Air raids on Tokyo

The air raids on Tokyo ( Japanese 東京 大 空襲 , Tōkyō Daikūshū ) in the last months of the Second World War destroyed the Japanese city ​​of Tokyo to over 50%. In the period from December 1944 to August 1945, Tokyo was the target of United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) bomber units more than 30 times . There were no more air strikes on any other Japanese city . Individual attacks are among the most destructive in history.

City center before and after the air raids

Importance of the city

The city of Tokyo together with Kawasaki , Yokohama and other smaller cities formed the metropolitan region of Kanto . At the beginning of the Second World War, this metropolitan area was considered to be the most industrialized and densely populated region in the world. The urban area covered an area of ​​around 2,500 km ² . This is where 20% of the population of the main Japanese islands lived . Tokyo had over 6.5 million inhabitants in 1944 and a population density of 77,699 to 349,648 people per km² , making it the largest Japanese city. The urban area covered an area of ​​over 577.5 km ² and had around 875,200 residential buildings, 48,300 factory buildings and 237,500 other buildings. As the capital of the Japanese Empire, Tokyo was the most important administrative center . The city was also home to the Imperial Palace , the residence of Tennō Hirohito . In addition, Tokyo was the financial, industrial, commercial, educational and cultural center of Japan with numerous universities, colleges, research institutes, theaters and museums. It was also the country's transportation hub, with various airports and railway junctions on several major lines.

Large industrial districts were located in the city . The Tokyo metropolitan area was the most important region for the Japanese war economy at the time . A large number of large industrial plants and factories were located in the industrial districts. These included, among other things, important companies for arms production , aircraft and vehicle production as well as for steel production . Tokyo was also an important location for the oil industry . In addition, there were a large number of small businesses , which were spread across the entire city area. In addition, there were countless home industries spread across the residential areas. In the Kantō region took place 20% of the Japanese industrial production and around 16% of the Japanese industrial workers worked in this region. Tokyo was also an important location for the Japanese nuclear weapons project .

The port areas of Tokyo and Yokohama were the most important in the country. Around 25% of Japanese foreign trade was handled in these port facilities. The ports could accommodate a large number of cargo and passenger ships . The port of Yokohama was the fourth largest shipyard in the country with extensive production and repair facilities for military and civilian ships. There were 16 anchorages for large ships in front of the port.

Compared to other cities on the main Japanese islands, Tokyo had a professional fire department and a volunteer fire department with a comparatively large number of firefighters. The professional fire brigade had 8,100 firefighters and 716 fire engines . However, the volunteer fire brigades had little new equipment and in the event of a fire they used outdated fire-fighting tactics. There was also a civil defense consisting of professional and volunteer personnel. Due to the prevailing construction and the weak civil defense, Tokyo was endangered by the use of incendiary bombs. The urban area was densely built up and most of the buildings were made of easily inflammable materials such as wood or paper. In addition, industrial and military facilities were often located in densely populated areas. After the Great Kantō earthquake in 1923 , regular air raid drills were carried out in Tokyo and, from 1937, instructions were issued to the municipal administrations to provide the civilian population with manuals explaining the best behavior in air raids. In the run-up to the war, only a few air raid shelters and other protective facilities for civilians and industry had been built in the country. In mid-1944, neither the fire brigade nor the civil defense were adequately prepared for the air raids.

The Kantō region was the best defended area in Japan. As an important industrial and business location, this region was assigned a comparatively large number of aircraft and flak units . Nevertheless, the air defense remained largely unprepared for the impending attacks, as only a few of the available aircraft and anti-aircraft guns could reach the operating altitude of the B-29 of 9,000 to 9,500 meters and only a few radar stations were ready for early warning.

Chronology of the air raids

B-29 during the attack on Tokyo

The primary aim of the air strikes was the destruction of Tokyo's industrial plants. The intent of these attacks was to weaken the Japanese armaments industry in order to limit and cut off supplies to the Imperial Japanese Army . The second target was the city's population. With the destruction of the workforce, the planners hoped for massive losses in industrial production. This should lead to supply shortages for the military and the civilian population. Furthermore, one wanted to weaken or break the morale (work ethic, perseverance, etc.) of the population. Emperor Hirohito saw the bomb damage on a tour of Tokyo in March 1945. This is said to have led him to believe that he could no longer win the war. This is said to have decisively influenced his decision to surrender five months later.

From November 1944 to August 1945 there were over 30 air raids on the city. The attacks on Tokyo can be roughly divided into three phases. Each phase was different in terms of targets, tactics and the types of bombs used. The air raids in the first phase from November 24, 1944 to January 27, 1945 were primarily aimed at armaments factories. The attacks of the second phase from February 10, 1945 to May 29, 1945 were directed against the residential areas and the civilian population. These attacks were carried out as area bombing . In the third phase from June 10, 1945 to August 15, 1945 armaments factories and infrastructure for supplying the army and the population were attacked again.

Early attacks

April 18, 1942

As a surprise to Japan, the first US air raid on Tokyo was carried out on April 18, 1942 as part of the " Doolittle Raid ". In response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, it was supposed to demonstrate to its own people that the US was also able to carry out such attacks. Since the Allies did not have any bases close enough to Japan at the time, the attack was flown by light B-25B bombers launched from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet . Of the 16 bombers launched, 10 attacked military and industrial targets in Tokyo and Yokohama. Each bomber was with four 500-pound bombs (227 kg) or with four cluster bombs with AN-M54 - incendiary bombs loaded. The bombs dropped caused only minor damage. The first attack on the main Japanese islands hit the Japanese air defense completely unprepared and they hardly offered any resistance. None of the attacking bombers were shot down.

Phase one

Brigadier General Haywood S. Hansell in front of a map of Greater Tokyo, November 1944

The first phase began on November 24, 1944 and lasted until January 27, 1945. In this phase, precision attacks from great heights were carried out with a few bombers. The attacks were flown both during the day and at night. The targets of these attacks were aircraft factories and various other industrial companies. Of seven attacks in the Kantō region, six were targeted in Tokyo. The first phase of the attack began after the first units of the XXI Bomber Command of the Twentieth Air Force (20th AF) had been stationed on the Mariana Islands in October 1944 . This formation was equipped with the advanced B-29 Superfortress bomber . The B-29 was able to carry heavy bomb loads over long distances and at great heights. Brigadier General Haywood Hansell was in command of XXIth Bomber Command .

The United States Army Air Forces later rated the precision attacks of the XXIth Bomber Command as unsuccessful in this phase. The bombing failed to permanently destroy the industrial facilities attacked, but at least weakened the confidence of the Japanese civilian population in the country's air defense. Various factors are used to explain the low effectiveness. The most important is the weather, as the attacks were often hampered by high winds prevailing over Japan and thick clouds , which made it difficult to drop the bombs accurately. Bad weather fronts between the Mariana Islands and Japan also led to the bomber formations disintegrating and navigation problems. Other reasons were poor maintenance and overcrowding of the available bases. They reduced the number of bombers available for attack and complicated the complex take-off and landing process of large bomber formations .

November 24, 1944

The first attack with heavy bombers of the type B-29 Superfortress took place on November 24th. For Mission 7 of the Twentieth Air Force, 111 B-29 bombers from the 73rd Bomb Wing were launched in the Mariana Islands. The surgery San Antonio I had the Nakajima -Flugzeugwerke in the district of Musashino goal. The Musashino Arsenal district was to the west of Tokyo. Each aircraft was loaded with 20,500 pound (227 kg) explosive bombs . 17 aircraft had to abandon the attack early. The lead aircraft was the SN 42-24592 "Dauntless Dotty" of the 497th Bombardment Group . The aircraft was flown by Captain Robert K. Morgan and the bombardier was Captain Vincent B. Evans. Both were previously crew members of the " Memphis Belle " and therefore very experienced. The target area was cloudy and only 24 bombers managed to bomb the target from a height of 8,230 to 9,754 meters. Evaluations showed that only 48 bombs hit the target area and caused only minor damage to the factory buildings. 57 workers were killed and 75 injured in the factory. Of the remaining B-29s, 59 could not make out the target and dropped their bombs over port and industrial facilities as well as residential areas. Five more bombers dumped the bombs over the village of Matsuzaki. The 125 Japanese fighter planes launched to defend themselves flew 184 attacks on the bomber formation. According to US information, the B-29 managed to shoot down seven aircraft and damage nine more. Eight B-29s were damaged and two lost in this attack, presumably only one loss being due to enemy action. A B-29 crashed over the open sea, with the entire crew being rescued by a submarine.

November 27th

The Mission 8 of the 20th AF had the surgery San Antonio II , the Nakajima aircraft factory in Musashino goal. The B-29 of the 73rd Bomb Wing were loaded with 4,535 kg each of high-explosive and incendiary bombs. Of the 81 B-29 bombers that took off from the Mariana Islands, 19 planes had to abandon the attack due to stormy weather. Arrived via Tokyo, the remaining planes could not identify the targets under the closed cloud cover. As a result, 49 B-29s with radar assistance bombed the secondary target , the port facilities and residential areas of Tokyo. Seven other bombers dumped their bomb load over the alternative target, the city of Hamamatsu . Over 103 tons of bombs were dropped during this mission, but no bombs were dropped on the primary targets. A B-29 crashed into the sea on its return flight. The crew could not be found.

November 29, 1944

On the night of November 29th to 30th, the 73rd Bomb Wing flew Mission 9 of 9 AF. The operation Brooklyn I was a test for the success already used in Europe incendiary bombs . The B-29 bombers were each loaded with 3,175 kg of AN-M50 incendiary bombs . The target of the 29 launched bombers was the industrial district in the port region of Tokyo. The bombers flew towards Japan through a bad weather front. Again Tokyo was under a closed cloud cover and the bombers flew to the target with radar assistance. 23 bombers dropped their bombs from a height of 7,620 to 10,119 meters above the target. The attack burned approximately 0.25 km ^{2 of the} city ​​area. The bomber crews counted five attacks by Japanese fighters. The heavy anti-aircraft fire over the target area led to the loss of a B-29.

December 3, 1944

The Mission 10 of the 20th AF was again the Nakajima aircraft factory in the district of Musashino goal. On December 3, 86 B-29s of the 73rd Bomb Wing took off, each loaded with 3,175 kg of explosive bombs. 73 of the bombers launched on Saipan reached Tokyo and were able to identify the target visually. During the approach, the lead machine was shot down by the flak . On board the machine were Colonel RT King, the commander of the 500th Bomb Group and Colonel Byron E. Brugge, the deputy chief of staff of the 73rd Bomb Wing. Again, strong winds hindered accurate bombing. From a height of around 8,750 m, the B-29 dropped over 231 tons of bombs. Only 27 bombs hit the target area and did not cause any major damage to the factory buildings. Eight other bombers could not make out the target and dumped their bomb load over the Tokyo waterfront. During the airstrike, Japanese fighters made 75 attacks on the bomber formation. After the mission, the American crews claimed ten kills and a further eleven probable kills. In this attack, six B-29s were lost to kills and accidents. Six more were damaged.

December 27, 1944

With Mission 10 , 20th AF launched another attack on the Nakajima aircraft plant in Musashino. 72 B-29s took off from the 73rd Bomb Wing, each loaded with 2,495 kg of explosive bombs. Fighting high winds, 39 bombers reached the target area at an altitude of 8,778 to 10,302 meters. Of the bombs dropped, only six hit the target and did little damage. Another nine B-29s could not approach the target and dumped their bombs at random over Tokyo. These bombs also accidentally hit a hospital . During this mission, the defense attempts by Japanese fighters were more violent. 272 attacks were counted. According to US information, the bombers succeeded in shooting down 21 fighters and damaging seven more. During this mission, the 73rd BW lost two bombers in accidents and another was shot down by a fighter.

January 9, 1945

On January 9th, 20th AF's 73rd BW on Mission 18 flew a repeated attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Musashino. On that day, 72 B-29 bombers took off from the Mariana Islands. Each was loaded with ten 500-pound high-explosive bombs. As a result of a bad weather front between the Mariana Islands and Japan, 19 bombers had to abandon the flight. 54 aircraft reached the main Japanese islands in loose formation at an altitude of 8,992 to 10,485 meters. There they were intercepted by 51 Japanese Mitsubishi A6M "Reisen" and Mitsubishi J2M "Raiden" fighter planes . In the air battles that followed, a B-29 was shot down and 10 other bombers were damaged. Of the 53 bombers that reached the target area, 34 unloaded their bomb loads at random over the Tokyo metropolitan area. Only 18 B-29s were able to locate the target under the closed cloud cover using radar and bomb them. Again, the bombs dropped did not cause any serious damage to the factory buildings. After the mission, the American crews claimed three kills and a further eleven probable kills. Three other fighter planes are said to have been damaged. The 73rd BW lost six bombers in this operation: two were shot down by the Japanese defense, one fell on the return flight into the sea and three more were lost for unknown reasons.

January 27, 1945

The Mission 24 of the 20th AF in turn had a precision bombing of Nakajima aircraft factory in Musashino goal. During this mission, each B-29 bomber carried twelve 500-pound high-explosive bombs (227 kg) in the two weapon bays . Of 74 aircraft of the 73rd Bomb Wing that took off, twelve had to turn around early. Off the Japanese main islands, 190 fighters of the type Nakajima Ki-44 "Shoki" , Kawasaki Ki-45 "Toryu" , Kawasaki Ki-61 "Hien" , Mitsubishi J2M "Raiden" and Nakajima J1N "Gekko" intercepted the bomber formation. In the air battles that followed, various ramming attempts were observed by Japanese airmen. When they arrived over Tokyo, the bomber formation struck violent flak, and again strong winds at high altitude and thick clouds prevented a targeted bombardment. None of the bombers approaching at an altitude of 7,468 to 9,022 meters could make out the target. As a result, 56 bombers bombed the secondary target, the port district of Tokyo, using radar assistance. The attack left 1,241 dead, missing and injured on the ground. 4,400 people were left homeless in the attack. The B-29 crews assumed to have safely shot six enemy fighters and possibly shot down 17 more. Another 39 fighters are said to have been damaged. The 73rd BW lost nine of their bombers during this mission: five B-29s were lost to the Japanese defense and four more crashed on the return flight or were broken on landing.

Phase two

Burned down Tokyo district after the air raid on March 10, 1945. Photograph by Ishikawa Koyo.

At the end of December 1944, the Commander in Chief of the USAAF, General Henry H. Arnold , who was dissatisfied with the performance of the XXIth Bomber Command under Brigadier General Haywood Hansell , decided to replace it. In addition, Hansell's preference for precision bombing no longer fit into the tactics of the Twentieth Air Force headquarters, which wanted a shift towards area bombing . In addition, there was the consideration that with the light wooden construction of Japanese houses the effect of incendiary bombs would be far greater than that of high-explosive bombs. Hansell's successor was Curtis LeMay . Hansell was informed of the decision on January 6, 1945. However, he was able to remain at his post until the middle of the month. Due to the poor results of the precision bombing and the success of the test attack with napalm on Kobe on February 3, General LeMay decided to launch such attacks against Tokyo from the end of February. This also corresponded to the target directive set by General Arnold for the XXIth Bomber Command , according to which urban areas were given the second highest priority after aircraft plants. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the air strikes, LeMay ordered that the B-29 bombers should attack at night at an altitude of 1,500 to 2,500 meters. The second phase, in the predominantly area bombing with incendiary bombs , lasted from February 10 to May 29, 1945. In this phase, six heavy air raids were carried out on the residential areas of Tokyo.

The first air strikes under the command of Curtis LeMay led to different results. The XXIth Bomber Command flew several large precision attacks between February 10 and April 12, which were classified as unsuccessful. After the massive fire bombing began, this second phase was rated a great success by the United States Army Air Forces . The XXIth Bomber Command managed to burn down a huge area of ​​the city and destroy important industrial plants. Tens of thousands of residents died and hundreds of thousands were left homeless in the incendiary attacks . The devastating destruction and the enormous number of casualties led many Japanese to realize that the military would no longer be able to effectively defend the main islands. The American losses were minimal compared to the Japanese; only a few bombers were lost as a result of enemy action.

February 10, 1945

With Mission 29 of 20th AF, the 313th Bomb Wing flew its first mission against the Japanese main islands. Operation Fraction I was targeted at the Nakajima aircraft plant in Ota, a suburb of Tokyo. For this mission, the B-29 bombers of the 73rd and 313th Bomb Wing were loaded with 500-pound high-explosive bombs (227 kg) and 500-pound napalm bombs of the type AN-M76 . Of the 120 machines launched on the Mariana Islands, 18 had to break off the attack early. Another 16 B-29s with their as yet inexperienced crews were unable to approach the target and instead bombed the port districts of Tokyo. 84 bombers dropped their bomb load on the primary target from a height of 7,925 to 8,961 meters. Only seven AN-M76 and 97 high-explosive bombs (43 of which later turned out to be duds ) hit the factory premises. The bombs destroyed or damaged eleven of 37 factories. Most of the damage was caused by the fires that sparked the AN-M76 incendiary bombs. During this attack, the bombers encountered strong Japanese defenses. In addition to heavy flak fire, 330 attacks by fighter planes were counted. According to US data, the B-29 managed to shoot down 21 fighters and damage 26 others. American losses were also high; twelve bombers were lost. A B-29 crashed into the sea immediately after takeoff. Two bombers collided in the air and crashed. One bomber was shot down by the Japanese defense and seven more had to make an emergency landing on the return flight . Another B-29 crashed for unknown reasons.

16.-17. February 1945

It was on those days that the US Navy carried out the first carrier-based air raids on the main Japanese islands. The aim of the attacks carried out by Task Force 58 (TF 58) was to destroy Japanese aircraft that could attack the American forces landing on Iwo Jima from February 19 . The TF 58 penetrated Japanese waters undetected and attacked airfields and aircraft plants in the Tokyo region on February 16 and 17. The planes also attacked various ships in Tokyo Bay and sank some of them. The attacks involved TBF Avenger , SB2C Helldiver and F6F Hellcat carrier-based aircraft . After the attacks, American pilots claimed 341 kills and 160 aircraft destroyed on the ground. The own losses amounted to 60 kills and 28 pilots lost in accidents. The actual Japanese losses from the attacks are unclear; the Imperial Headquarters gave its own losses as 78 aircraft shot down and no figures for those destroyed on the ground.

February 19, 1945

On February 15, the battle for Iwojima began . With the mission 37 of the 20th AF wanted to distract you from this attack and prevent the Japanese fighters on the main islands. For Operation Enkindle IV , 150 B-29s took off from the 73rd and 313th Bomb Wings in the Mariana Islands. Another precision bombardment of the Nakajima aircraft factory in Musashino was planned. For this purpose, the bombers were each loaded with 2,467-3,112 kg of high-explosive bombs or AN-M50 rod-incendiary bombs. Again, this mission failed to attack the primary target. 119 aircraft reached Tokyo at an altitude of 7,468 to 9,144 meters. The crews could not see the target, which was under the mist and cirrus clouds . Using radar assistance, the planes dumped their bomb load over the secondary target - the urban and port area of ​​Tokyo. Twelve other planes dumped the bombs at random somewhere over town. Another 13 aircraft had already canceled the flight early due to technical problems and strong high-altitude winds. Again the Japanese defense was strong in this attack. In addition to heavy anti-aircraft fire, the bomber crews counted 570 attacks from fighter planes. After the mission, the American pilots claimed 36 kills and 16 probable kills for themselves. 37 fighter planes are also said to have been damaged. The Americans lost two B-29s to rams by Japanese fighters, one bomber had to make an emergency landing on the return flight and another was broken on landing.

February 25, 1945

With the mission 38 of the 20th AF, the first firebomb attack took place at the residential areas of Tokyo. The operation Meetinghouse I was the first joint attack of the three Squadron 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings and a large-scale test for the later firebombing. For the first time should have Tokyo Napalm - cluster bombs of the type AN-M69 are brought into use. This type of incendiary bomb was specially developed to attack Japanese cities. The B-29 were each loaded with 1,789-3,205 kg incendiary or fragmentation bombs. For this daily mission, 229 aircraft took off from the Mariana Islands. As a result of a bad weather front between the Mariana Islands and Japan, 25 bombers had to abandon the flight. 201 aircraft reached the main Japanese islands in loose formation at an altitude of 7,163 to 9,449 meters. Tokyo was covered by thick cloud cover that day and it was snowing heavily in the city. Of the approaching bombers, 28 unloaded their bomb loads at random over the city area. The main formation of 172 bombers dumped their bomb load with radar assistance over the primary target - the Shinjuku district  . Within two hours, nearly 40 tons of cluster bombs and over 396 tons of napalm bombs were dropped on Tokyo in seven waves of attack. The attack was less successful than the previous one against Kobe. For one thing, the planes did not drop their bombs from a closed formation and so the small bombs were spread over a large area. On the other hand, the cluster bombs were dropped in a longer time interval , which led to a lower hit density. Instead of a firestorm , various wildfires broke out. These destroyed around 2.0 km ^{2 of} urban residential areas and burned 29,970 buildings. During this air raid, the B-29 encountered little resistance. Two bombers were shot down by the Japanese defense, two more collided in the air and crashed. Another B-29 broke on landing.

March 4, 1945

With Mission 39 , 20th AF launched another unsuccessful precision bombardment of the Nakajima aircraft works in Musashino. In this attack, too, no bombs fell on the primary target, as it was not visible under the thick clouds. Instead, 159 of the 192 B-29 bombers launched bombed the city and port area of ​​Tokyo using radar assistance. Eighteen other planes dumped the bombs at random somewhere over town. The attack took place from an altitude of 7,650 to 8,809 meters with incendiary and high-explosive bombs. As the target was not evaluated, nothing is known about the damage done. The attack met only weak resistance and no aircraft was lost to enemy action. A B-29 had to make an emergency landing on the return flight and another bomber had to make an emergency landing on the island of Iwojima, which was still contested at the time . This was the first of almost 1,000 subsequent emergency landings on this island. After this mission, the Twentieth Air Force put an end to the unsuccessful precision attacks from a great height.

March 9, 1945

Burned down residential areas of Tokyo on March 10, 1945

After the fire bombing attack of February 25 had not had the desired effect, 20th AF repeated the attack with Mission 40 . Another area attack with incendiary bombs on the residential areas of Tokyo was scheduled for the night of March 9th to 10th. This time the attack was supposed to be from a much lower altitude. For Operation Meetinghouse II , the XXI Bomber Command gathered all available forces from the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings. On the afternoon of March 9, 346 B-29 bombers took off on the Mariana Islands in the direction of Tokyo. It took around three hours for all the bombers to take off. After the planes had flown through a bad weather zone with severe turbulence, 279 bombers reached Tokyo Bay shortly before midnight . Shortly afterwards, pathfinder planes flying ahead from the 73rd BW and 314th BW reached the city with good visibility. Each of these bombers was loaded with 184 AN-M47 bombs, the maximum possible number of this type of bomb. Eight minutes after midnight , these aircraft began to mark three adjacent target areas with the napalm bombs. The three areas together corresponded to a rectangle with sides of about 6.4 km and 4.8 km. Around 1.2 million people lived in this densely populated area. There were also various shopping, industrial and business districts in the target area. Shortly after these first bombs were dropped, an air-raid alarm was raised in Tokyo at 12:15 a.m. Shortly after the target areas were marked, the main formations reached the city. A certain altitude was assigned to each bomb wing. The B-29 bombers of the 314th Bomb Wing flew at an altitude of 1,524-1,768 meters (5,000-5,800  feet ), those of the 313th Bomb Wing at 1,829-2,042 meters (6,000-6,700 feet) and the bombers of the 73rd Bomb Wing 2,134-2,316 meters (7,000-7,600 feet). The three main formations bombed the target areas in a continuous stream of bombers with AN-M69 incendiary bombs. The AN-M69 napalm bombs were each packed in 38 units in M19 cluster bombs (E46). These opened at a height of 762 m (2,500 feet) and distributed the AN-M69 small bombs with a high hit density. For just under two hours, an average of two B-29s unloaded their bomb load every minute. 20 bombers could not find their targets and dropped their bombs at random. That night 117 tons of AN-M47 and 1,473.3 tons of AN-M69 incendiary bombs were dropped over Tokyo. Strong westerly winds at 45–74 km / h sparked a firestorm from the wildfires . Around 30 minutes after the start of the attack, the city's fire service and civil defense had lost control of the fires. Although fire brigade units from other prefectures also rushed to the city's fire brigade, it could not be prevented that 41 km ²  - that was 7% of the city area - burned down. On the return flight, the bomber crews could see the fires in the city from a distance of more than 240 km. Japanese police estimated that the attack and fires killed 83,793 people, wounded 40,918 and left over a million homeless. Post-war estimates assume 80,000 to 185,000 deaths. While the big fires went out on March 10, individual city areas burned for three days. 256,070 buildings were destroyed by flames. Over a million people were evacuated from the greater Tokyo area in the days that followed. Due to the enormous casualties among the population, Operation Meetinghouse II proved to be the most destructive single air strike in history. Although the attack met with only weak resistance, 14 B-29 bombers were lost: two bombers to flak fire and seven aircraft, presumably due to the violent thermal winds of the firestorm. Five aircraft had to be emergency watered on the return flight and another aircraft had to be written off after a crash landing.

April 1, 1945

On the night of April 1 to April 2, 20th AF's Mission 51 was another attempt to destroy the Nakajima aircraft factory in Musashino. The attack was to be carried out from low altitude as a precision bombardment with radar assistance. The aircraft of the 73rd Bomb Wing each carried around 8,800 kg of high explosive bombs. Of 121 aircraft launched, 115 bombed the target from an altitude of 1,776 to 2,426 meters. Despite the clear sky, the target could not be hit precisely. Of the approximately 92.4 tons of bombs dropped, only 3.6 tons hit the target area. In later aerial photographs, no new damage to the aircraft factory could be found during the previous attack. The weak Japanese defense was able to shoot down a bomber in this attack and five more B-29s were lost for unknown reasons. The Americans assumed they had shot down an enemy fighter.

April 3, 1945

The Mission 59 and Mission 57 the 20th AF took place in the night of 3 April 4. The objectives of these missions were a precision bombardment of the Koizumi and Tachikawa engine factories on the outskirts of Tokyo. From the 313th BW, 48 B-29s bombed the target in Tachikawa and 61 bombers from the 73rd BW bombed the target in Koizumi. 18 other bombers bombed the city and port area of ​​Tokyo as an alternative target. Again, both targets were under thick cloud cover and the bombs were dropped with radar assistance. AN-M64 (227 kg) and AN-M76 (227 kg) Napalm bombs were used in both missions . Of the Nakajima factory in Koizumi, 23.8% of the factory site was devastated and the engine factory in Tachikawa was almost completely destroyed. In the attacks of 3./4. On April 1st, one B-29 was lost for unknown reasons and four others were damaged.

April 7, 1945

The Mission 58 of the 20th AF on April 7, was once again the Nakajima aircraft factory in Musashino goal. In the operation Enkindle VII the B-29 bomber were first of approximately 91 P-51 Mustang -Jagdflugzeugen escorted . 107 B-29s took off from the 73rd BW. These were loaded with 4,000 pound AN-M56 explosive bombs (1,814 kg). This time, a large number was previously AN-M26 - flares (24 kg) dropped and the goal could be well identified from the main formation. Two bombers could not approach the target and dropped their bomb load over the urban area of ​​Tokyo. The main formation of 101 B-29 flew to the target at an altitude of 3,505 to 4,740 meters and dropped 471.8 tons of bombs in clear weather. Around 26% of the bombs hit the target and caused serious damage. Around 10% of the factory halls were completely destroyed. The attack met with fierce resistance from the Japanese. The B-29 crews counted 531 attacks by enemy aircraft. The P-51 fighters reported the shooting down of 21 attackers with two self-inflicted losses. The B-29 crews claimed an additional 80 kills and 23 probable kills. Three B-29s were shot down by Japanese fighters. Two B-29s were shot down by the flak over the target and another bomber was hit by the bombs of an aircraft flying overhead and crashed. Another 66 bombers were damaged and 31 of them had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima .

April 12, 1945

B-29 pass Fuji volcano during the attack on Tokyo

In Mission 63 of 20th AF, the Nakajima aircraft works in Musashino were the target again. In the Mariana Islands, 114 B-29s took off from the 73rd BW, loaded with 2,000-pound AN-M66 (907 kg) explosive bombs. Again, the flight was escorted by 102 P-51 Mustang fighters. 93 bombers reached the target area at an altitude of 3,658 to 5,182 meters. The target was covered in thick haze and the bomb was dropped using radar assistance. Of the 444 tons of bombs dropped, around 58 tons of bombs hit the eastern factory area. In this area 94% of the buildings were destroyed. Another 10% of the remaining factory buildings were destroyed. So far, all attacks flown on this factory destroyed around 63% of the factory buildings. Eleven more bombers had to  fly to the secondary target - the Mitsubishi engine factory Shizuoka . The halls of the recently completed factory were 86% destroyed by the attack. The Americans counted 105 attacks by Japanese fighters on this mission. The B-29 crews claimed 16 kills and two probable kills after the attack. Another ten fighters are said to have been damaged. The fighter pilots of the P-51 Mustang reported 20 kills with two losses of their own. During this mission, 36 bombers were damaged by the defense, but none of them crashed.

April 13, 1945

With Mission 67 of 20th AF, the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings carried out another area attack with napalm bombs on Tokyo. The destination was the southern district of Riken, in which various arsenals , industrial plants and armaments factories were concentrated between residential areas. For Operation Perdition I , 348 B-29 bombers took off on the Mariana Islands on the night of April 13-14. When the night sky was clear, aircraft flying ahead from the 314th BW marked the target area with AN-M47 phosphor bombs. Then the main body bombed the target area in several waves from a height of 1,393 to 3,353 meters with AN-69 -Napalm cluster bombs. Three bombers could not make out the targets because of the turbulence and the heavy smoke and dumped their bombs somewhere over the greater Tokyo area. That night, 33 tons of AN-M69 (227 kg) and AN-M59 (454 kg) explosive bombs, 205 tons of AN-M47 and 1,750 tons of AN-69 incendiary bombs fell on Tokyo. The resulting enormous firestorm and extensive wildfires burned an area of ​​almost 30 km ² and caused enormous losses among the civilian population. A huge amount of light and heavy military equipment was destroyed in the fire. The ammunition dumps for artillery ammunition and bombs of the Luftwaffe caught fire and exploded. During this attack, isotope separation and uranium enrichment laboratories for the Japanese nuclear research program were burned down. With the destruction of these facilities, Japan had to abandon the development of nuclear weapons. After the attack, the Americans claimed to have shot down six Japanese aircraft and damaged two more in the loss of seven B-29s. Six B-29s probably crashed due to the strong thermal winds of the wildfires and one aircraft had to make an emergency landing on the return flight.

April 15, 1945

The Mission 69 of the 20th AF in the night of 15 to 16 April was a surface attack with incendiary bombs against three goals in the metropolitan area of Tokyo. With Operation Arrange I , attacks were carried out on Tokyo and its suburbs, Kawasaki and Yokohama . Again, industrial and residential areas were the targets. That night there was not only good visibility, but also strong high-altitude winds and the bombers flew to their targets with radar assistance. On Tokyo, 118 B-29 bombers dropped 295 tons of AN-M47 and 419 tons of AN-69 incendiary bombs and 13.6 tons of AN-M41 cluster bombs from heights of 2,438 to 3,082 meters . 194 B-29 bombers dropped 283 tons of AN-M47 and 737 tons of AN-69 incendiary bombs and 36.8 tons of AN-M41 fragmentation bombs on the targets in Kawasaki and Yokohama . The attacks burned an additional 22.3 km ² in Tokyo and 9.3 km ^{2 in} urban areas in Kawasaki . The attack on Yokohama burned 3.9 km² - which corresponded to around 55% of the urban area. In Tokyo and Yokohama, 217,130 buildings were destroyed by flames. 31,603 buildings were burned down in Kawasaki. In addition to heavy anti-aircraft fire, the bomber crews counted 22 attacks by fighter planes. After the mission, the American pilots claimed one kill and another probable kill for themselves. The Americans lost eleven bombers and another crash-landed on Iwojima on the return flight.

May 23, 1945

The Mission 181 of 20th AF was another area attack with incendiary bombs on Tokyo. This was the largest air strike of World War II that was carried out with B-29 bombers. The 58th, 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings participated with 558 B-29 bombers. The target of this night attack were the residential and industrial districts south of the Imperial Palace on the west side of the port. 44 B-29s flying ahead marked the target area with AN-M47 phosphor bombs. From 3 a.m. Guam time, 476 bombers began to reach Tokyo in heavy cloud cover. The four main formations bombed the marked area with AN-M69 napalm bombs in a continuous stream of bombers . For around an hour and a half, an average of four B-29s unloaded their bomb load every minute from a height of 2,377 to 4,602 meters. In an unprecedented short time, almost 540,000 AN-M69 small bombs fell on the target area with a high hit density. Extensive wildfires quickly developed from the countless large fires. 36 bombers could not find their targets because of the smoke and the violent turbulence and dumped their bombs somewhere over the urban area of ​​Tokyo. That night, 725 tons of AN-M47 , 2,725 tons of AN-69 incendiary bombs and 41 tons of AN-M50 stick bombs were dropped on Tokyo . As a result of this attack, a further 14 km ^{2 of} urban living space with a large number of home industries and various industrial plants that were important to the war effort were completely burned down. During this mission, the B-29 crews counted 83 attacks by fighter pilots in addition to violent flak fire. After the attack, the Americans claimed six kills and two other fighters are said to have been damaged. 69 bombers suffered damage and 17 were lost: a B-29 was shot down by a fighter and twelve more were probably lost to anti-aircraft fire. Four more bombers were broken by accidents during take-off and landing.

May 25, 1945

Burning Tokyo on May 26, 1945

For Mission 183 of the Twentieth Air Force , the XXIth Bomber Command once again gathered all available forces of the 58th, 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings. The target of the attack in the center of Tokyo were the districts north of the area near the Imperial Palace bombed on May 23. In addition to residential areas with a large number of home industries, there were financial, shopping and administrative districts in the target area. In advance, the bomber crews had been ordered not to aim at the palace, since the US government did not want to risk killing Tennō Hirohito . For this night raid, 498 B-29 bombers took off on the Mariana Islands. Twelve B-29s from each bomb wing flew ahead to the target marker and dropped AN-M76 incendiary bombs. From 11:38 p.m., the four main formations with 416 bombers reached Tokyo. These bombed the marked areas with incendiary bombs in a continuous stream of bombers . For around two and a half hours, an average of three B-29s unloaded their bomb load every minute from a height of 2,412 meters. The big fires that were kindled developed into extensive wildfires. In addition to thick smoke, this also caused strong turbulence, so that many aircraft coming behind had to climb to an altitude of over 6,500 m and from there dropped their bomb load with radar assistance. Another 34 bombers could not locate their targets because of the smoke and the violent turbulence and unloaded their bombs at random. That night 583 tons of AN-M47 , 796 tons of AN-M50 , 1,276 tons of AN-M69 , 298 tons of AN-M76 incendiary bombs and 3.6 tons of AN-M41 fragmentation bombs were dropped on Tokyo. The badly decimated fire brigade was unable to counter the wildfires that had gotten out of control and so a further 44 km ^{2 of} urban area burned down. Even previously created firebreaks could not prevent the fire from spreading. In no other air raid in history, a large area of ​​the city was destroyed. The attack completely burned down various residential and industrial districts in downtown Tokyo. During the air strike, 80 Japanese night fighters flew 99 attacks on the bomber formation. After the mission, the American pilots claimed 19 kills and another 14 probable kills. The Americans lost 26 B-29 bombers in the operation. Five were shot down by Japanese defenses, one fell on the return flight into the sea and 20 more were lost for unknown reasons. 100 bombers suffered combat damage.

May 29, 1945

B-29 of the 73rd Bomb Wing dropping incendiary bombs over Yokohama on May 29, 1945

The Mission 186 was again a surface attack with firebombs and was directed against Yokohama , a south-western suburb of Tokyo. During this daytime raid, the bombers of the 58th, 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings were accompanied by 101 P-51 Mustang fighters of the VII Fighter Command from Iwojima. The goal was the port and urban area with an important business district and various residential and industrial areas. Of 510 bombers launched, 454 reached the target area at 10:14 a.m. For the next 75 minutes or so, an average of six B-29s dropped their incendiary bombs every minute from a height of 5,334 to 6,401 meters. 56 other B-29s could not make out the targets due to turbulence and the heavy smoke and unloaded their bombs over Yokohama without targeting. During this mission, the bombers dropped 706 tons of AN-M47 , 17 tons of AN-M50 and 1,722 tons of AN-M69 incendiary bombs. The overburdened fire brigade was only able to counter the large number of large fires and wildfires very little, so that a further 18 km ²  - which corresponded to 34% of the urban area - burned down. The attack met with fierce resistance from the Japanese. 150 A6M fighter planes intercepted the formation. In the air battles that followed, they shot down two American bombers and damaged another 175. Another B-29 was brought down by a ram blow from a Japanese fighter. The pilots of the P-51 then reported 26 safe and 23 possible enemy kills with two personal losses. Three more bombers were shot down by the flak over the target. Two bombers had to make an emergency landing on the return flight and a further 39 bombers had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima .

Phase three

P-51 Mustang of the 15th Fighter Group (VII Fighter Command) stationed in Iwo Jima, June 1945

After the phase two attacks, 50.8% of Tokyo city center was in ruins, which is why the XXIth Bomber Command removed it from its target list. The third phase lasted from June 10th to August 15th, 1945. During this, precision attacks were carried out on the remaining industrial and armaments factories that had already been damaged or were less important. The oil industry and power plants were added as further targets . With these attacks one also wanted to increase the pressure on the Japanese government by further bombing. The attacks in this phase took place in part as part of large-scale combined air strikes targeting different targets in different cities. After that, the 20th Air Force ended the attacks, as there were no more industrial establishments worth bombing. The bombing raids in this phase were generally carried out from medium altitude and explosive bombs were primarily used. In addition, targets in the greater Tokyo area were attacked several times by carrier-based fighter planes from Task Force 58 (TF 58) and fighter planes from Iwojima .

The United States Army Air Forces later rated the precision attacks of the XXIth Bomber Command as a success in this phase. The constant air raids on the industrial and armaments factories led to massive bottlenecks and production losses with only minor losses. In addition to the physical destruction, many people no longer dared to leave their homes and go to work because they feared the factories would be bombed.

June 10, 1945

The Mission 197 of the Twentieth Air Force was once again a precision bombing of Nakajima aircraft factory in the district of Musashino goal. Despite repeated bombings, various factory halls were still largely intact. Of the 124 B-29s launched by the 73rd Bomb Wing, 118 aircraft bombed the target from a single closed formation . From a height of 5,974 to 6,461 meters, the B-29 with radar assistance dropped over 732 tons of 2,000-pound (907 kg) AN-M66 explosive bombs . The reinforced concrete bingo halls in the eastern factory area were destroyed by bombing to 85%. Most of the rest of the factory's halls were already burned out due to the fires from the previous area attacks. During the mission, the bombers were accompanied by around 50 P-51 Mustang fighters from the VII Fighter Command from Iwojima. In addition to moderate anti-aircraft fire, 45 Japanese fighters were observed over the target, which made 41 attacks. The Americans had no losses during this mission, but 18 bombers had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima on the return flight.

July 10, 1945

That day, Task Force 38 (TF 38) carrier-based aircraft attacked airfields in the Tokyo area and destroyed several enemy planes on the ground. With the Japanese withholding their air forces for a planned large-scale kamikaze attack on the Allied fleet, none of their planes launched counter-attacks.

July 12, 1945

With Mission 267 , 20th AF launched a precision bombardment of the oil refineries of Kawasaki , a suburb of Tokyo, on the night of July 12th to 13th . This attack took place as part of the so-called Eagle Missions , which were aimed at facilities of mineral oil companies (oil refineries, tank farms, etc.) on the main Japanese islands. Of 60 B-29s launched, 55 reached the target, which was under a closed cloud cover. The B-29s of the 315th Bomb Wing were each loaded with 36 AN-M64 explosive bombs (227 kg). From a height of 4,572 to 5,090 meters, they dropped around 410 tons of bombs with radar assistance. Evaluations showed that 25% of the oil refineries were destroyed. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was found over the target, but no aircraft were lost to the Japanese defenses. Two B-29s crashed into the sea on the outbound flight, from which nine crew members were rescued.

July 20, 1945

A B-29 dropped a so-called pumpkin bomb on Tokyo. This bomb was identical to the Fat Man atomic bomb , but instead of the nuclear warhead, it had conventional explosives . This attack served as a target exercise for the later uses of the atomic bombs . The goal, the imperial palace, was missed.

July 25, 1945

On the night of July 25th to 26th, the Twentieth Air Force flew another attack on the Kawasaki oil refineries with Mission 291 . This attack took place again as part of the so-called Eagle Missions . Due to strong winds at high altitude, of the 83 bombers launched by the 315th Bomb Wing, only 75 could bomb the target. These unloaded over 589 tons of AN-M64 explosive bombs (227 kg) from a height of 5,029 to 5,517 meters . Eight other planes could not make out the target and dropped their bombs randomly over Kawasaki. The attack destroyed around 20 refineries and buildings as well as 68% of the tank farms . A B-29 was shot down over the target by a direct flak hit and three more had to make an emergency landing on the return flight on Iwojima.

July 28, 1945

Over 140 Iwojima VII Fighter Command fighter- bombers attacked airfields and other military targets in the Tokyo metropolitan area.

August 3, 1945

Around 100 fighter-bombers of the VII Fighter Command from Iwojima attacked power plants, railways and trains in the Tokyo area.

August 5, 1945

Over 100 fighter-bombers of the VII Fighter Command from Iwojima attacked military and civilian targets in the Tokyo area.

August 6, 1945

Approximately 100 Iwojima VII Fighter Command fighter- bombers attacked six factories and power plants in the Tokyo metropolitan area.

August 8, 1945

The partially burned out Tokyo at the end of August 1945

The Mission 320 of the 20th AF was the remaining factory halls of Nakajima Aircraft in Musashino. In the Mariana Islands, 69 B-29s took off from the 314th BW, loaded with 2,000-pound AN-M66 (907 kg) explosive bombs. 51 bombers reached Tokyo in the late afternoon at an altitude of 5,944 to 6,843 meters. But since the target was covered by clouds, the bombers attacked the alternative target - the Tokyo arsenals . Although the alternative target was partially covered by clouds, the bombs were dropped without radar assistance and only the bombs from one squadron hit the target. The bombs of the other squadrons missed the target by up to 4.5 km. Eleven other planes could not make a target and dumped their bombs randomly over Tokyo. During this mission over 262 tons of bombs were dropped on Tokyo. The Americans observed various Japanese fighters on this mission, but they did not fly any attacks. Two B-29s were shot down by the strong flak over the target and another machine crashed due to technical problems. These aircraft were the last Twentieth Air Force B-29s to be shot down by the enemy. Twelve more bombers had to make an emergency landing on Iwojima on the return flight.

August 10, 1945

Since the Nakajima aircraft works could not be bombed during the previous mission, mission 323 of 20th AF had these aircraft works as its target again. The mission is carried out with fighter protection from 50 P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang . In the Mariana Islands, 78 B-29s took off from the 73rd BW, loaded with 2,000-pound AN-M66 (907 kg) and 500-pound AN-M64 (227 kg) explosive bombs. 70 bombers reached Tokyo at an altitude of 6,706 to 7,985 meters. Again, the primary target was covered by clouds, so that the airmen dropped their bombs on the alternative target - the arsenals of Tokyo. Over 290 tons of bombs fell on Tokyo during this mission, but no bombs fell on the primary target. Three other B-29s dumped their bombs randomly over Tokyo. In addition, the escort's fighters also attacked ground targets with on-board weapons . The Americans observed various Japanese fighters on this mission, but they did not fly any attacks. The heavy anti-aircraft fire over the target damaged 29 bombers but did not result in any casualties. Nine B-29s had to make an emergency landing on the return flight in Iwojima.

August 13, 1945

On that day, carrier-based aircraft of Task Force 38 (TF 38) attacked ships, airfields, aircraft factories, power plants and other ground targets in the Tokyo area.

August 15, 1945

On that day another attack took place with carrier-supported aircraft of Task Force 38. Again they attacked ships, airfields, factories, power stations and railroad facilities in the Tokyo area. 103 Airmen of the first wave of attacks attacked their targets, but the second wave of attacks was canceled when it became known that the Japanese government had consented to unconditional surrender.

Effects

Tokyo bomb damage

The six massive area bombings that were flown against Tokyo are the most devastating air raids that occurred during World War II. With regard to the number of victims and the destroyed urban area, they put the heavy air strikes in Europe on London , Hamburg and Dresden in the shade. The human losses in the air raid on Tokyo on 9/10 March 1945 even exceeded the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki five months later.

The two goals set by the USAAF - the destruction of the industrial district and the decimation and wearing down of the population - were successfully achieved according to the evaluations of the USSBS . The first phase of the attacks was rated as unsuccessful, as the factories were not hit by night attacks from a great height. At this time the AN / APQ-13 radar device was available for the B-29 , which could hardly be used effectively due to the far too low resolution. The area attacks with incendiary bombs in the second phase did not require precise aiming and were therefore much more promising. These attacks caused widespread damage and resulted in enormous civilian casualties. In the third phase, the advanced AN / APQ-7 Eagle radar systems now available were able to bomb individual targets from a lower attack height with improved precision. In addition, the Japanese armed forces were hardly able to provide effective defense at this time.

In total, the Twentieth Air Force dropped around 20,761 tons of bombs on Tokyo. Of these, around 13,985 tons were incendiary bombs and around 6,776 tons were explosive and fragmentation bombs. Around 79% of the bomb load was dropped in area bombing. In the six large-scale incendiary bombings from February to May 1945, over 145.8 km ²  - which corresponded to 50.8% of the urban area - was burned down. In Tokyo, 722,270 buildings were burned down by the incendiary bombing. In addition, almost 22 km ² of the agglomeration areas of Yokohama and 9.3 km ² of Kawasaki were destroyed. The incendiary bombing burned 89,073 buildings in Yokohama and 31,603 buildings in Kawasaki. Yokohama around 57% and Kawasaki 35% of the city area was destroyed. The air strikes on Tokyo resulted in tens of thousands of deaths among Japanese civilians, but estimates of the exact numbers vary considerably. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) determined in 1947 that the air raids on Tokyo on the ground left almost 100,000 dead and just as many injured. Over 2.8 million of Tokyo's residents were left homeless and around 4.1 million left the city without authorization or were evacuated . These numbers later had to be revised upwards significantly, although no precise number of victims could be determined in the end. In Yokohama, incendiary bombings killed 4,832 people and injured 17,967. In Kawasaki, the incendiary attacks left 1,520 dead and 8,759 injured. 883,613 people were left homeless in Yokohama and Kawasaki. Much of Tokyo's industrial capacity was destroyed by the air strikes, causing a massive drop in industrial production in the Kantō region. With the incendiary bombing destroyed much of Tokyo’s infrastructure, most urban life came to a standstill and many survivors did not dare to leave their homes. The continuous heavy attacks on area led to an increasing degeneration of social community life. As a result of the attacks, the water and electricity supply in the city largely collapsed and, despite the opening of the still intact food depots, food soon became scarce. The rescue and supply of the survivors as well as the clean-up work in the largely destroyed city turned out to be extremely difficult and time-consuming for the badly decimated auxiliary workers. The attacks on civilians were the strongest factor in convincing the population that the war was lost, according to a post-war survey by the USSBS.

Ethical and legal aspects

Fire bomb victim mother with child. Photographed by Ishikawa Koyo.

Victims of the March 10th attack. Photographed by Ishikawa Koyo.

See also : Allied war crimes in World War II

Since the Second World War there has been a multitude of debates about the ethical correctness of the strategic bombing operations against Japan. The air raids on Tokyo, like those on German cities, aimed to decimate the workforce and break the population's will to war. The targeted massive use of incendiary bombs against the residential areas, which are easily inflammable due to their wooden construction, is widely regarded as a war crime , especially in Japan . During the war, most of the American public endorsed the bombing of the German Empire and Japan, and the few people who criticized them were seen as unrealistic or traitors. Some people in the United States government and military viewed the strategic bombing as morally questionable. Among them was Brigadier General Bonner Fellers , who described the attacks against a subordinate as the most ruthless and barbaric murder of non-combatants in the history of the war. According to historian John Dower, other senior officers shared Feller's opinion but did not make it known publicly.

Mark Selden described the height of the air raids in the spring and summer of 1945 as saying that it was perhaps still an unrivaled peak in the slaughter of people. It has also been suspected that the anti-Japanese sentiment heightened by propaganda caused the USAAF commanders to rely on large-scale incendiary bombing, while precision bombing was carried out against the German Reich. The historian Richard B. Frank attributes these changed tactics to a changed view of the extent to which bombings can influence the course of the war. Little knowledge of the structure of the Japanese economy and the greater vulnerability of Japanese cities to incendiary bombs would have been strong factors, according to Frank.

The Commander in Chief of XXIth Bomber Command Curtis E. LeMay stated after the war that he would probably have been charged as a war criminal had the US lost the war:

“I suppose if I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side. "

However, he felt that his missions were justified because, in his opinion, they would have shortened the war:

“Maj. Gene. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the B-29's of the entire Marianas area, declared that if the war is shortened by a single day the attack will have served its purpose. ”

- New York Times

In the Japanese population he was called " Brutal LeMay " ( 鬼畜 ル メ イ , kichiku Rumei ).

Even Robert McNamara , who later became Secretary of Defense and then Staff Officer of LeMay, expressed similar LeMay. In one of the interviews for the documentary The Fog of War , he said that if the war ended in a different way (i.e. not a total defeat for Japan), the incendiary bombing raids on cities would most likely be considered a war crime today.

In memory of the victims, the government of Tokyo Prefecture declared March 10th by decree 1990 to be Tōkyō-to heiwa no hi ( 東京 都 平和 の 日 , "Tokyo Prefecture Day of Peace").

literature

• Antony Beevor: The Second World War. ( The Second World War. ) Bertelsmann, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-570-10065-3 .
• FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. Turner Publishing Company, Nashville, Tennessee, 1999, ISBN 1-56311-483-6 .
• Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, Rexmond C. Cochrane: The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC, 1988
• Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology, 1941-1945. Center for Air Force History, Washington, DC 1991.
• Clayton KS Chun: The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's first strike back at Japan. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2006, ISBN 1-84176-918-5 .
• Harry L. Coles and James C. Olson: The North Pacific. In: Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (eds.): The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan August 1942 to July 1944. (= The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume IV). The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1951, OCLC 256471288 .
• Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. (= The Army Air Forces in World War II. Volume V). The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1953, OCLC 256469807 (PDF; 21.4 MB).
• Per F. Dahl: Heavy water and the wartime race for nuclear energy. CRC Press, 1999, ISBN 0-7503-0633-5 .
• Robert F. Dorr: B-29 Superfortress Units of World War 2. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2002, ISBN 978-1-84176-285-2 .
• John W. Dower: War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. Faber, London 1986, ISBN 0-571-14605-8 .
• Niall Ferguson : The War of the World. History's Age of Hatred. Penguin Books, London 2007, ISBN 978-0-14-101382-4 .
• Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Penguin Books, New York City 1999, ISBN 0-14-100146-1 .
• R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment. Air Force History and Museums Program. 1998, Washington, ISBN 0-16-049781-7 .
• Thomas RH Havens: Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two. Norton, New York City 1978, ISBN 0-393-05656-2 .
• Daniel L. Haulman: Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan. In: The US Army Air Forces in World War II. Air Force Historical Studies Office, Washington, DC 1999 (PDF; 100 kB).
• Laura Hillenbrand: Unbroken. Random House, New York, 2010, ISBN 978-1-4000-6416-8 .
• Edwin P. Hoyt: Inferno: The Fire Bombing of Japan, March 9 - August 15, 1945. Madison Books, 2000, ISBN 1-4617-0420-0 .
• Joint Target Group: Study of Incendiary Bombings for Employment by the United States Army Air Forces. NARA-M1655, Washington DC October 1944.
• E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. Donald I. Fine Inc., New York City 1991, ISBN 1-55611-301-3 .
• Janusz Piekałkiewicz : The Second World War. ECON Verlag, 1985, ISBN 3-89350-544-X
• Curtis LeMay and Bill Yenne: Superfortress: The Boeing B-29 and American airpower in World War II. Westholme Publishing, Yardley, Pennsylvania 2007, ISBN 1-59416-039-2 .
• Samuel Eliot Morison : Victory in the Pacific. In: History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. University of Illinois, Champaign 2002, ISBN 0-252-07065-8 .
• National Defense Research Committee (NDRC): Summary Technical Report of Division 11, Volume 3: Fire Warfare, Incendiaries and Flame Throwers. Washington DC 1946.
• Diana Preston: Before the Fall-Out: From Marie Curie To Hiroshima. Random House, 2011, ISBN 1-4464-2349-2 .
• Kenneth D. McRae: Nuclear Dawn: FE Simon and the Race for Atomic Weapons in World War II. Oxford University Press, 2014, ISBN 0-19-151084-X .
• Stewart Halsey Ross: Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts. McFarland, December 13, 2002, ISBN 0-7864-1412-X .
• Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young (Eds.): Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History. The New Press, New York City 2009, ISBN 978-1-59558-547-9 .
• Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. Simon & Schuster, New York City 2010, ISBN 978-1-4165-8440-7 .
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Medical Division (Ed.): The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Services in Japan. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947, OCLC 13475684 .
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Moral Division (Ed.): The Effecits of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947, OCLC 9941656 .
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Physical Damage Division (Ed.): Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey: European War, Pacific War. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1987.
• United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947
• Robert M. Neer: Napalm. Harvard University Press, 2013, ISBN 0-674-07545-5 .
• HP Willmott (Eds.) & John Keegan: The Second World War in the Pacific. Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus, 1999, ISBN 3-89488-138-0
• Herman S. Wolk: Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan. University of North Texas Press, Denton 2010, ISBN 978-1-57441-281-9 .
• Steven Joseph Zaloga : Defense of Japan 1945. Osprey Publishing, Oxford 2010, ISBN 1-84603-687-9 .

Web links

Commons : Air raids on Tokyo  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• Aerial photos of the destroyed Tokyo (English / Japanese)
• Bombing Japan - Incendiary Bombs Over Tokyo (Video)
• The Firebombing of Tokyo - Part 2 (English)
• The Tokyo Fire Raids, 1945 (eyewitness account )
• Eyewitness account in an Associated Press article on the 60th anniversary of the heavy bombing (English)
• History learning site - The Fire Raids on Japan
• Firebombing of Japanese Cities (English)
• The great bombing of Tokyo, a serious war crime - article by Hiroaki Sato in JapanTimes 2002 (English)

Individual evidence

1. ^ Herman S. Wolk: Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan. 2010, p. 125.
2. ↑ Air raids in 1945 cause Japan's trauma. Die Welt, April 10, 2013 , accessed: January 27, 2015
3. ↑ The Atomic Paradox. Der Spiegel, August 3, 2005 , accessed January 27, 2015
4. ↑ ^{a b} March 9, 1945: Burning the Heart Out of the Enemy . In: Wired . Condé Nast Digital. March 9, 2011. Retrieved January 2, 2015.
5. ↑ ^{a b} United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, pp. 3-5.
6. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan. 1947, pp. 67-71.
7. ↑ Kenneth D. McRae: Nuclear Dawn: FE Simon and the Race for Atomic Weapons in World War II. Oxford University Press, 2014, ISBN 0-19-151084-X , p. 161.
8. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 616.
9. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 142-143.
10. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 610 and 623.
11. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, p. 48.
12. ^ Thomas RH Havens: Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two. 1978, p. 155.
13. ↑ Steven Joseph Zaloga: Defense of Japan 1945. 2010, p. 25.
14. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan. 1947, pp. 70-79.
15. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 61-64.
16. ^ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War). P. 18.
17. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 38.
18. ^ Leo P. Brophy, Wyndham D. Miles, Rexmond C. Cochrane: The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field. 1988, pp. 174-175.
19. ^ Clayton KS Chun: The Doolittle Raid 1942: America's First Strike Back at Japan. 2006.
20. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 6.
21. ^ Curtis LeMay, Bill Yenne: Superfortress: The Boeing B-29 and American airpower in World War II. 2007.
22. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 559-560.
23. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 575-576.
24. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 558-560.
25. ^ Herman S. Wolk: The Twentieth Against Japan . 2004, p. 72
26. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab} Twentieth Air Force Association. Accessed January 28, 2015.
27. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m} B-29 Superfortress Then and Now. Accessed January 13, 2015.
28. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 560.
29. ^ ^{A b} F. J. Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 10.
30. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 108-109.
31. ↑ ^{a b} Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 561.
32. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 556.
33. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 559.
34. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 564-565.
35. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, pp. 579-580.
36. ^ ^{A b} R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 308.
37. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 312.
38. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 607.
39. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 12.
40. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 566-568.
41. ^ Herman S. Wolk: The Twentieth Against Japan. 2004, p. 72
42. ↑ Daniel L. Haulman: Hitting Home: The Air Offensive Against Japan. 1999, p. 22.
43. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 568-570.
44. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 642-644.
45. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 261-262.
46. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, pp. 76-77.
47. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 570-571.
48. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 619.
49. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
50. ^ ^{A b} Samuel Eliot Morison: Victory in the Pacific. 1960, pp. 22-25.
51. ^ ^{A b} Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942–1945. 2010, pp. 123-124.
52. ↑ Laura Hillenbrand: Unbroken. Random House, New York, 2010, ISBN 978-1-4000-6416-8 , pp. 261-262.
53. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 648.
54. ↑ Firebombing Japan. in: Flying Magazine. October 1945, page 64.
55. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 571.
56. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 627.
57. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
58. ^ ^{A b} R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 315.
59. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h} National Defense Research Committee (NDRC): Summary Technical Report of Division 11, Volume 3: Fire Warfare, Incendiaries and Flame Throwers. 1946, p. 21.
60. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 314.
61. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
62. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 572-573.
63. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 633.
64. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 33-34.
65. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan. 1947, p. 90.
66. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 573.
67. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 637.
68. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
69. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 318.
70. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. 1947, p. 90.
71. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 614-615.
72. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, pp. 3-4.
73. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 35.
74. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998, p. 320.
75. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 149–153.
76. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
77. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 615.
78. ^ ^{A b c} E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 207.
79. ^ Niall Ferguson: The War of the World. History's Age of Hatred. 2007, p. 573.
80. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: European War, Pacific War 1987, p. 92.
81. ^ Robert M. Neer: Napalm. Harvard University Press, April 1, 2013
82. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
83. ^ Herman S. Wolk: Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan. 2010, p. 125.
84. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, pp. 66-67.
85. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 614-615.
86. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 34.
87. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 329.
88. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 14.
89. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 647.
90. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 665.
91. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 15.
92. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} The 6th Bomb Group - The Missions.
93. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 647-648.
94. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 669.
95. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 15.
96. ^ ^{A b c} R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998, p. 330.
97. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 648.
98. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 674.
99. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 15.
100. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
101. ↑ Kenneth D. McRae: Nuclear Dawn: FE Simon and the Race for Atomic Weapons in World War II. Oxford University Press, 2014, ISBN 0-19-151084-X , p. 161.
102. ^ Diana Preston: Before the Fall-Out: From Marie Curie To Hiroshima. Random House, 2011, ISBN 1-4464-2349-2 , p. 392.
103. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 636.
104. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 675.
105. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 15-16.
106. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
107. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 636.
108. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 226.
109. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 677.
110. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 703.
111. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. 1947, p. 117.
112. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 36-37.
113. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. 1947, p. 117.
114. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 638.
115. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 703.
116. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 36-37.
117. ^ R. Cargill Hall: Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment . 1998. p. 332.
118. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 37.
119. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 37.
120. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
121. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, pp. 74-75.
122. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 37.
123. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 638-639.
124. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 37.
125. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 37.
126. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Effects of Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan, A Report on eight Cities. 1947, p. 117.
127. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, pp. 639-640.
128. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 639.
129. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 156–157.
130. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, pp. 9, 26.
131. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate (Eds.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 651.
132. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Victory in the Pacific. 1960, pp. 310-311.
133. ↑ ^{a b c} Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, p. 201.
134. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 725.
135. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 19.
136. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 97.
137. ^ Norman Polmar: The Enola Gay: The B-29 That Dropped the Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima. Potomac Books, 2004, 1-57488-836-6, p. 24.
138. ^ ^{A b} Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. & T Major General USAF: Retired: The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir. Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, DC, 1986
139. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 19.
140. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Japan Air Raids.org. Accessed February 9, 2015.
141. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 735.
142. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 735.
143. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 736.
144. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 18.
145. ↑ Kit C. Carter and Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 737.
146. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 653.
147. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, p. 18.
148. ↑ Kit C. Carter, Robert Mueller: US Army Air Forces in World War II: Combat Chronology 1941-1945. 1991, p. 738.
149. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Victory in the Pacific. 1960, pp. 310-311.
150. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Victory in the Pacific. 1960, pp. 310-311.
151. ^ Barrett Tillman: Whirlwind: The Air War Against Japan 1942-1945. 2010, pp. 242-244.
152. ↑ ^{a b} United States Strategic Bombing Survey: European War, Pacific War. 1987.
153. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 34-35.
154. ↑ Antony Beevor: The Second World War. ( The Second World War. ) Bertelsmann, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-570-10065-3
155. ^ FJ Bradley: No Strategic Targets Left. 1999, pp. 34-35.
156. ↑ Antony Beevor: The Second World War. ( The Second World War. ) Bertelsmann, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-570-10065-3 .
157. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 278-279.
158. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, pp. 6-8.
159. ↑ Wesley Frank Craven, James Lea Cate (Ed.): The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki. 1953, p. 639.
160. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
161. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 7.
162. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto. 1947, p. 30.
163. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, pp. 6-8.
164. ^ Niall Ferguson: The War of the World. History's Age of Hatred. 2007, p. 573.
165. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947, p. 8.
166. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, pp. 278-279.
167. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 282.
168. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Moral Division: The Effecits of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale. 1947.
169. ↑ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tokyo-Kawasaki-Yokohama. 1947.
170. ^ E. Bartlett Kerr: Flames Over Tokyo: The US Army Air Force's Incendiary Campaign Against Japan 1944–1945. 1991, p. 282.
171. ^ John Dower: War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. 1986, p. 41.
172. ^ Yuki Tanaka and Marilyn B. Young (Eds.): Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth Century History. 2009, p. 87.
173. ^ Richard B. Frank: Downfall. The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. 1999, p. 336.
174. ^ Transcription of The Fog of War
175. ↑ Tokyo Prefecture Government: 都 の 紋章 ・ 花 ・ 木 ・ 鳥 ( Memento of the original from June 25, 2013 on WebCite ) Info: The archive link has been automatically inserted and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.