Ōfunato

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Ōfunato-shi
大船 渡 市
Ōfunato
Geographical location in Japan
Ōfunato (Japan)
Red pog.svg
Region : Tōhoku
Prefecture : Iwate
Coordinates : 39 ° 5 '  N , 141 ° 43'  E Coordinates: 39 ° 4 '55 "  N , 141 ° 42' 31"  E
Basic data
Surface: 323.25 km²
Residents : 35,535
(October 1, 2019)
Population density : 110 inhabitants per km²
Community key : 03203-4
Symbols
Flag / coat of arms:
Flag / coat of arms of Ōfunato
Tree : jaw
Flower : camellia
Bird : Larus crassirostris
town hall
Address : Ōfunato City Hall
15 Aza Utsunosawa, Sakari-chō
Ōfunato -shi
Iwate  022-8501
Website URL: http://www.city.ofunato.iwate.jp/
Location Ōfunatos in Iwate Prefecture
Location Ōfunatos in the prefecture

Ōfunato ( Japanese 大船 渡 市 , -shi ) is a city in Iwate Prefecture on Honshū , the main island of Japan .

geography

Tsunami breakwaters in Kamaishi city and in Ofunato city before the 2011 tsunami.jpg

Ōfunato Bay with the tsunami breakwaters at the entrance to the bay (before the 2011 tsunami )

The community is located on the Sanriku coast and thus on the Pacific coast of the Tōhoku region . As the Ria coast, the Sanriku coast has many steep, narrow bays which, due to their complex geographical effects, intensify the effects of tsunamis and, especially in Ōfunato, can lead to particularly high up to record heights.

The city of Ōfunato is located in the narrow bay of Ōfunato (大船 渡 湾), which - bounded on both flanks by steep hills - extends south and opens into the ocean. The bay stretches from the port to the ocean over a length of 5.7 km and measures 1.1 km in width directly at the port. Before the Tōhoku tsunami, there were two breakwaters at the entrance of the bay, which together had a length of 540 m, but were completely destroyed on March 11, 2011.

Ōfunato is located southeast of Morioka and northeast of Sendai .

history

In the Edo period , Ōfunato included not only the trading and administrative city but also fishing and mountain villages. Since the sea was plentiful, many fishermen lived on the coast. Other residents worked in the hinterland as loggers.

In the 1930s, a private company began producing cement using limestone from the city's hinterland. This served as a catalyst for Ōfunato's transformation into a modern heavy industrial city .

In 1952, two cities and five villages in the region were merged to form the city of Ōfunato in order to fulfill a national development project to create a coastal heavy industrial city (“rinkai kogyo moderu toshi”). The municipality of Ōfunato was named a city (shi) on April 1, 1952 .

The city administration of Ōfunato also applied for the city to be developed into a model city of "industrial development in underdeveloped areas" ("teikaihatsu chiiki kogyo Kaihatsu"), which corresponds to a national location policy that was in place in the age of high economic growth in the 1960s was introduced. The local entrepreneurs Ōfunatos, especially those from the declining fishing sector, and local politicians from the industrial sector pushed for the city to apply for designation as a model city.

These major development projects, supported by the national government, not only fostered regional industrialization, but also built up urban infrastructure such as seaports and fishing industry complexes. In addition, the projects were designed to improve the economic situation of the people in the northern Japanese coastal region, which is one of the poorest regions in Japan. In the era of economic growth between the 1950s and 1980s, Japan's national land and industrial location policy aimed at “balanced development of national land” (first comprehensive national development plan introduced in 1962) and recommended the correction of unequal regional developments. As part of this policy, Ōfunato and other medium-sized and small towns and villages in the country experienced regional economic growth and population growth until the 1980s.

With the stagnation of the Japanese fisheries in the 1980s at a low level, there was a decline in the sea-product processing industry Ōfunatos.

The industry's reliance on public and private construction contributed to the demise of the Ōfunato cement industry after Japan ran into economic difficulties in the early 1990s. Another problem that Ōfunato faced was the aging of the population .

Under the influence of the economic crisis, the Japanese government implemented a decentralization policy in the 1990s and increasingly encouraged local governments to merge within the framework of the policy known as “heisei municipal mergers”, by providing financial support for mergers that had not been completed and financial penalties for those that had not been merged. The neoliberal government of Prime Minister Jun'ichirō Koizumi (2001-2006) pursued this policy, which ended a year before the Tōhoku earthquake in 2011 , in March 2010, and resulted in a total decrease in the number of communities from 3,229 (April 1999) to 1,730 (March 2010) led.

In November 2001, as part of the policy of amalgamation, the municipality of Ōfunato joined forces with the northern city of Sanriku, which was facing a budget crisis due to the aging population and the declining fishing industry and was seeking fiscal support through the national amalgamation policy. Ōfunatos local entrepreneurs and politicians hoped that the financial support through the merger would enable the city administration to develop and renovate the city's infrastructure and thus strengthen the city's competitiveness.

Earthquake and tsunami disasters

Since the Meiji period , the coastal region of Iwate Prefecture, including Ōfunato, had experienced three particularly strong earthquake-generated tsunamis before 2011: 1896 , 1933, and 1960 . Affected cities and villages in the region were revitalized and rebuilt each time.

Comparison of the balance sheets of completely destroyed houses and victims in Ōfunato for the disasters of 1896, 1933, 1960 and 2011
Disaster event Completely destroyed houses Death toll source
Meiji 1896 (earthquake and tsunami) 806 3174
Shōwa 1933 (earthquake and tsunami) 694 423
Chile 1960 (earthquake and tsunami) 384 53
Tōhoku 2011 (earthquake and tsunami) 362 419
Note: The death toll for the 2011 Tōhoku disaster is calculated from the total number of dead and missing in the 153rd FDMA damage report of March 8, 2016, minus the figures for catastrophe-related deaths determined by the Reconstruction Agency (RA).
Maximum tsunami height of 38.2 m from the 1896 Sanriku tsunami shown on a pole near the border of Okubo and Shirahama, Sanrikucho-Ryori, Ofunato City, Iwate Prefecture.jpg
The maximum tsunami height of the Meiji-Sanriku tsunami of 1896 of 38.2 m is displayed on a mast near the border between Okubo and Shirahama (Sanrikucho-Ryori, city of unfunato). The Tōhoku tsunami of 2011 with heights of 16.8 m and 21.2 m did not reach this point.
Ōfunato - 20120902 tsunami damage3.jpg
Tsunami level table for the Chile tsunami ("チ リ 地 津 波 水位 表") in Ōfunato ("大船 渡 市") dated May 24, 1960 ("昭 35 5 24"), the maximum flood height at this point of 5.3 m indicates. It warns not to forget catastrophes, because otherwise they will repeat themselves ("災害 は 忘 れ た 頃 に や つ て く る"). The photo from September 2, 2012 in Chayamae / Ōfunato-chō (大船 渡 町) shows the renewed tsunami damage in the building.


Ofunato city center area Aerial photograph.1977.jpg
Left picture: Sakari-cho (盛 町) on the north-western bank of the river and south of it the city center of Ōfunato on the western bank of the port ( aerial photo in color taken from 15 aerial photographs in 1977 by MLIT )
Ofunato Inundation areas of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Ando et al 2013.jpg


Right picture: The 2011 tsunami far exceeded the flood plains predicted for Ōfunato:
red : predicted flood plains based on the combination of three types of earthquakes: the historical Meiji-Sanriku-oki and Shōwa-Sanriku-oki and the hypothetical Miyagi-oki
black numbers : flood or run-up heights [m] March 11, 2011
blue : floodplains on 11 March 2011
column charts : population (left) and dead (right) for ages 0-15 (below), 16-64 (center) and ≥65 (top)

Damage from the tsunami inundation of Kamaishi city with a maximum runup height of 11.7 m -1-6-2011- and of Ofunato city with a maximum runup height of 10.9 m -1-6-2011-.jpg

Damage from the tsunami flooding in Ōfunato 2011

Historical tsunami experiences and countermeasures

In Ōfunato record levels of tsunamis have been measured repeatedly . The area was devastated after the Meiji-Sanriku earthquake in 1896 by a tsunami triggered by the earthquake, which reached its maximum height in Ryōri -Shirahama (today belonging to Ōfunato) of around 38 m (contemporary information spoke of 39-55 m and 22 m ) and killed 204 of the 240 residents. The Shōwa-Sanriku earthquake in Japan in 1933 with a total of 3,000 deaths triggered a tsunami that reached its maximum height of 29 m in Ryōri-Shirahama. The Chile tsunami of 1960 reached heights of 3–5 m here.

After the tsunami triggered by the Chile earthquake in 1960 hit the city of Ōfunato with long-period waves, two tsunami breakwaters were built at the entrance to the bay at a water depth of 38 m, lengths of 290 m and 250 m and an opening 200 m wide release. The breakwaters were completed in 1967 and successfully protected the city against the 1968 Tokachi-oki tsunami .

Tōhoku disaster 2011

On March 11, 2011, the city of Ōfunato was shaken at 2:46 pm by the Tōhoku earthquake , which was registered with level "weak 6" on the Japanese seismic intensity scale .

Extent of flooding and damage

Victims record, population, tsunami wave and distance from evacuation sites to areas of Ōfunatos
Territory in Ōfunato Fatalities Residents Tsunami Distance to the next evacuation site [m]
Rate [%] number Max. Flooding height [m] Arrival time [min.]
Ōfunato 1.35 136 10,047 9.75 25th 382
Sanriku 1.25 92 7,386 8.54 27 333
Matsusaki 0.87 41 4,718 13.84 27 297
Source: Total population according to Statistics Bureau (統計局) and Director-General for Policy Planning (政策 統 括 官), 2010 census; Fatalities according to fire and disaster management agency (消防 庁 = Fire and Disaster Management Agency, FDMA); Maximum flood height and arrival time of the tsunami according to The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami Joint Survey Group ; Distance to the nearest evacuation site from the place of residence according to the evacuation site data from the Cabinet Secretariat Civil Protection Portal Site ( http://www.kokuminhogo.go.jp/en/pc-index_e.html ) of the Cabinet Secretariat (内閣 官 房) and the aerial photographs and maps from Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (GSI) from the Tsunami Damage Mapping Team, Association of Japanese Geographers.

The earthquake triggered a tsunami larger than the breakwater designers in Ōfunato (as well as Kamaishi) expected, and the tsunami caused significant damage to the breakwaters and flooded the city (also in Kamaishi), although the breakwaters contributed to it to mitigate the impact of the tsunami on its height and arrival time (even more so in Kamaishi than in Ōfunato). The tsunami hit both coastal and central areas in Ōfunato.

The tsunami hit Ōfunato in three waves, one of which was 23.6 m high, according to the Port and Airport Research Institute (PARI). The funnel effect in the bay contributed to the fact that the measured tsunami height at the port rose up to 11.8 m. According to the water levels recorded in the port, the tsunami first arrived there 25 minutes after the earthquake and only took 6 minutes to reach a height of 8 m (at this point the recording by the measuring devices ended). Before the arrival of the tsunami, there was a period of sea retreat here, and the first tsunami wave remained the highest.

In Sanrikucho-Ryori, the 2011 tsunami height, with heights of 17 and 21 m, was lower than the Sanriku tsunamis of 1896 and 1933 and higher than the Chile tsunami of 1960. But also the 2011 Tōhoku tsunami, which occurred across Japan along with the earthquake claimed the lives of over 20,000 people, reached 40.1 meters in Ryōri Bay of Ōfunato, the highest run-up height in Ōfunato, which is also the highest known run-up height in Japanese history. In this Ria coastal region, cities were devastated between the 38th and 40th parallel. The number of completely destroyed residential buildings in Ōfunato is put at 2,791, that of the partially destroyed at 1,147. Seven of the city's 24 clinics were damaged by the tsunami.

The 3-storey shear wall residential building made of reinforced concrete (top center in the picture) in Chayamae (茶屋 前) / Ōfunato-chō (大船 渡 町) was flooded up to the top of the 3rd floor, but remained intact during the construction because it was in spite of it Proximity to the sea and relatively exposed location did not suffer from major debris impacts and was protected by a similar building on its landward side during the tsunami backflow. To the east of it (top right in the picture) is the JR East Ōfunato station. (Photo: March 15, 2011)

The wooden buildings in the area collapsed almost completely. Many steel frame and reinforced concrete buildings remained intact in their construction, but the steel buildings suffered severe damage to non-load-bearing parts such as the loss of the cladding. After the Chilean tsunami in 1960, when flooding depths of 5.6 m in Ōfunato, some residents built their houses as 3-storey reinforced concrete buildings in the belief that they would withstand a future tsunami. However, on March 11, 2011, the tsunami flooded many of these buildings to roof height.

A co-seismic subsidence developed in the city , which has resulted in frequent flooding since the Tōhoku disaster.

Victim

The Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA) reported 422 dead and 79 missing persons for Ōfunato in its 157th FDMA damage report of March 7, 2018.

Measured against the total population of Ōfunato, which was given as 40,737 in the 2010 census, the casualty rate from the 2011 disaster was 1.2%, if all dead and missing persons recorded in the 157th FDMA damage report of March 7, 2018 are taken into account or 1.03% if the victims recorded in the 153rd FDMA damage report of March 8, 2016 (419 dead and 79 missing) minus the catastrophe-related deaths reported by the Reconstruction Agency (RA) are taken into account, which results in a 419 dead and missing results. With the same database, but based solely on the floodplain of the tsunami in Ōfunato, which covered an area of ​​8 km 2 , the casualty rate was 2.20%. 19,073 people and thus 47% of the total population of the city of Ōfunato (assuming 40,738 inhabitants in 2010) had their residence in the area flooded by the tsunami on March 11, 2011.

Although almost half of the population lived in the flooded area, the death rate of those living in the flooded area was among the lowest on the Ria coast and was still below that of Miyako , where only 3% of the population lived in the flooded area.

evacuation

The city of Ōfunato had a transmission system that could be used for tsunami warnings with over 120 mobile, portable and stationary (loudspeaker) stations, some of them with visual alarms. In Ōfunato, these systems failed when tsunami water flooded the Battery Power Packs attached to the siren towers. Local civil protection officials assume that most of the people in Ōfunato left the coastal areas to evacuate as a result of the ground tremors, while their proportion in Kesennuma is estimated at 20–30% and the majority there waited for an official or formal warning before their evacuation. The reaction of so many people to natural warning signs, as in this case the strength and especially the duration of the ground vibrations, can be traced back to the history of significant tsunami effects in places on the Ria coast and the resulting education to escape to higher terrain in the event of severe ground vibrations .

While in the city of Ōfunato most of the people in the tsunami danger zones officially and on the maps marked as such quickly evacuated, those living just outside the danger zones marked on the maps tended not to evacuate until they saw the tsunami in their own home saw coming close.

In the Okirai primary school, the tsunami almost reached the roof of the three-storey building, but all students were able to safely escape via an evacuation bridge that connects the school building with a nearby road on higher ground and the escape route from 250 to 110 meters and the evacuation time from 6 to 3 Minutes shortened.

  • Gallery: Devastation in Ōfunato after the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011:

  • Destroyed house (Photo: March 15, 2011)

  • A tug in the tsunami in Ōfunato (Photo: March 15, 2011)

  • A sailing boat washed up on a gas station roof in the port of Ōfunato (Photo: March 21, 2011)

reconstruction

One month after the disaster, on April 20, 2011, the city of Ōfunato adopted a fundamental regional rehabilitation and reconstruction policy. She set up a planning committee made up of local politicians and business leaders, as well as city planners from the university, who finalized the city's reconstruction plan on October 31, 2011. The plan provides for the construction of social housing, the abolition of the coastal settlements, and the repair and construction of the fishing ports and roads. A significant part of these regional construction projects is funded by the national government.

In addition to the municipal reconstruction plan, there are other plans for regional reconstruction.

traffic

  • Street:
    • Sanriku-Jukan Highway
    • National road 45,107,397
  • Train:

sons and daughters of the town

Neighboring cities and communities

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 997, Figure 3. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  2. ↑ a b c d e Shunichi Koshimura, Nobuo Shuto: Response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster . In: Philosophical Transactions of The Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences . tape 373 , no. 2053 , 2015, p. 20140373 , doi : 10.1098 / rsta.2014.0373 . (Published online September 21, 2015).
  3. ↑ a b c d e f Stuart Fraser, Alison Raby, Antonios Pomonis, Katsuichiro Goda, Siau Chen Chian, Joshua Macabuag, Mark Offord, Keiko Saito, Peter Sammonds: Tsunami damage to coastal defenses and buildings in the March 11th 2011 Mw9.0 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami . In: Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering . tape 11 , 2013, p. 205-239 , doi : 10.1007 / s10518-012-9348-9 . (Published online March 27, 2012).
  4. ↑ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Masao Maruyama: Local Regime after the Great East Japan Earthquake: For a Study on the Politics of Post-disaster Reconstruction . In: Disaster, Infrastructure and Society: Learning from the 2011 Earthquake in Japan = 災害 ・ 基 盤 ・ 社会 ―― 東 日本 大 震災 か ら 考 え る . tape 3 , 2012, p. 53-60 ( hit-u.ac.jp ). (Special Issue: The Logic of Cascading: Infrastructural Perspectives on a Post-disaster Situation).
  5. ↑ a b c d e f Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Why did Rikuzentakata have a high death toll in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster? Finding the devastating disaster's root causes . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 27 , 2018, p. 21-36 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2017.08.001 . (Published online August 15, 2017). With reference to: Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Forensic investigation of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster: a case study of Rikuzentakata , Disaster Prevention and Management, 26 (3) (2017), pp. 298-313 , doi: 10.1108 / DPM-10-2016-0213 .
  6. ↑ Yoshinobu Tsuji, Kenji Satake, Takeo Ishibe, Tomoya Harada, Akihito Nishiyama, Satoshi Kusumoto: Tsunami Heights along the Pacific Coast of Northern Honshu Recorded from the 2011 Tohoku . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 171 , no. 12 , 2014, p. 3183-3215 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-014-0779-x . (Published online March 19, 2014). License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0). Here: p. 3209, Figure 18.
  7. ↑ cf. S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 24, Fig. 30.
  8. ↑ Overview: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 17, pp. 1–21 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO; here: p. 17, Map O.2: "Actual inundation areas were much larger than predicted" (source: Cabinet Office).
  9. ↑ M. Ando, ​​M. Ishida, Y. Hayashi, C. Mizuki, Y. Nishikawa, Y. Tu: Interviewing insights regarding the fatalities inflicted by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake . In: Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci. tape 13 , September 6, 2017, p. 2173-2187 , doi : 10.5194 / nhess-13-2173-2013 . , License: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0); here: 2179, Fig. 2 d) ("Yamada").
  10. ↑ Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online on July 7, 2012), here: p. 997, Figure 4. License: Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0).
  11. ↑ 23.6-meter-high tsunami triggered by March 11 quake: survey. (No longer available online.) In: Kyodo News . March 23, 2011, archived from the original on March 26, 2011 ; accessed on August 12, 2016 .
  12. ↑ a b c K. Abe: Tsunami Resonance Curve from Dominant Periods Observed in Bays of Northeastern Japan . In: Kenji Satake (Ed.): Tsunamis: Case Studies and Recent Developments . Springer, 2005, ISBN 1-4020-3326-5 , pp. 97-99 , doi : 10.1007 / 1-4020-3331-1_6 .
  13. ↑ a b c Nobuhito Mori, Daniel T. Cox, Tomohiro Yasuda, Hajime Mase: Overview of the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake Tsunami Damage and Its Relation to Coastal Protection along the Sanriku Coast . In: Earthquake Spectra . tape 29 , S1, 2013, pp. 127-143 , doi : 10.1193 / 1.4000118 .
  14. ↑ a b c d e f Yoshinobu Tsuji, Kenji Satake, Takeo Ishibe, Tomoya Harada, Akihito Nishiyama, Satoshi Kusumoto: Tsunami Heights along the Pacific Coast of Northern Honshu Recorded from the 2011 Tohoku . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 171 , no. 12 , 2014, p. 3183-3215 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-014-0779-x . (Published online March 19, 2014). License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
  15. ↑ a b Anawat Suppasri, Nobuo Shuto, Fumihiko Imamura, Shunichi Koshimura, Erick Mas, Ahmet Cevdet Yalciner: Lessons Learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Tsunami: Performance of Tsunami Countermeasures, Coastal Buildings, and Tsunami Evacuation in Japan . In: Pure and Applied Geophysics . tape 170 , no. 6-8 , 2013, pp. 993-1018 , doi : 10.1007 / s00024-012-0511-7 . (Published online July 7, 2012).
  16. ↑ Nam Yi Yun, Masanori Hamada: Evacuation Behavior and Fatality Rate during the 2011 Tohoku-Oki Earthquake and Tsunami . In: Earthquake Spectra . tape 31 , no. 3 , August 2015, p. 1237-1265 , doi : 10.1193 / 082013EQS234M . , here table 2.
  17. ↑ Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Why did Rikuzentakata have a high death toll in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster? Finding the devastating disaster's root causes . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 27 , 2018, p. 21-36 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2017.08.001 . (Published online August 15, 2017).
  18. ↑ a b c 平 成 23 年 （2011 年） 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 （東 日本 大 震災） に つ い て （第 157 報） ( Memento from March 18, 2018 on WebCite ) ( PDF ( Memento from March 18, 2018 on WebCite )),総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), 157th report, March 7, 2018.
  19. ↑ 東 日本 大 震災 図 説 集 . (No longer available online.) In: mainichi.jp. Mainichi Shimbun- sha, May 20, 2011, archived from the original on June 19, 2011 ; Retrieved June 19, 2011 (Japanese, overview of reported dead, missing and evacuated).
  20. ↑ a b Shinichi Omama, Yoshihiro Inoue, Hiroyuki Fujiwara, Tomohiko Mase: First aid stations and patient demand in tsunami-affected areas of Iwate Prefecture following the Great East Japan Earthquake . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 31 , 2018, p. 435-440 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2018.06.005 . (First available online on June 12, 2018). License: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
  21. ↑ Stuart Fraser, Alison Raby, Antonios Pomonis, Katsuichiro Goda, Siau Chen Chian, Joshua Macabuag, Mark Offord, Keiko Saito, Peter Sammonds: Tsunami damage to coastal defenses and buildings in the March 11th 2011 Mw9.0 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami . In: Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering . tape 11 , 2013, p. 205-239 , doi : 10.1007 / s10518-012-9348-9 . (Published online March 27, 2012). Here p. 219, Fig. 7.
  22. ↑ 平 成 22 年 国 勢 調査 - 人口 等 基本 集 計 結果 - （岩手 県 ， 宮城 県 及 び 福島 県） ( Memento from March 24, 2018 on WebCite ) (PDF, Japanese), stat.go.jp (Statistics Japan - Statistics Bureau , Ministry of Internal Affairs and communication), 2010 Census, Summary of Results for Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures, URL: http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/index.html .
  23. ↑ 東 日本 大 震災 記録 集 ( Memento from March 23, 2018 on WebCite ) , 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), March 2013, here in Chapter 3 (第 3 章 災害 の 概要) the subsection 3.1 / 3.2 (3.1被害 の 概要 ／3.2 人 的 被害 の 状況) ( PDF ( Memento from March 23, 2018 on WebCite )).
  24. ↑ a b Tadashi Nakasu, Yuichi Ono, Wiraporn Pothisiri: Why did Rikuzentakata have a high death toll in the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami disaster? Finding the devastating disaster's root causes . In: International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction . tape 27 , 2018, p. 21-36 , doi : 10.1016 / j.ijdrr.2017.08.001 . (Published online on August 15, 2017), here p. 22, table 2.
  25. ↑ 平 成 23 年 (2011 年) 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 （東 日本 大 震災） に つ い て （第 153 報） ( Memento of March 10, 2016 on WebCite ) , 総 務 省 消防 庁 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency), 153rd report, March 8, 2016.
  26. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 3.
  27. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 29.
  28. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 26.
  29. ^ S. Fraser, GS Leonard, I. Matsuo, H. Murakami: Tsunami Evacuation: Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of March 11th 2011 . In: GNS Science Report 2012/17 . Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited, 2012, ISBN 978-0-478-19897-3 , ISSN  1177-2425 , 2.0, pp. I-VIII + 1–81 ( massey.ac.nz [PDF; accessed on June 29, 2018]). ; here: p. 31.
  30. ↑ Evacuation . In: Federica Ranghieri, Mikio Ishiwatari (Ed.): Learning from Megadisasters - Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake . World Bank Publications, Washington, DC 2014, ISBN 978-1-4648-0153-2 , Chapter 11, pp. 99-108 , doi : 10.1596 / 978-1-4648-0153-2 ( work accessible online on Google Books [accessed April 3, 2018]). , License: Creative Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO.

Remarks

  1. ↑ As a run-up height (English: run-up height ) is here the height of the country to which the tsunami has penetrated, respectively. (Source: Miyako City Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records Editorial Committee: The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Records of Miyako City - Vol. 1, History of Tsunami (Summary Version) - English Edition ( Memento from August 20, 2018 on WebCite ) (PDF), Miyako City Iwate Prefecture, March 15, 2015 (Japanese original version: September 1, 2014).)

Web links

Commons : Ōfunato  - collection of images, videos and audio files
The tsunami hazard map with its tsunami flood information is based on three tsunami simulations (1st historical Meiji-Sanriku tsunami, 2nd historical Showa-Sanriku tsunami and 3rd predicted Miyagi-Oki earthquake tsunami). The map of the Kokudo Chiriin (国土 地理 院, Geographical Survey Institute = GSI) has been created on a scale of 1: 25000 and is intended for printing on A3 paper . The damage prediction study was carried out by Iwate Prefecture in 2003 and 2004.
  • 10 万分 1 浸水 範 囲 概況 図 , 国土 地理 院 ( Kokudo Chiriin , Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, formerly: Geographical Survey Institute = GSI), www.gsi.go.jp: 地理 院 ホ ー ム> 防災 関 連> 平 成 23 年 （2011年） 東北 地方 太平洋 沖 地震 に 関 す る 情報 提供> 10 万分 1 浸水 範 囲 概況 図:
The GSI published here two maps with Ōfunato ( 浸水範囲概況図8 , 浸水範囲概況図 ) on which the flooded from the Tohoku Tsunami 2011 areas are drawn on the basis of reports of aerial photographs and satellite imagery, as far as was possible.