NATO expansion to the east

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An animation showing the year and location of counties as they joined the alliance.
Animation depicting the gradual expansion of NATO

With NATO's eastward expansion of the accession of countries of the former is the Warsaw Pact , including the former Soviet republics in the Baltics , and successor states of the non-aligned Yugoslavia to NATO called.

NATO accession

At the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997 , the states of the former Warsaw Pact Poland , the Czech Republic and Hungary were offered accession negotiations for the first time, and later also other Eastern European states. The accession negotiations with the Czech Republic were conducted by Otto Pick on the Czech side . On March 12, 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined NATO.

At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO invited Bulgaria , Estonia , Latvia , Lithuania , Romania , Slovakia and Slovenia to accession talks. On March 29, 2004, these seven countries joined NATO.

At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the accession of Albania and Croatia was officially decided. Their accession was planned for the NATO summit in Kehl and Strasbourg in April 2009 , ratified by all NATO members and completed on April 1, 2009.

At their meeting in Brussels on December 3, 2009, the foreign ministers of the 28 NATO member states declared Montenegro a candidate country; they did not mention a possible date of joining. On December 2, 2015, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the NATO countries in Brussels, Montenegro was officially invited to join the alliance. The accession as the 29th member country was finally completed on June 5, 2017.

The Accession Protocol for North Macedonia was signed on February 6, 2019 . The ratification by the member states was completed a year later. On March 27, 2020, North Macedonia joined NATO as the 30th member.

Candidates and prospects

  • Member States
  • Candidate Countries (MAP)
  • Promised invitation
  • No joining planned
  • Attitude towards joining unknown
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina is also interested in membership: at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the heads of state and government of the NATO member states decided to start accession negotiations with the Balkan state. At their meeting on December 3, 2009, the foreign ministers stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not yet advanced enough to become a candidate country and needed further reforms for democratization . On December 18, 2018, the foreign ministers decided to include Bosnia and Herzegovina in the action plan for candidate countries.

    NATO also classified Serbia as a candidate country. In 2007 the Parliament of Serbia passed a resolution on military neutrality. The then Defense Minister Dragan Šutanovac ( Cvetković government ) said in February 2009 that Serbia will likely not apply for full membership in NATO, but that it intends to strengthen its partnership with the Alliance through increased participation in international operations. The Kosovo want (as of 2008) to join NATO as soon as possible. Every accession to NATO must be ratified - unanimously - by all NATO member states.

    Georgia and Ukraine, with the support of the United States, wish to join NATO as soon as possible; Russia rejects this. The Western European NATO countries reject negotiations with consideration for Russia, whereas the Eastern European NATO countries want to start accession negotiations with Georgia and Ukraine as soon as possible, referring to the war in the Caucasus . Germany and France emphasized in 2008 that Georgia with its breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia , which had declared themselves independent, would destabilize NATO and that the majority of Ukrainians refuse to join NATO. Relations between NATO and Ukraine have been regulated in the NATO-Ukraine Charter since 1997 . The war in Ukraine since 2014 has put a heavy strain on relations between NATO and Russia.

    On February 7, 2019, the Verkhovna Rada enshrined in the constitution of Ukraine the country's strategic orientation towards full accession to NATO and the European Union.

    Criticism of the eastward expansion

    Rejection by US politicians

    NATO1999.jpg
    The first eastward expansion of NATO on March 12, 1999
     
    NATO2004.jpg
    The second eastward expansion of NATO on March 29, 2004
     
    NATO2009.jpg
    The third eastward expansion of NATO on April 1, 2009
     
    NATO2017.jpg
    The fourth eastward expansion of NATO on June 5, 2017
     
    NATO2020.jpg
    The fifth eastward expansion of NATO on March 27, 2020

    In an open letter dated June 26, 1997 to then President of the United States, Bill Clinton , more than 40 former senators, members of the government, ambassadors, disarmament and military experts expressed their concerns about his planned eastward expansion of NATO and called for its suspension. The signatories included Senate Defense Expert Sam Nunn , Gary Hart , Bennett Johnston , Mark Hatfield , Gordon J. Humphrey , and Ambassadors to Moscow Jack Matlock and Arthur Hartman , as well as Paul Nitze , Reagan's disarmament negotiator, Robert McNamara , Secretary of Defense. D., Admiral James D. Watkins , former director of the CIA , Admiral Stansfield Turner , Philip Merrill, and scientists Richard Pipes and Marshall D. Shulman . The letter describes NATO's membership offers in 1997 as a "political error of historical proportions".

    The signatories feared that the security and stability of Europe was in danger and justified this with four arguments:

    1. In Russia, NATO's eastward expansion, which is rejected by all political forces, will strengthen the undemocratic opposition and weaken the reform forces. Russia is being made to question the agreements after the end of the Cold War and to mobilize resistance to the disarmament treaties.
    2. A new line will be drawn between members and non-members. This increases the instability and leads to a weakened sense of security among the non-members.
    3. The eastward expansion diminishes the potential of NATO by giving guarantees to countries with serious border and minority problems as well as unevenly developed democratic systems.
    4. A cost debate will be triggered in the United States, which will call into question the United States' commitment to NATO.

    As an alternative to eastward expansion, the signatories called for an economic opening in the sense of eastward expansion of the EU , a strengthening of the Partnership for Peace program, closer cooperation between Russia and NATO and a continuation of disarmament efforts.

    Further US positions

    The decision of the Clinton administration to expand NATO to the borders of Russia was judged by historian and diplomat George F. Kennan in 1997 as "the most disastrous mistake in American politics in the post-Cold War era" because "this decision is expected that nationalist, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies will be ignited in the mind of Russia; that they have a detrimental influence on the development of democracy in Russia, that they restore the atmosphere of the Cold War in relations between East and West and force Russian foreign policy in directions that we will definitely displease.

    Former United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates published a similar view in his memoir.

    Attitude of Russia

    Russia rejected the eastward expansion of NATO as the wrong way to a new European security order, but could not prevent it. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act attempted to tone down Russia's reservations. In it, NATO and Russia declared their intention to build a strong, stable, lasting and equal partnership. The aim is to strengthen security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.

    North Macedonia

    In 2008 NATO announced that North Macedonia would be allowed to join the military alliance as soon as the name conflict with Greece was resolved. Moscow feared that North Macedonia's accession to NATO would weaken Russian influence in the Western Balkans and rejected Macedonia's accession. On April 7, 2017, even before the West-oriented Zoran Zaev was elected Prime Minister, Moscow's ambassador Oleg Shcherbak said in Skopje that Moscow wanted to create “a strip of militarily neutral countries” in the Balkans from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia. Russia threatened economic and diplomatic penalties if North Macedonia sought to join NATO. According to the Macedonian secret service UBK, the Russian foreign secret service SWR and the military secret service GRU tried to recruit soldiers, police officers and secret service agents in order to build up a network of militarily trained people who could be used if necessary to enforce Russian interests. In addition, Russia tried to influence economic projects such as the construction of a pipeline in North Macedonia by the Strojtransgas company, the establishment of several “friendship associations” and disinformation placed in local media.

    In June 2018, Greece and North Macedonia initially agreed on a name and paved the way for North Macedonia to join NATO. Both countries accused Russia of stoking resistance and demonstrations against the naming agreement. Russian diplomats are also said to have bribed Greek state officials and opponents of the naming agreement. In July 2018, Greece expelled two Russian diplomats and two other Russians from the country. During the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018, the North Macedonian Prime Minister Zaev said that while he knew that Russia was behind some protests against the agreement with Greece, that his country would seek friendship with everyone and not seek conflict. There were also fears within NATO that Moscow might try to support opponents of the solution in the name dispute before the name referendum in North Macedonia.

    In July 2018, NATO officially invited Macedonia to accession talks. The North Macedonia Accession Protocol was signed on February 6, 2019. After ratification by the member states, membership was completed on March 27, 2020.

    Ukraine and Georgia

    The Orange Revolution of Ukraine in 2004 was considered controlled by the Russian government as from the USA. As a result, the relationship between Russia and the United States deteriorated. At the International Security Conference in February 2007, Vladimir Putin described NATO's continued expansion plans as a serious "provocation". When discussing offering Ukraine and Georgia a plan to join NATO at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, he said: “We are contemplating the arrival of a military bloc [at our borders] whose membership obligations include Article 5 , as a direct threat to the security of our country ”. - Article 5 of the NATO Treaty contains the assistance obligation of its members.

    Since the Russian response to the implementation of the National Missile Defense program (National Missile Defense, NMD) of the United States with the planned construction of a radar station in the Czech Republic and a defense site in Poland that Moscow will not tolerate any further expansion of NATO in its neighborhood is assumed, especially not the accession of Georgia and Ukraine. According to official information, NMD is primarily intended to offer the USA protection from a threat from “risk countries” ( North Korea , Iran , Iraq ) that could acquire the ability to produce long-range nuclear missiles. Putin declared in Munich in 2007 that the realization of these positions would provoke “Russian countermeasures” and lead to a “new arms race”. As further countermeasures, the stationing of short-range missiles in the area of Kaliningrad and Belarus was brought into play, as well as the deployment of medium-range missiles (successor system to SS-20 ) within range of the American positions in Eastern Europe. The latter would require the termination of the medium- and short-range nuclear missile agreement ( INF treaty ). In the INF treaty, the USA and the then Soviet Union agreed not to use ground-based missiles with a range of between 500 and 5500 km.

    According to US reports in 2008, Putin is said to have spoken in the NATO-Russia Council that if Ukraine joined NATO, Crimea and eastern Ukraine could be replaced by Ukraine and annexed to Russia. Dmitri Anatolyevich Medvedev warned Ukrainian President Yushchenko not to act on his threat and evict the Russian fleet from its naval base in Sevastopol , which Russia had leased. Medvedev took the position that Ukraine's membership in NATO violated the Russian-Ukrainian friendship treaty . Medvedev and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov justified this point of view that the treaty contains an obligation on both sides not to do anything that poses threats or security risks to the other side . In 1997, this treaty established the border between Ukraine and Russia. The BBC reported that Georgia's membership in NATO would set in motion a "spiral of confrontation", Georgian President Saakashvili was told. A few weeks later, the Caucasus War began in 2008 .

    After the Russian armed forces, which had shrunk in the course of the transformation , had already undergone a series of armament spurts during Putin's presidency , Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced in mid-March 2009 that they would be further strengthened. In particular, the nuclear arsenal should be modernized, the combat readiness of the strategic forces increased. The reason he claimed was attempts by NATO to expand its presence near the Russian borders; therefore he ordered a "large scale" upgrade of the army and navy by 2011. “The analysis of the military-political situation in the world shows that there is still a serious potential for conflict in certain regions. Attempts to expand NATO's military infrastructure close to the borders of our country continue. ”The Russian government has budgeted 1.5 trillion rubles (33 billion euros) for arms purchases in 2009; a quarter of this is to be used for the modernization of the nuclear armed forces, most of the equipment of which dates back to Soviet times. In comparison with other military budgets , the proportion of the gross domestic product of about four percent, the same as that of the United States , the sum is about 15% of the US figures.

    Controversy over pledges to the Soviet Union

    In the context of the war in Ukraine and the related foreign policy crisis, the causes of the conflict were increasingly discussed. A central question here was whether, during the negotiations on German reunification within the framework of the Two-Plus-Four Treaty, there had been promises to the Soviet Union not to expand NATO to the east, and whether any promises made by Western politicians were broken be.

    An initially kept secret and published in 2009 note on a statement by Genscher of February 10, 1990 to the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze reads:

    BM (Federal Minister): We are aware that membership of a united Germany in NATO raises complicated questions. For us, however, it is clear: NATO will not expand to the east. "

    Der Spiegel wrote that Genscher remembered what had happened in the 1956 uprising in Hungary: Sections of the rebels had announced that they wanted to join the Western alliance, thus providing Moscow with the pretext for military intervention. Since it was about the GDR , Genscher explicitly added:

    "As for the non-expansion of NATO, this applies very generally."

    As Foreign Minister, Genscher could not have entered into any binding commitments and - in contrast to other, less important points - they were not addressed in the treaties. Michael Rühle, Head of Unit for Energy Security in NATO and speechwriter for several General Secretaries, wrote:

    “The Soviet Union has never asked for such written commitments. By then, at the latest, it would have quickly become clear that the West would not allow a second Yalta. "

    - At the Yalta conference in February 1945 the heads of government of the victorious powers under Churchill , Stalin and Roosevelt decided on the division of Germany and the distribution of power in Europe. -

    In addition, many politicians regarded an eastward expansion of NATO in 1990 as an unrealistic scenario. When asked why the exclusion of NATO membership for the Eastern European countries was not contractually agreed, Shevardnadze replied:

    “At the beginning of 1990 the Warsaw Pact still existed. The very idea that NATO would expand to include countries in this alliance sounded completely absurd at the time. "

    The eastward expansion of NATO is still widely perceived today on the Russian side as a breach of treaty by the West, even if it occurs at the request of the former Soviet republics or contracting states of the Warsaw Pact. This perception was already there in 1999, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn demonstrated in a 2007 interview:

    “In addition (to the NATO bombing of Serbia) there were attempts by NATO to pull parts of the collapsed USSR into its sphere, above all - which was particularly painful - Ukraine, a country closely related to us, with which we have become more familiar through millions Relationships are connected. These could be cut in no time by a military alliance border. "

    The then Secretary of State of the United States, James Baker , declared on February 9, 1990 in the Katharinensaal of the Kremlin regarding Germany:

    "The alliance will 'not expand its sphere of influence an inch further east' if the Soviets approved NATO membership for a united Germany."

    Mary Elise Sarotte, professor at the University of Southern California , came to the conclusion in 2014 on the basis of previously kept secret documents that there was "never a formal commitment to non-expansion of NATO" to the Soviet Union. Even if such a commitment was temporarily discussed in the negotiations, the Soviet Union would have waived it in the contract text in order to receive high German financial aid instead, which Helmut Kohl had offered in return.

    According to Sarotte's evaluations, Baker, Genscher and Kohl briefly indicated that NATO would not expand in February 1990.

    Genscher announced to Douglas Hurd on February 6, 1990 that Gorbachev wanted to rule out an expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe. Genscher then proposed an immediate public declaration of intent from NATO in which such an expansion would be excluded. Genscher gave Hungary as an example of a case of enlargement. Hurd agreed to Genscher's proposal. On February 9, Baker traveled to Gorbachev for talks and noted the result of the talks:

    "Final result: United Germany anchored in ★ (polit.) Changed NATO - ★ their jurisdiction. would not move ★ eastwards! "

    Baker left Kohl a secret letter for his upcoming visit, in which he described the conversation with Gorbachev in more detail. He asked:

    "Would you prefer a united Germany outside of NATO, independent and without US forces, or would you prefer a Germany within NATO, accompanied by the promise that NATO jurisdiction will not move an inch east of its current position? "

    Gorbachev replied:

    "Any expansion of NATO would certainly be unacceptable."

    Kohl and Genscher followed this line in their statements to Gorbachev in order to make German reunification possible. However, President George HW Bush and his Security Council rejected the line of negotiation proposed by Baker, Kohl and Genscher. Kohl then turned to the American line and suggested that Germany could compensate the Soviet Union financially for the fact that no promise would be made about future NATO expansion. This approach was said by Bush with the words "The Chancellor has big pockets!" been approved. Financial compensation was also attractive for Gorbachev in view of the difficult economic and political situation in the Soviet Union. Finally, it was agreed that the Soviet troops could remain in the GDR territory for another four years. a. a German-funded housing program for returning soldiers would be implemented. (The German financial commitments amounted to DM 12 billion plus three billion D-Mark interest-free loans.) In return, the Soviet Union waived the originally discussed promise of non-expansion of NATO.

    In April 1994 Manfred Wörner reported in a private circle that on the occasion of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, on behalf of the heads of government of the NATO member states, including in Kiev, Minsk and Moscow, he had to expressly assure that NATO would not move up if member states left wanted to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and the NATO area would end on the German state border.

    In 2014 Gorbachev contradicted the claim in the heute-journal that he had been promised not to expand NATO to the east in talks about German unification. Rather, he confirmed that these talks had revolved exclusively about the non-expansion of the troops in the Federal Republic to the territory of the GDR, which had been observed over the years.

    An overview of the state of research from 2018 sums up:

    “In 1990, specific western guarantees only related to the GDR; but the West deceived the Soviet Union at the same time with vague promises of a cooperative, inclusive European security order, while the Bush administration deliberately moved exclusive NATO (without the USSR) to the center of the new security architecture in Europe. "

    literature

    Web links

    Individual evidence

    1. Cornelia Frank: NATOisierung Polish and Czech security policy in the field of civil-military relations . Diss. University of Trier 2010, p. 339.
    2. Johannes Varwick: NATO: from defense alliance to world police? ; P. 190.
    3. Croatia and Albania sign treaties. NATO is expanded by two states ( memento of February 14, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). On: tagesschau.de .
    4. ^ Clear the way for Croatia and Albania to join NATO ( Memento from October 15, 2009 in the Internet Archive ).
    5. ^ Before the anniversary summit in Strasbourg, Kehl and Baden-Baden. NATO accepts Albania and Croatia ( memento of April 3, 2009 in the Internet Archive ). On: tagesschau.de .
    6. Montenegro closer to NATO ( Memento from July 19, 2011 in the Internet Archive ). On: sueddeutsche.de .
    7. spiegel.de December 2, 2015: Montenegro invited to join: Russia reacts with threats to NATO advance
    8. Montenegro joined NATO. In: tagesschau.de . June 5, 2017. Retrieved June 5, 2017 .
    9. https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/nato-mazedonien-105.html
    10. ^ NATO summit only decides on a small new round of enlargement
    11. Montenegro is getting closer to joining NATO ( memento of the original from May 14, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . On: dw-world.de . @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.dw-world.de
    12. Bosnia is getting a little closer to joining NATO ( Memento of the original from May 14, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . On: dw-world.de . @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.balkaninsight.com
    13. ^ Kosovo question: Bush beckons Serbia with NATO membership
    14. The Euro-Atlantic Integrations of Serbia ( Memento of the original from July 26, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. February 12, 2009 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / glassrbije.org
    15. WDR Europa Forum: Thaci confirms that Kosovo is striving for membership in the European Union as well as NATO
    16. welt.de December 1, 2008: Ukraine and Georgia are not allowed to join NATO for the time being
    17. Constitutional amendment: Ukraine continues to strive west . Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2019.
    18. ^ Tim Weiner, Barbara Crossette: George F. Kennan Dies at 101; Leading Strategist of Cold War . In: The New York Times . March 18, 2005, ISSN  0362-4331 ( nytimes.com [accessed December 16, 2018]).
    19. ^ Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Knopf, 2014) ... from 1993 onward, the West, and particularly the United States, had badly underestimated the magnitude of Russian humiliation in losing the Cold War and then in the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which to the end of the centuries-old Russian Empire. The arrogance, after the collapse, of American government officials, academicians, businessmen, and politicians, in telling the Russians how to conduct their domestic and international affairs (not to mention the internal psychological impact of their precipitous fall from superpower status) had led to deep and long-term resentment and bitterness… Getting Gorbachev to acquiesce to a unified Germany as a member of NATO had been a huge accomplishment. But moving so quickly after the collapse of the Soviet Union to incorporate so many of its formerly subjugated states into NATO was a mistake… NATO expansion was a political act, not a carefully considered military commitment, thus undermining the purpose of the alliance and recklessly ignoring what the Russians considered their own vital national interests.
    20. ^ Open letter in the original Boston University server
    21. Macedonia: Escape Forward . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , June 6, 2017.
    22. Greece to expel Russian diplomats over alleged Macedonia interference . In: The Guardian , July 11, 2018.
    23. ^ At the summit in Brussels: NATO invites Macedonia to accession talks . In: RP Online , July 11, 2018.
    24. NATO formally invites Macedonia to join alliance . In: Reuters , July 11, 2018.
    25. ^ Greco-Macedonian: Unification Victory of the West, Debacle for Russia . In: Spiegel Online , June 13, 2018.
    26. https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/nato-mazedonien-105.html
    27. Johannes Varwick : The NATO. From a defense alliance to a world police force? Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-56809-1 , p. 109
    28. Hannes Adomeit : Russian military and security policy in: Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.), Country Report Russia , Federal Center for Political Education, Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-8389-0066-7 , pp. 268 f.
    29. Hannes Adomeit : Russian military and security policy in: Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.), Country Report Russia , Federal Center for Political Education, Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-8389-0066-7 , p. 269.
    30. Hannes Adomeit : Russian military and security policy in: Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder (Ed.), Country Report Russia , Federal Center for Political Education, Bonn 2010, ISBN 978-3-8389-0066-7 , p. 269 f.
    31. ^ Medvedev warns against NATO entry , BBC News June 6, 2008
    32. Russia: Medvedev wants to massively rearm . In: Spiegel Online . March 17, 2009
    33. a b c d Uwe Klußmann, Matthias Schepp & Klaus Wiegrefe : Absurd idea . In: Der Spiegel . No. 48 , 2009, p. 46-49 ( online ).
    34. Michael Rühle: The myths and legends proliferate . In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung . April 10, 2014
    35. Christian Neef & Matthias Schepp: Written with blood . In: Der Spiegel . No. 30 , 2007, p. 96-102 ( online ).
    36. Mary Elise Sarotte: NATO: promise and broken? In: The time. No. 41, October 1, 2014 .
    37. Mary Elise Sarotte: NATO: promise and broken? In: The time . No. 41, October 1, 2014
    38. "End result: Unified Ger. Anchored ★ in a changed (polit.) NATO - ★ whose jurisd. would not move ★ eastwards! “ (jurisdiction = sphere of influence). Quoted from Mary Elise Sarotte: 1989. The Struggle to Create Post – Cold War Europe. 2nd ed. Princeton NJ 2014, p. 221 (Afterword to the New Edition).
    39. Baker: "Would you prefer to see a unified Germany outside of NATO, independent and with no US Forces or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastwards from its present position ? " , Gorbachev: " Certainly any extension of the zone of NATO would be unacceptable " . Quoted from Mary Elise Sarotte: 1989. The Struggle to Create Post – Cold War Europe. 2nd ed. Princeton NJ 2014, p. 222 (Afterword to the New Edition).
    40. Mary Elise Sarotte: A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion . In: Foreign Affairs . September / October 2014
    41. Mary Elise Sarotte: NATO: promise and broken? In: The time . No. 41, October 1, 2014
    42. Jürgen Reichardt, GenMj a. D. in .loyal The Magazine for Security Policy , # 04 2019, p. 6
    43. Russia: Gorbachev sees no break in NATO's eastward expansion . In: The time . November 9, 2014
    44. Mikhail Gorbachev: I am against all walls , RBTH, October 16, 2014
    45. Manfred Wörner: " " The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees. "May 19, 1990
    46. Christine Nünlist: War of the Narrative - The year 1990 and NATO's eastward expansion. In: SIRIUS - Journal for Strategic Analyzes. Vol. 2/4, pp. 389-397. Accessed Oct. 12, 2019, online .