Wuchang uprising

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Banner of the Wuchang Uprising, later the flag of the Army of the Republic of China from around 1913–1928
The Sun Yat Sen statue in Wuhan is said to commemorate the Wuchang uprising. Behind the statue was the seat of the military government established after the uprising.

The Wuchang uprising ( Chinese  武昌 起義 , Pinyin Wǔchāng qǐyì ) began on October 10, 1911 in the capital Wuchang of the Chinese province of Hubei . After a long series of unsuccessful uprisings in various cities across the country, the Wuchang insurgents managed to overthrow the local government. As a result of the uprising, the military government of Hubei established the first modern regime on Chinese soil, the Republic of China was proclaimed and the Chinese Empire , the longest-lived political system of mankind, ended. As a result, numerous provinces declared their independence within a short period of time, which marked the beginning of the Xinhai Revolution , named after the Chinese year Xinhai (~ 1911) . Thus the Wuchang uprising marks the beginning of the republican era of China.

The Wuchang uprising was initiated by NCOs of the New Army . The leaders of the uprising had hardly cooperated with the revolutionary democratic forces around Sun Yat-sen , who had a plan for the period after the fall of the Qing Dynasty . Their main aim was to drive the Manchu out of power. After the uprising had succeeded despite the amateurish preparation and implementation, the revolutionaries voluntarily placed the power they had gained in the hands of representatives of the traditional aristocracy around Li Yuanhong , even though the latter had nothing to do with the revolution. Thanks to the efforts of the established urban elites, the Qing dynasty came to an end, but social progress was prevented. The governments of the new regime were weak and corrupt, so that hardly any functionary could hold his position for more than six months. Li's power, on the other hand, became inviolable, and Sun's Tongmenghui was also unable to limit it. After the abdication of the last emperor Puyi , tensions arose between Li's military government and Sun Yat-sen's provisional government, which resulted in an alliance between Li and the later dictator Yuan Shikai .

With the exception of the expulsion of the Manchu, the insurgents therefore carried out no real revolution. The aristocracy consolidated its power base and the foreign influence against which the insurgents wanted to rebel increased. The fifteen years after the Wuchang uprising were marked by instability and the rule of numerous warlords.

Prehistory and background

Political Reform Attempts by the Qing Dynasty

After China reached its greatest expansion and economic power around 1800 under the Qing Dynasty, its decline began at the beginning of the 19th century. As in Europe, the population had grown rapidly, but at the same time industrialization had started with a long delay and the available arable land per capita had decreased. Institutionally, the Qing dynasty was based on the same concepts as the Qin dynasty two thousand years before that , essentially monarchy and the peasant economy, in which land was owned by the aristocracy. There were hundreds of riots; the Taiping uprising (1851–1864) is considered the most terrible war of the 19th century, the great Muslim rebellions were no less gruesome civil wars. The Qing Empire did not have much to oppose the increasingly aggressive Western powers in the first or second Opium War . The defeat against the former tribute payer Japan in the Sino-Japanese war was particularly disturbing, as were the unequal treaties , which in the course of the 19th century led to increasing foreign control, loss of territory and high compensation payments to foreign states.

Foreign pressure on China led to the self-strengthening movement from 1860 onwards . In 1898, Emperor Guangxu introduced the Hundred-Day Reform , which failed after a coup by the Dowager Empress Cixi . The beginnings of industrialization were largely driven by foreigners and were therefore limited to the foreign leased areas. In the Boxer Rebellion , marauding masses ready to fight tried to drive the foreigners out of the country; this uprising was suppressed and only led to further concessions by the imperial family.

After these humiliating developments, the imperial family realized that China had to modernize its economy as well as its society. The measures taken from 1901 to 1905 under the title New Politics and with the approval of Cixi included deep cuts such as the establishment of a commission to reorganize the army and the creation of the New Army, whereby the Qing practically abolished their traditional eight banners . Trade and industrialization were to be promoted, and a trade and foreign ministry were established. The official examinations were abolished; Schools based on the Western model were set up throughout the country, and the Chinese who wanted to study abroad could hope for funding from a wide variety of organizations. The bureaucracy should be reformed. Under pressure from the constitutionalists , the imperial family allowed a national parliament and consultative provincial assemblies, and a constitution was passed. While all of these reforms modernized the country's politics, they also destroyed the mechanisms that had ensured the stability of society during the Chinese Empire, such as the civil servant exams, which at least nominally allowed all gifted Chinese from all over the country to rise in the bureaucracy.

Despite these efforts, in 1911 it was foreseeable that sooner or later the Qing Dynasty would fall. The Chinese upper class expected this, the foreign secret services reported this to their headquarters and the numerous uprisings and reforms had also created an awareness of it among the common people; in the traditional thinking of many Chinese, the imperial family had forfeited the mandate of heaven . Many provincial governors had lost faith in the Qing Dynasty's ability to maintain China's sovereignty and were seriously pursuing the possibility of declaring themselves independent from Beijing.

Industrialization and economic crisis in Wuhan

The triple cities of Wuchang, Hanyang and Hankou, which together form today's Wuhan , are located in a strategically important position on the Yangtze River , which is one of the most important traffic arteries in China as a connection between the east and the west. At the beginning of the 20th century, these three cities had a total of around one million inhabitants. The location of this metropolis was enhanced by the newly built Beijing-Hankou Railway and it was considered that the ruler of what is now Wuhan controlled the entire central Yangtze. At the beginning of the 20th century, Hankou was an important port city with foreign leasehold areas in which banks, insurance companies, customs offices, warehouses and newspaper publishers had settled. Numerous European business people and diplomats lived here. In Hanyang there was a large ironworks and an armaments factory. After all, Wuchang was the location of numerous government institutions, schools and barracks, in the latter of which revolutionary ideas could flourish.

At the beginning of the 20th century, today's Wuhan had risen to become an important industrial city, after Shanghai it was the second most important economic location in the country. Zhang Zhidong , who as governor-general of Huguang , which included the provinces of Hubei and Hunan, was one of the most powerful men in the country and at the same time one of the most important industrial reformers in China, had made the region his seat of government and promoted the introduction of Western technologies and economic methods. In Hanyang there were armaments factories and iron foundries, weaving mills, spinning mills, silk reel mills, hemp factories, paper mills, brick kilns, a match factory, a hydroelectric power station, an engineering factory, but also banks, trading companies, insurance companies, freight forwarders and shipping companies.

Zhang died in 1909, leaving his successor Ruicheng with a corrupt administrative apparatus . Ruicheng, who had distinguished himself as an able administrator in other positions, made numerous attempts at reform, but his initiatives were blocked by the corrupt officials. In 1910, China slipped into a recession that resulted in numerous bank failures and an opium decree. Before the Opium Decree came into force, enormous sums of money had been invested in hamster purchases of opium so that large amounts of capital were tied up. This led to sharply rising interest rates, which were at times around 20% per day, and falling land prices. The Qing government's increase in consumption taxes and riots in almost all parts of the country put even more pressure on the economy. In addition, there have been annual floods in Hubei since 1906 on the Han River and Yangtze River , culminating in severe flooding in 1911, which claimed numerous lives, left millions more homeless and resulted in the loss of much of the harvest. As a result of the floods, the price of rice doubled in the summer of 1911 and grain exports were banned. All of this led on the one hand to a massive closure of factories in Hankou and Hanyang and on the other hand to a flow of refugees from the entire region, which destabilized the city triplet.

New army in Wuchang

In the course of the Boxer Rebellion, a western expeditionary force had invaded Beijing and the Forbidden City and forced the imperial family to flee to Xi'an in a hurry. At the center of the reforms that the Qing wanted to implement after this event was the military, the equipment and organization of which had turned out to be out of date. The traditionally trained and commanded troops were to be partly disbanded, partly reorganized, and new units were created. Zhang Zhidong was among those who most strongly advocated these reforms.

Thus, today's Wuhan was not only an industrial city, but also the location of the New Army of Hubei. In addition to Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army, it was considered an elite force in the Chinese military and was a model for the armies of other provinces. Their total of 22,000 soldiers were organized according to the Japanese and German model, so their officers were trained at newly established military schools and the officer ranks were no longer inheritable. The New Army was equipped with modern equipment and had Krupp guns, cannon boats and torpedo boats. In order to be accepted into the New Army, the candidates had to meet unusually high requirements, so that after the official examinations were discontinued, an officer career in the army became an attractive professional alternative. It can be assumed that many proponents of social change opted for a military career in the New Army because the New Army promised good pay and, in the event of invalidity, a pension . Numerous revolutionary activities took place within the New Army, which were brought in from outside or emanated from it. About twenty to thirty percent of all officers and soldiers in 1911 sympathized with revolutionary societies or were members of such an association.

In contrast to the Beiyang Army, which was mainly stationed in smaller cities due to the Boxer Protocol , Wuchang was the most important location of the New Army. Here the numerous young, educated men of the army encountered the conditions in the foreign leased areas, where they experienced racism as well as westernization and technical progress. The New Army was also much less controlled by the Manchus. The engineer and artillery troops commanded by Li Yuanhong placed particular emphasis on the education of the recruits. However, these recruits were led by older, poorly educated officers. Since many soldiers' hopes for advancement were not fulfilled, dissatisfaction, resistance to harsh treatment by the officers and radicalization were most common in Li's troops.

In the summer of 1991 the government had to reduce the soldiers' pay, although prices rose at the same time, resulting in desertions , skirmishes within the troops and open rebellions against the officers. For security reasons, it was decided not to hand over any ammunition to the soldiers.

Formation of revolutionary groups

Revolutionary activities in China had increased since the late 19th century. Established in 1894 under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen , the Xingzhonghui (Society for the Resurrection of China), based in Hong Kong, organized a series of uprisings in southern China from 1885 onwards. The Hundred Day Reform had widespread support across the country. When reform efforts were suppressed after Cixi's coup and important protagonists of the reforms such as Tan Sitong were executed, numerous reformers turned into revolutionaries. Radicals in the aristocracy allied themselves with secret societies , the most important of which was the Gelaohui . In 1899 an alliance of the Triads and Sun Yat-sens Xingzhonghui was formed. The secret societies recruited people for a so-called independence army, which started an uprising in Anhui province in 1900 , but it was suppressed. On August 22, 1900, the leadership of the Independence Army led by Tang Caichang , a graduate of Zhang Zhidong's Hunan Hubei Academy, was arrested and executed in Hankou . A riot in Hankou that a. should lead to the establishment of Guangxu as constitutional monarch, was thus thwarted.

In Zhejiang , Can Yuanpei founded the Guangfuhui in 1904 , which among other things organized the Anqing uprising in which Xu Xilin murdered the governor of Anhui En Ming . Also in 1904, Huang Xing and Zhang Shizhao founded the Huaxinghui organization in Hunan . The members of all these revolutionary organizations were drawn from the lower aristocracy. The many uprisings planned or carried out by these organizations all failed and resulted in numerous arrests and executions. In August 1905, these and numerous other organizations merged to form the Tongmenghui .

While the repression after the failed Hundred-Day Reforms had turned reformers into revolutionaries, the educational reforms at the beginning of the 20th century led to the emergence of a progressive-minded student body. Governor General Zhang Zhidong was a promoter of educational reforms, focusing on the establishment of elite schools, all of which were located in Wuchang. However, Zhang left the establishment of elementary schools to the regional authorities. At the same time a nationalist, anti-Manchurian and anti-imperialist press began to flourish in Wuchang, often equating the work of foreigners with genocide and accusing the Manchurians of collaborating with other countries. Rumors about the expansion of the leased areas, about an exchange of territory from Fujian to Liaodong with the Japanese or about the opening of further ports made the rounds. When the US passed an immigration law that discriminated against the Chinese, Wuchang's press successfully called for a boycott of American products in 1905. Most of the students were anti-Western, in contrast to the pro-Western policies of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionaries. The students had no relation to the Hundred Day Reform, but in the intellectual climate of Wuchang they feared that China as a whole would fall victim to imperialism and saw the Qing dynasty as unable to withstand foreign pressure. The tax increases, which had become necessary for the compensation payments to the foreigners, and the racism in the leased areas ensured an influx of revolutionary student groups.

In the Ping Liu Li uprising of 1906, the students played an important role in channeling the great discontent of the farmers and miners in the border area between Hunan and Jiangxi. The rebels had hardly any weapons and were ideologically and militarily poorly organized, so that the New Army had no problems putting down the uprising. However, it became clear here that the revolutionary potential was greater than it was since the Taiping uprising .

In Wuchang, two competing societies had established themselves, which acted as a reservoir for numerous revolutionary forces and partly non-political associations: The Literary Society (文學 社 Wenxueshe) founded on January 30, 1991 and the Society for Common Progress founded in Tokyo in April 1907 (共進會 Gongjinhui). The actual leader of the Society for Common Progress was Sun Wu , it brought together numerous well-educated Chinese people who had returned from Japan and graduates from prestigious schools. The Literary Society published a newspaper called the Great River Newspaper (大江 報 Dajiangbao) to inform its members and followers. The chairman of the Literary Society was Jiang Yiwu , and it was mainly made up of educated soldiers. Both societies benefited from a growing aversion to the Qing dynasty and the Manchu ethnic group. Their ideology was largely limited to the ethnic question. Concepts like socialism or anarchism , which at that time already had a certain following in China, were not in the programs of the two societies. The aristocratic revolutionaries von Wuchang also did not take over the project of a land reform , for which Sun advocated under the working title of equalization of land rights . In general, they had little idea what China should look like after the fall of the Qing Dynasty.

Neither of the two societies succeeded in establishing a collaboration with experienced Tongmenghui revolutionaries such as Song Jiaoren or Huang Xing . They refused to take part in a revolution in Hubei due to a lack of prospects of success and stayed away from an agreed meeting. The Tongmenghui wanted to raise money for arming revolutionaries who would then carry out uprisings in several provinces at the same time. They planned their revolution for 1913.

Railway policy

Announcement of the Society for the Protection of the Railways, 1911

At the turn of the century, especially after the lost First Sino-Japanese War and the British Tibet Campaign , China's national territory was threatened from many sides and it was recognized that the construction of railways was urgently necessary to increase the country's defensive capabilities. However, China did not have the resources to make these huge investments and took out foreign loans to do so, which, however, meant concessions to donors regarding the operation or use of the profits. Zhang Zhidong was responsible for the construction of the Hankou - Canton Railway and the Hankou- Sichuan Railway. He was of the opinion that foreign loans were the most economical solution for the railway construction and negotiated with a bank consortium to finance the two projects. After his death in 1909, attempts by the local aristocracy began to finance and build the railways themselves. Prince Regent Zaifeng supported this project. It soon turned out, however, that the aristocracy could neither raise enough capital nor the technical knowledge to build efficient railways.

In 1910, Sheng Xuanhuai , who had been linked to large-scale corruption, returned to the government. He and Minister Zaize decided to nationalize the railway projects and entrust foreigners with the construction and financing. The shares of the aristocracy were to be converted into bonds, but this meant losses for the shareholders. The aristocracy in Sichuan in particular would have suffered great losses, as significant sums of money had been embezzled and speculated for the construction of the Hankou-Sichuan Railway. The autocratic approach of Zaize and Sheng without the involvement of parliaments led to immediate opposition . Minister Zaize forced Governor General Zhao Erfeng to bloodily suppress protests in Chengdu . The alienation between the aristocracy and the imperial family deepened as a result.

Among other things, the 16th brigade of the New Army from Hubei was deployed to suppress the protests under Duanfang , who was originally retired . This had several effects on the situation in Wuchang: The soldiers of the New Army were forced to fight a nationalist movement that was closely related to them in terms of content. As a result, it was easy for the revolutionaries to recruit supporters for an uprising. The troops remaining in Wuchang were those that had already been most heavily infiltrated by the insurgents. In addition, troops from Wuchang had been assigned to other strategically important locations, which they were able to occupy immediately after the outbreak of the uprising. At the end of September there were thus between 3,000 and 5,000 revolutionaries in the New Army of Hubei; The Wuchang uprising broke out just ten days after the Chengdu bloodbath and the declaration of martial law on Sichuan.

Course of the uprising

Preparations

On September 14 and 16, 1911, after the failed uprising in Canton , the chairmen of the Literary Society and the Society for Common Progress agreed to settle rivalry and distrust and to found a joint civil and military organization. They decided to jointly prepare an uprising. After Tongmenghui members, more experienced in organizing riots, refused to cooperate, Jiang Yiwu , Liu Fuji , Yang Hongsheng , Sun Wu and Peng Chufan were practically on their own.

On September 24, the revolutionaries agreed to begin the uprising on the day of the mid-autumn festival (October 6, 1911). The uprising could not be postponed, since further parts of the New Army from Wuchang with their revolutionary-minded officers were to be dispatched to Sichuan to suppress the railway movement. This plan was initially thwarted by the Governor General of Huguang, Ruicheng . After the whole city had been worried and panicked since the end of September because of rumors of an imminent uprising, Ruicheng imposed martial law on October 3, and an additional night curfew on October 4. On October 6, the commander of the 8th Division, Zhang Biao , had the streets checked by soldiers day and night - as a precaution without ammunition. The uprising was postponed to October 11th.

Taking the seat of government

On October 9th, one of the revolutionaries named Liu Tong accidentally detonated an insurgent bomb workshop, injuring Sun Wu's face. Sun Wu was taken to a Japanese-run hospital undetected. Due to the explosion, however, the police of the Russian leased area had become aware of the group and searched the headquarters of the Society for Common Progress, where, in addition to incriminating material, they also came across a list of co-conspirators.

Jiang Yiwu, the chairman of the Literary Society, had just returned to Wuchang on October 9th and was informed of the explosion and Huang Xing's decision to postpone all planned riots until November. However, Liu Fuji convinced all other revolutionaries that the discovery of the headquarters of the Society for Common Progress required swift action. Jiang sent messengers to all army units that were supposed to take part in the uprising, with the message that at midnight the 8th Artillery Regiment should give the signal to strike by shooting at the Zhonghe Gate . Shortly afterwards, the Chinese police, who had received the membership list, searched four revolutionaries' hideouts and arrested 32 people. Yang Hongsheng, Liu Fuji, and Peng Chufan were executed that night. Another mishap occurred among the revolutionaries: the messengers sent did not arrive until the 8th Artillery Regiment, when the soldiers were already asleep, so the signal to strike was never given. The agreed attacks on ammunition depots and the seat of government did not take place either. Thus the situation of the insurgents was hopeless. Division commander Zhang Biao said he was in control of the city. On the evening of October 9, Ruicheng reported to Beijing that the unrest had been nipped in the bud and that the situation was under control.

Ruicheng and Zhang Biao must have known their report was false. The raids by the Chinese police after the membership list was found were limited to civilian objects. Ruicheng had to bow to the commanders of the New Army who had refused to allow searches of their troops. It was known that there was revolutionary activity in the New Army, but out of concern for their careers, the commanders did not want such activities to be exposed in the units under their command. Thus, no soldiers were arrested, only the city gates were closed and a curfew was imposed on soldiers.

On October 10th after the execution of the arrested revolutionaries, rumors circulated of the arrests and executions of randomly listed people. It was said that the Manchu mainly arrested Han Chinese who had their braids cut off as a sign of protest against the Qing dynasty . In this atmosphere, the soldiers decided to start the uprising originally planned for October 9th. The revolutionaries were in the minority in the New Army, but the rumors of arbitrary executions led many non-revolutionary soldiers to join the uprising because they saw it as the safer choice.

Movements of the insurgents (red), escape route of the Qing government (blue), artillery positions of the insurgents (circles with cross)
Insurgent artillery in Hankou
Insurgent soldiers towards the end of the uprising

Thus, on the early evening of October 10, the uprising broke out in the New Army. The platoon leader of the 1st platoon of the 8th Engineer Battalion, Xiong Bingkun , took the initiative, forced Wu Zhaolin's company to join the uprising and had officers who refused to participate in the uprising killed. Communication with the 29th and 30th regiments, which were supposed to join the uprising, broke down again, so that the actual uprising could only begin in the evening. Purges took place within the insurgents, killing Manchurian bannermen and Han Chinese soldiers who refused to rebel. Together with students from the army school, they brought the weapons and ammunition depot (Chu Wangtai) under their control. Outside the city, the engineer and transport battalions of the 21st Brigade and the 8th Artillery Regiment revolted. The 8th Artillery Regiment entered the city from the south, and a half-hearted attack was repulsed by troops loyal to Qing. The balance of power between soldiers loyal to the Qing and the insurgents was balanced during this phase, but the soldiers loyal to the Qing were largely illiterate and were led in the traditional style.

The revolutionaries now found that they had failed to establish a structure of command for their insurrection. Wu Zhaolin, who had previously also been a member of a secret society, commanded a pioneer battalion and hid in the bushes when the uprising began, was persuaded to command the planned attack on the seat of government. Hundreds of insurgents were killed in the fighting for the seat of government, which was defended by a machine gun position, and the building was captured on the third attempt. The seat of government was set on fire and the 30th regiment, made up of Manchurian soldiers, was wiped out in a massacre that was probably ethnically motivated. Because the revolutionaries cut the phone lines, the Qing troops could not call for help. Ruicheng fled on a ship in the Yangtze River in the late evening of October 10, and his senior military officer, Zhang Biao, fled on the morning of October 11. The resistance of the government troops collapsed so that the insurgents were able to take the government building.

In the two neighboring cities of Hanyang and Hankou , the riots began a day later than in Wuchang. They followed the same pattern there: NCOs and soldiers rose and persuaded a commanding officer to take the lead. In Hanyang, Song Xiquan took the lead; in Hankou, Liu Yizhi took on this role. The insurgent troops struggled to maintain public order, with looting between October 12 and 14. Unlike in Wuchang, the rebels received generous support from local industrialists and traders. Wuchang was the city of administration and education, where the aristocracy predominated, while Hanyang and Hankou were industrial and commercial cities.

Formation of the Hubei Military Government

On the morning of October 11, 1910, Wuchang, the capital and administrative seat of Hunan and Hubei, had no government. The insurgents had taken power, but with the exception of Sun Wu, their leaders were on the run, injured or dead. Sun Wu himself considered himself too unknown to be able to secure the support of the masses. For this reason the revolutionaries met on the same day in the Consultative Provincial Assembly to discuss the next steps. An agreement was reached on a government under Li Yuanhong , who was recognized by both the armed forces and the elite of the province. He had served in the Qing Dynasty military; Zhang Zhidong had brought him to Hubei to modernize the army. He advocated the principle of the educated soldier and was on the side of the local elite in the railroad dispute. He was dissatisfied with the rule of the Manchus because he could not make the career he had hoped for. But he was also strictly anti-revolutionary: he had executed the messenger who wanted to mobilize the 41st regiment of his brigade for the revolution. Thus the revolutionaries chose a person who explicitly did not stand for a new political order in their favor to be the guardian of what they had achieved. This shows the political naivety and inexperience of the revolutionaries.

However, Li has been in hiding since the beginning of the revolution. He had to be tracked down; he was first taken to the arms and ammunition depot and then to the Provincial Consultative Assembly under threat of violence. On the evening of October 11th, the Hubei military government, which had its seat in the provincial assembly building, was proclaimed against his will. The Qing Dynasty was declared over and the Republic of China was declared established. The first republic of Asia came into being and with the Chinese Empire the longest-lived political system of mankind came to an end. The new government proclaimed the anniversary year 4609 of the Yellow Emperor and made the five-color national flag and the iron-and-blood eighteen-star flag the revolutionary flag of war. The Wuchang Declaration, however, had nothing in common with the modern Chinese nationalism of Liang Qichao or Sun Yat-sen ; it was initially clearly anti-Manchurian.

The Hubei military government was the first modern regime in Chinese history. At the moment it was established, it enjoyed almost unreserved support from the population. With around 40 million tael in the military government's coffers when the Republic of China was proclaimed, some of the taxes of the Qing dynasty, especially the lijin and various consumption taxes, were abolished . The collection of the 1911 autumn rate of land taxes was waived.

Constitution

Military Governor Li Yuanhong, photo from 1917

On October 16, 1911, a group of juridically savvy reformers passed a constitution for the newly established republic. It guaranteed basic civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, assembly and religion and the inviolability of private property. The equality of all citizens was enshrined, although it was left to the government to define who was a citizen and who was not. All political power was placed in the hands of the military governor. The civil government should set up a Ministry of Political Affairs, divided into departments of home affairs, finance, justice and foreign affairs. Li Yuanhong became military governor, Tang Hualong was appointed minister of political affairs, and Hu Ruilin was appointed chief of the finance bureau.

The revolutionaries, above all Sun Wu and Jiang Yiwu , who suspected monarchists behind numerous new officials, tried to place their shop stewards in the government. Li, on the other hand, relied on officers whom he knew and from whom he could expect loyalty. The mistrust of the revolutionaries towards the elites from the time before the revolution led to mutual blockade. Some officers suspected of collaborating with the Qing Dynasty were executed by the revolutionaries, such as Zhang Jingliang .

The non-functioning Ministry for Political Affairs was dissolved again on October 25, 1911. New ministries were created that were directly subordinate to the military governor. Tang Hualong became Minister of Government Organization , Hu Ying Minister of Foreign Affairs, Li Zuodong Minister of Finance, Zhang Zhiben Minister of Justice, Feng Kaijun Minister of Interior and Xiong Jizhen Minister of Transport. Tang Hualong's position became increasingly untenable, so that on November 28, 1911 he fled to Shanghai without resigning. This meant the defeat of constitutionality and the subordination of civilian government to the military. The revolutionaries' attempts to gain influence in the military were successfully blocked by Li Yuanhong; in the powerless civil government, however, he let it go. Thus the revolutionaries finally lost their influence on the further course of things.

Hankou Military Government

The revolutionaries in Hankou, who had been successful with their uprising shortly after taking the government building in Wuchang, did not approve of the transfer of power to representatives of the old elites. They therefore formed their own government, led by Zhan Dar and financed by the Hankou Chamber of Commerce. The military stationed in Hanyang, over which Song Xiquan took control, also supported the Hankou military government. Even before the Wuchang military government, Hankou sent revolutionary ambassadors to the neighboring provinces along the Yangtze.

As early as October 17 or 18, the military government in Wuchang began to put the Hankou government under pressure. At the same time, the Northern Army , loyal to the Qing Dynasty, threatened the city. It advanced along the Beijing-Hankou Railway.

On October 28th, Huang Xing, a high-ranking representative of the Tongmenghui , arrived in Hankou to agree further steps with the representatives of the Hankou military government. At this point, however, the leaders of the revolutionaries saw their situation as hopeless. Song Xiquan's group left for Hunan on October 31, where Jiao Dafeng wanted to build a real revolutionary base. Before Song arrived in Hunan, Jiao was murdered, and Song and his associates were arrested and executed on the orders of Li Yuanhong. Zhan Also withdrew, first to Anhui and later to Jiangxi . Thus, the Hankou military government only survived three weeks.

Spread of the uprising

Shortly after its proclamation, the Hubei military government published notices calling on the elite in Hubei and other provinces to also rebel against the Qing government. These announcements were made in such a way that they held the Manchu responsible for all grievances, did not incite anyone against the aims of the military government and, above all, appeased foreigners. The local governments of Hubei were asked to reorganize themselves according to republican principles, but to pay particular attention to the maintenance of public order.

In the prefectures north and west of Wuchang, members of the aristocracy, who were often imprisoned for attempted rebellions or membership in a revolutionary society, took control and drove out the Manchurian administrators. For example, a member of a forerunner movement of the Literary Society took control of Hanchuan , and something similar happened in Jingshan . In Huangguang , a released school teacher took control, supported by wealthy traders. To the east and northeast of Wuchang, units of the New Army, stationed there due to the unrest in the wake of the railroad movement, took power. In Yichang there were troops under Tang Xizhi , in Jingzhou the Manchurian governor only surrendered after a month of siege and mediation by a Belgian clergyman. In the north of the province, however, the revolutionaries failed to take power. The attempted insurrection was betrayed inmacheng, and its leader, a member of the local people's assembly, was executed. Also Huangpi remained Qing army under the control of; Along the Peking-Hankou Railway, the troops of the Northern Army were fought with guerrilla tactics by insurgent railway workers, farmers and members of secret societies.

The governors of the other provinces interpreted the calls for a coup from Wuchang differently; Everywhere there were disputes with the aim of taking the most promising position in the new political landscape to be formed. Hunan declared independence on October 22nd under the revolutionary leadership of Jiao Dafeng and Chen Zuoxin . That same day it happened in Shaanxi under Jing Wumu ; in Xi'an , around 10,000 Manchurians died in outbreaks of violence by the Han Chinese two days later. On October 23, 1911, Jiangxi renounced the Qing under Lin Sen and Cai Gongshi . By the end of November, 15 provinces had finally declared their independence, meaning that the Qing dynasty still formally existed, but no longer had a livelihood. The military did not take power in all provinces as in Hubei; however, there was no fighting anywhere between civilians and the military, for both the army leaders and the aristocracy wanted a minimum of stability. These events, known as the Xinhai Revolution , resulted in the extremely complicated North-South peace talks between December 18 and 31 in Shanghai. The negotiations between representatives of the Qing Dynasty and the revolutionaries, at which representatives of the foreign powers were present, centered on the future form of government in China and the role of Yuan Shikai, who had previously consolidated his influence militarily. As a result of the negotiations, the imperial family and the nobility were allowed to continue to exercise numerous privileges. The revolutionaries around Sun Yat-sen were very dissatisfied with these agreements.

Role of Tongmenghui and loss of Hankou

Prisoners of war in Hankou
Japanese map dated November 3, 1911. Insurgent areas are hatched in red.

The group led by Sun Yat-Sen , which was working towards a fall of the Qing Dynasty for many years, was not involved in the Wuchang Uprising and its success. Song Jiaoren had been in contact with the revolutionary societies a few days before the outbreak of the uprising, but he too was surprised by the uprising and its successful outcome. Sun Yat-sen only found out about the Wuchang uprising from the newspaper because he was in the United States. Immediately after the uprising, Tongmenghui sent two representatives, Ju Zhong and Tan Renfeng, to Wuchang to assess the situation.

Huang Xing, a high-ranking Tongmenghui member, arrived in the rebellious cities on October 28th. Huang's initial intention was to support the Hankou military government, which was ideologically closer to the Tongmenghui than the Wuchang military government, which was dominated by traditional elites. Since Huang had to realize that Hankou could not be kept, the Tongmenghui allied themselves with the Wuchang military government; Huang was named wartime high commander of the People's Army on October 31. With the aim of consolidating rule over the revolutionary territory, Huang brought numerous Tongmenghui representatives as well as advisors and spies from Japan to Wuchang. Plans to place Li Yuanhong under a Huang-led government were dropped because the Tongmenghui officials had no regional roots in Hubei.

After the attack by the Northern Army along the Beijing-Hankou Railway on October 26th, Hankou had to be given up on November 2nd. Huang and his Tongmenghui colleagues, who felt superior because of their higher education and prolonged revolutionary experience, made grave strategic mistakes in defending Hankou and Hanyang due to their lack of knowledge of the region. As a result, Hanyang fell to the Qing Army on November 27, and the army of the Wuchang government lost around 5,000 people. Hankou and Hanyang were largely destroyed in the war. Huang subsequently left Wuchang after being called to Nanjing by the Tongmenghui .

After capturing the north bank of the Yangtze River, the Qing Army began bombing Wuchang. The residents of Wuchang left the city mostly dressed as prescribed by the Qing. In the city itself, people suspected of collaborating with the Qing Army were executed on the spot. However, after being hit on his government building, Li Yuanhong also fled the city. However, with the Hubei Army in control of the Yangtze, a direct attack on Wuchang was too risky for the Qing Army. For the general of the Beiyang Army Yuan Shikai, who had meanwhile been appointed imperial representative with all military powers in Hubei Province, taking Wuchang was no longer an issue because he needed cooperation with the revolutionaries to maintain his power base to strengthen.

Hubei on the way to the dictatorship of Yuan Shikai

Sun Yat-sen (right) and Li Yuanhong , Wuchang 1912

On December 3, Li agreed to a ceasefire brokered by British officials between Li, the generals of the Northern Army and representatives of the southern Chinese provinces. This ceasefire provided, among other things, that China should be reunited as a constitutional monarchy; previously, the representatives of the Wuchangs had always insisted on the proclamation of a republic. This armistice was repeatedly extended until the last Qing emperor abdicated in early 1912.

Li and his now established Minshe (People's Society) party supported Yuan Shikai , who insisted on Beijing, against Sun Yat-sen's provisional government , which favored Nanjing , in the dispute over the choice of the capital . Duan Qirui acted as the contact between Li and Yuan . When Yuan was sworn in as president of China on March 10, 1912, Li became vice president. Li's Minshe Party had an unclear ideology, but it pursued policies that competed with the Tongmenghui, were right-wing, and openly sided with Yuan. When the Tongmenghui tried in April and May 1912 to win Li as an ally in the power struggle with Yuan Shikai, Li had already decided to support Yuan. In Hubei, Li had the opposition suppressed more and more brutally. Li had officers and soldiers who were planning or suspected of another uprising executed or murdered. Foreign countries supported and praised Li for protecting foreign interests. Even the urban elite saw no alternative to Li's rule, although the taxes that were abolished in 1911 were reintroduced and even increased beyond the level of 1911 in view of the high expenditures for the army.

Preparations for another uprising by a group called the Reform Corps were exposed in the summer of 1912 and the group crushed. The leaders of the reform corps moved towards Shanghai. In other provinces fighting had broken out between troops supporting the Provisional Government and troops loyal to the northern warlords. Yuan and 15,000 soldiers entered Hubei from the north in order to be able to control Jiangxi from there. In the fall of 1913, he finally replaced Li Yuanhong because he considered him unreliable. Li's successor as military governor was Duan Qirui . There was no resistance from the elites; they preferred the rule of Yuan to a second uprising. This ended the regime of the revolutionary period in Hubei; the region became part of Yuan Shikai's dictatorship. The fifteen years after the Wuchang uprising were marked by the rule of numerous warlords and intensifying armed conflicts until China was temporarily reunified in 1928 after the northern campaign under the leadership of the Kuomintang .

Aftermath of the uprising for the population

The uprising was welcomed by practically the entire population of the country and led to euphoria among the people in Wuchang and its region. The Qing Dynasty, and especially the Manchu rule, was blamed for all evils such as poverty, injustice and gang membership. In the wake of the Wuchang uprising and the proclamation of the Hubei military government, the aristocracy, which already held great local and provincial authority during the Qing Dynasty, gained further power. The demand of the revolutionaries for a standardization of land rights was quickly dropped. Centuries before, the local aristocracy, who held and could inherit their posts for life, had replaced their own government with civil servants who could be recalled; now the items were inheritable again.

The increase in power of the aristocracy meant that the rural population, 80% of all Chinese, was faced with an even better organized group of landowners who collected taxes with even greater vehemence. The situation of the peasants worsened and there was unrest in the country like in the time of the declining Qing Dynasty. The trend of rising prices continued. Secret societies were re-established to plunder the rich to help the poor. Some newly formed secret societies even aimed to reinstate the Qing Dynasty. With this estrangement between the elites and the masses, one of the preconditions for Mao Zedong's peasant revolution was created.

Commemoration

Students with portraits of Sun Yat-sen in the 1965 Taiwan National Day Parade

October 10th as the day of the beginning of the uprising, often referred to as double tens ( 雙 十 節 , Shuāngshíjié ) and symbolized by 十 十, the double numeral for 10, is by law the national holiday of the Republic of China (Taiwan) .

In the historiography of the People's Republic of China, the Wuchang uprising and the Xinhai revolution are viewed as "a bourgeois national movement that did not lead to a genuine revolution". The former seat of the military government during the Wuchang uprising ( 武昌 起義 軍 政府 舊址 , Wǔchāng qǐyì jūnzhèngfǔ jiùzhǐ ) in Wuhan has been on the list of monuments of the People's Republic of China (1-7) since 1961 .

literature

  • Joseph W. Esherick: Reform and revolution in China - the 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei . 2nd Edition. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 1998, ISBN 0-89264-130-4 .
  • Joseph W. Esherick (Ed.): China: how the empire fell . Routledge, 2014, ISBN 978-0-415-83101-7 .

Web links

Individual evidence

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Coordinates: 30 ° 32 ′ 21.3 "  N , 114 ° 18 ′ 21.1"  E

This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 16, 2019 .