Himmeroder memorandum

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Abbey Church of the Himmerod Monastery in the Eifel (2005)

The Himmeroder memorandum is a memorandum on the question of German rearmament , which was written in October 1950 in the Himmerod monastery .

background

Korean War

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War began with a North Korean attack , which initially led to an almost complete occupation of South Korea and threatened its continued existence. Here was North Korea , although the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China has supported the military operations had the North Korean armed forces but performed alone. This proxy war avoided a direct confrontation between the superpowers USSR and the USA . There was concern that such a proxy war could also occur in Germany, in which GDR troops would overrun the Federal Republic. A direct attack by the Soviet Union was also considered possible. This threat led to great concern among the West German population, which made itself felt, among other things, in the form of hamster purchases.

German armed forces

Division of Germany into zones of occupation after 1945

As early as December 1, 1946, the Soviet military administration in Germany had started to set up an armed and militarily organized border police , which was initially subordinate to the German Administration of the Interior (DVdI) and later to the Ministry for State Security (MfS). In October 1948, the establishment of an initially 10,000-strong force of 40 standby units with 250 men each began.

After the founding of the GDR on October 7, 1949, in the same month the people's police readiness and schools were combined in the main training administration (HVA) of the Ministry of the Interior (MdI). In addition to the police troops subordinate to the HVA, other armed groups emerged. From January 1950, the border police of the state of Mecklenburg was responsible for monitoring the Baltic Sea coast. In June 1950, the Maritime Police Headquarters (HVS) of the MdI was set up, which was equipped with coastal protection, clearing and special boats. In July 1950 it was decided to form military sports interest groups as part of the youth work of the FDJ with the support of the People's Police . In the west, in the summer of 1950, an East German troop strength of between 53,000 (US estimate) and 75,000 (West German estimate) was assumed, with an increase of up to 300,000 men being considered possible by 1952.

By the summer of 1950, the development of military capabilities in the GDR had begun on a broad basis. It was accompanied by aggressive propaganda by the GDR leadership, which constantly drew parallels with the Korean War and publicly discussed such a solution for Germany. Ulbricht declared at a party event on August 3, 1950 in the Friedrichstadtpalast , "Korea teaches that puppet governments will sooner or later be swept away, and therefore the fight will be waged to liquidate the nests of the war provocation, as is happening in South Korea" . However, the Adenauer government and the Western Allies assessed the GDR's military capabilities as so poor that an armed attack by their troops alone could not be expected before 1952.

In 1950 the Federal Republic of Germany had no armed forces of its own, only the federal states had riot police . In the spring of 1950, the United Chiefs of Staff of the Allied Forces in Germany demanded that a federal police force of 5,000 men be set up under the name “State Security” . In fact, the establishment of the Federal Border Guard did not begin until 1951 . The Allied service groups formed a specialty , in which around 145,000 Germans were employed in 1950. For security tasks on the coasts such as fighting sea mines , there were smaller German sea units with around 1,600 men under Allied leadership.

Troops of the Eastern Bloc and the Western Allies

Against this background, the forces of the victorious powers of World War II and their allies would have been decisive for a war in Germany and Europe .

The main battle tank T-54 was introduced into the Red Army after the Second World War

According to various Western estimates, in 1950 the Soviet Army had a peacetime strength of 175 combat divisions, 30 anti-aircraft and artillery divisions and between 25,000 and 60,000 battle tanks. The group of the Soviet armed forces in Germany was assigned 22 combat divisions with 6,000 tanks, six to nine anti-aircraft and two to three artillery divisions. It was assumed that 328,700 men were stationed in the GDR, 270,000 of them with the land forces.

After the end of the war in Europe in 1945, the Western Allies had considerably reduced their troops in Germany. The strongest combat units were involved in various conflicts overseas, such as the Indochina War . In 1950 there were still around 170,000 American, British and French army soldiers in Germany, a significant proportion of whom performed administrative tasks for the occupation forces and were unsuitable for combat tasks. Most of the troops' equipment was not modern. According to the West German government, the Allies had two American and two British divisions and several smaller French units. In the home countries there were hardly any troops available for a quick transfer to Germany.

A MiG-15 , of which the Soviet Union owned around 100 machines at the beginning of the Korean War

The assessment of the strength of the air forces was very uncertain because their forces could have been deployed much faster. The Soviet air forces and naval forces were assigned around 20,000 aircraft, including 5,000 jet aircraft. It was assumed that the West was considerably inferior.

A whiskey class submarine , 215 of which were built in the USSR from 1948 onwards

The situation was different with the war fleets , where the western forces were considerably superior to those of the Soviet Union. Only the suspected 250 submarines of the Soviet Navy , which could be used against western reinforcement transports to Europe , caused concern .

Western and Soviet sphere of influence in Europe

In the nuclear weapons the US had enjoyed a monopoly since 1945, which had been sufficient to European allies as sufficient protection against the superiority of conventional Soviet forces. After the Soviet Union's first successful nuclear test in 1949, this situation changed. It was foreseeable that in the foreseeable future the Soviet Union would compensate for the American potential with its weapons. This made their conventional forces a threat to Western Europe. According to Western estimates, they were able to lead an offensive as far as the Atlantic. Particularly threatening for Germany was the fact that the Allies wanted to take up defense on the ground only along the Rhine . In the event of a Soviet attack, practically the entire Federal Republic would have fallen into the hands of the enemy immediately.

In the considerations that followed the outbreak of the Korean War, the main focus was on how great the risk of an immediate attack by the Soviet Union was and whether the GDR People's Police could wage a proxy war like in Korea. Adenauer received different ratings on both questions. On the western side, however, it was considered most likely that in the event of an attack, People's Police would initially be deployed against the Federal Republic of Germany, followed by Soviet forces if necessary. By 1952 the People's Police would grow up into a People's Army capable of such operations. A nuclear stalemate was also expected in 1952, which would greatly increase the importance of conventional forces. This left only two years for countermeasures.

Ways to Strengthen Western European Defense

Against this background, the question arose of how Western Europe could be defended against the superior conventional Soviet forces. It also had to be clarified how West Germany, as the most populous state in Western Europe, should participate in its defense while demilitarization measures were still taking place. The German rearmament was not only a practical-military, but above all a political and psychological question. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer recognized early on after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany that its sovereignty would depend to a large extent on how much it would participate in European defense with its own troops.

Various options emerged for such participation, with a national German Wehrmacht being excluded from both the German side and the European public. One option was the creation of a so-called Federal Gendarmerie as a heavily armed police force with up to 60,000 men. In fact, the Allies approved the creation of such a force, later referred to as the Federal Border Guard , with initially 30,000 members. The possibility of expanding the Allied service groups was also considered.

Adenauer insisted on an Allied request as a prerequisite for German considerations about a defense contribution. The North Atlantic Council decided on this request on September 19, 1950. On the same day, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain and France adopted a communiqué in which the connection between rearmament and German sovereignty was recognized in practice. In addition to the relaxation of the Allied occupation law, an offer was made to treat an attack on the Federal Republic of Germany as an attack on oneself. In fact, that was the offer of a guarantee for the security of West Germany.

The Himmeroder expert group

However, the question of military armament in the Federal Republic of Germany was far from being politically decided. In the wake of the Korean War, a number of explorations took place between the Western Allies and with the Adenauer government. In September 1950, Adenauer and his American counterparts felt that the time had come to prepare discussions on practical questions relating to a German defense contribution. For this purpose, experts were sought on the German side who were available for the task and who were also politically acceptable.

In May 1950, Adenauer had an office set up under the utmost secrecy under the direction of his military advisor, General Gerhard Graf von Schwerin . It was called the Central Office for Homeland Service (ZfH) and was commissioned to select former general staff officers , generals and admirals of the three armed forces who were considered to be "unencumbered" and some of which were to be attributed in the broadest sense to the military resistance against Hitler . A committee of German experts for military expert discussions with the Allies was to emerge from them. You should also be able to speak to allied negotiating partners. Nevertheless, the selection of individual participants has been severely criticized .

In the Walberberg Monastery , between Cologne and Bonn, the first meeting of a committee for security issues was to take place at the end of August 1950. At the last moment it was canceled again because the NATO Council wanted to deal with the question of German rearmament in New York in September 1950, and Adenauer preferred to wait until then to take further German steps. Invited by the ZfH, the committee of experts finally met on October 5, 1950 in the Himmerod Monastery with a composition that had been changed and expanded compared to the plans for Walberberg and met until October 9. The aim was to prepare a concept for armaments and organization, equipment and equipment for the future German armed forces in preparation for German rearmament.

The convened circle consisted of 15 people, including ten former generals and admirals. The seven participants, who were later accepted into the service of the Bundeswehr, attained general and flag officer ranks there . The remaining six died before the Bundeswehr was set up or were not taken on for reasons of age. Five participants were members of the Gehlen organization , including three of the later Federal Intelligence Service ; two went to the Bundeswehr.

It can be assumed that the seven officers who were taken over, some of whom had the highest positions in the Bundeswehr (inspector general, inspectors of branches of the armed forces) and in NATO (chairman of the military committee, high commanders), the ideas developed in Himmerod will apply to the Bundeswehr brought.

Participant, function until 1945 and after 1955
Last rank in the Wehrmacht Surname Year of birth and death Wehrmacht part /
armed forces 		Activity in the Bundeswehr Remarks
major Wolf Graf Baudissin 1907-1993 army 1955–1967, most recently as Lieutenant General Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning and Operations at the NATO High Command Europe ( SHAPE ) after retirement, founder and head of the Institute for Peace Research at the University of Hamburg
General of the Infantry Hermann Foertsch 1895-1961 army not used Member of the Gehlen Organization , later BND
admiral Walter Gladisch 1882-1954 marine Died before the Bundeswehr was deployed
Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger 1897-1982 army 1956–1964, first inspector general of the Bundeswehr , first German chairman of the NATO military committee , last rank of general Member of the Gehlen organization
Colonel i. G. Johann Adolf Graf von Kielmansegg 1906-2006 army 1956–1966, most recently as General Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT)
General of the Aviators Robert Knauss 1892-1955 air force Died before the Bundeswehr was deployed
Major i. G. Horst Kruger 1916-1989 air force 1955–1973, most recently as major general
General of the Aviators Rudolf Master 1897-1958 air force not used
Colonel i. G. Eberhard Graf von Nostitz 1906-1983 army Brigadier General d. R. Member of the Gehlen Organization , later BND
General of the armored force Hans Röttiger 1896-1960 army 1956–1960 first inspector of the army , lieutenant general
Vice admiral Friedrich Ruge 1894-1985 marine 1956–1961 First Inspector of the Navy , Vice Admiral
Sea captain Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs 1893-1972 marine not used Member of the Gehlen Organization , later BND
General of the armored force Fridolin von Senger and Etterlin 1891-1963 army not used Member of the personnel appraisal committee for the Bundeswehr
Lieutenant General Hans Speidel 1897-1984 army 1956–1964, as General First German Commander in Chief Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) Member of the Gehlen organization
Colonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel 1887-1952 army Died before the Bundeswehr was deployed

Four committees were set up for the conference, each of which should deal with various topics:

  • Military Political Committee: Speidel (Chair), Meister, Ruge, Nostitz
  • General committee: Foertsch (chair), Knauss, Baudissin, Krüger
  • Organizing committee: Heusinger (chair), Röttiger, Meister, Gladisch, Kielmansegg
  • Training committee: Senger and Etterlin (chair), Schulze-Hinrichs, Krüger

Kielmansegg acted as secretary of the expert group, who also did the final editing of the report. After some intense discussions, the group managed to agree on a common text that was supported by all members. That is why the memorandum was also called the founding compromise of the Bundeswehr .

Schulze-Hinrichs took part in the conference as a marine expert. He had been a member of the Gehlen Organization since 1948 and in 1952 took over the new independent department for the military evaluation of the navy.

Content of the memorandum

The group of experts worked out a memorandum “on the establishment of a German contingent as part of a supranational armed force to defend Western Europe” and on the concepts of “ Inner Leadership ” and the “ Citizen in Uniform ”.

The so-called Himmeroder memorandum according to its place of origin is divided into five sections:

  • I. Section "Military-political foundations and requirements"
  • II. Section "Basic considerations on the operational situation in the Federal Republic"
  • III. Section "Organization of the German Contingent (DK)"
  • IV. Section "Training"
  • V. Section "The Inner Structure"

A statement from Count Schwerin was attached

I. Military political foundations and requirements

The first section deals with political, military and psychological requirements for a German military contribution to the defense of Western Europe. It is considered the most controversial of the memorandum because it contains various demands for dealing with former members of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS , which reflect the then common views about their involvement in German war crimes during the Second World War. It is assumed that the Western powers and the Adenauer government, among other things, stop the defamation of the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS, release the soldiers convicted as war criminals if they have acted on the orders or on the basis of old German laws, stop pending proceedings and issue a declaration of honor for the hand in German soldiers.

One of the reasons for the basic demand for rehabilitation was the precarious economic and social situation of former professional soldiers. With the Allied Control Council Act No. 34, their state salaries and entitlements to pensions no longer existed. They were banned from being employed in the public service, and their opportunities to find a job were severely limited due to a lack of civilian professional qualifications. Many former professional soldiers refused to participate in the development of new armed forces while these regulations existed.

This section also deals with the role of a German contingent within a Western defense organization. The German units should be organized nationally in relatively large troops up to corps strength. Under no circumstances should the German soldiers be involved in Allied structures as "2nd class soldiers".

In addition, it was demanded that Germany in the future defense plans of a joint alliance should not only defend on the Rhine and thus become a devastated combat area. The Western powers had given a security guarantee for the Federal Republic of Germany, but did not have the means to honor it in the event of a Soviet attack.

II. Fundamental considerations on the operational situation in the Federal Republic

In the second chapter, the Soviet threat is first analyzed. The group of experts comes to the conclusion that the Soviet Union can attack Western Europe at any time and without further preparation. Their goal must be to quickly acquire possession of the entire Atlantic coast from Narvik to the Pyrenees , in order to create a situation in which they can quietly await the reactions of the West. When such an attack would begin cannot be foreseen, and the Soviet Union would not act lightly.

The West has only inadequate defenses. An operational plan for the overall defense of Western Europe is required, in which American and German contributions are included. Europe must be defended as much as possible in the east. The defense readiness must be able to be established very quickly. It was important to establish three operational priorities that had to be defended. The Dardanelles would have to be held in order to prevent the Soviet Union from entering the Mediterranean Sea and from influencing the sea lines there and to allow the Western powers to penetrate the Black Sea . The Tagliamento - Alps - Southern Germany area had to be held in order to be able to threaten forces from the flank that had penetrated into western Germany from there. The area of Schleswig-Holstein - Denmark - Southern Scandinavia barred the Soviet armed forces from leaving the Baltic Sea and enabled the West to operate against the Soviet northern wing and in the Baltic Sea.

Since it was not possible to stop a Soviet attack along natural defensive lines east of the Rhine, a mobile defense with offensive elements was to be set up, among other things with the aim of carrying the fight to East Germany as soon as possible. This should be supported by fortifications and barriers along the borders.

In practice it was important to organize a defense that the Soviet Union could not overcome without first bringing additional troops westward. The observation of such war preparations gives the West time to bring in reinforcements. An attack is associated with considerable risks, which would deter the Soviet Union from its intention.

III. Organization of the German contingent

Basic considerations

While the German armed forces were supposed to be subordinate to a European alliance, they needed a German command organization to manage the troops. This envisaged a “Inspector of the German Contingent” or “Chief of the Defense Office” subordinate to the Federal President as Commander-in-Chief. The experts attached great importance to the fact that the personnel management lay with a civilian responsible such as a minister for security issues in order to guarantee a personnel policy in the democratic sense.

In view of the strong air and naval forces of the USA and Great Britain, the focus of German armed forces was seen in the army, although the German contingent had to dispose of air and naval forces. A quick deployment of the German armed forces was particularly important to the group of experts in order to anticipate Soviet countermeasures. The measures were to begin as early as November 1, 1950, i.e. only about three weeks after the meeting, and were largely to be completed by autumn 1952. The memorandum contains a number of suggestions for immediate measures and for further action in the formation of troops.

army

It was suggested that in this period the army forces set up in strength of 250,000 soldiers. This number is at the same time the operational minimum and the upper limit of what the Federal Republic can achieve. With these soldiers, twelve armored divisions , four each in North, West and South Germany, and six corps headquarters with associated corps troops would have to be formed. Only with armored divisions was it possible to guarantee the level of combat power that was needed in view of the strong numerical superiority of the enemy.

The following larger weapon systems were planned as the final equipment of the army:

The equipment of the Army Air Force to be deployed is described in the memorandum in the Air Force chapter .

air force

It is assumed that most of the air force should belong to the army. However, a strong fighter rifle is required to defend against the Soviet long-range bomber units . In ignorance of the Allied forces, however, it was left open whether one could rely on their abilities or whether one had to set up one's own German units. The same applies to ground-based air defense. Therefore, the equipment required for German air force forces is not specified.

The Army Aviation Associations should be equipped in such a way that they can support the armored divisions in their struggle. This called reconnaissance -, hunting and attack aircraft forces required. The following are to be provided:

  • 180 reconnaissance aircraft in six groups of 30 each
  • 279 attack aircraft in three regiments of 93 each
  • 372 fighters in three regiments of 124 each

In addition to the necessary ground units, liaison and transport aircraft would be added to these 821 aircraft .

marine

The main task of the western naval forces in the area of ​​the North and Baltic Seas is to secure the Schleswig-Holstein bridgehead and to counter the Russian naval power. For all their superiority at sea, the Western powers lacked the appropriate means for waging war in the coastal area. The German naval forces should therefore have light coastal forces , including their own naval aviation forces . Coastal defense on land is a matter for the army.

The following naval warfare funds should be made available for the various tasks:

IV. Training

Great importance was attached to the training of the German contingent. Well-trained soldiers who think and act independently would be required to balance out the majority of Soviet troops. There were not enough good trainers among the former German soldiers, which was reflected in the poor level of training of the Wehrmacht in the last two years of the war. Therefore, and because of the foreign material to be imported, one has to lean on the Western powers as sponsor armed forces. The army should lean closely on the USA, the air force equally on the USA and Great Britain. No sponsor force was proposed for the Navy.

As with the equipment, a number of emergency measures were proposed in order to have operational forces as intended by 1952. New regulations played a special role in the structure of the training. The foreign regulations should be translated into German as soon as possible and revised for German purposes. Suitable personnel should primarily be recruited and assigned to the sponsored armed forces. Own schools and courses should follow later.

V. The inner structure

The experts attached great importance to the internal structure of the new German armed forces. The initial situation has changed in such a way "that fundamentally new things can be created today without following the forms of the old Wehrmacht ". In doing so, one should orientate oneself towards the western allies and thereby also take into account "the military experiences and feelings of the German people".

The German soldier defends freedom and social justice at the same time. The commitment to Europe obscures the traditional national ties. The new armed forces should not be a state within a state and should be obliged to be non-partisan. Active and passive voting rights for soldiers are possible with restrictions, but party and trade union activities must be suspended during active service.

In a sub-chapter “Ethics”, the oath and soldiers' duties are dealt with. This calls for a complete reorganization of the military jurisdiction, the disciplinary system and the possibility of complaints. It is considered to involve committees of trust in criminal and complaint proceedings. These could also take on a kind of cleaning function when recruiting former Wehrmacht soldiers.

With regard to the education of the soldiers, new paths should also be explored. Beyond military service, it was intended to serve “the development of a staunch citizen and European soldier”. Outlived institutions such as the obligation to wear uniforms when not on duty should be given up.

criticism

Both the composition of the panel of experts and the memorandum written by it were criticized. Among other things, it is criticized that General Foertsch, the officer who had drafted the personal oath of the Wehrmacht members on Adolf Hitler in 1934, was sitting at the table.

The content-related criticism was directed primarily against the first chapter with the undifferentiated demand for rehabilitation of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS and convicted war criminals.

literature

  • Detlev Bald: The Bundeswehr - A Critical History 1955-2005 . Munich 2005, ISBN 3-406-52792-2 .
  • Document in the Federal Archives under B Arch BW 9/3119.
  • Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, Norbert Wiggershaus : The "Himmeroder Memorandum" from October 1950. Political and military considerations for a contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to Western European defense . Karlsruhe 1985, ISBN 3-7650-0850-8 ; also published in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM), Volume 27, 1977, pp. 135-206.
  • Norbert Wiggershaus: Germany 1950 - a "second Korea"? Chancellor Adenauer's threats after the outbreak of the Korean War . Freiburg 1979, ISBN 3-7650-0818-4 ; also published in: Military History Reports (MGM), Volume 25, 1979.
  • Detlef Bald: Adenauer's secret . In: Die Zeit , No. 23/2005.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d e Norbert Wiggershaus: Germany 1950 - a "second Korea"? Chancellor Adenauer's threats after the outbreak of the Korean War . Freiburg 1979, ISBN 3-7650-0818-4 , also published in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM), Volume 25, 1979.
  2. ↑ Timeline of the military history of the German Democratic Republic 1949–1984 . Military publishing house of the German Democratic Republic, Berlin 1986
  3. ^ New Germany , August 5, 1950 according to Norbert Wiggershaus: Germany 1950 - a "second Korea"? Chancellor Adenauer's threats after the outbreak of the Korean War . Freiburg 1979, ISBN 3-7650-0818-4 , also published in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM), Volume 25, 1979, p. 103.
  4. ↑ Article Federal Border Guard
  5. ↑ On the following two chapters see: Hans-Jürgen Rautenberg, Norbert Wiggershaus; The “Himmeroder Memorandum” of October 1950. Political and military considerations for a contribution by the Federal Republic of Germany to Western European defense . Karlsruhe 1985, ISBN 3-7650-0850-8 ; also published in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen (MGM), Volume 21, 1977, pp. 135-206.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (=  Jost Dülffer , Klaus-Dietmar Henke , Wolfgang Krieger , Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]): Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 277 .
  7. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (=  Jost Dülffer , Klaus-Dietmar Henke , Wolfgang Krieger , Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]): Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 127 .
  8. ^ Johannes Berthold Sander-Nagashima: The Federal Navy 1955 to 1972: Concept and construction . Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2006. ISBN 978-3-486-57972-7 , p. 23 ff.