Daimonion

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1st century bust of Socrates in the Louvre , Paris

A daimonion ( ancient Greek δαιμόνιον daimónion, Latin genius ) is an inner voice in ancient literature that, according to tradition, gave the philosopher Socrates warning signs to keep him from making wrong decisions. Socrates considered the originator of these signs to be a deity which he did not specify. He followed the waving of the voice, always given without justification, which, according to his statements, always proved to be useful and helpful. If the daimonion was silent, he took it as approval of his behavior. As he shared his experiences with the Inner Advisor, his relationship with the mysterious authority in his hometown of Athens was well known. Opponents accused him of introducing a religious innovation. This accusation contributed to the fact that he was born in 399 BC. Was sentenced to death and executed.

Reliable contemporary information on the daimonion is scarce. The main sources are descriptions by Socrates' disciples Plato and Xenophon . The phenomenon was already considered puzzling in antiquity, led to the formation of legends and gave rise to various explanations. Platonists viewed the sign-giver as a high-ranking daimon , as a divine spirit being who functioned as the philosopher's personal protective spirit. Christian authors saw in the guide partly a guardian angel , partly a malicious demon .

In modern research, opinions differ on the interpretation of the sources. A central topic of discussion is the question of how Socrates was able to reconcile his claim to orient himself only to reason with following unfounded advice of unclear origin.

Word meaning

The word daimonion ('deity', 'demon') is the noun form of the neuter form of the adjective daimónios ('divine', 'demonic'), which is derived from the noun daimon (Greek δαίμων daímōn , 'divine being', 'demon') . In Plato, according to a widespread but controversial research opinion, it occurs as an elliptical expression, that is, as an adjective, whereby the associated noun - in this case a sign - is omitted. Then the meaning is the divine / demonic [sign]; what is meant is the communication of the inner voice. According to an alternative interpretation, Plato uses the word, like his contemporary Xenophon, as a noun meaning 'the divine in general', 'an indefinite deity'. Then the sign is not meant, but its originator.

In Greek mythology , popular religion and philosophy, a daimon is either a god or a god-like spirit being who occupies a middle position between gods and humans. Such a middle being, a "demon", can be helpful or hostile. It is therefore not a question of demons in the sense of the Christian notion of the consistently malignant nature of all demons, which still has an impact today. In the sources, the term daimon is used in particular when there is talk of an influence from a superhuman sphere that is not attributed to a specific god known by name, but to an unknown higher power. Accordingly, the associated adjective daimonios and its nouns also refer to an unspecified divine instance. This indeterminacy is an important aspect of the philosophical use of the word among the early Socratics , the disciples of Socrates. The vague, abstract expression daimonion is intended to indicate that the signs of the divine authority are perceived, but the originator himself remains in the dark and can therefore only be described generally as “something divine”. It is unclear whether the sign-giver is one of the gods of the popular religion or an independent “demonic” spirit being that makes contact with Socrates, or a mysterious, purely internal authority that only operates in the spirit of Socrates.

Reports from the classical era

All representations by contemporaries of Socrates have in common that the daimonion appears as a warning authority that discourages individual errors without justifying this or giving further clarification. The signs of the daimonion are imperceptible to the environment; Socrates is the only one who hears the voice. He is always only the passive recipient of surprising warning signals that “happen” to him. It never happens that he takes the initiative, asks for a sign or tries to learn something from the divine authority. In Plato's presentation, the daimonion's warnings relate exclusively to individual imminent decisions in the respective concrete situation; general knowledge is not conveyed. Socrates interprets the absence of a warning sign as the tacit approval of the higher power to his current intention. Since the daimonion gives no justification or evaluation, it bears no resemblance to a moral sense or a voice of conscience. His hints not only serve to avoid ethically relevant wrong decisions, but also generally prevent an “incorrect” approach, even on trivial occasions, which would be unsuccessful or have disadvantageous consequences.

Since Socrates used to tell about his experiences with the higher power in his large circle of friends and acquaintances, these were generally known. Much talked about it in Athens. The daimonion was one of the peculiarities that made Socrates a strange outsider to his fellow citizens.

The main contemporary sources are reports from two disciples of Socrates, Plato and Xenophon. The most important information can be found in the Apology of Socrates , the literary version of Plato's defense speech that Socrates gave before the Athenian People's Court when he was in 399 BC. Chr. Because of godlessness was accused and seduction of youth. The apology , according to the indictment was, he disregards the gods of the state cult and bring new daimonia - divine beings, powers, or effects - one, that is an illegal cult. This obviously meant his daimonion.

In the defense speech, Socrates explains why he gives advice to private individuals, but does not appear before the popular assembly as a speaker and advisor to the crowd and actively intervene in politics. The daimonion, his inner voice, rightly warned him against such political activity. The reason for this, from his point of view, is that someone like him, who is under no circumstances willing to accept something wrong, has to oppose the rulers in both a democracy and an oligarchy . But with such an attitude one cannot be politically successful. Those who consistently stand up for justice are even killed if they interfere in politics, and that would not serve anyone.

Socrates describes the daimonion in the Apology as "something divine and daimonic" that happens to him. According to him, the divine voice has only intervened since childhood to discourage individual intentions; She never makes recommendations. Often the daimonion interrupts him in the middle of speaking. So far, it has often come forward to prevent him from doing something, always when he wanted to behave wrongly, even on minor occasions. Socrates speaks of a "sign of God" that always warns him against wrong steps, but is now silent about the process and in view of the impending death penalty. From the absence of the divine warning he deduces that the carefree and frankness with which he appears in court and accepts a death sentence cannot be a bad thing, and that there is no reason to regard death as an evil. Otherwise the daimonion would have intervened and stopped him.

The daimonion is also mentioned in some of Plato's fictional, literary dialogues , in which the author lets his teacher Socrates appear as a conversation partner. In the Euthyphron one learns that the charges against Socrates were based on the accusation that he was inventing new gods. This allegation related to the philosopher's claim that he heard the divine voice. In the Euthydemus Socrates says that it was one day the "usual divine signs" prevented to get up and the locker room of the Lyceum - gymnasium to leave. Because he stayed, there was a philosophical conversation with those who were new. In the Politeia , Socrates alludes casually to the daimonion's warning against political activity and comments that he does not know whether he is the only person who has received such a sign so far. In the Phaedrus the voice announces itself to prevent Socrates from leaving for a walk; the reason is that he must first cleanse his conscience and correct a wrongdoing committed immediately before. Socrates understands what the voice means, he suspected it beforehand: He spoke badly about the god Eros and thereby committed a slander. He now has to revoke that. In Theaetetus , Socrates talks about students who separated from him but who later asked to be admitted again. In some of these cases the daimonion indicated to him that he should turn away the supplicant.

The daimonion is also mentioned in the First Alcibiades , a dialogue that was either written by Plato himself or was created in his environment. There Socrates announced that “a certain daimonical obstacle” had previously prevented him from approaching the young Alcibiades , but now there was no longer any resistance. Apparently - according to Socrates - the deity did not allow the conversation earlier, since Alcibiades, the future famous politician and strategist, was still too immature and a meeting with him would therefore have been fruitless.

Xenophon gives a somewhat different representation in his memoirs of Socrates . According to Xenophon's usage of the word, daimonion is not to be understood as the divine sign, but the divine per se, the deity in general as the author of the warnings. This does not mean an instance personally assigned to Socrates. Xenophon's version partially confirms Plato's statements; According to her, too, Socrates used to maintain that the daimonion gave him signs, which earned him the accusation on the part of the accusers that he was disregarding conventional religion and introducing new kinds of divine beings. In contrast to Plato, however, Xenophon reports that the signs of the daimonion not only affected Socrates' own affairs, but also gave him advice for his friends, and not only advised against wrong decisions, but also recommended good things. The outcome then showed that the advice benefited those who followed it, while others later regretted ignoring the divine hints. Xenophon counters the accusation of the philosopher's enemies that he introduced an illegitimate religious innovation that the daimonion's warnings were normal prophecies from the world of the universally recognized gods. A peculiarity of Xenophon's description is a detail for which he refers to Hermogenes , a pupil of Socrates. The already accused philosopher replied to the suggestion to prepare his defense that the best justification was his previous life. Although he initially planned to draft a speech for the trial, the daimonion then disapproved of this intention. Accordingly, Socrates' position before the court was improvised.

As Cicero reports, “in the books of the Socratics” there was often talk of the daimonion. Apparently the subject fascinated the philosopher's circle. With the exception of the works of Plato and Xenophon, this literature has not survived.

The daimonion is discussed in detail in the Theages . In antiquity, this dialogue was considered to be the work of Plato, but in more recent research it is largely viewed as inauthentic. It was probably created in the 4th century. The unknown author reproduces a fictional conversation in which Socrates talks to Demodokos, a respected citizen, and his ambitious son Theages. Demodokos wants his young son to be accepted among the disciples of Socrates. However, the philosopher hesitates; he points out the daimonion, tells of his previous experiences with this authority and wants to wait to see whether it advises against it. The description of the divine voice given here largely corresponds to the information in Plato's real dialogues, but also shows an important difference to them: In Theages the function of the inner adviser is greatly expanded as in Xenophon. In this dialogue, the daimonion is not limited to references that concern the personal affairs of Socrates, but it also enables the philosopher to warn of harmful plans of others, such as disastrous military ventures. The deity behind the daimonion thus gives the words of Socrates an additional authority that goes beyond his philosophical competence.

Hellenistic and imperial interpretations

At the latest in the Roman Empire , beginning as early as the 4th century BC. Chr., There was a change in understanding of the phenomenon of the inner voice. In the contemporary representations of Plato and Xenophon, the expression daimonion was used to indicate the vague, mysterious character of the divine originator of the signs. In doing so, the Socratics had evidently oriented themselves to the authentic choice of words of Socrates. This usage of language was intended to prevent hasty identification with a certain deity of mythology and popular religion. However, recipients of the imperial era no longer adhered to this skeptical restraint; the Socratic daimonion was equated with the daimon, a personal patron god, and thus received a clear definition. This was the common interpretation among the Platonists of the imperial era. It was believed that everyone, or at least every good person, had a daimon as protector. The peculiarity of the inspirations of Socrates could only be seen in the extraordinary quality of his relationship with his outstanding daimon. So the daimonion of Socrates was integrated into the general doctrine of demons and interpreted in this context. The phenomenon received special attention because it provided an opportunity to explore the interlocking of the divine and the human. One tried to fathom what the divine voice was and in what way it was effective.

According to Cicero, the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus , who in the 2nd century BC, was interested . Lived for the daimonion of Socrates and collected numerous reports about it. The writing of Antipater, a treatise on prophecy, was still known in Cicero's time, but is lost today.

The traditional role of the daimonion met with strong rejection among the Epicureans . According to their teaching, the gods do not interfere in human affairs. The Epicureans believed that Socrates, whom they judged extremely negatively, invented the divine clues out of showing off.

The Jewish historian Flavius ​​Josephus mentioned in his work On the Originality of Judaism (Against Apion) the opinion held by “some” that Socrates' communications about the Daimonion were meant to be joking.

Around the turn of the 1st to the 2nd century, the Middle Platonist Plutarch dealt with the riddle in detail. His Greek writing About the Daimonion of Socrates is a philosophical dialogue in which the participants in the conversation discuss various attempts to explain the divine symbol of Socrates. The fictional plot takes place two decades after the famous thinker was executed. The starting point is a statement by Galaxidoros, a participant who considers messages from superhuman beings to be superstitions. He praises Socrates, who only relied on his reason and what can be proven instead of paying attention to dreams, appearances and prophecies. Accordingly, Socrates believed in the gods, but not in ghosts and fables, and was therefore able to put philosophy on a serious basis. However, this assessment is countered by a conversation partner that the philosopher followed the instructions of his daimonion, which had proven to be justified, which, in view of the reports of eyewitnesses, cannot be dismissed as a fraud. Galaxidoros tries to downplay the phenomenon with a banal explanation: He suspects that Socrates only paid attention to an external sign, such as a sneeze, and made his decision dependent on it in certain cases of doubt, when none of the rational considerations could be decisive. This interpretation is based on a tradition that allegedly comes from the environment of Socrates, but meets with contradiction, because it seems to imply an unworthy behavior of the great thinker. Galaxidoros finds a clever reply to this. He argues that a sign that is insignificant in itself can herald a significant event, just as a minor symptom can be the sign of a serious illness or a light cloud precedes a storm. The discussion is then interrupted by a distraction, but the thread is taken up again later. Now Simmias von Theben , the circle's host , gives a different interpretation. As a student of Socrates, Simmias has the authority of an eyewitness. He reports that the teacher had refused to provide more information about his daimonion, but that his behavior provided evidence. He reacted negatively to stories of visions, but he was very interested in reports about divine voices. From this it was concluded among his group of students that the daimonion is probably not an optical impression, but an inner voice or the spiritual grasping of a silent message, the author of which is a higher being. According to Simmias 'theory, the messages entered Socrates' consciousness in the waking state, but this happened just as one receives the ideas and mental perceptions of certain words in a dream and believes to hear them, although no real voice is heard. In principle - according to Simmias' hypothesis - such voices can also be perceived by other people, but there is an obstacle to this: "the lack of harmony, the unrest within themselves". Only those who have “an undisturbed mind and a soul that is not aroused by storms ”, that is, like Socrates, is not under the compulsion of affects , can hear the messages. Simmias explains the special position of Socrates with the extraordinary receptivity of this man. His mind was pure and untroubled by passions and was therefore highly sensitive and able to take in any impression very quickly.

Plutarch did not strictly adhere to the tradition in Plato's apology , according to which the daimonion only advised against and never recommended anything. With him, the divine voice has an advisory role that goes beyond mere warning and deterrence.

In the third quarter of the 2nd century, the Middle Platonist Apuleius, who was active as a writer and orator, wrote the Latin treatise De deo Socratis (On the God of Socrates) , the widespread written version of a lecture in which he presented his doctrine of demons. In this context he treated, among other things, the daimonion. He said that the “divine sign” that Plato speaks of was probably something visible, that is, Socrates perceived his daimon not only with his ears but also with his eyes. According to this demonological model, the daimon can appear to man as an external figure, but usually appears internally as an internal voice; he dwells "in the manner of conscience" directly in the heart of the soul. In the case of Socrates, the daimon contented himself with warnings, since this man was such a perfect wise man that he did not need any guidance to carry out his duties. With Apuleius, the special position of Socrates as the privileged recipient of divine communications is clearly relativized. He does not appear as a unique darling of the deity, but as a role model to emulate and to be like. In principle, everyone is able to become a philosopher like Socrates and, like him, to enter into a close relationship with the divine realm, because everyone has their own daimon, a helpful guardian spirit and adviser, to whom they should orientate themselves like the great one Athenian at his daimonion.

Another Middle Platonist who dealt with the subject was the rhetor Maximus of Tire , who lived in the late 2nd century. In one of his speeches he discussed the daimonion of Socrates, addressing skeptics who doubted the reality of the phenomenon. He presented it as a prophetic authority, which was no more astonishing than the widely appreciated oracles known . Like Apuleius, he drew a parallel to a comparable phenomenon in Homer's Iliad , where the goddess Athena appears to stop Achilles . According to Maximos' interpretation, it is a real helpful daimon who assisted the philosopher as a protective spirit. According to the understanding of this interpreter, this is nothing unique, it does not represent a special feature of Socrates, because, according to the will of the gods, outstanding personalities are in the care of personal Daimonical helpers.

At the end of the 2nd and early 3rd centuries, the Christian apologist Tertullian passed a devastating judgment , who wanted to expose the entire tradition of the extraordinary wisdom of Socrates as a misleading in order to discredit philosophy by criticizing its outstanding representative. According to him, the daimonion was a real being who exerted a pernicious influence and prevented the glorious philosopher from turning to the good. Tertullian saw a "demonic" power at work in the sense of the Christian idea, according to which demons are diabolical creatures who only cause mischief. The daimonion cooperated with Apollo , who was also such a malicious demon. With his remarks, Tertullian initiated the Christian interpretation, which places the daimonion in the ranks of the evil demons. This is how the apologist Minucius Felix thought , who probably wrote the dialogue Octavius in the first half of the 3rd century . The author of the tract Quod idola dii non sint attributed to Cyprian of Carthage († 258) also considered the phenomenon to be diabolical. On the other hand, a contemporary of Tertullian, the church father Clemens of Alexandria , gave a positive assessment . He understood the daimonion as a guardian angel .

Late antique interpretations

The Neo-Platonists of late antiquity dealt with the interpretation of the daimonion in their commentaries on Plato. According to their demonology, which is based on Plato's concept, each person is assigned a daimon as a constant companion, guardian spirit and guide of destiny. Socrates, as an exemplary man, had a particularly exalted spiritual leader who was more than an intermediary between men and gods; his counselor was a god.

In the 4th or early 5th century, the scholar Calcidius took up the comparison with the apparent hearing of voices in dreams in his commentary on Plato's Timaeus .

In the 5th century, the influential Neo-Platonist Proklos went into the subject in detail in his commentary on the First Alcibiades . He discussed the nature of communication between the philosopher and his guardian spirit and the question why the daimonion only advised against and never advised. He emphasized that the divine voice did not come from outside, as with ordinary human hearing, but from within. She confined herself to warnings and gave no suggestions because Socrates did not need an incentive to do good deeds. The protective spirit of Socrates belongs to the area of ​​the cleansing power of the god Apollo. He examined particularly thoroughly a problem with which the well-known Neoplatonist Iamblichus and Proklos' teacher Syrianos had already dealt with: the question of why the daimonion allowed Socrates to deal with an unworthy person like Alcibiades.

Another Neoplatonic scholar who spoke about the divine sign was Hermeias of Alexandria , who, like Proclus, had attended the lessons of Syrianos. Hermeias dealt with the subject in his commentary on Plato's Phaedrus . He emphasized that the daimonion was neither a part of the soul nor the personified philosophy, as some believed. Rather, it is the personal protective spirit. According to Hermeias, every human being has one, but only those who philosophize with discipline manage to notice their presence. What is required is a virtuous way of life and a dedication to the divine realm, as practiced by Socrates. The messages of the daimonion are not heard with the physical ear, but are recorded through an act of perception of the soul by means of the soul vehicle . The reason why the divine counselor of Socrates limited himself to advising against was his respect for human self-determination. If the daimonion had not only warned, but also advised, the consequence would have been that the philosopher would have behaved like an unreasonable and alien being who does nothing by itself.

Socrates (center right) turns to demons. The picture shows the negative interpretation of the daimonion in the Middle Ages. Illumination in a manuscript of the French translation of Augustine's work Vom Gottesstaat , which Raoul de Presles made 1371–1375. The Hague, Museum Meermanno, 10 A 11, fol. 380v (late 15th century)

In the 6th century, one of the last pagan Neo-Platonists, Olympiodorus the Younger , only briefly referred to the daimonion in his commentary on the First Alcibiades .

Late antique church writers also commented on the phenomenon. They had different interpretations. In the early 4th century, the church father Eusebius of Caesarea considered the possibility that the daimonion had the function of a guardian angel for Socrates. His contemporary Laktanz, on the other hand, a well-known apologist, counted the daimonion among the evil demons. In the early 5th century Augustine polemicized in his work On the State of God against Apuleius' doctrine of demons. He was convinced that all demons are evil, and turned against Apuleius 'claim that Socrates' inner voice was that of a benevolent demon. For Augustine there were only two options: either Socrates' advisor was not a demon or he was bad.

Medieval and modern reception

Middle Ages and Early Modern Times

Socrates with his daimonion. Engraving by Giulio Antonio Bonasone in Achille Bocchi's work Symbolicarum quaestionum de universo genere, quas serio ludebat, libri quinque , Bologna 1555

In the early and high Middle Ages , the relevant works of Plato and Xenophon, as well as later Greek literature, were unknown to the Latin-speaking scholars of Western and Central Europe. But you could find information on the subject from Apuleius' work on the god of Socrates and Augustine's polemics.

The humanist Giannozzo Manetti , who wrote the first biography of Socrates since antiquity in 1440, described the daimonion from the ancient sources available to him. With reference to the "truthful" representation of Plato, Manetti represented the opinion that the daimonion was a guardian or guardian angel that Socrates received at his birth.

The humanist and Platonist Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499) dealt in detail with the demonology of ancient Platonism and especially with the doctrine of the personal demon as the guardian spirit of man. He primarily dealt with the demon teaching of Proclus. He went into the Socratic daimonion most extensively in his little comment (argumentum) on Plato's apology . Building on the ideas of the late ancient Neo-Platonists, he stated that the demon of Socrates was a Saturnian fire spirit and belongs to the highest class in the hierarchical hierarchy of guardian spirits. These spirit beings are so sublime that they are usually called gods. Outstanding philosophers like Socrates and Plotinus would have such companions. Ficino also discussed the question of how one should imagine “hearing” the voice of the Guardian Spirit. His intention was to integrate these Platonic ideas into his Christian worldview.

The humanist philosopher Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592), who admired Socrates, expressed reluctance to the daimonion. According to his conjecture, the sign of the ancient thinker was "a certain drive of the will that arose in him without waiting for the advice of his reason". These suggestions, though rash and disorderly, were probably always significant and worthy of obey. Montaigne said that everyone felt within himself the shadow images of such impulses of a suddenly impetuous thought. As he reports, he himself had such impulses, though less often than Socrates, and had followed them for his good fortune and benefit. Hence one might think that they had something of divine inspiration.

In 1754 Denis Diderot dealt with the question of intuitive abilities in natural research in his work Pensées sur l'interprétation de la Nature (Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature) . According to him, a great skill in experimentation confers a faculty of intuition which has the character of inspiration . If you are wrong about it like Socrates, you call it a familiar demon. Socrates had such a remarkable skill in judging people and weighing circumstances that even in the most difficult cases a quick and correct combination was secretly made within him. This enabled him to make a prediction from which the event itself hardly deviated. Diderot compared this process with the instinct in experimental physics. He asked how one can transfer the ability to “sense” new procedures and experiments and future results to another person. His answer was: The one who possesses the gift must first go inside to see clearly what it consists of, and then replace the “familiar demon” with clear, understandable terms and explain them to others. The ability could, for example, relate to the assumption or perception of opposites or analogies between individually viewed objects or the recognition of interactions between things viewed in context.

Socrates with Alcibiades and the Daimonion. Oil painting by François-André Vincent, 1776, in the Fabre Museum , Montpellier

Voltaire considered the daimonion to be a charlatanry of Socrates; he said it was a superstition.

The motif was picked up occasionally in painting. In an oil painting by François-André Vincent from 1776, Socrates speaks to Alkibiades while the angelic daimonion whispers to him from behind. The Danish painter Nicolai Abildgaard created an oil painting in 1784 that shows Socrates with two shadowy spirits, his daimonion and an evil demon. The daimonion prevents the demon from addressing the philosopher. The motif of the good and the bad spirit that accompany man comes from the depiction in Giannozzo Manetti's biography of Socrates.

19th century

Friedrich Schleiermacher found that the daimonion was not a personal character or appearance of any kind. Rather, it is about "the authentic field of such quick moral judgments which cannot be traced back to clear reasons and which he [Socrates] therefore did not attribute to his real self".

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel dealt in detail with the topic. In his lectures on the history of philosophy he emphasized the subjective, particular character of the daimonion. The “famous genius of Socrates”, a “so much talked-about bizarre of his imagination”, should in no way be thought of a guardian spirit or angel or of conscience. For Hegel, conscience is “the idea of ​​general individuality, of the self-assured spirit that is at the same time general truth”. The “demon of Socrates”, on the other hand, is the “very necessary other side”, the “individuality of the spirit”. He stands in the middle between the external of the oracle and the purely internal of the spirit. According to Hegel's understanding, the daimonion made Socrates a forerunner of modern subjectivity . Despite this forward-looking aspect, the Berlin philosopher judged the phenomenon critically; he viewed it as an expression of a pathological condition and found: "Socrates is driven." Hegel's disparaging judgment was based on the content of the messages of the "divine voice", in their restriction to advice on "particular successes" and thus on "coincidences" a reference to the general. After all, Hegel saw the daimonion as the beginning of the fact that “the will, which previously only transposed itself beyond itself, moved within itself and recognized itself within it”. This is "the beginning of knowing and therefore true freedom".

Søren Kierkegaard analyzed the phenomenon in detail in his dissertation from 1841. According to his findings, Plato's account, according to which the voice always only intervenes as a warning, is preferable to Xenophon's “thoughtlessness”, who added a driving role. The word daimonion is the expression for something absolutely abstract that works like an instinct. Socrates put this abstraction in the place of the concrete individuality of the gods, with which he entered into a polemical relationship to the state religion. Thus the indictment on this point was factual; “The demonic” describes “the utterly negative relationship of Socrates to the existing in religious terms”. From Kierkegaard's point of view, the daimonion should be viewed critically. Socrates was able to make do with it, it gave him security, but this was "merely the selfish satisfaction of a particular personality". Kierkegaard judged that one could see here that “subjectivity is brought to a standstill in its pouring out”, that it “closes itself off in a particular personality”.

Socrates with his daimonion. Drawing by Simeon Solomon, around 1865, in the Victoria and Albert Museum , London

Arthur Schopenhauer tried to explain the phenomenon in the context of his theory of premonitions. In his opinion, negative premonitions and pre-feelings are effects of “theoretical” dreams that take place in deep sleep and of which nothing remains in consciousness but their impression on the mind, which reverberates “as a prophetic foreboding, as a sinister anticipation”. Such an impression takes hold of the person when the first circumstances connected with the misfortune seen in the dream occur in reality. For Schopenhauer, the only warning intervention of the inner voice of Socrates fits this.

Friedrich Nietzsche included the daimonion in his devastating judgment on Socrates. He described it as "auditory hallucinations" that had been interpreted in a religious sense. This is one of the characteristics of Socrates' decadence . The phenomenon is perhaps "an ear ailment that he interprets according to his prevailing moral way of thinking differently than it would now be". In the warning function of the inner voice, Nietzsche believed he had found a key to the essence of Socrates. In his words, the “instinctive wisdom” only showed itself in this “completely abnormal nature” in order to prevent conscious knowledge. While with all productive people the instinct is the creative-affirmative force and the consciousness acts critical and admonishing, with Socrates the instinct became the critic and the consciousness the creator. Nietzsche saw this as a monstrous defect.

The daimonion was only occasionally used as a motif in the fine arts. The British pre-Raphaelite Simeon Solomon created the drawing Socrates and his Agathodaemon around 1865 . There the angelic guardian spirit stands as a naked young man next to the philosopher.

20th and 21st centuries

In research in the 20th and 21st centuries, the material in Plato's works usually forms the starting point for investigations into the daimonion, while Xenophon's information is only used as a supplement. It is assumed that, contrary to Xenophon's presentation, the daimonion actually only advised against and never advised, as Plato claims, although the advising against can also be understood as an encouragement to the opposite behavior. This weighting of the sources is related to the fact that when trying to reconstruct the philosophical position of the historical Socrates, Plato's image of Socrates is generally favored. In addition, Plato was present at the trial and Xenophon was not. However, some historians of philosophy expressly abstain from a judgment on the question of whether Xenophon's version might not offer an at least partially better tradition. In the second half of the twentieth century and in the twenty-first century, the history of philosophy discourse primarily discussed the question of how Socrates was able to reconcile the respect for the authority of the daimonion with his claim to be persuaded only by plausible arguments. Different proposed solutions have sparked controversial discussions.

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1919) considered the always warning intervention of the inner voice to be an indication of the impulsiveness of Socrates, which he had learned to master. The philosopher acquired the ability to heed such inner warnings through self-control, "which was very necessary to him given his passion". Some of his students would have believed him to be a real visionary and had given him an accompanying, subservient demon. They would not have accepted any authority next to him and would only have paid homage to the new demon. This eventually led to the accusation of godlessness and bad influence on the youth, which Socrates was doomed in the trial.

According to the judgment of Werner Jaeger (1944), the Daimonion proves that Socrates, in addition to his intellectual ability, "possessed the highest degree of instinct that rationalism so often lacks". This, and not the voice of conscience, is the meaning of the daimonion.

Olof Gigon (1947) saw the Daimonion primarily as a historical phenomenon, a trait of the historical Socrates who believed in the sign. Such a move was not necessary for the early “Socrates poetry”, the tradition of the first generation of Socrates, in which “the pure factuality of what has happened is elevated to a symbolic meaning through interpretation and reinterpretation”. But she found him and took him in, “rather in such a way that she came to terms with him”, without fully exploiting his “dramatic and spiritual possibilities”. Only later was the daimonion interpreted as a special phenomenon against the background of a general speculative demonology.

Karl Jaspers (1957) located the daimonion beyond the rational realm. According to his presentation, there were specific, unique situations in which Socrates could not justify a decision through right thinking. Therefore, he needed divine help, and this was "the limit at which there is obedience without discernment." The voice brought him no knowledge and he followed it without understanding. It was not an objective authority, but incommunicable. Therefore, he could not appeal to her for justification, but only give an indication of her.

Martha Nussbaum (1986) came to a completely different assessment . She said that the daimonion was not a god in the traditional sense, but - as a neuter - a "divine thing", namely human reason as an intermediary "between the animal that we are and the god that we could be". It is an ironic allusion to the only authoritative authority of reason, which for Socrates is the "God" who really deserves respect.

Gernot Böhme (1988) pointed out that Socrates could easily have described the hints of the inner voice as whisperings or warnings from the gods. Instead, he was very vague and extremely reserved. He insisted on the phenomenon but refused to attribute it to its traditional originators, the gods. His noticeably reduced way of speaking is - according to Böhme - a product of the Enlightenment that is already behind him. It was also understood in this way by his accusers when they accused him of not worshiping the gods of the city. For Böhme the daimonion necessarily belongs to the “type of person” that Socrates embodies. This type has isolated itself from heterogeneous drives to act - be it divine stimuli or drives originating from the unconscious - in order to appear as perpetrators of their own deeds. But precisely as the type that is organized through consciousness, he is particularly sensitive to the heterogeneous drives he finds in himself. The daimonion is to be understood as the last residue of such impulses, not as a deeper self of Socrates, for he experiences it as something that he is not himself. As a conscious person, he has taken over all positive drives for action into himself. The negative ones, which “are simply a no”, come from an area of ​​which he is not master, over which he cannot give an account, but which he accepts. He wanted to push back the irrational, but encountered the limits of this program and then preferred to develop ways of dealing with the irrational rather than denying it.

Gregory Vlastos (1989, 1991) considered the daimonion to be an “extra-rational” source of information, but found that the juxtaposition of rational reflection and divine voice was not a problem, because Socrates had by no means two different systems of justifying assumptions. According to Vlastos' interpretation, the indications of the daimonion were for the philosopher not a source of ethical certainty that was independent of reason and that was superior to it. Rather, he interpreted the signs in the light of his critical reason. They gave him a subjective reinforcement, but never had such weight that they could have changed his rationally justified decisions. Only reasons of reason were decisive.

The interpretation put forward by Vlastos was contradicted by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (1994), who believed that the daimonion had contradicted reasonable, but nonetheless wrong decisions and prevented their implementation. According to the findings of Michael Bingenheimer (1993), however, the possibility of a conflict between reason and the divine voice, assumed by Brickhouse and Smith, did not exist. Bingenheimer interpreted the experience of the daimonion as a security of Socrates arising from the religious sphere, that his actions and thoughts are in accordance with the divine world order - "an expression of a happy personality for whom rational and religious action go hand in hand".

Franz Vonessen (1993) came to the conclusion that the daimonion was not a special authority, but the voice of a daimon. According to Vonessen's understanding of Plato's remarks, this is not a deity approaching Socrates from outside, but is to be found in himself as an inner god: the daimon is identical with reason. Reason is indeed given to everyone and thus everyone has such a personal daimon, but not everyone is in living contact with the divine that dwells in him. The special position of Socrates, who was the only one who heard the divine voice, is from the point of view of the Platonists due to the fact that he has attained wisdom as far as it can be reached by humans: “That means that reason does not stand for him more about the ego, but the ego coincides with it, with the highest part of the soul. "

Mark L. McPherran (1996) agreed with Vlastos that the signs were extra-rational phenomena and that Socrates scrutinized them whenever possible. But one should not, as is the case with Vlastos' interpretation, reduce it to a mere emotional premonition. Rather, for Socrates they were definitely the basis for the construction of claims to a special moral knowledge, and he assumed that there was a reasonable basis for this knowledge, although he could not have assumed infallibility. McPherran's consideration is: Since the signs always related to the future that could not be estimated at the time or only to a limited extent, it was entirely compatible with a rational attitude to trust such hints. The reliability of the information source could be checked retrospectively, and since she had always confirmed herself, the decision to continue to trust her was rationally justified.

Richard Kraut (2000) came to a similar assessment. He said that Socrates had critically examined the reliability of his inner voice over a longer period of time and only then confided in its leadership. Therefore his attitude is rationally justified. Kraut emphasized that the strange effect of the philosopher's statements in court had inevitably occurred, because his claim to a unique divine private revelation had appeared arrogant and was a challenge for conservative religious circles.

C. David C. Reeve (2000) identified the originator of the daimonion's warnings with the god Apollo. At least this applies to the point of view of Plato's dialogue figure Socrates, regardless of the question of his relationship to the historical person.

Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2005) turned against the “reductionist” approach of Vlastos, which does not do justice to the sources, and opposed it with an empirical , “reliabilistic” interpretation. Accordingly, based on a multitude of experiences, Socrates could come to the rational conclusion that the daimonion's hints were reliable and helpful, even if he had no knowledge of their origin or the reason for their reliability. The empirical evidence was sufficient to justify this conclusion.

Mark Joyal (2005) recalled the importance of the “Socratic problem”, the general uncertainty about the views of the historical Socrates. He pointed out that this uncertainty also affects the understanding of the daimonion. The debates revolve around the image of Socrates of the literary source discussed, while the question of historical truth remains open.

Anthony A. Long (2006) argued against Vlastos 'view that one could not reconcile Socrates' commitment to reason with the assumption of an irrational daimonion. It can therefore be assumed that the philosopher has taken the action of this authority and its heed to the warnings as rational. In many cases he found clear reasons that made advising against the inner voice seem sensible. The background was his conviction that human reason is of divine origin and is therefore in harmony with the striving of the godhead and that a divine voice by its nature can only proclaim what is reasonable. Numerous experiences had reinforced this understanding and the reliability of the warnings had given him good reason to trust the source of the information.

Further research discussions revolve around the questions of whether the voice of the daimonion can be assigned to one of the traditional gods of Greek mythology, such as Apollon, as Luc Brisson (2005) thinks, and whether the communicator is an omniscient world leader, as Mark L. McPherran ( 2005) believes, or whether it is just an internal authority that does not intervene from the outside world, but only operates in the spirit of Socrates, as Gerd Van Riel (2005) assumes.

literature

Collections of articles

  • Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (Eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy. Academic Printing and Publishing, Kelowna 2005, ISBN 0-920980-91-0
  • Nicholas D. Smith, Paul B. Woodruff (Eds.): Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, ISBN 0-19-513322-6

Studies on the reception in the classical period

  • Anthony A. Long: How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him? In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (Ed.): A Companion to Socrates. Blackwell, Malden 2006, ISBN 1-4051-0863-0 , pp. 63-74
  • Mark A. Joyal: 'The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me': A Problem In Plato's Apology? In: Mark Joyal (Ed.): Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Essays Presented to John Whittaker. Ashgate, Aldershot 1997, ISBN 0-86078-647-1 , pp. 43-58

Studies on the post-classical reception

  • Klaus Döring : Plutarch and the daimonion of Socrates. In: Mnemosyne 37, 1984, pp. 376-392
  • Mark Joyal: Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates' Divine Sign. In: Lewis Ayres (Ed.): The Passionate Intellect. Transaction, New Brunswick / London 1995, ISBN 1-56000-210-7 , pp. 39-56
  • Geert Roskam: Voice or Vision? Socrates' Divine Sign and Homeric Epiphany in Late Platonism and Beyond. In: American Journal of Philology 135, 2014, pp. 359-385
  • Geert Roskam: Socrates' δαιμόνιoν in Maximus of Tire, Apuleius, and Plutarch. In: Françoise Frazier, Delfim F. Leão (eds.): Tychè et Pronoia. La marche du monde selon Plutarque. Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanísticos da Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra 2010, ISBN 978-989-8281-52-4 , pp. 93-108

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Luc Brisson: Socrates and the Divine Signal according to Plato's Testimony: Philosophical Practice as Rooted in Religious Tradition. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 1–12, here: 2 f .; Pierre Destrée: The Daimonion and the Philosophical Mission - Should the Divine Sign Remain Unique to Socrates? In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 63–79, here: 64.
  2. ↑ Louis-André Dorion: L'autre Socrate , Paris 2013, pp. 287–290. Cf. Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, p. 53 f. and note 49.
  3. ↑ Michael Bingenheimer (translator): Lucius Apuleius of Madaura: De deo Socratis. The Guardian Spirit of Socrates , Frankfurt 1993, pp. 36–40; Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, pp. 16–19.
  4. ↑ Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (Ed.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. VIII f.
  5. ↑ Luc Brisson: Socrates and the Divine Signal according to Plato's Testimony: Philosophical Practice as Rooted in Religious Tradition. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 1–12, here: 4 f., 11.
  6. ^ Bruno Centrone: Il daimonion di Socrate nello pseudoplatonico Teage . In: Gabriele Giannantoni , Michel Narcy (eds.): Lezioni socratiche , Napoli 1997, pp. 329–348, here: 342.
  7. ↑ Mark A. Joyal: 'The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me': A Problem In Plato's Apology? In: Mark Joyal (Ed.): Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition , Aldershot 1997, pp. 43–58, here: 44–46.
  8. ↑ Michael Bingenheimer (translator): Lucius Apuleius of Madaura: De deo Socratis. The protective spirit of Socrates , Frankfurt 1993, p. 59.
  9. ^ Plato, Apologie des Sokrates 24b – c. See Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates on Trial , Oxford 1989, pp. 34-36.
  10. ^ Plato, Apology of Sokrates 31c – 33a. See Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates on Trial , Oxford 1989, pp. 169-173; Gregory Vlastos: Socrates. Ironist and moral philosopher , Cambridge 1991, p. 286 f.
  11. ^ Plato, Apologie des Sokrates 31c – d, 40a – c. See Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates on Trial , Oxford 1989, pp. 237-256.
  12. ^ Plato, Euthyphron 3b. Cf. Maximilian Forschner (translator): Platon: Euthyphron , Göttingen 2013, pp. 52–58.
  13. ↑ Plato, Euthydemus 272e-273a.
  14. ↑ Plato, Politeia 496c.
  15. ↑ Plato, Phaedrus 242b-243b. See Ernst Heitsch (translator): Plato: Phaidros , Göttingen 1993, p. 89.
  16. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 151a.
  17. ↑ Alkibiades I 103a-b, 105d-106a, 124c-d. See Klaus Döring (translator): Platon: Erste Alkibiades , Göttingen 2016, pp. 67–70, 114 f.
  18. ↑ Louis-André Dorion: L'autre Socrate , Paris 2013, pp. 276–281.
  19. ↑ Xenophon, Memories of Socrates 1, 1, 1–5; 4,3,12; 4.8.1. See Louis-André Dorion: L'autre Socrate , Paris 2013, pp. 281-287, 295; Thomas L. Pangle: The Socratic Way of Life: Xenophon's Memorabilia , Chicago / London 2018, pp. 12-14.
  20. ↑ Xenophon, Memories of Socrates 4,8,5. See Louis-André Dorion: L'autre Socrate , Paris 2013, pp. 285 f .; Mark A. Joyal: 'The Divine Sign Did Not Oppose Me': A Problem In Plato's Apology? In: Mark Joyal (Ed.): Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition , Aldershot 1997, pp. 43–58, here: 54–56.
  21. ↑ Cicero, De divinatione 1,122.
  22. ^ Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : The Platonism in antiquity , Volume 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 315.
  23. ↑ Theages 128d-131a. Cf. Klaus Döring (translator): [Platon]: Theages , Göttingen 2004, pp. 49–71; Bruno Centrone: Il daimonion di Socrate nello pseudoplatonico Teage . In: Gabriele Giannantoni, Michel Narcy (eds.): Lezioni socratiche , Napoli 1997, pp. 329–348, here: 334–348; Mark Joyal (Ed.): The Platonic Theages , Stuttgart 2000, pp. 72-103, 128-130.
  24. ↑ Mark Joyal: Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates' Divine Sign. In: Lewis Ayres (ed.): The Passionate Intellect , New Brunswick / London 1995, pp. 39–56, here: 42 f.
  25. ↑ Mark Joyal: Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates' Divine Sign. In: Lewis Ayres (ed.): The Passionate Intellect , New Brunswick / London 1995, pp. 39–56, here: 39–43, 55 f. ; Louis-André Dorion: L'autre Socrate , Paris 2013, pp. 298-300.
  26. ^ Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: The Platonism in antiquity , Volume 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 316; Klaus Döring: Exemplum Socratis , Wiesbaden 1979, p. 11.
  27. ↑ Cicero, De divinatione 1,123. See Klaus Döring: Exemplum Socratis , Wiesbaden 1979, p. 6.
  28. ↑ Knut Kleve: Scurra Atticus. The Epicurean View of Socrates. In: Συζήτησις. Studi sull'epicureismo greco e romano offerti a Marcello Gigante , Naples 1983, pp. 227-251, here: 242 f.
  29. ↑ Flavius ​​Josephus, On the originality of Judaism 2,263.
  30. ↑ Plutarch, On the Daimonion of Socrates 9 f. Cf. Pierluigi Donini: Socrates and his demon in Platonism of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD In: Matthias Baltes (translator) ao: Apuleius: De deo Socratis. About the God of Socrates , Darmstadt 2004, pp. 142–161, here: 149–151.
  31. ↑ Plutarch, On the Daimonion of Socrates 11 f. Cf. Olof Gigon: Socrates. His image in poetry and history , 3rd edition, Tübingen / Basel 1994, p. 176 f.
  32. ↑ Plutarch, On the Daimonion of Socrates 12. See on the role of Galaxidoros Daniel Babut : La part du rationalisme dans la religion de Plutarque: l'exemple du De genio Socratis. In: Daniel Babut: Parerga , Lyon 1994, pp. 431-408, here: 393-408.
  33. ↑ Plutarch, On the Daimonion of Socrates 20 f. Cf. Klaus Döring: Plutarch and the daimonion of Socrates. In: Mnemosyne 37, 1984, pp. 376-392, here: 379-381; Stephan Schröder : Plutarch on oracles and divine inspiration. In: Heinz-Günther Nesselrath (ed.): Plutarch: On the daimonion of Socrates , Tübingen 2010, pp. 145–168, here: 159–168; Andrei Timotin: La demonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, pp. 246–249.
  34. ^ Jan Opsomer: Plutarch's Defense of the Theages, in Defense of Socratic Philosophy? In: Philologus 141, 1997, pp. 114-136, here: 115-121; Pierluigi Donini: Socrates and his demon in Platonism of the 1st and 2nd centuries AD In: Matthias Baltes (translator) ao: Apuleius: De deo Socratis. About the God of Socrates , Darmstadt 2004, pp. 142–161, here: 150 f.
  35. ↑ Apuleius, About the God of Socrates 17-20. Cf. Geert Roskam: Voice or Vision? Socrates' Divine Sign and Homeric Epiphany in Late Platonism and Beyond. In: American Journal of Philology 135, 2014, pp. 359-385, here: 368-370; Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, pp. 282–286; Marie-Luise Lakmann: Introduction to Scripture. In: Matthias Baltes (translator) ao: Apuleius: De deo Socratis. About the God of Socrates , Darmstadt 2004, pp. 11–44, here: 33.
  36. ^ Philippe Hoffmann: Le sage et son demon. La figure de Socrate in the tradition philosophique et littéraire. In: École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses: Annuaire. Résumés des conférences et travaux , Volume 94, 1985-1986, pp. 417-435, here: 429-431; Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, pp. 259, 278 f.
  37. ↑ Maximus of Tire, Speeches 8: 1-3. Cf. Geert Roskam: Voice or Vision? Socrates' Divine Sign and Homeric Epiphany in Late Platonism and Beyond. In: American Journal of Philology 135, 2014, pp. 359-385, here: 365-368; Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, p. 283 f.
  38. ↑ Maximus of Tire, Speeches 8: 6-8. Cf. Geert Roskam: Socrates' δαιμόνιoν in Maximus of Tire, Apuleius, and Plutarch. In: Françoise Frazier, Delfim F. Leão (eds.): Tychè et Pronoia , Coimbra 2010, pp. 93–108, here: 96–99.
  39. ↑ Tertullian, Apologeticum 22.1; 46.5; De anima 1, 2–6; 39.3. Cf. Lucia Saudelli: Le Socrate de Tertullien. In: Revue d'études augustiniennes et patristiques 59, 2013, pp. 23–53, here: 39–48; Klaus Döring: Exemplum Socratis , Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 154-160.
  40. ↑ Minucius Felix, Octavius 26.8 f .; 38.5. See Mark Edwards: Socrates and the early Church. In: Michael Trapp (Ed.): Socrates from antiquity to the Enlightenment , Aldershot 2007, pp. 127–141, here: 130.
  41. ^ (Pseudo) Cyprian of Carthage, Quod idola dii non sint 6.
  42. ^ Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 5,91,5. Cf. Edgar Früchtel: Some remarks on the Socrates picture in Clemens Alexandrinus. In: Wolfgang von der Weppen et al. (Ed.): Sokrates im Gang der Zeiten , Tübingen 2006, pp. 57–76, here: 66–68.
  43. ↑ See on Neoplatonic demonology Andrei Timotin: La démonologie platonicienne , Leiden / Boston 2012, pp. 286, 301–318; Mark Joyal: Tradition and Innovation in the Transformation of Socrates' Divine Sign. In: Lewis Ayres (Ed.): The Passionate Intellect , New Brunswick / London 1995, pp. 39–56, here: 39–41; Alain Philippe Segonds (ed.): Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon , Volume 1, Paris 1985, pp. 64, 166.
  44. ↑ Calcidius, Commentary on Plato's Timaeus 288.
  45. ↑ Proklos, Commentary on the First Alcibiades 78–85, ed. by Alain Philippe Segonds: Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon , Volume 1, Paris 1985, pp. 63-70; see. Pp. 166-170.
  46. ↑ Proklos, Commentary on the First Alcibiades 85–93, ed. by Alain Philippe Segonds: Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon , Volume 1, Paris 1985, pp. 70-77; see. Pp. 170-175.
  47. ↑ Hermeias of Alexandria, Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus 1.64. See Hildegund Bernard (translator): Hermeias von Alexandrien: Commentary on Plato's “Phaidros” , Tübingen 1997, p. 69 f. and the notes on pp. 157–164; Geert Roskam: Voice or Vision? Socrates' Divine Sign and Homeric Epiphany in Late Platonism and Beyond. In: American Journal of Philology 135, 2014, pp. 359-385, here: 375-378; Philippe Hoffmann: Le sage et son demon. La figure de Socrate dans la tradition philosophique et littéraire (suite). In: École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses: Annuaire. Résumés des conférences et travaux , Volume 96, 1987-1988, pp. 272-279.
  48. ↑ Olympiodorus the Younger, Commentary on the First Alcibiades 21: 1-14. Cf. François Renaud: Socrates' Divine Sign: From the Alcibiades to Olympiodorus. In: Marguerite Johnson, Harold Tarrant (eds.): Alcibiades and the Socratic Lover-Educator , London 2012, pp. 190–199, here: 194.
  49. ↑ Eusebius of Caesarea, Praeparatio evangelica 13,13,6. See Mark Edwards: Socrates and the early Church. In: Michael Trapp (ed.): Socrates from antiquity to the Enlightenment , Aldershot 2007, pp. 127–141, here: 132.
  50. ↑ Laktanz, Divinae institutiones 2,14,9.
  51. Jump up ↑ Augustine, On the State of God 8:14.
  52. ↑ See also Lenka Karfíková: Augustine's polemic against Apuleius. In: Matthias Baltes (translator) ao: Apuleius: De deo Socratis. About the God of Socrates , Darmstadt 2004, pp. 162–189, here: 165–171.
  53. ↑ Giannozzo Manetti: Biographies of Socrates and Senecas , Vita Socratis 45 f., 48–50, ed. by Stefano U. Baldassarri, Rolf Bagemihl: Giannozzo Manetti: Biographical Writings , Cambridge (Massachusetts) / London 2003, pp. 214–221. See James Hankins: Manetti's Socrates and the Socrateses of Antiquity. In: Stefano U. Baldassarri (ed.): Dignitas et excellentia hominis , Florence 2008, pp. 203-219, here: 212-214.
  54. ↑ Latin text and English translation by Michael JB Allen: Synoptic Art , Florence 1998, pp. 197–208.
  55. ↑ Michael JB Allen: Synoptic Art , Florence 1998, pp. 130-147; Michael JB Allen: Plato's Third Eye , Aldershot 1995, No. XIV pp. 64-68; Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Marsilio Ficino: Commentary on Plotinus , Volume 4, Cambridge (Massachusetts) / London 2017, pp. CXVIII f., 286 f .; Michael JB Allen: The Platonism of Marsilio Ficino , Berkeley 1984, pp. 19-27.
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  58. ^ Russell Goulbourne: Voltaire's Socrates. In: Michael Trapp (ed.): Socrates from antiquity to the Enlightenment , Aldershot 2007, pp. 229–247, here: 233 f.
  59. ↑ Michael Trapp: Representing Socrates' daimonion, from Heiligenkreuz to Simeon Solomon , p. 10 ( online ).
  60. ↑ Friedrich Schleiermacher: History of Philosophy. Lectures on Socrates and Plato. In: Peter M. Steiner (Ed.): Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About Plato's Philosophy , Hamburg 1996, pp. 3–20, here: 7 (text from transcripts of lectures from the period between 1819 and 1823).
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  62. ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Basics of the Philosophy of Law (= Hegel: Works , Vol. 7), ed. by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Frankfurt 1970, p. 448 (§ 279).
  63. ^ Søren Kierkegaard: On the concept of irony with constant consideration for Socrates , translated by Emanuel Hirsch , Düsseldorf / Cologne 1961, pp. 164–171, 174.
  64. ↑ Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena , Volume 1, Munich 1913, p. 286 f.
  65. ↑ Friedrich Nietzsche: Götzen-Twilight or How to philosophize with the hammer . In: Nietzsche: Gesammelte Werke , Volume 17, Munich 1926, pp. 51–163, here: 64.
  66. ^ Friedrich Nietzsche: Menschliches, Allzumenschliches . First volume. In: Nietzsche: Gesammelte Werke , Volume 8, Munich 1923, pp. 1–400, here: 125.
  67. ↑ Friedrich Nietzsche: The birth of tragedy from the spirit of music . In: Nietzsche: Gesammelte Werke , Volume 3, Munich 1920, pp. 17–165, here: 93. On Nietzsche's view, see Philippe Hoffmann: Le sage et son démon. La figure de Socrate in the tradition philosophique et littéraire. In: École Pratique des Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses: Annuaire. Résumés des conférences et travaux , Volume 94, 1985-1986, pp. 417-435, here: 434 f.
  68. ↑ See on this drawing Michael Trapp: Representing Socrates' daimonion, from Heiligenkreuz to Simeon Solomon , pp. 1–3, 17–20 ( online ).
  69. ↑ See the relevant statements in the anthology Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, p. VIII, p. 28 f., Edited by Pierre Destrée and Nicholas D. Smith . Note 42, p. 98 f. and Anthony A. Long: How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him? In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (ed.): A Companion to Socrates , Malden 2006, pp. 63–74, here: 65. Cf. Mario Montuori: Socrates. Physiology of a Myth , Amsterdam 1981, pp. 74-86; Ernst Heitsch (translator): Plato: Apologie des Sokrates, Göttingen 2002, pp. 189–197; Luis E. Navia: Socrates. The Man and His Philosophy , Lanham 1985, pp. 86-88.
  70. ↑ Anthony A. Long: How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him? In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (ed.): A Companion to Socrates , Malden 2006, pp. 63–74, here: 65–68. See Mark L. McPherran: The Religion of Socrates , University Park 1996, pp. 175-177; Nicholas D. Smith, Paul B. Woodruff (Eds.): Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy , Oxford 2000, pp. 176-204.
  71. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), pp. 84 f., 119 f.
  72. ↑ Werner Jaeger: Paideia , Berlin / New York 1989 (1st edition of Part II 1944), p. 644 f.
  73. ↑ Olof Gigon: Socrates. His picture in poetry and history , 3rd edition, Tübingen / Basel 1994 (first published in 1947), p. 69.
  74. ↑ Olof Gigon: Socrates. His picture in poetry and history , 3rd edition, Tübingen / Basel 1994 (first published in 1947), p. 177 f.
  75. ^ Karl Jaspers: The great philosophers , Volume 1, Munich 1957, p. 112.
  76. ^ Martha Nussbaum: Commentary on Edmunds. In: Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1985), 1986, pp. 231-240, here: 234.
  77. ↑ Gernot Böhme: Der Typ Sokrates , Frankfurt 1988, pp. 161-165.
  78. ^ Gregory Vlastos: Socrates. Ironist and moral philosopher , Cambridge 1991, pp. 166-174, 282-287; Gregory Vlastos et al .: Socrates and His Daimonion. In: Nicholas D. Smith, Paul B. Woodruff (eds.): Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy , Oxford 2000, pp. 176–204, here: 191 f. (1989 opinion).
  79. ↑ Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Plato's Socrates , New York / Oxford 1994, pp. 189-195.
  80. ↑ Michael Bingenheimer (translator): Lucius Apuleius of Madaura: De deo Socratis. The protective spirit of Socrates , Frankfurt 1993, p. 62.
  81. ^ Franz Vonessen: The daimonion of Socrates in a platonic view. In: Herbert Kessler (Ed.): Sokrates. Gestalt and Idea , Heitersheim 1993, pp. 71–95, here: 80, 87–89, 92–94.
  82. ↑ : Mark L. McPherran The Religion of Socrates f, University Park 1996, p 178, f 184th.
  83. ↑ Mark L. McPherran: The Religion of Socrates , University Park 1996, pp 186-201.
  84. ^ Richard Kraut: Socrates, Politics, and Religion. In: Nicholas D. Smith, Paul B. Woodruff (eds.): Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy , Oxford 2000, pp. 13–23, here: 16–18.
  85. ^ C. David C. Reeve: Socrates the Apollonian? In: Nicholas D. Smith, Paul B. Woodruff (eds.): Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy , Oxford 2000, pp. 24–39, here: 24–26.
  86. ^ Thomas C. Brickhouse, Nicholas D. Smith: Socrates' Daimonion and Rationality. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 43–62, here: 58–62.
  87. ^ Mark Joyal: To Daimonion and the Socratic Problem. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 97–112, here: 105, 111 f.
  88. ^ Anthony A. Long: How Does Socrates' Divine Sign Communicate with Him? In: Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Rachana Kamtekar (eds.): A Companion to Socrates , Malden 2006, pp. 63–74, here: 67 f., 73.
  89. ↑ Luc Brisson: Socrates and the Divine Signal according to Plato's Testimony: Philosophical Practice as Rooted in Religious Tradition. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 1–12, here: 4.
  90. ↑ Mark L. McPherran: Introducing a New God: Socrates and His Daimonion. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 13–30, here: 24 f.
  91. ↑ Gerd Van Riel: Socrates' Daemon: Internalization of the Divine and Knowledge of the Self. In: Pierre Destrée, Nicholas D. Smith (eds.): Socrates' Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy , Kelowna 2005, pp. 31–42, here: 34–36.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles in this version on March 30, 2019 .