Theo Saevecke

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Theo Saevecke in the uniform of an SS-Obersturmführer, date unknown

Theodor Emil Saevecke (born March 22, 1911 in Hamburg , † December 16, 2000 in Dissen am Teutoburger Wald ) was a German SS-Hauptsturmführer and war criminal who was involved in the organization of forced labor for Tunisian Jews and hostage shootings in Italy during the National Socialist era was involved. After 1945 Saevecke worked for the American intelligence service CIA and in a leading position at the German Federal Criminal Police Office .

Life

The son of a sergeant visited Saevecke secondary school in Eutin and real grammar school branch of the Friedrich-Franz-Gymnasium (Parchim) . He moved to Ludwigslust and to the Katharineum in Lübeck . Saevecke left this grammar school prematurely in February 1930 as a subprime student. Saevecke justified this in retrospect in the time of National Socialism , saying that the school was "under Jewish and Marxist management". Saevecke became an officer candidate in the merchant navy and drove twice to the west coast of South America between December 1930 and June 1932 on the training ship Padua . Later he took part in the wheat regatta to Australia on the four-masted barque Priwall . He retired from the sea on March 27, 1934, and married three days later.

From October 1, 1934, Saevecke completed training as a criminal detective candidate with the Lübeck police. In 1937 he attended the driving school of the security police ; He finished school with a successful exam for detective inspector. Saevecke moved to Berlin and headed the fire and disaster department there, and he also worked on murder cases. Together with Ernst Gennat he was involved in the first TV manhunt in November 1938 . After the television broadcast, which could be received in 28 public television rooms in Berlin, numerous reports were received from the population through which the murder of a Berlin taxi driver could be solved.

On June 29, 1926, Saevecke in Parchim became a member and group leader of the Schill Youth , a sub-organization of Gerhard Roßbach's Freikorps . On December 15, 1928, he joined the SA ; on February 1, 1929, he became a member of the NSDAP ( membership number 112,407). Saevecke said he was active in the SA until 1938. At a time that is not exactly known, he became a member of the SS (SS no. 396,401).

Task Force Groups in Poland and Tunisia

At the German invasion of Poland Saevecke took in September 1939 as a member of the Task Force VI part. The task of this mission, also known as " Operation Tannenberg ", was to "combat all elements hostile to the Reich and German against the fighting force". The Einsatzgruppen murdered members of the Polish intelligentsia , Jews and hostages. The Einsatzgruppe VI under Erich Naumann was deployed in the former province of Posen from September 9, 1939 . After the area was incorporated into the German Reich as " Reichsgau Wartheland ", Himmler's decree of November 20, 1939 commanded the members of the task force to the Stapo control center in Posen . Saevecke ran a homicide detective in the city. According to a CIA informant later, Saevecke was one of the three people who were able to authorize the execution of Russians, Gypsies and Jews in a concentration camp near Posen . On March 25, 1941, Saevecke was transferred to the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) in Section V A2, which was responsible for " Preventive Combating Crime ".

Already in June 1940 Saevecke had reported to the "security police colonial service". In early 1941 he completed a course at the colonial school of the Italian police in Tivoli near Rome; from 1942 he was used as a liaison officer of the security police and the SD to the Italian police in Libya . Saevecke's activity in Libya coincided with the advance and retreat of the German Africa Corps under General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel . In November 1942, Saevecke was transferred to Walter Rauff's task force in Tunisia . Rauffs Kommando organized the forced labor of Tunisian Jews and extorted high "compulsory taxes" from the local Jewish communities. As of December 10th, Saevecke issued instructions to the Jewish communities in Tunis and Sousse to organize the use of forced labor . After the Allied successes in the Battle of Tunisia , the Einsatzkommando left Tunisia on May 9, 1943 for Italy. From the point of view of his later superior Karl Wolff , the highest SS and Police Leader (HöSSPF) for Italy, Saevecke had "worked on the Jewish question in the Tunisian area with great success ," said Wolff in the reason for the award of the medal.

"Fight against gangs" in Italy

From July 1, 1943, Saevecke worked for the commander of the Security Police and the SD (BdS) in Verona, northern Italy . On September 13, 1943, he took over the leadership of the BdS external command in Milan and thus became the head of the Gestapo there. In this role, Saevecke personally supervised the arrest of Italian resistance fighters and was responsible for the deportation of at least 700 Italian Jews to the extermination camps .

Saevecke was referred to as the "executioner of Milan" after he had 15 Italian hostages shot in public on 10 August 1944 on Milan's Piazzale Loreto as "retaliation". On August 8, 1944, the Italian resistance bombed a German military truck, killing six Italian civilians and injuring ten. The German driver of the truck was slightly injured in the cheek. Saevecke was involved in the selection of the hostages who were shot, and according to Italian press reports, the order for the shooting was signed by him. On June 17 and again on July 1, Albert Kesselring, as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in Italy, ordered the shooting of ten Italians for every German killed.

Also in August 1944, a ten-man SS commando under Saevecke's command shot three men in Corbetta after an SS member had been killed by resistance fighters in the town. The three men had not made any confessions. The following day Saevecke, his superior Walter Rauff, 20 SS men and 100 Italian collaborators again appeared in Corbetta. The community, located 20 km west of Milan, was surrounded and the male population was ordered to a square. Five men were selected from those gathered and shot in public. The houses of those shot were burned down. Saevecke, according to his superior Wolff in March 1944, “ excelled in fighting gangs in Lombardy and was at the forefront of fighting the partisans on almost all missions . It is thanks to his enthusiasm and determination that the gang situation in Lombardy has been reduced to the minimum possible. "

In April 1945, Saevecke had an SS command stationed in Trieste punished. This command is said to have "bartered" with Jews. In the same month Saevecke was captured by Allied troops .

The historian Carlo Gentile counts Saevecke as one of the representatives of the security police and the SD in Italy, who used violence selectively. Thereby, communist resistance fighters were acted "particularly ruthlessly", while they occasionally spared national, liberal and Catholic representatives of the resistance movement. Gentile sees in this procedure, already practiced in other occupied countries, the intention to use politically moderate partisans as “'living Persilscheine ' or to 'turn them around' according to the established secret service manner in order to split the partisan front.” In Italy the attempt was added, “ To present themselves to the Allies as particularly effective experts in the fight against communism, but otherwise factual or even moderate ”, which means that this group of people has kept options open for the post-war period.

Internment and work for the CIA

Internal, three-page CIA note on Theo Saevecke dated January 8, 1953. Brackets indicate places that were obscured by the CIA before publication.
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Saevecke worked for the American intelligence service Central Intelligence Agency from 1947 at the latest ; In early 1952 he was hired by the German Federal Criminal Police Office, which had recently been founded . On February 1, 2002, the CIA released documents relating to Saevecke's life. The results of a file evaluation carried out by historians on behalf of the US government were published in 2005. As early as 2001, Dieter Schenk , who had previously worked as a criminal adviser at the BKA, published an investigation into the founding history of the BKA. Schenk came to the conclusion that in 1959 of 47 senior BKA officials 45 had a National Socialist past. About half, including Saevecke, are to be regarded as Nazi criminals in the criminological sense. A study on the same topic was published in 2011 under the direction of Patrick Wagner and commissioned by the BKA.

In interrogation after his capture, Saevecke admitted his involvement in organizing the forced labor of Jews in Tunisia and in the shootings in Milan and Corbetta, but withheld his role in the killing and deportation of Jews in Italy. Saevecke was interned in the Dachau internment camp . At the beginning of October 1947, Saevecke was transferred from American to British custody, as the British were preparing an indictment for the murders committed in Italy. In November 1947 the British authorities declared that there was no interest in bringing charges and returned Saevecke to the Americans. Saevecke was not a member of a criminal organization , according to the British authorities. At this point the SS had been declared a criminal organization in the Nuremberg Trials; the British knew Saevecke's SS membership from interrogations in June 1945. Saevecke stated that he had been a simple police officer in Berlin all the time during the war. The group of historians dealing with the evaluation of the CIA files speaks of "clear whitewashing" and comes to the conclusion that Saevecke must have been under the protection of American intelligence services at this point in time.

In April 1948, Saevecke was released from internment in Dachau. During the denazification , on August 25, 1950, the verdict committee in Berlin imposed “an atonement period of 18 months in consideration of three years of internment”. In the beginning of the Cold War , Saevecke was hired at the Berlin CIA base under the code name "Cabanjo". In contrast to other former National Socialists, Saevecke was apparently a valuable source of intelligence and also already had relevant practical experience. Saevecke did not withhold his political views from the CIA: Saevecke longed to go back to the days when the NSDAP was in power, said one of his senior officers at the CIA to Richard Helms ; he was of the opinion that the principles of National Socialism were correct. According to a January 1953 CIA memo, Saevecke stood by his actions against the Italian partisans. For him the partisans were communists, and the Allied support for the partisans was woefully foolish. There was little point in arguing with Saevecke about this, as history might prove that he was right. In general, National Socialism is a topic that Saevecke is better off avoiding.

Kriminalrat at the Federal Criminal Police Office

As recently as August 1951, the CIA and Saevecke assumed that it would be impossible for Saevecke to return to the West German police force. Saevecke had applied to the Federal Minister of the Interior in April 1950; According to Schenk, almost the entire top of the Federal Ministry of the Interior was involved in his appointment , including Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU) and State Secretary Hans Ritter von Lex . Max Hagemann , who was responsible for the recruitment, considered Saevecke “technically undoubtedly to be recruiting at the BKA. qualified ”, but initially expressed concerns about Saevecke's early entry into the NSDAP. A note Hagemann from December 1951 led the SS membership Saeveckes to the rank approximation back and judged him "[n] as a non-political and dutiful [n] officials [n] with a pronounced sense of justice" have drawn one, of no advantage from its NSDAP membership .

Saevecke was hired on January 10, 1952 for the BKA security group . According to the head of the security group, Paul Dickopf , from April 1952, Saevecke was mainly engaged in the "defense against left-wing radical groups" and had led the investigation into a case of industrial espionage. In April 1953 he was in charge of " Aktion Vulkan ", the arrest of 40 people suspected of espionage . The operation, which was initially viewed as a successful search, turned out to be a failure, as some of those arrested were innocent and for many the evidence was insufficient for an indictment or conviction. In August 1953 promoted to the criminal police , Saevecke was from September 1953 head of the investigation service of the security group and from 1955 headed a department that was responsible for investigations against Eastern intelligence services.

In September 1953, Saevecke defended Ferruccio Parri in the Italian press against allegations that he had collaborated and betrayed partisans. Parri was arrested as a leading member of the Italian resistance in January 1945 and interrogated in Milan; after the end of the war he was briefly Italian Prime Minister. In the months that followed, Italian parliamentarians pointed out Saevecke's role in Milan; In 1954, Saeveckes was requested to be arrested for war crimes in Italy. The Federal Ministry of the Interior suspended Saevecke in July 1954 and initiated disciplinary proceedings against him in October. The CIA, which Saevecke had no longer been an agent but a contact since January 1952, passed on exonerating British investigations from 1947 to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Saevecke was instructed not to reveal the support of the CIA to the German authorities. The American secret service feared that it could be recognized on the German side that the USA had a spy in the German security system. The personnel officer of the Ministry of the Interior came to the conclusion on site in Italy that the testimony was contradicting itself, was largely based on hearsay and that it could not be proven with sufficient certainty that Saevecke was involved in attacks on Jews and political prisoners. In 1955 the disciplinary proceedings were abandoned after nine months for lack of evidence.

In October 1962 Saevecke, meanwhile deputy head of the security group Bonn of the BKA, was involved in a leading role in the actions of the security authorities against the news magazine Der Spiegel . Saevecke headed - on behalf of his boss Ernst Brückner  , who was abroad - since October 27, 1962, the action that expanded into the " Spiegel Affair ". He was involved in the arrest of the deputy editor-in-chief Conrad Ahlers in Spain. Ahlers was arrested through Interpol , although Interpol was not allowed to act on allegations of treason . According to the Spiegel, Saevecke later campaigned “to make the unfamiliar prison life easier for the imprisoned SPIEGEL journalists.” Saevecke later made serious accusations to his superior Ernst Brückner: “At least I did for his [Brückner's] behavior when the Spiegel case was initiated In view of the reason for the campaign, he had to pay for two years and who did not find the courage to say, I am the head of the department, I helped stoke the fire, I had the crucial talks until the night and Saevecke was not even my deputy . You can't learn courage, and the shots against me covered the trail well, ”Saevecke said later in a letter to the new BKA boss Paul Dickopf.

Saevecke's role in the "Spiegel Affair" led to press reports addressing his National Socialist past. In February 1963, the Milan City Council demanded a unanimous telegram to Prime Minister Fanfani for Saevecke to be tried. On March 6, 1963, the German Bundestag dealt with Saevecke. In a question and answer session, Federal Interior Minister Hermann Höcherl described Saevecke as a “qualified civil servant”, assessed “Saevecke's membership of the SS as an involuntary level adjustment” and saw the BKA officer “rehabilitated”, according to the decision of the 1950 denazification chamber . After a Bonn ministerial official had heard witnesses again in Italy, Interior Minister Höcherl initiated a second disciplinary procedure on April 24, 1963. Saevecke had an officer from the security group in Bonn inquire at the CIA who was researching his National Socialist past. The CIA began an investigation but was unsure whether to pass this information on to Saevecke. Compared to the 1950s, the attitude of the CIA towards people with a National Socialist past had changed: This group of people was considered susceptible to blackmail and seen as potential double agents, like the KGB agent Heinz Felfe, who was exposed in 1961 . In fact, the Ministry for State Security of the GDR had investigated Saevecke. Department I of the Headquarters Enlightenment (HVA) had investigated Saevecke's role in Poland from 1961 - albeit with little success. The HVA documents can be used to prove that Saevecke belonged to Einsatzgruppe VI during the German attack on Poland. The HVA apparently stopped its investigation in 1976.

In November 1964, the second disciplinary proceedings were discontinued because no evidence had been produced that Saevecke “violated his duties as a civil servant during the Second World War by violating the laws of the rule of law, humanity and law as a detective has violated human dignity. ”In May 1963, Paul Dickopf had told the CIA that the disciplinary proceedings would probably not provide any new information, but that Saevecke would not be able to continue his career at the BKA. In May 1965 Saevecke was seconded to the Federal Air Protection Association and in May 1966 to the Federal Office for Civilian Protection . The delegation was later converted into a transfer. Until 1971, Saevecke was employed as head of security building the government bunker near Ahrweiler . Here, among other things, he was responsible for security checks of construction workers and bunker workers as well as shielding the construction site from espionage. In addition, Saevecke was involved in the preparation, implementation and evaluation of NATO exercises in the bunker; for example in October 1966 at the general staff exercise Fallex 66 , during which the cooperation between NATO organs and national decision-makers was to be tested.

Investigations by the West German judicial authorities did not lead to an indictment: In Berlin, Saevecke was investigated in proceedings against the management level of the Reich Security Main Office. The investigations against Saevecke were stopped on February 9, 1967: It could not be refuted that Saevecke had not belonged to Section V A2 for preventive crime prevention. Two further investigations - concerning the shooting of hostages in Milan - were closed in 1971 and May 1989. According to a police investigation note from August 1960, Saevecke had stated that he needed permission from his authority at the time to make a statement. Nobody can release him from his duty of confidentiality, since this authority no longer exists.

Condemnation in Italy

In Italy in May 1994 - while searching for documents on Erich Priebke  - files relating to investigations against Saevecke from before 1960 were also found. A parliamentary committee of inquiry set up to find the files in - according to press reports - “ closet of shame ” remained divided on the background. After an internal investigation by the Italian military judicial authorities , the head of this authority ordered the files to be “temporarily archived” in January 1960. This affected documents about 2,274 crimes during the Second World War , which had to be forwarded to the responsible public prosecutor's offices according to the legal regulations. Around 1,300 cases were processed in the mid-1960s. 695 files remained in a cabinet at the headquarters of the Military Prosecutor General in Rome, which - with the cabinet door facing the wall - was additionally secured with an iron grille.

After the discovery of the files, preliminary investigations were initiated in Italy in November 1997 against Saevecke, who at that time was living as a pensioner in Bad Rothenfelde near Osnabrück. Saevecke did not comply with a request from the Italian authorities to be at the disposal of the competent Turin military court . Saevecke was not extradited to Italy, as German citizens are not allowed to be extradited according to the Basic Law . On June 9, 1999, Saevecke was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia by the Turin military court for the shooting of hostages in August 1944 . Saevecke died in 2000.

literature

  • Imanuel Baumann, Herbert Reinke, Andrej Stephan, Patrick Wagner : Shadows of the Past. The BKA and its founding generation in the early Federal Republic . (= Police + research . Special issue). Edited by the Federal Criminal Police Office, Criminalistic Institute. Luchterhand, Cologne 2011, ISBN 978-3-472-08067-1 . bka.de (PDF)
  • Dieter Schenk : Blind in the right eye. The brown roots of the BKA. Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne 2001, ISBN 3-462-03034-5 .
  • Timothy Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. In: Richard Breitman, Norman JW Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe (eds.): US Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005, ISBN 0-521-61794-4 , pp. 337-374.
  • Klaus-Michael Mallmann , Martin Cüppers : Crescent moon and swastika. The Third Reich, the Arabs and Palestine. (= Publications by the Ludwigsburg Research Center at the University of Stuttgart. Volume 8). Knowledge Book Society WBG, Darmstadt 2006, ISBN 3-534-19729-1 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Death register of the registry office Dissen am Teutoburg Forest No. 173/2000
  2. ↑ Information on the curriculum vitae in: From Windjammer to Storming the Press House. The curriculum vitae of the Bonn government criminal councilor Theo Saevecke . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 25 ( online ). K.-M. Mallmann, M. Cüppers: Half moon and swastika. 2006, p. 202. D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, pp. 267 f., 348. T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 354f. Ernst Klee : Personal Lexicon for the Third Reich. Who was what before and after 1945. Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt am Main 2005, ISBN 3-596-16048-0 , p. 518.
  3. ↑ Curriculum vitae from June 25, 1940, quoted from Vom Windjammer zum Sturm auf Pressehaus. The curriculum vitae of the Bonn government criminal councilor Theo Saevecke . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 25 ( online ).
  4. ↑ Saevecke as a witness to the television search: Deutschlandfunk June 12, 1998 .
  5. ↑ The CV of 25 June 1940 Saevecke wrote: "My transfer to SS hovering at the SD office in Poznan." Quoted in From Windjammer to storm onto the press building. The curriculum vitae of the Bonn government criminal councilor Theo Saevecke . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 25 ( online ).
  6. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, pp. 267f, 287f.
  7. ↑ Internal correspondence of the CIA from January 6, 1964; see T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, pp. 354, 371.
  8. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 348, with reference to a telephone directory of the RSHA.
  9. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 221.
  10. ↑ K.-M. Mallmann, M. Cüppers: Half moon and swastika. 2006, p. 207.
  11. ^ A b Justification for the award of the War Merit Cross 1st Class by Karl Wolff on March 22, 1944. Quoted from: D. Schenk: Auf dem Rechts Augen blind. 2001, p. 268.
  12. ^ A b T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 355.
  13. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 269. For the shooting of hostages see also: The third from the left . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 22-26 ( online ). Execution in the morning . In: Der Spiegel . No.  25 , 1998, pp. 66-68 ( online ).
  14. ^ T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 355, referring to an interrogation report dated June 4, 1945. Five former members of Saevecke's office in Milan were interrogated.
  15. ^ Carlo Gentile: Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS in Partisan War: Italy 1943–1945. Schöningh, Paderborn 2012, ISBN 978-3-506-76520-8 , p. 403.
  16. ^ CIA Documents / Files Declassified and Released to NARA as of 17 Mar 2004 . (PDF; 117 kB) at George Washington University . The files were released under the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998.
  17. ↑ Richard Breitman, Norman JW Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe (Eds.): US Intelligence and the Nazis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2005. The files were evaluated by the Nazi War Criminal and Imperial Japanese Records Interagency Working Group (IWG).
  18. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 222.
  19. ^ A b T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 356.
  20. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 267.
  21. ^ Note from CIA Chief Karlsruhe (name made unrecognizable) to Chief Foreign Division "M", Richard Helms, August 6, 1951, quoted by T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 355. Here also the code name Saeveckes and the assessment of his work by the CIA.
  22. ^ Note from CIA Chief Bonn (name made unrecognizable) to CIA Chief Berlin (name made unrecognizable) of January 8, 1953, quoted by T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 357f.
  23. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 266.
  24. ↑ Hagemann's note of December 15, 1951, quoted in I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 224.
  25. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 228f.
  26. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 231.
  27. ^ T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 357ff.
  28. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 225.
  29. ↑ The third from the left . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 24 ( online ).
  30. ↑ On Saevecke's role in the Spiegel affair see D. Schenk: Blind on the right eye. 2001, p. 261f; and: memory of Tunis . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1963, pp. 28-30 ( online ).
  31. ↑ Memory of Tunis . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1963, pp. 30 ( online ).
  32. ^ Letter from Theo Saevecke to Paul Dickopf dated March 7, 1965, quoted from D. Schenk: Blind on the right eye. 2001, p. 262.
  33. ↑ a b The third from the left . In: Der Spiegel . No. 24 , 1963, pp. 26 ( online ).
  34. ↑ Excerpts from the minutes of the Bundestag in D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 264.
  35. ^ T. Naftali: The CIA and Eichmann's Associates. 2005, p. 359 referring to internal CIA correspondence of April 30, 1963. Here also on the position of the CIA in the 1960s.
  36. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 287f.
  37. ↑ The Federal Minister of the Interior's discontinuation order from November 19, 1964, quoted in I. Baumann et al .: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 235.
  38. ^ I. Baumann et al.: Shadows of the past. 2011, p. 235.
  39. ↑ Jörg Diester: Brown wooden fence. Theo Saevecke: From Nazi war criminal to head of security in the government bunker. ( Memento from May 1, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) At aus Weichsitz.de (accessed on April 7, 2011).
  40. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 348.
  41. ↑ Execution in the morning . In: Der Spiegel . No. 25 , 1998, pp. 68 ( online ).
  42. ↑ D. Schenk: Blind in the right eye. 2001, p. 270.
  43. ↑ Georg Bönisch, Carsten Holm, Hans-Jürgen Schlamp: closet of shame . In: Der Spiegel . No. 17 , 2001, p. 56-58 ( online ). An internal investigation by the Italian military judicial authorities was available to the authors.
    Carla Giacomozzi, Guido Salvini: closet of shame . gemeinde.bozen.it.
    Wolfgang Most: The cabinet in the Palazzo Cesi - Late wave of lawsuits against former German soldiers in Italy . ( Memento from August 17, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) resistenza.de.
  44. ↑ Execution in the morning . In: Der Spiegel . No. 25 , 1998, pp. 66-68 ( online ).
personal data
SURNAME Saevecke, Theo
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Saevecke, Theodor Emil (full name); Cabanjo
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German SS-Hauptsturmführer and war criminal
DATE OF BIRTH March 22, 1911
PLACE OF BIRTH Hamburg
DATE OF DEATH December 16, 2000
Place of death Dissen in the Teutoburg Forest