Ulster Defence Regiment

Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
File:Cap Badge of the Ulster Defence Regiment.jpg Regimental Badge
Active	1970-1992
Country	Northern Ireland
Branch	British Army
Type	Militia
Role	Internal Security
Size	11 battalions (at peak)
Motto(s)	Quis separabit (Latin Who will separate us)
March	(Quick) Garryowen & Sprig of Shillelagh. (Slow) Oft In The Stilly Night
Commanders
Current commander	None

The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was an infantry regiment of the British Army formed in 1970 to replace the Ulster Special Constabulary ("B-Specials") in assisting with security duties within Northern Ireland. It was the largest regiment in the British Army, formed with seven battalions initially and an extra four added within two years. The regiment consisted overwhelmingly of part-time volunteers until 1976 when a full time cadre was added. Recruiting from the local community at a time of intercommunal strife, it was accused of sectarian attitudes and collusion with loyalist paramilitary organisations through most of its term. The Regiment was intended to be nonpartisan, and it began with Catholic recruits accounting for 18% of membership. However, in time suspicion and disenchantment among the Catholic community grew, and Catholic membership settled at around 3%. In 2007 the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross was awarded to the regiment for its service during Operation BANNER, and the regiment is now granted the use of the post nominal letters CGC as part of its name (The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC).

History

The regiment was formed in 1970 after recommendations from the Hunt Report (1969), which suggested replacing the part time "B Specials" police force who were regarded by Catholics as the strong arm of the "Protestant ascendancy", with a force that would be "impartial in every sense and remove the responsibility of military style operations from the police force." Unlike the Special Constabulary which came under the control of the Stormont administration in Belfast, the new regiment would be under the direct command of the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall. Throughout the existence of the regiment, policy was decided in conjunction with a six-man committee (three Protestant and three Catholic) chaired by the Colonel Commandant. Their brief was "to advise the G.O.C., Northern Ireland, on general policy for the administration of the Ulster Defence Regiment, in particular on recruitment policy; and on such specific matters as the G.O.C. might refer to the Council."

Many politicians were initially unsure of the new regiment and had reservations about encouraging their electorate to join, however the [then] newly formed SDLP relented by proposing an accommodation which encouraged all Catholics to play a "full and fair" part in the institutions of the Province. Some politicians such as Bernadette Devlin would not support the new regiment and from the outset condemned it as a "reincarnation of the B Specials," In the same debate Jeremy Thorpe MP pointed to the fact that a "substantial majority" was to be recruited from former B Specials and questioned if this was "likely to increase the chances of general acceptance in Ulster?" In a direct reply Roy Hattersley pointed out that this was due to "necessity" and that the vast majority of the Specials were "men who have given good and honourable service to Northern Ireland." .

The first regimental commander was Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden. According to the Belfast Telegraph on the 18 February 1970 the first two soldiers reported as signing up were a 19-year-old Catholic, James McAree and a 47-year-old Protestant, Albert Richmond. Seven battalions were initially raised, making it the largest infantry regiment in the British Army. Two years later, four more battalions were added, taking the total to eleven. Until 1976 the full-time cadre consisted only of a "conrate" (so called because they had a "consolidated rate of pay") whose duties consisted of guarding UDR bases and carrying out administrative tasks. It was then decided to expand the role of the regiment by raising full-time platoons to perform duties on a twenty-four hour basis. The first of these was raised at 2 UDR under the command of a sergeant. By the end of the 1970s the full-time cadre had been raised to sixteen platoons. As these "Operations Platoons" were expanded to company strength, eventually the conrate role was phased out with full-time UDR soldiers undertaking their own guard duties and administration.

The regiment was reduced to nine battalions in 1984, then to seven in 1991, at which point Tom King, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that, as part of the restructuring of the armed forces, the regiment would merge with the Royal Irish Rangers to form the Royal Irish Regiment. On 1 July 1992 the merger was officially complete. On 1 August 2007 the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross, the second-highest British military honour, was awarded to the regiment for its service during Operation Banner.

The regiment was unusual in many ways. It is the only unit in the history of the British Army to have been on operational deployment for its entire history. It was the first to be raised as a paid citizens' army, the first to incorporate women into its regimental structure, the first to serve its own locality and the first to have a dedicated "aftercare" service. When it merged, the UDR had been on active service longer than any regiment since the Napoleonic Wars.

Recruitment

File:UDR Join 70 47r.jpg

Original application form to join the UDR.

Applications were available for males aged between 18 and 55. Application forms were available to the public from 1st January 1970 from police stations, public libraries, post offices and Army Careers Offices. The initial enrollment period was a three year contract. Candidates would be vetted at Army Headquarters in Lisburn. When asked in parliament if there was an automatic right to transfer for B Specials, Denis Healey replied that there wasn't but that apllications would be treated on the grounds of merit and fitness.

In a debate in the lower house at Stormont, John Hume objected to the fact that Lt Col Stephen Miskimmon, the commandant of the B Specials had, in his final letter to each individual member of the force, enclosed a form to be completed if the individual concerned wished to join the RUC Reserve or Ulster Defence Regiment. Sir Robert Porter replied that these forms were not application forms and had been to ascertain if members of the Specials had any previous military experience and wished to join the new force. He also said that Hunt had expressed the hope the members of the USC would join "one of the two new forces". The Ministry of Defence issued a statement which said that Miskimmon's forms were to be ignored and only the official forms accepted as applications. They further stated that any future letters of such a nature must be cleared with MOD. This was however only one of a number of errors which diluted Catholic confidence in the integrity of the new force.

40,000 people served in the from UDR 1970 to 1992. Only a small percentage of the male population of Northern Ireland ever served with the regiment. In 1972 Brigadier Ormerod complained that only 2.7% of eligible males had joined and in 1981 Brigadier Ritchie noted that only 6% of eligible Protestant males were serving.

The role of ex-B-Specials in the UDR and the effect on Catholic recruitment

Like its predecessor, the B Specials, it failed to attract more than a small percentage of Catholics due to IRA threats, and because of the regiment's reputation as the B Specials under a different name, according to Martin Dillon in The Diry War. David McKittrick & David McVea in Making Sence of the Troubles, suggest that internment without trial also alienated the vast majority of Catholics, aided by the fact that not a single Loyalist had been detained.

Questions were raised in the British Parliament before the Regiment was formed. Jeremy Thorpe MP was the first to draw parallels with the B Specials when he asked in the House of Commons what effect "saying straight away that a substantial majority of this force is to be recruited from former B Specials is likely to increase the chances of general acceptance in Ulster?" Bernadette Devlin MP later in the debate was to ask, "Do you really expect me or any other member or anybody in Northern Ireland to accept one solitary word of the whitewash and eyewash you have produced? Can you give me one concrete statement that it the UDR is not the USC under the guise of the British Army?"

Politicians called for a full implementation of the Hunt Report which recommended a more neutral name, a reduction in the proposed size of the force and a ban on the recruitment of B Specials' county commanders as UDR battalion commanders.

According to Graham Ellison & Jim Smyth in The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland, Nationalists feared that the UDR would simply be "the B Specials by another name" and this fear appeared to be confirmed when all the new battalion commanders were ex-B Specials and, in Co. Derry for example at least, half the recruits of the local UDR were ex-B Specials. The Belfast Telegraph disagreed. In editorials several days apart its pages declared: "In no sense can the new Regiment be regarded like the old USC, as a vigilante force and a law unto itself. Inevitably the members of the new force will be provided by present B Specials and just as inevitably it is already being smeared in some quarters as simply the old force in new uniform. Every effort must be made to ensure that this is not so. No-one must be able to put a denominational tag on the UDR and if one of the senior officers in the force happened to be a Roman Catholic, so much the better... The establishment of this new force should be regarded as a turning point in the life of the community."

In the event the response from the B Specials was mixed. Some felt betrayed and resigned immediately, others grasped the new opportunity and made application to join the UDR as soon as forms were available.

There was another option open to the men of the B-Specials, to join the newly-formed RUC Reserve and many did so, especially in Belfast where it has been noted that the Specials had received more training as, and were more akin with, policemen, whereas the border districts had operated in a more military fashion. In Belfast, during the first month of recruiting only 36 Specials applied to join the UDR compared to a national average of 29% - 2,424, one thousand of whom were rejected, mainly on the grounds of age and fitness. Around 75% of the men of the Tyrone B Specials did apply and as a result the 6th Battalion started life as the only battalion more or less up to strength and remained so during its history. The border counties in general followed this pattern. It also meant that former B Specials members had domination of these battalions. .

The story was different for Belfast, Londonderry, Down and Antrim where the figures were markedly more balanced with a high proportion of Catholic recruits. The results at 3 UDR were best in this respect. The battalion commenced duty with 30% of its numbers as Catholic.

By the end of March 1970 the number of accepted recruits was 2,440 including 1,423 ex B Specials and 946 Catholics. The breakdown for each area was:

Battalion	Applications	Accepted	USC	Accepted
Antrim (1 UDR)	575	221	220	93
Armagh (2 UDR)	615	370	402	277
Down (3 UDR)	460	229	195	116
Fermanagh (4 UDR)	471	223	386	193
Londonderry (5 UDR)	671	382	338	219
Tyrone (6 UDR)	1187	637	813	419
Belfast (7 UDR)	797	378	70	36

The table above shows the number of B Specials who joined the regiment before it began duties. However, by 1 April 1970 only 1,606 of the desired 4,000 men had been enlisted and the regiment began its duties much under strength.

Unlike soldiers from the regular Army the UDR did not live in barracks. As a citizens' army they returned to their own homes at the end of a duty. Many lived in Protestant or Catholic enclaves which put them within easy reach of paramilitary or community groups within those areas.

A number of former members of the B Specials felt aggrieved at the loss of their force and were not prepared to join the UDR. The targets for their intimidation were the members of their own (Protestant) community, and in particular other former B Men, who had joined up. In later years boos and jeers handed out to UDR patrols by former B Specials were mild. Most resistance was by the B-Specials in the Belfast and Down areas.

The years 1972-73 saw the emergence of paramilitary threats from loyalists. Of 288 incidents of intimidation reported all but twelve of those were from Protestants who had been threatened from within their own community. Sometimes Potter suggests, this was to gain information, or to persuade members of the regiment to join (or remain within) Protestant organisations. The intimidation included incidents of threatening letters and phone calls, abduction, shots fired from passing cars and off-duty soldiers being assaulted..

Subsequent Catholic recruitment

The British Government, the Ministry of Defence, the UDR Advisory Committee, successive Regimental Commanders (with exceptions) and the battalions themselves failed to properly to address the issue of low Catholic recruitment numbers. Despite the general non-sectarian approach of the regiment, unless the numbers of recruits from both communities reflected the demographics of Northern Ireland it would never become the model which Lord Hunt intended it to be.” Whilst Catholics continued to join the regiment the numbers were never sufficiently high to bring the percentage up to 30% except in 3 (Co Down) UDR. Unionist politicians compounded this error by complaining that Catholics got preferential treatment for promotion in 3 UDR

The 3rd (Co. Down) Battalion was, and remained the unit with the highest percentage of Catholic members, beginning at 30% throughout the Troubles, with entire sections being made up of Catholics. This led to protests from the B Specials Association that in 3 UDR “preference for promotion and allocation of appointments was being given to Catholics”

Many Catholic recruits found themselves reporting for duty in B Specials drill halls, according to Chris Ryder The UDR -An Instrument of Peace. In some cases he says, the new Catholic recruits were cold-shouldered or ignored and generally made to feel unwelcome to the point where they resigned. Despite this he notes, many Catholics stayed in the regiment, and following Operation Demetrius there was a general outcry by Nationalist politicians because no Protestant paramilitaries were interned: only suspected members of the IRA. The general feeling according to Ryder, was made clear by Austin Currie MP (whose own brother was a member of the regiment) on 18 August, 1971 when he publicly withdrew his support for the regiment. For some time the IRA had been discouraging Catholics from joining he says, but after these events more serious intimidation began to emerge, such as:

• homes daubed with painted slogans;
• shotguns fired outside homes;
• being handed bullets or having them delivered through the post;
• threatening letters;
• threatening phone calls;
• arson attacks;
• children of members bullied at school;
• beatings and assault;
• refusal to give service in shops;
• being sent to Coventry in the local community.

Thomas G. Mitchell writes that UDR's recruitment of Catholics was affected by both its member's prior association with the B-specials and by IRA intimidation tactics aimed at discouraging Catholics from joining.

The first Catholic soldier to be killed according was 32-year-old part-time Private Sean Russell of 7 UDR who was shot dead in 1970, in front of his wife and children, by a gunman who burst into his home in the predominantly Catholic area of New Barnsley, Belfast. The last was part-time Private William Megrath of 11 UDR who was shot dead in July 1987 as he drove through the Twinbrook area of west Belfast on his return home from his civilian job. According to official figures the worst period was in the fourteen months following Internment when seven Catholic soldiers were killed by the IRA. In that period they numbered 7% of the regimental strength but in terms of the numbers of UDR soldiers killed by the IRA the percentage was 28%.

The Belfast Telegraph would report that as a result of IRA pressure and disillusionment with the government's attitude towards the minority community over internment, 25% of Catholics in the regiment resigned in 1971, 50% of those in the months following Internment. The Belfast Telegraph's comments were:

The threat of intimidation against members of the UDR is a serious matter. The UDR is more than an army regiment. It is an experiment in co-operation between Protestants and Catholics. If the Catholics leave, the UDR will become a purely Protestant force by default.

— The Belfast Telegraph

The Regiment attempted to halt the exodus of Catholics in a number of ways, including allowing battalion commanders to appear on television (normally not permitted for the rank of Lieutenant Colonel at that time), appeals to religious and political leaders and the implementation of extra personal security measures. Although the Ministry of Defence never admitted to any intent on the matter, when Brigadier Scott-Bowden's term as Commander UDR finished in 1972, his successor was Brigadier Denis Ormerod, a Catholic whose mother's family came from the Republic of Ireland. His second-in-command (Deputy Commander UDR) Colonel Kevin Hill was also Catholic, as was his successor Colonel Paddy Ryan whose father lived in Donaghadee, Co Down. Ormerod admitted in his memoirs that his religion and appointment as the senior Catholic army officer in Northern Ireland helped him considerably in his rapport with Catholic religious leaders but that conversely, these appointments also created unease with Protestants and he was visited by a number of concerned politicians including, notably, Ian Paisley.

Duties

Main article: Ulster Defence Regiment Operations

The primary function of the regiment was to assist the police by guarding key installations and providing patrols and vehicle checkpoints on public roads to hamper the activities of paramilitary groups. As the force was initially predominantly part-time the presence of its members was mostly felt during evenings and weekends. It was expected to answer to general call-outs, and was mobilised on a permanent basis on several occasions such as Operation Motorman to provide manpower assistance to the police and Army. As the regiment evolved into a predominantly full-time unit it assumed more duties previously assigned to the police or Army in support of Operation Banner. By 1980, the full-time element had become the majority and the regiment's role had expanded to include tactical responsibility for 85% of Northern Ireland supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Because UDR soldiers lived within their own communities and not in barracks they were able to provide intelligence to the Army. However this also made many soldiers vulnerable to attack. 155 of all UDR personnel killed by the IRA were killed off duty. A further 47 after leaving the regiment.

Structure

By March 1970, when deputy Minister of Defence Roy Hattersley answered questions in the House of Commons, there had been 4,791 applications to join, of which 946 were from Catholics and 2,424 from former members of the B-Specials. 2,440 had been accepted, including 1,423 from former B-Specials.

The regiment was described in 1972 as:

Organised into 11 Battalions and 59 companies: there are two battalions in Belfast and the remainder cover county or sub-county areas. Seven of the eleven Battalions are commanded by Regular Commanding Officers. In addition the Training Majors, Quartermaster, Regimental Sergeant Majors, Chief Clerks, and Signaller NCOs are also Regulars. There are a number of 'Conrate' (full time UDR) posts in each unit, including Adjutants, Permanent Staff Instructors, Security Guards, etc. Many of the officer and senior rank Conrates are ex-Regulars. The remainder are part-timers. Their main tasks are guarding key points, patrolling, and surveillance, and manning Vehicle Check Points. They do not operate in the 'hard' areas of Belfast, and are not permitted to become involved in crowd confrontations anywhere. Men are armed with self-loading rifles or sub-machine guns. The current strength of the Regiment is 7910.

Initially, seven battalions were raised, immediately making it the largest regiment in the British Army. Within two years, a further four battalions were added, taking the total to eleven. To begin with, the regiment's operational capability consisted entirely of part-time volunteers, before a full time cadre was added in 1976.

According to Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell the full-time element of the regiment eventually expanded to encompass more than half the total personnel. The UDR was they say, the first infantry regiment in the British Army to fully integrate women into its structure, when Greenfinches (so-called because of the code-name used to identify them by radio took over clerical and signals duties, which allowed male members of the regiment to return to patrol duties. They also say Greenfinches accompanied many patrols so that female suspects could be searched.

By 1990, they note, the regiment had stabilised its numbers at 3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time soldiers, with 140 attached regular army personnel in key command and training positions. They also say that the standard of training of the permanent cadre soldiers by this time was so high that they were used in much the same way as regular soldiers and it was not uncommon for regular army units to then come under local command and control of a UDR Battalion Headquarters.

Battalions and locations

There were many UDR bases throughout Northern Ireland. Some were Regimental locations, Battalion locations, Company locations or Platoon locations.

Name	Between	Bases
Headquarters	1970-1992	Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn
1st (County Antrim) Battalion	1970-1984	Ballymena; Larne
1st/9th (County Antrim) Battalion	1984-1992
2nd (County Armagh) Battalion	1970-1991	Drumadd Barracks, Armagh (replaced Gough Barracks which was taken over by the RUC); Loughall UDR Barracks; Glenane Barracks (destroyed in an IRA attack); Newtownhamilton RUC Station
2nd/11th (Craigavon) Battalion	1991-1992
3rd (County Down) Battalion	1970-1992	Ballykinlar; The Abbey, Kilkeel; Rathfriland UDR Barracks; Newry
4th (County Fermanagh) Battalion	1970-1991	Grosvenor Barracks, Enniskillen; Lisnaskea; Monea; St Angelo; Fintona
4th/6th (County Fermanagh and County Tyrone) Battalion	1991-1992
5th (County Londonderry) Battalion	1970-1992	Ballykelly; Londonderry; Strabane, Magherafelt, Coleraine
6th (County Tyrone) Battalion	1970-1991	St Lucia Barracks, Omagh; The Deanery, Clogher; Pomeroy; Caledon RUC Station; Aughnacloy; Castlederg
7th (City of Belfast) Battalion	1970-1984
7th/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion	1984-1992	Palace Barracks, Holywood; Grand Central Hotel, Royal Avenue, Belfast, Newtownards, Ladas Drive, Belfast
8th (County Tyrone) Battalion	1971-1992	Killymeal House, Dungannon; Cookstown UDR Barracks
9th (Country Antrim) Battalion	1972-1984	Steeple Hill, Antrim; Lisburn; Carrickfergus
10th (City of Belfast) Battalion	1972-1984	Malone Road, Belfast; Carryduff
11th (Craigavon) Battalion	1972-1991	Mahon Barracks, Portadown; Kitchen Hill Barracks, Lurgan; Scarva Road Barracks, Banbridge

The Destroyed Barracks at Glenanne

The joint UDR/RUC base at Fintona after a mortar attack

According to Potter, the normal means of dispersing UDR soldiers into their areas of responsibility was to provide a sub-barracks which would hold an entire company or perhaps just a platoon of men. Battalion Headquarters would be located in a major town he says, (usually the county town but not always as some counties had two Battalions). Guarded by a permanent cadre of soldiers these barracks he notes, would become doubly active after 6 p.m. as part-time soldiers arrived for evening duties. After Ulsterisation began in 1976 many Battalion HQ's eventually had full-sized permanent cadre companies attached and these would maintain a 24 hour presence in the Battalion's area of responsibility on a twenty-four hour basis. In each battalion area, sub headquarter units would maintain direct contact with their own men and Battalion HQ by radio. In many cases the radios were operated by Greenfinches whose husbands were out on patrol. This did lead to some very tense moments when mobile units or foot patrols came under attack and submitted a "contact report" (contact with the enemy) by radio .

An example of this structure can be seen in the make-up of 2 UDR based at Drummad Barracks in Armagh:

Company	Part/Full-time	Base	Hours of duty	Number on duty
HQ Coy	Mixed	Armagh, Command, Control & Admin	Admin 9-5, Watchkeepers 24 hr	9-5 = 15, 24hr = 5
A Coy	Full time	Armagh	24	35
B Coy	Part time	Armagh/Newtownhamilton/Caledon	7pm - 2am	35
C Coy	Part time	Glenanne	7pm - 2am	35
D Coy	Part time	Loughgall	7pm - 2am	35

Annual training camps

According to John Potter, part-time UDR soldiers were required to attend an annual camp for a seven-day period, usually somewhere in the United Kingdom e.g.:

• Warcop, Cumbria, England
• Lydd and Hythe, Cinque Ports, England

• Barry Buddon, Scotland

• Ballykinler, Northern Ireland
• Magilligan, Northern Ireland

Rates of pay

1970

Rank	Pay
Unmarried Private 1st Class with less than 6 years experience	£2. 19 shillings
Corporal	£3. 3 shillings
Sergeant	£3. 12 shillings
Captain	£5. 6 shillings
Major	£7. 2 shillings

Uniform, armament & equipment

File:South Armagh.JPG

Soldiers of 11 UDR on a patrol break in the hostile South Armagh area. The soldier on the right is carrying a jamming device to prevent the detonation of radio controlled IED's.

No4 Lee Enfield Rifle

An SLR rifle similar to those used by the Ulster Defence Regiment

The Enfield SA80

Lynx helicopter similar to those used by the UDR

Carl Gustav grenade launcher as used by UDR boat sections.

Walther P5

• Uniform. On operational duty male members of the regiment dressed in a similar fashion to regular army units. Camouflage jackets were worn and headgear was a distinctive green beret with a gold coloured "Maid of Erin" style harp, surmounted by the Royal crown (in later years this was dulled down by blackening). Female "Greenfinch" members wore rifle green skirts and jackets with the UDR beret and cap badge. For ceremonial occasions the men wore the standard British Army No.2 Dress uniform (also called Service Dress). The female "best dress" was exactly the same as their patrol uniform. The beret was retained as headgear. (The badge was a direct copy of the Royal Ulster Rifles cap badge with the motto removed from its base). On the formation of Operations Platoons, narrow coloured slides were adopted and worn on the shoulder straps in battalion colours which indicated these were full time soldiers to the trained eye. These were dispensed with as the Operations Platoons were merged into full time rifle companies. Rank was the same as the conventional ranks for infantry NCO's and officers and the insignia was worn in the same fashion.

• Due to equipment and uniform shortages the early image of the regiment was very much of a rag-tag bunch using World War II weaponry, old army uniforms and carrying pockets full of loose change in order to make reports from public telephone boxes. Many of the soldiers were veterans of earlier campaigns with the British Army or had been in the Special Constabulary and were middle-aged, this earned them the public nickname of "Dad's Army" after the sobriquet given to the Home Guard during World War II. Separate reports from the army's "Soldier Magazine" from 1970 and 1977 illustrate the differences in age and weaponry.

• Armaments. The most familiar weapon associated with the regiment was the standard issue L1A1 Self Loading Rifle, referred to as the "SLR". Other weaponry was available however such as; the 9 mm Browning pistol, the Sterling sub machine gun, the L4A4 Light Machine Gun and the L7A2 General Purpose Machine Gun. Small stocks of Riot Guns were also kept. These were used to fire plastic bullets to knock down doors and other obstacles during search operations. A small number of Carl Gustav 84 mm grenade launchers were also kept but rarely deployed as the weapon was unsuited to most operations. (see Boat Sections below). The regiment later exchanged its SLRs (as did all infantry units in the army) for the SA80.

For personal protection off duty most members were issued with a Walther PPK but Major Ken Maginnis acquired permission for UDR soldiers to purchase Browning 9&nnsp;mm pistols at £200 each. These were deemed to be more effective. In the late 1980s the PPK was replaced by the Walther P5 which was considered a more practical weapon because of its size and ballistic capabilities. Where a soldier was considered to be at high risk he would be permitted to hold his rifle at home in addition to his personal protection handgun. This policy was known as "weapons out" and was reduced by 75% when the more modern SLR replaced the No4 Lee Enfield in 1973 due to the high number of rifles stolen by paramilitaries.

Most of the stolen weapons were taken by Loyalist gangs but a number of soldiers lost their lives when confronted by members of the IRA who had entered their homes by force to steal rifles. The "weapons out" policy was eventually discontinued on the introduction of the SA80 rifle in 1986/7.

• Transport. The standard patrol vehicle was the 3/4 ton Land Rover used extensively throughout the British armed forces. Following withdrawal from police service a number of Shorland armoured cars were allocated to the regiment but these were rarely used after initial service because the turret was designed to hold a General Purpose Machine Gun which was deemed unsuitable for urban use due to its rapid rate of fire and tendency to be inaccurate. The Shorland was not popular with soldiers who used it due to its instability on the road because of the heavy turret although some battalions continued to use them into the 1980s in border areas because of the increased protection the plate armour gave over the Makrolon polycarbonate armour fitted to Land Rovers. Three-ton and four-ton Bedford trucks were used for large troop movements. A range of unmarked civilian cars and vans was also used for staff, administration and covert activities.
• The Ulster Defence Regiment was also deployed by helicopters supplied by either the Royal Air Force or Army Air Corps for rapid insertion or for duties in border areas where it was unsafe or unwise to use wheeled transport.
• Equipment

Fast Boats. Several battalions were supplied with rigid Dory craft for patrolling waterways shared with the Republic of Ireland in an attempt to prevent gun running across these narrow channels (such as Carlingford Lough). Assisted by land based radar, these fast boats were armed with General Purpose Machine Guns and carried a Carl Gustav 84mm anti tank weapon in addition to the rifles and sub-machine guns normally carried by soldiers. After a report submitted by 3 UDR in 1972 HQ Northern Ireland requested a navy patrol vessel to be permanently stationed in the centre of Carlingford Lough to assist with suppression of gun-running. This suggestion was adopted and to the end of the security situation a small warship was on station off the coast off the Warrenpoint/Rostrevor shoreline. This intervention was called Operation Grenada. Gun-running across these coastal estuaries ceased according to Potter as a result.

Dogs. Search dogs were originally provided by the regular army but eventually a UDR dog section was formed to provide more immediate assistance in search operations.

Information cards. All members of the British Armed Forces, including the UDR, carried a number of small information cards to assist in the execution of their duties in Northern Ireland. These were generally referred to by their colour.

The Yellow Card was a list of the rules for opening fire.

The Blue Card was a detailed explanation of how arrests were to be made.

The White Card was to be given to next of kin or other appropriate person in the event of an arrest of a suspect.

The Green Card carried instructions on how to deal with accidental cross-border incursion into the Irish Republic and subsequent arrest by Irish security forces.

The Red Card contained instructions on how to summon helicopter support and the drills for entering and leaving helicopters.

The Yellow Card was seen as particularly important and all soldiers were taught to be entirely familiar with its content as it contained specific instructions to be followed when opening fire on a suspected enemy. Warnings were to be issued to allow suspects to surrender. Soldiers could only shoot without warning when: if there is no other way to protect themselves or those whom it is their duty to protect from the danger of being killed or seriously injured.

Rank

Prior to the formation of the regiment one of the major issues facing Whitehall was finding officers of enough seniority to appoint as battalion commanders. The result was that for the first year each battalion was commanded by the former County Commandant of the Ulster Special Constabulary. This was only ever intended to be a temporary measure as one of the issues of command and control was to have an officer of field rank from the regular army in direct control of each battalion. The normal rank for this position being Lieutenant Colonel. Using B Specials officers was neither politically expedient or practical because, although some of these men had previous military experience, some didn't. To have B Specials battalion commanders hearkened back to the B Specials itself and the absolute danger was that their appointment would act as a deterrent to Catholics who might otherwise have joined the regiment but would be put off by the presence of B Specials.

As the ranks moved down the command structure the problem became more acute. For each battalion there was a minimum requirement of:

• 1 Lt Col
• 6 Majors
• 7 Captains
• 25 Lieutenants
• 1 RSM
• 7 Warrant Officers 2nd Class (WO2)
• 25 Sergeants
• 25 Corporals
• 25 Lance Corporals

Finding senior officers and NCO's with enough experience to do the job was difficult and had the same result as with commanding officers. These posts were generally filled by older men who had previous military experience or by former B Specials officers.

On allocating rank to Corporals and Lance Corporals there was little structure. In some cases the men elected their own NCO's because of a particular standing in the community, in others they fell by default to ex-servicemen or to former B Specials officers with the experience to carry out the tasks of the rank.

The dependency on former B Specials was unsettling for Catholic recruits, offset in some circumstances by the fact that Catholic ex-Servicemen were given positions of rank because they had the experience. This led to unusual situations such as patrols of former B Specials men being led by a Catholic sergeant or as in the case of 3 UDR, patrols which were 100% Catholic being led by a former B Special as their sergeant.

The Greenfinches

In the early days of the regiment female members of the Royal Military Police accompanied patrols when available to enable female suspects to be searched. There were never enough of these RMP searchers so in 1973 an act was passed in Parliament to recruit women into the regiment for this purpose. On 16 August, 1973 a regular army officer from the Women's Royal Army Corps, Major Eileen Tye, took up the post of "Commander Women" at HQUDR. By September 352 had been enrolled and the first enlistments were carried out at 2 UDR's HQ in Armagh on the 16th.

Uniforms were a problem as the only available clothing was mostly ATS surplus from WW2 but this was resolved in time although many women were unhappy with the semi-formal skirts and knee length boots which had to be worn in all weathers. The women soldiers also wore a silk cravat in their battalion colour.

WO2 Brooker from the WRAC was assigned to train the women in a one week course consisting of drill, army organisation, map reading, searching of women and vehicles, radio procedure and basic first aid.

The first recruits were largely from the executive professional classes which, in Testimony to Courage, John Potter notes to be unusual because it was the males from those social types who were most reluctant to join the UDR. Some were wives of serving UDR soldiers and others were married to soldiers on long-term (accompanied) posting to Northern Ireland.

Potter writes that the country and border battalions welcomed the use of women as they knew they were an essential in the searching of women suspects but the city based battalions were slower to see the advantages and to some extent resented the presence of the women soldiers. In the short-term however all battalions came to appreciate the value of having women with patrols. Through time the role of women was expanded as it was realised that their higher pitched voices were more suited to radio transmission than men. They were tasked to relieve RMP women at the city centre segment gates in Belfast and soon learned how to accept abuse from the public and how to avoid traps which could be set for them when searching other women; i.e. razor blades placed in pockets. Potter notes that women had less problems with the male public who seemed more amenable when questioned by women. Some women were trained in the use of "Sea Watch" radar to assist seaborne patrols from those battalions which had fast boats.

Initially a part time female officer was appointed in each battalion to supervise the women soldiers but through time the women came under command of the OC of the company they were assigned to. In later years some women became battalion adjutants and company commanders and some were attached to brigade staffs throughout the Province.

Accomodation for changing and toilet facilities was another problem faced early on and it took several years for the all male environments of UDR bases to adapt their infrastructure to suit female needs.

The recruitment of women soldiers peaked in 1986 with 286 permanent cadre and 530 part timers but the establishment never dropped below 700 from 1978 onwards.

Women were never armed on duty, although some were permitted to be issued (or purchased) personal protection pistols if they were considered to be at high risk. They were however trained in the use of weapons and HQUDR ran a women's .22 shooting competition. Although women in the British Army carry weapons now this change did not happen until after the UDR was merged with the Royal Irish Rangers in 1992.

The same issues which affected other servicewomen also affected UDR Greenfinches. Rules regarding pregnancy, marriage and pay. Early recruits with children had to provide a signed certificate stating that their children were properly supervised whilst they were on duty.

The name Greenfinch applied to the women's UDR comes from the system of radio "appointment titles" used by the army to identify certain people or branches of the service. For example; bomb disposal officers were referred to as "Felix", infantry as "Foxhound". New titles were introduced when the UDR was established and soldiers in the regiment were identified as "Greentop". When women were introduced the appointment title "Greenfinch" was assigned to them and became their working nickname. It is still applied today to women in the Royal Irish Regiment.

The integration of women into the UDR paved the way for the disbandment of the Women's Royal Army Corps and the integration of women into previously male only regiments.

Four Greenfinches were killed as a result of their service with the regiment between 1974 and 1992.

Music

Each battalion had a number of pipers and these musicians participated in a centralised pipe band formally called the Pipes & Drums of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Their uniform followed the traditional military dress for Irish pipers, consisting of a saffron kilt, bottle green "Prince Charlie" jacket, bottle green cape and bottle green caubeen adorned with a double size cap badge. Unlike other Irish regiments in the British Army UDR pipers did not wear a hackle and the lining colour of the cloaks was unique to the regiment.

In June 1986 the Regiment held its only tattoo for two days in good weather at Ravenhill rugby grounds. Some of the attractions for the 12,000 people who attended were:

• The Red Devils parachute team
• Greenfinches abseiling from the top of one of the grandstands
• UDR Dogs
• A mock terrorist ambush
• Beating Retreat with the Pipes & Drums of the UDR plus the bands of the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment and the RUC.

The crowd are reported to have created a "deeply moving" moment by humming the evening hymn "The Day Thou Givest".

Some recordings of UDR Pipes & Drums were released, such as the 5 UDR P&D "Irish & Scottish Pipe Music" which includes recordings of the regimental and battalions marches as well as other popular tunes.

Ulsterisation

Ulsterisation is the term now applied to the policy by the British government to reduce regular Army troop numbers in Northern Ireland and bring local forces into the front line as a result of international opinion about British soldiers being used in what could viewed as a "colonial occupation". Also known as "Criminalisation", "Normalisation" or "Police Primacy". One of the major changes in policy was to return control of internal security matters to the Royal Ulster Constabulary which had effectively been under the command of the Army since the Scarman and Hunt reports which called for the restructuring of the severely-undermanned force of 1969. In a report commissioned in 1976, recommendations were made which included:

• An increase in the establishment of the RUC and RUC Reserve.
• The creation of RUC "mobile support units".
• An increase in the conrate establishment of the UDR to enable it to take over tasks from the regular Army.
• The UDR to provide a 24-hour military presence.

Despite the rapid induction of 300 extra recruits to the UDR and the raising of operations platoons, the scheme was hampered by the shortfall of conrate officers in the UDR who could take on the role of operations officers. It also placed a heavier demand upon senior NCOs trained as watchkeepers in the operations rooms, or "comcens" (an abbreviation for communications centres) at UDR bases.

The term "Ulsterisation" was coined by the media. The then Assistant Chief Constable of the RUC, Jack Hermon, summed it up when he said, "Ulstermen need to learn to live together and be policed by Ulstermen. If they have to kill, let them kill each other, not English soldiers."

Criticism

Criticism by Republican and Nationalist sources such as An Phoblacht and the SDLP, highlighted the number of criminal convictions accumulated by UDR members. According to Chris Ryder, of the 40,000 who are recorded as having served in the UDR from 1970-1992, 18 were convicted of murder, 11 for manslaughter (two as a result of the careless handling of weapons). The regiment was responsible for the shooting dead of 9 people - 3 members of the IRA, one Loyalist hijacker, two joyriders, an alleged thief, a deaf youth who could not hear the warnings shouted at him and a man shot accidentally in a confrontation with a patrol. In Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe, Ronald Weitzer reports that between 1970 and 1990 seventeen UDR members were convicted of murder or manslaughter, 99 of assault, and "others" (no exact figure) were convicted of charged or convicted of armed robbery, weapons offences, bombing, intimidation and attacks on Catholics, kidnapping, and membership in the UVF. Only a small fraction of the regiment he calculates, were involved in such crime, but the proportion was higher than for the regular British Army or RUC. For context, Potter cites a study carried out by the Irish Information Partnership in 1985, that compared the percentages of paramilitary-related offences in the age group 18-35 (the average age for UDR members.) The study found that the civilian population's comparative offence ratio was two and a half times greater than that of the UDR.

File:Bloodmoney Poster.jpg

Blood Money poster

An Phoblacht also criticises the regiment for "collusion with loyalist murder gangs" and "biased sentencing" from the courts in favour of UDR members. The newspaper covered a story about Sinn Féin's Newry and Armagh Assembly member, Conor Murphy, condeming the awarding of a Wilkinson Sword of Peace to a former UDR battalion. The family of Michael Power, who was shot dead in 1987, are reported in An Phoblacht as challenging Lisburn City Council over its decision to erect a monument to the UDR in Lisburn city centre Another article carried an item on redundancy payments to the Royal Irish Regiment (Home Service) (former UDR) battalions in which the paper referred to as a "sectarian militia" and calls their redundancy "blood money". Republicans also produced a poster against the payments.

The SDLP carried out a campaign for the disbandment of the UDR from as early as 1974 through the media and by applying pressure through the Irish government. One SDLP delegate at the party conference, described the UDR as "an armed wing of the British establishment designed to enable the unionist population to dominate the nationalists". In the mid-1980s the SDLP's Canavan Report said the UDR "has by far the worst record for serious sectarian crimes of any Regiment presently in service with the British Armed Forces in Northern Ireland". The SDLP remained opposed to the regiment and continually called for its disbandment due to the failure of the GOC to address the issue of Catholic recruiting and the regimental image. Brigadier Roger Preston in an interview with RTE in February 1985 attempted to addressed these concerns when he pointed out that, to that point; some 32,000 people had served with the UDR, nine had been convicted of murder, six for manslaughter.

In the wake of the Hillsborough Agreement the DUP began a campaign with the apparent motive of reducing morale in the regiment (and the RUC) and causing mass resignations by "undermining the confidence of soldiers in their officers". There was some speculation that this was a step in forming the "Third Force" under the name of Ulster Resistance which the DUP had been advocating for some time. During this period Ian Paisley announced to the press that soldiers in Ballymena had been requested to report to barracks to be disarmed prior to the part-time cadre being disbanded. The DUP press office claimed that the use of English officers and senior NCOs was "London and Dublin insisting the UDR could not be trusted". and Peter Robinson, the deputy DUP Leader, advised soldiers not to co-operate with policemen who were attached to their patrols as they were there on the "directions of the Anglo-Irish Council".

Original Anti-UDR poster

Potter writes that this political manoeuvring wasn't for the "good of the UDR" but an attempt to make the DUP the "main voice of the Protestant people". To counter this he says, the UDR Advisory council decided to hold briefings for the four main political parties at HQUDR. Invitiations were issued to the Official Unionist party, the Alliance Party, the DUP and the SDLP. The DUP didn't attend any briefings but the other three parties did.

Infiltration by paramilitaries

The UDR had a problem throughout its history with infiltration of its structures by paramilitaries, who were mostly, but not only loyalists. The problem was compounded by the fact that dual membership of the UDR and UDA was acceptable to the military authorities. According to Martin Dillon in The Dirty War, the UVF an illegal organisation also exploited membership of the UDR and its potential for widely circulating intelligence files on the nationalist community throughout its ranks. During The Troubles, nationalists and human rights groups alleged that the UDR colluded - i.e. co-operated -with loyalists in an institutionalised manner, knowingly providing them with weapons and intelligence to target Republican suspects. Regimental sources argue that while the Regiment had a problem with some low ranking members aiding paramilitaries, the institution as a whole was dedicated to upholding the rule of law and worked to rid itself of paramilitaries within its ranks.

In the early years of the regiment's history Loyalist paramilitaries raided (or were given access to) several UDR barracks and were able to steal substantial quantities of modern weaponry. Many of these weapons were subsequently recovered by follow up operations by the UDR but some were proven to have been used by Loyalist organisations to carry out murders. A number of UDR soldiers were convicted of assisting paramilitaries by providing information to enable these raids to take place.

UFF Paramilitary mural

Loyalist raids were mounted against 2 UDR, 3 UDR, 5 UDR, 7 UDR, 10 UDR, and 11 UDR battallions. In a raid against 2 UDR's Lurgan company (which later became C Coy, 11 UDR), the guard commander was later charged and convicted of supplying information to loyalists. According to Potter, the commander was later killed in 1975 during an internal Ulster Volunteer Force feud.

Two soldiers from the 11th Battalion's C Company in Lurgan, who were also members of the Ulster Volunteer Force, were convicted of the 1975 killing of three members of the pop group the Miami Showband in a UVF attack. In the same attack two members of the UDR Portadown company who were also UVF men died in the premature explosion of their bomb. In 1999 David Jordan, a former UDR soldier, allegedly broke down in a bar and admitted to being part of a patrol that killed nationalist councillor Patsy Kelly in 1974. Jordan also implicated former Democratic Unionist Party Northern Ireland Assembly member Oliver Gibson in the murder.

In 1989, twenty-eight UDR soldiers from the same platoon in 7/10 UDR were arrested by the Royal Ulster Constabulary as part of the Stevens Inquiry. Six of those arrested were later awarded damages over their arrests and only one was charged with activities linked to paramilitaries. This caused "intense anger" in the regiment, according to Potter, as three hundred police had been used to surround the homes. In doing so, Potter writes, Stevens had identified the soldiers as members of the UDR to their neighbours, putting their lives at risk. Eleven soldiers moved house as a result and the homes of eighteen otherS were provided with "additonal security measures" at a cost of £25,000.

There were also some cases of republican paramilitaries infiltrating the regiment.

IRA Poster from the 1980's

One example involved William Bogle of 6 UDR who was ambushed and killed on 5 December 1972 at Killeter near the Tyrone/Donegal border. Potter notes that at least one book includes the allegation that he was killed by a former member of his own company possessed of strong Republican views, and after the shooting the suspect moved across the border and is not known to have returned to Northern Ireland.

In another example, Potter recounts that one member of 3 UDR is known to have been a member of the Irish Freedom Fighters and another was suspected of dual membership with the same organisation. An SLR was reported "stolen" from the home of the latter.

In June 1987 the Belfast Newsletter reported, that 7/10 UDR had been infiltrated by the IRA, and that Private Joe Tracey had been shot dead as he started a new job on some flats off the Lisburn Road, Belfast. The UDR accepted that someone must have informed on him but emphatically denied that the IRA had been able to penetrate the battalion calling the allegation a "wild rumour".

The Subversion in the UDR report

On January 1 every year the Public Record Office (PRO) in Kew releases government documents under the thirty year rule. The document, entitled Subversion in the UDR, was released in 2004 and was uncovered in the PRO by researchers working for the Pat Finucane Centre and the group, Justice for the Forgotten. Contents from the document first came public attention when they appeared as a series of articles in The Irish News (a Belfast based newspaper) on 2 and 3 May 2006. The document is believed to have been prepared by British military intelligence in August 1973, which highlighted the problem of overlapping membership between the UDR and loyalist organisations in the early years of the Regiment's history.

For the purpose of the paper subversion was considered to include a "strong support for, or membership of, organisations whose aims are incompatible with those of the UDR" and "attempts by UDR members to use their UDR knowledge, skills, or equipment to further the aims of such organisations."

The 1973 report found that an estimated 5-15% of UDR soldiers were directly linked to loyalist paramilitary groups. It concluded that the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for Protestant extremist groups was the UDR" and that the British Government knew that UDR weapons were being used by loyalist paramilitaries, including the killing of a Roman Catholic civilian and other attacks. It estimated that over 200 UDR weapons passed to loyalist paramilitaries by 1973.

The authors of the report expressed concern that UDR troops were loyal to "Ulster" alone, rather than to "Her Majesty's Government". One case cited as "indicative, but not typical," was that of a member of 1 UDR, described as "a good citizen (the Deputy Chairman of a District Council)." The report explained how he lived a "double life" as the OC of Ballymena UDA, had obtained ammunition for the UDA and was suspected of illegal arms dealings. He was however, described by his Commanding Officer as "a model soldier". The report accepted that very little was known, from an "intelligence point of view," but that subversion had certainly resulted in arms losses to Protestant groups on a "significant scale," though the rate of loss had decreased in 1973 (when the report was written).

The report found less evidence of subversion from Republican paramilitaries. It describes "isolated incidents where Catholic UDR soldiers have 'lost' weapons in suspicious circumstances," but explained that "neither the number of weapons nor the threat is thought to be great."

The report concludes that the danger of subversion in the UDR was "enormously heightened" by comparison with other British Army regiments. It considered a number of reasons for this, including the circumstances in which it was set up, the communities from which it recruits, the task it is expected to fulfil and the political circumstances that have prevailed in the first three years of its existence. However, it suggested that any effort to remove members who in the "foreseeable political circumstances" could possibly operate subversively would have resulted in a regiment that was "very small."

Attempts to prevent paramilitary infiltration

In Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, John Potter, documents several attempts to remove anyone with paramilitary connections from the regiment. In the early 1970s he says, this was made difficult by the fact that vetting was done by the regular army who had little or no knowledge of Northern Ireland paramilitary groupings. More emphasis was therefore placed on getting as many recruits as possible into the under-strength force.

On 29 November 1972 the GOCNI on instructions from Westminster, announced that dual membership of UDR and paramilitary organisations would not be tolerated and began a purge which saw a thousand members forced to resign from the UDR. The SDLP pushed for this purge to be extended to members of the Orange Order but no action was ever taken in this direction. Lt Col Dion Beard (1RTR) commander of 3 UDR issued a battalion order: "I will not tolerate any active participation by members of this battalion in any organisation which encourages violence......you cannot play in both teams. Either you believe in law and order applied equally to all men, or you believe in violence as a means of achieving political ends. In this respect the UDA is no better than IRA. Not only should you take no part in UDA activities but you should discourage your fellow citizens [from doing so]."

• The Bray reforms

Brigadier Michael Bray writes Potter, adopted a zero-tolerance policy from the beginning of his tenure as Commander UDR. He instituted a number of safeguards including monitoring of entire battalions and six month security reviews of all UDR personnel. Anyone found with even the most tenuous links to Protestant organisations was dismissed from the regiment. An "Out-of-bounds" list was produced which included pubs and clubs known to be frequented by Protestant paramilitaries. Members of the regiment were cautioned as to whom they should socialise with. All of this was a concerted effort to remove anyone with dual membership from the regiment and to prevent peer pressure being applied.

• The Stevens Enquiry

Working under almost total isolation and secrecy from the police and other security forces in Northern Ireland, John Stevens produced what would be the most stinging criticisms of the security forces in Northern Ireland. The Stevens Report resulted in a tightening of control on even the most low-rated intelligence documents and heightened accountability. For the first time the RUC were given access to UDR vetting procedures and many members of the regiment found themselves under police observation for extended periods of time, in some cases resulting in the expulsion of soldiers. Stevens agreed that there had been collusion between a small number of UDR soldiers who had "gravely abused their positions of trust" but that the issue was not "widespread or institutionalised".

• The Bennett Report

As working conditions and wages improved in the regiment many young people Potter suggests, saw it as an alternative to unemployment rather than just a means of expressing their wish to defend Northern Ireland. Professionalism expanded and there was less tolerance of members with dual membership. With the almost total absence of Catholics in the regiment however, and considering the damage which had already been done, the UDR was unlikely to ever be free of infiltration by Protestant Paramilitaries and to be unable to regain the confidence of the minority community. The Bennett Committee report of 1989 stressed this acutely and recommended that the regiment be disbanded. A view echoed by Lord Hunt who had made the original recommendation for the formation of the force. In Hunt's view the times had changed, the regiment's role was no longer required, and it was a time to return the duties of the UDR to the police.

• Anglo-Irish Agreement

After the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement the Irish government came to understand the security situation better and made several recomendations to improve the regiment's image with Nationalists, they included:

• An RUC officer to accompany each patrol.
• The part time element to be discontinued.
• The removal of powers of arrest.
• Restriction to operations carried out in support of the RUC.
• A more professional officer corps and better numbers of experienced NCO's.

As a result of these recommendations the post of Deputy Commander UDR was restored, ten additional senior NCO's were posted in from the regular army, officer training was increased to six months at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. According to Potter, efforts were made to increase the number of RUC officers on patrol with the UDR and the initial training for part-time soldiers was increased from eight to fourteen days. In his memoirs the former Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald noted that by 1986 there had been "a notable reduction in complaints of harassment of the Nationalist community by the security forces".

The military campaign

Targeting by the IRA

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Deaths in the Troubles by area.

As the IRA campaign continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the organisation increasingly targeted RUC officers and Ulster Defence Regiment servicemen, including when they were off duty. Because these men were largely Protestant, these killings were also perceived as a campaign of sectarian assassination. However White notes of the RUC:"The fact that the IRA killed Catholic members of the force at a slightly higher rate than their proportion of membership suggests that the IRA does not target Protestant members of the force." Former Unionist MP and a major in the UDR, Ken Maginnis, compiled a record of IRA attacks on the UDR and claimed from this that the IRA's campaign was sectarian and genocidal in that the eldest sons and breadwinners were especially targeted in order to ethnically-cleanse Protestants from their farms and jobs west of the River Bann.

However Professor Henry Patterson (Professor of Irish Politics) has said "No doubt many Provisionals then and now would sincerely and forcefully deny that their campaign in Fermanagh was a form of ethnic cleansing. As we have seen, most of the Protestants killed were in the security forces and Fermanagh did not experience the wholesale evacuation of Protestants that occurred in West Cork during the War of Independence.Yet, that the killings struck at the Protestant community’s morale, sense of security and belonging in the area was undeniable. It was being made clear to them that they could continue to live in Fermanagh but on terms defined by the Provisional IRA."

Despite the fact that most of the IRA's security force victims by the late 1980s were locally recruited RUC or UDR personnel, the Provisional leadership maintained that the regular Army was its preferred target. Gerry Adams, in an interview given in 1988, said it was, "vastly preferable" to target the regular Army as it "removes the worst of the agony from Ireland" and "diffuses the sectarian aspects of the conflict because loyalists do not see it as an attack on their community".

The regiment was created shortly after the formation of the Provisional IRA. The campaign pursued by the IRA became and remained the major target for anti-terrorist action by the UDR. Although most UDR casualties were ambushed off-duty there were open actions between the regiment and the IRA which varied in style and tactics between the urban setting of Belfast and the rural conditions of what has been referred to as the "Border War".

Belfast and other urban settings

Sniper action by the IRA resulted in casualties. These were hard to defeat as, when shots were fired, patrols would immediately take cover, report to battalion headquarters and wait for backup before engaging in search operations. In the short length of time this took the sniper team would quickly make their escape.

Rural ambushes and attacks

There were few military style frontal attacks on UDR establishments but some did occur. Most notably that of 2nd May 1974 when according to Sean O'Callaghan up to forty IRA men attacked the isolated Deanery at Clogher which was being used as a base by a company from 8 UDR. A sustained attack lasted for approximately twenty minutes during which the base was hit by rockets, mortars and small-arms fire. The engagement was broken off after intervention by Ferret armoured cars of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment who used their Browning.30 calibre heavy machine guns to suppress the attackers.

The most common method of attack was an ambush on rural roads. Commencing with the detonation of an IED which, if successful would knock out one of the two vehicles normally in a patrol (usually the Shorland armoured car because it housed the rapid firing General Purpose Machine Gun), the bomb would be followed up by small arms fire. In some cases the nearest available cover (such as hedgerows) would contain another IED which would be detonated if any soldiers were foolish enough to shelter there. During these actions it was not uncommon to have both side exchanging a high volume of small arms fire. UDR patrols reported expending up to several hundred rounds of ammunition from their rifles and machine guns.

Mortar attacks

The IRA developed a number of home-made mortars between 1972 and 2000. Referred to colloquially as Barrack busters. These were normally deployed by fixing them to the back of a commercial vehicle such as a builder's lorry. The vehicle would be parked in a position near a barracks and the devices fired by timing device or remote controlled detonator sending large missiles made from gas cylinders into the barracks compound. The largest of these devices used was twelve tubes fired at once at 3 UDR's Kilkeel base "The Abbey" in 1992.

Members killed

Between 1 April 1970 and 30 June 1992, a total of 197 soldiers were killed as active servicemen. Another 61 members were killed after they had left the UDR. Many UDR soldiers were killed in the line of duty, or because of their association with the regiment.

Two UDR soldiers were killed by the regular army, three by loyalist paramilitaries, and the remaining 192 by republican paramilitaries (mainly the IRA). Hugh Gallagher, a Catholic part-time UDR soldier and uncle of Omagh bomb victim Aidan Gallagher was shot dead by the IRA in 1984 in Omagh. Four Greenfinches were killed during the Troubles, Private Eva Martin, L/Cpl Jean Leggett, Cpl Heather Kerrigan and Pte Margaret A. Hearst. Three members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) killed during the conflict were also soldiers of the regiment.

During this time members of the UDR were responsible for the killing of six civilians and two members of the IRA.

• List - Comprehensive, chronological list of attacks on the Ulster Defence Regiment

Aftercare

In 2001, 9 years after amalgamation, 228 members were still receiving treatment for trauma related incidents, according to Potter. The Ulster Defence Regiment is the only regiment in the British Army to have its own "Aftercare" service. Like other British Army units the regimental association runs a charity known as the UDR Benevolent Fund which exists to provide assistance to those who require it as a consequence of illness or hardship but thus far is the only regiment to have a dedicated website to guide its dependents. Unlike other regiments the UDR's benevolent fund is supported by money from the public purse as well as through donations. This is being seen as the model for other army units to adopt as the number of dependants rises as a result of actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The UDR soldiers who were injured during their service or suffer from service-related disabilities. are cared for through the British National Health Service. Additional resources are offered by a number of civilian and forces charities such as Combat Stress The Aftercare site gives advice and offers assistance to soldiers and their families who have been affected by the death, physical or mental illness or who are in need of welfare or vocational assistance. Former members of the regiment are also entitled to seek assistance from the (British) Service Personnel and Veteran's Agency (SV&PA) who may provide pensions and other assistance to those who qualify.

Options for Change and amalgamation

After the fall of the Berlin Wall the United Kingdom began to reduce the size of its armed forced under the working title of Options for Change. The strength of the army was to be reduced from 160,000 to 110,000. In particular the General Service Corps was to see the reduction of the infantry from 55 battalions to 38. The GOC saw this as a perfect opportunity to streamline the UDR and and also remove some of the more "intractable problems" with regards to image and career prospects. In a revolutionary plan he decided to merge the UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers, for the first time in history incorporating part-time soldiers into the regular army.

"Project Infancy" would also ensure that the Rangers did not lose their training facilities and presence in Northern Ireland as the last Irish infantry battalion of the line. The UDR, which was not regular "line" infantry was, in the words of one commander, "like a fish without feathers". Incorporation as infantry of the line would provide UDR officers with career prospects which mirrored those of the regular army and hopefully resolve the problem of recruiting junior officers long-term. From a politcal perspective; the Rangers recruited from all over Ireland and had a higher preponderance of serving Catholics, some from the Republic of Ireland. To the GOC the prospect of having a larger number of Catholic subalterns and nco's in the UDR would resolve much of the political furore surrounding the regiment.

The plan was approved by early summer 1991 and proposed:

• The 2nd Battlion of the Rangers would amalgamate with the 1st Battallion to create a single "General Service" battalion.
• The existing nine UDR battalions would be reduced to seven and designated "Home Service".
• The part-time element would remain but the new structure provided for general reduction when the time was right.
• The new regiment would be called the Royal Irish Regiment, ressurecting an historic name which had been lost as part of the disbandment of many famous Irish infantry regiments on partition in 1922.

The "carrots" for the UDR would be:

• A "royal title".
• Direct line of succesion through the regimental name to the Battle of the Boyne and other battles of the Williamite Wars.

The proposals were generally welcomed at command and control level but there was predictable worry amongst the ranks that this was a precursor to disbandment. A fear exacerbated by the Unionist political parties, particularly the DUP who immediately ressurected their 1989 "Hands Off the UDR" campaign.

Awards, honours and decorations

The Conspicuous Gallantry Cross

The Queen's Gallantry Medal (reverse)

The most notable award to the Ulster Defence Regiment was the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross made by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second in 2007. This unit citation confers the right of the regiment to be known as The Ulster Defence Regiment CGC. During the award ceremony in Belfast the Queen paid tribute to the regiment by saying "Your contribution to peace and stability in Northern Ireland is unique." "Serving and living within the community had required "uncommon courage and conviction". "The regiment had never flinched despite suffering extreme personal intimidation. Their successes had "come at a terrible price, many gave their lives. Today you have cause to reflect on the fine achievements, while remembering the suffering". "The Home Service Battalions of the RIR and the UDR which had preceded them won the deepest respect throughout the land." So that their actions would always be remembered, the CGC was awarded to the RIR/UDR "as a mark of the nation's esteem" with the citation, "This award is in recognition of the continuous operational service and sacrifice of the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Irish Regiment in Northern Ireland during Operation Banner."

In total 953 individuals received awards through the British honours system including: 12 Queen's Gallantry Medals; 2 Military Medals; 88 BEM's; 108 OBE's and 276 Mentioned in Dispatches, however for most UDR soldiers the presentation of decorations assumed the form of "service" or campaign" medals including:

File:UDR Service Medals.JPG

General Service Medal with Northern Ireland clasp and Accumulated Sevice Medal (1000 days in campaign)

• The General Service Medal with "Northern Ireland" bar. (Awarded after 28 days service in the campaign)
• The Ulster Defence Medal
• Northern Ireland Home Service Medal
• The Accumulated Campaign Service Medal (Awarded after 1000 days service in the campaign)
• The Long Service and Good Conduct Medal

Officers who are awarded the Ulster Defence medal (UD) may use the post-nominal letters UD.

The man credited by the Regimental History as "the most decorated UDR soldier" is Corporal Eric Glass of the 4th (Co Fermanagh) Battalion who received both the Queen's Gallantry Medal and Distinguished Conduct Medal for bravery.

A number of individual town councils in Northern Ireland honoured the regiment with "Freedom of the Borough" awards, most notably that given to the 7/10th (City of Belfast) Battalion where in addition to the Freedom of the City" the Wilkinson Sword of Peace was awarded for "community relations work". This prestigious award was also later given to the 8th (County Tyrone) Battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment, successor to the 6th and 8th (Co Tyrone) Battalions of the Ulster Defence Regiment.

Presentation of colours

In 1987 the Regiment submitted a requst for the issuing of colours to the Queen which was given consent. Unusually the Queen decided to present the colours herself, an honour which is normally reserved only for those regiments where she is Colonel in chief. On the 29th of June 1991 at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn the first colours were presented to five battalions. The last colours were presented by Prince Andrew in a ceremony near Edinburgh in April 1992 although 6 UDR's were presented in November 1991 at St Lucia Barracks, Omagh by the Duke of Abercorn.

Notable members

Professional soldiers (order by appointment)

• General Sir John Anderson GCB, KCB DSO (5 Innis DG) (1st Colonel Commandant)
• Colonel Sir Dennis Faulkner CBE VRD UD DL (1st Regimental Colonel & brother of Brian Faulkner, last Prime Minister / 1st Chief Minister of Northern Ireland))
• Brigadier Logan Scott-Bowden (first Commander UDR)
• Brigadier Denis Ormerod CBE (First Roman Catholic Commander UDR)
• Brigadier Harry Baxter CBE GM (First Irish Commander - Kilkenny born, also 2nd Colonel Commandant)
• Brigadier Mervyn McCord MC (Royal Ulster Rifles), later Deputy Colonel in Chief the Royal Irish Regiment.
• Brigadier Michael RN Bray CBE (author of the Bray Reforms) (Son of General Sir Robert Napier Hubert Campbell (Bobbie) Bray GBE KCB DSO and bar)

• Brigadier David Strudley (latterly chief of training for the PSNI)
• Brigadier MA David E Millar OBE (joint author of "The Way ahead" [Ulsterisation] document.)
• Brigadier Charles Ritchie OBE CBE OB (first UDR Battalion commander [3 UDR] to be promoted Commander UDR)
• Lieutenant Colonel 'Paddy' Liddle (formerly Royal Ulster Rifles. Apart from the original Conrate CO's, he was the only UDR officer to be given command of a UDR battalion - 9 UDR, 15th December 1971)
• Major John Furniss Potter. Adjutant of 3 UDR, later Regimental Secretary and author of the a regimental history. "A Testimony to Courage". Commissioned 1944 into the Royal Artillery, he served with the UDR from 1970 until 1992.

Politicians (order by rank, where known)

• Colonel (Reginald) Harvey Bicker OBE TD
• Colonel Alan Brooke
• Major Ken Maginnis
• Major Samuel (Sam) Foster CBE
• Lieutenant Michael Copeland
• Danny O'Connor
• Oliver Gibson
• Jeffrey Donaldson
• Tom Elliott
• Robert Smith, former DUP Mayor of Craigavon.

Others (order by rank, where known)

• Captain Frederick Michael Alexander Torrens-Spence DSO, DSC, AFC
• Captain Colin Wallace
• Willie Frazer

References

Bibliography

• A Testimony to Courage - the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969 - 1992, John Potter, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 2001, ISBN 0850528194
• The Ulster Defence Regiment: An Instrument of Peace, Chris Ryder 1991 ISBN-10: 0413648001
• The Blackwell Companion to Modern Irish Culture, W. J. McCormack, Blackwell Publishing 1999
• The Dirty War,Martin Dillon, Arrow 1991, ISBN 0 09 984520 2
• Making Sense of the Troubles, David McKittrick & David McVea, Penguin Books 2001, ISBN 0 14 100305 7
• Big Boy's Rules: The SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA, Mark Urban, faber & faber 1992, ISBN 0 571 16809 4
• The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland, Graham Ellison, Jim Smyth, Pluto Press, 2000, ISBN 0745313930
• Security Forces in Northern Ireland 1969-92, Tim Ripley, Mike Chappell, ISBN10:1855322781
• Provos - the IRA and Sinn Féin, Peter Taylor, Bloomsbury Publishing (1997), ISBN 0-7475-3818-2
• Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA, Ian S. Wood, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, ISBN 0748624279
• Explaining Northern Ireland: Broken Images, John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, Blackwell Publishing, 1995, ISBN 0631183493
• Killing Finucane, Justin O'Brien, Gill & Macmillan 2005, ISBN 0 7171 3543 8
• A History of Ulster, Jonathan Bardon, Blackstaff Press,(2001), ISBN 0856407038

External links

• Palace Barracks Memorial Garden
• Regimental Association of the Ulster Defence Regiment CGC
• Murder, Collusion & Lies: The murder of Seamus Ludlow
• Seamus Ludlow by Ed Moloney, Sunday Tribune