 1998 saw himself - again - Government reshuffle initiated, in the course of which almost all Tutsi were removed from the government. a transformation with similar objectives had already been carried out at the management level of the AFDL at the end of 1997, whereby the influence of the Kabila-led PRP had been strengthened. Also in June, Kabila instructed officers in the east to transfer captured ex-FAR soldiers to a military base in the south, where they would eventually be released and integrated into the Congolese army. On the Rwandan side, this more or less desperate attempt to assemble a functioning army was seen as an open affront, as Rwanda saw its security endangered precisely by the ex-FAR soldiers and the country in the Congo did not have sufficient troops to to form a noteworthy inner opposite pole.

In fact, from the beginning of 1998 on the Rwandan side had increasingly distanced themselves from Kabila. For example, Rwanda (as well as Uganda) refused to take part in the anniversary celebration of the AFDL victory over Mobutu in May 1998; In addition, in the same month a meeting called by the Kabila government failed due to the absence of Uganda and Rwanda. Finally, in June, the Kabila administration was accused by the Rwandan government of training Interahamwe itself. In July 1998, Kabila finally broke with his Rwandan allies: He initially dismissed the Chief of Staff James Kabarebe (previously head of the Rwandan secret service), possibly out of fear of an imminent coup, and finally, on July 27, demanded all those still stationed in the country through his Ministry of Defense Rwandan troops (as well as all other foreign soldiers) to retreat.

Course of war

Start of war (August 1998)

Even if the decision to expel the foreign and especially the Rwandan RPA troops met with broad approval from the Congolese population, there were considerable upheavals in the eastern provinces in the period that followed. On August 2, 1998, just under a week after Kabila's request to leave Rwanda, the 10th Brigade of the Congolese Army (consisting mainly of Banyamulenge ) stationed in Goma announced that it was turning away from President Kabila. Their commanding officer announced on the radio that the nepotism and corruption under Kabila had been condemned and that the army had come to the decision to disempower the president; Afterwards, Goma fell to the rebels without any major fighting. A unit of troops stationed in Bukavu joined the group the following day and in turn announced that it would no longer recognize the local rulers. The escalation was not limited to the Kivu provinces, however. There were also firefights in Kinshasa, as a result of which a night curfew was imposed for several days; Clashes were also reported in Kisangani. After a few days, the strategically important cities of Bukavu and Goma were under the control of the rebels, as was Uvira , where the fighting began on August 4th.

The viral spread of the rebellion was due not least to the central role of James Kabarebe, one of the leaders, who, through his work as an army commander in the Congo, had considerable strategic knowledge on the one hand, but had already armed loyal units in the east in this position (for example in Bukavu and Goma), so that after his recall by Kabila (see above) he only had to instruct them to turn against the government. Gérard Prunier also points out with anecdotal evidence that Kabarebe, in particular, had already rebuilt the 10th Brigade ethnically in the months before the start of the war in such a way that it would oppose the later suggestion of a rebel campaign.

On August 3, on state television, the government accused "influential foreign officers" who had planned the attacks for a long time, and then tried to portray the rebellion as an attempt by the Tutsi to gain special status; A few days later, at a demonstration, Kabila even said that the Tutsi wanted to found their own empire. Radio and television stations read government communiqués alleging that the Tutsi were collectively collaborating with the Rwandan military and the rebels; henceforth Kabila's security services and other opponents of the rebels launched a campaign against Tutsi, Banyamulenge and people of Rwandan descent in general. Meanwhile, the fighting spread rapidly. Contrary to the initial statements by Rwandan officials, no later than 3–4 August also involved Rwandan RPA soldiers, who came into the country across the border in the east and contributed heavily to the capture of Bukavus and Gomas.

From August 4th, the activities of the Kabila opponents extended to the west of the Congo. Ugandan and Rwandan troops under the leadership of Kabarebe ("Commander James") captured a passenger plane in the rebel-controlled Goma in the east to transport elite soldiers - composed of Rwandan, Ugandan and possibly also Congolese armed forces - to the small town of Kitona in the province of Bas-Congo on the To convey Atlantic coast. In their military base they managed to win several thousand former soldiers of the Mobutu army - Tatjana Carajanis and Herbert Weiss speak of 10,000–15,000 - who were housed under Kabila for "re-education" for their uprising against the government in Kinshasa. The strategy of supporting the opened Western Front by airborne troop transfers from the east (“Kitona airlift”) was applied throughout the initial phase of the conflict.

In the days that followed, the rebels moved east towards Kinshasa. They took several cities, including Matadi , but especially on August 13 the Inga dams , 140 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa, whose control made it possible for them to interrupt the power supply in the capital and thus the city's water supply systems collapse. In Kinshasa, where Kabila had ordered the killing of all armed Tutsi days before and the government continued to agitate against the Tutsi, the impending supply crisis led to a considerable intensification of the conflict. Whether President Kabila had already left the capital at the time of the supply outages to flee to his hometown Lubumbashi, or was only induced to do so by the supply crisis, is debatable. At the same time, so-called self-defense militias (Forces d'autodéfense populaire) were organized in Kinshasa , in which many young Congolese in particular came together. At times they comprised up to 20,000 men and in Kinshasa, alongside loyal FAC soldiers, brutally attacked Rwandans and Tutsi resident in the capital. The mobilization of volunteers as an extension of the weak military base was also practiced in other regions.

Formation of the RCD and intervention by Zimbabwe and Angola

RCD's sphere of influence and offensive at the beginning of the war

The rebels advanced rapidly in the west and were also able to post further successes in the east. The starting point in the east was still the area around Goma and Bukavu, where Rwandan troops were gathering, which, contrary to the withdrawal instructions by Kabila, were still in the country on July 27th. In the second week of fighting, Beni and Butembu fell on the Ugandan border, and finally on August 12 - supported by Ugandan troop units - after heavy fighting with government troops flown in, Bunia was also killed . Meanwhile, the population was called on the state radio to use gun violence against Tutsi.

On August 12, the rebels went public under the name Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD). On August 17, they disclosed their organizational structure: Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, who had long taught historians in Tanzania and the USA, was elected as chairman, and Moïse Nyarugabo, a former member of the government, was elected as his deputy. In addition, there was an executive council consisting of half civil and military members, as well as seven administrative areas, for example for foreign policy, communication and finance. The management level of the RCD was extremely heterogeneous and a mixture of former Mobutu supporters who tried to return to power, Tutsi who had previously fought on the side of Kabila but were disappointed with the president, radical leftists (including Chairman Wamba ) as well as traditional representatives of Rwandan interests (such as Nyarugabo). The influence of Rwanda was evident (contrary to the Rwandan government's initial assertions to the contrary): the RCD leadership was put together by the Rwandan government, Kigali provided them with premises and equipment and the "rebellion" had been going on for more than a week when the RCD made its appearance. At the same time, all major issues of the RCD had to be approved by Rwanda; military actions were principally led by the Rwandan military.

Meanwhile, in the first few weeks after the start of the rebellion, Kabila actively sought support for his government abroad, including talks with Namibia, Angola and Cuba. The conflict was turned around by the intervention of Zimbabwe on the part of the Congolese government. In the run-up to a multilateral meeting on the situation in the Congo, the Ministry of Defense announced on August 6 that it was “basically” ready to provide military support for the Congolese government, whereupon President Robert Mugabe also declared his readiness to support a few days later . A corresponding decision was finally taken on August 18 at a meeting of the South African Development Community (SADC) convened by Mugabe . In it, against the resistance of a group around South Africa, which (at that time) strictly rejected military means, the Congolese government was promised both material and personnel support. Angola confirmed this decision the following day - in a clear departure from its position during the First Congo War, when the Angolan government had still supported Mobutu's opponents - through the Ministry of Defense. The next day, the first 400 Zimbabwean troops landed in Kinshasa. Namibia did not provide any significant troop contingents, but supplied Angola and Zimbabwe with weapons. On August 21, Angola intervened in the action by bringing several thousand FAA soldiers (Forças Armadas Angolanas) with tanks, combat helicopters (mainly Mi-17 , Mi-24 and Mi-25 ) and MiG-23 combat aircraft under heavy artillery fire crossed the border. As a result, a strategic attempt was made to contain the rebels advancing rapidly in the direction of Kinshasa from both sides: from the south-west by the FAA troops, who gradually attacked the rebel supply systems, from the direction of Kinshasa by Zimbabwean (and also some Angolan) soldiers . Meanwhile, the rebels in the east achieved two strategically important successes with the capture of Kisangani on August 23 and Kalemie on August 26.

Angolan troops were able to retake Boma , Muanda and Kitona in the first days . Strengthened by these military successes, Kabila returned to Kinshasa on around August 25th. A day later, the Rwandan-backed rebels began an attack on the capital. They first reached their goal of taking Ndjili Airport , but shortly afterwards the military campaign collapsed under Zimbabwean artillery fire; Parts of the rebels were picked up by residents of Kinshasa - especially by the self-defense militias who were patrolling in anticipation of the rebels -, driven through the city and burned alive. Some of the surviving rebels and soldiers fled to Angola in UNITA- controlled areas, from where they were flown out by the Ugandan Air Force in the months that followed. A short time later, Matadi and the Inga dams fell back to the government side.

Intervention of further supporters and relocation to the eastern provinces (by the end of 1998)

Even if the rebels were unable to take control of Kinshasa, the situation in the capital remained tense in the months that followed. A food crisis in Kinshasa, which resulted from the fact that important transport routes were cut off, led the United Nations World Food Program to set up an airlift between Congo-Brazzaville and the city; the crisis lasted until early December. In the meantime, peace efforts - the seriousness of which is denied by some commentators anyway - have remained unsuccessful; a ceasefire agreed at a first joint meeting of the conflicting states in Victoria Falls on September 7th was broken the next day with the shelling of Kalemies by the Angolan military and had been concluded without any say by the rebels, so that the chances of success were early in doubt . On the part of the rebels, however, after the intervention of Kabila's allies, there was a loss of power in the western territories that had initially been won, which increasingly fell back to the government side. As a result, the RCD and its supporters turned their focus to the East of the Congo, whose central strategic points remained under their control. However, there were setbacks there too.

Unlike in the First Congo War, Mai-Mai militias, Interahamwe militiamen and ex-FAR troops showed solidarity with Kabila and supported him in the eastern provinces; especially in the Kivu provinces, they provided the majority of the forces on Kabila's side. Kabila integrated the Interahamwe / Ex-FAR into ethnically homogeneous battalions in his army. The Mai Mai were organized in groups themselves and supported the governing coalition in the strategically growing Kivu provinces in the east; Kabila supplied them with weapons and placed their leaders in high positions in the FAC hierarchy.

The starting point of the government's counter-campaign was the capital of the Maniema province, Kindu , by mid-September at the latest , from where air strikes against the rebels began. Meanwhile , around 2,000 soldiers from Sudan were sent to the city to support the Kabila troops, although it is a matter of dispute whether these were troops from the (Tutsi-dominated) Sudanese army or other forces, e.g. Interahamwe. For their part, Angola, Zimbabwe and Nigeria held back from the east for a long time; only after Kindu was captured by the rebels on October 12th did they, too, feel compelled to intervene on the eastern front. Towards the middle of September, Sudan and Libya were actively working towards a military participation of Chad on the side of Kabila, which was first implemented on September 18 with the transport of a first 1,000 troop contingent to the northeast of the Congo. The Tutsi-dominated Burundian army began to raise troop contingents to support the rebels in mid-September, which had been estimated at around 3,000 by the end of November.

At a meeting towards the end of September, nine governments, including that of the Congo-Brazzavilles and the Central African Republic, pledged their support for Kabila. Kabila was also able to count on Mai Mai and Interahamwe as a supporter. By October, Zimbabwe increased its troop strength in the Congo to around 5,000, Namibia to around 2,000 and Angola also expanded its presence in terms of personnel. Throughout October, both rebels and the Kabila coalition were able to take cities in the eastern provinces. As a result of the increasing success of the Kabila opponents in the eastern provinces, Kabila's supporters increasingly shifted their engagement to the east. Around October 12, after several days of fighting, the rebels took over the capital of the Maniema province, Kindu , which, due to its location on the border with the resource-rich Katanga province in the southeast and the country's most important diamond mining area, Mbuji-Mayi - in the words of Gérard Prunier the only remaining government territory that brought Kinshasa significant income - is of great strategic importance. On the government side, the government involved in particular the ex-FAR, Interahamwe and Ugandan guerrilla fighters flown in by the Sudanese army, and on the opposition side, less Congolese than Ugandans and Rwandans. François Ngolet reports that the capture of Kindu caused panic in the capital and that Kabila immediately began to recruit more young men as soldiers.

A peace talks lasting several days in Lusaka at the end of October 1998 remained unsuccessful. Efforts were also made by the government to recruit more soldiers. In the Katanga province in particular, local rulers recruited a large number of young men into self-defense militias, accepting that this step would lead to destabilization elsewhere, since the use of weapons by these new militiamen was often directed against members of other ethnic groups. In mid to late November, the rebels captured the Katangian cities of Moba and Kongolo; in December finally Nyunzu and Pweto on the Zambian border, with which the rebels by the end of 1998 already had a considerable part of the Katanga province under their control. At the end of November, Zimbabwe began its major military offensive in the east of the country, which had been announced well in advance; The situation was made more difficult for Kabila by the lack of motivation of the Zimbabwean troops, which was expressed in the collective refusal to continue the fighting.

Foundation of the MLC and split of the RCD (end of 1998 to mid-1999)

Areas of power of the three rebel groups and the government in June 1999
MLC founder Jean-Pierre Bemba (2006).

On November 7th, Jean-Pierre Bemba announced the existence of a new rebel organization in the north of the country, the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC). Before the installation of Kabila, Bemba was a supporter and close confidante of Mobutu; his father, Saolona, ​​was chairman of the Zairean employers' association under Mobutu and one of the richest men in the country. In fact, contrary to what its leaders claim, the alliance was mainly shaped by former Mobutu supporters. The MLC received massive support from Uganda: Bemba himself received military training in the Ugandan Army UPDF (Uganda People's Defense Force) for his request, as did the nearly 150 Congolese rebels recruited by Uganda who trained a few weeks before the MLC was publicly presented were; after all , it was a UPDF commander who later (early December) after the conquest of Lisala was able to convince a large number of disappointed RCD members to transfer to the MLC. Due to his position under Mobutu, Bemba himself had connections to exiled generals from this period, had considerable financial resources and was popular with the population. On November 17, the MLC rebels, together with the Ugandan UPDF soldiers, captured Bumba , just under 300 kilometers northeast of Kisangani , which contributed to Bemba's recruitment efforts, so that over a thousand new fighters could be won over the next few days.

Towards the middle of November, tensions between Rwanda and Uganda increased, primarily because the RCD, which continues to be chronically unpopular among the population, was led by a Ugandan protégé, dia Wamba. The emergence of the MLC as another Ugandan-cited undertaking threatened to exacerbate the problem, so that the RCD leadership repeatedly wanted to create the impression that the MLC was merely a subordinate group - in fact, according to some, Uganda's support for the MLC arose Rather, commentators of Museveni's endeavor to provide an alternative to the dia Wamba, which he initially valued ideologically, but which is unpopular and allegedly limited in its military strategic competence. There were also differences inside the RCD. The heterogeneous composition of the rebel alliance had the price of repeatedly flaring up conflicting interests between the two participating states. Due to these differences, the RCD split more and more into a camp close to Rwanda and a camp close to Uganda under the leadership of dia Wamba; while the Rwandan operations center continued to operate in Goma, Wamba's supporters relocated their headquarters to Kisangani in early 1999. Based on the two cities, a distinction is now made between the RCD-G, which is close to Rwanda, and the RCD-K, which is close to Uganda.

At the end of 1998 the MLC controlled large parts of the Orientale province. The government responded by sending contingents of troops, but the successes of the MLC initially continued, among other things with the conquest of Lisala and Gemena in the province of Equateur, which finally forced the government to fly troops to the Central African Republic to defend the border towns of Zongo and Gbadolite from the north against the MLC; Nevertheless, Kabila Zongo lost to the MLC forces (and later also Gbadolite in a joint action by UPDF and MLC troops) as well as almost the entire province of Equateur until the end of May 1999. There was little resistance; the Chadian soldiers who supported Kabila in this section of the front fled quickly, and moreover the MLC consisted mainly of former Mobutu supporters, for whom its stronghold, the province of Equateur, was home.

Armistice and peace negotiations

Development of the war up to the beginning of 2000, largest expansion of the rebel areas

Lusaka Agreement

As early as October 1998, SADC called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign troops in the Congo and subsequent peace negotiations. In November, at the 20th Franco-African summit in Paris, the government and rebels agreed to negotiate. Armistice negotiations were supposed to take place in Lusaka in December, but this date has been postponed several times until June 1999. After two weeks of negotiations, the Lusaka Armistice was signed on July 7th .
The agreement provided for the following regulations:

  • Armistice within 24 hours
  • Monitoring of the ceasefire by a Joint Military Commission (JMC) under UN supervision
  • Withdrawal of the troops from the fronts within 14 days
  • Working out a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops by the joint commission
  • provisional maintenance of the status quo for the territorial division of the Congo
  • new negotiations within 45 days.

The agreement was initially only signed by the participating countries, the MLC only followed on August 1, and the RCD on August 31.

The agreement was largely ignored, and foreign troops also stayed in the country. The JMC was not constituted until October, the UN mission MONUC was not decided until November 30th. In February 2000, MONUC received a mandate to use force according to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and was increased to 5537 men, including 3400 combat units. However, not even the military observers provided for in the Lusaka Agreement were in the country.

Memorial to the Kisangani Six Day War , 2000

The MLC canceled the ceasefire agreement at the beginning of November and started a new offensive. Until the end of December, the MLC controlled the entire north of the country, up to the border with the Republic of the Congo . The RCD also succeeded in making another advance westward in Kasai, where heavy fighting with Zimbabweans and Namibians broke out again. The rebel-controlled areas had now, in March 2000, reached their greatest extent.

The Lusaka ceasefire agreement had now failed and was also canceled by the government on August 23. The fighting then intensified again, and the rebels began a new, successful offensive against the government. For the government in Kinshasa, the situation deteriorated noticeably. There was talk of traitors in the military and government, and rumors of a coup arose.

On January 16, 2001, Laurent Kabila was shot dead in his office in Kinshasa under unexplained circumstances. His son Joseph Kabila , then Chief of Staff, was appointed as his successor by the government, without legitimation. The RCD and MLC, who had viewed Kabila as the main enemy, quickly offered new negotiations.

Peace of Pretoria

Congolese soldiers, 2001

In fact, the fighting subsided quickly, with both sides withdrawing troops from the main front lines as early as February. On April 30, the RCD, MLC, civil society groups and the opposition founded the Union des Forces congolaises pour le respect intégral de L'Accord de Lusaka et la tenue du Dialogue inter-congolais (UFAD) in Kinshasa. Both the rebels and the government put the Lusaka Agreement back into force and agreed to start new negotiations, and the first MONUC soldiers finally arrived in the Congo.

A renewed split within the rebels changed the situation again, because the RCD-K , which was under Ugandan influence, split into the RCD-ML and RCD-N . The RCD-ML allied itself with the central government in Kinshasa and established its rule in the north of the province of North Kivu and parts of the district of Ituri, the RCD-N remained an ally of Uganda.

A first summit meeting in October 2001 in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa was canceled without success. In February 2001, with the mediation of President Mbeki , new talks began in Sun City, South Africa, about power-sharing in the country. At first, the government insisted that Kabila should remain president until free elections, which the rebels rejected. Mbeki then proposed a vice-presidential post for RCD and MLC, and a prime minister for the opposition in Kinshasa. At first an agreement seemed possible, but in the end the government and MLC submitted their own proposal after Kabila would remain president and the MLC would provide the prime minister. The RCD refused and let the negotiations fail.

In Kinshasa, the opposition there now sided with the RCD, while MLC delegations traveled to the capital at the same time to take part in the government. In the summer of 2002, the Kabila government concluded separate agreements with Rwanda and Uganda on a troop withdrawal from the Congo, and from October the Angolan and Zimbabwean troops also withdrew.

New negotiations between the government and the rebels began in Pretoria in October on a power-sharing. On December 16, the Accord Global et Inclusif was surprisingly concluded, presumably under massive pressure from Mbeki, because a day earlier all sides had uncompromisingly insisted on their demands.
The agreement provided for the following key points:

  • Establishment of an all-party government from the warring parties
  • Reunification of land and army
  • free elections in two, at the latest three years.

Kabila remained president, the four vice-presidential posts were occupied by the RCD, MLC, opposition and the Kabila camp. The cabinet consisted of 26 ministers and 25 vice ministers, an appointed transitional parliament was composed equally of the old government, MLC, RCD, the RCD spin-offs RCD-ML and RCD-N as well as the opposition, civil society and May-May militias. An interim constitution was presented on March 6, 2003 and signed by 366 delegates on April 1 in Sun City. On April 7th, Kabila was sworn in as transitional president, and in the following months more and more UN troops arrived in the country. The new government started its work on June 30th, the national holiday.

The Pretoria Agreement ended the war between the RCD, MLC and the government, but did not pacify the country. In the east, in Kivu and Ituri , the fighting between factions and local rebels, which had been going on since the 1990s, continued. As early as 1997, the situation in Kivu had largely decoupled from the wars and conflicts in the rest of the Congo, and the rebel groups there were not involved in the peace negotiations.
The armed conflict in Eastern Congo continues to this day.

States involved

States involved in the conflict

The participation of numerous African states was largely responsible for the long duration of the war; each state tried to enforce its own interests in the Congo or in its own country by participating in the war.

Government supporters

Militarily, three states took part on Kabila's side, without which he would not have been able to maintain power.

  • Angola had an interest in the fact that the Congodid not offer UNITA a safe haven. The Congolese government should therefore be as dependent as possible on Angola, the stationing of Angolan troops in Kinshasa ensured that the Congolese government could not take a decision against the will of Angola.
  • Namibia's reasons for participating in the war are more diffuse; the country tried to emancipate itself from South Africa in terms of foreign policy.
  • Zimbabwe saw the stationing of troops in the mining regions in the south of the Congo as an opportunity to take control of the mines there. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp , both close allies of President Robert Mugabe , made large contributions to the mining operations.

Three other states participated to a lesser extent:

  • The Sudan supported the government's fight Kabila against Uganda because Uganda turn the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in southern Sudan supported.
  • Chad briefly sent troops to the north of the country to prevent the conflict from spreading to the Central African Republic, which in turn would have threatened Chad.
  • The Central African Republic briefly supported the Kabila government with a few hundred soldiers. As in Chad, the troops were soon withdrawn because civil wars were taking place in both countries.

Logistic support provided:

  • Libya provided Chad with the planes with which its soldiers were flown into the country.
  • North Korea trained Congolese government soldiers in exchange for uranium for its nuclear program .
  • Israel , initially on the side of the rebels, also took part in the training of government soldiers against the transfer of a third of the Congolese diamond production .

Political support came from:

  • South Africa , Kabila's ally in the First Congo War, acted as a mediator during the peace negotiations on behalf of the government.
  • Tanzania advocated a military operation by SADC in favor of the government, but this was not carried out.
  • Zambia planned to provide military support to Kabila, but had to abandon the plans because of an impending mutiny within the Zambian armed forces .

The Congolese armed forces , which were already in the process of being established, were severely weakened by the rebellion in the east. The government was therefore dependent on the support of irregular associations. These militias were z. Some of them formally incorporated into the government armed forces, which can distort the figures.

  • The ex-FAR / Interahamwe , the remnants of the Génocidaires who had fled to the Congo and who fought on Mobutu's side against the AFDL and Kabila in the first war , switched sides and now supported the new Congolese government.
  • The government recruited tens of thousands of fighters as "self-defense militias " (French Forces d'Autodéfense Populaire , FAP) in a short time . They consisted of young people with no prospects, gangs of thugs, e.g. T also May-May militias.
  • In Eastern Congo, tens of thousands of May-May fighters stood by Kabila , although the transition between May-May and FAP was sometimes fluid.

Rebel supporters

  • Rwanda felt betrayed by Kabila, who had now allied himself with the ex-FAR / Interahamwe, and tried a second time to overthrow the government in Kinshasa.
  • Uganda accused the Congolese government of supporting Ugandan rebel groups, and Uganda tried to maintain its influence in the border area with the warring Sudan.
  • Burundi also fought to a small extent against Hutu rebels in the Congo.

War victims

There are no reliable figures on the number of war victims, only vague projections by the American aid organization IRC on the death rate in the Congo were widely used . The significance of these figures is controversial.No counting of the war dead was carried out, rather surveys were carried out in only three cities with their surroundings ( Kisangani , Bukavu and Moba ), in which the respondents were asked to state the number of household members who had died since the beginning of the war and their cause of death . 7339 respondents reported 606 deaths. This was used to determine a death rate for the total population, which was compared with the death rate in all of sub-Saharan Africa (there were no comparative values ​​from the Congo from the time before the war). The difference between the two death rates was offset against the population of the Congo, and the calculated value was given as the number of war victims. An initial extrapolation for the period from 1998 to 2000 spoke of 1.7 million deaths, a more precise calculation from 2004 of 3.9 million deaths. The statement "over three million dead" for the war from 1998 to 2003 found international circulation.

Of the war dead mentioned, only a minority of less than 10% were actually victims of violence (soldiers and civilians). Well more than half of the dead are victims of diseases and malnutrition, after the previously precarious medical care had collapsed due to the war, and the same applies to the production of food.

In 2008, five years after the end of the war, another (again more precise) extrapolation was carried out which also covered the number of people who died after the end of the war as a result of the war. This investigation spoke of 5.4 million additional deaths since 1998.

The accuracy of the numbers determined in this way is controversial. The few respondents came from only three cities, the rural population was largely excluded, and due to a lack of statistical data, the death rate could not be compared with the pre-war period, so the entire continent was used as a comparison value. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the victims of diseases, which have always decimated the region's population, should be viewed as victims of war.

Socio-economic effects of the war

The flag used by the rebel governments. It was the country's national flag from 1963 to 1966

In contrast to the first Congo War, which lasted only a few months and resulted in a quick decision in favor of the rebels, the second war developed into a protracted positional war due to the intervention of other states. As a result, the national territory was divided into several areas of power with their own governments over the years. Travel between the spheres of power was only possible by air, which was unaffordable for most of the population. For large parts of the country this meant complete isolation from the outside world.

After two decades of economic decline, the financing of the war posed considerable difficulties for all warring parties, the main source of income being the export of raw materials. The war and its socio-economic effects, a “ huge humanitarian catastrophe ”, hardly attracted international attention.

Economic impact

The dilapidated infrastructure and the permanent danger of raids made overland travel impossible, which brought intra-Congolese trade to a standstill. On the Congo , the most important still existing traffic route, no ship traffic between the different spheres of power was possible for years. The isolated villages were cut off from urban markets, while the cities were lacking in food. In Kinshasa, food prices quadrupled in one year.

The impoverishment of the population continued to worsen; a study by the Congolese government in 2006, three years after the end of the war, revealed the following figures: 76% of the population could not send their children to school, 79% were malnourished, and 81% had insufficient living space and 82% have no access to medical care. A total of 71% of the population lived in absolute poverty (85% in the poorest province of Equateur) and at least 11% of the children died before their 5th birthday and 12% before their 1st birthday. According to aid organizations, 31% of Kinshasa residents were chronically malnourished in 2000 and only 10% could afford three meals a day. In 2003 the average food intake of the population was 1300 kilocalories per day. The health system was largely destroyed, allegedly 500,000 people died of malaria every year, more than a third of them children under five.

International aid was scarce. In the beginning it was mainly restricted to Kinshasa, only from 2001 onwards did it also reach the actual war zones in the east.

Rural exodus and internal displacement

The constant danger of attacks by both rebels and government soldiers led to millions of people fleeing from the villages to the cities, and sometimes from the villages to the forest. The UN estimated the number of internally displaced persons between one and two million, with strong fluctuations. The Kivu was particularly hard hit, with the number of inhabitants in the cities quadrupling in just a few years. As the number of refugees increased, the social situation in the cities deteriorated, the social services, which were already barely in existence, and the infrastructure were completely overloaded, and the only advantage of living in the city, due to the large number of people, was better security against acts of violence on the part of the city Rebels or government soldiers.

War finance

War financing was initially secured for the government as well as for the rebels through measures such as the confiscation of the cash holdings of local banks or the stocks of companies, the levying of numerous new taxes or monopolies on products or services. Such a measure did not produce the necessary sums, all warring parties were always on the verge of insolvency. In the course of time, the income had to be organized in other ways and the export of mining products quickly developed as a basis for financing the war. The AFDL financed the first Congo War by awarding mining concessions to foreign investors even before they had conquered the territories and without their being entitled to do so. After the end of the war, extensive investments would have been necessary to repair the technically obsolete and, to a large extent, no longer functional systems. However, this mostly did not materialize, mainly because of the unchanged high level of corruption, hardly any foreign companies took part in the mining sector or did not transfer their income to the state. The lack of conveyor systems for industrial mining ensured that the inhabitants of the mining areas increasingly switched to small-scale mining . Taxation of mineral exports was the main financing of the war, although numerous attempts to monopolize the trade in mining products have failed. The government financed itself mainly through diamonds from Kasai and copper from Katanga, with the participation of Zimbabwean companies. In the rebel areas in the east of the country, mainly coltan and gold from Kivu and Ituri were exported via the rebel allied states of Rwanda and Uganda, with Ugandan and Rwandan companies and militias playing a key role. It is alleged that at times up to 70% of the coltan deposits in Kivu were controlled and exploited by Rwanda.

The financing of the war through the export of raw materials was often described by non-governmental organizations and the international press as the plundering of the natural wealth of the Congo by warlords , neighboring states and international corporations ; the buyers of the raw materials had contributed significantly to the long war. A real exploitation of the raw material sources by the warring parties never took place, there were no forms of forced labor, nor were contributions extracted from the population . After two decades of economic decline, small-scale mining was often the only way for the population to earn a living, regardless of the war. For the miners, however, small-scale mining usually meant a certain income security and sometimes even meant a noticeable increase in income.

literature

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  • Gérard Prunier : Rebel movements and proxy warfare. Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99). In: African Affairs . 103, No. 412, 2004, pp. 359-383, doi: 10.1093 / afraf / adh050 .
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  • Filip Reyntjens: The great African was. Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996–2006. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009, ISBN 978-0-521-11128-7 .
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  • United Nations Security Council : Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ( Memento of November 11, 2014 in the web archive archive.today ) 2001, accessed on November 5, 2011.
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  • Gauthier de Villers, Jean Omasombo, Erik Kennes: République démocratique du Congo. Guerre et politique. Les trente derniers mois de LD Kabila (août 1998 – janvier 2001). (= Cahiers Africains. No. 47-48). Institut africain (CEDAF). Harmattan, Paris 2001, ISBN 2-7475-1630-X .
  • Herbert Weiss: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (= Current African issues. No. 22). Nordiska Afrikainstitutet , Uppsala 2000, ISBN 91-7106-458-3 . (online at: nai.diva-portal.org , PDF file, 5.9 MB)

Web links

Commons : African World War  - Collection of Pictures, Videos and Audio Files

Remarks

  1. a b Terms related to the Rwandan military: The FAR (Forces Armées Rwandaises) was the army of the former Rwandan Hutu regime, which was overthrown in 1994 in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda . Many of the FAR soldiers then settled in the Congo (and are referred to as Ex-FAR). The FAR is to be distinguished from the RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front). The RPF was founded in the late 1980s by Rwandan Tutsi who retreated into exile in Uganda as a political movement against the Rwandan regime. She took power in 1994 after the genocide in Rwanda. After the takeover of power, the (Tutsi) government formed the RPA (Rwandese Patriotic Army) as the new national army , while the political arm continued to operate as the RPF.
  2. There were primarily three recruiting pools for the new FAC army. Mainly they were loyal Katangers (often from the ranks of the former FNLC Front national de liberation du Congo , which had fought against Mobutu in the 1970s), on the other hand kadogo (child soldiers of eastern Congolese descent) and, in South Kivu, Banyamulenge . See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 176; Afoaku: Congo's Rebels. 2009, p. 113.
  3. The wave of founding such "self-defense militias" began in June 1997 in South Kivu; These groups consisting of Babembe subordinated themselves to Charles Simba, who had fought on the side of the AFDL against the Mobutu regime in the First Congo War. See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 173.
  4. A reshuffle of the government had already been decided on January 3rd, which had already served the purpose of reducing the influence of the Tutsi.
  5. “President Laurent-Desire Kabila […] informs the Congolese people that on July 27th he put an end to the presence of Rwandan soldiers who supported us in the liberation of our country. Through these soldiers, we would also like to thank the entire Rwandan people for the solidarity they have shown us so far. The Head of State also congratulates the Congolese people for their greatness, which they have shown in tolerating and facilitating the presence of these friendly soldiers in our country and being a good host to them. This marks the end of any presence of foreign armed forces in the DRC. ”Own translation from BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Kabila statement thanks Rwandans for solidarity. July 28, 1998.
  6. Specifically, he reduced the number of traditionally Kabila-loyal kadogo and increased the presence of Banyamulenge and former soldiers of the FAZ (Forces Armées Zaïroises) - the army under Mobutu - who opposed Kabila. See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, pp. 177, 182.
  7. At the highest level, participation was only admitted at the beginning of November, when Vice President Paul Kagame emphasized that there were “good reasons” why this had not been publicly communicated beforehand. See IRIN: Update No. 540 for Central and Eastern Africa. November 6, 1998, accessed September 5, 2012.
  8. See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 184 f. Mandela commented to SAPA : “Our attitude is clear. We would not worsen the position by sending in a military force. We are committed to peace. "Quoted from IRIN: DRC: Zimbabwe says SADC to back Kabila. August 19, 1998, accessed on August 24, 2011. However, the position was revised almost two weeks later when the country expressed its support for the interventions of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. See IRIN: IRIN Update No. 494 for Central and Eastern Africa. September 3, 1998, accessed October 9, 2012.
  9. See Clark: Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War. 2002, p. 156; again in detail Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 224, who reports that Bemba was initially intended for a position within the (then still unified) RCD, but then expressed doubts about the sustainability of the movement. He then submitted the proposal for a completely new movement to Museveni, who himself was increasingly critical of the top-down style of Rwanda in the RCD. This met with encouragement, whereupon Bemba was then trained in the army as described above. Gérard Prunier quotes Bemba as saying that he saw the possibility of forming an armed group and, as a result, looked for serious partners. “There were two countries in the region that showed interest and I decided to submit my plan to the Ugandans.” (Own translation from Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 204, quoted there from Jean-Philippe Rémy : Rébellion-business au Congo. In: Liberation. August 13, 1999.)

Individual evidence

  1. a b c d e f Mario von Baratta: Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2001. Numbers, data, facts. Current. Competently. Reliable. Fischer, Frankfurt 2000, ISBN 3-596-72001-X .
  2. a b c d The Europa World Year Book 2001 . Volume 1, Europa Publications , London 2001, ISBN 1-85743-098-0 , p. 1170.
  3. a b Johnson, p. 94.
  4. Peter Scholl-Latour : African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 320.
  5. Peter Scholl-Latour: African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 116.
  6. ^ Johnson, p. 93.
  7. ^ Johnson, p. 89.
  8. a b Johnson, p. 104.
  9. ^ First assessment of the armed groups operating in DR Congo ( Memento of October 16, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
  10. Peter Scholl-Latour: African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 35.
  11. Johnson, pp. 109f.
  12. a b Johnson 2009, p. 86.
  13. ↑ In detail on the entire topic of Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, Chapter 5; Afoaku: Explaining the Failure of Democracy in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2005, pp. 157-167.
  14. ^ Howard French: Congo Aid at Risk In Defiance of UN Over War Refugees . In: The New York Times . September 15, 1997, p. A3 ( online ).
  15. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 174 f .; Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 4 ff .; Carayannis / Weiss: The Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996–2002. 2003, p. 268 ff., Who also point out that Rwanda also actively worked towards preventing the investigations and, in some cases, instructed its own soldiers on Congolese territory not to let the inspectors pass. Specific examples of the difficulties of the UN mission can be found in the daily reports, see Barbara Crossette: UN Says Congo Blocks Investigation of Reported Massacres. In: The New York Times. July 2, 1997 ( online )
  16. Reyntjens: The great African was. 2009, p. 154; James C. McKinley Jr: Kabila Ban's Party Activity In Kinshasa. In: The New York Times. May 27, 1997.
  17. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 161 ff .; Carole Collins: Congo / Ex-Zaire: through the looking glass. In: Review of African Political Economy. 25, No. 75, March 1998, ISSN  0305-6244 , pp. 112-123, doi: 10.1080 / 03056249808704296 . On the economic development under Kabila also this: Reconstructing the Congo. In: Review of African Political Economy. 24, No. 74, December 1997, ISSN  0305-6244 , pp. 591-600, doi: 10.1080 / 03056249708704284 .
  18. Clark: Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations. 2001, p. 271.
  19. Afoaku: Congo's rebels. 2009, p. 111 f.
  20. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 177.
  21. Carayannis, Weiss: The Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996–2002. 2003, p. 257.
  22. Renaud Girard: Un entretien avec l'homme fort du Rwanda; Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison. In: Le Figaro. November 22, 1997. In it, Kagame responded to the interviewer's information that one of his advisors was considering a military operation in Eastern Congo: “Pour le moment, je ne vois pas la nécessité de traverser la frontière. Corn, certainement, nous allons coopérer avec les autorités congolaises sur cette question. »
  23. Reyntjens: The great African was. 2009, p. 147.
  24. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 176, especially footnote 134.
  25. See Weiss: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2000, p. 9.
  26. ^ AFP: Kinshasa reports attack on provincial capital. December 11, 1997; Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 18.
  27. United Nations: Final Report of the international Commission of Inquiry about Illicit Arms Transfers in the Great Lakes Region. (S / 1998/1096). November 18, 1998, para. 17. Jason Stearns also points out that other sources place the number in the range between 30,000 and 40,000. See Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 181, footnote 2.
  28. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 14 ff.
  29. Economic and Oil Minister Pierre Victor Mpoyo accused example, quite frankly, "senior officials in Uganda", wood, gold and diamonds from the eastern parts of Congo across the border to smuggle. See East African Weekly, 1. – 7. June 1998, cit. according to Clark: Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations. 2001, 279.
  30. See the list in Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 16.
  31. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 183.
  32. See (also on the following examples) Weiss: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2000, p. 10.
  33. Clark: Explaining Ugandan intervention in Congo: evidence and interpretations. 2001, p. 268.
  34. So at least United Nations (ed.): Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003. 2010, p. 153.
  35. IRIN : IRIN Update No. 471 for Central and Eastern Africa. July 31, 1998, accessed June 28, 2011; BBC Worldwide Monitoring: DRCongo: Congolese Welcome Kabila's Sacking Foreigners from Army. July 29, 1998.
  36. ^ Johnson: Congo. 2009, p. 86; analogous to United Nations (ed.): Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, p. 153, who speak of "tutsi soldiers".
  37. IRIN: DRC: Fighting in east as army vows to topple Kabila. August 3, 1998, accessed July 19, 2011.
  38. United Nations (Ed.): Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, p. 159, Rn. 319
  39. a b IRIN: DRC: Situation confused as Banyamulenge take over Bukavu radio. August 3, 1998, accessed June 29, 2011.
  40. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 181.
  41. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 22.
  42. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, pp. 188-190.
  43. Reuters: Congo urges neighbors to avoid rebellion. August 4, 1998, accessed June 29, 2011.
  44. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 21.
  45. AFP: Congolese threaten to expand conflict to neighbor Rwanda. August 9, 1998.
  46. United Nations (Ed.): Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, p. 154, Rn. 312.
  47. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 181; IRIN: DRC: Situation confused as Banyamulenge take over Bukavu radio. August 3, 1998, accessed June 29, 2011.
  48. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 188 f .; Weiss: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2000, p. 14.
  49. . See Carayannis, Weiss: The Democratic Republic of Congo, from 1996 to 2002. 2003, p. 271.
  50. ^ Market Enterprise: DRC Battle Summary and Map. August 10, 1998, accessed August 23, 2011.
  51. For the latter: Weiss: War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 2000, p. 14; Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 183; different view in detail Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 196.
  52. ^ Johnson, p. 88.
  53. Reyntjens: The great African was. 2009, p. 198 f .; United Nations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, para. 313.
  54. United Nations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, p. 155, Rn. 320, 374.
  55. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 23.
  56. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 24.
  57. IRIN: DRC: Rebels formally announce new movement, leadership. August 17, 1998, accessed August 24, 2011.
  58. For details on the members of the RCD also de Villers / Omasombo / Kennes, République démocratique du Congo. Guerre et politique. 2001, pp. 44-49.
  59. ^ Johnson: Congo. 2009, pp. 87, 90 ff .; Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 184.
  60. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 206.
  61. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 209 f.
  62. IRIN: IRIN Update No. 478 for Central and Eastern Africa. August 11, 1998, accessed August 24, 2011.
  63. AP: Zimbabwe willing to help Kabila says Defense Minister. August 13, 1998.
  64. ^ Reuters: Angola confirms intervention planned in Congo. August 19, 1998, accessed August 24, 2011.
  65. See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 185.
  66. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, pp. 25; also AP: Government asks troops to regroup as rebels advance on Kinshasa With Zimbab. August 19, 1998.
  67. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 197; Reyntjens: The great African was. 2009, p. 199; Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 185.
  68. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 186; IRIN: Weekly Round-up 35-98 covering the period August 21-27, 1998. August 27, 1998, accessed January 31, 2012; Norimitsu Onishi: Congo Recaptures a Strategic Base. In: The New York Times. August 24, 1998, p. A4, accessed January 31, 2012.
  69. See Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 185.
  70. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 186, in contradiction to government and diplomatic information from the time. Reuters reported on August 28, citing diplomats, that Kabila was (still) no longer in the capital, and also quoted the political chief of staff Abdoulaye Yerodia on August 27 as saying that Kabila would still be in the country and soon would come back. See Reuters: Shelling in Kinshasa suburb, civilians flee. August 28, 1998. Retrieved November 28, 2012.
  71. Reuters: Rebels attack outskirts of Kinshasa. August 26, 1998, accessed August 24, 2011.
  72. Reyntjens: The great African was. 2009, p. 199.
  73. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 186; IRIN: Update No. 490 for Central and Eastern Africa. August 28, 1998, accessed on November 18, 2012. The United Nations describe the incidents in detail in their Mapping Report and speak of at least 80 people killed, cf. United Nations (Ed.): Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, p. 156 f., Rn. 314.
  74. ^ Johnson: Congo. 2009, p. 87 f.
  75. IRIN: Update No. 491 for Central and Eastern Africa. August 31, 1998, accessed January 31, 2012.
  76. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 26; also World Food Program: WFP airlifts first emergency food aid to Kinshasa. September 10, 1998, accessed January 31, 2012.
  77. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 203; see also IRIN: Update No. 497 for Central and Eastern Africa. September 8, 1998, accessed January 31, 2012.
  78. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 204.
  79. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 32; an example of this is the composition of the attackers in the attacks on the rebel stronghold of Goma in North Kivu, cf. AFP: DR Congo rebels admit they are losing grip on east. September 17, 1998. In it, RCD leader dia Wamba: “We don't control the entire Kivu, but have decided to fundamentally rethink the May-May problem.” (“We don't control all of Kivu, but we have decided to reconsider the May-May problem from the beginning. "); IRIN: IRIN chronology of current crisis as of September 30, 1998. September 30, 1998; IRIN: Update No. 518 Central and Eastern Africa. October 7, 1998, accessed February 1, 2012.
  80. Carayannis: The Complex Wars of the Congo. 2003, p. 243 f.
  81. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 27; IRIN reported on September 14, 1998 that the government and its allies had confirmed the establishment of their headquarters in Kindu. See IRIN: Update No. 501 for Central and Eastern Africa. September 14, 1998, accessed January 31, 2012.
  82. For the former Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 27; going back to AFP: 2,000 Sudanese troops in government-held Kindu. September 15, 1998; Doubtful Prunier: Rebel movements and proxy warfare. 2004, p. 378. Immediately after the troop movement, AFP quoted a diplomat who (in line with Prunier) identified the troops flown in as Rwandan Interahamwe militiamen who had been trained in Sudan. See AFP: Ugandan newspaper claims Sudan sent 2,000 troops to DRC. September 22, 1998. Differentiated from another troop transport towards the end of September also AFP: Sudan to send additional troops to DR Congo. September 25, 1998, where sources are quoted according to which the soldiers of this second transport (whose strength is put at 1,500 people) from rebels of the ADF ( Allied Democratic Forces ) , the LRA ( Lord's Resistance Army ) and the UNRF-II (Uganda National Rescue Front II) were composed.
  83. ^ Prunier: Rebel movements and proxy warfare. 2004, p. 378 f .; officially confirmed on September 29, cf. AFP: Chad sends troops to aid Congo president. September 29, 1998; IRIN: Chronology of current crisis as of September 30, 1998. September 30, 1998; or IRIN: IRIN Weekly Round-Up 46-98 covering the period 6-12 Nov 1998. November 13, 1998, accessed November 22, 2012.
  84. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 29; AFP reported for the first time on September 14th that Belgium had accused the Burundian army of crossing the border into the Congo. See AFP: Rebels charge Sudanese troops supporting Kabila, but deny general offensive. September 15, 1998.
  85. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 28.
  86. IRIN: IRIN Weekly Round-Up 43-98 covering the period 16-22 Oct 1998. 23 October 1998, accessed on 22 November 2012). Illustrative IRIN: Zimbabwe-DRC: Allied forces to confront rebels in east. October 21, 1998, accessed November 22, 2012. Therein Mugabe: “We are going east. From a military point of view, this means that we defend the Congo from the rebels ”(own translation.
  87. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 206.
  88. ^ Reuters: Rebels fight for strategic East Congo town. October 6, 1998, accessed November 22, 2012; IRIN: IRIN Update No. 523 Central and Eastern Africa. October 14, 1998, accessed November 22, 2012.
  89. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 206.
  90. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 28.
  91. IRIN: IRIN Update No. 532 Central and Eastern Africa. October 27, 1998, accessed February 1, 2012.
  92. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 29.
  93. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 30; Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 206 f.
  94. IRIN: IRIN-CEA Weekly Round-Up 48-98 covering the period 20-26 Nov 1998. November 27, 1998, accessed November 22, 2012.
  95. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 29 f. The first reports of such motivation problems were found at the end of November and were immediately described by the Zimbabwean government as "malicious lies". Cf. AFP: Report of mutiny by Zimbabwean troops in DRCongo slammed as "lies". November 30, 1998. Retrieved November 22, 2012.
  96. ↑ In detail on Bemba Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, pp. 217-223.
  97. ^ Kisangani: Civil Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 2012, pp. 141, 143; in this sense also Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 225 ff.
  98. Stearns: Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. 2011, p. 225; United Nations: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993-2003. 2010, para. 381, p. 206.
  99. See Clark: Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War. 2002, p. 156.
  100. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 205.
  101. ^ Prunier: Africa's World War. 2009, p. 205.
  102. See Carayannis: The Complex Wars of the Congo: Towards a New Analytic Approach. 2003, p. 244.
  103. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 31 f.
  104. Ngolet: Crisis in the Congo. 2011, p. 32.
  105. ^ Johnson: Congo. 2009, p. 91 ff.
  106. a b Johnson, p. 96.
  107. Johnson, pp. 97f.
  108. Johnson, pp. 99f.
  109. Johnson, pp. 100f.
  110. Johnson, pp. 120ff.
  111. Johnson, pp. 103-105f.
  112. ^ Johnson, p. 133.
  113. Johnson, pp. 133, 136f.
  114. Johnson, pp. 76, 134.
  115. ^ Network Peace Co-operatives : Alliances and Mesallianzan in Congo / Zaire
  116. ^ Johnson, p. 89.
  117. ^ Johnson, p. 126.
  118. Alexander Schwabe: Congo War: massacre, starvation and big business. on: mirror online. November 14, 2002.
  119. Peter Scholl-Latour: African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 310.
  120. Peter Scholl-Latour: African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 122.
  121. Johnson, pp. 109f.
  122. One of the investigation reports (2007): IRC Congo Mortality Survey 2007
  123. Peter Scholl-Latour: African death suit - The sell-out of the black continent. Goldmann, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-442-15219-4 , p. 115 f.
  124. The financing of war through the sale of raw materials is well documented by numerous studies by the UN and various non-governmental organizations . A selection of reports can be found at http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/dokumente/index.php
  125. Johnson, pp. 106-110.
  126. a b c Johnson, pp. 106-108.
  127. Johnson, p. 180.
  128. Johnson, pp. 77, 124-128, 131.
  129. Johnson, pp. 124f.
  130. Johnson, pp. 77, 124-128.
  131. Johnson, pp. 127, 130.
  132. Dominik J Schaller: Guilt and atonement in Rwanda: How genocide researchers acting as political advisors contribute to the moral and political upgrading of the regime in Kigali In: Zeitschrift für Politikberatung. Volume 1, Numbers 3–4, pp. 626–636, doi: 10.1007 / s12392-008-0064-4
  133. ^ Johnson, p. 124.
  134. Johnson, pp. 130f.