Falun Gong
Falun Gong , also Falun Dafa (literally "Dharma wheel practice" or "Law wheel practice"; Chinese法輪功 / 法轮功, Pinyin Fǎlún gōng , also 法輪 大法 / 法轮 大法, Fǎlún dàfǎ ), is a spiritual Chinese practice. It combines meditation and qigong exercises with moral principles based on the three virtues of Truthfulness (zhēn 眞), Compassion (shàn 善) and Forbearance (rěn 忍). The practice emphasizes morality and the cultivation of these virtues. It is a Qigong practice of the Buddhist school, but also contains elements from Daoist traditions. Through moral righteousness and meditation exercises, Falun Gong practitioners seek better health and ultimately spiritual enlightenment.
Since Falun Gong's public appearance in 1992, extensive academic papers have been written on Falun Gong. Most come from social scientists who researched the social circumstances that led to the beginning of the movement, and from religious scholars and historians who examined Falun Gong in the tradition of Chinese Buddhism , in order to give Western cultures an understanding of the somewhat alien-seeming way of thinking with Buddhism and to enable Daoist elements. Historian David Ownby points out that Falun Gong can only be properly understood if its relation to the Chinese Buddhist tradition from which the practice originates is taken into account.
Li Hongzhi , the founder of Falun Gong, first introduced his practice to the public on May 13, 1992 in northeast China. It occurred towards the end of China's "qigong wave" - a time when similar meditation practices, slow exercise movements, and breathing exercises spread. Falun Dafa differs from other schools in that there are no fees, no formal membership, and no daily rituals of Master-worship; with the greatest attention being paid to the morality and theological nature of his teaching. Western scholars referred to Falun Gong as a qigong, a "spiritual movement", a "cultivation system" according to the ancient Chinese tradition or as a form of Chinese religion.
In the beginning, Falun Gong was strongly promoted by the Chinese government through the state-controlled media, and Li Hongzhi or Falun Gong was repeatedly praised and recognized. However, since the mid-1990s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Chinese State Security began to increasingly view Falun Gong as a threat because of its number of practitioners, independence from the state, and spiritual teachings. In 1999, the Chinese government estimated the number of Falun Gong practitioners to be between 70 and 100 million. Tensions peaked in April 1999 when over 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners peacefully gathered outside the central government grounds in Beijing to appeal for legal recognition and freedom from government interference. This event, later referred to as a "demonstration," is widely viewed as a catalyst for the persecution that followed, but it is also believed that this may have been arranged by the CCP to justify the persecution.
On July 20, 1999, then Chinese Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin began a nationwide crackdown and multi-faceted propaganda campaign aimed at eradicating Falun Gong. The communist regime blocked internet access to websites that mentioned Falun Gong. In October 1999, the Communist Party declared Falun Gong a " heretical organization" that threatened social stability.
Human rights organizations report that Falun Gong practitioners in China have been subjected to a variety of human rights abuses: Hundreds of thousands are estimated to have been illegally detained. Detained practitioners are subjected to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and brainwashing for mental transformation by the Chinese authorities. By 2009, at least 2,000 Falun Gong practitioners had died in custody as a direct result of the abuse. Falun Gong sources documented over 3,700 verifiable deaths as of 2017. However, some observers believe the number of unreported cases is significantly higher and reported that preliminary investigations indicate that over 100,000 practitioners were killed to supply China's organ transplant industry. In the years since the persecution began, Falun Gong practitioners have actively started advocating for more human rights in China.
Falun Gong founder Li Hongzhi has lived in the United States since 1998 , and Falun Gong has a very large following worldwide. Some sources estimated that tens of millions continue to practice Falun Gong inside China despite the persecution, and outside of China hundreds of thousands of people practice Falun Gong in over 70 countries around the world.
origin
Falun Gong is mostly associated with the Qigong wave in China. Qigong is a modern expression for a variety of practices that involve slow movements, meditation and breathing exercises. Exercises similar to qigong have historically been practiced by Buddhist monks, Daoist martial artists, and Confucian scholars to ennoble the body, mind and virtue.
The modern wave of qigong emerged in the early 1950s when communist cadres adopted the techniques to improve their health. The new term was created to distance oneself from religious practices, as these were easily labeled "feudal superstitions" and persecuted during the Maoist era . The early adopters of qigong avoided its religious undertones and instead viewed it as a form of Chinese medicine. In the late 1970s, Chinese scientists claimed to have found evidence of the material existence of the Q1 energy used in qigong . In the post-Maoist spiritual vacuum, tens of millions, mostly old and urban Chinese citizens, began to practice qigong, and various charismatic qigong masters began to establish practices. In 1985, the State Qigong Research Society of China was established to monitor and control the Qigong wave.
On May 13, 1992, Li Hongzhi gave the first public lecture on Falun Gong in northeast Changchun City . In his hagiographic spiritual biography, it is said that Li Hongzhi learned the "cultivation practice" from various masters in the Buddhist and Daoist schools. Among them were Quan Jue, the tenth successor of the school of the Great Buddha Law , and a master of the school of the Great Way with the Daoist name True Daoist from the Changbai Mountains . It is said that Falun Dafa is the result of his sorting, revising, and sharing the teachings that have been given to him.
Li presented Falun Gong as part of a "centuries-old tradition of cultivation," aiming to revive the religious and spiritual elements of qigong that were thrown away in the earlier communist era. David Palmer wrote that Li "redefined his method so that it had goals entirely different from Qigong: the purpose of the practice was not to be physical health or the development of supernatural powers, but purification of one's heart and spiritual salvation."
Falun Gong differs from other qigong schools in that its teachings cover a wide range of spiritual and metaphysical subjects, with an emphasis on morality and virtue, with a full cosmology being presented. The practice is a Buddhist school (Fojia), but also contains concepts and languages from Daoism and Confucianism . This is why some scholars refer to the practice as syncretistic belief .
Beliefs and practices
Central teaching
Falun Gong aims to enable practitioners to ascend spiritually through moral righteousness and by practicing the exercises and meditation. The three pillars of faith are Truthfulness (真, Zhēn), Compassion (善, Shàn) and Forbearance (忍, Rěn). These three principles are considered together as the fundamental nature of the cosmos, as a yardstick to distinguish good from bad, and are considered to be the highest manifestation of Dao or Buddhist Dharma . Observing and cultivating these virtues is central to Falun Gong. In Zhuan Falun (转法轮), the main work published in 1995, Li Hongzhi writes: “But no matter how the moral norms of mankind change, the properties of this cosmos remain unchanged. They are the only yardstick by which to judge who is a good person and who is a bad person. As a cultivator, you must use the properties of the cosmos as a yardstick and conform to it, not the standard of ordinary people. "
Practicing Falun Gong consists of two parts: on the one hand, performing the exercises and, on the other hand, improving one's xinxing (spiritual nature, morality, temperament). In the main work of Falun Gong, Li says, “Xinxing includes De (De is a kind of substance); it implies forbearance; involves knowing; includes renunciation, renunciation of all desires and all kinds of attachments of an everyday person; and still be able to endure suffering and so on, it includes things in many areas. ”The elevation of spiritual nature is achieved on the one hand by striving for Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance in everyday life, on the other hand by laying desires and“ negative thoughts and behaviors such as greed, lust, lust, killing, fighting, stealing, cheating, jealousy, etc. "
Part of the basic concepts of Falun Gong teaching is the existence of virtue ('德, Dé) and karma (Ye). Virtue arises on the one hand through good deeds, on the other hand through enduring suffering. Karma is accumulated from doing bad deeds. It is said that the relationship between karma and virtue determines success and happiness in this and / or the next life. Virtue brings blessings and enables spiritual advancement; the accumulation of karma, on the other hand, leads to suffering, sickness and separation from the qualities of the cosmos (Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance). So the spiritual elevation is achieved through the removal of karma and the accumulation of virtue.
According to the teachings of Falun Gong, people are originally good, even divine, at heart, but after becoming selfish and accumulating karma, they have fallen into a world of delusion and suffering. In order to ascend again and return to the "original, true self", Falun Gong practitioners should assimilate themselves to the qualities of the cosmos (Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance), free themselves from attachments and desires and through enduring suffering their karma repay. The ultimate goal of the practice is enlightenment or spiritual perfection (Yuanman), whereby the practitioner steps out of the cycle of rebirth; known as samsara in Buddhist schools .
Two main focuses of Li Hongzhi's teaching are thoughts on traditional Chinese culture and modernity. Falun Gong reflects traditional Chinese belief that people are connected to the universe through mind and body. Li wants to question "conventional views" about the nature and formation of the universe, time-space and the human body. The practice includes aspects of East Asian mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine . She objects to the supposedly self-imposed limits of modern science and sees traditional Chinese science as something completely different, but equally valid and ontological system .
Exercises
In addition to its philosophy, Falun Gong consists of five exercises, four of which are standing and one is meditation. The exercises are considered secondary to the enhancement of virtue, but they are an essential part of cultivating Falun Gong.
The first exercise is called "Buddha holds out 1000 hands". It serves to enable the free flow of energy through the body and to open the meridians . In the second exercise, "Law Wheel Post Pose," the practitioner stands in four immobile body positions for a long time, each of which symbolizes holding a wheel. The goal of the exercise is to "improve wisdom, increase strength, increase level, and strengthen divine power". The third exercise, "Connecting the two cosmic poles", contains three different sequences of movements that aim to repel bad energy (ie pathogenic or black Qi ) from the body and to absorb good energy into the body. By practicing this exercise, the practitioner wants to purify and ennoble his body. Through the fourth exercise, "Law Wheel Heavenly Circle", the energy should be able to flow freely through the body again. The fifth exercise, "Enhancement of the divine abilities", is practiced in the lotus position in contrast to the first four exercises . It is a mediation that should be carried out for as long as possible.
The Falun Gong exercises can be practiced alone or in a group. The exercise time is variable to suit the needs and abilities of the individual practitioner. Porter writes that Falun Gong practitioners are encouraged to read the Falun Gong books and do the exercises regularly, preferably daily. Groups practice the Falun Gong exercises in parks, college campuses, and other public places in more than 70 countries around the world, with volunteer teaching free of charge. In addition to the five exercises, another meditation called "Sending Righteous Thoughts" was introduced in 2001. Its purpose is to reduce persecution on a spiritual level.
A genomic profile test study of six Falun Dafa practitioners showed that "changes in gene expression in Falun Gong practitioners in contrast to normal, healthy controls caused by a stronger immune system , downregulation of cell metabolism and changes in apoptotic genes in favor of rapid ones Dissolution of inflammation ”.
In addition to attaining physical health, many Buddhist and Daoist meditation systems seek to transform the body , cultivating various supernatural abilities (Shentong) such as telepathy and clairvoyance . Discussions about supernatural abilities are widespread within the qigong movement, and the existence of these supernatural abilities was widely recognized in China's academic community in the 1980s. The teaching of Falun Gong states that practitioners can acquire supernatural abilities through a combination of cultivation of virtue, meditation, and exercises. Some of these are precognition , clairaudience, telepathy and clairvoyance (through the opening of the third eye or celestial eye ). However, Falun Gong emphasizes that these skills can only be attained as a result of moral practice, and should not be sought or lightly displayed. According to David Ownby, Falun Gong teaches that "being proud of one's abilities or wanting to show off are signs of dangerous attachments," and Li warns his disciples not to be distracted from the pursuit of such powers.
Social practices
Falun Gong differs from monastic Buddhist traditions in that it places great emphasis on participating in normal social life. Falun Gong practitioners should continue to go to work and do well, lead normal family lives, and obey the laws of their respective governments; so are taught not to distance themselves from society. There is an exception for Buddhist monks and nuns who are allowed to continue their monastic life while they practice Falun Gong.
Since the teachings of Falun Gong emphasize moral behavior, they make strict personal demands on practitioners. They are expected to be honest, do good deeds, and be patient and forgiving when faced with difficulties. For example, Li dictates that Falun Gong practitioners “do not strike back when attacked; do not argue if they are verbally abused. ”In addition, they must“ discard bad thoughts and behaviors, ”such as greed, deceit, jealousy, etc. The teachings call not to smoke or drink alcohol, as these things are considered addictions are detrimental to health and mental clarity. Falun Gong practitioners are not allowed to kill, including animals to eat, but are not required to become vegetarians.
In addition to these things, Falun Gong practitioners are supposed to get rid of a number of worldly attachments and desires. During cultivation, Falun Gong disciples aim to break away from fame, fortune, feelings, and other entanglements. Li's teaching repeatedly emphasizes the futility of seeking material things, however, Falun Gong practitioners are not encouraged to quit their jobs or renounce money, only to give up emotional attachment to those things. Likewise, sexual desires and eroticism are viewed as attachments to be discarded; however, learners are generally expected to get married and have families. All sexual contact outside of monogamous, heterosexual marriages is considered immoral. While gay men and women can practice Falun Gong, it is said that such behavior creates karma and is contrary to the goals of the practice.
The cosmology of Falun Gong includes the belief that different races have a connection to their own heavenly realms and that individuals of mixed race lose some part of that connection. However, Li says that mixed race does not affect a person's soul, nor does it diminish their ability to cultivate. The practice is not against marriages between people of different races, and many Falun Gong practitioners have mixed race children of their own.
Falun Gong teachings advise against engaging in politics or social issues. Excessive interest in politics is seen as an attachment to worldly power and influence, but Falun Gong aims to put such pursuit behind. According to Hu Ping, “Falun Gong is only concerned with purifying the individual through the exercises and does not touch any social or national issues. It has neither proposed nor even suggested a model for social change. Many religions (...) strive to some extent for social reform (...), but such a tendency cannot be found with Falun Gong. "
Fonts
The first book on the teachings of Falun Gong was published in April 1993 under the name China Falun Gong, or simply Falun Gong . It is an introduction to Qigong, Falun Gong's relationship with Buddhism, the principles of cultivation practice, and the exaltation of one's spiritual nature (xinxing). It also includes illustrations and explanations of the exercises and meditation.
The book Zhuan Falun, published in Chinese in January 1995, contains the main teachings of Falun Gong. It is divided into nine lessons and is based on the revised transcripts of Li's lectures in China in the previous three years. The books have now been translated into 40 other languages. In addition to these major works, Li has published several books, lectures, articles, and volumes of poetry that are available free of charge on Falun Gong websites.
The teachings of Falun Gong contain some untranslated Chinese religious and philosophical terms and refer to people and events of Chinese folk and concepts from various Chinese religions. This, along with the literal translations of the texts, which reflect the slang style of Li's lectures, makes it sometimes difficult for Western readers to understand the Falun Gong scriptures.
Symbols
The main symbol for the practice is the Falun (wheel of the law, commandment wheel or Dharma chakra in Sanskrit ). In Buddhism, the wheel of law represents the completeness of teaching. The title of Falun Gong's major work Zhuan Falun (Turning the Wheel of Dharma) means to teach Buddhist teachings. Despite the use of Buddhist language and symbols, the wheel of law, as understood in Falun Gong, has its own meaning and is viewed as the image of the entire cosmos. It is shown as a symbol with a large swastika and four small swastiks, which represent the Buddhist system, as well as four small Taiji (Yin-Yang) from the Daoist tradition.
End time of the Fa
Li spreads his teachings of Falun Gong in the "End Times of the Fa" (Mo Fa, 末法), which the Buddhist scriptures describe as the age of moral decline in which the teachings of Buddhism must be corrected. The present age is described in the teachings of Falun Gong as the time of "Fa-rectification" (zhengfa, 正法), a time of cosmic transition and renewal (zhengfa could also be translated as "correcting the Fa"). The Fa-rectification process becomes necessary due to the moral decline and degradation of life in the cosmos. The Chinese government's persecution of Falun Gong in China since 1999 is now seen as a tangible symptom of this moral decline in this context. Through the process of Fa-rectification, everyone's life is rearranged based on their morality and spiritual quality, with good people being saved and raised to higher spiritual levels, while bad people are struck down or destroyed. Under this paradigm, Li takes on the role of Fa-rectification by spreading his teaching.
Some scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang and Susan Palmer, described Li's talks about "Fa-rectification" and the possibility of salvation in "the last days of the end times" as apocalyptic . On the other hand, Benjamin Penny argues that Li's teachings can be better understood when viewed in the context of the "Buddhist view of the cycle of the Fa or Buddha-Fa." Richard Gunde notes that, unlike apocalyptic groups in the West, Falun Gong is not fixated on death or the end of the world, but instead contains "a simple, harmless moral message." Li Hongzhi does not speak about a "time of reckoning" and in his teachings rejects predictions about the impending end of the world.
classification
Falun Gong is a multifaceted practice that means different things to different people. Starting with a series of physical exercises for better health and a practice of self-change, to a moral philosophy and a new system of knowledge. Scholars and journalists used different terms and classifications to describe Falun Gong; some of them are more precise than others.
Since Falun Gong originated within the Chinese Buddhist tradition, David Ownby points out that this practice can only be properly understood if the historical reference from which this practice comes is taken into account. In the cultural context of China, Falun Gong is therefore generally described as either a qigong or a "cultivation practice" (Xiulian). According to Benjamin Penny, professor of Chinese history at the Australian National University , "cultivation" is a Chinese term that describes the process by which a person seeks spiritual perfection, often through improvement both physically and mentally. Throughout Chinese history, various cultivation practices that included Buddhist, Daoist, and Confucian traditions and were part of Chinese life have appeared again and again. Qigong practices can therefore also be seen as part of another tradition of “cultivation practices”. Penny wrote, "The best way to describe Falun Gong is as a cultivation system."
In the West, Falun Gong is regularly regarded as a religion because of its theological and moral teachings, its preoccupation with spiritual cultivation and transformation, and its extensive scriptures. Human rights organizations report the persecution of Falun Gong as a violation of religious freedom. In 2001, Falun Gong received the International Religious Freedom Award from Freedom House . Falun Gong practitioners themselves sometimes reject this classification, indicating the relatively narrow definition of "religion" (zongjiao) in China today. According to David Ownby, religion in China has been defined since 1912 as a "world historical belief" that has "well-developed institutions, pastors and written traditions" - namely Buddhism, Daoism, Islam , Protestantism and Catholicism . However, Falun Gong does not have these characteristics, temples, rituals of worship, priests, or a formal hierarchy. In addition, if Falun Gong had been described as a religion, it would probably have been suppressed immediately in China. Despite these historical and cultural circumstances, the practice is still often referred to as a type of Chinese religion. German religious scholars do not regard Falun Gong as a religion in the strict sense, but as a "popular religious movement" without reference to Buddhist religions, according to religious historian Hubert Seiwert from the University of Leipzig . Religious scholar Ulrich Dehn from the University of Hamburg sees the practice as "a meditation movement with religious aspects as long as it is nourished by Buddhist and Daoist elements". Friedmann Eißler, religious scholar and advisor at the Evangelical Central Office for Weltanschauung questions , also regards Falun Gong as "a religious movement with comprehensive and exclusive claims" without assigning the status of a religion to this practice.
Although journalistic literature repeatedly referred to Falun Gong as a "cult," it does not meet the definition of such. A sect is broadly defined as a branch or denomination of an established belief system or church. However, although Falun Gong incorporates both Buddhist and Daoist ideas and terms, it does not claim to have any direct connection to or ancestry from these religions. Sociologists view sects as exclusive groupings that exist within clearly defined boundaries, with strict standards of acceptance and strict loyalty. On the other hand, Noah Porter notes that Falun Gong has none of these characteristics: "There are no clearly defined boundaries and anyone can practice it." Cheris Shun-ching Chan also writes that Falun Gong "is not fundamentally a cult": its practitioners do not disconnect from normal society, it is "loosely structured, with fluctuating members and tolerance of other organizations and beliefs," and cares more about personal, rather than common, veneration.
Public perception
The perception of Falun Gong (Falun Dafa) went through different periods of acceptance in and outside of China. From 1992 to 1996, Falun Gong's popularity in China increased rapidly and peaked in 1999. From 1995 onwards, Li Hongzhi taught Falun Dafa more and more outside of China, which increased the popularity of this Buddhist qigong school there too. Although the state-controlled media initially supported Falun Gong massively, the media split in 1996 after Li withdrew from the Chinese Qigong Research Society and at the same time refused to open a branch of the Chinese Communist Party within his school that wanted to exercise control over Falun Gong. In addition to articles of praise, there were also critical contributions that questioned what had previously been praised even by high state organs. Then, after the persecution began in July 1999, all of the media in China disseminated articles from the Ministry of Propaganda and the 610 Office aimed at defaming and marginalizing Falun Gong. At the same time, "the case of Falun Gong" was taught in all schools and universities and linked to every exam. The articles discriminating against Falun Dafa were also initially published by Western media because they did not have any other information than that from China. However, after the extent of the persecution became known outside of China, there was a reassessment and acceptance of Falun Gong, and human rights organizations, media and governments turned against the persecution of Falun Gong and the Communist Party's propaganda.
Perception before persecution
After the public presentation of Falun Gong in the spring of 1992, Li Hongzhi and his qigong school immediately became leaders in the qigong movement and were accepted by the government-administered qigong research society in China. In 1993, Yiwen Military Publishing House published Li Hongzhi's first major textbook, "Chinese Falun Gong". In the first half of the year, a number of enthusiastic articles appeared in the state-controlled media, praising the virtues of Falun Gong and discussing the superiority of the Falun Gong system across the country. At the same time, state organs thanked Li for the positive effects of his teaching. The Ministry of Public Security thanked Li for helping 99 police officers who were injured while on duty achieve "obvious improvements" in their health through Falun Gong. The Public Security Daily , a publication of the Ministry of Public Security, Falun Gong praised for "promote traditional virtues to combat crime of the Chinese people by ensuring social order and security, and righteousness in society promotes" the. Li participated in the Beijing Asia Health Fair and won several awards. Li himself received the “Most Hailed Qigong Master” award, and Falun Gong was honored with the “Special Gold Award” and the “Advanced Frontier Science Award”. In 1994, Li Hongzhi was named "Grand Master of Qigong" by the Qigong Research Association of Jilin Province. In early 1995, a publication ceremony was held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Public Security to celebrate the publication of the book Zhuan Falun , The Complete Teaching of Falun Gong, by the Chinese Television Authority Publishing House. In the same year, Li was invited by the Chinese embassies in Paris and Stockholm to teach Falun Dafa abroad. After Paris, Li gave three lectures in Sweden.
Beginning of public criticism
From 1996 onwards, opinion-forming about Falun Gong changed: while some state organizations and state-controlled media continued to advocate Falun Gong, others began to criticize it. This applied to both qigong in general and Falun Gong in particular.
Falun Gong withdrew from China's state-run Qigong Research Association in March 1996 after Li discovered that it was more interested in profit than doing real research. At the same time, he refused to open a branch of the Chinese Communist Party within his qigong school. Falun Gong was left completely without government supervision and support. As a result, Falun Gong became a high-level debate within the government and the Communist Party, with some ministries and government agencies continuing to support the practice while others became increasingly suspicious of it. These tensions were also reflected in the media as some continued to praise the effects of Falun Dafa while others criticized it as pseudoscience. In June 1996, the first major state article appeared in the Guangming Daily , accusing Falun Gong of spreading "reactionary superstitions" and "deceiving the masses." Shortly afterwards, the State Buddhist Association of China, which had not previously spoken out against Falun Gong, began to criticize it. In July of the same year, Falun Gong books were banned by China's News Publishing Bureau, a branch of the Propaganda Department, on the grounds that Falun Gong was "spreading superstition." This was despite the fact that Falun Gong was awarded the "Advanced Frontier Science Prize" in 1993. Since the Falun Gong books were no longer available for sale, copied versions with Li's consent became popular. The Qigong Research Society of China, which Li had proclaimed "Grand Master of Qigong" in 1994, also participated in the criticism. While admitting that Falun Gong practitioners "achieved unparalleled results in terms of vitality and disease prevention," she claimed that Li Hongzhi was promoting "theology and superstition."
In 1997, the Ministry of Public Security started an investigation into whether Falun Gong should be considered "Xiejiao" (heretical religion), but the ministry's report concluded that "there is no evidence yet." However, in July 1998, the ministry released Document No. 555, "Notice of Investigation into Falun Gong," in which it suddenly called Falun Gong an "evil religion."
Qiao Shi , then-retired chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress , conducted his own investigation into Falun Gong in response to Document No. 555 and concluded that "Falun Gong benefits the Chinese people and China for hundreds of benefits and not has only one bad effect ”. In 1998, China's National Sports Commission also concluded that "the exercises and effects of Falun Gong have been excellent" and the practice has "made an extraordinary contribution to improving the stability and ethics of society." Estimates by the State Sports Commission put between 60 and 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in China. Despite the partial criticism in China, Li was again invited by the Chinese Embassy in Paris to give a lecture in the Assembly Hall of the United Nations in Geneva in front of 1200 participants.
In February 1999, Wu Shaozu of the National Sports Commission of China said in an interview with US News & World Report that the popularity of Falun Gong has dramatically reduced health care costs. According to Wu, “every practitioner can save 1,000 yuan in health costs annually. If 100 million practice, it will save 100 billion yuan annually ”. Wu added that then Prime Minister Zhu Rongji was "very happy about it". In April 1999, He Zuoxiu, a physicist of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and brother-in-law of Luo Gan , then head of state and party chief Jiang Zemin's security, published an article in the youth magazine of Normal University in Tianjin . In this post, Falun Gong is criticized as superstitious and portrayed as potentially harmful to the youth. After Falun Gong practitioners in Tianjin complained to the editorial office, they promised to publish a retraction, but broke their word. Due to violence against practitioners and illegal arrests, 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered peacefully in front of the Central Appeal Office next to the Zhongnanhai Government Complex in Beijing on April 25th. Five Falun Gong officials met with Premier Zhu Rongji to ask for official recognition and an end to the escalating harassment against the group. Zhu agreed to release the illegally arrested practitioners in Tianjin, and assured officials that the government would not oppose Falun Gong. However, on the same day, Communist Party leader Jiang Zemin issued a letter expressing his wish that he would see Falun Gong "defeated". This letter caused concern among Communist Party members at the popularity of Falun Gong. In early May, Jiang Zemin decided that Luo Gan and Hu Jintao should set up a special task force, the 610 Office, to prepare a campaign to discredit Falun Gong. At the same time, the authorities increased the surveillance of Falun Gong in various cities and tapped practitioners' phones.
Perception from the start of the persecution
On July 19, 1999, during a meeting, the Communist Party cadre announced Jiang Zemin's decision to eradicate Falun Gong. The crackdown began the following day, July 20, 1999. A nationwide propaganda campaign was launched to discredit and eradicate Falun Gong. However, terms such as "cult" or "sect" did not initially appear in the propaganda against Falun Gong. It was not until October 25th that Jiang Zemin described Falun Gong as a "sect" to the French newspaper Le Figaro . Immediately afterwards, the term was adopted by the state-controlled People's Daily newspaper and Falun Gong was referred to as "Xiejiao". Originally used as a "deviant teaching" regarding Confucianism, "Xiejiao" is used in communist China to persecute religious communities that do not recognize the CCP as the ultimate authority. During the propaganda campaign against Falun Gong it became an "evil sect" in the European-speaking area and an "evil cult" in the English-speaking area in order to - as Ian Johnson and Hubert Seiwert argued - "with the legitimacy of the anti-cult movement of the West" to persecute one to justify religious minority to foreign countries. The term "malevolent cult" was defined by the atheist government "for political premises, and not by any religious authority," and was used by the authorities to postpone previous arrests and imprisonments as "constitutional". On November 13, 2000, China's Anti-cult Association was established to provide "theoretical justification for the persecution of Falun Gong" and to support "various anti-Falun Gong activities" at home and abroad.
Voices on the CCP's Propaganda
The Chinese Communist Party's labeling as an "evil cult" or "evil cult" met with opposition abroad.
The Washington Post wrote in November 1999 that a party source said, "It was Mr. Jiang who ordered that Falun Gong be branded a 'cult' and then demanded that a law be passed banning cults."
Religious scholars took the following positions: Ulrich Dehn wrote in 1999 that the accusations made by the Communist Party of China were irrelevant and at the same time criticized the German media landscape because the reporting sometimes gave the impression that “German East Asia correspondents in particular do not always adhere to the suggestiveness of the official could withdraw Chinese propaganda against Falun Gong ”. In 2000, Hubert Seiwert stated that the Chinese government was "consciously referring to the Western discussion of cults in its argumentation" in order to justify the persecution of a religious minority abroad. In 2001 , Jean-François Mayer took the same stance in Switzerland and viewed the word “cult” as a means of exclusion.
Hong Kong Baptist University's John Powers and Meg YM Lee stated in 2001 that the popular perception of Falun Gong was an "apolitical qigong practice club" and was therefore not viewed as a threat by the government prior to the persecution. As a result, the main strategy of the suppression campaign against Falun Gong has now been to convince people to reclassify Falun Gong into a series of "negatively charged religious names" such as "evil cult", "sect" or "superstition". In this process of renaming, the government tried to use a “deep reservoir of negative feelings” that “are connected with the historical role of quasi-religious cults as destabilizing forces in the political history of China”. Even the group's silent protests have now been labeled "social unrest".
In 2002, Human Rights Watch (HRW) characterized China's move to label Falun Gong a "cult" as a "political decision with potentially far-reaching political consequences." For HRW, the methods used during the crackdown reflected previous efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to eradicate religion itself.
Pulitzer Prize winner Ian Johnson argued in 2005 that the Chinese government had put Falun Gong on the defensive by calling it "cult" and camouflaged the crackdown on Falun Gong "with the legitimacy of the anti-cult movement of the West."
In April 2006, during a state visit to Washington, the Chinese party leader Hu Jintao tried to convince President Bush to publicly declare Falun Gong an "evil cult" that should be banned, but Bush refused.
Former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and Canadian Immigration Attorney David Matas viewed the term "evil cult" in 2007 as part of the Chinese government's suppression of Falun Gong. For David Matas, the Chinese government's labeling of Falun Gong as an "evil cult" is "part of the suppression of Falun Gong, a pretext for that suppression, and a slander, hatred, depersonalization , marginalization, and dehumanization of Falun Gong." ... The bad cult label is a fabricated tool of oppression, but not its cause. ”Kilgour and Matas regard Falun Gong practitioners as“ good citizens and members of their respective civil societies ”.
Canadian historian David Ownby wrote in 2008 that "the entire issue of the alleged cultic nature of Falun Gong was a red herring from the start that was cleverly exploited by the Chinese state to weaken the appeal of Falun Gong."
At the 65th UN General Assembly in New York in 2010, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, condemned the Chinese-led stigmatization of Falun Gong and other small communities as a "cult", whereby they "often meet social prejudice" , "Which can expand into full-fledged conspiracy theories". A member of the Chinese delegation replied, "Falun Gong is an evil cult," and it was right, "that China severely punishes and ultimately 'exterminates' Falun Gong."
Religious scholar Friedmann Eißler stated in 2011: "The official Chinese assessment as a dangerous sect is politically motivated, it is not covered by serious incidents in either China or Europe."
Defamation Actions
Since the Chinese Communist Party did not limit its propaganda campaign against Falun Gong to China but expanded it to other countries, the discrediting was reflected here as well. For example, Les Presses Chinoises in Quebec , Canada, published a series of articles between November 2001 and February 2002 describing Falun Gong as an "evil" cult and "enemy of the state" and continued to do so despite a court in Quebec prohibited it from doing so. In August 2002, the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council found that Vancouver- based Chinese language television station Talentvision had violated journalistic ethics by re-broadcasting anti-Falun Gong propaganda produced by Beijing's state-controlled media.
As a result of this massive discrediting carried out abroad, there were legal disputes: In 2004 the Canadian Falun Gong practitioner Joel Chipkar won a defamation case against Pan Xinchun, China's consul in Toronto. Pan had described Chipkar in a newspaper article as a member of a "dark cult" that wanted to "incite hatred". Pan was sentenced by the court to pay Chipkar $ 10,000 in damages, but left the country without paying.
In 2005, a court ruling dismissed the German Dafa Association's libel suit that the defendant's statement that Falun Gong was a psycho sect was an insult. In his ruling, the judge indicated that the defendant's testimony would fall under freedom of expression. Furthermore, the term "psychosect" is applicable to Falun Gong, since it offers "meditation courses" and "seminars for learning meditation technique" in accordance with the decisions of the Federal Administrative Court and the Federal Constitutional Court . The Federal Administrative Court ruled in 1989 that the term "may also be used for movements that have an open organizational structure and whose courses or seminars have a therapeutic goal". And the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 2002 that the “term 'sect' typically finds its general use in the religious field, regardless of its origin” and “often indicates a minority role vis-à-vis the large religious communities”. The attribute “psycho” is added when “therapeutic meditation courses on a large scale” are offered. In his statement of reasons, the judge pointed out that this term did not in itself contain any evaluation, neither positive nor negative, but added that "in public ... the term arouses a bundle of negative associations".
In the same year, the Edmonton Police Service confiscated anti-Falun Gong materials distributed by officials at the Chinese Consulate in Calgary at the American Family Foundation's annual conference . The materials, including calling Falun Gong a "cult," have been categorized as violating the Criminal Code, which forbids willfully promoting hatred against identifiable religious groups.
On 18 January 2006, the condemned Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario , the Chinese Senior Association practiced because of discrimination against one of its members, the Falun Gong. The tribunal found that the association repeatedly confronted the 73-year-old plaintiff with her belief in Falun Gong and subjected her to humiliating comments about her beliefs. These discriminatory acts resulted in the plaintiff's disregard and loss of reputation, exposed her to isolation within her own cultural community, and a violation of her dignity. The tribunal clarified that Falun Gong is a creed, a "sheltered ground" in the world Meaning of the Ontario Human Rights Code. It also forms the Plaintiff's "deep and sincere personal beliefs about her own spirituality." The association was fined $ 18,000 for loss of dignity and mental agony, and for amending its statutes to rule out future discrimination. Ontario Human Rights Commission Chief Representative Barbara Hall commented on the verdict: “This decision confirms that the Doctrine of Faith encompasses more than just institutionalized religions or traditional religions. Individuals have the right to their honest beliefs and should be treated with dignity and respect and not face discrimination because of their particular beliefs or practices. "
In the same year, the Canadian Radio-TV-Telecommunications Commission disagreed with the anti-Falun Gong broadcasts on China Central Television (CCTV), stating, “These are expressions of extreme malice against Falun Gong and its founder, Li Hongzhi. This could incite violence and threaten the physical security of Falun Gong practitioners. "
In 2008, the Quebec, Canada Appeals Court ruled that the Chinese newspaper Les Presses Chinoises slandered Falun Gong by portraying the practice as dangerous and perverse.
On August 12, 2012 , the US Department of Justice issued an acknowledgment of the complaint filed by Falun Gong practitioners who were kicked out of the pub by a restaurant owner for wearing shirts depicting the teachings of the Falun Gong spiritual movement , which prohibits the accused from discriminating against a customer based on their religion, religious expression, dress, or association with Falun Gong. Tom Perez , Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division found it "shameful that a person should be refused service in a restaurant for doing nothing but exercising their right to wear clothing with a religious message".
observer
After Falun Gong became better known outside of China, observers from various disciplines looked at the movement and assessed its teaching and structure independently of China's propaganda. In addition to analyzing the teachings and behavior of practitioners in Chinese and foreign society, predictions were also made about how long Falun Dafa could withstand the suppression and whether there would be a danger that brutal repression would turn a peaceful movement into a violent one Resistance could arise.
Sociologist John Wong predicted in 1999 that the crackdown "effectively slowed down" Falun Gong and that the CCP's repression will cause the demise of Falun Gong. Wong also considered the opportunities for growth outside China to be limited by the “peculiar Chinese character of the movement”. Both assumptions did not come true, see the story of Falun Gong . Massimo Introvigne did not see it the same way as Wong, because since Falun Gong has no "organization" that could be wiped out by the Chinese regime, he stated that "Falun Gong as a diffuse and disorganized practice is likely to remain popular despite government opposition" .
The sociologist William T. Liu of the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore wrote that according to the critical Western definition of "cult", especially according to Margeret Singer's definition, Falun Gong is not a cult because the "leadership style is neither totalitarian nor based on exclusion and isolation ”, and“ there is no clear evidence of public glorification of the founder ”.
Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance believes that Falun Dafa does not fit any definition of cult (sect). Neither to the Christian countercult movement (CCM) nor to the anti-cult movement (ACM), nor to the definition of Margaret Singer. However, the Chinese government "adopted much of the terminology used by the Western anti-cult movement" to suppress Falun Dafa. The International Cultic Studies Association (ICSA) only lists information about Falun Dafa that includes the Chinese government's suppression of the group.
Michael D. Langone, director of the International Cultic Studies Association, noted that Falun Gong is portrayed in sociological studies as a movement with relatively open borders and little pressure to stay. Therefore, Langone also sees "no convincing evidence that Falun Gong currently fits into the stereotype of a cultic group that recruits members under high pressure and socio-psychological influence and binds them to itself."
For the media critic Danny Schechter , Falun Gong neither fulfills the definition of a sect nor that of a cult, as it has no direct relationship to established belief systems or main churches, which defines the term. Although Falun Gong incorporates both Buddhist and Daoist ideas and terms, it does not claim to have any direct connection to or ancestry from these religions.
According to ethnologist Noah Porter, Falun Gong also has no characteristics of an exclusive group that exists within clearly defined boundaries, with strict admission standards and strict affiliation. Falun Gong has no clearly defined boundaries and anyone can practice it.
Alain Vivien, President of the Inter- Ministerial Mission to Combat Cults (MILS) stated in 2001 that Falun Gong is not considered a cult in France. Falun Gong "has never committed any crime or has been the object of a complaint." Under these conditions, Falun Gong has nothing to fear from the anti-cult law passed by the National Assembly in late May.
Massimo Introvigne, sociologist, lawyer and one of the leading experts on sects and new religions, sees Falun Gong as an easy path, “based on Buddhism and Confucianism, which aims to promote the three key values of Truthfulness, Kindness and Forbearance both individually and socially Level. "
Religious scholar Friedmann Eißler, advisor at the Evangelical Central Office for Weltanschauung questions, regards Falun Gong as "a religious movement with comprehensive and exclusive claims", but not as a sect.
Sociologist Cheris Shun-ching Chan of the University of Hong Kong wrote that Falun Gong is "categorically not a cult" because the practitioners maintain their connections to normal society, are "loosely structured, with a fluctuating affiliation and tolerance of other organizations and religions ”. They are more about personal than collective veneration.
In his study of Falun Gong, historian and religious scholar David Ownby stated, “Unlike cults, Falun Gong has no financial obligations, no isolation of practitioners in communities, and no withdrawal from the world. There is no penalty for leaving Falun Gong as there is nothing to leave. Practitioners can practice Falun Gong as much or as little as is convenient for them. You can start or stop at any time. You can do the exercises individually or in groups. "Ownby added," Falun Gong practitioners stay in society. Most of them live in their normal (core) family. You go to work; send their children to school. "
According to the Leipzig religious scholar Hubert Seiwert, the “popular religious movement” Falun Gong is “by no means” a sect, and - contrary to the Chinese propaganda which tries to legitimize its repression - there is no information that Falun Gong poses any danger . Seiwert also points out that it would also be “completely inappropriate” to “call Falun Gong a 'Buddhist sect'”.
Pulitzer Prize winner Ian Johnson noted that Falun Gong does not fit the standard definition of a cult: “Its members get married outside of the group, have friends outside of the group, have normal jobs, do not live in isolation from society, do not believe the end of the world is imminent, and don't give the organization significant sums of money ... it doesn't advocate violence and is at its core an apolitical, inward-looking discipline aimed at purifying oneself spiritually and improving one's health. "
Religious scholar Ulrich Dehn from the University of Hamburg considers Falun Gong a "serious meditation movement", bizarre, but not dangerous. “It is by no means a sect,” says Dehn, but “a meditation movement with religious aspects, provided it is nourished by Buddhist and Daoist elements.” It is also not an organization, but a loose association of people willing to meditate. “There was no evidence of the movement's aggression,” said Dehn, “and there are no allegations of racism, totalitarian structures or other human rights-related problems either from the writings or other statements of the founder of the movement, Li Hongzhi, or from the statements or behavior of the movement as a whole to prove."
David Kilgour, known for his interreligious dialogue, and David Matas also reject the sect accusation, as Falun Gong has no points in favor of it. David Matas, representative of Holocaust survivors when they immigrated to Canada, said, “Falun Gong has none of the characteristics of a cult. It's not an organization. It has no memberships or offices, no administrators or leaders. Falun Gong has no money or bank accounts. Falun Gong practitioners live at home with their families. You do not live apart from fellow practitioners. They are not expected to make any financial contribution to Falun Gong. There is no penalty for leaving Falun Gong as there is nothing to leave. Practitioners are free to practice as little or as much Falun Gong as they see fit. You can start and stop at any time. You can do your exercises in groups or individually. The practitioners, albeit mostly ethnic Chinese, come from a wide variety of cultures and backgrounds. They lead a normal everyday life, can be found in all professions, eat the same food as everyone else, study in the same schools and universities as non-practitioners. Li Hongzhi, the author of the books that inspired Falun Gong practitioners, is not worshiped by practitioners. He also does not receive any money from practitioners. He is a private individual who rarely meets with practitioners. All of his advice to practitioners is public information, such as conference lectures and published books. "
For human rights attorney David Matas, the claim that Falun Gong is a cult "so far from reality and so closely related to the Chinese decision to persecute Falun Gong" is open to question as to whether it could be already seems inappropriate. Because “the evil of inciting hatred does not just lie in the conclusions. That lies in the questions that are asked “, since these can already contain a presumption and judgment, with all the consequences that may result from it. According to Matas, even if research shows otherwise, "the question of the propagandist is [considered] a valid question and gives it credibility"
Historian David Ownby notes that sympathy for Falun Gong is undermined by the effect of the "cult label" applied to the practice by the Chinese authorities, which has never completely disappeared in the minds of some Westerners and which still stigmatizes it Role in public perception of Falun Gong.
Commendations
After Falun Gong became known abroad, especially as a result of the brutal persecution by the Chinese Communist Party, Falun Gong became more and more popular, including praise. Here are a few excerpts:
In 1994 the city of Houston , Texas , USA, proclaimed Li Hongzhi an honorary citizen of the city for his "unselfish public service for the benefit and welfare of mankind".
Hilary Mary Weston , Lieutenant Governor of Ontario , described Falun Dafa in 1999 as "a compelling discipline, and the fact that it has become so popular in such a short time is a tribute to its formidable health benefits."
Rabbi David Saperstein , former president of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom , said in 2001 that Falun Gong has become a "symbol of freedom." In the same year, Margit Tombak, Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Office of the President of the Republic of Estonia, responded to an inquiry: “It is good to hear that in today's materialistic world where everyone is in a hurry, there is a movement that teaches compassion, tolerance and harmony, and that this movement is gaining so much popularity. Such an initiative is indeed necessary and welcome. ”And New York Senator Neil Breslin recognized that“ more than 100 million people in more than 54 countries [are practicing] Falun Dafa to turn away from drugs, alcohol and violence ”.
Larry W. Campbell , Mayor of Vancouver, Canada, thanked Falun Dafa in 2004 for aligning practitioners "with moral standards and the traditional values of honesty, courtesy, loyalty, and selflessness." In the same year, 22 Senators from Kansas in their Senate Resolution No. In 1845, in support of Falun Dafa, peaceful and nonviolent practice.
George Ervin "Sonny" Perdue III , as Governor of Georgia in 2005, paid tribute to the determination and courage of Falun Dafa practitioners to stand up for Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance under the most difficult of conditions. And Ernie Fletcher , as Governor of Kentucky, praised that “Li Hongzhi, the founder of Falun Dafa, has helped hundreds of millions of people around the world improve their health, morals, and understanding of life, humanity and the universe through the practice to deepen Falun Dafa ”.
In 2013, Stephen Harper , the Prime Minister of Canada , recognized Falun Dafa's impact on society: “Over the past two decades, millions of people around the world have benefited from the teachings of Falun Dafa. The principles of Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance, which are at the heart of this practice, are strongly in line with our pluralistic society. "
In 2016, Martin Patzelt from the Federal Government's Human Rights Committee conveyed his “appreciation for the selfless commitment of Falun Gong practitioners to their values of Truthfulness, Compassion and Tolerance. These values are universally valid and can only bring good things to mankind. I am pleased that there are many Falun Gong practitioners in Germany, including a number of Chinese. "
organization
Organization in general
An important part of the teaching is that Falun Gong is "informal," meaning that it has little or no formal organization. Falun Gong practitioners are not allowed to raise money or charge fees, or to heal, or to impart or interpret the teachings for others. There are no administrators or officials, no membership, churches or places of worship within the practice. Since there is no membership or admission rites, anyone who chooses to practice can be a Falun Gong practitioner. Students are free to participate in the practice and follow the teachings as much or as little as they like, and practitioners do not instruct others about what to believe or how to behave.
Spiritual authority resides entirely in the teaching of founder Li Hongzhi. However, from an organizational point of view, Falun Gong is decentralized, and the local branches and contacts do not have any special privileges, powers, or titles. The volunteer contacts have no authority over other practitioners no matter how long they have been practicing Falun Gong. Li's spiritual authority is absolute within the practice, but the organization of Falun Gong is opposed to totalitarian control and Li does not interfere in practitioners' private lives. Falun Gong practitioners have little to no contact with Li except through studying his teachings. There is no hierarchy in Falun Gong to enforce strict faith and little to no emphasis is placed on dogmatic discipline. According to Craig Burgdoff, professor of religion, the only thing that is emphasized is the need for strictly moral behavior.
As far as there is an organization for Falun Gong, it is created through a worldwide network and a largely virtual online community. In particular, electronic communication tools, mailing lists, and a collection of websites are the primary tools for organizing and disseminating Li Hongzhi's teachings.
Outside mainland China, there is a network of volunteer "contact persons", local Falun Dafa associations and university associations in over 70 countries (as of January 2018). Li Hongzhi's teachings are basically disseminated through the Internet. In most medium to large cities, Falun Gong practitioners organize regular groups to practice, meditate, and read Li Hongzhi's writings together. The practice and meditation meetings are described by practitioners as non-formal groups that meet for one to two hours, mostly in the morning, in public parks. The reading groups usually take place in the evenings, in private apartments or classrooms in schools and universities. If there is any "community experience" within Falun Dafa at all, David Ownby describes these meetings as "the closest thing to it" that Falun Gong offers. People who are too busy, isolated, or who simply prefer seclusion may instead practice by themselves. If expenses have to be borne (for example, for renting space for large conferences), these costs are borne by people who are willing to take the initiative and who are relatively wealthy.
Organization within China
In 1993, the Falun Dafa Research Association became a branch of the State Qigong Research Association of China, which administered various qigong schools in the country and sponsored activities and seminars. As requested by the Qigong Research Society, Falun Gong was organized into a nationwide network of aid centers: "main stations," "branches," "guidance stations" and local practice sites, reflecting the structure of the society for qigong and even the CCP itself. Falun Gong workers were volunteers who volunteered to demonstrate the exercises, organize events, and distribute Li Hongzhi's new writings. The Falun Dafa Research Association gave students advice on meditation techniques, translation services, and nationwide coordination of the practice.
After Falun Gong broke away from China's Qigong Research Association in 1996, it came under increasing scrutiny from the authorities. In response, it adopted an even more decentralized and looser organizational structure. In 1997, the Falun Dafa Research Association was officially dissolved along with the local "main stations". However, practitioners continued to organize themselves at the local level, keeping in touch through electronic communications, personal networks, and group practice areas. Both Falun Gong sources and the Chinese government said that there were around 1900 "guidance stations" and 28,263 local Falun Gong practice sites in 1999, but they disagree on the level of vertical coordination between these groups. As a result of the persecution that began in 1999, Falun Gong has been driven underground, the organizational structure within China has become more informal, and the Internet has become the main communication platform for practitioners.
After the persecution of Falun Gong began in 1999, the Chinese authorities wanted to portray Falun Gong as a hierarchical, well-funded organization. James Tong writes that it was in the government's interest to portray Falun Gong as highly organized in order to justify the repression of the group: "The more organized you could portray Falun Gong practitioners, the better the regime could do its repression on behalf of the social Justify order. ”Tong concluded that the party's allegations“ lacked substantiated evidence, both internally and externally, ”and that despite the arrests and close monitoring, the authorities never“ credibly disproved Falun Gong's evidence ”.
Demographics
In 1998, the Chinese State Sports Commission estimated that 60 to 70 million people practice Falun Gong in China, similar to the Chinese Communist Party's membership. In February 1999, she told US News & World Report that up to 100 million people now practice Falun Gong in China. When the persecution began on July 22nd, 1999, according to most statements by the Chinese authorities, there were suddenly only two or three million Falun Gong practitioners, although some published figures remained around 40 million. According to Falun Gong, the number at that time was 70 to 100 million. Other sources put the number of practitioners at 10 to 70 million. It is difficult to determine the number of Falun Gong practitioners in China today, but some sources estimate it to be tens of millions practicing privately.
In 1998, demographic surveys in China showed that the majority of Falun Gong practitioners were women and elderly. Of 34,351 Falun Gong practitioners surveyed, 27% were male and 73% were female. Only 38% were under 50 years old. Falun Gong also attracted a range of other people, from young college students to bureaucrats, intellectuals, and party officials. Polls from the 1990s showed that between 23% and 40% of practitioners had university degrees, many more than statistically in the general population.
Falun Gong is practiced by tens of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands, outside of China, including the largest communities in Taiwan and North American cities with large Chinese populations such as New York and Toronto. Palmer and Ownby demographic surveys in these communities found that 90% of practitioners are Chinese. The people were on average 40 years old. 56% of the respondents were female and 44% male; 80% were married. The practitioners included "university professors and students, high party and government officials, well-educated cadres and members of the upper middle class, and [...] the old, the weak, the unemployed and the desperate." The survey showed that the respondents were very educated: 9% had a doctorate, 34% a master's degree and 24% a bachelor's degree. According to Ownby, the average Chinese practitioner in North America is "young, urban, and dynamic." Scott Lowe, Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire , came to similar conclusions . Lowe found that Chinese respondents residing in Western nations "were uniformly educated and clearly represented the overseas elite," with all respondents having a master's degree or higher. Respondents from Singapore and Malaysia had a mixed educational profile, with the minority having university degrees.
The main motivations for practicing Falun Gong were its intellectual content, cultivation exercises, and health benefits. Non-Chinese Falun Gong practitioners generally fit the profile of "spiritually seeking" people who had tried various qigong, yoga, or religious practices before finding Falun Gong. This is in contrast to the standard Chinese profile, which Ownby described as “the straightest of the straight arrows”.
According to Richard Madsen, Chinese scientists with PhDs from renowned American universities who practice Falun Gong claim that modern physics (such as the superstring theory ) and biology (specifically the function of the pineal gland ) provide a scientific basis for their beliefs. In their view, "Falun Dafa is more knowledge than religion, more a new form of science than belief."
History within China
1992 to 1996
Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public on May 13, 1992 in Changchun , Jilin Province . The following September, Falun Gong was accepted as a qigong school by the China State Qigong Research Association. Li was recognized as a qigong master and authorized to teach his practice nationwide. Li traveled to major cities in China to teach the practice from 1992 to 1994 and received a number of awards from CCP government organizations such as the Ministry of Domestic Security .
According to David Ownby, professor of history and director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Montreal , Li has become a "celebrity of the qigong movement," and Falun Gong has been recognized by the government as an effective way to reduce health care costs to promote Chinese culture and raise social morale.
For example, in December 1992 Li and several Falun Gong students took part in the Asian Health Fair in Beijing, where, according to the organizer, he "received the most praise [of all qigong schools] at the fair and achieved very good therapeutic results." The fair increased Li's popularity, and press reports about Falun Gong's healing powers spread. In 1993, a publication by the Ministry of Public Security praised Li for "promoting traditional virtues of the Chinese people in fighting crime, maintaining social order and security, and promoting righteousness in society."
Falun Gong differed from other qigong groups in its emphasis on morality, low cost, and striking health effects. It spread very quickly via word of mouth, attracting people from all walks of life, including numerous members of the Chinese Communist Party.
From 1992 to 1994, Li took fees for the seminars he held across China. Compared to competing qigong practices, these were considerably less, and the local qigong associations received a significant share. Li reasoned the fees as necessary to cover travel expenses and other expenses, yet he sometimes donated the money to charity. In 1994, Li completely stopped charging fees and stipulated that Falun Gong must always be taught for free, including online. Although some observers believed that Li continued to make significant income from selling Falun Gong books, others denied it, who found that most of the Falun Gong books in circulation were pirated.
Even though Li stopped giving seminars and lectures himself, he continued to provide his teachings by publishing Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun . Zhuan Falun, whose publication ceremony was held in the auditorium of the Ministry of Public Security in January 1995, became a bestseller in China (until it was pirated after the publication ban in 1996).
In 1995, the Chinese authorities tried to strengthen Falun Gong's organizational structure and relationship with the party state. The Chinese National Sports Committee, the Ministry of Public Health, and the China State Qigong Research Association approached Li to jointly establish a Falun Gong association. However, Li declined the offer. In the same year, the Qigong Research Society issued a new regulation requiring all qigong schools to establish a branch of the Communist Party. Li refused again.
In 1996, tensions between Li and the Chinese Qigong Research Association began to increase. With Falun Gong's rising popularity - partly due to its low cost - Li has been accused by competing qigong masters of undercutting it. According to Schechter, the qigong association, which Li and other qigong masters belonged to, required Li to raise its fees, but Li emphasized the need for the teachings to be and remain free.
In March 1996, in response to the increasing disagreement, Falun Gong withdrew from China's Qigong Research Association, and thereafter operated outside of the state's official approval. Falun Gong representatives tried to register with other government agencies but were turned away. Li and Falun Gong were now outside the circle of personal relationships and financial opportunities that gave the other qigong masters and their organizations a place within the state system and the protection that the system offered.
1996 to 1999
At the time that Falun Gong turned away from the state-run Qigong Research Association of China, the government changed its view of qigong practices. As the qigong critics became more influential in the government, the authorities tried to limit the growth and influence of these groups. Some already had tens of millions of followers. In the mid-1990s, the state-run media began to publish critical articles about qigong.
Initially, Falun Gong was not the target of growing criticism, but it lost that protection after quitting the Chinese Qigong Research Society in March 1996. On June 17, 1996, Guangming Daily , an influential state-controlled newspaper, published a polemical article about Falun Gong . In it, Falun Gong's main work Zhuan Falun was cited as an example of "feudal superstition". The author wrote that human history was a "battle between science and superstition" and called on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudoscientific books by swindlers". The article was followed by at least 20 more in newspapers across the country. Soon after, on July 24th, the Central Propaganda Department banned all publication of Falun Gong books, but the ban was not enforced consistently. The state-run Chinese Buddhist Association also started criticizing Falun Gong and urged lay Buddhists not to take up the practice.
The events were a great challenge to Falun Gong and not something that practitioners took lightly. Thousands of Falun Gong practitioners wrote to the Guangming Daily and the China Qigong Research Society complaining. They alleged that the reports violated Hu Yaobang's "Triple No" directive from 1982, which required the media not to encourage or criticize qigong practices. In later incidents, Falun Gong practitioners peacefully demonstrated in front of the media offices or the local government to demand the withdrawal of what was deemed unjust.
The polemic against Falun Gong was part of a larger state media movement against qigong organizations. Although Falun Gong was not the only target of media criticism, and Falun Gong did not demonstrate it alone, its response was the most agile and steadfast. Many protests by Falun Gong practitioners against the negative media coverage have been successful and have resulted in the withdrawal of many newspaper articles.
In June 1998, He Zuoxiu, an avowed critic of qigong and a passionate advocate of Marxism, appeared on a talk show on Beijing television . There he openly denigrated qigong groups and specifically mentioned Falun Gong. The Falun Gong practitioners peacefully demonstrated against this and asked the broadcaster for a reply. A few days later, the journalist in charge of the program was fired and a program positive about Falun Gong was broadcast. Falun Gong practitioners also demonstrated in 14 other media outlets.
In 1997, the Ministry of State Security began an investigation into whether Falun Gong should be considered "xie jiao" (邪教, "heretical doctrine"). The report concluded that “there has been no evidence of this so far”. However, on July 21, 1998, the Ministry of Domestic Security issued Document No. 555, "Announcement to Investigate Falun Gong." It claims that Falun Gong is a "heretical teaching" and that a further investigation should be conducted to find evidence for this claim. Falun Gong practitioners reported that their phone lines were tapped, their homes were ransacked and ransacked, and the practice sites were disrupted by State Security agents.
During this period, despite increasing criticism of Qigong and Falun Gong in some circles, there were still some high-ranking supporters of the practice in the government. In 1998, Qiao Shi , the recently retired chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, began his own investigation into Falun Gong. After months, his group concluded that "Falun Gong has hundreds of benefits and not a single bad effect for the Chinese and China." From May to October of the same year, China's National Sports Commission also conducted its own investigation and asked doctors to conduct medical surveys on a total of 12,731 Falun Gong practitioners in Guangdong Province . Before practicing Falun Gong, 93.4% of those surveyed had chronic diseases, and 48.9% had at least three diseases. By practicing, 99.1% reported improved health. A cure rate of 58.5% was given for diseases of all kinds. The proportion of people who belonged to the "extremely vital and healthy" category increased from 3.5% before the practice to 55.3%. Overall, 97.9% of the practitioners increased their vitality and health. In October, the National Sports Commission concluded, “We believe that the exercises and effects of Falun Gong are excellent. The practice has made an extraordinary contribution to improving the stability and ethics of society. This should be duly confirmed. "
During the period of rising tension with the government, Li Hongzhi, the practice's founder, was mostly outside the country. At the invitation of the Chinese embassies in Paris and Stockholm, Li left China in March 1995 to teach Falun Dafa abroad. After Paris and a series of lectures in Sweden, he spread his teaching in other European, American and Asian countries. In 1998 he settled in the USA.
Protests in Tianjin and Zhongnanhai
In April 1999, a critical report on Falun Gong was published in Tianjin Pedagogical University's Youth Reader magazine . The article was written by the physicist He Zuoxiu, who, Porter and Gutmann note, is the brother-in-law of Luo Gan , a member of the Politburo and head of State Security. The article described qigong, and especially Falun Gong, as superstitious and dangerous for the youth. In response, about 5,000 practitioners held a silent and peaceful demonstration on April 22nd at the Tianjin College of Education and in front of the newspaper offices, demanding that the article be withdrawn. The editors initially agreed to withdraw, but broke their word. Suddenly 300 riot police showed up who had been ordered to "use martial law and evacuate the area." However, the security forces did not find a "Falun Gong demonstration," only practitioners sitting around peacefully. Still, the police marched into the crowd, beat practitioners, and arrested 45 of them. Falun Gong practitioners then turned to Tianjin City Hall to ask for the detained practitioners to be released. There they were told, however, that the order to dissolve the rally and detain the demonstrators was "initiated by the Ministry of State Security under the central government," and further complaints are to be directed to Beijing.
Therefore, on April 25th, 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners went to the Central Appeal Office to petition for an end to the increasing harassment against the movement and the release of practitioners detained in Tianjin. According to Benjamin Penny, the practitioners wanted redress from the government and "if very calmly and politely, make it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily." However, the practitioners were awaited by the police and Red Army units, who blocked their way to the Appeals Office and diverted everyone to Fuyou Street, which led directly to the Zhongnanhai government seat . The regular security forces on Fuyou Street had been assigned. Cameras were set up everywhere along the way. Jiang Zemin drove past the practitioners in his limousine with smoked glass windows and watched the staged scene. China analyst Ethan Gutmann wrote that State Security officials were waiting for the practitioners and penned them up on Fuyou Street in front of the Zhongnanhai Government Complex to stage an incident. At the gate of the Forbidden City , Red Army Guard troops waited in jeeps with bayonets on their rifles, but there was no provocation from practitioners for 16 hours. All the practitioners sat or just stood still on the sidewalks around Zhongnanhai.
Five representatives of Falun Gong practitioners eventually met with Prime Minister Zhu Rongji and other high-ranking party officials. Zhu assured representatives that the regime supports physical exercises for health promotion and that Falun Gong is not viewed as anti-government. Zhu also promised to release the illegally detained practitioners. Then the crowd of Falun Gong practitioners broke up. However, that same evening, Jiang Zemin wrote a letter expressing his desire to see Falun Gong "destroyed". In the letter, he expressed concerns about the size and popularity of Falun Gong, particularly the large number of high-ranking members of the CCP who were among Falun Gong practitioners. He let it be known that he saw Falun Gong's moral philosophy as opposed to the atheistic values of Marxist Leninism and that it was therefore a kind of ideological competition.
A day later, the Chinese media reported that Falun Gong practitioners had gathered at Zhongnanhai and "everyone is free to practice or not, as they wish." Meanwhile, Jiang Zemin convened a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee to discuss the so-called "Falun Gong demonstration," which he described as "the largest demonstration since the Tiananmen Square student demonstration in 1989". Jiang and Security Tsar Luo Gan demanded determined action to suppress and crush Falun Gong. Jiang reportedly criticized Prime Minister Zhu for being too "soft" with the situation.
According to Gutmann, the April 25 incident was just the deployment of an elaborate decoy with Falun Gong as a scapegoat, with plans to suppress it having started years earlier. According to Gutmann, the article in the state-owned journal of Tianjin Normal University was "a flicker in the night sky, a signal and an attempt to test the party's designs." According to Chinese press reports, the Chinese government was supposedly surprised by the practitioners, but a group from Jilin Province was intercepted at a bus station by a special police division and sent back home. Others have already been intercepted by police in Shenyang. Another group from Harbin were sent back by police when they arrived at the Beijing train station. Instead of the regular Fuyou Street security guards detached, Red Army guards with bayonets on their firearms were in jeeps on the east side of the Forbidden City, and police officers directed practitioners to Fuyou Street, Zhongnanhai, instead of the Appeals Office . Everything was recorded by video cameras. According to Gutmann, there is no taping, film, or plausible report pointing to provocations from Falun Gong practitioners. The myth of a disorderly demonstration or riot, fabricated by the Chinese Communist Party, only appeared later in official media reports in which the demonstration was ultimately portrayed as a terrorist act. And since, according to Gutmann, the western media knew so little about Falun Gong, the Chinese fiction lasted from April 25th until today.
Jiang is held personally responsible by Falun Gong practitioners for his decision to persecute Falun Gong. Peerman gives reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi; Saich cites Jiang's anger at the widespread popularity of Falun Gong and ideological battles as the cause of the persecution. Willy Wo-Lap Lam suggests that Jiang's decision to suppress Falun Gong was due to his desire to strengthen his power within the Politburo. According to Human Rights Watch , the CCP leaders and the ruling elite were far from unified in support of the persecution.
persecution
On July 20, 1999, the security forces abducted and detained thousands of Falun Gong practitioners who they identified as the alleged leaders. Two days later, on July 22nd, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China banned the Falun Dafa Research Association as an unlawful organization that "engages in illegal activities, advocates superstition and deceit, misleads people, causes unrest, and those jeopardize social stability ”. On the same day, the Ministry of Public Security issued a circular prohibiting citizens from practicing Falun Gong in groups, possessing Falun Gong teachings, displaying Falun Gong banners or symbols, and opposing the ban demonstrate.
The subsequent campaign aimed to "eradicate" the group through a combination of propaganda, detention, and forcible re-education of practitioners, resulting in the deaths of practitioners. In October 1999, four months after the ban began, laws were put in place to outlaw "heterodox religions" and to sentence Falun Gong practitioners to prison terms.
It is estimated that hundreds of thousands have been detained without trial. Detained practitioners have been subjected to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive "mental re-education" by the Chinese authorities. The US State Department and the Executive Committee of Congress on China estimated that half of those detained in labor camps in China are Falun Gong practitioners. China analyst Ethan Gutmann estimated that Falun Gong practitioners make up an average of 15 to 20% of the “ Laogai ” inmates, which includes forced labor camps as well as prisons and other types of administrative detention. Former labor camp inmates reported that Falun Gong practitioners are one of the largest groups of prisoners. In some labor camps and prisons, they make up the bulk of the prisoners and have often been said to have received the longest sentences and the worst treatment. A 2013 Amnesty International report on re-education camps found that Falun Gong practitioners in some camps "average a third to 100 percent of the inmates."
According to Ian Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong affects many sections of society, including the media, the police, the military, the educational system and the workplace. An extra-constitutional unit, the 610 Office, was created to "oversee" the endeavor. Human Rights Watch noted that families and employers were being pressured to cooperate with the government.
Speculation about the motivations
Foreign observers attempted to explain the Communist Party's motivation for the ban based on several factors: the popularity of Falun Gong; China's history of quasi-religious movements that led to violent uprisings; Falun Gong's independence from the state and refusal to submit to the party line; internal power politics within the party and Falun Gong's moral and spiritual content that contradicts aspects of official Marxist ideology.
The CCP's official news outlet, Xinhua News Agency , wrote that Falun Gong opposes the Chinese Communist Party and the central government and preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition. Xinhua also reiterated that the "so-called" principles of honesty-compassion-forbearance taught by Falun Gong have nothing to do with the socialist, ethical and cultural advancement that China seeks to achieve. Xinhua further argued that it was necessary to crush Falun Gong in order to maintain the CCP's "leadership and purity". Other reports from state media postulated in the first days and weeks of the ban that Falun Gong must be defeated because its theistic philosophy contradicts the Marxist-Leninist paradigm and the worldly values of materialism.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam of CNN writes that Jiang Zemin's campaign could perhaps have been used against Falun Gong to to promote him over loyalty. Lam quoted a veteran of the Party: "By using a Mao-style movement [against Falun Gong], Jiang is forcing long- standing cadres to swear allegiance to him." According to the Washington Post , not all members of the Standing Committee shared Jiang's view of Falun Gong wipe out. James Tong suspected that there was still no significant opposition from the Politburo.
According to Human Rights Watch, the fight against Falun Gong mirrors the CCP's historical efforts to eradicate religion as a matter of principle, as the government regards it as fundamentally subversive. The Chinese government protects five "patriotic" CCP-approved religious groups. Unregistered religions that are outside the state-approved organizations are therefore defenseless against oppression. Globe and Mail wrote: "(...) any group that is not under the control of the party is a threat." According to Craig S. Smith of the Wall Street Journal , the party is increasingly threatened by any belief system that challenges its ideology and has the ability to organize itself. Jiang Zemin was particularly disturbed by the fact that Falun Gong, whose belief system is a revival of traditional Chinese religion, was practiced by large numbers of members of the CCP and the military. For Julia Ching of the Institute of Asian Studies at the University of Toronto , Jiang saw “the threat posed by Falun Gong as an ideological threat: spiritual beliefs versus militant atheism and historical materialism. He [wished] to rid the government and the military of such beliefs. "
Yuezhi Zhao points out several other factors that may have worsened the relationship between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media. These included the power struggles within the Qigong Research Association, the influence of Qigong opponents among the leaders of the Communist Party, and the mid-1996 to mid-1999 disputes between Falun Gong and China's powerful elite over the status and treatment of the movement. According to Zhao, Falun Gong practitioners established a "resistance identity" that opposed the prevailing pursuit of wealth, power, scientific rationality and "the entire value system associated with China's modernization project." In China, the practice represented an indigenous spiritual and moral tradition, a cultural revitalization movement, and thus offered a sharp contrast to "Marxism with Chinese characteristics".
Vivienne Shue similarly stated that Falun Gong posed a major challenge to the Communist Party's legitimacy. Shue argued that Chinese rulers historically derived their legitimacy from the claim to have an exclusive connection to "truth". In imperial China the truth was based on a Confucian and Daoist cosmology, while in the case of the Communist Party the truth is represented by Marxist Leninism and historical materialism. Falun Gong challenged the Marxist-Leninist paradigm and revived an understanding based on traditional Buddhist and Daoist ideas. According to David Ownby, Falun Gong has also questioned the Communist Party's supremacy over the Chinese nationalist discourse: "[Falun Gongs] highlighting a different view of Chinese tradition and its contemporary value is so threatening to the state and the party because it is them denied the sole right to define the meaning of Chinese nationalism and perhaps even Chinese unity. "
Maria Chang noted that since the fall of the Qin Dynasty, "millennial movements have had a profound effect on the course of Chinese history," which accumulated in the 1949 Chinese revolutions that brought the Chinese communists to power. Patsy Rahn describes a paradigm of conflict between Chinese denominational groups and the rulers who often challenge them. According to Rahn, the history of this paradigm goes back to the collapse of the Han dynasty : “The pattern of the ruling power keeping a close eye on denominational groups, occasionally feeling threatened by them and occasionally campaigning against them, began in the second Century and continued over the entire dynastic period, over the Mao era to the present. "
610 Office
In May 1999, Jiang Zemin ordered that then security chief Luo Gan and Hu Jintao set up a special task force to plan, implement, and control the persecution of Falun Gong. This was called the "Central Leadership Group for Handling Falun Gong". To carry out its task, on June 10, 1999, the leadership group established the 610 Office (中央 610 辦公室), an executive and supervisory body named after its founding date. The office reports directly to the Chinese Communist Party and has no formal legal authority, so it is also described as an extra-legal organization.
The central 610 Office is headed by a senior member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party Political Bureau and directs other state and party organs in the anti-Falun Gong campaign. It is closely related to the powerful Political and Legal Committee of the Communist Party of China. Local 610 Offices have been established at provinces, counties, parishes, and neighborhood levels. There are an estimated 1,000 offices across China.
The main functions of the 610 Office include coordinating anti-Falun Gong propaganda, surveillance and intelligence, as well as punishing and "transforming" Falun Gong practitioners. The office has reportedly been involved in extrajudicial convictions, as well as forced relocation, torture and the killing of Falun Gong practitioners. Overseas, the 610 Office is involved in monitoring, infiltrating, and gathering data on links with Falun Gong. Hao Fengjun, a former 610 agent and defector from Tianjin, said, "Much of the funds available for Chinese overseas work are used for public relations against dissidents. The main expenses are used to bribe decision-makers. "
In 2003, the mandate of the 610 Office was expanded to include Falun Gong as the number one priority, and it has since targeted religious and qigong groups that the Chinese Communist Party deems "heretical" or "harmful".
Media campaigns
The Chinese government's campaign against Falun Gong was promoted by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and the Internet. Within the first month after the crackdown, 300 to 400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the major state newspapers. At the same time, prime time television broadcast alleged exposés about the group. Divergent views no longer appeared in any media. The propaganda campaign centered on claims that Falun Gong is endangering social stability, is deceptive and dangerous, is "against science," and threatens progress. It has been argued that Falun Gong's moral philosophy is incompatible with Marxist social ethics.
China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith confirmed that several months after Falun Gong was banned, the evening news on China Central Television contained little more than thrashing against Falun Gong. According to Wright and Fewsmith, the government's act was "a study of absolute demonization." The newspaper Beijing Daily , the official media of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Communist Party, compared Falun Gong with "a road traversing rat, calls on everyone that they should crush them." Furthermore, it was heard from some officials that it would be a "long, complex and serious" struggle to "eradicate Falun Gong."
State propaganda first used the attraction of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong's view of the world was "in complete opposition to science" and communism. For example, on July 27, 1999, the People's Daily claimed that the fight against Falun Gong was "a fight between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism." Other editorials stated that Falun Gong's "idealism and theism are absolutely at odds with the fundamental theories and principles of Marxism" and that the "principles of" Truthfulness-Compassion-Forbearance "taught [by Falun Gong] are inconsistent with socialist ones , ethical and cultural progress that we strive to have in common. ”The suppression of Falun Gong has been portrayed as a necessary step in order to maintain the Communist Party's“ leadership ”in Chinese society.
In the months after July 1999, propaganda in the state media escalated, even including allegations that Falun Gong was collaborating with foreign "anti-China" forces. However, despite the party's efforts, the initial allegations against Falun Gong failed to find broad popular support for the group's persecution. Starting in October, the Chinese media changed its propaganda against Falun Gong. This was preceded by an email interview with Jiang Zemin by the French newspaper Le Figaro , in which the latter insisted that all of his statements should be published verbatim. In this interview, Jiang called Falun Gong a "sect". Immediately afterward, People's Daily, the Chinese Communist Party organ, claimed that Falun Gong was a "Xiejiao". A direct translation of this is “heretical teaching”, but during the propaganda campaign against Falun Gong it became “evil cult” in English and “evil sect” in German. In the context of Imperial China, the term “Xiejiao” was used to denote non-Confucian religions. However, in the context of communist China, it is used to target religious communities that do not submit to the authority of the CCP.
Ian Johnson argued that applying the cult label to Falun Gong was a government cover-up tactic that linked "the crackdown on Falun Gong [...] to the anti-cult movement of the West" in order to gain an understanding of their suppressive measures. Johnson pointed out, however, that Falun Gong does not meet any of the regular definitions of a cult or sect because, for example, Falun Gong practitioners marry non-followers, have normal social circle of friends, are active in society, and do regular jobs . The practice does not receive large amounts of money, and no one believes in the near end of the world. According to Johnson, Falun Gong is not an advocate of violence and is an inward, apolitical practice that aims to improve one's health and purify oneself spiritually. David Ownby, similar to Johnson, argued that all Communist Party's propaganda that Falun Dafa is a cult or sect is intended to mislead both the Chinese people and abroad. According to Ownby, the Chinese government is using the term cunningly to reduce the popularity of Falun Gong. According to John Powers and Meg YM Lee, Falun Gong was seen in the public eye as an "apolitical practice association for qigong" that was not threatening either to the people or the government. Accordingly, the Communist Party now tried to convince the people to view Falun Gong with "negative prejudices" such as "evil sect", "evil cult" or "superstition". Therefore, the most critical strategy in this renaming process was to evoke a "deep reservoir of negative feelings" by associating Falun Gong with "the historical role of quasi-religious sects as a destabilizing force in Chinese political history." That is why, for example, the group's silent and peaceful demonstrations were redefined as “social disturbances”.
In education
The propaganda against Falun Gong also penetrated the Chinese education system. After Jiang Zemin banned Falun Gong in 1999, then Minister of Education Chen Zhili launched an aggressive anti-Falun Gong campaign. Chen used her special relationship with Jiang Zemin and the associated privileges to forcibly implement Jiang's genocide policy in the Chinese education system. She held numerous meetings where she spread the Party's position on Falun Gong within all levels of academic institutions, including graduate degrees, universities, colleges, middle schools, elementary schools, and kindergartens. It forced faculty, staff and students to watch slanderous propaganda films; Forced students to sign a petition against Falun Gong for the "One Million Signatures" campaign; the Ministry of Education had to incorporate anti-Falun Gong materials into classroom materials and examination papers, including college and graduate school entrance exams; in addition, Chen used the anti-Falun Gong programs on the Chinese Central Television (CCTV) as teaching materials in ordinary schools to instill animosity and long-term mind control in future teachers . Their efforts even included a "cultural revolution-like oath" requiring faculty, staff, and students to publicly denounce Falun Gong. Teachers who did not attend were either fired or imprisoned. Uncooperative students have been denied academic progress, others have been kicked out of school or sent to "re-education camps" to be brainwashed and changed in their thinking.
Chen also worked to spread the anti-Falun Gong propaganda in academic fields abroad. She used domestic educational funds to promote and encourage foreign institutions to oppose Falun Gong. Due to opposition from the international community to the persecution of Falun Gong, Chen gradually went from undercover in the education system and exported the persecution overseas through diplomatic channels in the name of "cultural and educational exchanges". At a conference hosted by the Chinese Ministry of Education in July 2002, Chen revealed that the education departments at foreign embassies and consulates "have done a lot of work to attack Falun Gong." Through what is known as "cultural and educational exchanges," Chen distributed huge amounts of financial aid overseas to spread the persecution of Falun Gong overseas, and wasted China's education fund and national resources overseas.
Self-immolation incident in Tian'anmen Square
A turning point for the propaganda campaign came on the evening of the Chinese New Year on January 23, 2001, when five people set themselves alight in Tiananmen Square. This self-immolation incident in Tian'anmen Square was portrayed as an attempted self-immolation by Falun Gong practitioners by the official Chinese Xinhua News Agency and other state media. The Falun Dafa Information Center denied the allegation on the grounds that Falun Gong's teachings specifically prohibit suicide and killing, and pointed out that the incident was "a cruel (if clever) staging."
Within an hour of the incident, the media ran a report in English only, with foreign reporters pointing out that cutting-edge coverage in China is not really possible as all messages must be checked and approved by multiple Communist Party channels. A week later, China Central Television (CCTV) in China showed video footage of the incident, such as 12-year-old Liu Siying being interviewed in an ambulance despite being severely burned, Liu's mother Liu Chunling being hit in the head by a hard object, and Wang Jindong sat cross-legged despite the fire and had a bottle of gasoline between his legs. In an interview later, both Wang and Liu Baorong, who did not appear as a "victim" until a week later, but was not seen on any of the recordings, claimed that they drank half a bottle of gasoline that day, which experts believe in theirs Doubted credibility. On the CCTV broadcast, those involved said that they believed they would come to paradise through the self-immolation.
At the time of the incident, however, reporters and a cameraman from CNN were on the scene who denied that the five people (three women and two men) included a child. The CNN cameraman tried to film the event, but was immediately arrested by military police and his equipment was confiscated.
The CCTV video showed that twelve-year-old Liu Siying was able to sing a song despite a tracheotomy, which again raised doubts among observers. On March 21, 2001, Liu was due to be released as cured and healthy, but died a few hours after a visit from the head of the hospital and the head of the Beijing Medical Administration Division. The autopsy results were not given to Liu's doctors, who could not explain their sudden death. Xinhua's claim that mother Liu Chunling, the only person who died on the spot, died from her burns was refuted by analysis of the CCTV video. The picture-by-picture analysis shows that Liu was killed by a hard blow to the head. Philip Pan of the Washington Post researched all five alleged victims and found no evidence that they were Falun Gong practitioners. In Liu Siying's hometown and her mother, Liu Chunling, no one had ever seen them practice Falun Gong. In addition, Liu worked in a bar and made her living by keeping men company. In addition, she often argued with her mother and daughter and even beat them. Behavior that is inconsistent with that of Falun Gong practitioners.
Wang Jindong, who sat cross-legged despite the fire and even had a plastic bottle full of gasoline between his legs, observers noted that he was not in a Falun Gong practice position, but rather that his posture was more like that used by soldiers in the military. In addition, Wang later claimed that he drank gasoline from a plastic bottle and spilled the rest on his clothes. On the one hand, however, the bottle on the video was still full, on the other hand, three grams of gasoline per pound of body weight leads to death. However, Wang remained seated during and after the fire with no evidence of poisoning. Therefore, Liu Baorong's statements raised doubts that half a bottle of gasoline would have been enough to kill her given her body weight. Nevertheless, Liu also appeared on CCTV without any signs of at least severe symptoms of intoxication.
Wang Jindong and Liu Baorong appeared on TV several times. Since there were discrepancies and contradictions during these performances, the World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong (WOIPFG) had a language analysis carried out at the language processing laboratory of the National University of Taiwan . Both Wang and Baorong found that the performances were different people. These observations solidified the assumption that the self-immolators were commissioned actors.
Falun Gong sources and other commentators pointed out that the account of those involved in the incident, as well as other aspects of the conduct of those involved, is inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa.
Chin-Yunn Yang of the Global Media Journal summarizes that all investigators from the Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe , National Review and Media Channel, and International Education Development (IED) agree that the alleged self -immolation incident was caused by the The Chinese Communist Party was staged to "prove" that Falun Gong was brainwashing its followers to commit suicide and should therefore be banned as a threat to the nation. The IED issued a statement during the 53rd session of the United Nations calling China's violent attack on Falun Gong practitioners state terrorism and the self-immolation incident was "government orchestrated."
Yang also pointed out, however, that the results and the exposure of the staged incident have not been fully broadcast in the Western mass media. And in China's tightly controlled communications environment, people couldn't find out about it at all. Time reported that Falun Gong was not seen as a real threat by many Chinese people before the self-immolation, and that state repression went too far for them. However, after the incident, the media campaign picked up noticeably in mainland China. As public sympathy for Falun Gong declined, the government began approving "systematic use of force" against the group.
In February 2001, a month after the Tiananmen Square incident, Jiang Zemin convened a rare central labor conference to emphasize the importance of continuing the campaign against Falun Gong and gathering senior party officials behind the effort. Under Jiang's leadership, the persecution of Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "maintaining stability," just as the party did during the June 1989 Tian'anmen massacre . Jiang's message was repeated at the 2001 National People's Congress, where the eradication of Falun Gong was linked to China's economic progress. After Jiang resigned from office, the persecution of Falun Gong continued, albeit less prominent on the national agenda. In 2008 and 2009, ongoing high-level "hard-hitting" campaigns against Falun Gong were initiated. In 2010, a three-year campaign began to revive the forced "re-education" of Falun Gong practitioners.
Re-education
According to James Tong, associate professor of political science and director of East Asian Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles , the regime aimed at both the forcible dissolution of Falun Gong and the "re-education" of practitioners. In 2000, the Party stepped up its campaign and sentenced "relapsed" practitioners to "transformation through work" to induce them to give up their beliefs and "transform" their thoughts. Prison terms were arbitrarily extended by the police and unclear and ambiguous charges were made such as “disturbing the social order”, “endangering national security” or “undermining the socialist system”. According to Bejesky, most of the long-term detained Falun Gong practitioners are subject to this system rather than the criminal justice system. After their reform custody expires, the practitioners who persisted are detained in "transformation camps" set up by the provincial authorities to "transform their minds."
Much of the re-education is based on Maoist techniques of indoctrination and mind manipulation, in which Falun Gong practitioners are forced to watch anti-Falun Gong television programs and take classes in Marxism and materialism. Traditional Marxism and materialism are the core content of these sessions.
The government-sponsored image of the re-education process emphasizes psychological persuasion and various "subliminal sales tactics". According to Tong, this practice is portrayed as the "ideal practice" in reports from the regime. On the other hand, reports of Falun Gong portray "disturbing and alarming" forms of coercion against practitioners who refuse to give up their belief. According to Tong, 14,474 cases of various torture methods were classified (Falun Gong practitioners documented over 63,000 individual cases of torture). These include cases of severe beatings, psychological torment, corporal punishment and forced labor, hard labor, torturous postures, solitary confinement under deplorable conditions; "Heat treatment" including incineration and freezing; Electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, which can cause nausea, cramps, or fainting; "Destructive" force-feeding; Torture with bamboo sticks under fingernails and throat tied up; Deprivation of food, sleep and use of the toilet; Rape and gang rape; as well as threats, extortion and dismissal from work and student status.
Tong writes that the cases are verifiable because most of them first document the individual practitioner, often with age, occupation and place of residence; secondly, the time and place at which the reported abuse took place down to the level of the district, the municipality, the village and often also the specific prison institution; and third, the names and rank of the alleged perpetrators. Many of the reports include lists of witnesses' names and descriptions of the injuries. The publication of repeated "abusive, often brutal behavior by named persons with their official title, place and time of torture" indicates, according to Tong, that there is no official will to cease or refrain from such activities.
Deaths
Because of the difficulty of verifying deaths from torture in China, estimates of Falun Gong practitioners killed in the persecution vary widely. In 2009 the New York Times reported that according to human rights organizations, the repression claimed "at least 2,000" lives. According to Amnesty International, at least 100 Falun Gong practitioners died in 2008, either in custody or shortly after their release. Falun Gong sources documented over 3,700 verifiable deaths. China analyst Ethan Gutmann estimated from extensive interviews that 65,000 Falun Gong practitioners were killed for their organs between 2000 and 2008. David Kilgour and David Matas reported that "the [organ] source of 41,500 kidney transplants in the six years from 2000 to 2005 is unclear."
The Chinese authorities do not publish statistics on the Falun Gong practitioners killed in the persecution. In individual cases, however, the authorities denied that deaths in custody were the result of torture.
Organ harvesting
In 2006, reports of organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners and other political prisoners in the People's Republic of China increased the international community's attention and concern. The reports indicated that prisoners of conscience, mainly Falun Gong practitioners, are being executed "on demand" for their organs, in order to quickly supply the Chinese transplant market with organs to meet the demand for living organs. It was assumed that the organ harvesting was due to the Chinese Communist Party's widespread persecution of Falun Gong. Hundreds of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been illegally arrested by the persecution. At the same time, institutions and individuals in the Chinese transplant area are said to have been given financial incentives.
Although reports of systematic organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners first surfaced in 2006, some investigators believed that it began as early as 2000. Persons involved in the investigation - in particular the Canadian human rights lawyer David Matas and the former Canadian State Secretary and Public Prosecutor David Kilgour , who were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 for their work investigating the illegal organ harvesting , as well as the China analyst Ethan Gutmann - assume that that besides Uyghurs , Tibetans and members of Christian house churches , tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners imprisoned as prisoners of conscience were murdered to support the lucrative organ and corpse trafficking, and that this crime continues. Their conclusions were drawn from statistical analysis and interviews with former prisoners, medical workers and agents of the Chinese State Security. In addition, there were large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners detained without trial in China; lack of evidence of organ sources for 41,500 kidney transplants from 2000 to 2005; Profits made from organ sales; and Chinese transplant hospital websites openly offering organs that can be delivered to order in the shortest possible time, even with guarantees.
Other investigators, who conducted independent investigations, came to similar conclusions, including the Assistant Director of the Human Rights and Medicine Program at the University of Minnesota Kirk Allison, the Vice-President of the European Parliament Edward McMillan-Scott , the anthropologist and investigative journalist Scott Carney, Jacob Lavee, Director of the heart transplant department at Sheba Medical Center in Israel and the chairman of the Swiss National Foundation for Organ Donation and Transplantation Dr. Franz Always .
The Chinese government denies all allegations, but to date there has been no reasonable statement from the state organs that would refute the allegations. Therefore, the allegations have drawn attention and public condemnation from governments, international organizations and medical societies. Canada , the European Union and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives passed resolutions condemning organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture Manfred Nowak and Freedom of Religion or Belief Asma Jahangi repeatedly asked the Chinese government to prove the source of the organs used in transplants. This prompted the UN Committee against Torture to request "a full explanation of the source of organ transplants" in November 2008 in order to investigate the organ harvesting allegations and to take action to punish those who abuse them. The World Medical Association and the American Transplant Society called for sanctions against medical professionals from China. Various countries introduced bills such as France , Canada and Australia . Others passed organ trafficking laws to discourage citizens from traveling to China for organ transplants, such as Israel in 2008, Spain in 2010, Taiwan in 2015, Italy in November 2016, and Norway in June 2017.
In the resolution passed by the European Parliament on December 12, 2013, it expressed, among other things, “its deep concern about the persistent and credible reports of systematic, state-approved organ harvesting from conscientious objectors in the People's Republic of China, which are carried out without the consent of those concerned including large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners imprisoned for their religious beliefs, as well as members of other religious and ethnic minorities. ”The resolution called for the immediate release of all prisoners of conscience and urged China to answer the United Nations' inquiries about the to answer organ sources used in transplants. This resolution was forwarded to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese National People's Congress, among others.
On March 19, 2014, Henri Malosse , President of the European Economic and Social Committee , described it in his opening speech at the conference “Organ harvesting in China: Europe must act now” in Brussels as “scandalous that such a practice is being carried out by Chinese officials”. The participants and speakers of the conference confirmed the contents and recommendations of the resolution of the European Parliament from the previous year.
In 2014, the Canadian documentary Human Harvest , which portrayed the harvesting of organs from Falun Gong practitioners with eyewitnesses, was released and won the Peabody Award . The German version "Ausschlacht - Organs auf Artikel" was published on February 18, 2016 on 3sat by Scobel and contained statements from Kilgour, Matas and Professor Huige Li from the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz.
In June 2016, David Kilgour, David Matas and Ethan Gutmann published the jointly prepared investigation report " Bloody Harvest / The Slaughter - An Update " at the National Press Club in Washington, DC , which is a forensic analysis from over 2,300 sources and, among other things, proved that that between 2000 and 2015, 712 liver and kidney transplant centers across China carried out approximately 1.5 million organ transplants without China having a functioning organ donation system.
Falun Gong's Response to the Persecution
Falun Gong practitioners' response to the persecution began in July 1999. They appealed to local, provincial, and central complaint offices in Beijing. Soon afterwards, major demonstrations began, with hundreds of Falun Gong practitioners going to Tiananmen Square every day to do the exercises and put up banners in defense of the practice. All of these demonstrations were broken up by the security forces and the practitioners involved - some by force - were arrested and detained. As of April 25, 2000, over 30,000 practitioners had been arrested in the square. Seven hundred practitioners were arrested on January 1, 2001 alone while demonstrating in Tiananmen Square. The public protests lasted well into 2001. Ian Johnson wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "Falun Gong practitioners have accepted what is arguably the most sustained challenge to authority in 50 years of communist rule."
As public protest fell into disgrace, Tiananmen Square demonstrations became increasingly rare until late 2001, and the practice was driven deeper underground. The practitioners then set up "materials manufacturing sites" underground and produced truth-clarifying materials (literature and DVDs) to counter anti-Falun Gong propaganda in the official media. Practitioners often handed out these materials door to door. Falun Gong sources estimated in 2009 that there were over 200,000 such sites across China. The production, possession, and distribution of the materials is often the justification for security forces to detain and sentence Falun Gong practitioners.
In 2002, Falun Gong activists in China tapped television channels and replaced regular state programs with their own content. One of the most notable cases occurred in March 2002 when Falun Gong practitioners in Changchun intercepted eight cable TV networks in Jilin Province and instead broadcast a program called "Self-immolation or Staging?" For almost an hour . All six Falun Gong practitioners involved were arrested over the next few months. Two were killed instantly, while the other four died by 2010 as a result of the injuries they sustained in captivity.
media
From April 1999 to 2001 there were regular reports in the western media, with some of the propaganda being taken directly from China. The abuse of practitioners in particular was written with skepticism, if at all. Adam Frank writes that in reporting on Falun Gong, the Western tradition of viewing Chinese people as "exotic" has become rampant. While the details reported in the Western media were generally correct, "the normality with which millions of Chinese practitioners viewed the practice has completely disappeared." In a study of the media discourse on Falun Gong, researcher Leeshai Lemish found that Western news organizations became increasingly unbalanced in their reporting and tended to uncritically present the Communist Party's stories instead of listening to Falun Gong practitioners or human rights groups. In 1999, the religious scholar Ulrich Dehn reprimanded the German media landscape because the reporting sometimes gave the impression that “German East Asia correspondents in particular could not always escape the suggestiveness of the official Chinese propaganda against Falun Gong”. In 2001, media critic Danny Schechter asked his American media colleagues why they had simply taken over the Chinese government's media propaganda instead of exercising the usual journalistic diligence, ie "why the deeply rooted, institutionalized skepticism of our own media crumbled so quickly".
From the second half of 2001, Western coverage of the persecution in China was suddenly curtailed, and by 2002 major news organizations like the New York Times and Washington Post had almost completely stopped reporting on Falun Gong in China; at a time when the number of deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in custody was on the rise. The China analyst Ethan Gutmann later described this behavior of the Western media as the “ third rail of journalism ”. Gutmann pointed out that there was a long-standing taboo within the journalist community about Falun Gong and the crime of organ harvesting: "Touching this issue is the 'third rail of journalism.' If you touch this issue - if you are in Beijing, if you are based in China - you will no longer get access to the executive floor. [...] And there are many other dangers for journalists who dare to do so, and I believe these extend beyond the borders. ” For example, the Foreign Correspondents' Association in China had complained that its members were“ persecuted, arrested were "interrogated and threatened" for reporting the crackdown on Falun Gong. Journalists from Reuters , the New York Times, the Associated Press and other media outlets were interrogated by police, their employment and residence papers were temporarily confiscated, and they were forced to sign "confessions". Reporters Without Borders estimated in 2002 that at least 50 representatives of the international press have been arrested since July 1999 and some of them have been beaten by the police. Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal had to leave Beijing after winning the 2001 Pulitzer Prize for some articles on the persecution because "the Chinese police made my life in Beijing impossible," said Johnson. After Time Asia published a story about Falun Gong in Hong Kong in March 2001 , the magazine was taken off the shelves in China and the owner threatened that his magazine would never be sold in the country again.
Since the coverage of the main Western media was torn down or the anti-Falun Gong propaganda from Beijing was rather uncritically adopted, Falun Gong practitioners outside of China founded international media organizations to draw the attention of a wider public to their concerns and the reports of the state critically examine controlled media in China. These media include The Epoch Times newspaper , New Tang Dynasty Television and the Sound of Hope radio station .
The Epoch Times
The Epoch Times was founded in 2000 by John Tang and a group of Chinese-American Falun Gong practitioners. Originally published in Chinese only, the Epoch Times is now a multilingual, international newspaper with headquarters in New York City and branches in 35 countries. It is produced in 21 languages. Covering topics of general interest with an emphasis on news about China and human rights issues, the newspaper draws on a network of sources within China and the expertise and contacts of Chinese expats living in the West.
There are various statements about the relationship between the newspaper and Falun Gong. Some scholars see the Epoch Times as the mouthpiece of the practice, while others find it only "positive" about Falun Gong. Stephen Gregory, editor of the English-language Epoch Times, said in 2007, “It is not a Falun Gong newspaper. Falun Gong is a single person's belief. The newspaper is not owned by Falun Gong, it does not speak for Falun Gong, it does not represent Falun Gong. However, she does cover the persecution of Falun Gong in China ”. David Ownby describes The Epoch Times as being taken seriously as a global newspaper rather than being judged on its strong association with Falun Gong. Ownby wrote, "The Epoch Times is a newspaper with a mission to cover human rights issues around the world, allowing it to have significant focus on China and Falun Gong."
The newspaper’s editorial stance is broadly anti-communist, including its strong opposition to the Chinese Communist Party. According to Zhao, the Epoch Times shows how Falun Gong established a "de facto media alliance" with China's exiled democracy movements, as articles by prominent Chinese overseas critics of the government of the People's Republic of China were often published.
Nine comments
In 2004, the Epoch Times published the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party series, which consists of nine editorials and examines in depth the rule of the Communist Party in China. The series criticizes this rule, with a focus on the history of the political repression by the party, its propaganda machine and its attacks on traditional culture and its value systems. This led to the Tuidang Movement , which is encouraging Chinese citizens to withdraw from the CCP, including withdrawing from the Communist Youth Association and Young Pioneers retrospectively . According to the Epoch Times, by July 2017 over 277 million Chinese had quit the Chinese Communist Party and its affiliated organizations as a result of the movement, but these numbers have not been independently confirmed. Participants in the movement include political dissidents, lawyers, scholars, diplomats, former police officers, 610 Office staff, and military personnel.
Hu Ping, in Human Rights in China, described the push into political commentary as a "logical path" against the party because Falun Gong was unable to end the persecution through other means. But Hu points out that the practice itself is apolitical: "If some people insist on seeing Falun Gong as political, then only in the sense that Václav Havel describes it, namely as 'anti-political politics'."
The Epoch Times and its staff have won over 50 media awards since its inception, including the 2005 National Ethnic Press & Media Council Awards for Human Rights Coverage for "strong advocacy for human rights and democratic values"; 2012, the National Ethnic Press and Media Council Awards for "excellence in editorial, freedom of expression, the best concept and visual presentation" and the Sigma Delta Chi Award of the Society of Professional Journalists for the Epoch Times reporter Matthew Robertson for his series of articles on organ harvesting from living people in China; and in 2013 and 2014 awards at the New York Press Association Awards for reporters, photographers and designers.
New Tang Dynasty Television
New York-based New Tang Dynasty Television (NTD) was founded in 2001 by Falun Gong practitioners. Satellite broadcasting began in North America in February 2002 and mainland China in April 2004. Multilingual satellite broadcasting is currently reaching Asia, Europe and Australia. NTD has correspondents in over 70 cities worldwide. Founded as a Chinese-language television station, it expanded its language offerings and now (2018) also broadcasts in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Persian, Hebrew and Vietnamese. In addition to news, NTD produces programs on the subjects of art and culture, travel, health, lifestyle and children's programs.
New Tang Dynasty Television's guiding principle is to provide uncensored information about China, to restore and promote traditional Chinese culture, and to improve mutual understanding between East and West. The company therefore focuses on China in its news coverage and is known for its news coverage and analysis on topics that are taboo in mainland China, such as criticism of the Chinese government and abuses of power by the Chinese Communist Party, as well as official corruption, public health threats and various Human rights abuses, including the persecution of Falun Gong practitioners. In addition, NTD offers a platform for Chinese human rights and pro-democracy activists.
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal , President Zhong Lee stated that the company's original purpose was to speak out against the Chinese government's persecution of Falun Gong, but that “democracy can also play a big role in China to advance ".
The Wall Street Journal reported in 2003 that NTD had already reported on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in China for three weeks before the Chinese government publicly admitted there was an epidemic. NTD regularly broadcasts the Chinese-language video version of the Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party.
The station's critical coverage of the Chinese Communist Party led to censorship by the Chinese government. NTD also accused the Chinese government of interfering with its reporting and business activities, including exerting political pressure via its embassies abroad. For example, the Chinese Embassy in the United States advised US government officials not to attend the NTD New Year Gala on its website. In January 2007, a theater in South Korea canceled the New Year's performance at the last minute because of threats from China that upcoming Korean shows in mainland China could be canceled. An incident occurred in 2008 that attracted international attention. On June 16, Eutelsat shut down NTD's transmission to mainland China through its W5 satellite "for technical reasons". Reporters Without Borders accused Eutelsat of stopping NTD broadcasts to mainland China to appease the Chinese government. According to Reporters Without Borders, the shutdown of NTD was a "deliberate, politically motivated decision." The International Federation of Journalists argued that the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 meant that the Chinese government put increasing pressure on the broadcast of NTD. All efforts by NTD and the advocacy of Reporters Without Borders, the International Federation of Journalists and the European Parliament to Eutelsat to reverse their decision to shut down NTD have been unsuccessful.
Sound of Hope
The Sound of Hope (SOH) radio station was founded in June 2003 by a group of engineers in Silicon Valley . The engineers were Falun Gong practitioners who wanted to create a Chinese-language medium that was independent of the pressure and influence of the Chinese government. SOH became the first Chinese public broadcaster to broadcast mainly in Mandarin and Cantonese over FM / AM / shortwave stations, mobile apps and web streaming, providing news to local Chinese communities. The company now has employees in North America, Asia, Australia and Europe.
SOH serves Chinese communities in the US and overseas via FM / MW and mobile apps, and since 2004 China via shortwave. While SOH in the USA sees itself as a bridge between the largely closed Chinese communities and the mainstream of America, it sends news, interviews and comments to China on a daily basis and positions itself there as an uncensored and independent alternative to the media controlled by the Chinese government. SOH offers a wide range of topics in its programs for mainland China, such as excluded people, environmental pollution, food safety and human rights issues.
Films and documentaries
Falun Gong practitioners made documentaries about the persecution of Falun Gong and the atrocities of the Chinese Communist Party.
In 2012 the documentary Free China: The Courage to Believe with Jennifer Zeng and Dr. Charles Lee. The film tells the true story of Jennifer Zeng, mother and former member of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese Internet police intercepted an email from Zeng, and Zeng was arrested and detained for her belief. In the documentary, Zeng tells about the physical and mental torture she suffered in prison. Dr. Charles Lee, a Sino-American businessman, wanted to broadcast uncensored information on China's state-controlled television to end the persecution, but was expected and arrested upon arrival in China and sentenced to three years of re-education through forced labor. The film tells of the mistreatment Lee was subjected to in the forced labor camp. Free China received several awards, including the highest award in the International Political and Cultural Documentaries category at the LA Awareness Film Festival 2012.
Human Harvest is a documentary from Vancouver director Leon Lee from 2014. It follows the investigations by Nobel Peace Prize candidates David Matas and David Kilgour into the allegations of whether and how state-run hospitals in China are organs of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, mainly Falun Gong - Practitioners, forcibly removed, sold, killing tens of thousands in the process. Human Harvest received the Peabody Award in 2015. On February 18, 2016, 3sat broadcast the German version of Human Harvest “Disused - Organs on Order” as part of the documentary series “scobel: Organ trade - The human value”. In the German version, Professor Huige Li from the medical faculty of the Johann Gutenberg University Mainz also has a say, explaining the restricted use of organs by criminals sentenced to death and why prisoners of conscience are used as a source of organs.
Research and Defense Organizations
Some practitioners set up a number of research and advocacy organizations involved in reporting human rights violations in China and relaying this information to Western governments, non-governmental organizations, and multilateral organizations. These include the Falun Dafa Information Center (FDI), which presents itself as the "official source for Falun Gong and the human rights crisis in China." FDI operates largely as a press department and publishes press releases and annual reports. The Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group is conducting similar research and reporting on the persecution in China. Their results are often presented to the United Nations. The World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong in China (WOIPFG) is a research institution committed to investigating "the criminal behavior of all institutions, organizations, and individuals involved in the persecution of Falun Gong." Falun Gong supporters and sympathizers formed groups, as well as Friends of Falun Gong and the Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong in China (CIPFG). Reports were made worldwide against the initiators and accomplices of the persecution campaign.
Arts and Culture
General
Falun Gong practitioners outside of China are committed to promoting the traditional culture of China, which is to be conveyed back to the West through the classical performing arts. This was persecuted and attacked under the rule of the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution under the campaign of the Four Elders (四旧). Practitioners present Falun Gong as part of the broader cultural tradition that led to Chinese arts.
One of the expressions of the revival of traditional Chinese culture is the internationally touring exhibition "The Art of Zhen Shan Ren," which features oil paintings by a group of artists who practice Falun Gong.
New Tang Dynasty Television is committed to promoting “the appreciation and awareness of traditional Chinese culture”. To this end, the broadcaster organizes competitions for ethnic Chinese participants every year. Contest themes are Chinese classical dance, martial arts, traditional clothing design, painting, music, photography, and Chinese cuisine.
Shen Yun Performing Arts
Shen Yun Performing Arts is a performing arts company based in New York. It shows Chinese classical dance, Chinese folk dances and national minority dances of China. Myths, legends and historical events from the past to the present of China are presented in the program. The dances are accompanied by an orchestra made up of traditional Chinese and classically Western instruments. The name "Shen Yun" is translated as "the beauty of dancing heavenly beings". Shen Yun Performing Arts has five touring groups with nearly 400 ensemble members and performs for seven months each year in Europe, North America, South America, Asia and Australia. By the end of the 2010 world tour, an estimated one million people had seen the dance troupe's performances. But despite its international success, Shen Yun has not been able to perform in mainland China or Hong Kong to this day.
Shen Yun was founded by Falun Gong practitioners in 2006 with a mission to reinvigorate the "essence of 5,000 years of divinely inspired Chinese culture," which was almost completely destroyed by the Chinese Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. On the first world tour in 2007, Chinese diplomats sent letters to Western diplomats urging them not to attend or otherwise support the Shen Yun events, as they believed that the intent was "propaganda" to "image To pollute China ”. Shen Yun representatives commented that the Chinese government's negative attitude towards Shen Yun stems from the fact that Shen Yun shows both today's political oppression in China and the traditional Chinese cultural history that the communist government tried to eradicate during the Cultural Revolution.
Interference from the CCP
Shen Yun had planned to perform in Hong Kong in January 2010, but all seven sold-out events were canceled after the Hong Kong government refused to issue entry visas to Shen Yun's production team. In the same year the company traveled to Moldova , where the event in the theater in Chisinau was canceled shortly before its planned appearance. Until today (2018) the communist government of China tries to prevent the Shen Yun events outside of China by means of political pressure through its embassies and consulates.
In 2012, the director of the congress center in Zurich, Norbert Bolinger, on whose board of trustees the city of Zurich is also a member, received a visit from an employee of the Chinese consulate who asked him not to see the show, but Bolinger refused. In the same year, the Chinese Embassy in Washington, DC , warned the American people about Shen Yun. In 2014, the communist government continued to attempt to prevent Shen Yun's performances. In Berlin, the event manager Jörg Seefeld from the Stage Theater on Potsdamer Platz was visited by the cultural attaché of the Chinese embassy, who tried to influence him, but Seefeld declined. On April 7, El Mundo , the second largest newspaper in Spain, published a report exposing the Chinese regime's attempt to force the theater to cancel the Shen Yun performance in Barcelona. In 2015, in Chicago, the brake and accelerator pedals of a truck carrying Shen Yun advertisements were said to have been doused with "harsh chemicals". Shen Yun reported that Chinese spies took photos of their movements and listened to cell phone calls. In addition, there were suspicious break-ins in which only passports and laptops were stolen. Shen Yun reported that in 2016, prior to their performances at the Tennessee Performing Arts Center in Nashville , the show host's car tires were cut. In 2017, it was reported that further attempts to prevent the show had also been reported by theaters and local governments in Ecuador, Ireland and Sweden. The Guardian writes that it is easy to dismiss Shen Yun as a "colorful curiosity", "but Falun Gong practitioners are among the most open opponents of the Beijing government," which is why Shen Yun's dance show has become "a concern of the Chinese government"; to "one of the battlefields on which the battle for the hearts and minds of Westerners and overseas Chinese is won".
Bypassing internet censorship
As the persecution began, Chinese authorities began to establish and strengthen a system of internet censorship and surveillance called the " Golden Shield Project " (also called the Great Firewall of China). Since then, information about Falun Gong has been a major target of censorship and surveillance on the Internet. Therefore, in 2000, North American computer scientists who practice Falun Gong began developing circumvention and anonymization tools. On the one hand, this is intended to enable practitioners in China to access information about Falun Gong and, on the other hand, to help people in mainland China obtain information from overseas. Their software tools, such as Freegate, GPass and Ultrasurf , have now become popular tools even for non-practitioners to bypass government controls on the Internet in some other countries.
Ultrasurf
Ultrasurf is software from the Internet company UltraReach, which is a scalable and highly effective tool for bypassing Internet censorship and allows users in closed social systems to gain access to news, political and religious information, social networks and other blocked content. At the same time, it uses encrypted protocols for privacy.
The software was developed in 2002 by Chinese dissidents in Silicon Valley, mostly Falun Gong practitioners, who immigrated abroad after the persecution of Falun Gong began in China in 1999. Initially, Ultrasurf should enable Internet users in China to evade censorship and surveillance by the Chinese government and bypass their Golden Shield project. It is now also used by users outside of China.
In 2010, Ultrasurf was described by Wired magazine as “one of the most important tools for freedom of expression on the Internet”, as it helps citizens to access and exchange information from oppressed countries in times of humanitarian or human rights crises . A 2007 Harvard University study considered Ultrasurf to be the “most powerful” bypass tool. Freedom House placed Ultrasurf in fourth place in 2011 after testing various software.
Show
Persecution reports outside of China
Falun Gong practitioners outside of China filed dozens of criminal charges against Jiang Zemin, Luo Gan, Bo Xilai and other Chinese officials for genocide and crimes against humanity. According to the International Advocates for Justice , Falun Gong practitioners filed the largest number of human rights violations criminal charges in the 21st century. The charges are the most serious international crimes defined by international criminal law. By 2006 there had been 54 civil and criminal complaints in 33 countries. In many cases, however, courts refused to accept charges against Chinese officials on grounds of state immunity. However, in November 2009, Jiang Zemin and Luo Gan were charged by a Spanish court with charges of genocide and crimes against humanity and their involvement in the persecution of Falun Gong and requested their arrest. A month later, an Argentine judge concluded that Jiang and Luo had used a genocidal strategy in the persecution and extermination of Falun Gong and ordered Interpol to arrest them. For the most part, the charges are viewed as symbolic and unlikely to be carried out. The court in Spain also brought charges against Bo Xilai, Jia Qinglin and Wu Guanzheng .
Falun Gong practitioners and their supporters filed charges against the technology company Cisco Systems in May 2011 . The advertisement, based primarily on internal Cisco documents, said that Cisco and its executives "designed and implemented a surveillance system for the Chinese Communist Party, knowing that it would be used to exterminate Falun Gong practitioners." subject them to imprisonment, forced labor and torture. ”Cisco denied that it“ adapted its products in any way to enable censorship or repression ”. Internal Cisco documents showed, however, that Cisco and its Chinese subsidiary competed "aggressively" for the contract to develop the surveillance system "Project Golden Shield" and "Policenet". Hao Fengjun, a former 610 Office worker who used the surveillance system on a daily basis, described Project Golden Shield regarding practicing Falun Gong practitioners: "Golden Shield also includes the ability to monitor online chat services and email. It identifies IP addresses and all previous communications a person has. This enables conclusions to be drawn about the location of the person, because a person will normally use the computer at home or at work. ”The arrest then takes place.
In addition to legal charges of great public interest against Chinese officials and corporations, Falun Gong practitioners have been involved in a variety of defamation lawsuits against Chinese-language media and agents of the Chinese government. There were also civil lawsuits for discrimination outside of China, most of which took place within the Chinese diaspora community. Several complaints were made after Falun Gong groups were prevented from participating in parades or other activities. In Canada and New York, Falun Gong practitioners won sentences against Chinese companies and community organizations that discriminated against them on the basis of their religious beliefs.
Wave of advertisements against Jiang Zemin in 2015
After a law came into force in China on May 1, 2015, stipulating that “all complaints from citizens must be accepted and registered by the Supreme People's Court”, “even if they are directed against communist party officials”, criminal charges were brought against them former head of the Chinese Communist Party, Jiang Zemin. The plaintiffs asked the Supreme People's Procuratorate and Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China to bring Jiang to justice for genocide and crimes against humanity.
Erping Zhang, spokesman for the New York Falun Dafa Information Center, said in July 2015, “This wave of indictments is significant for two reasons. First, it shows an increase in support across China and around the world for Jiang Zemin his role in the violent suppression of Falun Gong. On the other hand, these lawsuits are accepted by the Chinese courts and the people who filed them have not been punished by the Chinese regime. "
In July 2015, the Australian Associated Press and other Australian newspapers reported on the wave of advertisements and that over 20,000 criminal complaints have been reported to date. According to OE24 , one year later, by July 2016, there were already over 200,000 criminal complaints from Falun Gong practitioners in and outside of China against the initiator of the persecution. Among the complainants were 567 Falun Gong practitioners from 21 other countries who also filed criminal complaints against Jiang with the Supreme People's Procuratorate in China. Theresa Chu, a Taiwanese human rights attorney and spokeswoman for the Falun Gong Legal Group, put the number of criminal charges at 225,485 in December 2017. Chu also pointed out that by December 8, 2017, over 2.6 million people from 31 countries had signed a petition calling on the Chinese judicial authorities to prosecute Jiang.
Minghui, a Falun Gong practitioner website that focuses on first-hand coverage of the persecution situation in China, published reports from Falun Gong practitioners in China who have filed charges. Some of these reports indicate threats by the Chinese authorities against complainants to withdraw their complaints. Among those who refused, some are believed to have been arrested and sentenced to prison.
Falun Gong in Hong Kong
Although practicing Falun Gong or protesting on its behalf is forbidden in China, Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong still have a legal status that grants them greater protection of civil and political freedoms, as the " One Land, two systems ”policy prevails. Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong have been holding demonstrations and protests against the Chinese government, and supporting those who have fled China due to the persecution.
There are hundreds of active practitioners in Hong Kong holding public events and demonstrations to protest the suppression in China and defend the rights of their fellow practitioners on the mainland. On July 23, 1999, about 1,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered in Hong Kong to protest the actions that were being carried out on the mainland. Another large-scale protest took place in January 2001. Practitioners regularly hold sit-in strikes, do public meditation exercises, and visit popular tourist spots where they distribute truth-clarifying materials detailing the human rights violations committed by the Chinese government.
Government disabilities
However, Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong have also faced restrictions due to political pressure from Beijing on the Hong Kong government. How the Hong Kong authorities treated Falun Gong is often used as an indicator to assess the integrity of the "one country, two systems" model.
Human Rights Watch reported that the government is "quietly chiseling the rights of practitioners in the territory." In 1999, Hong Kong bookstores refused to sell Falun Gong books. Hong Kong's Prime Minister Tung Chee-hwa rejected a planned Falun Gong conference and warned against activities that "are not in the interests of China or Hong Kong, or do not conform to 'one country, two systems'". In 2001, pro-Beijing forces "launched a large-scale campaign to definitively ban Falun Gong in Hong Kong." Prior to Jiang Zemin's visit in 2001, the practitioners' protests were restricted even further, and their freedom of speech and assembly were restricted . The government's stance drew condemnation from sectors within Hong Kong civil society and pro-democracy lawmakers. Rev. Stephen Chan, a Catholic priest , told the Wall Street Journal , "The government is damaging the reputation of a group of people who have not broken the law."
Article 23
In 2002, the Hong Kong government proposed " Article 23 ", an anti-subversion law intended to prohibit incitement or subversion against the Chinese central government in Beijing. Article 23 would have prohibited foreign political organizations from engaging in political activities in Hong Kong; domestic political organizations forbidden to establish relations with foreign organizations; and Falun Gong practitioners banned from gathering or protesting in Hong Kong. After around 350,000 to 700,000 Hong Kong citizens protested the bill in July 2003, it was withdrawn.
Travel restrictions
Starting in 2000, Hong Kong authorities imposed entry bans on Falun Gong practitioners to prevent them from entering their territory and participating in demonstrations. Prior to Jiang Zemin's visit in 2001, the Hong Kong government blacklisted foreign Falun Gong practitioners from Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States and denied them entry into their territory. In 2003, 80 Taiwanese practitioners were prevented from entering Hong Kong even though they had already obtained a visa. In 2004, a Canadian Falun Gong practitioner who was on a book tour was refused entry into Hong Kong territory. In 2007, hundreds of Taiwanese practitioners were refused entry to Hong Kong, and some were even arrested at the airport. In 2008, two more Falun Gong practitioners, one from the United States and one from Switzerland, who were on a professional research trip and wanted to separately go to Hong Kong, could not enter. In early 2010, Hong Kong immigration officials refused entry to six Shen Yun Performing Arts company production workers whose artists practice Falun Gong. These employees were key roles that the show, which should have been in January, had to be canceled. Albert Ho, leader of the Democratic Party, told Agence France-Presse that the denial of visas was a worrying new erosion of Hong Kong's freedoms and damaging Hong Kong's reputation for being a liberal and open society.
Falun Gong outside of China
development
Li Hongzhi was invited to teach Falun Dafa in 1995 by the Chinese embassies in Paris and Stockholm. This began the international spread of the Falun Gong teachings. In March 1995, Li gave his first lecture outside of China at the Chinese Embassy in Paris. This was followed by three lectures in Sweden in May. Between 1995 and 1999, Li lectured in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, and Singapore.
Falun Gong's growth outside of China largely coincided with the migration of students from mainland China to the west in the early to mid-1990s . Falun Gong associations and clubs were established in Europe, North America and Australia, the activities of which took place mainly on university campuses. Currently (2018) there are volunteer caregivers teaching the Falun Gong exercises free of charge in 80 countries outside of China and volunteers in Falun Dafa associations. Falun Gong teachings have been translated into 40 languages. The international Falun Gong community is estimated in the hundreds of thousands, but the estimates are inaccurate due to a lack of formal membership.
In the late 1990s, translations of the teachings of Falun Gong appeared . As the practice began to spread outside of China, Li Hongzhi found recognition in the United States and other parts of the western world. In 1994, Li was made an Honorary Citizen of Houston , Texas, for his "disinterested public service for the benefit and welfare of humanity ." In May 1999, Li was welcomed to Toronto by the mayor and governor-general of the province; in the following two months also from the cities of Chicago and San José .
Although the practice attracted followers outside of China as early as the mid-1990s, it remained relatively unknown until the spring of 1999. That changed when tensions between Falun Gong and the Chinese Communist Party authorities became the topic of international media. Due to the increased attention, the practice now gained a larger following outside of China. In addition, after the Communist Party's campaign of repression against Falun Gong began, the overseas presence became critical to the practice's resistance in China and its continued survival.
Falun Gong practitioners overseas responded to the persecution in China with various activities to educate the public about human rights issues. To this day, this includes media work, lobbying for governments and non-governmental organizations, the distribution of leaflets, participation in seated demonstrations in front of Chinese embassies and consulates, and the regular holding of demonstrations, parades and rallies. Falun Gong practitioners set up media centers, advocacy groups and research organizations to cover the persecution in China, and filed complaints against the architects and participants in the persecution campaign.
Other Initiatives and Actions: Falun Gong practitioners launched a number of other actions to raise awareness of the persecution of Falun Gong in China. A notable example is the Human Rights Torch Relay, which traveled through over 35 countries in 2007 and 2008, ahead of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The torch relay was intended to draw attention to a number of human rights issues in China related to the Olympics, particularly those related to Falun Gong and Tibet . The torch relay received support from hundreds of parliamentarians, former Olympic medalists, human rights groups and other affected organizations.
Some Falun Gong practitioners, both inside and outside of China, support the Tuidang movement , a dissident phenomenon that was sparked in late 2004 by a series of articles in the Epoch Times. The movement encourages Chinese citizens to withdraw from the Chinese Communist Party, including the Chinese Communist Youth Association and the Young Pioneers , also retrospectively. Falun Gong practitioners make phone calls to China from outside or send faxes to mainland China to inform citizens of the movement and the withdrawal declarations.
International acceptance and reactions
Since 1999, numerous Western governments, the United Nations, and human rights organizations such as the International Society for Human Rights , Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the Chinese government's suppression of Falun Gong and raised concerns about the allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Falun Gong practitioners expressed in China. In addition, members of the US Congress have been making public statements since then and have introduced several resolutions in support of Falun Gong. For example, 2010 US House of Representatives Resolution 605 called for "an immediate end to the persecution, intimidation, detention and torture of Falun Gong practitioners," condemned efforts by the Chinese authorities to spread false propaganda about the practice around the world, and suppressed persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families with their sympathy.
To counter the support of Falun Gong in the West, the Chinese government expanded its efforts against the group internationally. This included visits by Chinese diplomats to media representatives to "praise the virtues of communist China and highlight the sins of Falun Gong"; to link support for Falun Gong with "compromising trade relations"; and sending letters to local politicians asking them to withdraw their support for the practice. According to Perry Link, pressure on Western institutions also took on more subtle forms, including academic self-censorship, for fear of angering the CCP. Research into Falun Gong has resulted in no longer being able to obtain a visa for academic work in China, as well as discrimination and exclusion from business associations and community groups with ties to China. Added to this was the 610 Office's espionage activities against Falun Gong outside of China, which, according to Hao Fengjun, uses large funds to bribe decision-makers who find “willing buyers in the so-called free Western world”. China should endeavor to “simply buy away any kind of criticism of human rights violations”.
Although the persecution of Falun Gong outside of China has now resulted in significant condemnation, some observers have noted that Falun Gong has failed to win the international sympathy and sustained attention that Tibetans , Chinese Christians, or democracy activists have received. This is attributed to the group's poor knowledge of public relations, the effects of the Communist Party's propaganda against this practice, and the seemingly alien teaching that identifies with Buddhist and Daoist traditions. Katrina Lantos Swett , vice chairman of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom , noted 2013, is that most Americans about repression "of Tibetan Buddhists and unregistered Christian groups or advocates of democracy and freedom of speech, such as Liu Xiaobo and Ai Weiei consciously are "but still" know little to nothing about China's attack on Falun Gong. "
Ethan Gutmann, who has been reporting on China since the early 1990s, tried to explain this apparent lack of public sympathy for Falun Gong, in part, through Falun Gong's deficit in public relations, and that the behavior of some Chinese practitioners bore the hallmarks of communist party culture to which they were accustomed from indoctrination in the People's Republic of China. Added to this is the general Western distrust of persecuted refugees. Gutmann also points out that media organizations and human rights groups have self-censored themselves because of the Chinese government's extreme stance towards Falun Gong, fearing the possible consequences of openly speaking out for Falun Gong.
Richard Madsen writes that Falun Gong lacks solid support from American constituencies, which typically support religious freedom. For example, Falun Gong's conservative moral beliefs alienated some liberal voters in the West. Christian conservatives, on the other hand, do not give the practice the same space as persecuted Chinese Christians. Madsen accuses the American political center of not wanting to tackle the human rights issue as strongly as it would disrupt economic and political relations with China. Therefore, most of the Falun Gong practitioners had to respond to the persecution by their own means.
However, Falun Gong and its founder also find support in political and scientific circles: In 2001, Li Hongzhi was nominated by the European Parliament for the Sakharov Prize and received the International Religious Freedom Award from Freedom House . In the same year, Li was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. The Hong Kong-based Human Rights and Democracy Information Center reported that Li Hongzhi was nominated by over 30 people, including parliamentarians from the United States and Britain, and scholars from the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and Taiwan. According to CNN, Li was named as one of the most serious candidates. The nomination, however, led to protests from the Chinese government, including against US congressmen. In Germany, Li was nominated by 70 professors from different universities with chairs in the subjects of religious studies, politics and law.
In 2013, the Association Doctors Against Organ Harvesting (DAFOH) initiated a global petition that collected almost 1.5 million signatures, including over 300,000 from Europe. The petition was submitted to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and called for an immediate end to the Chinese government's persecution of Falun Gong.
In December 2013, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning organ harvesting from Falun Gong prisoners of conscience. In March 2014, Henri Malosse , President of the European Economic and Social Committee, called for greater pressure on the Chinese government to end organ transplant abuse. The US Senate unanimously passed a resolution against organ harvesting in June 2016.
literature
- Li Hongzhi: Zhuan Falun . FA-Verlag, 2019, ISBN 978-3-948416-00-3 .
- Li Hongzhi: Falun Gong - The Path to Consummation . GoodSpirit-Verlag, 2004, ISBN 3-932273-68-0 .
- Li Hongzhi: Falun Gong exercises . GoodSpirit-Verlag, 2012.
- David Ownby: Falun Gong and the Future of China. Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6 .
- David Ownby: Falungong and Canada's China Policy. International Journal, Vol. 56, 2001.
- David Ownby: A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty. Nova Religio, 2003.
- Maria Hsia Chang: Falun Gong: The End of Days. Yale University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-300-10227-5 .
- Danny Schechter: Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice Or "Evil Cult"? Akashic Books, New York 2000, ISBN 1-888451-27-0 .
- David A. Palmer: Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China. Columbia University Press, New York 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9 .
- James Tong: Revenge of the Forbidden City, The Suppression of the Falungong in China. 1999-2005, Oxford University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-19-537728-6 .
- Benjamin Penny: The Religion of Falun Gong. University of Chicago Press, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 .
- Noah Porter: Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study: Publisher Dissertation.com, Universal Publishers, 2003, ISBN 1-58112-190-3 .
- Vivienne Shue: (2004) Legitimacy Crisis in China? ( Memento of November 24, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) in Peter Hays Gries, Stanley Rosen: State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation. Routledge, New York 2004, ISBN 0-415-33205-2 .
- Ian Johnson: Wild Grass: Three Portraits of Change in Modern China. NY: Vintage, New York 2005, ISBN 0-375-71919-9 .
- Ian Johnson: Pulitzer Prize winning articles in the Wall Street Journal
- Jennifer Zeng: Witnessing History: One Chinese Woman's Fight for Freedom. Soho Press, 2005, ISBN 1-74114-400-0 .
- Mickey Spiegel: Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong. Human Rights Watch., 2002, ISBN 1-56432-270-X .
- David Kilgour; David Matas: Bloody Harvest - The killing of Falun Gong for their organs. Seraphim Edition, 2009, ISBN 978-0-9808879-7-6 .
- Ethan Gutmann: The Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China's Secret Solution to Its Dissident Problem. Prometheus Books, 2014, ISBN 978-1-61614-940-6 .
- Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden: Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2010, ISBN 978-0-415-30170-1 .
- Nancy N. Chen: Breathing spaces: qigong, psychiatry, and healing in China. Columbia University Press, New York 2003, ISBN 0-231-12805-3 .
- Yuezhi Zhao: Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China. in Nick Couldry, James Curran: Contesting Media Power. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD 2003, ISBN 0-7425-2385-3 .
- Hu Ping: The Falun Gong Phenomenon. in Sharon Hom and Stacy Mosher: Challenging China: Struggle and Hope in an Era of Change. The New Press, 2008, ISBN 978-1-59558-416-8 .
- Patricia Thornton: Manufacturing Dissent in Transnational China. in Kevin J. O'Brien: Popular Protest in China. Harvard University Press, London 2009, ISBN 978-0-674-04158-5 .
- United States, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Falun Gong in China: Review and Update: Hearing before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, December 18, 2012 . USGPO, Washington 2013.
See also
- Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong in China
- Human rights in the People's Republic of China
- Religious Freedom in China
- Religion in the People's Republic of China
Web links
- Falun Gong website (German)
- Falun Gong website (other languages)
- Falun Dafa Information Center
- Minghui: Falun Gong website for news from China and abroad
- Clearharmony: Falun Gong website for news from Europe
Individual evidence
- ↑ Yanfei Sun, The Religion of Falun Gong , Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 110-112, University of California Press, Fall 2015, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ A b David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 17, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ A b David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 241–246, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 134, 139, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ A b David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, p. 219, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ^ A b c d Benjamin Penny, The Past, Present, and Future of Falun Gong , Lecture given at the National Library of Australia, 2001, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c d e Scott Lowe, Chinese and International Contexts for the Rise of Falun Gong ( Memento of January 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ), Nova Religio Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2003, webarchive.org, accessed on 16. January 2018
- ↑ a b Seth Faison, In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protestors , The New York Times, April 27, 1999, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ An opiate of the masses ?, US News & World Report, February 22, 1999
- ^ Phillip Adams, Media and Internet Censorship in China , Late Night Live, Radio National Australia, September 4, 2007, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c Ethan Gutmann, The Chinese Communist Party’s Trap for Falun Gong , Epoch Times, April 22, 2009, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c d 2008 Annual Report, Congressional Executive Commission on China , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b Andrew Jacobs, 'China Still Presses Crusade Against Falun Gong' , The New York Times, April 27, 2009, accessed January 16, 2018.
- ↑ a b Individual Cases of Falun Gong Deaths , Falun Dafa Information Center, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Ethan Gutmann, “How many harvested?” Revisited , eastofethan.com, March 10, 2011, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Jay Nordlinger, "Face The Slaughter, The Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China's Secret Solution to Its Dissident Problem, by Ethan Gutmann," National Review, August 25, 2014, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b 2009 International Religious Freedom Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau) , US Department of State, October 26, 2009, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b Malcolm Moore, Falun Gong 'growing' in China despite 10-year ban , The Telegraph, April 24, 2009, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b Regional Contacts , Falundafa.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 126; Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, p. 7, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 5 and 45, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, p. 5, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David Ownby, Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China , Talk Given at Rice University, October 20, 2000, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 10, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, Qigong, Daoism and Science: some contexts for the qigong boom, pp. 166-179, in Mabel Lee and AD Stefanowska (eds.), Modernization of the Chinese Past, Wild Peony, 1993
- ^ A b Richard Gunde, Culture and Customs of China , Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2002, ISBN 0-313-30876-4 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Nancy N. Chen, Breathing spaces: qigong, psychiatry, and healing in China , Columbia University Press, New York, 2003, ISBN 0-231-12805-3 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 9, 28, 184, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Li Hongzhi, 9-Day Seminar, Lesson 1 , (audio), accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b David Ownby, A History for Falun Gong: Popular Religion and the Chinese State Since the Ming Dynasty ( January 24, 2015 memento in the Internet Archive ), Nova Religio Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2003, webarchive.org on January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 11, 26, 152, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ A b Edward Irons, Falun Gong and the Sectarian Religion Paradigm ( January 25, 2015 memento in the Internet Archive ), Nova Religio Vol. 6, Issue 2, 2003, webarchive.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun , p. 17, FA-Verlag, 2019, ISBN 978-3-948416-00-3 , quotation: “The most fundamental properties of this cosmos are Zhen, Shan, Ren; they are the ultimate embodiment of the Buddha-Fa, the most fundamental Buddha-Fa. ", Retrieved December 20, 2019
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 93, 102, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun , p. 16, FA-Verlag, 2019, ISBN 978-3-948416-00-3 , accessed December 20, 2019
- ↑ Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study , p. 29. Quotation: “According to the belief system of Falun Gong, there are three virtues that are also principles of the universe: Zhen, Shan and Ren (真, 善,忍). Zhen is truthfulness and righteousness. Shan is compassion, benevolence, and kindness. Ren is forbearance, tolerance and perseverance. These three virtues are the only criteria that distinguish really good people from bad people. Human society has deviated from these moral standards. All matter in the universe contains Zhen-Shan-Ren. Those three are equally important. ”Dissertation.com, Parkland, FL, 2003, ISBN 1-58112-190-3 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 93, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3 , quotation: "The structure of the universe, according to Li Hongzhi, consists of the moral qualities that cultivators use in their own lives are Truth, Compassion and Forbearance. "
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 124-125, 133, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 . Quote: “For Li, as he repeats many times in Zhuan Falun, the special quality or peculiarity of the cosmos is the moral triumvirate of Zhen (truth), Shan (compassion) and Ren (forbearance). He doesn't mean it metaphorically. For him, Zhen, Shan and Ren are the basic organizational principles of all things ... They are embedded in the essence of everything in the universe, and they adhere to the principles of Truth, Compassion and Forbearance. "
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 124, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 . Quotation: “In addition, cultivating Falun Gong adheres to the Code of Truth, Compassion, and Forbearance. Not only is this viewed as proper and responsible conduct for practitioners, it is an essential part of the cultivation process. Those who deviate from it make all other efforts in their cultivation worthless. "
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 125, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 169, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ A b Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 170, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 172, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , citation: "Converting karma into virtue is part of the cultivation of Falun Gong basic "
- ↑ a b David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 110-112, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 172, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun , pp. 28-32, FA-Verlag, 2019, ISBN 978-3-948416-00-3 , accessed December 20, 2019
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 172, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 93, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3 , quotation: “The goal of cultivation, and thus of life itself, is spiritual exaltation which is achieved through the removal of negative karma - the built up sins of past and present life - and the accumulation of virtue. "
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 134-135, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 105, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 170, 173, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 93, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3 , quoted: “In Li's writings, there are few things that can and cannot be done , are found, there are still demanding ethical discussions. Instead, students are advised to rid themselves of unnecessary attachments and do what they know is right and thereby return to their origins, to their original selves. "
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, University of Chicago Press, p. 213, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c d e f Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice Or "Evil Cult"? , Akashic Books, 2001, ISBN 1-888451-13-0 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c d e f g Zhao Yuezhi, Falun Gong, Identity, and the Struggle over Meaning Inside and Outside China , Chapter 13 in "Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World," Nick Couldry and James Curran (ed. ), Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, ISBN 0-7425-2385-3 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 163-169, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong , Version 2016, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong (2016), Exercise 5, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 167, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c d David Ownby, The "Falun Gong" in the New World , European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 313-314, Brill, 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study ( September 9, 2006 memento in the Internet Archive ), University of South Florida, July 18, 2003, accessed May 16 , 2006 January 2018
- ↑ Regional contacts , Falundafa.org, accessed on 16 January 2018
- ^ QZ Li, P. Li et al. a .: Genomic profiling of neutrophil transcripts in Asian Qigong practitioners: a pilot study in gene regulation by mind-body interaction. In: Journal of alternative and complementary medicine. Volume 11, number 1, February 2005, pp. 29-39, doi : 10.1089 / act.2005.11.29 , PMID 15750361 .
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , University of Chicago Press, pp. 157-158; 202, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 64, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 201; 201, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 117, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study ( September 9, 2006 memento on the Internet Archive ), University of South Florida, 205, July 18, 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 171-174, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 102; 170-181, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 112-114, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 123-182, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 170, 181, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c d e Ian Johnson, Wild Grass: Three Portraits of Change in Modern China , Vintage, June 2, 2005, ISBN 0-375-71919-9 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Misconceptions: "Intolerant"? , Falun Dafa Information Center, June 16, 2008; See also Robyn Lebron, "Searching for Spiritual Unity," p. 349, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 215-217, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 216-217, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ FalunInfo.net - Misconceptions: Misconceptions: “Intolerant”? , faluninfo.net, 2011, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , University of Chicago Press, p. 48, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c Hu Ping, The Falun Gong Phenomenon, 2003, in Challenging China: Struggle and Hope in an Era of Change , Sharon Hom and Stacy Mosher (ed), New Press, 2007, ISBN 978-1-59558-132- 7 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 93-94 + 165, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 97, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ List of Languages , Falundafa.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Books , de.falundafa.org, accessed on January 16, 2018
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , University of Chicago Press, pp. 100-103, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny: The Falun Gong, Buddhism and "Buddhist qigong". In: Asian Studies Review. 29, 2005, p. 35, doi : 10.1080 / 10357820500139513 .
- ↑ a b George Bruseker, Falun Gong: A Modern Chinese Folk Buddhist Movement in Crisis ( Memento of 26 April 2005 at the Internet Archive ), April 26, 2000 web.archive.org, accessed on January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 108-109, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 139-140, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 143-144, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c d e Craig A. Burgdoff, How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi's Totalistic Rhetoric ( January 25, 2015 memento in the Internet Archive ), Nova Religio Vol January 2018
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 231-233, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 143, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ A b c d Susan Palmer, David Ownby: Falun Dafa Practitioners: A Preliminary Research Report. In: Nova Religio. 4, 2000, p. 133, doi : 10.1525 / no.2000.4.1.133 .
- ^ A b Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days , Yale University Press, November 28, 2012, ISBN 978-0-300-19603-0 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b Chris Bullock, Falun Gong: Cult or Culture? , National Radio, ABC, April 22, 2001, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice Or "Evil Cult"? , Akashic Books, ISBN 1-888451-13-0 , 2001, p. 57, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 152-153, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b Richard Madsen, Understanding Falun Gong , Current History, Vol. 99, Issue 638, ProQuest, September 1, 2000, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 25, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 26, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Unofficial Religions in China: Beyond the Party's Rules ( Memento of December 26, 2005 in the Internet Archive ), Testimony for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, May 23, 2005, accessed on January 16, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 7-24, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , University of Chicago Press, p. 226, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , citation: "Falun Gong is a new form of the Chinese religion, even though his students themselves do not recognize it as a religion. ", accessed on January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b Hubert Seiwert, sect allegation: Falun Gong complains in Leipzig , Catholic Media Center, October 8, 2004, accessed on February 5, 2018
- ↑ a b c d e Hubert Seiwert, Falun Gong - A new religious movement as the main domestic enemy of the Chinese government , magazine Religion · State Society, 1st year 2000 issue 1, accessed on February 5, 2018
- ↑ a b c d Ulrich Dehn, Is Falun Gong a sect? , EZW press release, August 18, 1999, accessed on February 5, 2018
- ↑ a b Herbert Kremp, The Mysterious Power of Falun Gong , Welt am Sonntag, March 11, 2001, accessed February 5, 2018
- ↑ a b Carolina Meinert, 450 days in China's labor camps , Ruhr Nachrichten Reportagen, September 2015, accessed on February 5, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , University of Chicago Press, pp. 26, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 . Quote: “Falun Gong does not claim an immediate predecessor who holds a position in any number of religions. However, it becomes clear in this book that many of the terms Li Hongzhi uses and the ideas that support the teachings of Falun Gong can be found in Chinese religions of the past. "Retrieved January 16, 2018
- ↑ a b c Cheris Shun-ching Chan, The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective ( January 24, 2015 memento in the Internet Archive ), The China Quarterly Vol. 179, webarchive.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, The Falun Gong in the New World ( Memento April 8, 2016 in the Internet Archive ), European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 2 Issue 2, p. 306, Brill Online Books, September 2003, accessed 5 February 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 88, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ a b Jennifer Zeng, Witnessing History: One Chinese Woman's Fight for Freedom , Soho Press, 2005, ISBN 1-74114-400-0 , pp. 329-335, accessed February 5, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 89, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 43, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 89, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 42, 56, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c Falun Gong: An Ancient Tradition for Mind, Body, and Spirit , Falun Dafa Information Center, April 9, 2015, accessed February 5, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 86, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 41, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 88-89, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 125, 127, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 49, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Katharina Borchardt, Meditieren gegen den Kommunismus , SWR2, June 19, 2009, accessed on February 5, 2018
- ↑ a b Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study , p. 70, Publisher Dissertation.com, Universal Publishers, 2003, accessed February 5, 2018
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- ↑ James Tong, Revenge of the Forbidden City, The Suppression of the Falungong in China , 1999-2005, Oxford University Press, March 25, 2010, ISBN 978-0-19-537728-6 , accessed February 5, 2018
- ↑ Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice Or "Evil Cult"? , New York: Akashic Books, 2000, p. 66, accessed February 5, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 51-53, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ a b c d e David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, p. 249, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
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- ↑ a b David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China, p. 180, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 52-56, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 51, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
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- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Life and Times of Li Hongzhi: Falun Gong and Religious Biography , The China Quarterly, Vol. 175, pp. 643-661, September 1, 2003, accessed February 5, 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, p. 56, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
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- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
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- ^ An opiate of the masses ?, US News & World Report, February 22, 1999
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- ^ Noah Porter: Professional Practitioners and Contact Persons Explicating Special Types of Falun Gong Practitioners. In: Nova Religio. 9, 2005, p. 62, doi : 10.1525 / no.2005.9.2.062 .
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- ↑ David Ownby: Falungong and Canada's China Policy. In: International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis. 56, 2016, p. 183, doi : 10.1177 / 002070200105600201 . Quote: “These people have discovered what the truth of the universe is for them. They are free to come to this discovery, and if they change their minds they can go free and do something else. The Falun Gong community appears to be supportive, but not restrictive. There is no peer pressure that exists in many group situations. There is no visible power structure to chastise a delusional practitioner, nor do practitioners tell each other what to do or what to believe. "Retrieved January 16, 2018
- ^ A b Kevin McDonald: Global Movements: Action and Culture. Wiley-Blackwell, 2006, ISBN 1-4051-1613-7 .
- ↑ Regional contacts , de.falundafa.org, accessed on January 16, 2018
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- ↑ Craig A. Burgdoff, How Falun Gong Practice Undermines Li Hongzhi's Totalistic Rhetoric , Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Vol. 6 No. 2, p. 338, University of California Press, April 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing , The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 171, p. 641, September 1, 2002, accessed January 16, 2018
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- ↑ James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing , The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 171, p. 642, September 1, 2002, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Patricia Thornton, Manufacturing Dissent in Transnational China, in Popular Protest in China , Kevin J. O'Brien (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 188–192, June 30, 2009, ISBN 978-0 -674-04158-5 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing , The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 171, p. 638, September 1, 2002, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ James Tong, An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing , The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 171, p. 657, September 1, 2002, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Bay Fang, An Opiate of the Masses? ( Memento of June 8, 2012 on the Internet Archive ), US News & World Report, February 14, 1999, webarchive.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Joseph Kahn, Notoriety Now for Exiled Leader of the Chinese Movement , The New York Times, April 27, 1999. Quoting: “Beijing puts the number of students in its mystical movement at 70 million. Practitioners do not deny these numbers. Yet they say they have no way to be sure, in part because they don't have centralized membership lists. "Retrieved January 16, 2018
- ↑ Renee Schoff, Growing group poses a dilemma for China ( Memento of December 27, 2008 in the Internet Archive ), Associated Press, April 26, 1999, quotation: “It teaches morality and acceptance, exactly what the Beijing government wants to see . But with more members than the Communist Party - at least 70 million, according to the State Sports Administration - Falun Gong is also a vast social network ... ”, from Falun Dafa Information Center, accessed February 7, 2018
- ↑ 4 From Chinese Spiritual group Are Sentenced , The Associated Press, The New York Times, SA5, November 13, 1999. Quoting: “Before the crackdown, the government estimated membership at 70 million - which would be greater than that of the Chinese Communist Party, which had 61 million members. "Retrieved January 16, 2018
- ^ An opiate of the masses ?, US News & World Report, February 22, 1999
- ↑ Cheris Shun-ching Chan, The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective , The China Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 179, pp. 665-683, September 2004, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-51170-4
- ↑ Seth Faison, Followers of Chinese Sect Defend Its Spiritual Goals , The New York Times, July 30, 1999, accessed January 16, 2018
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- ↑ Noah Porter, Falun Gong in the United States: An Ethnographic Study ( September 9, 2006 memento on the Internet Archive ), University of South Florida, p. 117, July 18, 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
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- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 127, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ a b c d Beatrice Leung: China and Falun Gong: Party and society relations in the modern era. In: Journal of Contemporary China. 11, 2002, p. 761, doi : 10.1080 / 1067056022000008904 .
- ↑ a b c David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 136, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 127, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 138, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Scott Lowe, Chinese and International Contexts for the Rise of Falun Gong , Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 263-276, University of California Press, April 2003, accessed February 8, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 141, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 135, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 11, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, The "Falun Gong" in the New World , European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 306, Brill, 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 86-87, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Brief biography of Li Hongzhi: founder of Falun Gong and president of the Falun Gong Research Society ( Memento of November 28, 2004 in the Internet Archive ), Source: Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 32, No. 6, November / December 1999, pp. 14-23, ISSN 0009-4609 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Jennifer Zeng, Witnessing History: One Woman's Fight for Freedom and Falun Gong , Soho Press, Allen & Unwin, 2005, ISBN 1-74114-400-0 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, The "Falun Gong" in the New World , European Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 2, Issue 2, p. 306, Brill, 2003, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 85, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 86, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 42-43, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Falun Gong: Timeline ( December 27, 2008 memento on the Internet Archive ), Falun Dafa Information Center, May 17, 2008, webarchive.org, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Honor Received by Falun Gong in 1993 , December 27, 1993, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Thomas Lum, China and Falun Gong ( December 1, 2007 memento in the Internet Archive ), Congressional Research Report # RL33437, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, August 11, 2006, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 86, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-971637-1
- ^ Dai Qing, Members of Falungong in an Autocratic Society ( Memento April 2, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), Harvard Asia Quarterly, Volume IV, No. 3, January 28, 2006, accessed January 16, 2018
- ^ Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice Or "Evil Cult"? , Akashic Books, ISBN 1-888451-13-0 , 2001, p. 66, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 89, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ^ A b David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 247-248, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 294-297, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 126, 163-164, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 161, 168, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 168, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 168, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ Sumner B. Twiss, Religious Intolerance in Contemporary China, Including the Curious Case of Falun Gong , The World's Religions After September 11, by Arvind Sharma (ed.) (Greenwood Publishing, 2009), pp. 227-240, accessed on 16 January 2018
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 52-55, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 53 + 54, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, pp. 169-170, Oxford University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-973853-3
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 134 and 252, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ a b Jew Howell, Governance and the Political Challenge of Falun Gong , governance in China (Lanham, Md .: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), ISBN 0-7425-1988-0 , pp 214-223, accessed on 16 January 2018
- ↑ a b c d e f g h Mickey Spiegel, Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against Falungong , Human Rights Watch, ISBN 978-1-56432-270-8 , 2001, p. 9, accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Country Advice China , Australian Government, Refugee Review Tribunal, April 20, 2012, accessed December 24, 2012
- ^ John Andress, The Persecution of Falun Gong and How it Began , organharvestinvestigation.net, July 15, 2009, accessed December 24, 2012
- ↑ Luo Gan's Role in the Persecution of Falun Gong , WOIPFG, February 14, 2004, accessed December 24, 2012
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 55-63, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ^ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong , p. 56, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7 , accessed January 16, 2018
- ↑ Tracey Zhu, Ancient Wisdom for Modern Predicaments The Truth, Deceit, and Issues Surrounding Falun Gong , ICSA, 2004, accessed January 16, 2018.
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 263-264, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, pp. 223 and 251, Columbia University Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-231-14066-9
- ↑ Benjamin Penny, The Religion of Falun Gong, pp. 49, 56, University of Chicago Press, April 13, 2012, ISBN 978-0-226-65501-7
- ↑ Eugene V. Gallagher; W. Michael Ashcraft, Introduction to New and Alternative Religions in America: African diaspora traditions and other American innovations , Greenwood Press, ISBN 978-0-275-98717-6 , 2006, p. 174, accessed January 16, 2018
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