Direct democracy in the Weimar Republic

Elements of direct democracy were first introduced in Germany in the Weimar Republic . The constitution granted the population the right to legislate by the people . With the signatures of at least ten percent of eligible voters, a referendum could be submitted to the Reichstag . If parliament did not approve the bill, a referendum was held , the success of which depended on 50 percent of the electorate taking part and, moreover, the majority of the participants voting “yes”. Also the Reichstag and the Reich Presidentwere able to initiate a referendum, but this never happened. Only the Reich President could initiate a referendum on the budget, tax laws and salary regulations. Comparable regulations were also incorporated into the respective state constitution in most of the federal states.

Only three referendums took place at the national level. Only two of them made it to the referendum, but neither of them could overcome the participation quorum of at least 50 percent. In 1926, the expropriation of the princes, supported by the KPD and SPD , failed due to the participation quorum, although the debate escalated into one of the most comprehensive political disputes in the Weimar Republic. The popular initiative "Against the building of the armored cruiser" , supported by the KPD, failed in 1928 with 1.2 million signatures, even at the signature quorum. The referendum against the Young Plan , which had been supported by the NSDAP and DNVP , also failed in 1929 with only 14.9 percent turnout. In view of the high participation quorum, the tactic of the respective opponents of the referendums was not to fight for a majority, but to boycott the vote.

With the first referendum in German history, the Baden state constitution was adopted on April 13, 1919 . This remained the only constitution of the Weimar Republic passed through a referendum. Up to 1933 a total of twelve direct democratic votes were held in the federal states, most of which were aimed at the premature dissolution of parliament. Only once, when the Oldenburg State Parliament was dissolved in 1932, such a referendum was successful. The other attempts, including the referendum to dissolve the Prussian state parliament brought about by anti-democratic right-wing parties and organizations ( Stahlhelm , DNVP , NSDAP, etc.) and the KPD in early 1931 failed because of the necessary quorum.

Referendums on territorial changes after the First World War

German propaganda poster before the referendum in Upper Silesia in 1921

→ Main article : Referendums in the wake of the Versailles Treaty

The first referendums in Germany took place on the basis of Articles 88, 94 and 104 of the Versailles Peace Treaty after the First World War in some areas on the question of whether they would go to the neighboring countries of Denmark, Poland, France and Belgium or remain with the German Reich should. The referendum in Schleswig in February 1920 showed that North Schleswig should belong to Denmark in the future, while Central Schleswig remained with Germany after the vote in March 1921. In July 1920, an overwhelming majority in the Marienwerder voting area and the Allenstein voting area each voted to remain with the German Reich. In the referendum in Upper Silesia in March 1921, the larger, western part of Upper Silesia remained with Germany, while East Upper Silesia with Katowice and its valuable coal mines became Polish.

In the Saar area , which was initially occupied by French and then under French administration as a League of Nations mandate , the referendum did not take place until January 13, 1935, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. It produced a majority of 90.8 percent for Germany, so that the Saar area was annexed to the German Empire. The National Socialists, who had been in power in the German Reich since 1933, exploited the “ return of the Saar ” as a propaganda success.

Introduction of direct democratic elements

Since the Eisenach program of 1869 and the Gotha program of 1875, the SPD has represented the demands for people's legislation at the Reich level. In the early 20th century, representatives of left-wing liberalism also began to consider direct democratic procedures. Direct democratic procedures found a certain distribution at the municipal level, especially in the southern German states.

Another line of tradition went back to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels . These had rejected popular legislation with reference to the social structure and political immaturity of large parts of the German population, which would have favored conservative and reactionary forces. They propagated a council democracy , which represents a special form of democratic directness. Her main concern was the (re-) entanglement of economy and politics in the sense of a socialist production community, the democratic theoretical aspects took a back seat. The concept was implemented briefly in the Soviet republics after the First World War and the November Revolution . Basic democratic and direct democratic instruments in the council model were people's assemblies , the imperative mandate , the connection of elected representatives to the will of the people through permanent voting and the rotation principle , referendums and referendums. The Munich Soviet Republic in particular gained importance, but on 2/3 May 1919 was crushed after less than a month.

When direct democratic elements were introduced in Germany , all the forces involved were aware that these were new types of constitutional elements for which there were no models in German constitutional history. The proponents could therefore only refer to practical experience abroad (especially in Switzerland and in some states of the USA) and to considerations of democratic theory. The democratic principle based on popular sovereignty was anchored to different degrees in the party programs. In the deliberations of the Weimar National Assembly , representatives of the SPD, DDP and USPD in particular pleaded for the introduction of people's legislation. The Liberals in particular, however, advocated a more restrictive design through higher quorums and subject exclusions. The national liberal DVP rejected the people's legislation on the other hand. The national-conservative DNVP rejected democracy as a constitutional principle in principle, but nevertheless had no uniform stance on direct democratic procedures. The Reich constitution was adopted on July 31, 1919, against the votes of the opposition from the right and left camps.

Legal basis

Procedure of the people's legislation

See also : Suffrage of the Weimar Republic

Articles 73 to 76 of the Weimar Constitution determined the basic direct democratic procedures. The exact regulations were regulated in the law on the referendum of June 27, 1921 and in the Reich voting order of March 14, 1924.

The constitution granted the population the right to submit a legislative proposal to parliament with the signatures of at least ten percent of the electorate by means of a referendum. The collection of signatures took place within a specified period. The lists were publicly displayed in official offices . The applicants had to bear the costs of printing the signature lists and sending them to the authorities responsible for interpretation. If parliament did not agree to a successful referendum, a referendum was made, the success of which depended on 50 percent of the electorate taking part and, moreover, the majority of the participants voting in the affirmative.

The Reichstag could demand a referendum if a constitutional amendment it had decided on was rejected by the Reichsrat . In addition, a third of the members of the Reichstag could initiate a referendum on a passed law. In this case, the support of five percent of the electorate was also necessary. Finally, the Reich President was able to order a referendum on a law passed by the Reichstag. Only the Reich President could initiate a referendum on the budget, tax laws and salary regulations.

In principle, the political system of the Weimar Republic was designed as a parliamentary democracy and a party democracy . In normal political situations, neither the popularly elected Reich President nor the people's legislation, but the Reichstag should be the organ of legislation and control of the Reich government. The latter was rather intended as a corrective counterweight to the party state and to a “ parliamentary absolutism ” in individual cases and thus as a supplement to the representative system. The main motive in the introduction of the people's legislation was the function of creating acceptance and educating the people to political culture and responsibility. In the given desolate situation and the weak democratic tradition in Germany, this was an optimistic plan. The main spokesmen for the democratic parties were aware of the risk, but were convinced that the Weimar Constitution as a whole had little chance of lasting existence without a comprehensive democratization of the population.

Practical application of direct democratic procedures at the national level

Unsuccessful and unapproved petitions from 1922 to 1926

The first attempts at referendums came from associations and association-like organizations. The beginning was made at the end of 1922 by the Reich Association for Settlement and Lease , which applied for a request for land reform . The bill stipulated settlement land for peasant holdings by an uncompensated expropriation and nationalization of large estates to provide that for a small fee in annual lease should be awarded. The initiative was fiercely opposed by large landowners , but also by their farm workers . Thereupon the initiators stopped their project by refraining from sending the signature lists to the authorities for interpretation.

In 1923 the Reichsbund submitted another application for approval of a referendum. Now the neglected by the government of the war victims should be improved by the fact that the necessary funds should be procured through a one-time property levy in favor of an "emergency community for war disabled". The Marx government hindered the project by stipulating in an ordinance that the initiators of a referendum had to transfer a lump sum to the Reich Minister of the Interior, the amount of which was at the discretion of the ministry. This should only be reimbursed if the proposed law has been accepted by the Reichstag or in a referendum. After protests by the SPD, DDP and the center , the regulation, which was based on the financial situation and was originally supposed to apply until 1930, was limited to October 1, 1924. The Reichsbund's draft law was also judged by the Reich Minister of the Interior as a tax law and was therefore not approved.

At the end of April 1926, the predominantly medium-sized "Sparerbund - Dr. Best ”submitted a petition for a referendum that contained a draft law to amend the revaluation laws of June 16, 1925. The Sparerbund, whose members were particularly affected by the devaluation of savings balances, longer-term liabilities such as mortgages and securities and war bonds as a result of the inflation of 1923 , demanded a higher revaluation in the new Rentenmark . Since the Reich government saw debt relief as absolutely necessary for the economic upswing, currency stability and the fulfillment of reparation claims, it wanted to prevent the request at all costs. Finally, she agreed to make the subject exclusion of the tax clause under Article 73, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution so narrow that the legislative proposal for the request would fall under it. If the constitutional amendment required for this did not receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the Reichstag, the government threatened to resign. When the petitioners for the referendum split in May 1926, the government no longer considered the constitutional amendment, which had been heavily criticized, to be necessary and withdrew the draft law. Even without the constitutional amendment, Interior Minister Wilhelm Külz rejected the referendum with the help of a controversial interpretation of the Reich constitution as an intervention in the budget.

Referendum "Expropriation of Princely Property" (1926)

Propaganda for the referendum on the expropriation of princes in 1926

→ Main article : Expropriation of princes

Since the November Revolution of 1918, a conflict between the state governments and the politically disempowered German princely houses over the question of what should be done with the assets of the former sovereigns has been simmering. In the years that followed, negotiations and legal proceedings did not lead to satisfactory results. The efforts also met with considerable resistance from the conservative parties.

In December 1925, the KPD demanded expropriation in an open letter and refused any compensation. The party entered into cooperation with the “Reich Committee for the Implementation of the Referendum for Compensation-Free Expropriation of the Princes”, which had been formed from left and liberal groups under the leadership of the German League for Human Rights, independent of the major parties and trade unions. In doing so, they thwarted the ongoing efforts of the SPD parliamentary group in the Reichstag to find a parliamentary solution and also pre-empted a social democratic application for approval of a referendum. As early as the autumn of 1925, the SPD parliamentary group in the Reichstag considered for the first time a legal solution to these problems by referendum. Since two competing petitions had no prospect of success, the SPD joined the referendum after initial hesitation. On January 25, 1926, the Reich Committee, the KPD and the SPD jointly submitted a petition for approval to the Reich Minister of the Interior. The wealth gained in this way was intended to benefit the unemployed, war victims and survivors as well as victims of inflation, and was to be used to procure settlement land for agricultural workers and smallholders. On February 26, 1926, the application for approval was granted and the referendum was scheduled for March 4 to 17.

The referendum was supported by around 39.5 million voters out of 12.5 million and was thus successful. The bill introduced by the referendum was unsuccessful in the Reichstag. The referendum was scheduled for June 20, 1926. The debate, which had already been held with great excitement, increased in intensity again considerably. The demand for an expropriation of the princes without compensation came among others. the national conservative DNVP, the national liberal DVP, the economic party and the German National Freedom Party , the churches and President Paul von Hindenburg . The opponents of the expropriation of the princes propagated a boycott of the vote, which not only aimed at a failure of the referendum at the necessary participation quorum of 50 percent, but also made it possible to control farm workers in the service of the nobility. The clientele of the opponents of the vote, especially the Landbund and the warrior associations, set up observation posts in front of the voting booths and noted the voters, who were thus easily recognizable as supporters. The expropriation, on the other hand, was supported by left and liberal groups. Many supporters of the Center Party and the DDP also endorsed it.

Of the 39.5 million eligible voters, 15.5 million people took part. The turnout was 39.3 percent. The referendum failed because of the 50 percent quorum. A total of 14.4 million people voted for the expropriation, 600,000 against.

Referendum "Armored cruiser ban" (1928)

In the autumn of 1927, the Marx IV cabinet decided to build several armored cruisers . In the budget 1928, she presented a first installment of 9.3 million Reichsmark to build the armored cruiser A one. The government took up the demand of the Reichsmarine to provide 40 million Reichsmarks annually for four armored cruisers for six to ten years. In view of the long-term planning of the project, the decision had to result in further approvals with corresponding financial consequences. The military-political background was that the German Reich had to surrender a large part of its fleet due to the Versailles Treaty and it was forbidden to build warships over a certain size. Therefore, the Reichsmarine demanded the construction of small, but highly modern, faster and heavily armed ships. Resistance to the plans came from the left-wing parties SPD and KPD, but also from parts of the DDP and other left-liberal forces. On the one hand, it was justified by the fact that social benefits were canceled at the same time, including five million Reichsmarks for school meals . On the other hand, the rejection was fundamentally pacifist .

In 1928 there were new elections , from which the SPD emerged as the strongest force. During the election campaign, like the KPD, it had advertised with the demand “child feeding instead of armored cruiser”. After the election, she entered into a grand coalition with the DDP, the Center, the BVP and the DVP. In the coalition negotiations, she gave in to the DVP, which stuck to the decision to build the armored cruiser A. On August 10, 1928, the Müller II cabinet voted for the first installment for the armored cruiser, while at the same time the German participants in the 3rd Congress of the Socialist Workers' International in Brussels were promoting complete disarmament. The own party and the public were only inadequately informed about the background to the course correction. There were protests in the SPD against its own members of the government, who were accused of voting fraud and who were suggested to leave the party. Even the party and parliamentary group leadership distanced themselves from the cabinet decision. The actual costs of shipbuilding quickly exceeded the expenditures approved in the 1928/29 Reich budget several times over.

On August 16, 1928, the KPD decided to initiate a referendum against the construction of the armored cruiser. To this end, she joined a collection of 30 smaller groups, including this time the German League for Human Rights , and bundled them in a “Preparatory Committee for the Implementation and Support of the Referendum against the Building of the Armored Cross”. On August 27, she submitted an application for approval to the Ministry of the Interior together with the Red Front Fighters Association and the Communist Youth Association of Germany (KJVD). Unlike in 1926, the SPD did not participate this time. Rather, she saw the referendum “Against the Building of the Armored Cross” primarily an attack against herself and described it as a “communist demagogue piece”. The SPD called on its supporters not to support the request.

The text of the referendum read: "The building of ironclad ships and cruisers of any kind is prohibited". Although the request did not contain a draft law and would intervene in the budget, the Social Democratic Reich Minister of the Interior, Carl Severing, allowed the request on September 17 so as not to make the situation even more dangerous for his party. The referendum was for the period between the 3rd and Scheduled October 16, 1928. With 1.2 million signatures, which meant a turnout of only 2.94 percent, the referendum failed with the signature quorum of ten percent and thus did not make it to the referendum. One of the causes is seen in the connection of the open listing procedure with the social pressure to classify every signatory as a communist.

Referendum against the Young Plan (1929)

The Karl Liebknecht House of the KPD on the day of the Reichstag election in 1930 with slogans against the Young Plan

→ Main article : Referendum against the Young Plan

For the first time in 1925 and again in 1927, the national-conservative military association Stahlhelm planned a referendum against the war guilt article of the Versailles Treaty and thus against the so-called " war guilt lie ", but initially abandoned the project due to a lack of support from the right-wing parties in the Reichstag. The question of war guilt heated the minds in Weimar politics and the public again and again. The right spectrum had also considered other petitions for a referendum. Since autumn 1928, the Stahlhelm has been considering a constitutional request that the government should no longer depend on the confidence of the Reichstag, but only on the Reich President. In the fall of 1927, the DNVP and DVP had plans to initiate a referendum to reintroduce black, white and red as the colors of the Reich. These considerations were dropped again because of the dubious prospects of success.

Instead, in 1929, under the influence of Alfred Hugenberg, a referendum directed against the Young Plan was initiated. At that time, the Young Plan was being negotiated in The Hague and was intended to reorganize German reparation payments . It became the focal point of disputes over almost all financial policy issues. In doing so, he also touched on all the economic and social problems of the unstable republic, which effectively addressed both the political right and the left for its propaganda. The right-wing spectrum in particular saw this as an opportunity for agitation to fundamentally attack and ultimately destroy the Weimar system and its supporters. After the election losses in May 1928, Hugenberg had pushed through a radical, uncompromising opposition course in the DNVP , with which the “Weimar system” was to be changed in an anti-parliamentary, conservative-authoritarian manner.

The NSDAP had not supported the previous efforts of Stahlhelm, DNVP and DVP to initiate referendums because it was fundamentally opposed to referendums. After Adolf Hitler had succeeded in restricting a referendum to reparation payments alone, the NSDAP joined the "Reich Committee for the German Referendum".

On September 28, 1929, Alfred Hugenberg and Franz Seldte applied for the approval of a referendum for a "law against the enslavement of the German people (freedom law)", in which the Reich government revoked Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the admission of war guilt , the immediate restoration of German state power in all occupied territories and the rejection of all further reparation claims was demanded. Just two days later, the referendum was approved and set for October 16-29. A massive campaign began, which was carried out mainly in the newspapers of the Hugenberg Group and by the NSDAP. She was supported by the DNVP, the Stahlhelm and the Reichslandbund . Above all, the governments of Reich Chancellor Hermann Müller and Prussian Prime Minister Otto Braun (both SPD) opposed this, but also the DVP, which is part of the government. The officials were forbidden by ministerial decrees to engage in and participate in the referendum under threat of disciplinary measures. Substantial resources were used in the campaigns on both sides, including newspapers, magazines, leaflets and brochures, as well as advertising films and radio advertising.

4,135,300 and thus 10.02 percent of the electorate signed the request, which was thus just about successful. The Reichstag rejected the request against the votes of the DNVP, NSDAP and the Christian National Peasant and Rural People's Party (LVP). When the main speaker of the NSDAP declared in the Reichstag session that the referendum should serve "to initiate the elimination of the system in a legal way", 17 MPs of the DNVP and one of the LVP refused to approve the draft. This meant a weakening of the alliance and initiated the disintegration of the DNVP.

The referendum was set for December 22, 1929. The SPD called for a boycott of the vote. With over 42 million eligible voters, there were 5,838,868 votes in favor and 338,195 against. That meant a vote participation of 14.9 percent, the approval quorum was 13.8 percent. This referendum had therefore also failed due to a lack of participation.

On March 12, 1930, the Reichstag adopted the Hague Agreement on the Young Plan. The outcome was generally seen, even within the NSDAP, as a severe defeat for the “national right”. The DNVP paid for the referendum with the price of its unity and unity; for them it marked the beginning of its end. There was a consensus among democratic observers as well as constitutional lawyers that deploying people's legislation with the aim of undermining and changing the political order of the Weimar Republic should be viewed as an abuse of this institution. At the same time, contemporary observers were generally of the opinion that this calculation had failed.

Not used other possibilities of referendums

The other possibilities of initiating a referendum "from above", regulated in Articles 73 to 76 of the Reich Constitution in addition to the people's legislation, were not used. The Reich Presidents avoided exposing themselves to the associated political risks, especially since, in accordance with Article 48 of the Reich Constitution, the Emergency Ordinance provided them with a very effective set of instruments for exceptional cases. Attempts by minorities in the Reichstag again failed due to declarations of urgency by the respective majority.

Direct democracy in the countries

Introduction of direct democratic elements in the state constitutions

Even before the Weimar constitutional deliberations, direct democratic procedures were included in the state constitutions of Baden , Württemberg and Bavaria . In both Baden and Württemberg, social democrats and liberals worked together in the first coalition governments. While the SPD strived for people's legislation without major hurdles, the liberals wanted to restrict the direct democratic elements through higher quorums and subject exclusions in budget laws. In both state constitutions there were compromises between these ideas. The opinion leaders in Baden were the liberal journalist and university professor Julius Curtius , in Württemberg the social democratic politicians Wilhelm Keil and Wilhelm Blos and the DDP members Wilhelm von Blume and Conrad Haussmann . Keil, Haußmann and von Blume cited the model of direct democracy in Switzerland . In addition, it played a role in the discussion to respond to the demands of the USPD for a soviet republic and to create a counterweight to a party state . Curtius, Keil and Haußmann strongly influenced the following debate on popular legislation in the Weimar National Assembly. The adoption of the Baden state constitution on April 13, 1919 was the first referendum on German soil.

In 1919 a socialist government ruled Bavaria under Kurt Eisner . After the defeat of the Munich Soviet Republic, the main concern here was to take the wind out of the sails of demands for the introduction of the Soviet system. Here, too, high quorums and area exclusions were introduced. The Bavarian debate has had little influence on the constitutional deliberations of the National Assembly.

Attempted dissolutions of parliament in the countries

Of the twelve direct democratic votes that were held at state level up to the end of the Weimar Republic, the majority were aimed at the premature dissolution of a parliament or the resignation of a government. While the Weimar National Assembly had rejected a popular dissolution of the Reichstag, the possibility of recalling the state parliaments was anchored in most state constitutions.

In the early years of the Weimar Republic up to 1926, corresponding initiatives in Hesse , Schwarzburg-Sondershausen , Saxony and Braunschweig came from the bourgeois forces of the DNVP and the DVP, who wanted to shift the balance of power in their favor by means of new elections . In later attempts in 1929 in Lippe , 1931 in Baden , Prussia , Anhalt , Braunschweig and Thuringia and in 1931/32 in Oldenburg and Saxony, the NSDAP and KPD, and to a lesser extent the DNVP, were concerned with undermining and eliminating or at least to change them. All attempts to dissolve except for the one in Oldenburg failed.

The best-known case was the referendum to dissolve the Prussian state parliament in the summer of 1931. In the largest and most important country in the empire, the attempt to dissolve parliament was also a struggle for supremacy in the empire. Prussia, where the “ Weimar Coalition ” consisting of the SPD, Zentrum and DDP ruled from 1919 to 1921 and from 1925 to 1932 , was seen as a bulwark of democracy. Since the election of 1928, however , the Braun government only had a slim majority in parliament. The 1930 Reichstag election had made it clear that considerable voters had turned away from the Weimar coalition and turned to the right-wing opposition parties. In this situation, the Stahlhelm and the DNVP took over preparations for a dissolution request from January 1931. The DVP joined the initiative, as did the NSDAP, which initially hesitated because it was anxious to maintain the independence of its policies. The KPD also supported the request. At first she fought the initiative sharply, but changed her stance on the instructions of the Moscow Executive Committee of the Communist International . This aimed to defeat the SPD, regarded as the “ social-fascist ” handmaiden of western capital, and expected that a temporary rise of right-wing radical forces would benefit communism in Germany in the long term. However, some of the KPD supporters did not follow this course. The referendum was supported by over 22 percent of the electorate. In the following referendum, 9.8 million voters, which corresponded to an approval quorum of 37.1 percent, voted for the dissolution of the state parliament. Participation was 39.2 percent, which means that the required participation of 50 percent of those entitled to vote was clearly missed.

In Oldenburg, the NSDAP managed to force new elections for the first and only time , after which it for the first time had an absolute majority in a state parliament. However, this only continued the rise of the party; by the election of May 17, 1931, it had already become the strongest party in the Oldenburg state parliament .

Other direct coordination at the state level

Further votes related to questions of the territorial affiliation of smaller regional authorities (Free State of Coburg, Schaumburg-Lippe).

Direct democracy at the local level

Bavaria was the first of eight federal states to introduce direct democratic procedures at the local level. The participation quorum was set very high at 50 percent.

Aftermath

Parliamentary Council 1949

The Frankfurt documents , which emerged from the London Six Power Conference and passed on July 1, 1948, provided for a constitution to be ratified by referendums in the federal states . However, in order to underline their provisional character and not to cement the division of Germany , the Prime Ministers of the states in the three western zones decided at the Rittersturz conference from July 8 to 10, 1948 to dispense with the term “constitution” and the “ Basic Law “Only to be ratified by the state parliaments. The constitutional convention in Herrenchiemsee , which met from August 10 to 23, 1948, agreed on the stipulation that there should be no referendum in the constitution to be drawn up, but that there should be an obligatory referendum for changes to the Basic Law . The Parliamentary Council , however, decided after heated debate to include any plebiscitary elements in the Basic Law.

In retrospect, this decision was interpreted as the result of concrete experiences from the Weimar Republic. More recent research, however, emphasizes that it was essentially time-dependent. The most important reasons for the negative attitude were the fear of an abuse of referendums by the SED or the KPD in the emerging Cold War , the provisional character that the Basic Law was supposed to have, and the difficulties in referendums in view of the destroyed infrastructure in the post-war period would have brought with them. In fact, no party in the Parliamentary Council rejected direct democratic procedures in general. The fluctuation between a principled affirmation and a situational rejection of direct democracy has been described by the term “ quarantine ”. For a transitional period after the dictatorship of the National Socialists and the Second World War, as well as during the beginning of the Cold War, the Parliamentary Council wanted to protect the young democracy from itself.

Later reception

After 1945, the thesis of the erosion of democracy in the Weimar Republic by the popular initiative became a commonplace with considerable historical relevance. The post-war era was characterized by a "plebisphobia". The influential political scientist Ernst Fraenkel put it in 1964: “At the time of its birth, the Weimar Republic committed itself to a plebiscitary type of democracy; at the hour of her death she received the receipt ”.

Recent research in contemporary history has largely rejected this thesis as having been refuted. The specific design of the direct democratic procedure was problematic. In particular, the high participation quorum made it easy for the opponents of a referendum to bring it down by boycotting the democratic process instead of fighting for a majority in the vote. The already weak anchoring of democracy in society was thus strengthened. Representative democracy, especially in the Reichstag elections , would have offered the extremists greater opportunities for agitation and mobilization than the few popular initiatives, none of which were successful at the Reich level. The remarkably few petitions for a referendum and referendums remained, in practice, sidelines of the political debate.

The referendum against the Young Plan, in particular, repeatedly serves as a warning example against popular legislation, as a warning sign of how this constitutional institution can be misused to destroy a political system.

See also

• List of plebiscites in Germany

literature

• Reinhard Schiffers: “Weimar Experiences”: Still an orientation aid today? , in: Theo Schiller, Volker Mittendorf (Ed.): Direct Democracy. Research and Perspectives , Westdeutscher Verlag, Wiesbaden 2002, ISBN 3-531-13852-9 , pp. 65–75.
• Christopher Schmidt: Direct local democracy in central and southern Germany during the Weimar Republic. An examination of procedure and practice . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007, also dissertation University of Hanover 2006, ISBN 3-8329-2607-0 .
• Christopher Schwieger: People's legislation in Germany. The scientific handling of plebiscitary legislation at the Reich and federal level in the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic of Germany (1919 - 2002) . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2005, ISBN 3-428-11518-X (also dissertation University of Tübingen).
• Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct democratic elements in German constitutional history , Berliner Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-8305-1210-4 .

Web links

• Detailed results of the referendums and nationwide referendums and referendums in the Weimar Republic

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 38.
2. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 39.
3. ^ Frank Decker : Governing in the Federal State of Parties , Wiesbaden 2011, p. 185.
4. ^ Theo Schiller: Direct Democracy , Frankfurt / Main 2002, p. 28.
5. ↑ Andreas Kost: Direct Democracy , Wiesbaden 2008, p. 32 f.
6. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 53 ff.
7. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 61.
8. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 62.
9. ↑ Article 73 ff. Of the Weimar Constitution on wikisource.
10. ↑ Law on the referendum of June 27, 1921 .
11. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 69.
12. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, pp. 133-135.
13. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 134.
14. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 134.
15. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 134 f.
16. ↑ ^{a b c d e f} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 72.
17. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 73.
18. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 75.
19. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 75 f.
20. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 51 f.
21. ↑ ^{a b c} Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 52.
22. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 51.
23. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 78.
24. ↑ ^{a b} Christopher Schwieger: Volksgesetzgebung in Deutschland , Berlin 2005, p. 53.
25. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 53; Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 78.
26. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 79.
27. ↑ ^{a b c d} Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 60.
28. ↑ ^{a b c} Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 61.
29. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 60 f.
30. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 84.
31. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 62.
32. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 85.
33. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 63.
34. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 89.
35. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 90.
36. ↑ ^{a b} Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 64.
37. ↑ ^{a b} Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 65.
38. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 91.
39. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 92.
40. ↑ Christopher Schwieger: People's Legislation in Germany , Berlin 2005, p. 66.
41. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 93.
42. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 71.
43. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 70.
44. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 44 f.
45. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 45 f.
46. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 46.
47. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 47.
48. ↑ ^{a b} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 95.
49. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 96.
50. ↑ ^{a b c} Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 97.
51. ^ Frank Decker: Governing in the federal state of parties , Wiesbaden 2011, p. 188.
52. ↑ Reinhard Schiffers: "Weimar Experiences": Still an orientation aid today? , in: Direct Democracy. Research and Perspectives , ed. v. Theo Schiller and Volker Mittendorf, Wiesbaden 2002, pp. 74 f .; Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 192; Frank Decker: Governing in the federal state of parties , Wiesbaden 2011, p. 186.
53. ↑ Reinhard Schiffers: "Weimar Experiences": Still an orientation aid today? , in: Direct Democracy. Research and Perspectives , ed. v. Theo Schiller and Volker Mittendorf, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 74 f.
54. ↑ Otmar Jung: Basic Law and Referendum , Opladen 1994, p. 329 f.
55. ↑ Otmar Jung: Basic Law and Referendum , Opladen 1994, p. 330.
56. ↑ Wolfgang Luthardt: Direct Democracy. A comparison in Western Europe. Baden-Baden, 1994, p. 106.
57. ↑ Wolfgang Luthardt: Direct Democracy. A comparison in Western Europe. Baden-Baden, 1994, p. 107.
58. ↑ Ernst Fraenkel : Germany and the western democracies , new edition, ed. v. Alexander von Brünneck, Frankfurt a. M. 1991, p. 197.
59. ↑ Overviews of the state of research, including at: Otmar Jung: Direct Democracy - State of Research and Perspectives , in: Direct Democracy. Research and Perspectives , ed. v. Theo Schiller and Volker Mittendorf, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 23 ff .; Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 180 f .; Frank Decker: Governing in the federal state of political parties , Wiesbaden 2011, p. 187.
60. ↑ Reinhard Schiffers: “Weimar Experiences”: Still an orientation aid today? , in: Direct Democracy. Research and Perspectives , ed. v. Theo Schiller and Volker Mittendorf, Wiesbaden 2002, p. 67.
61. ↑ Reinhard Schiffers: Bad Weimar Experiences? , in: Dare more direct democracy , ed. v. Hermann K. Heussner, Otmar Jung, Munich 2009, p. 73 f.
62. ↑ Hanns-Jürgen Wiegand: Direct Democratic Elements in German Constitutional History , Berlin 2006, p. 87.