Religious Freedom in China

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Freedom of religion in China is provided for in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China with one important caveat: the government protects what it calls "normal religious activity". In practice, this is defined as activities that take place within government-approved religious organizations and places of worship. Although the dynasty governments of imperial China also took responsibility for the practice of religion, human rights organizations such as the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) have criticized this differentiation because it does not meet international standards for the protection of religious freedom.

The five officially recognized religious organizations in China are the Chinese Buddhist Society , the Chinese Daoist Society , the Chinese Islamic Association , the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association . These groups are granted some protection but are subject to restrictions and controls by the state administration for religious affairs. Unregistered religious groups - including Christian house churches , Falun Gong , Buddhism in Tibet , Roman Catholics in hiding , and Uyghur Muslims - face varying degrees of harassment and persecution, including prison, torture and forced religious conversion . Tam and Hasmath argue that the Chinese government views religion as potentially destabilizing.

Legal framework

Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China states:

“The citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No government body, public organization or individual may force citizens to believe or not to believe in any religion. Nor are they allowed to discriminate against citizens who believe or disbelieve in a religion. The state protects normal religious activities. Nobody is allowed to use religion to engage in activities that disturb public order, harm the health of citizens, or disrupt the state's educational system. Religious institutions and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign rule. "

However, this protection only extends to so-called “normal religious activities”, which are generally referred to as religions and which are subject to state control by the State Office for Religious Affairs. The Constitution forbids the use of religion to “engage in activities that disrupt social order, harm the health of citizens, or disrupt the state's educational system”. Religious organizations and religious affairs are not subject to foreign rule.

The law provides protection to five officially recognized religions: the Chinese Buddhist Society , the Chinese Daoist Society , the Chinese Islamic Association , the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, and the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association . Religious groups are required to register with the State Religious Affairs Bureau (formerly known as the Central Religious Affairs Bureau) or their provincial or local offices (Religious Affairs Offices). The State Religious Affairs Office and Religious Affairs Offices are responsible for monitoring and assessing the legitimacy of religious activities.

Missionary work is only allowed in private rooms or within registered places of worship. Missionary work in public, in unregistered churches or temples, or by foreigners is prohibited. Members of the atheist Communist Party are strictly prevented from adhering to any religious belief.

There are a significant number of unapproved churches and temples that are visited by locals and foreigners alike. Unregistered or submerged churches are not officially banned but are not allowed to perform religious services in public. These organizations can be disrupted, harassed and persecuted to varying degrees by state and party organs. In some cases, unregistered religious believers and leaders have been charged with “illegal religious activities” or “disrupting social stability”. Religious believers have also been charged under Article 300 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the use of heretical organizations to "undermine law enforcement". An extraordinary security body called the 610 Office , run by the Communist Party , oversees the suppression and persecution of Falun Gong and, increasingly, other unregistered religious organizations. Hao Fengjun, a former 610 agent and defector from Tianjin, said at a press conference of the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR) in October 2005 : "In addition to Falun Gong and other qi groups, the 610 now persecutes a total of 14 religious groups, including the evangelical house churches and Catholics loyal to Rome. "

Folk religions, though not officially protected, are sometimes tolerated by the authorities. The State Bureau of Religious Affairs has created a department to oversee the administration of the popular religion.

Christianity

Main article: Christianity in China

Christianity in China has a history that dates back to the Tang Dynasty and received allegiance to China with the arrival of large numbers of missionaries during the Qing Dynasty . Missionaries were expelled from China in 1949 when the Communist Party came to power and linked the religion to Western imperialism. However, since the reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and 1980s, Christianity has revived and gained popularity. By 2011 it was estimated that around 60 million Chinese were practicing Protestantism or Catholicism. Most of them do not belong to the state-approved churches.

Religious practices are still strictly controlled by government agencies. Chinese children in mainland China are allowed to attend officially approved Christian meetings of the Patriotic Three-Self Movement or the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association.

Roman Catholicism

Main article: Roman Catholic Church in China

A Roman Catholic Church on the Lancang (Mekong) River in Cizhong, Yunnan Province, China

China is home to an estimated 12 million Catholics, the majority of whom worship outside the official Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association. The State Religious Affairs Bureau says 5.3 million Catholics belong to the official Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, which serves 70 bishops and about 6,000 churches across the country. In addition, there are about 40 bishops who are not appointed by the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and who recognize the authority of the Vatican. These are unofficially active.

The state-approved church appoints its own bishops and, as with all official religions, exercises control over the teaching and conduct of the religion. In order to maintain the autonomy and to reject foreign intervention, the state-approved and controlled church has no official contact with the Vatican and does not recognize its authority. However, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association has unofficially allowed the Vatican to conduct ordinations. Although the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association continues to conduct ordinations that are rejected by the Holy See, the majority of these appointed bishops are recognized by both the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Vatican. In addition to overseeing the Catholic faith, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association also pursues political goals. Liu Bainian, chairman of this association and the bishops' conference of the Catholic Church in China, stated in an interview in 2011 that the church needs individuals who “love the country and love religion: politically they should respect the constitution, respect the law and to fervently love the socialist motherland ”.

Some Catholics, who recognize the authority of the Holy See, chose to hold services in secret because of the risk of harassment by the authorities. Several Catholic bishops in hiding have reportedly been reported missing or imprisoned, and harassment against unregistered bishops and priests is widespread. There are reports of Catholic bishops and priests being forced by authorities to attend the ordination ceremonies for bishops who did not obtain the approval of the Vatican. The Chinese authorities are also said to have pressured and urged Catholics to break communion with the Vatican by requiring them to renounce a certain belief of Roman Catholicism and the papal primacy of the Roman pontiff. In other cases, however, the authorities allowed the Churches loyal to the Vatican to carry out their activities.

Protestantism

Main article: Protestantism in China

The Patriotic Three-Self Movement is a Protestant church in China, and one of the largest Protestant bodies in the world. Colloquially it is called the Three-Self Church and is the state-approved (patriotic) Christian organization in China.

The National Committee of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement of Evangelical Churches in China and the Chinese Christian Council are known in China as Lianghui (the two organizations), and constitute the only state-approved (registered) Evangelical Church in mainland China. All other Protestant names are illegal.

Chinese house churches are religious movements with unregistered assemblies of Christians in China that are independent of the government-affiliated Patriotic Three-Self Movement, as well as the Chinese Christian Council for Protestant Groups, the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association and the Chinese Catholic Bishops' Council for Catholics. They are referred to as "underground" or "unofficial" churches, although this is a misnomer as it is a collection of independent individual churches rather than a single unitary church. They are called "house churches" because they are not officially registered organizations. Since they are not allowed to own any property themselves, they meet in private houses, often in secret, for fear of arrest or imprisonment.

Buddhism

Tibetan Buddhism

Main article: Buddhism in Tibet

Two young Tibetan Buddhists at Sakya Monastery in southern Tibet

China took control of Tibet in 1959. In the course of the takeover and especially during the Cultural Revolution , many Vihāra monasteries were destroyed and many monks and lay people were killed. The 14th Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso fled to India and temporarily handed over his power to an elected government in exile. The current Dalai Lama is trying to negotiate with the Chinese authorities about greater autonomy and religious freedom for Tibet. As various high-ranking lamas died in the country, the authorities proposed their own candidates for the positions of religious authorities. This occasionally resulted in rival claimants for the same position. In an effort to control this, in 2007 the Chinese government passed a law requiring all lamas who wanted to reincarnate to have a reincarnation application fully completed and approved.

The current incarnation of the Penchen Lama is controversial. The Dalai Lama recognizes Gendün Chökyi Nyima as the reincarnation of the Penchen Lama. However, the Chinese government recognizes Gyaincain Norbu as the incarnation of the 11th Penchen Lama. Tibetan sources in exile claim that Gendün Chökyi Nyima was kidnapped by the Chinese government. The identity of the Penchen Lama is therefore of vital importance to Tibetan Buddhism, as it is one of the authorities that must approve the next Dalai Lama.

Daoism

Daoist practitioners are required to register with the state-controlled Chinese Daoist Society , which controls religious doctrine and staff. Local governments are restricting the building of Taoist temples and statues, and demanding that practices that they consider "superstitious" or "feudal" be abandoned. The Chinese Daoist Society dictates the correct interpretation of Daoist doctrine and exhorts Daoist practitioners to support the Communist Party and the state. For example, in November 2010, the Chinese Daoist Association held a Taoist scripture reading class and required attendees to "love the socialist motherland deeply and support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party."

Islam

An ethnic Hui family takes an oath

The State Bureau of Religious Affairs puts the number of Muslims in China at around 21 million, while independent estimates suggest it could be over 50 million. According to a census in 2000, 96 percent of 20.3 million Muslims belong to three ethnic groups: Hui, Uighurs and Kazakhs. Most Hui Muslims live in Ningxia , Qinghai, and Gansu provinces , while Uighur Muslims are predominantly in Xinjiang .

The state-run Chinese Islamic Association oversees the practice of Islam, although many Muslims worship outside the state system. The Islamic Association regulates the content of sermons and the interpretation of religious scriptures, exercises control over religious leaders and oversees pilgrimages abroad. In 2001, the Chinese Islamic Association set up a committee to ensure that the scriptures were interpreted to serve the interests of the Chinese government and the Communist Party.

Authorities in Xinjiang have strict controls on religious expressions, especially among Uyghurs. Human rights reports suggest that attacks on religion are often incorporated into security campaigns. Authorities monitor mosques, restrict government officials and students from observing Ramadan, and campaign to prevent Uyghur men from wearing beards. Uyghur Muslims who conducted church services independently were arrested and charged with engaging in “illegal religious activities”.

However, the oppression of the Uyghurs has more to do with the fact that they are separatist and not Muslim. China banned the book Xing Fengsu (Sexual Habits), which offended Islam, and arrested the authors after protests by Chinese Hui Muslims in Lanzhou and Beijing in 1989. During these protests, Chinese police protected the protesting Hui Muslims, as well as the Chinese Government organized public burns of the book. The Chinese government supported the Hui and gave in to their demands, since the Hui Chinese , unlike the Uyghurs, do not have a separatist movement. Hui Muslim protesters who violently rioted and vandalized property during the protests against the book have been released by the Chinese government and gone with impunity while Uighur protesters have been detained.

Islamic Festival of Sacrifice (Eid al-Adha) at the Jiangwan Mosque in Shanghai .

In 2007, in anticipation of the coming "Year of the Pig" on the Chinese calendar , the depictions of pigs on China Central Television were banned "to avoid conflicts with ethnic minorities." It was assumed that this measure applied to the 20 million Muslims in China (who are considered to be "unclean" pigs).

In response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, the Chinese state media attacked Charlie Hebdo for publishing cartoons insulting Mohammed. State-run Xinhua news agency advocated limiting freedom of speech, while another state-run newspaper, the Global Times , reported that the attack was "retaliation" for what characterized it as Western colonialism. She also accused Charlie Hebdo of trying to create a conflict between different cultures.

Different Muslim ethnic groups in different regions of China are treated differently by the Chinese government with regard to religious freedom. Religious freedom is present for Hui Muslims. They can practice their religion, build mosques and their children are allowed to visit mosques, while controls are specifically imposed on Uighurs in Xinjiang. Since the 1980s, Islamic private schools in Muslim areas have been supported and approved by the Chinese government; only Xinjiang was excluded because of the separatist mood there.

Although religious education for children is illegal in China, the Communist Party allows Hui Muslims to break this law. Their children are allowed to have religious education and go to mosques while the law is enforced among Uyghurs. After completing secondary education, China allows Hui students to begin religious studies under an imam. So China is not enforcing the law against children who visit mosques run by non-Uyghurs in areas outside of Xinjiang.

Hui Muslims who are employed by the state are allowed to fast during Ramadan, unlike the Uyghurs in the same positions . The number of Hui making pilgrimages to Mecca ( Hajj ) is expanding, and Hui women are allowed to wear veils while Uighur women are prevented from wearing them.

Hui religious schools are allowed to have a massive autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader. This was formed with the approval of the Chinese government, even though the leader admitted to having attended an event where Bin Laden was speaking.

The diplomat reported on the fact that Uyghur religious activities are restricted, while Hui Muslims are largely given religious freedom. So the policy of the Chinese government towards the Uyghurs in Xinjiang is not directed against Islam, but wants to aggressively eradicate the threat to the Uyghur separatists.

The views of the Uighurs differ in the oasis in which they live. China historically had favored Turpan and Hami . Uyghurs in Turfan and Hami and their leaders, such as Emin Khoja, allied with the Qing against Uyghurs in Altishahr . During the Qing Dynasty , China enfeoffed the rulers of Turpan and Hami ( Kumul ) as autonomous princes, while the rest of the Uyghurs in Altishahr ( Tarim Basin ) were ruled by Begs. Turpan and Hami Uyghurs were designated as officials by China to rule over Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin. Turpan is wealthier economically and has a more positive view of China than the rebellious Kashgar , which is the largest anti-China oasis. Uyghurs in Turpan are treated leniently and positively by China with regard to religious policies, while Kashgar is subject to government control. The religion in Turpan and Hami is viewed more positively by China than the religion in Kashgar and Chotan in southern Xinjiang. Both communist Uyghur and Han officials turn a blind eye in Turpan and allow religious Islamic education for Uyghur children. Celebrating at religious events and going to Mecca for Hajj is encouraged by the Chinese government for Uighur Communist Party members. Between 1979 and 1989, 350 mosques were built in Turpan. Han, Hui and the Chinese government are viewed much more positively by the Uyghurs in Turpan, as they receive better economic, religious and political treatment from the government.

The Islamic Turkistan magazine of the Uyghur Islamic Turkestan Party accused the Chinese "Muslim Brotherhood" (the Yihewani ) of being responsible for the moderation of Hui Muslims and the lack of Hui who joined the terrorist jihad groups. In addition, there are the facts that the Hui and Uyghurs have been enemies for more than 300 years, that there are no separatist Islamist organizations among the Hui, that the Hui regard China as their home and that they speak the "unbelieving Chinese language".

Tibetan-Muslim violence

In Tibet, the majority of Muslims are the Communist Party-sponsored Hui. The hatred between Tibetans and Muslims probably goes back to the events in the 1930s when the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang wanted to establish an Islamic enclave in Qinghai. Tibetans have been driven from their land, some executed and others forced to convert. This led to the Ngolok rebellions (1917–1949) and the Sino-Tibetan War .

From 1934 to 1938, Qumil Eliqsan led around 18,000 Kerey Kazakhs to Gansu and Qinghai. In 1936, after Sheng Shicai drove 30,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, the Hui, led by General Ma Bufang, slaughtered their Muslim Kazakhs until only 135 remained. Over 7,000 Kazakhs fled from northern Xinjiang via Gansu to the Tibetan Qinghai Plateau, causing massive chaos and devastation. Tibetan troops attacked the Kazakhs 640 kilometers east of Lhasa near Chamdo when they entered Tibet via Gansu and Qinghai. In northern Tibet, Kazakhs collided with Tibetan soldiers and the Kazakhs were sent to Ladakh . Ma Bufang "solved" the problem by moving the Kazakhs to designated grazing land in Qinghai, but the Hui, Tibetans and Kazakhs continued to clash.

In 1949, the communists put an end to the unrest between Tibetans and Muslims, but new ones broke out after China embraced liberalization and eased travel restrictions so Muslims could travel to Tibet again. During the unrest in Lhasa in mid-March 2008 , many of the shops and restaurants attacked belonged to Muslims, and a fire was also set on the mosque. According to the Los Angeles Times , there have been dozens of clashes between Tibetans and Muslims in the provinces of Sichuan , Gansu and Qinghai and the Tibet Autonomous Region in the past five years . Very few are reported in the state-controlled media in China, so as not to contradict China's claims that minorities “live together harmoniously”. Because of the unrest, many Muslims no longer wore traditional Islamic white caps, Muslim women replaced the scarves with hairnets, and Muslims secretly prayed at home. On the other hand, Tibetans have complained that their culture is being watered down by non-Tibetans, especially Muslims, who move to their areas and buy Tibetan shops, which is particularly true in Lhasa. What would exacerbate tensions is the support of the Chinese government by the Hui Muslims in suppressing Tibetan independence efforts. According to The Economist , Tibetans are attacking Hui Muslims as the Chinese government in turn supports and backs the Hui Muslims. These tensions are said to be due, on the one hand, to the anti-government feelings and, on the other, to violence triggered by Ma Bufang. Another reason should be their different religions and their ethnicity. At the same time, Chinese-speaking Hui have problems with Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan-speaking Kachee minority of Muslims).

Falun Gong

Main article: Persecution of Falun Gong and History of Falun Gong

Gao Rongrong , a Falun Gong practitioner, was tortured in 2005.

Falun Gong, also known as Falun Dafa, is a spiritual qigong practice that consists of physical exercises, meditation and a moral philosophy, and ties in with the Buddhist tradition. After a period of rapid growth in the 1990s, the Communist Party launched a campaign on July 20, 1999 to "eradicate" Falun Gong. The repression is characterized by a multifaceted propaganda campaign, a program of forced ideological adjustment and re-education, and a variety of extra-legal coercive measures such as arbitrary arrests, forced labor and physical torture that often resulted in death.

An unconstitutional body called the 610 Office was established to carry out the suppression of Falun Gong. The authorities mobilized the state media apparatus, the judiciary, the police, the army, the education system, families and jobs against the group. The campaign was powered by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and the Internet. There have been reports of systematic torture, illegal imprisonment, forced labor, organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China, and abusive psychiatric interventions with the obvious aim of forcing practitioners to give up their belief in Falun Gong.

Foreign observers estimate that hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of Falun Gong practitioners have been incarcerated in "re-education-through-labor" camps, prisons, and other detention centers for refusing to give up spiritual practice. Former inmates reported that Falun Gong practitioners consistently received "the longest sentences and the worst treatment" in labor camps, and in some facilities, Falun Gong practitioners made up the vast majority of detainees. By 2009, at least 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners had been tortured to death in the persecution campaign, with some observers putting the number much higher.

Some international monitors and judicial authorities described the campaign against Falun Gong as genocide. In 2009, Spanish and Argentine courts indicted long-time Chinese officials for their role in suppressing Falun Gong for genocide and crimes against humanity.

Accusation of organ harvesting

Main article: Organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China

In 2006, allegations surfaced that Falun Gong practitioners are being executed "on demand" for their organs in order to rapidly supply organs to China's transplant market to meet the demand for living organs. It was assumed that the organ harvesting was due to the Chinese Communist Party's widespread persecution of Falun Gong. Independent investigators such as University of Minnesota Assistant Director of Human Rights and Medicine Kirk Allison, Vice President of the European Parliament Edward McMillan-Scott, and former Canadian Secretary of State and Attorney David Kilgour and Canadian human rights attorney David Matas came to similar conclusions. Kilgour and Matas wrote in their investigation report that "there have been and are still extensive organ harvesting from involuntary Falun Gong practitioners." China analyst Ethan Gutmann interviewed more than 100 witnesses in eight years and published the results in 2014 in book form. According to Gutmann, 65,000 Falun Gong prisoners are said to have been killed for their organs between 2000 and 2008. In 2008, two United Nations Special Rapporteurs ( Manfred Nowak and Asma Jahangi) reiterated their request that "the Chinese government fully explain the allegation that vital organs have been harvested from Falun Gong practitioners." The Chinese government has denied the allegations to date (2017).

present

The 2017 International Religious Freedom Report by the US State Department indicates that China's President Xi Jinping consolidated his power in 2016 and that conditions for freedom of religion, belief and related human rights deteriorated. Authorities continue to target anyone seen as a threat, such as religious believers, human rights lawyers and other members of society. In 2016, the Chinese government again underlined the “Sinization of Religion” and circulated new guidelines to control them. This included sanctions for activities that were viewed as “illegal” and crackdowns on Christian house churches. Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang continue to be oppressed and their children are banned from participating in religious activities. Authorities expelled thousands of monks and nuns from the Larung Buddhist Teaching Institute of the Five Classical Sciences in Tibet before their homes were destroyed. The Chinese government continued to arrest, detain and torture countless numbers of freedom of belief lawyers, human rights defenders and religious believers, including the seriously persecuted Falun Gong practitioners.

Web links

Individual evidence

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