War of devolution

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War of devolution
Entry of Louis XIV and Maria Theresa into Arras (July 1667)
Entry of Louis XIV and Maria Theresa into Arras (July 1667)
date May 24, 1667 - May 2, 1668
place Spanish Netherlands
output French victory
Peace treaty Peace of Aachen
Parties to the conflict

France Kingdom 1792France France

Spain 1506Spain Spain Sweden England United Netherlands
England kingdomKingdom of England 
Republic of the Seven United ProvincesRepublic of the Seven United Provinces 

The War of Devolution (1667–1668) was a military conflict between Spain and France in which King Louis XIV of France claimed parts of the Spanish Netherlands . The war ended on May 2, 1668 with the signing of the Peace of Aachen , in which Spain had to cede some territories.

The war of devolution is considered to be the first in the series of so-called reunion wars , which were designed solely to increase the French Empire and consolidate French hegemony in Europe and established the image of Louis XIV as a glorious conqueror. In older German literature, this war was therefore often referred to as the “First Predatory War of Louis XIV”.


In 1659, France and Spain signed the Pyrenees Peace , which ended a 24-year war between the two states. In the peace treaty, King Philip IV of Spain (1605–1665) not only had to accept some territorial losses, but also consented to the marriage of his daughter Maria Teresa (1638–1683) to the young Louis XIV of France (1638–1715). In addition, it was stipulated that Maria Teresa expressly waived all claims to her father's inheritance. As "compensation", the Bourbon Louis XIV was assured a dowry of 500,000  Goldécus in return , but was probably not paid.

Maria Teresa of Spain as Queen of France, painting by Charles Beaubrun

When Philip IV finally died on September 17, 1665, the French king immediately filed claims for parts of the Spanish Netherlands . In detail, these were the duchies of Brabant and Limburg , Cambrai , the margraviate of Antwerp , the rule of Mechelen , Gelderland , the counties of Namur , Artois and Hainaut , a third of the Free County of Burgundy and a quarter of the Duchy of Luxembourg .

As justification, Louis XIV stated that the promised dowry had not been paid out and that the queen's waiver was therefore ineffective. As an additional legal basis, he used the Brabantian inheritance law. This provided for the so-called devolution , an instrument under private law that placed the inheritance rights of children (including daughters) from the first marriage before that of children from the second marriage. French lawyers concluded that the Spanish Netherlands should not fall to the underage Spanish heir to the throne Charles II (1661-1700), because he had emerged from Philip IV's second marriage. Maria Teresa, on the other hand, came from his first marriage and was therefore, and thus Louis XIV himself, entitled to inheritance in Brabant. The Queen could not waive this natural right for her children as well. The historian Heinz Schilling judged: "Here medieval private law was made subservient to the modern power state, which was structured objectively, institutionally and that means supra-personal."

The Spanish regent Maria Anna (1634-1696), who led the affairs of state for her underage son together with her confessor Cardinal Johann Eberhard Neidhardt (1607-1681), rejected these demands with reference to Maria Teresa's waiver of any inheritance claims. The French king then began preparations for a new armed conflict against Spain.

Political preparations

Louis XIV around 1661, painting by Charles Lebrun

The foreign policy situation was very favorable for France in 1667. Spain had already been in a war against Portugal ( Restoration War ) for several years , which had brought Spain almost only setbacks and tied up most of the Spanish military potential. France initially supported Portugal in secret, but then openly. On March 31, 1667, both states signed a formal alliance treaty.

Another ally of France was the United Netherlands . After France had long supported the Netherlands in the fight against Spain, the two powers finally formed a defensive alliance in 1662 . Louis XIV was anxious to get the support of the United Netherlands for a conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, and so began negotiations. The United Netherlands was at this point at war with England ; in the States General they feared a merger of England and France if the French offers were not accepted. The influential Dutch pensioner Johan de Witt (1625–1672) suggested that the French divide the Spanish Netherlands together. Such plans have been discussed since 1663. But the share that Louis XIV demanded for himself deterred de Witt and the contract was never concluded. At the same time, Spanish proposals came in to set up a joint army in the event of a French attack. De Witt assessed Spain's military potential as weak and the French ambassador frankly stated that an alliance between the Netherlands and Spain would amount to a declaration of war on France. Although the Franco-Dutch negotiations had not led to any tangible result, Louis XIV was convinced of the goodwill of the United Netherlands. He promised them to mediate in the conflict with England, and finally declared war on England itself, without the French navy becoming involved on a large scale.

The only potential opponent to French expansion was the Holy Roman Empire . The Spanish Netherlands, as the Burgundian Imperial Circle , was subject to a special pledge of assistance from the Empire in accordance with the Augsburg agreements of 1548 between Charles V and the Empire. In the event of an attack, the imperial estates of the Reichstag could therefore declare imperial war on France . The French diplomats, however, wanted to remove this danger as well. Here they made use of the members of the Rhine Confederation . Bilateral agreements were signed with the Duchy of Münster , Kurmainz , Pfalz-Neuburg , Kurbrandenburg and Kurköln , in which these imperial estates undertook to close their territories to foreign troops and to insist on the neutrality of the empire in the Reichstag. As a result, the planned French campaign to the east was shielded against the intervention of the empire.

On May 8, 1667, Louis XIV sent a declaration to the Spanish court in which he repeated his demands. This declaration was also made known by the French ambassadors at every court in Europe. They should not portray the campaign of the "Sun King" as a war, but as the invasion of countries that already rightfully belonged to him. The King himself called the invasion a "journey" ( voyage ).

Course of war

Map of the course of the war

After the Peace of the Pyrenees, the French army was greatly reduced in order to save costs. In 1665 there were only 50,000 men. Due to an armament initiated by Louis XIV, the strength grew to 82,000 soldiers by the beginning of the war. In the spring of 1667, 51,000 French soldiers finally marched between Mézières and the Channel coast, who were able to be drawn together within four days. The main army consisted of 35,000 men under the personal command of the king. The actual commander, however, was Maréchal Turenne (1611-1675). To the left of the main army, another French corps formed under Marshal Antoine d'Aumont de Rochebaron (1601–1669) in Artois on the Channel coast , while another corps under Lieutenant-General François de Créquy (1624–1687) protected the main army the right flank took over. All three troops were to enter the Spanish territories at the same time, in order to take advantage of the numerical superiority of the French and not to allow the Spanish to concentrate against a single French unit.

The campaign in the Spanish Netherlands

On May 24, 1667, the French armed forces crossed the border with the Spanish Netherlands. They were poorly prepared for a war and could not count on support from the motherland for the foreseeable future. In general, the military facilities in the Spanish Netherlands were not organized uniformly. Each major city had its own area of ​​responsibility and looked after the maintenance of its own defenses, which in practice meant that they were ill-prepared for a siege. Their commanders were relatively independent and only responsible to the governor, Marquis of Castel Rodrigo (1610–1675), to whom the few regular Spanish troops were also subject. Apart from that, only militias were available to him, but they were only called up in extreme emergencies. The small number of troops available did not allow a field army to be raised. The few existing armed forces were therefore thrown into the fortresses of the country in order to stay there as long as possible. Because of this, only minor skirmishes and sieges , rather than one major battle , occurred throughout the war .

The French Army before Courtrai (June 1667), painting by Adam Frans van der Meulen

On May 10, 1667, the Maréchal de Turenne took command of the French armed forces. The first goal was the Charleroi fortress , which, located on the Sambre , dominated the connections between the northern and southern Spanish possessions. The Marquis de Castel-Rodrigo did not have the means to maintain this important site and vacated it after destroying all the fortifications. Maréchal de Turenne occupied Charleroi on June 2nd and had the fortifications rebuilt by the leading engineer Vauban (1633–1707) in order to be able to operate from there against Mons or Namur . For this purpose the whole main army camped around Charleroi for 15 days. The Spaniards reinforced the fortresses of Mons and Namur. But Turenne bypassed Mons and took Ath on June 16 , which the Spanish troops, surprised by the unexpected advance of the French, left without offering any resistance. The fortifications of this city were also expanded by the French.

The goal of the Maréchals de Turenne was to cut off the whole of Flanders, including the capital Lille, from the large Spanish bases in the east ( Bruges , Ghent , Brussels , Namur ). So he turned against Tournai next . On June 21, the main army reached the fortress and trapped it. The fortress surrendered a few days later and the French entered on June 25th. The main army then moved west along the Scheldt and successfully besieged Douai from July 1st to 7th . In the meantime the corps of the Maréchal d'Aumont had advanced successfully further north and had cut off Flanders from the sea by taking the fortresses Bergues (June 6th) and Furnes (June 12th). Then Maréchal de Turenne ordered this corps to attack Courtrai . This city was captured on July 18th, and shortly afterwards the Spanish occupation of Oudenaarde (July 29th to 31st) surrendered to the forces of d'Aumont.

Maréchal de Turenne, painting by Robert Nanteuil

Through the French advances, Maréchal de Turenne had isolated the strong Spanish main fortresses of Ypres , Lille and Mons. However, instead of immediately besieging these fortresses, he decided to advance further against Antwerp to take advantage of the weakness of the Spanish troops. However, this attempt failed at Dendermonde between Ghent and Brussels . This small fortress, defended by 2500 Spaniards, held its own against the French army. Maréchal de Turenne therefore withdrew via Oudenaarde at the beginning of August and prepared the siege of Lille . This siege was the largest operation of the entire campaign and lasted from August 10th to 28th, when the Spanish occupation surrendered to free withdrawal. Since the Marquis de Castel-Rodrigo was not yet informed of the fall of the fortress, he sent an army of 12,000 men under Count de Marchin to relieve Lille. On August 31, this army met the corps of the French Marquis de Créquy, which Maréchal de Turenne had in the meantime used to cover the siege. The French won this battle, while the troops of the Marquis de Marchin (1601–1673) had to withdraw. After the conquest of Lille, Maréchal de Turenne only undertook one other venture. On September 12th, he captured the Aalst fortress, breaking the lines between Ghent and Brussels. After that, the French troops limited themselves to the loose blockade of Ypres and Mons and finally went to their winter quarters on October 13th.

In Spain, preparations for sending a force to Flanders had already started in June. The regent's government raised more than a million pesos and appointed Juan José de Austria (1629–1679) as the commander of the intended armed forces. His reputation as general was tarnished after a few defeats in the war against Portugal, and since he was pessimistic about the situation in the Spanish Netherlands, he delayed the departure for many weeks and months. As a pretext he used the vote of a theology commission that had spoken out against an alliance with the Protestant powers England and the Netherlands. Ultimately, further domestic political entanglements meant that the Spanish army would never arrive in Flanders.

The turning point in diplomacy

Emperor Leopold I (1640–1705)

While operations were suspended in winter, important decisions were made in European politics. Spain tried to put itself in a more advantageous position. First the Spanish government sent a request for help to the United Netherlands. Marquis de Castel-Rodrigo asked above all for financial support (2 million guilders), for which he wanted to hand over the customs revenue from the Meuse and Scheldt trade to the United Netherlands. The assignment of Bruges, Ostend and Damme was also discussed. De Witt did not want to risk a direct confrontation with France and did not accept these alliance offers. Furthermore, Spain initiated negotiations with the Portuguese court and concluded the Treaty of Lisbon on February 13, 1668 . It was thus able to turn all military forces against France from next spring.

In order to at least keep Emperor Leopold I out of the conflict, French diplomats entered into secret negotiations with the Viennese court. In these they offered the emperor the division of the Spanish Empire. King Charles II of Spain was a six-year-old child who, due to numerous physical and mental disabilities, no one predicted a long life. With him the Spanish line of the Habsburgs would die out. The emperor accepted the offer. He should receive Spain itself, its colonies and the duchy of Milan . In return, France claimed the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Navarra and the Kingdom of Naples-Sicily. The secret partition contract was signed on January 19, 1668. The emperor no longer had any reason to go to war against France, because France only occupied territories that had been granted to him by the emperor. However, the treaty was not ratified by the emperor in the following years in order not to worsen relations with Spain.

Johan de Witt (1625–1672)

The United Netherlands, however, had been very concerned about the rapid French advance. They too were actually enemies of the Spanish monarchy, but “an inactive and tired Spain was a better neighbor for them than a powerful and aggressive France.” They wanted the Spanish Netherlands as a kind of “buffer state”. The Netherlands therefore hurried to end their war against England and, despite the very successful course of the war, concluded the Peace of Breda on July 31, 1667 . Then they first offered to mediate in the war between France and Spain. However, Louis XIV refused this in September 1667 and continued to try to win the Dutch for a joint division of the Spanish Netherlands. These efforts came to nothing, and Louis XIV toyed with the idea of ​​a war against the Netherlands. Now the Dutch efforts were directed to bring about a coalition against France in order to limit the French expansion. However, it was not de Witt's intention to end the good relationship with France.

After the Peace of Breda, King Charles II of England (1630–1685) began secret alliance negotiations with France that were directed against the United Netherlands. But at the same time he negotiated with the United Netherlands about a common alliance against France. In the first case, French subsidies would make him independent of the English parliament; in the latter case the success would be to break up the Franco-Dutch alliance. While Louis XIV refused the English offers, de Witt accepted them. On January 23, 1668, the United Netherlands and England formed an alliance whose stated aim was to get Spain to cede some territories and France to limit its claims. In a secret additional article, however, it was also stated that if the French king were to expand his demands or continue his conquest, the Alliance would use martial means to push France back within the borders of 1659. The Kingdom of Sweden also joined this alliance ( triple alliance ) in order to receive urgently needed subsidies in this way. Nonetheless, de Witt assured the French diplomats that this alliance was not directed against France, but was intended to bring Spain to the cession of the required territories.

The campaign in Franche-Comté

In the meantime, Louis XIV was on a new campaign to conquer as wide a span as possible in order to be able to exchange them in the event of a peace agreement. The capture of the Spanish Franche-Comté offered itself for this purpose. This was isolated and was almost completely bared by Spanish troops. There were several reasons for this: On the one hand, France had respected the neutrality of this free county in the last war against Spain and, on the other hand, the Spanish generals did not expect an invasion by the French in the middle of winter. The Marquis of Castel-Rodrigo wrote in a letter: "I am satisfied with the interruption of the fighting that winter is forcing the King of France."

The Siege of Dole (February 1668), painting by Adam Frans van der Meulen

Louis XIV commissioned the General de Condé (1621–1686) to prepare for a winter campaign against Franche-Comté. As a former opponent of the king, Condé had fallen out of favor during the Fronde uprisings and in 1668 was again entrusted with a military command for the first time in nine years. As governor of Burgundy , Condé was most likely in a position to prepare an attack against the free county. For this purpose a second army was formed from newly formed troops. Again, Louis XIV personally accompanied the campaign. The king left Saint-Germain on February 2, 1668 to join the main army. At this point he received news of the conclusion of the Triple Alliance and a spy informed him that it was also ready to declare war on France. Nevertheless, he insisted on the campaign that had been initiated, because he believed that he would gain a suitable bargaining chip for later negotiations.

General de Condé had started the advance on February 4th and took the Free Imperial City of Besançon on February 7th , which was also in Franche-Comté. On the same day another French corps under General François-Henri de Montmorency-Luxembourg (1628–1695) succeeded in conquering Salin . Both fortresses had offered practically no resistance. Now the French army concentrated on taking the fortress of Dôle . This only surrendered on February 14th after a brief four-day siege that killed 400–500 French soldiers. Only five days later, on February 19, the Gray Fortress fell to the French. The Spanish governor Philippe de La Baume-Saint-Amour , Marquis de Yenne, had surrendered to the French king shortly before and now persuaded the governor of the fortress Gray to surrender. Louis XIV returned to Saint-Germain, where he arrived on February 24, 1668. After only 17 days, the entire free county was occupied. The reason for this quick success was the surprise and poor preparation of the Spaniards. In addition, the local population was inclined to the French and welcomed them by a majority.

The peace of Aachen

Territorial gains of France in the Peace of Aachen 1668

The conquest of Franche-Comté was initially only to be the prelude to a comprehensive campaign in spring. The army had increased to 134,000 soldiers. The plan provided that the King and Maréchal de Turenne with 60,000 men should conquer the remaining part of the Spanish Netherlands. At the head of 10,000 men, the king's brother, the Duke of Orléans (1640–1701), should invade Catalonia , while the Prince de Condé, with 22,000 men in the dioceses of Metz , Toul and Verdun, made a possible advance from the Holy Roman Empire had to fend off. But after Louis XIV had secured the Franche-Comté as a bargaining chip, the first question arose whether he should bow to the demands of the Triple Alliance or continue the war. War Minister Louvois as well as Turenne and Condé were in favor of a continuation of the war because the opportunity seemed favorable to the weakened Spaniards. The Foreign Minister Hugues de Lionne (1611–1671) and Finance Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619–1683), however, preferred a quick peace agreement because the costs of a war were incalculable (up to now it had cost over 18 million livres) and the foreign policy conditions were one Made success seem questionable. In addition, Spain had in the meantime (February 13, 1668) concluded the Treaty of Lisbon with Portugal and could now concentrate more on the war against France. Louis XIV had to realize that France was not yet able to cope with the coalition of Spaniards, Dutch, English and Swedes, so he announced an armistice by the end of March 1668 and initiated negotiations.

The parties met in Saint-Germain in April and negotiated a peace treaty by the 13th of the month. From April 25th a congress was held under the chairmanship of the Nuncio of Pope Clement IX. in Aachen , where the peace was finally signed on May 2, 1668 (→ Peace of Aachen ). In these negotiations, the Triple Alliance pushed through its demands: France evacuated Franche-Comté, including the Free Imperial City of Besançon, but previously destroyed all fortifications in the cities of Gray and Dole. In addition, the French troops had to withdraw from the Spanish Netherlands. Only 12 conquered cities remained in the possession of the French king: Lille, Tournai, Oudenarde, Courtrai, Furnes, Bergues, Douai with the Fort de Scarpe, Binche, Charleroi, Ath and Armentiers.

Louis XIV later wrote in his memoirs about the decision to conclude peace:

“With the considerable yield that my luck afforded me, nothing seemed more necessary than to give the youngest of my neighbors the impression of honest moderation and in this way to deprive them of some of the fear that one feels naturally towards too great power . […] Franche-Comté, which I gave up, was so reduced in its position that I could seize it at any time, and my new conquests, well protected, would give me safe access to the Netherlands. "

- Louis XIV : Mémoires pour l'instruction du Dauphin, ca.1670

The staging of the "Sun King"

Louis XIV at the siege of Douai (July 1667), painting by Charles Lebrun

For the young French king, the war against Spain was an opportunity to gain lasting fame. "The passion for fame certainly has priority over all others in My Soul," he often said. According to tradition, he commanded the army himself, at least nominally, and accompanied them on the campaign. He reached the main army on June 3, 1667 off Charleroi and left them again on September 2, 1667. Between February 2 and 24, 1668 he was once again in the field with the army of Prince Condé in Franche-Comté. Although Ludwig participated in the council of war, experienced generals actually made the decisions on the battlefield. However, the king was noticeable because he constantly put himself in personal danger, for example when he visited the foremost trenches during the sieges and spent many nights in the bivouac . Nevertheless, this could not be compared with the "heroism" of some of his predecessors, because as Voltaire later reported about him:

“On ne lui voyait point, dans les travaux de la guerre, le courage emporté de François Ier et de Henri IV, qui cherchaient toutes les espèces de danger. This contentait de ne les pas craindre, et d'engager tout le monde à s'y précipiter pour lui avec ardeur. »

“In the endeavors of the war, one did not see the courage of Francis I and Henry IV , who sought all kinds of dangers. He was content not to fear them and to move the whole world to rush into battle for him with zeal. "

- Voltaire : Le siècle de Louis XIV, CHAP. IX (1751)

During these periods, however, the king traveled with the entire court and all the luxuries that he did not want to do without in war. This alone required a great deal of logistical effort. Among other things, the queen and the king's two mistresses (the Duchess de la Vallière and the Marquise de Montespan ), as well as all the ministers and unemployed generals , traveled with Louis XIV . The latter in particular tended to intrigue against the commanding marshals and especially against the Maréchal de Turenne, which impaired his command.

The king's entourage included the two leading court painters Adam Frans van der Meulen and Charles Lebrun , who were required to record the Sun King's deeds. The same was true for other artists. This resulted in numerous paintings and tapestries , as well as medals and poems. After the peace treaty, a great victory ceremony took place in Versailles , which other contemporaries such as Molière , Jean-Baptiste Lully , Louis Le Vau and Carlo Vigarani also participated in. On all these occasions, the king was always portrayed as having assumed sole command, without mentioning the numerous marshals and generals. In the years after the war (from 1671) the king was often praised as Louis le Grand or Ludovicus Magnus (Louis the Great), and according to a proposal by Finance Minister Colbert, a triumphal arch should even be built in Paris. However, construction ceased in 1671.


  • September 17, 1665 - Philip IV of Spain dies


  • May 8th - Declaration of Louis XIV to Spain
  • May 24th - French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands
  • 10.-28. August - Siege of Lille
  • August 31 - Battle near Brussels
  • October 13th - end of the French Campaign


  • January 19 - Habsburg-French partition treaty
  • January 23rd - conclusion of the triple alliance
  • 4th-19th February - Franche-Comté conquered
  • May 2nd - Peace of Aachen

The effects of the war of devolution were many. In purely military terms, France had gained some advantages by breaking into the belt of fortifications that surrounded the Spanish Netherlands. At the same time, this led to an increase in French defensive strength, as Vauban immediately set about building the conquered cities into strong fortresses. These in turn served in the later wars as starting points for further French conquests. It is no longer possible to determine how high the losses of the French and Spanish troops and the civilian population were during the war. Due to the short duration of the conflict, these are likely to be classified as relatively low. It is known, for example, that the French army lost more than 4,000 soldiers to death or wounding during the siege of Lille alone. The Spanish troops are said to have lost 180 men in the battle near Brussels.

On the political level, the results for King Louis XIV were rather negative. The king's reputation had suffered at least in the Holy Roman Empire, mainly due to the capture of the Free Imperial City of Besançon. The Confederation of the Rhine dissolved under the impression of the French expansion plans in 1668, and other allies such as the Elector of Brandenburg fell away from France. This reversal of many imperial estates became clear when they declared imperial war on France in 1673, at the beginning of the second war, Louis XIV .

The most important consequence, however, was the changed attitude of Louis XIV towards the United Netherlands. The king blamed them, the former close allies, for the creation of the Triple Alliance, the pressure of which had halted his conquest. French foreign policy in the following years was therefore entirely aimed at isolating the United Netherlands in order to attack it when the opportunity arose. After isolation through alliances with several German princes, England and Sweden, Louis XIV opened the Dutch War (1672–1679) in 1672 , which was to expand into a pan-European conflict. Many historians see this second war only as the continuation of the War of Devolvement.


  • Peter Burke: Ludwig XIV. - The staging of the sun king. Berlin 1993, ISBN 3-8031-2412-3
  • M. Chéruel (Ed.): Journal d'Oliver Lefèvre d'Ormesson et extraits des mémoires d'André Lefèvre d'Ormesson. Volume 2, Paris 1861.
  • Pierre Gaxotte: Louis XIV - France's rise in Europe. Munich 1951, ISBN 3-404-00878-2
  • François Guizot : A Popular History of France From The Earliest Times. Volume 5, London 1834.
  • Albrecht Graf von Kalnein: The reign in Spain 1665–1677. Saarbrücken / Fort Lauderdale 1992, (= Research on Spain, Volume 11), ISBN 3-88156-559-0
  • RG van Kampen: History of the Netherlands. Volume 2, Hamburg 1833.
  • Heinz Kathe: The "Sun King" - Louis XIV., King of France and his time 1638–1715. Berlin 1981.
  • John A. Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714. London / New York 1999, ISBN 0-582-05629-2
  • Herbert H. Rowen: John de Witt and the Triple Alliance. In: The Journal of Modern History. Volume 26, No. 1 (1954), pp. 1-14.
  • Jules Roy: Turenne - Sa vie, les institutions militaires de son temps. Paris 1896.
  • D. v. Schaumberg: Wars of Ludwig XIV. In: Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. Volume 5, Leipzig 1878, pp. 300-313.
  • Heinz Schilling: Courts and Alliances - Germany 1648–1763. Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-442-75523-9
  • Paul Sonnino: Louis XIV. And the origins of the Dutch War. Cambridge / New York / New Rochelle 1988, ISBN 0-521-34590-1
  • Maxime Weygand : Turenne. Munich 1938.

Individual evidence

  1. John A. Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714. London / New York 1999, p. 105
  2. ^ Carl Tanera: Germany's mistreatment by Ludwig XIV. 1672–1714. Beck'sche Verlagsgesellschaft, Munich 1891 (=  Germany's wars from Fehrbellin to Königgrätz. Volume 1); Eugen von Frauenholz : German war history. Leipzig 1942. p. 113; Siegfried Fiedler: Tactics and Strategy of the Cabinet Wars 1650–1792. Bonn 1986. p. 215
  3. ^ A b Jules Roy: Turenne - Sa vie, les institutions militaires de son temps. Paris 1896, p. 229
  4. ^ RG van Kampen: History of the Netherlands. Volume 2, Hamburg 1833, p. 207
  5. ^ A b c d Heinz Schilling: Courts and Alliances - Germany 1648–1763. Berlin 1998, p. 215 f.
  6. ^ Herbert H. Rowen: John de Witt and the Triple Alliance. In: The Journal of Modern History. Volume 26, No. 1 (1954), p. 3
  7. ^ RG van Kampen: History of the Netherlands. Volume 2, Hamburg 1833, p. 208 f.
  8. John A. Lynn: Recalculating French Army Growth during the Grand Siecle 1610-1715. In: French Historical Studies. Volume 18, No. 4 (1994), p. 892 f., Other authors speak of only 72,000 men, see: Pierre Gaxotte: Ludwig XIV. - France's rise in Europe. Munich 1951, p. 75
  9. The descriptions of the campaign are based on: Jules Roy: Turenne - Savie, les institutions militaires de son temps. Paris 1896, pp. 236-244
  10. ^ RG van Kampen: History of the Netherlands. Volume 2, Hamburg 1833, p. 206
  11. ^ Albrecht Graf von Kalnein: The Regency in Spain 1665–1677. Saarbrücken / Fort Lauderdale 1992, (= Research on Spain, Volume 11), p. 52 f.
  12. ^ RG van Kampen: History of the Netherlands. Volume 2, Hamburg 1833, p. 210
  13. “… because a tired and inactive Spain promised to be a better neighbor than a powerful and aggressive France” , see: John A. Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714. London / New York 1999, p. 108
  14. ^ Maxime Weygand: Turenne. Munich 1938, p. 131 f.
  15. ^ Herbert H. Rowen: John de Witt and the Triple Alliance. In: The Journal of Modern History.  26, No. 1 (1954), p. 5
  16. John A. Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714. London / New York 1999, p. 108
  17. ^ Herbert H. Rowen: John de Witt and the Triple Alliance. In: The Journal of Modern History. Volume 26, No. 1 (1954), p. 9
  18. ^ François Guizot: A Popular History of France From The Earliest Times. Volume 5, London 1834, p. 413 ff.
  19. ^ Paul Sonnino: Louis XIV. And the origins of the Dutch War. Cambridge / New York / New Rochelle 1988, p. 22 f.
  20. a b M. Chéruel (ed.): Journal d'Oliver Lefèvre d'Ormesson et extraits des mémoires d'André Lefèvre d'Ormesson. Volume 2, Paris 1861, p .542
  21. Hermann Stegemann: Battle for the Rhine. Berlin / Leipzig 1929, p. 248
  22. ^ Paul Sonnino: Louis XIV. And the origins of the Dutch War. Cambridge / New York / New Rochelle 1988, p. 17
  23. ^ Maxime Weygand: Turenne. Munich 1938, p. 133 f.
  24. a b D. v. Schaumberg: Wars of Ludwig XIV. In: Bernhard von Poten : Concise dictionary of the entire military sciences. Volume 5, Leipzig 1878, p. 302
  25. Quoted from: Pierre Gaxotte: Ludwig XIV. - France's rise in Europe. Munich 1951, p. 87
  26. ^ Mémoires pour l'instruction du Dauphin (c. 1670); quoted from: Heinz Kathe: The "Sun King" - Louis XIV., King of France and his time 1638–1715. Berlin 1981, p. 79.
  27. ^ Maxime Weygand: Turenne. Munich 1938, p. 127.
  28. Quotation from: Heinz Kathe: The "Sun King" - Louis XIV., King of France and his time 1638–1715. Berlin 1981, p. 81.
  29. The pregnant Louise de la Vallière, however, traveled after the king against his will, as she rightly feared that he would start a relationship with another woman (the Montespan) in the meantime. Their behavior sparked a minor scandal.
  30. ^ Maxime Weygand: Turenne. Munich 1938, p. 130 f.
  31. Peter Burke: Ludwig XIV. - The staging of the sun king. Berlin 1993, pp. 94–97, there are also specific references to various poems and sonnets
  32. ^ Johann Philipp Abelinus / Wolfgang Jacob Geiger: Theatrum Europaeum. Frankfurt am Main 1677, Volume 10, pp. 694 ff.
  33. John A. Lynn: The Wars of Louis XIV 1667-1714. London / New York 1999, p. 109
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