Plane collision in Überlingen
| Plane collision in Überlingen | |
|---|---|
 Re-enactment of the collision of DHL Flight 611 (left) with Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 |
|
| Accident summary | |
| Accident type | Airplane collision in the air |
| place | via Owingen near Überlingen |
| date | July 1, 2002 |
| Fatalities | 71 |
| 1. Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | Tupolev Tu-154 M |
| operator | Bashkirian Airlines |
| Mark | RA-85816 |
| Departure airport |
 Moscow Domodedovo Airport
|
| Destination airport |
 Barcelona-El Prat Airport
|
| Passengers | 60 |
| crew | 9 |
| Survivors | 0 |
| 2. Aircraft | |
| Aircraft type | Boeing 757-200 |
| operator | DHL International Aviation Middle East |
| Mark | A9C-DHL |
| Departure airport |
 Bahrain Airport
|
| Stopover |
 Bergamo Airport
|
| Destination airport |
 Brussels-Zaventem Airport
|
| Passengers | 0 |
| crew | 2 |
| Survivors | 0 |
| Lists of aviation accidents | |
The plane collision in Überlingen was the collision between DHL flight 611 and Bashkirian Airlines flight 2937 over Owingen near Überlingen on the evening of July 1, 2002. The flight accident was the most serious flight accident in the Federal Republic of Germany with 71 victims, including 49 children . The accident sparked numerous discussions about air traffic control and various air traffic control systems.
course
History of the flight before the accident
Bashkirian Airlines flight 2937 took off on July 1, 2002 at around 9 p.m. ( CEST ) at Moscow-Domodedovo Airport with a Russian Tupolev Tu-154 M of Bashkirian Airlines . There were 69 people on board the machine, the majority of whom were school children between the ages of 8 and 16 from Ufa (Republic of Bashkortostan, subject of the Russian Federation). The destination of the charter flight was Barcelona . The trip was intended to be a reward for the mostly highly gifted students for good performance in school and was organized by a local Bashkir committee for UNESCO . The departure should actually have taken place the day before. Since the driver responsible for the bus transfer of the children got lost in Moscow, the flight was missed and then rebooked for the next day. The aircraft was controlled by the flight captain Alexander Gross, who had already completed 12,000 flight hours. Murat Itkulov was the co-pilot.
Shortly after 11 p.m. on the same evening, DHL flight 611 , a cargo flight with a Boeing 757-200 aircraft operated by the service company DHL , took off from Bergamo Airport in Italy . The destination of the flight was the Belgian capital, Brussels . The captain was the Briton Paul Phillips, who had been with DHL since 1989 and had 10,000 hours of flight experience in the service of this company alone. Co-pilot was Brent Campioni from Canada.
The crossing of the two flight routes was not expressly noted by air traffic control and should have been planned for an area above Lake Constance .
Against 23:20 the captain of the DHL flight 611 Paul Phillips notified the authorities responsible for the southern German airspace area control center to, that of the air traffic control company Skyguide operated Area Control Center (ACC) Zurich. The responsible air traffic controller, Peter Nielsen, then instructed Phillips to increase the altitude from the current flight level 260 to flight level 320. In order to save fuel, Phillips asked for permission to continue to flight level 360 (approx. 11,000 m). The permission was given by Nielsen, whereupon the Boeing reached the desired altitude at 23:29:50. The altitude of the Tupolev coming from Russia, who registered with Skyguide at 11:30 p.m., was also flight level 360.
Accident
At 11:30 p.m., the Tupolev pilots again gave the flight data including the altitude . The responsible air traffic controller at Skyguide, Peter Nielsen, confirmed the flight data. However, he assigned neither the Boeing nor the Tupolev a different altitude, so that both aircraft were still at the same altitude.
At 23:34:42, the TCAS collision warning system reported acoustically in both cockpits that the safety distance had not been exceeded . At the same time, air traffic controller Peter Nielsen recognized the dangerous situation on his radar screen . He instructed the Tupolev to descend immediately to flight level 350 at 23:34:49, seven seconds after the TCAS Traffic Advisory had been triggered - the collision warning system's indication of an impending conflict situation. The Tupolev crew did not confirm this, briefly discussed the instruction among themselves and finally complied with the air traffic controller's request. At the same time, TCAS had calculated a resolution advisory for an evasive maneuver and instructed the Tupolev to climb, while it instructed the Boeing crew to descend. This briefly irritated the Tupolev crew, who had noticed the contradiction. A pilot (?): "It [TCAS] says' climb '!" - Co-pilot (?): "He [pilot] sends us down'!" - First Officer (?): "... sink?". One of the pilots (?) Decided to continue the descent. The air traffic controller reported again at 23:35:03 and requested the Tupolev again to descend to flight level 350. This was immediately confirmed by the team. The air traffic controller saw the situation as defused.
The captain of the Boeing, Paul Phillips, followed the recommendations of his TCAS and initiated a descent at 23:35:10. Due to the instruction of the air traffic controller to the Tupolev to descend and the non-compliance with the TCAS instruction to climb by the Tupolev crew, both aircraft were now equally descending. At 11:35:13 p.m. Peter Nielsen spoke with the Tupolev crew one last time. He erroneously warned of conflict traffic at 2 o'clock in flight level 360. The message from the Boeing crew that they were descending due to their own TCAS command was not registered on the ground. The captain of the Tupolev, Gross, was apparently looking in the wrong direction for the other plane and said it was overhead. About nine seconds before the collision, he asked his co-pilot: "Where is it [the other aircraft]?" The latter replied: “Here, left.” Two seconds before the collision, Gross tried to pull the Tupolev up sharply, and the Boeing's control column was pushed forward as far as it would go in order to sink faster.
At 11:35:32 p.m. there was a collision at 34,890 ft (about 10,630 m) altitude: After two previous changes of course by a total of 20 °, the Tupolev was last with a west course of 274 ° just above the altitude of the Boeing, the flew an almost exact north course at 004 °. During the collision severed the vertical stabilizer of the Boeing the fuselage of the Tupolev just before the wings , which then from the rest (rear) part of the fuselage with three engines broke. Scattered over two kilometers, these debris fell together with the front part of the fuselage in an area north of Überlingen. The Boeing, which had become rudderless without the vertical stabilizer, crashed eight kilometers further north over the community of Owingen. Most of the debris fell on uninhabited areas and neither hit people on the ground nor caused major property damage .
Rescue and recovery measures after the collision
At 11:39 p.m., the integrated control center at Lake Constance in Friedrichshafen was notified of various small fires between Überlingen and Owingen. The first rescue vehicles from the Owingen Volunteer Fire Brigade moved out before an alarm was raised, followed only a short time later by various fire engines from the Owingen and Überlingen volunteer fire brigades. All fire brigades from the surrounding area and the neighboring districts were then alerted.
At 11:47 p.m. the control center received the first indications of a plane crash and burning wreckage. The rescue control center then alerted two rescue helicopters as well as ten ambulances, two rescue dog teams and other fire engines. At 12:25 a.m., the technical operations management was alerted, which then set up in Überlingen. The most urgent task of the fire departments was to extinguish the numerous burning rubble. A forest fire was triggered in Taisersdorf by the impact of the burning wreck of the Boeing.
After most of the fires had been brought under control, the emergency services began to look for possible survivors in the dark. The debris of the machine was spread over about 30 square kilometers. Four more rescue helicopters, two of them from neighboring Switzerland, and a large-capacity rescue helicopter from the Bundeswehr from Laupheim were used for the search . In total, several hundred helpers from a wide variety of aid organizations were on duty. The first eight fatalities were recovered around 1:45 a.m. At 2:12 a.m., a boat squadron for water rescue on Lake Constance was sent out by the German Life Saving Society .
After midnight, a specialist could unit of the fire brigade 3,500 liters of kerosene pump from one of the wings of the Tupolev. The targeted rescue of the dead began on July 3rd. For this purpose, the technical relief organization, under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation, dismantled the wreckage of the Tupolev's fuselage and the cockpit with cut-off machines and rescue shears . On July 6th, the last 29, partially severely mutilated bodies, including the five members of the cockpit crew, were finally recovered from the crash site of the aircraft fuselage by the crime scene group of the Federal Criminal Police Office. The corpses were transported to the Goldbacher tunnel to slow down the decomposition process. On the basis of clothing and with the help of DNA comparisons , all corpses could be identified by the identification commission (IdKo) of the Federal Criminal Police Office. On July 8, the large-scale operation was declared over.
Aircraft accident investigation
The Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU / Braunschweig) prepares an investigation report for every incident - in commercial aviation - in German airspace. In its investigation report of May 19, 2004, it refers to various structural errors that directly contributed to the accident. In addition to technical defects, the investigation report mentions human errors in the private operator of Zurich air traffic control, Skyguide, and in the Russian aircraft. For years Skyguide had accepted that only a single pilot was on duty during the low-traffic night hours. However, the BFU expressly refrains from naming a sole culprit.
Technical condition of the aircraft
The investigations by the BFU showed that both aircraft were in perfect technical condition and had an identical collision warning system that worked perfectly. Both cockpit crews could hear the accident-related radio traffic from the ground control because they had set the corresponding frequency on their radio.
Understaffing of the monitoring positions and distraction of the pilot
On the evening of July 1, 2002, Skyguide was manned by three people in accordance with regulations. The second controller was not at his place of work at the time of the events due to a break, so the remaining controller had to monitor both radar monitors. The third person was not involved in operational flight control. When the pilot on duty Peter Nielsen released his colleague for the break, neither of them knew that they had to oversee a delayed landing approach of an aircraft at Friedrichshafen Airport . Nielsen was distracted by taking care of this approach, so that he probably didn't pay enough attention to the staggering of the other two flights. In addition, due to this approach, Nielsen had to switch back and forth about two meters between two radar screens in order to be able to oversee the crossing of the Boeing and Tupolew as well as the landing in Friedrichshafen.
If a controller feels overstrained and there are several controllers in the room, he can usually ask his colleagues to help him. The air traffic controller in charge, however, did not make any other controller aware of his double burden.
“At the time of the incident, there was only one controller in the control room at ACC Zurich. At the same time he had to perform the tasks of the planning traffic manager, the radar traffic manager and the service manager. With him in the control room was an assistant controller. Their job was to support the pilot in routine and coordination tasks; she had no tasks or authorizations in the context of traffic management. "
Due to his overload, the controller failed to stagger the two aircraft in good time and, due to the poor support from colleagues and technology, misjudged the dangerousness of the situation until the very end, which is evident, among other things, from his inappropriate choice of words.
Limited functionality of the air traffic control systems
Due to maintenance work at the Zurich ground control, some supporting air traffic control systems were not available. These are not absolutely necessary for safe operation, but can help to detect errors in good time. On the evening of the accident, the ground-based collision warning system ( STCA ), the automatic correlation of flight plan data with the radar data and a distance scale mark were not available. The absence of support systems was not compensated for by other measures. To compensate for this, another controller and a system manager were present in the control room and would have supported the regular controller if he had asked for it; however, the pilot in charge, Peter Nielsen, either misjudged the extent of his work overload or he was not aware of the possibility of support.
According to a subsequent technical examination, the acoustic STCA worked perfectly and issued an acoustic warning 32 seconds before the collision, which, however, was not heard by anyone present; however, since this system is switched off by the day shift and the reactivation is not logged, it is unclear whether it could be heard at all at the time of the accident. At the time of the acoustic warning, Nielsen had already instructed the Tupolev to descend. The warning could only have emphasized the urgency of the situation.
Telephone system failure
The direct telephone lines from Zurich ground control to the neighboring air surveillance centers were also out of order after the controller, after initial hesitation, agreed to maintenance work on the telephone system, although he was entitled to assume that the function of the telephone system would be adequately replaced; In fact, however, the replacement system was not ready for use and the maintenance work on the main system had ended at the time of the accident, but it had not been released for the controller. The district control point for the monitoring of the upper airspace , the UACC (Upper Area Control Center) Karlsruhe , had tried several times in vain to inform Zurich of the impending collision by telephone, but was not allowed to intervene directly in what was happening, especially since a successful intervention in an already such one advanced situation seems to be excluded from today's perspective. In addition, the controller was distracted by multiple attempts to reach Friedrichshafen Airport by telephone , which were unsuccessful due to the defective replacement system , on the occasion of the imminent landing of the third aircraft.
Carelessness of the pilots
The follow-up examinations showed that both crews did not follow the instructions that were considered valid. The Boeing crew deviated from the recommended rate of descent of 2,500-3,000 ft / min with a rate of descent of 2,400 ft / min. The crew of the Tupolev did not adjust their rate of descent to the required new altitude, so that the collision occurred 110 ft (about 33 m) below the ordered altitude with a rate of descent of about 1,900 ft / min.
Collision warning system
Both aircraft crews received the warning about conflict traffic (“Traffic, Traffic”) from their TCAS 50 seconds before the collision. Seven seconds later, air traffic controller Peter Nielsen instructed the Tupolev's crew to descend to flight level 350. In contrast, seven seconds later the TCAS requested the Tupolev to initiate a climb . The Boeing TCAS in turn issued the order to descend. However, the Tupolev crew followed the instructions of the air traffic controller and went into descent. This contradiction and the resulting scope for interpretation for the crew of the Tupolev led to the collision of the aircraft.
"This system philosophy of TCAS provides that one follows the TCAS and the order of the air traffic control is secondary, in which case it has to be ignored."
The situation at the time of the accident was not necessarily regulated under aviation law. Although there were several recommendations to give TCAS Resolution Advisories a higher priority, none of them had official status. The explanation for the fact that the Russian crew ignored the easily understandable TCAS instruction could be that the air traffic controller is authorized to give instructions to the crew and there is a lack of experience with the TCAS system.
However, another factor comes into play: According to the TCAS user manual, flight maneuvers that are opposite to the TCAS maneuver are prohibited. In the Flight Operations Manual (FOM) of the Bashkirian Airlines, however, it is stated that the instructions of the air traffic control are the most important means of avoiding collisions - a possible simultaneous TCAS Resolution Advisory is completely disregarded in these explanations.
While the flying pilot (also: Pilot Flying ) initiates appropriate flight maneuvers during a TCAS Resolution Advisory , the assisting pilot (also: Pilot Monitoring ) immediately contacts air traffic control and informs them that the machine has been released from the Air traffic control arranged flight level deviates. Only at 23:35:19, and thus only 13 seconds before the collision or 23 seconds after the TCAS Resolution Advisory , did the Boeing crew issue this report. According to the TCAS user manual, the BFU nevertheless considers this response time to be appropriate for the situation, as the frequency for air traffic control was previously occupied. Despite the inconsistencies within the cockpit, the crew of the Tupolev did not inform the pilot of the contradiction.
The investigation of the accident came to the conclusion that the TCAS of the Boeing (unlike that of the Tupolev) was probably not set to the longest range, so that the pilots only became aware of the approach of the second aircraft very late. The TCAS display used on both aircraft has an adjustable range of up to 40 nautical miles , but the acoustic warning only occurs shortly after the graduation is not reached . This is the only way to explain that the Boeing co-pilot, Brent Campioni, went to the toilet shortly before the first TCAS warning and only returned to the cockpit after the warning. Thus, the captain Paul Phillips was left on his own in a crucial phase under the most stressful conditions.
After two Japan Airlines flights fell short of the scale on January 31, 2001 , an amendment proposal to TCAS (change proposal CP112) was passed, in which the implementation of a new function was proposed. This new function gives the two crews a Reversal Resolution Advisory should one crew not follow the instructions of the TCAS. In such a case, TCAS would exactly reverse the instructions to the crews. In the specific case, the Tupolev would have been instructed to continue the descent, while the Boeing would have been instructed to climb. The thwarting of the incident through this function can be classified as "likely".
Statements from participating states
In a statement on the official investigation report, Switzerland emphasized that regardless of the incorrect position information provided by the controller, at the time of the collision the altitude for the Tupolev had already been 33 meters below the flight altitude ordered by the controller. She also states that the rate of descent was still 1,900 ft per minute and that bilateral implementation of the TCAS advice would have helped to avoid the accident.
In a corresponding statement, Russia emphasized that the TCAS advice had already worked incorrectly due to the incorrect information provided by the air traffic controller about conflict traffic over the Tupolev and that the incorrect information provided by the air traffic controller did not serve the decision-making process of the Russian crew. In addition, the Boeing crew was able to hear the radio traffic with the Tupolev, even though the air traffic controller had not addressed them directly about the conflict, and thus missed a real opportunity to avoid the accident.
Civil law disputes
Bashkirian Airlines filed a lawsuit against Skyguide in 2005, followed by a lawsuit against the Federal Republic of Germany in 2006 alleging a lack of air traffic control and monitoring. The amount of damages claimed for the destroyed aircraft is 2.6 million euros. On July 27, 2006, the Constance Regional Court gave the Federal Republic of Germany sole guilt for the accident, as the transfer of air traffic control in the southern German peripheral area on Lake Constance (see map of the flight information area for Germany) to the Swiss company Skyguide was unlawful and therefore ineffective due to invalid contracts; the contract violates the constitutional provision that air traffic monitoring must be carried out as a sovereign task in the federal administration. According to the judgment, the Federal Republic of Germany must meet all claims for damages from this accident. However, the federal government appealed against the judgment calling the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe one. In 2013, Bashkirian Airlines, which had been insolvent since May 2007, and the Federal Republic of Germany came to an out-of-court settlement, and the process before the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court was then discontinued.
As early as 2004, the Swiss company Winterthur paid an undisclosed amount of damages as Skyguide's liability insurance . A little later, however, she filed a lawsuit against Bashkirian Airlines and, due to the complicity of the Tupolev pilots, demanded 60 percent of the severance payments paid to the surviving dependents of the DHL crew as well as compensation for those injured on the ground in a volume of around 2.5 million. Euros back. However, the lawsuit was dismissed by the Constance Regional Court on September 18, 2008 , since, in the judge's view, the misconduct of the Tupolev pilots "takes a back seat and does not justify partial joint liability of the airline".
On January 29, 2009, an appeals court in Barcelona ruled that Bashkirian Airlines - insolvent since February 2007 - had to compensate the surviving dependents of the victims. Bashkirian Airlines was sentenced to pay $ 20,400 per victim. The bereaved had originally requested compensation of US $ 100,000 per victim, but this was also dismissed by the appeals court on the grounds that the main responsibility for the accident lay with Skyguide.
Criminal penalties
After the accident, the responsible public prosecutor's offices in Winterthur / Unterland and Konstanz began investigating the two air traffic controllers on duty and another seven Skyguide employees on suspicion of negligent homicide and other criminal offenses. On August 4, 2006, the public prosecutor's office in Winterthur / Unterland brought charges against the Skyguide employees at the Bülach District Court for negligent homicide and negligent disruption of public transport. Due to the charges being brought and the accused being Swiss citizens, the Konstanz public prosecutor's office handed over the investigation to the Swiss authorities on August 7, 2006.
On May 15, 2007, the criminal proceedings against eight Skyguide employees began before the Bülach District Court near Zurich, which ended on September 4, 2007 with the conviction of four executives among the eight accused of negligent homicide to suspended sentences.
Consequences to Prevent Similar Incidents
Even after investigating the incident on July 1, 2002, the BFU issued safety recommendations. However, none of these recommendations were implemented in 2002, so that the collision of the two aircraft near Überlingen did not result in any improvements in the functioning of technical means or mandatory instructions for the personnel structure of air traffic control.
The BFU published the first safety recommendation on October 1, 2002, just three months after the collision. In this safety recommendation, the ICAO , the International Civil Aviation Organization, is advised to make the TCAS commands mandatory for all pilots in the future. It should not matter whether an air traffic controller might give other, opposite instructions.
On July 21, 2003, three further recommendations were published on the behavior of air traffic controllers and various safety precautions. The BFU recommends that maintenance of air traffic control systems be announced well in advance, that there are always enough controllers, but at least two, at air traffic control, and that the controllers always have up-to-date knowledge through regular training.
On May 19, 2004, the BFU issued further safety recommendations. The most important recommendations relate to the STCA, the ground-based collision warning system. Every controller should be clearly informed about a possible failure of the STCA on his radar screen. In addition, the acoustic signal emitted by the STCA should be set to a fixed volume that cannot be overheard. This acoustic signal, which sounds in the event of an alarm, could be switched off, but this should be formally acknowledged by the corresponding controller. The BFU also recommends that the telephone system should always work and that a replacement system should be installed during maintenance.
In addition, the manufacturer of the TCAS was urged to present the system philosophy of TCAS even more clearly so that there could be no more misunderstandings like those that happened on July 1, 2002.
Killing of the air traffic controller on duty
On February 24, 2004, the air traffic controller who was in charge of the accident, Peter Nielsen, was stabbed to death in Kloten near his house by the Russian Vitaly Kalojew , whose wife and two children were killed in the collision . The higher court of the canton of Zurich sentenced the perpetrator to eight years imprisonment for intentional homicide . The annulment appeal filed against this judgment was partially upheld by the Court of Cassation of the Canton of Zurich. The higher court then reduced the sentence in July 2007 to five years and three months, as Kaloyev was attributed a greatly reduced sanity . The public prosecutor's office lodged a complaint with the federal court . However, on November 8, 2007, he confirmed the sentence of five years and three months. Kaloyev, who had already served two-thirds of his sentence, was released from custody.
After his release from prison, Vitaly Kaloyev returned to his homeland; there he was received and celebrated , especially by hundreds of members of the Naschi youth organization . On January 18, 2008, he was appointed Deputy Minister for Construction and Architecture in the Republic of North Ossetia .
Commemoration and international understanding
Memorial in Brachenreuthe
The Tupolev's fuselage was found in the Brachenreuthe district of Überlingen, only a few hundred meters from the Camphill school community in Brachenreuthe, and it is there that most of the victims of this plane crash were recovered. After the rescue and clearing measures had been completed, the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of Science announced the construction of a memorial . After a selection by a jury, it was built in Brachenreuthe and inaugurated on May 3, 2004.
The memorial is located northwest of Überlingen and can be reached via the Brachenreuthe exit of the B 31n or the exit towards Nesselwangen on the federal road 31 . ( Location ). It is titled Memento mori - In the middle of life we are surrounded by death , based on the song by Martin Luther .
The sculpture The Torn Pearl Necklace was designed by Andrea Zaumseil . Hollow stainless steel balls with a diameter of about one meter, some of which are connected by steel cables, are reminiscent of a torn pearl necklace. The memorial commemorates the victims and expresses the sympathy of the people in the region who were spared from the disaster.
Memorial in Überlingen: red candles.
Memorial in Überlingen-Brachenreuthe for the passengers who died in the plane crash: name plaque. Flowers of loved ones.
Commemorative plaque "The Torn Pearl Necklace"
Memorial in Überlingen-Brachenreuthe for the passengers who died in the plane crash: Torn pearl necklace.
The relatives of the victims of the crash are grateful for the sympathy, help and commemoration of the people of Überlingen. Relatives from Bashkiria, 4000 kilometers away, visit the memorial site. Next to the memorial, the relatives planted 71 birch and ash trees as a reminder of the 71 dead in the accident. As a thank you for the helpfulness of the people of Überlingen, the bereaved on November 4, 2017 planted twenty Siberian stone pines on the northern slope opposite the memorial. Every five years there is a memorial service at the crash site.
Owingen-Taisersdorf Memorial
The cockpit of the DHL machine hit the Owingen district of Taisersdorf . The memorial is located on the K 7788 from Owingen towards Taisersdorf behind the Happenmühle farm, on the right of the road in an area covered with trees. ( Location ) A memorial stone with a plaque and another ball of the torn pearl necklace mark the place and remind of the two pilots of the DHL cargo plane.
Crash site of the DHL plane: notice board on memorial
Crash site of the DHL plane: memorial plaque and ball
Crash site of the DHL plane: stone in memory of the pilots
Memorial in Switzerland at Skyguide
Another memorial for the aircraft accident and the memory of the air traffic controller who was killed was inaugurated in Switzerland at the Skyguide air traffic control on July 1, 2006. The Überlingen artist Daniela Einsdorf previously designed the respective commemorations for the anniversaries of the accident in Überlingen. The company Skyguide commissioned her to design and build a worthy sculpture in the entrance hall of the headquarters in Dübendorf, Switzerland . The sculpture is two meters high and 1.5 meters wide and made of blue glass. It is supported by two basalt steles and stands on an iron plate. The dates of the aircraft accident on July 1, 2002 and the killing of the air traffic controller on February 24, 2004 are inlaid in gold leaf on it. Fused into the glass plate are 72 gold shimmering wing symbols, which represent the 71 victims of the accident and the air traffic controllers who were killed.
Memorial in the home of the killed passengers
A memorial was also erected in the Bashkir capital, Ufa . 55 of the victims, including 40 children and young people, are buried at the southern cemetery there. The tombstones are arranged in four rows in front of the monument. The square, framed by a small fence, is paved with red paving. As a symbol of hope, the area surrounding the monument and the individual graves are overgrown with grass and framed with black stone. The gravestone is engraved with the image of the deceased, the name and the dates of life. In the upper right corner a small crescent moon indicates the Muslim religion, a cross the Christian one. Another third is missing a symbol. A short text is engraved on the back.
Bridge to Ufa
The initiative Brücke nach Ufa was founded in 2002 and developed into the association “Brücke nach Ufa” with 30 members. After the plane disaster, it serves to promote international understanding, the transfer of knowledge through encounter projects and the student exchange between the Jörg-Zürn-Gewerbeschule in Überlingen and Gymnasium 39 in Ufa.
Realizations for film, stage and radio
The Überlingen disaster was shown in the Canadian television series Mayday - Alarm im Cockpit with the English title Deadly Crossroads and the German title Flugzeugkollision von Überlingen . In simulated scenes, animations and interviews with bereaved relatives and investigators, reports were made about the preparations, the process and the background of the flight.
The documentary series Seconds Before the Disaster also reconstructed the Überlingen disaster.
The 2009 feature film Flight into the Night - The Misfortune of Überlingen by director Till Endemann deals with the accident and the aftermath up to the death of the air traffic controller.
The play Human Failure by the Swiss playwright Lukas Holliger deals with the Überlingen disaster and was premiered at the Konstanz City Theater. A radio play version of the piece (produced by SRF / SWR, director: Stephan Heilmann) was among the three finalists for the 2013 Radio Play Prize for the Blind .
The content of the German film drama 10 Seconds is also based on the catastrophe and the associated deliberate killing of the air traffic controller.
The Hollywood film Vendetta - All That Was Left for Him Was Revenge (in the original: Aftermath ) with Arnold Schwarzenegger in the role of the grieving father moves the accident to the USA.
In episode 48 of the radio play series Revelation 23 called The Most Explosive Package in the World , an alternative conspiracy theory is treated based on the incident.
The Russian artist Gulyas Galimullina shot the documentary The Flight to Paradise (German version: Haus am See ) about the events .
The Russian film drama Непрощенный , released in 2018, deals with the story of the desperate father Vitaly Konstantinowitsch Kalojew and his revenge murder on the responsible air traffic controller.
See also
Web links
-
BFU investigation report on air collision (PDF); (3.95 MB)
- Annexes 1 and 3 (PDF)
- Annexes 2 to 10 (PDF)
- Judgment (PDF (296KiB)) LG Konstanz . July 27, 2006. Archived from the original on October 8, 2007. Retrieved January 17, 2013.
- Learning from the past: Aircraft accident near Überlingen . Skyguide . Archived from the original on May 3, 2015. Retrieved September 7, 2012.
- Federal Aviation Administration: Accident overview (English)
Individual evidence
- ↑ Two accidents on what is now German territory claimed even more victims, but occurred in what was then the GDR, see the Königs Wusterhausen aircraft disaster and Aeroflot flight 892
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i Investigation report AX001-1-2 / 02 May 2004. (PDF) In: Investigation report. Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation , May 19, 2004, accessed on August 11, 2016 .
- ↑ " Address by Mr. Koïchiro Matsuura " UNESCO (English) (PDF; 13 kB)
- ↑ a b evening paper: The unlucky pilots of Überlingen.
- ↑ a b Death above the clouds (documentation on the accident), ZDF
- ↑ The course of the unlucky night of Überlingen. Mitteldeutsche Zeitung
- ↑ Official Aircraft Accident Investigation, Annex 3: Representation of the last minute.
- ↑ see website: integrierteleitstellebodensee.de
- ↑ a b c Plane crash over Owingen on July 1, 2002 . Owingen volunteer fire brigade. 2011. Archived from the original on July 19, 2011. Retrieved on February 12, 2017.
- ^ A b Website of the Überlingen volunteer fire brigade on the plane crash
- ↑ a b Plane crash near Überlingen 2 machines collided in the air - Überlingen fire department.
- ^ Press report from the Überlingen fire brigade ( Memento from April 8, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ Gudrun Dometeit, Göran Schattauer and Marco Wisniewski: Ueberlingen: Inferno in idyll. In: Focus , issue 28, 2002, accessed on April 17, 2010
- ↑ Nils Köhler: The tragedy is present. as well as the disaster and its consequences. Agency abbreviation dpa. In: Südkurier of June 24, 2017, p. 3.
- ↑ Aircraft accident investigation: Annex 5b (evaluation of flight recorder data)
- ^ Markus Kirschnek: Vereinigung Cockpit , in the ZDF documentation
- ^ Aircraft Accident Investigation Report . Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission . July 12, 2002. Retrieved December 15, 2013.
- ↑ TCAS II CHANGE PROPOSAL . FAA . February 28, 2007. Archived from the original on January 9, 2009. Retrieved on December 15, 2013.
- ^ Legal aftermath. The 10th anniversary of the collision near Überlingen.
- ↑ 12 years after the plane crash near Überlingen: Who is responsible for the sky over southern Baden? Südkurier from August 23, 2014
- ↑ Überlingen plane crash: No compensation for Skyguide's liability insurance.
- ↑ The court dismisses the lawsuit Stuttgarter Nachrichten ( Memento from August 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
- ↑ The court decides on compensation after the accident in Überlingen. Focus Online from September 18, 2008
- ↑ Compensation for surviving dependents. NZZ Online
- ↑ Public Prosecutor Winterthur / Unterland, indictment of August 4, 2006 (full text, anonymized), at: Steiger Legal, Skyguide: Indictment and judgments in the Überlingen trial. published on April 3, 2015.
- ↑ Four convictions. n-tv.de, September 4, 2007
- ↑ Nobody is allowed to apologize. Spiegel Online , September 4, 2007
- ↑ District Court Bülach, judgments of August 21, 2007 (full text, anonymized), at: Steiger Legal, Skyguide: Indictment and judgments in the Überlingen trial. published on April 3, 2015.
- ↑ a b "A Russian who, after losing his family, murdered an air traffic controller in revenge in the plane crash in Überlingen, has been appointed vice minister in the Republic of North Ossetia." After the Skyguide trial: air traffic controller murderer becomes vice minister in North Ossetia. T-Online Nachrichten, January 18, 2008
- ↑ When the reporter works like a detective ( Memento of November 23, 2004 in the Internet Archive ), Abendblatt, November 23, 2004.
- ↑ "The Russian who killed a Skyguide air traffic controller in 2004 should be punished more mildly. The Zurich Higher Court has reduced the imprisonment sentence from 8 to 5 years and 3 months. ” Mild sentence for air traffic controller murderers swissinfo.org, July 3, 2007
- ↑ The Russian Kaloyev is set free. Neue Zürcher Zeitung , November 9, 2007, archived from the original on April 16, 2008 ; retrieved on August 11, 2016 : “Public consultation from November 8, 2007 u. a. in procedure 6B – 401/2007 "
- ↑ Air traffic controller murderer celebrated as a hero. Mirror online
- ↑ Time dossier on Vitaly Kalojew. Die Zeit # 36, August 28, 2008
- ↑ Nils Köhler: The tragedy is present. In: Südkurier of June 24, 2017, p. 3.
- ↑ Andrea Zaumseil: Monuments in public space
- ↑ Andrea Zaumseil: The Torn Pearl Necklace, 2004
- ↑ Brachenreuthe Memorials and Ufa South Cemetery
- ↑ Nils Köhler: Trees that grow into the sky. In: "Südkurier", November 6, 2017.
- ^ Nils Köhler: The catastrophe as a film. In: Südkurier from February 22, 2017.
- ↑ Nils Köhler: The tragedy is present. In: Südkurier of June 24, 2017, p. 3.
- ^ Nils Köhler: The bereaved mourn in Überlingen. In: Südkurier of June 27, 2017, pp. 2–3.
- ^ Bridge to Ufa , a project to commemorate the victims of the plane crash.
- ↑ Circle of Friends “Bridge to Ufa”. Projects.
- ↑ Mayday // Deadly Crossroads. Internet Movie Database , accessed May 22, 2015 .
- ↑ Nikolaus von Festenberg: In heaven as on earth . Spiegel Online . July 27, 2009. Retrieved July 30, 2009.
- ↑ Human error . Theater Konstanz . July 1, 2011. Retrieved September 7, 2012.
- ↑ Revelation 23. Truth is immortal. Skyscore Media GmbH, accessed March 24, 2017 .
- ↑ Nils Köhler: Trees that grow into the sky. In: "Südkurier", November 6, 2017.
Coordinates: 47 ° 46 '42 " N , 9 ° 10' 26" E