Operation Dexterity
Soldiers in the jungle at Cape Gloucester
| date | December 15, 1943 to February 10, 1944 |
|---|---|
| place | New Britain , Pacific |
| output | American victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
|
6th US Army (Alamo Force) approx. 19,000 men |
Parts of the 65th Brigade of the 8th Regional Army and parts of the 51st and 17th Divisions (Matsuda Force) approx. 10,500 men |
| losses | |
|
60 officers |
approx. 4,500 men |
1942
Rabaul -
1. Salamaua-Lae -
Operation MO -
Coral Sea -
1. Buna-Gona -
Kokoda Track -
Milne Bay -
Goodenough -
2. Buna-Gona -
Operation Lilliput
1943
Wau -
Bismarck Sea -
I -
2. Salamaua – Lae -
Finisterre -
Cartwheel -
Bougainville -
Huon -
Dexterity / Arawe -
Bombing of Rabaul
1944 - 1945
Admiralty Islands -
Emirau -
Take Ichi convoy -
Reckless -
Persecution -
Wakde-Sarmi -
Biak -
Noemfoor -
Driniumor -
Sansapor -
Morotai -
Aitape – Wewak
The operation dexterity (German operation skill ) was a company of the high command of US forces in the Southwest Pacific under General Douglas MacArthur during the Pacific War in World War II . It included the landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester in northwestern New Britain , today's West New Britain Province of Papua New Guinea , from December 15, 1943, and the capture of the Japanese Tuluvu airfield on December 30th there. The operation officially ended on February 10, 1944.
History and planning
In the spring of 1942, the Japanese Empire had largely achieved its goals in the Pacific region. Almost the entire area between Burma and the Bismarck Archipelago was under Japanese control. Now further offensives against the Allied positions should force them to a decisive battle and negotiations. However, the Japanese offensive plans failed in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 and the capture of Port Moresby in New Guinea also failed. When the Allies launched a first counter-offensive against the island of Guadalcanal in the South Pacific in August 1942 , the Japanese armed forces were put on the defensive. On March 25, 1943, both Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku's naval forces and the 8th Regional Army in Rabaul received instructions to prepare for the defense.
In order to keep the Japanese on the defensive and to begin the advance towards the main Japanese islands, the military leadership of the USA had planned an advance over two main lines of attack. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz began to conquer the Gilbert Islands , while General Douglas MacArthur, who was in command of the Southwest Pacific, planned landings on the coast of New Guinea , which would represent the first step towards a return to the Philippines . This operation against New Guinea was named Operation Cartwheel and began on June 30, 1943. The objectives of the operation were initially to conquer New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Rabaul. Until mid-September 1943, the fighting was concentrated in the eastern part of New Guinea. Then on September 22nd the decision to land in western New Britain was made, which was initially planned for November 15th. The forces envisaged for the company mainly included units of the newly established and already deployed 6th US Army under General Walter Krueger , which was also known under its code name Alamo Force . This primarily affected the 1st Marine Division , the 32nd Infantry Division and the 503rd US Paratrooper Regiment.
In detail, Operation Dexterity was divided into two individual operations :
- Operation Lazaretto - landing in southern New Britain at the Lindenhafen plantation , about 5 kilometers from Gasmata , on November 14th and the neutralization of the Japanese base at Gasmata to protect the eastern flank for the following operation.
- Troops: 126th US Infantry reinforced as Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and elements of the 32nd US Infantry Division and the 6th US Army.
- Operation Backhander - landing in northwestern New Britain near Cape Gloucester and taking the Japanese airfield there.
- Troops: 1st US Marine Division reinforced by the 503rd US Paratrooper Regiment
The remaining elements of the 32nd US Infantry Division were in reserve . The main objective of Operation Dexterity was the capture and control of western New Britain as far as the Talasea line in the north, the Willaumetz peninsula as far as Gasmata in the south.
Like most of the Pacific islands, the islands of the Bismarck Archipelago are of volcanic origin with steep mountain slopes, dense jungle and treacherous swamps where soldiers could quickly become infected with malaria . The hot climate was seldom tempered by torrential floods of rain and thick clouds. On the islands inhabited by indigenous peoples , which were administered by Australia before the war, apart from some coconut plantations and mission settlements, there was hardly any influence of Western culture.
The Japanese in New Britain
On the Japanese side, the command of the commander of the 8th Regional Army of the Japanese army operations in the archipelago. From Rabaul it controlled the actions in the Solomon Islands , New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago . In January 1942 the Japanese took the strategically important port city of Rabaul in northeast New Britain and in the following months the largest and most important sea and air base of the Japanese armed forces during the Pacific War was established there. The security of this area was entrusted to the 8th Regional Army under General Imamura Hitoshi , which at times was up to 200,000 soldiers. In the early autumn of 1943, the Japanese leadership had to expect that the Allies would succeed in breaking through the inner Japanese defense belt in the Pacific and attacking the bases in New Guinea, the Mariana Islands , Palau and the Philippines . General Imamura therefore also foresaw an attack on New Britain, at the latest after the Allies had captured Bougainville or cut off communications via the Admiralty Islands and New Ireland , especially in the Kavieng sector. According to General Imamura, this would be the case around February or March 1944.
The rear connections of the 8th Regional Army were based exclusively on the sea route to New Guinea, since the direct routes from the main Japanese islands were already under Allied air control. They ran over the airfield at Cape Gloucester in western New Britain, as well as over the bases at Gasmata and on the Willaumez Peninsula. As early as May 1943, General Imamura had tasked the weak 65th Brigade with expanding and securing this route in western New Britain. In early September 1943, Major General Iwao Matsuda took over their command . He also commanded the unloading units and the engineers and troops of the 51st Division, whose main units were fighting Australian troops in New Guinea. His troops also included two companies of the 115th Infantry Regiment as well as two provisional infantry companies composed of artillerymen and engineers. General Matsuda, a seasoned troop officer, established his headquarters near Cape Gloucester Air Base. Only one month later, on October 5, 1943, all units of Matsuda were placed under the command of the 17th Division under Lieutenant General Yasushi Sakai , whose units were brought in from China in December 1943 for reinforcement . When moving to New Britain, however, the division had suffered major losses from Allied ships and submarines , which meant that parts of the division had to be reorganized.
General Sakai set up his headquarters at Malalia , near Cape Hoskins, east of the Williaumez Peninsula. The troops of the 17th Division set up for defense in the west of New Britain and immediately began with the ordered expansion of the defense positions. These included an already existing large concrete bunker at the foot of the Talawe Mountain, which was surrounded by thick vegetation . Smaller bunkers and shelters for machine gun emplacements stood on the beaches that could be considered for a possible American landing, five kilometers southeast of Cape Gloucester. Two inland hills, later named "Target Hill" and "Hill 660" by the Americans, were turned into defensive positions. Thus about half of all Japanese forces available in the west of the island were in positions that could effectively contribute to the defense of Cape Gloucester.
As early as December 12th, General Sakai sent a message to all commanders of his units warning of an imminent invasion. However, due to the high number of Allied landing ships on the most diverse stretches of coast of New Guinea, the Japanese did not succeed in getting a clear picture of the planned operations of the Americans. False alarms were the order of the day until the end of 1943. Even the aerial reconnaissance of Rabaul and Wewak only revealed that an invasion must be imminent.
Preparatory actions
enlightenment
Already two days after the landing decisions were made, Alamo Force scouts began their reconnaissance in the Cape Gloucester area. They approached the coast in speedboats , then transferred to rubber dinghies and landed on the beaches. From there, they scouted out the positions and troop strengths of the Japanese by making direct observations or contacting and questioning the local population. Immediately after their actions were over, or when they were discovered by the Japanese, they could be picked up by the speedboats and escape. During the operations, which sometimes lasted up to two weeks, there were also smaller firefights, in which there were wounded on both sides.
In mid-November the Allies assumed a Japanese troop strength of 7,071 men in western New Britain and the surrounding islands. However, the number was steadily corrected upwards, since the 17th division had been recognized as belonging to the defense. In the end, shortly before Operation Dexterity began , the estimate was 8,400 men as the lowest and 12,076 men as the upper limit. For the bombing of the Japanese positions, an advance warning time of about 30 to 60 minutes was expected by the Japanese.
Due to the growing Japanese troop strength and the relocation of their units as well as coordination problems with the other planned operations and the introduction of the necessary supply units, the original planning could no longer be retained. At the end of October, Operation Lazaretto was completely canceled and instead a landing on the Arawe peninsula was scheduled under the code word Operation Director , as significantly fewer defensive positions had been identified there. In order to prepare the troops for the new situation, the dates also had to be postponed. The Arawe landing was set for December 15th and the Cape Gloucester landing for December 26th.
The steadily increasing number of bombers and fighter planes stationed in Rabaul, which posed a threat to the invasion fleets, made General MacArthur to create. In order to warn its own planes and ships in advance, the American submarine USS Grouper dropped 26 US agents and 27 specially trained locals on New Britain three months before the landings. They set up radio stations on the Gazelle Peninsula, Wide Bay and Open Bay, as well as at Gasmata and Cape Orford. Radio detectors were also located on Rooke Island to report incoming Japanese formations from the west.
Airfields and Conquests
In order to ensure sufficient air superiority so that future bomber flights to Rabaul could take place with a fighter escort, it was essential to conquer the Japanese-occupied airfields on the Solomon Islands and make them operational. The Australians also began their landings on the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea and fought the Japanese at Finschhafen and the Markham-Ramu highlands . Behind the lines, they began building new airfields at Lae and Finschhafen as well as at Nadzab and Gusap . However, the onset of the monsoon hindered the construction work considerably, so that completion could hardly be expected before mid-December.
Until the new air bases were operational, the ships of Admiral Barbey's amphibious landing fleet were busy transporting supplies and troops from Townsville to Port Moresby and Milne Bay .
General MacArthur split his units into two task forces for the attacks on New Guinea and Rabaul. The Australian general Sir Thomas A. Blamey commanded the Einsatzgruppe New Guinea , which was supposed to attack the Japanese mainly on the Huon Peninsula, and Lieutenant General Walter Krueger commanded the Einsatzgruppe New Britain , which was supposed to be the first to occupy the islands of Woodlark and Kiriwina (→ Operation Chronicle ) . The follow-up action should then be Operation Dexterity .
Operation Dexterity
The Arawe Landings - Operation Director (Cape Merkus)
The ships of the task forces (Task Forces) 76 and 74.1 put to sea on December 13 from the island of Goodenough . These were the HMAS Westralia , the new landing dock ship USS Carter Hall and the fast transporters USS Sands and USS Humphreys . They reached southwest New Britain at Arawe , known to the Japanese as Cape Merkus, the next day.
As the vanguard, a small unit consisting of 33 soldiers rowed in rubber boats to the base of the peninsula on December 15 to prevent a possible Japanese retreat. Shortly before they landed, they were caught in heavy Japanese machine gun fire, in which all rubber boats sank. The men had to give up all their equipment and swim for their lives. 16 Americans were killed and the others seriously injured in some cases before the five destroyers off the coast succeeded in eliminating the Japanese positions with their naval artillery.
Meanwhile, after a heavy air attack by the 5th Air Force , in which 433 tons of bombs were dropped, the actual landings began at 7:00 a.m. on the tip and the west side of the peninsula. Since the landing craft also had to be used in the following Operation Backhander , none could be lost. The 1,600 soldiers of the US 112th Cavalry boarded the boats under the command of Brigadier General Julian W. Cunningham . When approaching the beaches, high waves led to confusion in navigation and some landing craft drifted from their intended positions. Despite everything, the landing succeeded and the overwhelming force of American firepower forced the defending Japanese to retreat inland. By noon the peninsula was in the hands of the Americans. Meanwhile, 5th Air Force B-25s were bombing villages north of Arawe.
The Japanese immediately relayed the landing news to their headquarters. The Japanese adopted the small airfield built not far from Arawe as their destination, which, however, was of little importance to the Americans. Headquarters in Cape Hoskins, in turn, contacted Rabaul and asked for air support. Towards afternoon, the Americans on the peninsula were under constant air attacks that continued for days. The air strikes were also directed against the destroyers and other escort ships lying off the coast. In addition, the Japanese were able to bring two infantry battalions to the front line, which dig themselves in there.
This fulfilled the hopes of the planners, as the defenders of western New Britain tied up part of their forces in the south of the island and thus could not intervene in the defense of Cape Gloucester.
The now-onset trench warfare was, however, extremely unsatisfactory for General Krueger, since he could run a breakthrough by Japanese lines only with heavy losses. Even constant air strikes by 20 A-20 bombers from December 19 through January of the next year hardly brought relief. Therefore, Krueger had tanks of the 1st US Marine Division embarked from Finschhafen and brought to Arawe when it was clear that enough troops were available for the invasion in the north at Cape Gloucester. On January 16, 1944, the Americans broke through the Japanese lines with the support of 18 tanks. The remaining Japanese gave up the fight for the peninsula and withdrew to the northeast. The occupation of the peninsula had killed 118 cavalrymen, 352 wounded and four reported missing.
Landing at Cape Gloucester - Operation Backhander
The designated landing zones at Cape Gloucester were the preferred targets for air strikes by the US 5th Air Force from December 18. Since New Britain had been a frequent target of Allied air strikes in recent months, the Japanese almost completely escaped the intensification and accumulation of bombings, although the total weight of the bombs dropped far exceeded the 3200-tonne mark since December 1 and the targets moved from moved the runways to the landing-relevant coastal posts. In addition, the Allies succeeded in setting up a radar post on Long Island, about 130 kilometers west of Cape Gloucester.
On December 25, the main operation began with the departure of Kampfgruppe 76 under Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey . The convoy included the transporters HMAS Etamin and HMAS Westralia , the dock landing ship USS Carter Hall , 65 landing units , 4 patrol boats , 7 submarine hunters, 3 minesweepers and some smaller ships. In addition, a diversionary operation was started at Buka and Buin near Bougainville, with three cruisers and four destroyers bombarding the coast there.
The Operation Backhand hander began the landings 13,000 soldiers of the 1st Marine Division under Major General William H. Rupertus on the points provided at Cape Gloucester. While ten destroyers secured the troops at sea, ten transporters carried the first wave to the invasion beaches. The ships of Task Forces 74.1 and 74.2, which were supposed to fend off a Japanese relief attack, were on the high seas. A US destroyer was sunk by Japanese planes and another was badly damaged.
Green Beach
Operation Backhander took place on two beaches, code names Yellow and Green . Task Force Stoneface separated from the main convoy at 4:22 a.m. on the morning of December 25th to set course for Green Beach near Tauali. Two destroyers located five kilometers from the coast opened artillery fire for 20 minutes. A squadron of B-25 bombers then bombed the landing coast. At the same time, the first landing craft left the formation. When they were about 500 meters from the beach, the bombers turned and the actual landing began at 7:48 a.m. Surprisingly, the Marines were able to go ashore without Japanese resistance. The next two waves, which landed in quick succession, also brought the men to the coast unharmed. Around 8:30 a.m., the supply units and pioneers landed, which also brought artillery pieces ashore. The Americans secured the 1,100-meter-long stretch of beach and the surrounding area up to 500 meters inland, and at 7 p.m. the last landing craft left the coast. With 1,300 Marines buried in their positions, the Americans had the first beachhead in the northwest of New Britain. Later that evening, a sent out patrol came into contact with a small group of Japanese soldiers with whom they engaged in a brief exchange of fire. The Japanese escaped into the thick jungle.
Yellow Beach
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On Christmas morning 1943, a Japanese observation post at Cape Ward Hunt in New Guinea sighted the convoy en route to Cape Gloucester. Its sighting, as well as another one by a Japanese submarine and the last report from a Japanese reconnaissance aircraft that was shot down by the convoy, indicated that the headquarters in Rabaul would give the invaders a warm welcome. Since there was still the possibility of setting the Japanese on the trail of a supply fleet for the Arawe landings by changing course during the daytime phase, this was done. In the late evening the ships set the north course again directly on Cape Gloucester. The high speed affected the machines of the mine sweepers ahead so much that the first ship had to return at 21:20 and another had to be towed by a fast troop transport.
To mark the narrow channel that ran through the reef in front of the beaches, the destroyers used their sonar and a minesweeper ensured the mine clearance. Meanwhile, at 6:00 a.m. from the sea, the artillery fire of the cruisers and destroyers began, which lasted more than 90 minutes. In addition, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:20 a.m., a squadron of B-24 bombers bombed Target Hill, the hill in the southeastern landing area that was considered a possible Japanese retreat and observation point. Therefore, eight tons of white phosphorus contained in smoke bombs were also dropped there. The resulting heavy smoke drifted onto the landing beaches, so that at H hour (specified landing time) the entire coastline was fogged. However, this did not affect the navigation of the landing craft.
After the LCVPs had passed through the canal one by one, they aligned themselves in front of the beach. At 7:30 a.m., the agreed signal for landing came and the boats started to drive to the landing beach. The bow flaps of the boats fell into the sand at 747 a.m. The marines reached the mist-shrouded beach in several waves at five-minute intervals. Without Japanese resistance they made their way through the dense jungle that began directly behind the narrow beach and worked their way with machetes under the direction of scouts into the swamp beyond. This terrain was very dangerous, as there were depressions like bomb craters underneath and the remains of trees that had been knocked over by the previous bombings piled up above the swamp and collapsed quickly when climbing over it.
The first Japanese bursts of fire came from bunkers around 10:00 a.m. on the path towards the airfield to be conquered. This led to a firefight, which at first seemed to turn against the Americans, when a number of weapons, such as bazookas and flamethrowers, did not work and even two senior officers of a company were killed. But by means of an Amtrac, the bunker system was finally overrun and switched off. Shortly afterwards, the first Sherman tanks went ashore and led the Marines to the first designated landing line. It was reported as secured at 1:25 p.m. By that point there were 25 Japanese dead and seven Marines dead.
A second group had meanwhile worked their way up to Target Hill and thus secured the left sector (eastern sector) of the landing area. They had come across only two Japanese machine gun positions and had eliminated them. Sufficient evidence of Japanese use of the hill as a Japanese observation post was also found.
While the second wave of landing craft was being unloaded on the beach, the Japanese launched their first counterattack. At 2:30 p.m., Japanese fighters and torpedo planes attacked the beach. They were fired on with anti-aircraft guns from aboard the ships when a squadron of B-25 bombers crossed the beach on the way to a bombing in Borgen Bay. Inadvertently the American riflemen mistook their own machines for Japanese and extended fire to them too. Two B-25s were shot down and two more damaged. In the ensuing turmoil, the B-25 also threw bombs on the positions of the Marines in the swamps, whereby one Marine was killed and 14 men were wounded. The Japanese hunters were on their way back from a morning mission against the landing head at Arawe and mainly attacked the ships lying in front of the bay, where they initially caused hardly any damage. The USS Shaw had spotted the machines nearly 100 kilometers away by radar and called in a squadron of P-38 fighters to intercept them. The interception did not quite succeed in time, but the American machines involved the Japanese in an aerial battle, which some torpedo bombers escaped. They sank an American destroyer and damaged three others, some severely. 108 Americans were killed. The Japanese planes fled shortly afterwards. Since the American air force expanded its attacks on Rabaul considerably from December 27th, there were hardly any Japanese air attacks later.
Towards evening the Americans had dug themselves in along their line of defense and brought all landed artillery pieces and tanks into position. The remaining soldiers had also landed on Yellow Beach that afternoon and had worked their way through the swamp with additional weapons, ammunition and other supplies. When it got dark, Yellow Beach was considered secure.
The next day General Rupertus inspected the positions and at noon ordered them to be moved further forward to "drier" terrain. When the last ship left the bay at 6:00 p.m., 11,000 soldiers were on land.
On Green and Yellow Beach the marines were busy fixing their lines of defense that evening. They created firebreaks and stretched trip wires across the area against intruders, expecting a sudden attack by the Japanese at any time.
Japanese reactions to the landing
The Japanese were extremely surprised at the American landings, as they had actually expected them earlier at Cape Bushing or at Cape Gloucester in the immediate vicinity of the airfield. Immediately after the landings became known, the headquarters of the 17th Division issued an order to General Matsuda to repel the invaders if possible on the beaches. Colonel Kouki Sumiya, who led the 1,400-strong defense force of the Tuluvu airfield, was given the task of concentrating his soldiers against the main landing head. They began their march toward Target Hill shortly after receiving orders. The first Japanese reached the ridge in front of the foremost American lines on the evening of the landing day.
The strongest force available to General Matsuda was the 141st Infantry Regiment under Colonel Kenshiro Katayama, which was defending at Cape Bushing. 1700 soldiers marched from there in the direction of the American landing head. At Nakarop they met the 51st Reconnaissance Regiment, which had crossed from Aisega and Nigol. Only defensive posts had been left on the islands.
The Japanese, who stood in the way of the Americans for defense on the day of the landing, came from small detachments of naval pioneers and their own landing units. After being practically overrun by the US Marines, the survivors, on their frantic retreat, encountered the men of Major Takabe's battalion, who were preparing a counterattack. By the afternoon of December 26th, they had succeeded in building a sufficiently strong line of fire. In the dark, Japanese scouts found that both flanks of the Americans ahead were open.
Battle for the landing sections
At that time, the occasional flickering skirmishes were conducted in the dense jungle with no direct line of sight to the enemy. Both sides relied on their hearing. As soon as one side fired a shot, the enemy returned fire with machine gun salvos. Then a deceptive calm returned. In the course of the night, heavy rain set in, accompanied by lashing winds, which further restricted the view. In addition, the shelters and trenches were full of water and marines, who were on their way from the beach to the defense line with ammunition and weapons, fought their way through the adverse conditions all night, at times under Japanese fire, to the front line.
Although the Japanese tried to throw the Americans back over the flanks, the constant artillery fire did not succeed in breaking the American lines. The following day the Marines had built up their flank cover. The Japanese then concentrated their attacks again on the center of the bridgehead. During three days of fighting, the Americans lost 18 Marines, 54 were wounded and three were missing. Japanese documents viewed later showed that the Japanese side had about five times as many failures to complain about.
The Americans began their advance towards the Tuluvu airfield on December 27th. General Walter Krueger originally wanted to advance earlier, but various circumstances, such as communication problems with the naval units at sea, which were supposed to land another wave of Marines to support the advance, delayed his plan.
During the day, the Americans managed to break two Japanese lines of defense. As soon as the first marines had identified a Japanese shelter, the following tanks were alerted and ordered forward to fight. This enabled them to advance to the planned line of attack for the airfield attack. The small grassy mountain range in front of the airfield was christened Hell's Point by the Marines . There, in the run-up to the landings, reconnaissance planes identified a high concentration of Japanese bunkers and trenches. At 8:00 a.m. on December 28, the artillery began firing heavily at the Japanese positions for an hour. Then summoned A-20 bombers bombed the ridge. The Americans use the following ceasefire to get their tanks into position.
Capturing the Tuluvu Airfield
The attack took place at 11:00 a.m. The Marines stormed out of their positions and the first reached a larger clearing in the jungle around 11:45 a.m., which was about 450 meters from the coast. While trying to cross the clearing overgrown with knee-high grass, they got caught in the crossfire of Japanese machine guns and mortars. After the marines had quickly retreated to cover the jungle, they returned fire. The fight continued for almost four hours with sudden brutality without either side gaining an advantage. At the same time, the Americans had to repel Japanese flank attacks at another point on the front line. Since they began to suffer from a lack of ammunition in all sections in the early afternoon, they withdrew to their starting positions. The Japanese did not follow them. The advance took the lives of eight Americans and 41 Japanese.
The next day the Americans tried again to take Hell's Point , but the Japanese bunkers, which were well camouflaged and secured with barbed wire and mines, kept the Marines running into their defensive fire. American tanks advanced in the beach area and were taken under fire from the Japanese side around noon. The Americans were able to advance to the Japanese positions under the protection of the tanks. As a result, the tanks destroyed the bunkers and the Marines shot at the fleeing Japanese. The last bunkers at Hell's Point were destroyed by the following departments of the Marines around 4:30 p.m. But they had already been abandoned by the Japanese.
The Americans buried themselves for the following night and were only startled by a false alarm triggered by the alleged arrival of Japanese tanks. Hell's Point left 266 Japanese dead and nine US Marines dead .
Meanwhile, on the morning of December 28, more Marines had disembarked at a new landing point, Blue Beach, less than a kilometer behind the Japanese defense line. Since the decision to open the new landing head had been made at short notice, there was some confusion, as the order to do so hit the Marines on their landing craft when they were already on their way to Yellow Beach. Some even landed there and were immediately rerouted again. Some took the arduous land route to Blue Beach. For this reason, the top management decided to postpone the attack on the Tuluvu airfield, which was planned for the next day, until all forces had arrived.
When the signal to leave the positions finally came at 3:00 p.m. on December 29, there were still a large number of Marines in the swamps behind the line. The Marines reached the second runway around 7:25 p.m. without encountering any resistance. The bunkers they had passed along the way all seemed to have been hastily abandoned not so long ago. As darkness fell, the Americans dug themselves in along a new line from the coast to the end of runway 2. The Japanese papers and documents found later did not provide any information as to why the Japanese had left the airfield and retreated further south into the jungle. It can be seen as likely that Colonel Sumiya saw no chance of fighting the American tanks in the open area of the airfield. His main focus was now on the bunkers and shelters prepared for defense on the southern hill, which was later called Razorback Hill by the Americans . From there the Japanese had a wide view of the airfield and the activities of the Americans there.
The very next day, a US patrol, which was supposed to explore the area south of runway 2 to the foot of the hill, found a small group of Japanese who they believed were stragglers of the fleeing soldiers. They escaped to the shelter of the jungle on Razorback Hill . When the Americans pursued them, to their great surprise the Japanese opened fire with rifles and machine guns from bunkers. After more marines and tanks were called in for protection, the battle for the hill began to break out. The Japanese had to retreat further into the jungle when the first row of bunkers was attacked and destroyed with heavy mortars, the tank guns and an assault by the Marines with hand grenades. More than 150 Japanese died in the 30 or so bunkers. The Americans reported 13 deaths. Another six Americans died when the airfield was bombarded from a Japanese position to the east.
The last defenders from Colonel Sumiya's force were spotted and successfully fought by a three-company American unit in the western area of the airfield in the early afternoon. With light tanks, the marines drove the Japanese quickly to the foot of Razorback Hill . There she received strong artillery fire, which only accelerated her escape. On the night of December 30th, the marines had significantly increased their secured area and on New Year's Eve 1943 were able to take the entire Tuluvu airfield with a total of four infantry battalions, two artillery battalions and two tank companies. At noon on December 31, General Rupertus raised the American flag at Cape Gloucester and reported the capture of the airfield to General Krueger.
Actions in the hinterland
During the conquest of the airfield, the hinterland and the landing beaches were relatively quiet. More supplies were unloaded, but Japanese attacks largely failed to materialize. Sent out patrols occasionally came across Japanese soldiers who fled after brief exchanges of fire. Some could be captured in their shelters. However, the signs that the Japanese would dare to break through to the south kept increasing. The Americans expected him on December 28th. But it wasn't until night fell on December 29 that the Japanese fire on the Marines was seriously intensified and at 1:55 a.m. the next morning the Japanese started their attack.
The first attempt to break through failed, but the Japanese soldiers were able to conquer an American machine-gun nest the second time. With the help of the artillery, the Americans managed to recapture them a little later and around 7:00 a.m. the Japanese fire was almost completely extinguished. The Marines found 89 Japanese bodies in the jungle after the battle. According to a Japanese prisoner, the total force was 116 soldiers. The Marines themselves had lost six men.
After the Japanese attempted breakthrough, only sporadic short bursts of fire flickered. A Japanese artillery position fired a few shells at American positions from about 2.8 kilometers away on December 31, but they all missed their target and landed in the sea.
On New Year's morning of 1944, PT boats docked at Cape Gloucester and picked up many of the wounded Americans. They were shipped to New Guinea to be transferred to military hospitals .
By January 4, the coastal patrols could no longer make out any Japanese. The soldiers who fled from the Tuluvu airfield had chosen the more arduous route over the Talawe and then marched further east. General Rupertus therefore gave the order to ship the heavy weapons to the Yellow Bridgehead, which began on January 5th. In the following days, the Marines loaded everything onto LCMs and set course to the southeast. The last ship left Green Beach on January 11th. The marines themselves fought their way to the airfield in bad weather until January 12th.
Suicide Creek
In the eastern sector of the landing area, the Americans at Target Hill had consolidated the front line in relative calm. On New Year's Day , however, the Japanese started a counterstrike. With complete underestimation of the strength of the naval units lying there, the commanding Japanese Colonel Katajama assigned an only slightly reinforced company for the attack. Since the Americans received further reinforcements during the day from the troops that had moved away from the Tuluvu airfield, the Japanese were clearly outnumbered. On the morning of January 2, the Marines began their counterattack on the Japanese digging into the front. At 10 a.m. the two attack battalions crossed the front line and fought their way 300 m to the edge of the jungle. On the bank of a small river, the Japanese defensive fire began to flare up more intensely in the afternoon and continued with almost unchanged strength for the rest of the day and the following night. The Americans dug themselves in on the bank and gave the river the descriptive name "Suicide Creek" (Eng .: Suicide River ), since no marine dared to stand up against the strong counterfire of the Japanese, which would have amounted to a suicide.
The Japanese advance in the early morning of January 3 began with artillery support from the nearby jungle and from the foot of Hill 660 . However, the Japanese made no effort to make their attack on Target Hill as covert as possible. Loudly they began to knock stairs into the rock, so that the Americans on the hill were warned in advance and could easily spot the attackers. Using handguns and hand grenades, the marines drove the Japanese soldiers back into the surrounding jungle. Japanese artillery was still firing in daylight, but no further attempts were made to take the hill. Navy patrols discovered many Japanese dead later that day, some of them piled at the foot of the hill. The Japanese themselves said they lost 46 soldiers in the battle. There were also 54 wounded and two missing. The marines lost two lives.
During the search of the Japanese victims, the Americans found documents with a command officer that were very helpful to them in their further tactics. They contained information about the strength of the Japanese troops, their battle regulations and important bases in the surrounding area. So their attention was also directed to the Aogiri Ridge , which was an excellent defensive position inland, from where the Japanese reached the front line.
Meanwhile, the Marines tried to push the Japanese back from Suicide Creek , but their advance came to a halt after a short time on the other bank. A further advance seemed possible only with larger weapons and so an attempt was made to get the tanks to the front. During the afternoon and evening of January 3, with great effort, the pioneers were able to lay a stick dam through the swamp area, on which heavy artillery and Sherman tanks could be brought forward.
On the morning of January 4th, after heavy artillery fire, the first US tanks advanced against the Japanese. After a short time they overran the trenches and holes in the ground in which the Japanese had dug themselves. Although they tried directly to attack the tanks with explosives , they were prevented from doing so by the marines advancing directly behind the tanks. Shortly afterwards the Japanese fled into the hinterland. The fighting over Target Hill and Suicide Creek killed around 500 Japanese soldiers. The Americans later said they had lost 36 Marines. There were also 218 wounded and five missing.
The Americans spent January 5th bringing in supplies to replace their weapons and ammunition that had been lost and used up in recent fighting. In addition, their units regrouped for the attack on the Aogiri Ridge . But before that they were interested in hill 150 , a few hundred meters behind Target Hill , from which they hoped for a good orientation point for finding the strategically important Aogiri mountain ridge.
Colonel Katayama, who at that time still had about 1,320 soldiers at his disposal, ordered 550 of them to dig themselves into the Aogiri Ridge for defense . Another 520 were to serve as a reserve. The rest retreated to Artillery-guarded Hill 660 .
The Americans repeatedly shot at the jungle with their artillery in the hope of hitting Japanese bases, especially at the presumed position of the ridge. Reconnaissance planes, which had also been taking off from Tuluvu airfield since January 2, could not make direct contact with the guns because the radios were not working. In some cases, the pilots simply dropped slips of paper with position coordinates over the nearest US artillery position. The 5th Air Force bombers also had great problems finding their targets. From a great height, the jungle of New Britain looked like a large green area without any particular landmarks being made out. So their targets were sometimes only 400 meters from their own troops.
Aogiri Ridge
On January 6, shortly before the start of the attack, two squadrons of B-25 air raids on targets marked with smoke bombs by a low- flying aircraft at the probable position of the Aogiri Ridge . Then fifteen minutes of artillery drum fire began. The Marines left their positions at 11:00 a.m. On the left flank they waded through the small river at the foot of Target Hill along the narrow path not far from the beach until they were fired at a barrier by Japanese soldiers. Since the blockade had been discovered by a patrol the day before, the Sherman tanks drove directly behind the infantrymen. Although they were afraid of sinking into the mud on the bank of the river, they followed a half-track vehicle driving ahead and thus reached the Japanese blockade, which was immediately eliminated. The increasingly marshy path led the Marines to a junction not marked on their maps, from which a path led inland. The marines followed him and reached Hill 150 without much resistance .
On the right flank, the Americans encountered much stronger defensive fire, which brought their advance to a standstill. The hidden Japanese shelters could not be found and so the US soldiers buried themselves for the time being. After dark, some men explored gaps in the Japanese defense. But the next day the events repeated themselves. The Japanese counterfire nailed the marines in place. They began to advance on January 8, although the Japanese continued to intensify the fire. The Marines noticed a slight increase in terrain the closer they got to the Japanese positions. Lt. Col. Lewis W. Walt, who led the battalion, guessed correctly that they had reached the slope of Aogiri Ridge . At around 6:00 p.m., headquarters announced that the Americans had left 15 dead, 161 wounded and five missing in the past 24 hours.
It was not until late January 9 that a 37-mm cannon could be brought to the front. The advance against Aogiri Ridge began around 4:30 p.m. The Marines' plan was based on a pincer movement, which should lock the Japanese in the center. The first attack, in which two Japanese bunkers were taken, came to a halt a little later, as the Japanese clearly concentrated their machine gun fire on the attackers. The second attack also flagged and was stopped by the Japanese. The Marines had reached the ridge, but the Japanese were still sitting in several of the 37 bunkers on the mountainside that were connected to each other. Since they were surrounded by the Americans, they had no alternative but to attempt an escape at some point. After this realization, the Marines stayed at their positions and waited for this attack, which was carried out in several waves at 1:15 a.m. on January 10th. The Japanese stormed out of the bunkers and shouted: “Marines you die, prepare to die!” The American soldiers repeatedly opened fire on the onrushing Japanese, wave by wave, until their ammunition ran out. Just before the Japanese sent a fifth wave down the slope, a supply of ammunition reached the Marines. The coastal artillery, constantly firing by ear, also intensified its fire at this point. The battle for Aogiri Ridge thus ended with the destruction of the fifth Japanese eruption at dawn. The Marines left their trenches at 8:00 a.m.
A single nest of resistance by the Japanese was still in a lowland between Hill 150 and the Aogiri Ridge . Although tanks were brought in, it was not until January 11th before the last Japanese was killed in the hail of bullets from the Marines.
After the fighting, the American headquarters put the number of casualties since the day of the landing at 170 dead, six dead from their wounds, four soldiers who died for other reasons and 636 wounded. 588 of them could be flown out to hospitals in New Guinea. The US secret service named 2,402 dead and 11 prisoners for the Matsuda Force . Wounded were estimated to be about the same number as those killed.
Hill 660
Marines scouting teams spent the whole of January 12 scouting the coastal path towards Hill 660 , the next order of attack. Japanese defenders could not be made out there. Everything remained calm between Aogiri Ridge and Hill 150 as well . The Marines decided to use two tanks, an army rocket launcher, three cannons and two infantry platoons to set up a blockade on the coastal path, which should block access to Borgen Bay for the Japanese. Confiscated documents from Japanese prisoners gave the Americans a pretty good picture of the expected Japanese defense. As soon as the position was on the path, the US artillery shelled Hill 660 with cannons and mortars. In addition, the US Air Force flew a few bombs.
At 8:00 a.m. on January 13, the American ground advance began. The first Marines to reach the foot of the hill discovered that the bombardment had caused considerable damage to the Japanese trenches and shelters. At around 9:30 a.m., the US soldiers began to climb the hill. Since the ascent was very steep, many shouldered their rifles in order to be able to hold on better. Suddenly the Japanese opened fire right in front of them, so all they could do was throw themselves on the ground to crawl back into a reasonably safe position and open the counterfire. A flank attack launched shortly afterwards by the Marines failed. Subsequent soldiers could no longer reach the hill because a Japanese machine gun was able to fire over the heads of the US soldiers lying on the slope at the foot of the hill. It wasn't until a tank arrived at the hill in the afternoon that the Marines were given the opportunity to retreat to safe positions for the night.
In the course of the following night, the US artillery covered Hill 660 continuously with shell fire. The marines attempted to climb the hill again the next morning. This time some tanks followed them immediately, but they soon had to stop at a ravine. Even so, the Americans were able to push the Japanese back further. In the increasingly steep terrain at the summit, they sometimes had to pull themselves up hand by hand. In the meantime the Japanese machine gun emplacements were successfully eliminated with mortars. Their crews ran headless down the hill, straight into the barrier set up on the coastal path. Others took cover in the swamps. That evening the Marines had Hill 660 in their hands. Immediately they began to take defensive measures against a Japanese counterattack, which was made more difficult by the onset of heavy rain. The rain also kept the Japanese from a direct counterattack. There were only a few minor skirmishes during the night.
On January 15, the Marines expanded the defensive positions with newly introduced automatic weapons. Signs that larger Japanese units were preparing to attack could not be made out, but the Japanese would not give up the strategically important hill without one last attempt at retake. During the day, their soldiers sneaked from the south through the swamp to the foot of the hill and took up attack positions at night.
The last attempt by the Japanese to retake Hill 660 began at 6:30 a.m. on January 16, amid loud shouts . With machine gun support they stormed towards the American positions on the steep slope. But the marines had been able to bring in many small and medium-sized automatic weapons. The fire was so strong that the Japanese were pushed back after just a few minutes. With subsequent concentrated mortar fire, the Americans finally drove them to flee. This last attack killed 110 of them. Another 48 died while trying to break through the tanks blocked access to the north and Borgen Bay . In total, more than 200 Japanese and 50 Marines were killed in the three-day fighting for Hügel 660 .
The end of Operation Dexterity
The days after the capture of Hill 660 were marked by the expansion of US positions and the Japanese began to withdraw their units from western New Britain on January 24th to rally at Cape Hoskins. In order to be prepared for unforeseen attacks by the Japanese, the Marines sent intensive patrols into the hinterland every day, but they saw no signs of Japanese efforts in this regard. Despite this, all access paths towards Borgen Bay and the Tuluvu airfield were blocked.
Towards the end of January and the beginning of February, during the exploration and persecution of the fleeing Japanese, several incidents occurred on Mount Langila, near Aipati and in the Gilnit area.
In Arawe , the landfall of Operation Director , it had remained relatively quiet. After a few smaller attacks against the American beachhead in December 1943, the Japanese withdrew into the jungle and began to build a bar against the Americans there, consisting of camouflaged shelters, holes in the ground and bunkers. Navy patrols observed the action and tried to push the Japanese back, but could not record any success. Until January 6, the Americans did not see a single Japanese during the skirmish, General Cunningham reported to General Krueger. He also asked him to deliver artillery pieces and tanks as supplies. Three days later a small fleet left Finschhafen and brought the requested weapons. With the help of the tanks, the Americans advanced into the jungle from January 13th to 15th. On the morning of January 16, a B-24 squadron also flew a mission in which 136 1,000-pound bombs were dropped on the Japanese positions. 20 B-25 bombers followed with more bombs and machine gun fire. On the ground, the Marines began an artillery and mortar deployment that paved the way for the tanks through the Japanese positions.
The Japanese commander Komori wrongly assumed that the Americans only had one goal, namely to capture the Lupine airfield northeast of the beachhead. So he retired there to defend himself to wait for the attack. After nothing happened for days and the Americans stayed in their positions, Komori radioed his division with the request whether he could withdraw to the north with his units, which were increasingly suffering from hunger and thirst, since the airfield would be for the Americans is too insignificant. In the answer he was initially asked to persevere. It was not until February 24 that the order to withdraw came and the Japanese immediately left the area around Arawe.
Although the Alamo Force headquarters announced the official end of Operation Dexterity on February 10, the direct aftermath lasted until the intended positions in the Iboki Plantation area were filled on February 24.
The escaping Japanese defenders reached the villages further to the east, completely exhausted, only to find that the supplies stored there had already been transported in the direction of Rabaul. So they could only eat fruits on the plantations and water from the rivers on their way. At the beginning of March, remnants of the Matsuda Force fought a gun battle with the Marines who had meanwhile landed at Kandoka. The Marines tracked the Japanese until the end of the month, inflicting repeated casualties on them. At the beginning of April, the Japanese reached Cape Hoskins.
However, the Tuluvu airfield gradually lost its importance, as the pioneers did not manage to restore the runways quickly enough. The Saidor airfield, 175 kilometers northwest of Finschhafen, was rather operational. It was not until January 28 that the first American aircraft landed on Tuluvu and on February 13, the 35th US Combat Squadron was the first to be stationed there.
consequences
After the occupation of western New Britain, the follow-up planning began for the further approach to the approach to Rabaul in the east of the island. General Krueger considered landing on the Willaumetz peninsula and from there taking Cape Hoskins and the Japanese airfield there. The 1st Division was no longer available for these operations, however, as it had been withdrawn by the naval command for further amphibious landing missions on the Palau Islands. As a replacement, units of the 40th Infantry Division under Major General Rapp Brush landed on New Britain from the Solomon Islands on April 28, 1944 .
The Dexterity success moved the American leadership to time the operations to isolate Rabaul more closely. General MacArthur issued the directive on February 13 to take Manus in the Admiralty Islands and Kavieng in New Ireland . His long-term goal, the reconquest of the Philippines , should take place in October of that year.
Due to the Allied occupation of western New Britain, the western approach routes to Rabaul for allied bomber formations were free of Japanese anti-aircraft fire and interceptors. Later on, their own fighter and bomber units were also stationed on the airfield near Cape Gloucester. The steadily increasing attacks, in which the Japanese lost 250 fighter planes between December 17, 1943 and February 19, 1944, for example, caused the Japanese military leadership to withdraw the remaining machines from Rabaul, thus completely removing the city and the Japanese troops and ships stationed there had to do without air cover.
swell
- ↑ Gerhard Krebs: The War in the Pacific 1943-1945 , in Das Deutsche Reich and the Second World War , Vol. 7, Ed. Military History Research Office . DVA, Stuttgart 2001, p. 650
- ↑ United States., Hough, FO, & Crown, JA: The campaign on New Britain. Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1952, p. 14.
- ↑ The strength of the brigade had shrunk to a regiment consisting of two battalions , which was supported by engineers , radio operators and medical units. Overall, their heavy armament consisted of only six 37-mm anti-aircraft guns , four 75-mm guns and two 70-mm howitzers . See: United States., Hough, FO, & Crown, JA: The campaign on New Britain. Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1952, p. 36 f.
- ↑ Eric Feldt: The Coast Watchers. New York, 1946, ISBN 0207949034 , p. 218.
- ↑ Isolation of Rabaul - Part IV - The New Britain Campaign, page 360 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-IV-4.html ; Retrieved September 9, 2006
- ^ Isolation of Rabaul - Part IV - The New Britain Campaign. Page 375 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-IV-4.html ; Retrieved September 25, 2006
- ^ Isolation of Rabaul - Part IV - The New Britain Campaign. Page 384 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-IV-5.html ; Retrieved October 3, 2006
- ^ Isolation of Rabaul - Part IV - The New Britain Campaign. Page 391 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-IV-6.html ; Retrieved October 7, 2006
- ↑ Isolation of Rabaul - Part III - Knockout by Torokina. Page 502 at: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/II/USMC-II-V-3.html ; Retrieved June 7, 2007
Movies
- Attack: The Battle for New Britain (1944). Producer: Frank Capra - Documentary , DVD , USA, (2003)
