Yamamoto Isoroku

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Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku

Yamamoto Isoroku ( Japanese 山 本 五 十六 ; born April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka , Niigata Prefecture , Japan ; † April 18, 1943 via Bougainville , Solomon Islands ) was a Japanese admiral during the Pacific War . Born as Takano Isoroku ( 高 野 五 十六 ), he was adopted by the Yamamoto family as an aspiring naval officer in 1916 and was promoted to the highest ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy until the late 1930s . In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the United Fleet of the Imperial Navy, he planned, among other things, the attack on the American naval base at Pearl Harbor and played a key role in determining the further actions of the Navy until his death.

Life

Childhood and youth

Isoroku Yamamoto in 1884, the third child of Takano Sadayoshi ( 高野定義 ), a former samurai , and his second wife in Nagaoka in Niigata Prefecture was born; There were also three more children from the father's first marriage. The first name Isoroku (literally translated "fifty-six") he received because his father was fifty-six years old at the time of his birth. Takano Sadayoshi had fought on the side of the shogunate in the Boshin War and had to hire himself out as a swordsmith after the dissolution of the samurai class in 1877, as he was refused any job in official offices due to his participation in the war. Shortly after Isoroku was born, he was appointed director of Nagaoka Elementary School; his family nevertheless remained one of the poorest in town.

First, the young Isoroku received lessons from Christian missionaries, including an American who taught him the English language. He later attended Sakanoue Elementary School and then moved to Nagaoka Middle School in 1894 , the founder of which placed great emphasis on character traits such as bravery, community spirit and, above all, a sense of responsibility. Both the lessons with the missionaries as well as in the middle school shaped his character very much.

Beginning of the military career

Takano Isoroku as a cadet of the Imperial Naval Academy (1905)

In the spring of 1901, Isoroku decided to apply to the Naval Academy on Eta Island in Hiroshima Prefecture . He finished the entrance examination as second best and was therefore able to start training in the summer of the same year. In addition to normal lessons, Isoroku especially practiced gymnastics; Kendō appealed to him because it required both physical and mental skills. In general, he got on well with his classmates, although a few attacked him for being the only cadet with a Bible. In the course of his training, he then decided on a career as a gunnery officer and graduated from the Academy in November 1904 as the seventh best of over two hundred cadets. After a brief interlude on a training ship, he was assigned to the cruiser Nisshin on January 3, 1905 with the rank of kaigun shōi , the rank of German sea ​​cadet .

In the meantime Japan was at war with the Russian Empire . There had been tensions in the relationship between the two countries for several years as there were significant conflicts of interest in relation to the Korean Peninsula and Manchuria . After Russia failed to comply with an agreement in which it had undertaken to withdraw troops from Manchuria, Japan decided the war that began in February 1904 with a surprise attack on the Port Arthur base . After the Russian Pacific Fleet suffered another heavy defeat in August in the Yellow Sea after a few more skirmishes , the Russian military command dispatched the Baltic Fleet to East Asia.

To intercept the Baltic Sea squadron, the Japanese admiral Tōgō Heihachirō put together a new fleet, to which the Nisshin was assigned. The two fleets met near the island of Tsushima on the morning of May 26th. In the following naval battle of Tsushima , Takano was wounded when an explosion occurred on board the Nisshin in the immediate vicinity . He lost two fingers of his left hand in this incident, but took part in the fighting until the end of the battle.

He spent the following weeks in a military hospital in Yokosuka while the war ended with the Treaty of Portsmouth in September . By the end of the year, Takano received both an official commendation and a message from Admiral Tōgō in which he personally thanked him for his commitment. In addition, he was promoted to kaigun chūi (first lieutenant at sea ). He was first sent to the Sasebo Naval Base Rifle School, where he stayed until 1907. He was then transferred to various ships, including the cruiser Aso , on which he took part in a voyage to the American west coast in 1909. In the year after the voyage, Takano Isoroku rose to kaigun daii ( lieutenant captain ).

In February 1912, his father Sadayoshi died and his mother became seriously ill. Takano Isoroku returned to Nagaoka and suggested that she retire from his career to take care of her. However, since his mother refused, he returned to his ship and learned of her death there in August.

Early officer career and adoption

In the same year Takano was transferred again, this time to the cruiser Niitaka , before he was appointed to the naval college in Tsukiji in 1913 , the degree of which was the basis for any officer in the higher ranks of the Imperial Navy. Takano achieved above-average results during his training, on the one hand due to his intensive efforts, but also because, unlike his fellow students, he only drank little at parties because he did not tolerate alcohol well. Yet he always took part in the celebrations; He also frequently visited geishas and found increasing pleasure in board games and games of chance that required tactical and strategic thinking, such as Shogi and Go or poker or bridge , which he would get to know a few years later in America. In the following years he spent a large part of his free time playing these games; He was later to compare the attack on Pearl Harbor with a smaller, just as successful move on the bridge.

In 1915 he was promoted to kaigun shōsa ( corvette captain ) due to his results, which he had achieved in the course of his training , in the following year he successfully graduated from the naval college and was appointed to the staff of the Second Battle Squadron of the Navy.

The good results made Takano's superiors aware of him. In particular, the highly respected Yamamoto clan based in the Niigata region was impressed by his achievements. A member of this family had fought on the Tokugawa side in the Boshin War and was killed without leaving any sons. In Japan it was customary in such cases to select an adult male and adopt him in order to maintain the lineage . The search for a suitable candidate for adoption had been going on for a number of years and they now found him in Takano Isoroku. The young officer accepted the offer, laid down his old name in a ceremony in a Buddhist temple and called himself Yamamoto Isoroku ( 山 本 五 十六 ) from then on.

The new name brought with it new obligations. Despite being 32 years old, he was still unmarried and his new family urged him to marry soon. Yamamoto was introduced to several candidates, but none of them appealed to him. A friend finally suggested Mihashi Reiko ( 三橋 玲子 ), the daughter of a farmer from his home prefecture. Despite the difference in class, both families gave their consent and the two married on August 31, 1918. This relationship would later result in two sons and two daughters. Yamamoto was expected to spend relatively little time with his family compared to other officers, but he never neglected his family responsibilities. However, he continued to seek the company of geishas, ​​where he led several romantic relationships.

Career after the First World War

American influence on the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, which had prevented Russia from paying reparations to Japan, had increased aversion to the West within the Japanese military. In order to get to know the potential enemy better, selected officers from the Army and Navy were sent to the United States. One of them was Yamamoto. In the spring of 1919 he traveled to America on a ship without his wife and enrolled in an advanced English course at Harvard while studying petroleum, an area that was becoming increasingly important for the Navy. Yamamoto was regarded by his fellow students at the university as a hard-working student, but also as a passionate and talented player. He got along well with the Americans because he did not harbor anti-American resentments like many other military personnel. Some American oil companies even offered him a job because of his great enthusiasm, which he refused. During his studies he also visited several automobile factories in Detroit . Yamamoto was extremely impressed by the high level of productivity and came to believe that a possible war between Japan and the United States would inevitably lead to a defeat for Japan.

At Harvard, Yamamoto also became aware of a comparatively young subject: aviation . He was very interested in it and tried to get as much information about it as possible. After reading some front-line reports from the First World War and visiting some aircraft factories, he came to the conclusion that the aircraft could play a decisive role as an offensive weapon in the future, especially in naval warfare. Yamamoto also followed some public debates at the time among the British and American military, who were rather skeptical and viewed aircraft as only suitable for reconnaissance.

In 1921, meanwhile promoted to kaigun chūsa ( frigate captain ), Yamamoto was called back to Japan. He taught at the Naval College for a year and was then briefly transferred to the cruiser Kitakami . Soon afterwards he accompanied Admiral Ide Kenji on his European tour as a translator, during which he was promoted to taisa ( sea ​​captain ).

After returning from Europe, Yamamoto became the commander of the cruiser Fuji . However, he was determined to continue to occupy himself with aviation and in 1924 managed to be transferred to study at the aviation school in Kasumigaura in the prefecture of Ibaraki , which had only been founded three years earlier . He learned to fly an airplane and was particularly interested in naval aviation until he was suddenly appointed director of studies at the school in December. Yamamoto held this office for a total of 18 months and, during his time in Kasumigaura, strictly adhered to the disciplinary regulations customary in the Navy. Despite high losses, his apprenticeship mainly insisted that the student pilots should practice night flights, as he was of the opinion that air attacks at night always had the advantage of surprise.

Yamamoto Isoroku as naval attaché in the USA, next to him the then US Navy Minister Curtis D. Wilbur

Promotion to the higher ranks of the Navy

In 1925 Yamamoto traveled to the USA again. He had been transferred to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, DC as a naval attaché , where he was supposed to gain information on defense and shipbuilding programs in the United States. Here, too, he dealt intensively with aviation matters. During these years some advances have been made in the field of aviation. Yamamoto was particularly interested in Richard Evelyn Byrd's north polar flight . On his flight, he no longer oriented himself exclusively to landscape features, but used technical aids for navigation. He had a report sent to Japan about it, in which he emphasized the advantages of these navigational instruments for the Air Force. In the spring of 1928, Yamamoto returned to Japan.

Upon return, Yamamoto briefly took command of a training ship before being named captain of the new aircraft carrier Akagi . When, during a maneuver in which the Akagi had participated, all pilots of the attack force got into a storm with their planes and did not return, Yamamoto again urged the military command to provide better navigation instruments.

In 1929 there was another transfer, this time to the technical department of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force, which was responsible for training and equipping pilots of the Navy Air Force . He immediately tried to get his ideas through. However, he did not stay long in his post, as the naval command appointed him in 1930 as a delegate to the London Naval Conference due to his very good knowledge of English .

In the Washington Agreement , the great powers had agreed to limit the size of their fleets, and the conversion of battleships to aircraft carriers was a measure expressly approved in the treaty that was actually tackled by several states. However, some senior navy officials were dissatisfied with the deal, demanding at least a balance with the American and British navies. When the Washington Agreement expired, a new consensus was to be found at the London conference. Ultimately, however, the only concession that could be achieved was that the Japanese Navy was only allowed to have 70 percent of their size in relation to the US Navy and the Royal Navy . The military, dissatisfied with the Washington Agreement, had initially refused to agree to these conditions, but Tennō Hirohito forced them to sign the agreement because he feared for the reputation of Japan and the credibility of its government motto shōwa (in German about "Enlightened Peace").

In Japan the London Agreement was widely debated. The Great Depression of 1929 had hit Japan as well, and the economy pushed for territorial expansion to open up new markets, although a treaty like the London Agreement could only be a hindrance. The expansionist military under the leadership of Admiral Katō Kanji did everything to get Tennō Hirohito to rethink and to get the public on their side. The situation finally escalated when Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi , who supported the agreement, was seriously injured in an attack carried out by an ultra-nationalist faction and had to withdraw from politics.

Yamamoto, meanwhile promoted to kaigun shōshō ( rear admiral ) and also a supporter of the London Agreement, was not targeted by the opponents despite his role in bringing about the agreement. He had meanwhile become head of the department for technical development of the air force in the Ministry of the Navy and initiated an extensive restructuring program. No longer battleships should form the backbone of the fleet, but aircraft carriers. For this purpose he had new reconnaissance and attack aircraft developed as well as a special type for attacks on submarines. He also tightened the training programs for fighter pilots. When he finished his job in 1933, he had decisively strengthened the combat strength of the Imperial Navy.

The Kawanishi H8K , a long-range reconnaissance flying
boat , was one of the aircraft developed at Admiral Yamamoto's initiative and the world's most powerful aircraft of this type during the Pacific War .

Aggravation of the domestic political situation

In October 1933 Rear Admiral Yamamoto was given the command of the 1st Carrier Division. While he was having his ships hold maneuvers, another argument raged among the military leadership. The expansionists tried to gain control of the most important decision-making bodies of the Imperial Navy in order to start an extensive fleet-building program. As a result, a new fleet conference was requested in London, with the aim of achieving equality after all. Yamamoto was appointed chairman of the Japanese delegation and entrusted with the task of achieving this equality at the new conference, which this time was supported by the Tennō himself. Once in London, however, the Americans and British strictly refused to accept the Japanese demand, as the efforts of the expansionists in Japan had not escaped them. The negotiations dragged on through the autumn of 1934 until the American delegation left the conference in December. Thereupon Yamamoto, who had uncompromisingly defended the government's position against his own publicly known convictions until the end of the negotiations, returned to Japan. In the meantime promoted to kaigun chūjō ( vice admiral ), he was solemnly received by both the authorities and the population, since after the failure of the conference they no longer saw themselves bound by arms restrictions. Yamamoto was then deported to an insignificant post in the Navy Ministry , as the right could not attack him directly due to his popularity with the people. Eventually influential friends managed to make him head of the Naval Air Force . Yamamoto trained the Air Force pilots over and over again and devised new uses for the Air Force. In addition, he obtained support for his plans to restructure the navy from the major aircraft manufacturers Mitsubishi , Nakajima and Aichi .

On February 26, 1936 there was an attempted coup initiated by the expansionist right-wing Kōdō-ha . Several members of the cabinet were killed, but the Tennō refused to support the coup plotters and the coup was crushed. As a result, the right lost influence domestically. The new Minister of the Navy, Admiral Nagano Osami , asked Yamamoto at the end of 1936 to take up the post of Vice Minister of Navy, which he accepted only reluctantly. In the spring of 1937 the cabinet fell and Yonai Mitsumasa , a friend of Yamamoto's from the days of the Naval Academy on Eta Jima, became the new naval minister. Meanwhile, with the Tōsei-ha, another right-wing group had taken power in the state. After the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge on April 7, 1937, she urged further military measures against China and managed, against the resistance of Yonai and Yamamoto, to expand the regionally limited conflict into war.

The immense increase in arms spending and the advance in China led US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to decide to impose an embargo on scrap metal against Japan. When the American gunboat USS Panay was sunk by Japanese planes in Chinese waters , Yamamoto rushed to the American embassy and apologized for the incident without first inquiring about the official position of the Army and Navy on the incident. In addition, Yonai publicly dismissed the officer in charge to warn the right wing. The two received death threats after criticizing the plan for a military alliance with Germany and Italy in 1938 . In their view, despite the planned alignment against the Soviet Union, sooner or later this would inevitably lead to war with Great Britain and the United States. But when the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was signed in August 1939 , with which Germany's potential ally entered into a far-reaching agreement with Japan's worst ideological enemy, the government fell again. The new Prime Minister Abe Nobuyuki , a general of the army, dismissed Navy Minister Yonai and his deputy Yamamoto, who was appointed kaigun taishō (admiral) and commander in chief of the United Fleet at Yonai's instigation .

The way to war

After the beginning of the war between the German Empire and the Western powers Great Britain and France, Yamamoto was certain that there was not much time left to prepare the Imperial Navy for a possible coming war. This impression was reinforced when the representatives of Germany, Italy and Japan actually signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 and the United States subsequently imposed a steel and scrap metal embargo.

The expansionist generals of the army demanded a war against the resource-rich possessions of the Europeans in Southeast Asia. The fleet was only supposed to support the advancing troops and then possibly carry out a strike against the US-held Philippines, but an attack on the American Pacific fleet was not planned. This is exactly what Yamamoto asked for. In a conversation with Konoe Fumimaro , who had once again become Prime Minister, he declared that in the event of a war with the USA and Great Britain he could operate unhindered for several months and inflict numerous defeats on them, but then the economic power of the United States and Japan would take hold will inevitably lose the war within a few years. Yamamoto was convinced that only a quick, decisive blow against the American fleet would give Japan enough time to inflict so many defeats on the Allies that they would have to plead for peace by admitting Japanese sovereignty over East Asia.

The relocation of the US Pacific Fleet to the Pearl Harbor naval base in Hawaii brought it close enough to the possible operating range of the Imperial Navy. The decisive impetus for Yamamoto's considerations was the British attack on Taranto in November 1940. During this attack on the Italian naval base carried out by torpedo bombers, several Italian battleships were sunk without the British having recorded any significant losses. On this basis, Yamamoto began to work out a plan of attack. He was probably also influenced by a maneuver report by the Americans, who had simulated an aircraft attack on Pearl Harbor as early as 1932. In January 1941 he had essentially completed the plan. However, he found little support at first, which did not prevent him from making preparations. In the following months he had the bay of Pearl Harbor scouted and developed a special torpedo that was suitable for the waters there, in which conventional torpedoes failed due to their draft when released (this means that after being released from the aircraft, the torpedo first up to dipped 20 meters into the water before reaching its specified shallower running depth). In addition, the first exercises for such an attack began. The military leadership let Yamamoto go, but their attitude only slowly changed when the United States imposed an oil embargo in the summer of 1941 on Japan 's occupation of French Indochina . The army leadership now pushed all the more for an attack on the colonies in Southeast Asia. Officially they were now willing to wage war against the United States if necessary, but internally within the naval leadership there was still debate about the exact course of the plan. Yamamoto finally threatened his resignation in the fall if the plan was not carried out, whereupon the Chairman of the General Staff of the Navy, Admiral Nagano Osami , gave the go-ahead on November 3, 1941. The attack, however, would only come if the last ongoing US-Japanese negotiations to lift the oil embargo were unsuccessful. In addition, not Yamamoto himself, but Nagumo Chūichi should lead the attack.

On November 5th, Yamamoto gave the official order to operate. It was agreed with the army command that the attack date would be the first Sunday of December 1941 - December 7th. The first submarines were already on their way east on November 10, and the main attack fleet, consisting of six aircraft carriers, two battleships and several smaller ships, ran out on November 26. The attack hit the Pacific Fleet badly, but the three US aircraft carriers stationed in Pearl Harbor were unscathed because they were not in port at the time of the attack. In addition, the important oil tanks were not hit. Yamamoto was congratulated on the success, but was dissatisfied with Nagumo's execution of the plan because, in his view, he had not fully completed the assignment. Nagumo had also failed to carry out the attack on Midway docks , which had been included in Yamamoto's plans for the return journey from Pearl Harbor, due to bad weather. The Army and Navy operations against Southeast Asia had, for their part, been successful as expected. With the sinking of the British battleships Repulse and Prince of Wales on December 10th, the susceptibility of battleships to air raids was demonstrated once again.

An American propaganda poster from the Pacific War. The text picks up on a misinterpreted quote from Yamamoto who had claimed before the war that the United States would only accept peace if you were already in Washington with your own troops.

Use in the Pacific War

Initial phase

The attack on Pearl Harbor had made Yamamoto famous in the United States in one fell swoop. He now embodied the devious aggressor who had planned a cowardly attack on the United States and also had the reputation of wanting to dictate the terms of peace to the United States personally in the White House in Washington DC.

In the weeks that followed, Japan undertook the long-planned forays into Southeast Asia. By the end of January 1942, Hong Kong and Manila , the capital of the Philippines , had fallen, and the conquest of the Malay Peninsula was successful. The advance was well ahead of his schedule, which is why Yamamoto had the United Fleet regrouped: While one part of the fleet supported the ongoing fighting in the Philippines, the other was supposed to prepare the invasion of the important Rabaul base on New Britain off the coast of New Guinea, which took place on January 23 ended successfully . Yamamoto's main concern, however, was to finally strike the big, decisive blow against the US fleet that failed at Pearl Harbor. Even with the victory over the last Allied naval forces remaining in Asia in the battle of the Java Sea at the end of February, this was not yet achieved. Nevertheless, the victory was important because it made the invasion of Java possible and the Japanese thus fell into the hands of the oil wells that were important for further naval operations. The conquest of Southeast Asia was practically complete within a few weeks.

Battle for Midway

After an overall successful operation in the Indian Ocean, Yamamoto decided to attack the Midway Islands, the capture of which would enable operations against Hawaii. At the same time, according to his idea, actions against Port Moresby in New Guinea and the island of Tulagi , which belongs to the Solomon Islands, should be carried out ( Operation MO ). His aim was that the Americans would only use their main forces, especially aircraft carriers, in the event of an attack in relative proximity to their main bases and that only here would his fleets get an opportunity to destroy them. Yamamoto also feared that the Americans might attempt an air strike on the Japanese capital, Tokyo , when the opportunity arises. Since they did not see a conquest of Midway as beneficial enough, the naval leadership rejected the Midway plan until the Doolittle Raid on April 18, 1942, Yamamoto's fears came true and the Navy rethought.

The fleet that ran against Midway in late May 1942 was the largest fleet in the history of modern naval warfare in any single country. In the Battle of the Coral Sea , the carrier Shōkaku was badly damaged, while the Zuikaku had lost a large part of its airborne squadron. Two other porters ( Junyo and Ryūjō ) had been detached to attack the strategically worthless Aleutians to support a diversionary attack . Yamamoto was only able to launch the attack on Midway with four porters. The fleet was divided into three parts. The attack squadron with the carriers commanded Nagumo Chuichi , Yamamoto himself followed him with a second squadron of battleships a few hundred miles apart. The third part came from the southwest. The US fleet was considerably smaller, but the Americans had already learned the time and place of the attack by deciphering the Japanese naval code and thus had an advantage.

On the morning of June 4, 1942, Admiral Nagumo ordered the aircraft squadrons to attack the base on Midway. Just as the Japanese bombers were returning from their first wave of attacks, American naval bombers appeared and put three of the four Japanese carriers out of action, whereupon Nagumo canceled the planned landing and withdrew with his fleet. Since Nagumo saw his fleet as no longer fit for action, Yamamoto could not carry out a relief attack with his battleships planned for the night. After the last remaining carrier of the Japanese attack fleet had been sunk that evening, Yamamoto finally ordered the final withdrawal.

Map of the Solomon Islands during the Pacific War. Japanese air bases are marked in red, the yellow dot marks Henderson Airfield on Guadalcanal

Battle for Guadalcanal

The defeat at Midway resulted in a change of strategy. The construction of new airfields on conquered islands was forced to replace the missing porters. One of the islands chosen to build an airfield was Guadalcanal , an island in the Solomon Islands . From there it was possible to control maritime traffic around Australia.

On August 7, 1942, American units landed surprisingly on Guadalcanal and the neighboring island of Tulagi and took both islands together with the almost completed airfield. The situation seemed extremely serious to Yamamoto and he decided to take command on site himself, whereupon he moved his headquarters to the island of Truk . Meanwhile, the Eighth Fleet in the region attacked the Americans. However, American losses after the fight were portrayed as being much higher than they actually were. In addition, it seemed as if the Americans had left Guadalcanal for the most part again a few days after the conquest, as the porter squadron with the troop transports parked for protection had withdrawn. As a result, only a small division of Marines began retaking on August 21. It quickly became clear that the Americans were still occupying Guadalcanal, and the attackers were repulsed. As a result, the forces on the island had to be increased, but this was a great risk, as a carrier group of the Americans was discovered nearby.

Until the autumn both sides reinforced their troops without fighting a major battle. Since the supply situation was extremely poor, Yamamoto initiated rapid destroyer convoys that brought supplies to Guadalcanal on moonless nights and were called the Tokyo Express by the Americans . In fact, the supply situation improved as a result, but it was not possible to transport heavy equipment due to the lack of capacity. The only way out seemed to be to recapture the airfield. The first attempt to destroy the field with a smaller formation failed on October 11th , which is why Yamamoto sent two battleships to severely damage the airfield and at the same time protect landing transport ships. Indeed, the Japanese gained an advantage, but to gain victory the American battleship cordon around their transporter had to be broken. Yamamoto had five aircraft carriers and four battleships as well as a number of other ships searched for the American fleet and was able to put them on October 26, 1942 near the Santa Cruz Islands . Despite high American losses, however, no decisive victory could be achieved.

A last attempt to finally put the airfield out of action failed in mid-November with heavy losses in the sea ​​battle of Guadalcanal . Yamamoto now demanded a withdrawal from the island, but the army leadership initially refused. At the end of December, however, Yamamoto was finally able to convince the army leadership. According to the official decision, the final withdrawal from the island was finally ordered on January 4th, which was only completed on February 7th. Nevertheless, the naval battles in the area around the Solomon Islands continued.

death

In the weeks after the defeat on Guadalcanal, Yamamoto decided to take the plane on an inspection trip to the bases in the South Pacific near the front in order to raise the severely reduced morale. His project was fraught with great risks, because the route led partly through American-controlled sea area. The trip was therefore kept top secret.

Yamamoto began the journey on April 18, 1943 in Rabaul , although several subordinate officers had advised against it due to the high risk. Escorted by six Zero fighters, Yamamoto's aircraft, a Mitsubishi G4M , flew to the airfield on the small island of Ballale near Bougainville , along with another aircraft of this type, which included his chief of staff Ugaki Matome . Despite the absolute secrecy of this flight, the Americans had been able to intercept and decipher radio messages with precise data on Yamamoto's plans and decided to intercept his plane. An entire squadron of Lockheed P-38s was hastily prepared for the mission, code-named Operation Vengeance . Around 9:30 in the morning on April 18, when the eight Japanese planes were over Bougainville, the sixteen American fighters appeared. An aerial battle broke out in which four of Yamamoto's escort fighters were shot down. The two-aircraft killer group , which was supposed to focus on Yamamoto's bomber, fired at the G4M, which then crashed into the jungle and exploded there. None of the passengers survived the crash. The G4M, in which Admiral Ugaki was flying, was also attacked and shot down, falling into the sea. Several passengers, however, including Ugaki, swam to the bank, where they were found by Japanese soldiers. Two of the US fighters were shot down in this operation and another six were damaged.

Yamamoto's body was found just outside the plane wreck a few hours after the attack. A doctor found gunshot wounds to the head and shoulder and concluded that Yamamoto was dead before the plane exploded on the ground. His body was then cremated and taken to Japan on board the battleship Musashi in May. It was only then that his death was made known to the Japanese public.

Commemoration

Yamamoto's State Funeral in Tokyo (June 5, 1943)
Gensui kaigun taishō ( Grand Admiral ); the rank given to Yamamoto after his death

On June 5, 1943, Yamamoto received a state funeral in Tokyo . His ashes were split up; one half was buried next to the grave of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō in the cemetery of Tama outside the city, the other half was brought to Yamamoto's hometown of Nagaoka . The grave there is at the bottom of a Buddhist Zen temple, where other members of the Yamamoto family were also buried. Yamamoto was also posthumously promoted from Tennō to gensui kaigun taishō ( Grand Admiral ) and received the Chrysanthemum Order . In addition, he was posthumously the only non-German to receive the German Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords.

Yamamoto, like Tōgō Heihachirō, is revered as a national hero in Japan today. In the museum of the naval academy on the island of Eta, which Yamamoto visited, there is a separate room in which personal items are exhibited. Yamamoto is also particularly honored in the museum of the Yasukuni shrine , which is repeatedly criticized, since all Japanese fallen there, including the war criminals convicted in the war crimes trials in Tokyo , are venerated as kami ; the museum in particular is also accused of conveying an image of history that portrays Japanese military history in a trivializing light.

In Yamamoto's native city of Nagaoka, there is still a small park named after him and designed as a memorial. Among other things, there is a bust of Yamamoto and a replica of his parents' house. Another memorial is in the cemetery near Tokyo, where Yamamoto's grave is located.

literature

  • Hiroyuki Agawa: The Reluctant Admiral. Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy . Kodansha, Tokyo et al. a. 1979, ISBN 4-7700-2539-4 .
  • Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The Man Who Planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, ISBN 0-446-36229-8 .
  • Edwin P. Hoyt: Three Military Leaders: Heihachiro Togo, Isoroku Yamamoto, Tomoyuki Yamashita . Kodansha International, Tokyo u. a. 1993, ISBN 4-7700-1737-5 .
  • John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. (also published under the title Admiral of the Pacific )
  • John Toland: The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 . Random House, New York 1970, ISBN 0-394-44311-X .

Web links

Commons : Isoroku Yamamoto  - album with pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 18.
  2. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 41.
  3. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 17.
  4. Edwin P. Hoyt: Three military leaders: Heihachiro Togo, Isoroku Yamamoto, Tomoyuki Yamashita . Kodansha International, Tokyo u. a. 1993. pp. 81f.
  5. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. pp. 18f.
  6. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990. pp. 50-54.
  7. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 67.
  8. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 73.
  9. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 87.
  10. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 84.
  11. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 34.
  12. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 36.
  13. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 106.
  14. Walter Lord : Midway: The Incredible Battle. Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 2000, ISBN 1-84022-236-0 . Quotation: “If I receive orders to wage war regardless of the consequences, I will fight wildly for six months or a year. But if the war lasts a second or third year, I see it extremely black! "
  15. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 49.
  16. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990. pp. 135-139.
  17. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. pp. 126f.
  18. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 126.
  19. John Toland: The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 . Random House, New York 1970. p. 310.
  20. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 179.
  21. John Toland: The Rising Sun. The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 . Random House, New York 1970. p. 424.
  22. Hiroyuki Agawa: The reluctant admiral. Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy . Kodansha, Tokyo et al. a. 1979. p. 369ff.
  23. a b Ugaki Matome: Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945. 2008. pp. 351-360.
  24. Ugaki Matome: Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945. 2008. p. 354.
  25. John Deane Potter: Yamamoto. The Man Who Menaced America . The Viking Press, New York 1965. p. 309.
  26. ^ Isoroku Yamamoto. historylearningsite.co.uk, accessed August 7, 2008.
  27. Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 38.
  28. ^ Mark Selden: Japan, the United States and Yasukuni Nationalism: War, Historical Memory and the Future of the Asia Pacific . In: The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus ( Memento March 22, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). Retrieved April 4, 2009.
  29. ^ Andrew M. McGreevy: Arlington National Cemetery and Yasukuni Jinja: History, Memory, and the Sacred . In: The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Retrieved April 4, 2009.

Remarks

  1. The translation of the respective ranks into German is based on Kinji Kimura / Sagara Morio : German-Japanese dictionary . Hakuyusha, Tokyo 1979 and the glossary on the Australia War Memorial website . Retrieved October 17, 2011.
  2. What exactly the explosion was due to is not certain: either a hit by Russian guns or the sudden explosion of one of the Nisshin's guns is suspected. See Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 28.
  3. On this subject, cf. in particular Hiroyuki Agawa: The reluctant admiral. Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy . Kodansha, Tokyo et al. a. 1979. The biography caused a sensation when it was published in Japan, as this aspect had previously been largely unknown in Yamamoto's life. Parts of the public then accused Agawa of having tainted the legacy of a national hero. See Edwin P. Hoyt: Yamamoto. The man who planned Pearl Harbor . McGraw-Hill, New York et al. a. 1990, p. 38.
  4. The bust is the upper part of a man-sized statue that was erected at the Aviation School in Kasumigaura in December 1943, but after the war was sawed in half on the orders of the Americans and thrown into the nearby lake. A few years later a scrap dealer picked up the top half and sold it to a friend of Yamamoto's, who had it installed in Nagaoka.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on April 8, 2009 .