Air strikes on Nagoya

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The air strikes on Nagoya in the last nine months of the Second World War largely destroyed the Japanese city ​​of Nagoya . In the period from December 1944 to July 1945, Nagoya was the target of United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) bomber units more than 20 times . There were no more air strikes on any other Japanese city, except Tokyo .

Economic importance of the city

Nagoya in 1945 after the bombing.

In 1944, Nagoya was the third largest city and the third largest industrial center on the main Japanese islands . It was also the administrative seat of the Tokai region . At that time the city had around 1.2 million inhabitants and a population density of 95,830-194,250 inhabitants per km² . The urban area and the agglomeration covered an area of ​​around 104 km 2 and almost all residential buildings were made of wood. The city had two large industrial area : A nearly 39 km 2 large area north of the port area of the city. The second industrial quarter was crescent-shaped with a length of around 3.2 km and was located in the northeast of the city. In the south of the city there was a large port facility that could accommodate up to forty large ships . There were 45 large industrial plants in the industrial districts. These included, among other things, operations for arms production , vehicle production and steel production . In addition, there were a large number of small businesses which were spread across the entire city area. Nagoya was particularly important to the civil and military aviation industries . The production halls of the aircraft manufacturers Mitsubishi , Kawasaki , Nakajima and Aichi were located in the industrial districts. In addition, Nagoya was the railway junction of four main lines.

Compared to other cities on the main Japanese islands, Nagoya had a professional fire department with a comparatively large number of firefighters. In addition, the city had a well-organized civil defense . The Nagoya region was one of the best defended areas in Japan. As an important industrial and business location, Nagoya was assigned a comparatively large number of air and flak units .

Chronology of the air raids

The primary target of the air strikes was to destroy Nagoya's industrial districts. The second target was the city's population. With the destruction of the workforce, the planners hoped for massive losses in industrial production and a weakening of morale (work ethic, perseverance, etc.). From December 13, 1944 to July 24, 1945 there were over 20 bombing raids on the city. Of these, 14 attacks were carried out as "precision attacks". The aim of this was to bomb individual industrial companies with pinpoint accuracy. The other six attacks were carried out as area bombing . These attacks were directed against the industrial and residential areas and the port facilities of Nagoya. The air raids can be divided into three phases: The first phase from December 13, 1944 to February 15, 1945. The second phase from March 12, 1945 to May 17, 1945. The third phase lasted from June 9, 1945 to July 24 1945. Each phase was different in terms of targets, tactics and the types of bombs used.

Early attacks

April 18, 1942

A first air raid on Nagoya took place on April 18, 1942 as part of the Doolittle Raid . Two B-25 Mitchell medium bombers dropped four 500-pound bombs each on the industrial districts. The damage done was minor.

Phase one

The first phase began on December 13, 1944 and lasted until February 15, 1945. In this phase, precision attacks from great heights were carried out with a few bombers. The attacks were flown both during the day and at night. The targets of these attacks were the production sites of the aircraft manufacturers. The first phase of the attack began after the first units of the XXIth Bomber Command of the Twentieth Air Force (20th AF) were stationed on the Mariana Islands in October 1944 . This formation was equipped with the advanced B-29 Superfortress bomber . The B-29 was able to carry heavy bomb loads over long distances and at great heights. Brigadier General Haywood Hansell was in command of XXIth Bomber Command . During the first phase, eight air strikes were carried out on Nagoya.

The United States Army Air Forces later rated the precision attacks of the XXIth Bomber Command as unsuccessful in this phase. The bombing failed to permanently destroy the aircraft factories, but at least weakened the confidence of the Japanese civilian population in the country's air defense. Various factors are used to explain the low effectiveness. The most important is the weather, as the attacks were often hampered by high winds prevailing over Japan and thick clouds , which made it difficult to accurately drop the bomb. Bad weather fronts between the Mariana Islands and Japan also led to the bomber formations disintegrating and navigation problems. Other reasons were poor maintenance and overcrowding of the available bases. They reduced the number of bombers available for attack and complicated the complex take-off and landing process of large bomber formations .

December 13, 1944

On December 13, the first attack with heavy bombers of the type B-29 Superfortress took place. For Mission 12 of 20th AF, 90 B-29 bombers from the 73rd Bomb Wing were launched in the Mariana Islands. 15 aircraft had to cancel the flight early. 71 bombers dropped their bomb load on the primary target, Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Plant No. 4. Each aircraft was loaded with ten 500 pound high explosive bombs (227 kg). Each one squadron from each group was with incendiary bombs of the type AN-M50 loaded. The attack came from an altitude of 8,062-9,845 m and caused considerable damage on the factory premises. The crews were able to detect around 230 bombs in the target area and around 40% of the factory premises were hit. However, a large number of the production halls remained largely intact. During the airstrike, Japanese fighters made 106 attacks on the bomber formation. According to American sources, four Japanese fighter planes were shot down. In this attack, 31 B-29s were damaged and four B-29s were lost, only one loss being due to enemy action. The attack left 264 dead and 105 injured on the ground.

December 18, 1944

On December 18, Mission 13 of 20th AF took place. The aim of this mission was the Mitsubishi aircraft factory Oe-machi. Of 89 B-29 bombers launched, 63 dropped their bomb load over the target. As a result of heavy cloud cover , around half of the bombers had to approach the target using radar . Ten planes could not find the target and dumped their bomb load over the residential areas of the city. The attack by the 73rd BW came from an altitude of 8,534-9,753 m and each aircraft was loaded with ten 500-pound high explosive bombs (227 kg). In this air strike, only a small part of the bomb load hit the Mitsubishi aircraft factory. An area of ​​around 0.03 km 2 of the factory site was destroyed. Only around 18% of the factory buildings were damaged or destroyed. In addition, around 0.2 km 2 of adjacent residential areas were damaged or destroyed. During the airstrike, Japanese fighters made 188 attacks on the bomber formation. After the attack, the Americans claimed to have shot down five Japanese aircraft and damaged 12 more in the loss of four B-29s. The attack left 464 dead and injured on the ground.

December 22, 1944

On December 22nd, Mission 14 of 20th AF used 500-pound napalm bombs (227 kg) of the type AN-M76 . Each B-29 was loaded with eleven of these bombs. The target was again the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 4 as in the attack four days ago. On December 22nd, the weather was bad and the city of Nagoya lay under an almost compact cloud cover, so that the bombers had to approach the target using radar . Of the 78 bombers launched, only 48 dropped their bombs from a height of 8,778-9,936 m above the target. Only 252 bombs were found in the target area and only minor damage was caused to the factory buildings. During this attack, the attempts at defense by Japanese fighters were more violent. 508 attacks were counted. According to US information, the B-29 managed to shoot down nine fighters and damage 15 more. During this mission the 73rd BW lost two B-29s in an accident. Another plane was shot down by the flak .

January 3, 1945

On January 3rd, as part of Mission 17 of 20th AF, an area attack was flown against the port and residential areas of Nagoya. This attack was a large-scale test for the stick incendiary bombs that were already being used successfully in Europe . Most of the B-29s were each loaded with 2,404 kg incendiary bombs of the AN-M50 type . In addition, individual bombers carried fragmentation bombs . The bombers of the 73rd BW flew to the target at an altitude of 8,595-9,900 m. As with the previous attack, it was covered by clouds. Of 97 aircraft that took off, 18 had to break off the flight early. Only 57 B-29 bombers dumped the bomb load over the target area. 21 other aircraft could not make the target area and unloaded their bomb load over the alternative target. Due to the high drop height and strong winds , the small bombs were distributed irregularly over a large area. The attack caused around 75 individual fires in the city, but they were quickly brought under control. In this attack, 126.7  tons of incendiary bombs and 10.9 tons of cluster bombs were dropped. During the airstrike, Japanese fighters made 346 attacks on the bomber formation. After the mission, the American pilots claimed 14 kills and another 14 probable kills. The own losses amounted to five kills and aircraft lost in accidents.

January 6, 1945

On January 6, 57 B-29s carried out a test attack using AN-M69 - napalm - cluster bombs . This type of incendiary bomb was specially developed for attacks on Japanese cities. The bombers of the XXth Bomber Command dumped almost 11 tons of AN-M41 fragmentation bombs (9.1 kg) and around 136 tons of AN-M69 incendiary bombs over Nagoya. The attack came from a height of around 8,530 m and burned down over 0.5 km 2 of the urban area.

January 14, 1945

The Mission 19 of the 20th AF on January 14, in turn, had the Mitsubishi aircraft factory Oe-machi goal. This plant was bombed on December 18, 1944 with little success. The B-29 bombers flew to the target again at night, at an altitude of 8,863-9,753 m. As in the previous attacks, the target was obscured by clouds. Of the 73 B-29s launched, only 40 were able to locate and bomb the target. Another 23 B-29 could not approach the target and dropped their bombs over the secondary target, the urban area of ​​Nagoya. Another 19 aircraft had to abort the flight due to technical problems and violent high winds. In this attack, nearly 90 tons of bombs were dropped on the primary and secondary targets by the 73rd BW. Around 40% of the bombs fell within 1,000  feet of the factory premises. However, only four 500 pound (227 kg) high explosive bombs hit the factory floor. During the air strike, the B-29 crews counted 583 attacks by Japanese fighters. The American pilots claimed 16 kills. Twelve B-29s were damaged in this attack and five more were lost to kills and accidents. After a flight time of 14 to 16  hours , the bombers landed again on the Mariana Islands. A single plane made the return flight with only two engines running and landed after 19 hours of flight time.

January 23, 1945

On January 23rd, the 73rd BW of the 20th AF flew an attack on the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 4 for the third time with Mission 22. On that day, 73 B-29 bombers took off from the Mariana Islands. Of these, 60% were each loaded with 12,500 pound high explosive bombs (227 kg). The remaining 40% carried 12,500 pound napalm bombs (227 kg) of the AN-M76 each . Due to a bad weather front between the Mariana Islands and Japan, 13 bombers had to cancel the flight. 60 aircraft reached the main Japanese islands in loose formation at an altitude of 7,710–8,290 m. Of these bombers, 27 unloaded their bomb loads at random over the urban area of ​​Nagoya and five bombers flew to the alternate target. Only 28 B-29s were able to locate the target, which was under a closed cloud cover, using radar and bomb them. In this attack around 76 tons of bombs were dropped on the secondary target and 77 tons on the primary target. Only four hits from high explosive bombs and 144 hits from napalm bombs were detected in the target area. The attack caused only minor damage to the factory buildings. During this attack, too, the defense of the Japanese was again fierce. In addition to strong flak fire, 691 attacks by fighter pilots were counted. After the attack, the Americans claimed 33 kills and 22 probable kills. Another 40 fighters are said to have been damaged. In this attack, a B-29 was shot down by a Japanese fighter and another B-29 was lost without enemy action.

February 15, 1945

With the mission 34 of the 20th AF last flown at high altitude precision attack was carried out in the Aircraft in Nagoya. Mitsubishi aero engine plant No. 4 was the target again. Like the previous air raid on this plant, this one was not very successful. On the approach, an unforeseen cold front with violent high-altitude winds dispersed the bomber formations. Of the 117 B-29s launched by the 73rd BW and 313th BW, 16 aircraft had to turn around early and 68 bombers had to fly to the alternative target. Only 33 B-29s reached the primary target. These bombed the target from a height of 7,710-10,363 m using radar assistance. The B-29s were loaded with 2,267–2,721 kg of explosive bombs or AN-M50 incendiary bombs. The bombs only destroyed around 5.4% of the factory buildings. Considerable damage was caused to the alternative destination, the city of Hamamatsu . The B-29 crews counted 166 attacks by Japanese fighters. American pilots claimed seven kills and eight probable kills after the attack. Another 23 fighters are said to have been damaged. Twelve B-29s suffered combat damage and one aircraft crashed on the return flight.

Phase two

20th Air Force B-29 firing bombs

At the end of December 1944, the Commander in Chief of the USAAF, General Henry H. Arnold , who was dissatisfied with the performance of the XXIth Bomber Command under Brigadier General Haywood Hansell , decided to replace it. In addition, Hansell's preference for precision bombing no longer fit into the tactics of the Twentieth Air Force headquarters, which wanted a shift towards more area bombing . He was succeeded by Curtis LeMay . Hansell was informed of the decision on January 6, 1945. However, he was able to remain at his post until the middle of the month. Due to the poor results of the precision bombing and the success of the fire bombing attack on Tokyo on February 25th, General LeMay decided to launch such attacks against Nagoya from March onwards. This also corresponded to the target directive set by General Arnold for the XXIth Bomber Command, according to which urban areas were given the second highest priority after aircraft plants. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the air strikes, LeMay ordered the B-29 bombers to attack at night at an altitude of around 1,500 m. The second phase lasted from March 12 to May 17, 1945, in which mostly area bombing with incendiary bombs was flown. Seven air strikes were carried out on Nagoya during this phase.

In retrospect, this phase was considered a success by the United States Army Air Forces . The XXIth Bomber Command succeeded in burning a large area of ​​the city and destroying important industrial plants. Thousands of residents died and hundreds of thousands were left homeless . The widespread destruction and the high number of casualties led many Japanese to realize that the military was no longer able to effectively defend the main islands. The American losses were minimal compared to the Japanese; only a few bombers were lost as a result of enemy action.

March 12, 1945

The Mission 41 of the 20th AF was flown at night from the 11th to the 12th of March. This was an area raid with incendiary bombs on downtown Nagoya. This included B-29 bombers from the 73rd BW, 313th BW and 314th BW. In this night attack came AN-M47 - phosphorous bombs and AN-M69 -Napalm cluster bombs used. The B-29 were each loaded with 4,457-6,296 kg incendiary bombs. Of the 310 aircraft that took off, one plane crashed shortly after take-off and 13 other bombers had to abandon the attack. The remaining bombers flew to the primary target, downtown Nagoya, at an altitude of 1,555–2,591 m. Six aircraft flying ahead from the 314th BW marked a triangular target area in the city center with AN-M47 phosphor bombs. Thereafter, 285 aircraft bombed the marked area and five more dumped their bomb load randomly over Nagoya. That night, almost 1,711 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on densely built-up urban areas. The attack lasted around three hours and burned around 5.3 km 2 of the urban area. The attack was spread over a larger area than that against Tokyo and caused less damage. Instead of a firestorm , over 394 large fires and wildfires broke out. In addition to urban living space, these also destroyed 18 industrial companies that were important to the war effort. Among other things, the Mitsubishi electronics plant, the Kureha spinning mill, and the Torimatsu, Kigusa and Asashi factories were destroyed or seriously damaged. The Aichi aircraft factory was also badly damaged. During this air raid, the B-29 encountered little resistance. In addition to weak anti-aircraft fire, the crews counted 47 attacks by Japanese fighters. Eight bombers were damaged by flak and one plane crashed into the sea immediately after takeoff.

March 18, 1945

The Nagoya Station on March 19, 1945

After the fire bombing attack of March 12th did not bring the desired success, the 20th AF repeated the attack with Mission 44 . Another area attack with incendiary bombs on the northern urban area of ​​Nagoya was scheduled for the night of March 18-19. Of the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings, 310 B-29 bombers took off. Of these, 20 had to break off the attack early. The bombers were loaded with AN-M47, AN-M50, AN-M69 and AN-M76 incendiary bombs. Furthermore, every third bomber was loaded with two 500-pound high-explosive bombs (227 kg) with long-term detonators. Most of the bombers had to approach the target area using radar. The attack took place from an altitude of 1,220–2,286 m. 1,663 tons of incendiary bombs and 17 tons of high-explosive bombs were dropped on the target area during 2 ¾ hours. The extensive wildfires destroyed a further 7.6 km 2 of the urban area. In addition to the residential areas, the fires destroyed the main arsenal , the Togo spinning mill, the Atsudo and Yamada factories, and the army's warehouses . Serious damage was also caused to the Aichi aircraft factory. The Japanese defenses were also weak in this attack. In addition to moderate anti-aircraft fire, the B-29 crews counted 44 attacks by Japanese fighters. A B-29 crashed due to enemy fire over the open sea , and the entire crew could be saved.

March 24, 1945

The Mission 45 of the 20th AF was flown in the night of 24 to 25 March. The target was once again the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 4. Despite being bombed four times, the plant was still largely intact. Of the 248 B-29 bombers launched, 223 reached the target area. Ten advance flying B-29 of the 314th BW dropped from an altitude of 2500 to 2987 m AN-M26 - flares (24 kg) on the target area from. Another ten B-29s followed around five minutes later, marking the illuminated target area with M17 cluster bombs (with AN-M50 stick incendiary bombs). Then the remaining bombers flew in two waves, at an altitude of 2,103–2,377 m. These dropped AN-M64 explosive bombs (227 kg), AN-M76 Napalm bombs (227 kg) and AN-M81 fragmentation bombs (125 kg with long detonator) on the marked target area. Most of the bombs missed the target and the attack destroyed around 0.76 km 2 of factory premises and the adjacent urban area. But only around 4.5% of the factory buildings were destroyed. During this mission there were no attacks by Japanese fighters, but there were strong flak fire over the target. One bomber was shot down and ten others damaged. A B-29 crashed on the outbound flight and three other aircraft were lost for unknown reasons.

March 30, 1945

The Mission 48 in the night of 30 to March 31 was a diversionary attack. 96 20th AF bombers mined Kammon Strait ( Mission 49 of 20th AF) that night . To divert attention from this action, 14 aircraft of the 314th BW launched an attack on Nagoya. This attack was again flown from a height of almost 2,500 m. Twelve B-29s reached the target shortly after midnight and dropped around 47 tons of AN-M64 explosive bombs (227 kg) on ​​Mitsubishi aero engine plant No. 4. In later aerial photographs , no new damage to the aircraft factory could be found during the previous attack. Despite strong flak fire, the US bombers suffered no losses during this mission.

April 7, 1945

The Mission 59 of the 20th AF on April 7, was once again the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant no. 4 to the target. 194 B-29 bombers took off from the 313th BW and 314th BW. 29 bombers could not approach the target and dropped their bomb load over the urban area of ​​Nagoya. The main formation from 155 B-29 flew to the target at an altitude of 4,876-7,620 m and dropped 138.8 tons of explosive bombs. This time a large number of flare bombs had been dropped beforehand and the target could be clearly identified by the main formation. The night attack destroyed 63 halls and 27 other buildings in the factory. Around 90% of the factory buildings were destroyed or badly damaged. The original monthly production from this factory was 129 engines. After this attack, only 44 engines could be produced in the plant until the end of the war in September 1945. The USSBS ( United States Strategic Bombing Survey ) later rated this attack as the most successful of the Twentieth Air Force on a single target. On this mission, the B-29 crews counted 233 attacks by Japanese fighters. American pilots claimed 21 kills and eleven probable kills after the attack. Another 23 fighters are said to have been damaged. A B-29 was shot down by the flak and another was brought down by a blow from a Kawasaki Ki-45 "Toryu" .

May 14, 1945

The Nagoya Castle on May 14, 1945

With Mission 174 , 20th AF flew another area raid with incendiary bombs on Nagoya on May 14th. The target area was north of Nagoya Castle . In addition to residential quarters, the target area included the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 10, a Mitsubishi electronics factory, the Chigusa factory and other war-important industrial companies. B-29s of the 58th, 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings participated in the daytime attack. Of the 524 bombers launched, 472 reached the target area. From a height of 4,937–6,248 m, the B-29 dropped over 2,430 tons of AN-M69 -Napalm cluster bombs on the city. The wildfires completely burned 8.2 km 2 of urban living space. The fire brigade and the firebreak created beforehand were just able to prevent the fire from spreading further. A large number of important industrial plants were completely destroyed and an even larger number of residential areas were destroyed by flames. The strong Japanese defense was able to shoot down two bombers and damage another 64 in this attack. Eight other aircraft were lost for other reasons. The Americans assumed they had safely shot 18 enemy fighters and possibly shot down 30 more; Another 16 are said to have been damaged.

May 16, 1945

The last incendiary raid on Nagoya took place on the night of May 16-17. The 58th, 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings were involved in Mission 176 of 20th AF. The target of this attack were the southern districts with the industrial area and the harbor district. The target area included the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 5, an Aichi aircraft plant, the Atsuta factory, the Nippoa vehicle plant as well as arsenals and other war-important industrial companies. Of the 516 B-29 bombers launched for the attack, 457 reached the city. Again, the target area was previously marked with AN-M47 phosphor bombs. From a height of 2,011 m, the B-29 unloaded over 3,033 tons of AN-M47, AN-M50 and AN-M69 incendiary bombs. Due to clouds and heavy smoke over the target area, many crews of the second wave could not make out their targets and had to approach them with radar assistance. The fires in Nagoya developed not only smoke but also strong thermal winds , so that many subsequent aircraft had to climb to a much greater height and drop their load of weapons from there. 49 bombers could not find their targets and dropped their bombs somewhere over the greater Nagoya area. The badly decimated fire brigade was unable to counter the resulting firestorm , so that a further 9.9 km 2 of the urban area burned down. 36 industrial and armaments factories were destroyed and the Mitsubishi aircraft engine plant No. 5 was seriously damaged. In addition, a large area of ​​urban living space was burned down. The heavy smoke over Nagoya rose to an altitude of nearly 40,000 m and was visible from over 240 km away. The Japanese night defense was significantly weaker than that during the day and could not shoot down any of the attacking bombers. The B-29 crews counted 11 attacks by Japanese fighters. According to American sources, two Japanese night fighters were shot down. 14 bombers were damaged and 16 had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima . Three bombers crashed due to technical defects. In the last two incendiary bombing attacks on Nagoya, 3,866 Japanese died on the ground and a further 472,701 were left homeless. After this mission, the 20th Air Force ended area attacks against Nagoya because the city had ceased to exist as a strategic target. The other attacks were aimed at the still intact industrial plants.

Phase three

The third phase came after large areas of Nagoya were burned down by the attacks in the second phase. The third phase lasted from June 9th to July 24th 1945. During this, precision attacks were carried out on the remaining industrial and armaments factories. These attacks were carried out in part as part of large-scale, combined air strikes that had various targets in different cities. After that, the 20th Air Force stopped the attacks because Nagoya had ceased to exist as a strategic target. There were also no longer any industrial plants worth bombing. The attacks in this phase were carried out from medium altitude and explosive bombs were primarily used. Targets in Nagoya were also attacked by Taks Force 37 carrier-based combat aircraft .

The United States Army Air Forces later rated the precision attacks of the XXIth Bomber Command as a success in this phase. The bombing raids on the industrial and armaments factories led to massive bottlenecks and production losses. In addition to the physical destruction, many people no longer dared to leave their homes and go to work because they feared the factories would be bombed.

June 9, 1945

20th AF Mission 193 on June 9th was targeted to industrial operations in Nagoya and Hamamatsu . In Nagoya these were the Aichi plants. These included an aircraft factory, an electronics factory and a watch factory . A second destination in the city was the Atsuta factory, which housed production lines for aircraft components. The B-29 bombers were loaded with 4,000 pound (1,814 kg) AN-M56 and AN-M66 (2,000 pound / 907 kg) explosive bombs . The attack on the two targets came from a height of 5,791–6,309 m. Over 252 tons of bombs were dropped. Evaluations showed that 53% of the targets were destroyed. In this attack, 87 attacks by Japanese fighters were counted. According to US information, the B-29 managed to shoot down two fighters and damage three more. The 313th BW did not lose any aircraft during this mission.

June 26, 1945

P-51 Mustang of the 15th Fighter Group (VII Fighter Command) stationed in Iwo Jima as escort in June 1945

The Mission 223 Mission 226 and Mission 227 of 20th AF had a number of industrial plants in Nagoya to the goal. These were the Aichi aircraft plant, the Sumitomo duraluminium plant , the Atsuta and Eitoku factories, a car plant and various arsenals . The attacks involved B-29s from the 58th, 330th and 314th Bomb Wing. These were escorted by 144 P-51 Mustang fighters . The B-29s were loaded with 4,000 pound AN-M56 explosive bombs (1,814 kg). 87 bombers dumped 740 tons of bombs on the targets from a height of 5,974–7,711 m with radar assistance. Five planes failed to locate their targets and dropped their bombs at random. Nothing is known precisely about the consequences of the attack, as no target evaluation was carried out for the time being. Photos during the attack showed the target areas and their surroundings littered with bomb explosions. In addition to moderate flak fire, the Americans counted 52 attacks by Japanese fighter planes. The crews assumed they had shot four enemy fighters safely and two more possibly shot down. A B-29 crashed as a result of anti-aircraft fire over the sea, whereby the entire crew could be saved.

July 20, 1945

That day the airfields around Nagoya were attacked. P-51 Mustang that had previously launched on Iwojima attacked the targets with on-board weapons and missiles .

July 23, 1945

A B-29 dropped a so-called pumpkin bomb on Nagoya. This bomb was identical to the Fat Man atomic bomb , but instead of the nuclear warhead, it had conventional explosives . This attack served as a target exercise for the later uses of the atomic bombs .

July 24, 1945

The Mission 289 of 20th AF was a day-precision attack on the Aichi Aircraft and Eitoku factory. 81 B-29 bombers took off from the 73rd and 314th Bomb Wing. These were loaded with 4,000 pound (1,814 kg) AN-M56 and AN-M66 (2,000 pound / 907 kg) explosive bombs . 75 aircraft reached their destinations, which were under a thick cloud cover. The bombers flew to their targets at an altitude of 5,486–6,888 m using radar assistance. Six more bombers could not make their targets and unloaded their bomb load over the alternative target, the village of Tsu . A total of 409 tons of bombs were dropped during this mission. The attack destroyed over 40,412m 2 factory buildings. In this attack, the Japanese defense was weak. There was moderate anti-aircraft fire over the targets but no attacks by Japanese fighters. Nine bombers were damaged by the flak fire and 15 had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima.

July 25th

On those days, the US Navy carried out a large carrier-based air strike on the main Japanese islands. Aircraft of the type TBF Avenger , SB2C Helldiver and F6F Hellcat took off from the aircraft carriers of the Taks Force 37 (TF 37) . These attacked airfields, aircraft plants and power plants in the Nagoya region. In addition, the planes attacked various ships in the port of Nagoya and sank some of them.

August 1, 1945

On that day, attacks were made on railways and airfields in the greater Osaka and Nagoya area. 30 P-51 Mustang that had previously launched on Iwojima attacked the targets with on-board weapons and missiles.

August 14, 1945

On that day, attacks were made on various airfields in the Nagoya area. P-51 Mustang that had previously launched on Iwojima attacked the targets with on-board weapons and missiles.

Effects

Bomb damage to the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya

According to the evaluations of the USSBS , the two goals set by the USAAF, the destruction of the industrial district and the wear down on the population, were successfully achieved. The first phase of the attacks was rated as unsuccessful, as the factories were not hit by night attacks from a great height. At this point in time, the B-29 did not have any radar devices that could be used effectively for target finding. The area attacks with incendiary bombs in the second phase caused enormous damage and claimed thousands of casualties among the civilian population. In the third phase, thanks to the advanced AN / APQ-7 radar systems that were now available, individual targets could be bombed with the required precision. At that time, the Japanese armed forces were hardly able to provide effective defense. Much of Nagoya's industrial capacity was destroyed by the air strikes, causing a sharp decline in industrial production.

A total of 12,749.6 tons of bombs were dropped on Nagoya by the Twentieth Air Force . Of these, 8,837.8 tons were incendiary bombs and 3,911.8 tons were explosive and fragmentation bombs. Around 71% of the bomb load was dropped in area bombing. These attacks led to the widespread destruction of urban living space. 37.2% of the urban area was completely destroyed and another 39.8% was badly damaged. The bombs destroyed 60,877 buildings and damaged another 6,434. The attacks left 8,152 dead, 10,095 injured and left 519,205 people homeless.

The repeated heavy air raids led to an increasing degeneration of social community life. As a result of the attacks, the water and electricity supply in the city largely collapsed and, despite the opening of the still intact food depots, food soon became scarce. The salvage, supply of the survivors and the clean-up work in the largely destroyed city turned out to be extremely difficult and time-consuming for the badly decimated auxiliary workers. The attacks on civilians were the strongest factor in convincing the population that the war was lost, according to a post-war survey by the USSBS.

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  • E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. Donald I. Fine Inc., New York City 1991, ISBN 1-55611-301-3 .
  • Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The Second World War. ECON Verlag, 1985, ISBN 3-89350-544-X
  • Curtis LeMay and Bill Yenne: Superfortress: The Boeing B-29 and American airpower in World War II. Westholme Publishing, Yardley, Pennsylvania 2007, ISBN 1-59416-039-2 .
  • National Defense Research Committee (NDRC): Summary Technical Report of Division 11, Volume 3: Fire Warfare, Incendiaries and Flame Throwers. Washington DC 1946.
  • Stewart Halsey Ross: Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts. McFarland, December 13, 2002, ISBN 0-7864-1412-X .
  • Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. Simon & Schuster, New York City 2010, ISBN 978-1-4165-8440-7 .
  • United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Medical Division (Ed.): The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947, OCLC 13475684 .
  • United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Moral Division (Ed.): The Effecits of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947, OCLC 9941656 .
  • United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Division (Ed.): Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947.
  • United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Division (Ed.): The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947.
  • Robert M. Neer: Napalm. Harvard University Press, 2013, ISBN 0-674-07545-5 .

Web links

Commons : Bombing of Japan in World War II  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Remarks

  1. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, pp. 4-9.
  2. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan. 1947, pp. 226-231.
  3. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, pp. 12-13.
  4. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan. 1947, pp. 226-227.
  5. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, p. 8.
  6. ^ Clayton KS Chun: The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's First Strike Back at Japan, 2006.
  7. Jump up ↑ Curtis LeMay and Bill Yenne: Superfortress: The Boeing B-29 and American airpower in World War II., 2007.
  8. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 559-560.
  9. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 575-576.
  10. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 562.
  11. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 567.
  12. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 10.
  13. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Twentieth Air Force Association. Accessed January 13, 2015.
  14. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j B-29 Superfortress Then and Now. Accessed January 13, 2015.
  15. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 563.
  16. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 572.
  17. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 10-11.
  18. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 563-564.
  19. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 575.
  20. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 11.
  21. ↑ a b Firebombing Japan, in: Flying Magazine, October 1945, page 64.
  22. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 565.
  23. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 586.
  24. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 33.
  25. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 118-119.
  26. ↑ a b c d e f g h National Defense Research Committee (NDRC): Summary Technical Report of Division 11, Volume 3: Fire Warfare, Incendiaries and Flame Throwers, 1946, p. 21.
  27. ^ WA Noyes: Science in World War II: A History of the Chemistry Components of the National Defense Research Committee 1940-1946 , Atlantic Monthly Press Book, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1948, p. 402.
  28. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, p. 11.
  29. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 565.
  30. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 595.
  31. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 11.
  32. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, p. 11.
  33. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 568.
  34. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 603.
  35. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 12.
  36. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 571.
  37. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 623.
  38. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 12.
  39. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 566-568.
  40. ^ Herman S. Wolk: The Twentieth Against Japan. 2004, p. 72
  41. ↑ Daniel L. Haulman: Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan. 1999, p. 22.
  42. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 642-644.
  43. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 261-262.
  44. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, pp. 76-77.
  45. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 618.
  46. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 322.
  47. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 618-619.
  48. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 35.
  49. ^ A b c R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 323.
  50. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 622-623.
  51. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 650.
  52. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 35-36.
  53. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 631.
  54. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
  55. ↑ Haywood. S. Hansell Jr .: The Strategic Air War against Germany and Japan: A Memoir. 1986, p. 10.
  56. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, p. 11.
  57. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 631.
  58. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 662.
  59. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
  60. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, p. 11.
  61. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 647.
  62. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 15.
  63. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 636-637.
  64. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 636-637.
  65. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 700.
  66. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 36.
  67. ↑ a b The 6th Bomb Group - The Missions.
  68. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 637.
  69. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 637-638.
  70. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 36.
  71. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 156–157.
  72. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, pp. 8-21.
  73. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 711.
  74. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 718.
  75. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 18.
  76. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 729.
  77. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 97.
  78. ^ Norman Polmar: The Enola Gay: The B-29 That Dropped the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima , Potomac Books (2004), p. 24, ISBN 1-57488-836-6 .
  79. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 652.
  80. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 730.
  81. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 18.
  82. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Victory in the Pacific. 1960, pp. 22-25.
  83. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 123-124.
  84. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 734.
  85. ↑ Jack McKillop: USAAF Chronology. Retrieved January 18, 2016 .
  86. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 278-279.
  87. ↑ Bombers over Japan, by Alex Wellerstein, May 2013.
  88. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, pp. 8-10.
  89. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack in the City on Nagoya. 1947, pp. 8-10.
  90. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 282.
  91. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Moral Division: The Effecits of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale 1947.
  92. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 282.