General MacArthur is dismissed by President Truman
The President Truman's relief of General Douglas MacArthur of his commands all took place on 11 April 1951. The General of the Army Douglas MacArthur , a popular public figure from the Pacific War , commanded at this time the troops United Nations (UN) in the Korean War . His dismissal by President Harry S. Truman was and is also discussed internationally in the context of relations between civil administration and the military. In the German-language media of the time, the dismissal and the accompanying events were also referred to as the MacArthur controversy .
MacArthur led the Allied troops in the Southwest Pacific command area during the Pacific War and then headed the occupation administration in Japan as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). After the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, he was given command of the UN forces intervening on the South Korean side. He planned and commanded the September 15, 1950 amphibious landing at Incheon , the success of which earned him the reputation of a military genius. The subsequent invasion of North Korea provoked an intervention by Chinese troops . A series of defeats forced MacArthur to initially withdraw his troops from North Korea. Various public statements by MacArthur, despite military stabilization, resulted in President Truman being removed from his command. The United States Senate Committee on Armed Services and the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations subsequently conducted a joint investigation into the circumstances of MacArthur's dismissal. They concluded that "General MacArthur's dismissal was the constitutional jurisdiction of the president, but the circumstances were a blow to national pride."
Truman's dismissal of MacArthur for a lack of "respect [for] the president's authority," which he negotiated confidentially with Congress, maintained the perception of the president's role as a pre-eminent leader, but sparked a constitutional crisis. The idea of the extraordinary or even absolute power of the president came to be known as the imperial presidency .
Background of the people involved
Harry S. Truman
Harry S. Truman assumed the office of President of the United States in 1945 after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt . Almost four years later he was confirmed in office in 1948 . Truman had in World War I with the rank of colonel of the reserve in the artillery served, although it the West Point Military Academy had before the war, rejected due to poor eyesight. He was proud of this service throughout his life.
According to his own statements, Truman mistrusted professional soldiers and appointed two members of the United States National Guard, Louis H. Renfrow and Harry H. Vaughan, as his military advisors. He once said that he did not understand how the US Army could "produce men like Robert E. Lee , John J. Pershing , Eisenhower and Bradley and at the same time Custers , Pattons and MacArthurs". He referred to this metaphor the human size or its non-existence in the latter.
In response to the 1948 Admiral uprising , Truman replaced the Chief of Naval Operations , Admiral Louis Denfeld , with Admiral Forrest Sherman . The officers had protested , among other things, against cuts in the capacities for amphibious warfare . In his testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services to investigate the incidents, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman Omar Bradley doubted that there would ever be another large-scale amphibious operation.
Douglas MacArthur
By accomplishments and seniority, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was the lead general in the US Army. The son of Lieutenant General Arthur MacArthur graduated from West Point Military Academy in 1903 as the best of his class. He had fought in World War I and served as Chief of Staff of the Army from 1930 to 1935 . In this post, apart from occasional disputes over the military budget, he worked closely with Presidents Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt . Later he compared Roosevelt's "extraordinary self-control" to Truman's supposedly "heated temper and unrestrained fits of anger".
Besides serving in Mexico and Europe during World War I, he held posts in Asia and the Pacific. During the Pacific War, he became a national hero and received the Medal of Honor for his unsuccessful defense of the Philippines against the Japanese armed forces. He commanded the Allied forces during the Battle of New Guinea and the Recapture of the Philippines . In doing so, he kept a famous promise made in 1942 to return to the Philippines. In 1944 he was traded as a possible Republican candidate for the presidential election and ran unsuccessfully in the primaries for the 1948 presidential election . After the end of the war, he headed the Allied occupation authorities in Japan . He played an important role in the political and social transformation of the country after its defeat in the Pacific War and the subsequent disempowerment of the military-dominated government.
In 1950 the occupation authorities began to reduce their control functions in Japan. MacArthur remained in his role as Commander-in-Chief Far East (CINCFE), to which Truman had appointed him in 1945, in the country. He had to struggle with major cuts in the defense budget, which reduced the number of troops under him to 108,000 soldiers in the Far East Command by June 1950. Cuts in budget and personnel led to a shortage of spare parts. 10,000 of the 18,000 Far East Command jeeps were defective, and of the 113,870 2½-ton 6 × 6 trucks, only 4,441 were considered operational. To counter this deficiency, the command opened up disused military camps and the local equipment in the Pacific region. In addition, this development program favored the establishment of a maintenance and reconstruction industry in Japan. The foreseeable end of the occupation led to a shift in focus of troop training towards a stronger focus on combat missions.
Events leading to dismissal
Korean War
North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, triggering the Korean War. In response to an urgent request from the Korean Military Advisory Group for ammunition replenishment, MacArthur ordered the supply ship USS Sgt. George D Keathley (T-AGS-35) , anchored in Yokohama , to be sent to Busan . President Truman met with the JCS and other advisors at Blair House that same day . After the meeting, he confirmed all decisions made by MacArthur and US Secretary of State Dean Acheson . At another meeting at Blair House on the evening of June 26th, Truman approved the use of air and naval forces on targets south of the 38th parallel .
On June 27, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 83 , which recommended that “Members of the United Nations provide the Republic of Korea with such assistance as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and promote international peace and the Restore security to the region. ”The South Korean capital, Seoul , fell on June 28th. The following day, Truman approved air and naval attacks north of the 38th parallel. This was an afterthought, as MacArthur had already ordered it. Truman did not order the use of ground forces until June 30, when he received a sobering description of the situation from MacArthur.
On July 8, on the advice of the JCS, Truman appointed MacArthur Commander of the UN Command in South Korea (CINCUNC). He stayed at CINCFE and SCAP in parallel. MacArthur found himself forced to throw his troops stationed in Japan in what he later described as "desperate retreat skirmishes". In July, Truman dispatched Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff , J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt S. Vandenberg , to assess the situation. They met with MacArthur and his chief of staff Edward Almond on July 13 in Tokyo. MacArthur warned against underestimating North Korea, whose troops he described as "well-equipped, well-managed and combat-experienced, and at times superior in manpower to our troops twenty to one". He suggested halting the North Korean advance first. A subsequent amphibious landing in the rear of the enemy should encircle them. The schedule should be based on the arrival of reinforcements from the United States.
When asked if his own troops would move into North Korea, Truman replied on July 13 that he would "make the decision when it becomes necessary." Some advisers, notably Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk and Office of Northeast Asian Affairs director John M. Allison argued that Resolution 83 provided the legal basis for an invasion of North Korea. Others, including George F. Kennan and Paul Nitze , disagreed with this interpretation. In addition to the question of legality, an invasion posed the risk of Soviet or Chinese intervention.
Battle for Incheon
MacArthur had to put his plans for an early amphibious operation against North Korea on hold due to the rapid advance of its troops, as he initially deployed the 1st Cavalry Division intended for this purpose to reinforce the 8th Army . In August this had withdrawn to the so-called Busan Perimeter . He continued the planning for the operation and provisionally set the date of implementation to September 15, 1950. Various officers from the Marines and Navy were alarmed by MacArthur's choice of location. Rear Admiral James H. Doyle , Commander of Amphibious Group One, and Major General Oliver P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division criticized Incheon for the high tidal range , wide mud flats, narrow and winding channels and high flood protection walls. Omar Bradley called the landing "the worst possible place ever chosen for an amphibious landing." While there was consensus on the Incheon-Seoul area as a key objective, the risks of the planned landing intimidated many in the officer corps. Collins and Sherman flew to Tokyo to receive clarification of the plans from MacArthur, who commented, "We will land at Incheon and I will destroy them."
MacArthur was invited to address the 51st National Assembly of Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago on August 26, 1950. He declined, but sent a public reading statement in which he contradicted Truman's policy on the island of Formosa : “Nothing could be more absurd than the flimsy argument of those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa, we alienate us from mainland Asia. ”Truman brought up the word“ appeasement ”and discussed the possibility of replacing MacArthur with Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson . Johnson replied that MacArthur was "one of the greatest if not the greatest general of our generation." Truman instructed Johnson to send an order to MacArthur to withdraw his position, which MacArthur did; however, it had already been included in the Congressional Record . In the end, it was not MacArthur's dismissal at that point, but Johnson's. Truman resented his argument with Secretary of State Acheson, and although Truman had previously said Johnson would remain his Secretary of Defense "as long as I am President," he asked Johnson to seek his dismissal. Johnson was publicly held responsible for the cuts in the defense budget, which led to poor preparation for the emergency and subsequently to the early defeats in Korea. Truman replaced him with George C. Marshall .
MacArthur understood his military goal to be the destruction of the North Korean army. This would require operations north of the 38th parallel. On August 31, his deputy chief of staff (G-2), Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby , warned him that 37 Chinese divisions were gathering on the Sino-North Korean border. The JCS agreed with MacArthur's understanding of the goal. A thesis paper by the National Security Council confirmed the legality of operations north of the 38th parallel. It also recommended that only South Korean troops be deployed in the immediate vicinity of the border with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In the event of a Soviet intervention, MacArthur should withdraw immediately south of the 38th parallel, but in the event of a Chinese intervention hold his position and fight "as long as the operations of UN forces offer a reasonable chance of successful resistance." Truman did not find out about the contents of the paper through the change in the office of Secretary of Defense, but MacArthur did not learn about it until September 22nd. When asked at a press conference on September 21st whether he had decided to conduct operations in North Korea, Truman replied that it had not.
In the meantime, landings at Incheon began on September 15. "So great has been the success of Incheon, and the ensuing prestige for General MacArthur so overwhelming," Collins later noted, "that the chiefs then hesitated to question future plans and decisions of the general that should have been questioned." Responding to rumors that the 8th Army were planning to stop at the 38th parallel and await UN approval to cross, Marshall sent a message to MacArthur giving him a free hand to cross the parallel:
“We want you to feel tactically and strategically unhindered from advancing north of the 38th parallel. The above announcement is likely to cause confusion at the UN, where there is a proven desire not to come into conflict over the need for a vote to pass, but rather that you consider it militarily necessary. "
An employee from MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, who did not want to be named, told journalists in November that the victory at Incheon had led the general to increasingly ignore the tactical reality in Korea and overestimate himself personally.
A few days later, MacArthur was instructed not to publicly announce that his troops would cross the 38th parallel. A resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 7 could generally be interpreted as authorizing the invasion of North Korea.
Wake Island Conference
With the 1950s mid-term elections approaching and Truman's reluctance to campaign openly during the fighting in Korea, staff members, including George Elsey in particular, drew other ways of winning votes for the Democratic Party. President Roosevelt had traveled to Hawaii in July 1944 to meet with MacArthur and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz . At this meeting Roosevelt made the decision to attack the Philippines the following year. The meeting turned out to be a political triumph in the election year, refuting the Republican Party's accusations that Roosevelt was fixating on war in Europe at the expense of the Pacific.
Truman was to mimic this success by heading to the Pacific to meet MacArthur. Initially, he was reluctant to accept the proposal because he had an aversion to this kind of public relations . But after the Busan and Incheon victories, MacArthur's star shone brighter than ever in October 1950, and by meeting with MacArthur, Truman could claim his own share as commander-in-chief, according to his advisors. A message to MacArthur suggested meeting in Hawaii or Wake Island. MacArthur replied to the message that he "would be delighted to meet the President on Wake Island on the morning of the 15th." When he learned that Truman would be accompanied by media representatives, MacArthur asked if he could bring his own correspondents from Tokyo, what was rejected.
On October 15, Truman landed with his team of advisors, which included Averell Harriman and Vernon A. Walters , on Wake Island, where MacArthur, who had arrived a day earlier, greeted him on the tarmac. MacArthur shook hands with the President instead of saluting him, which General Bradley found "offensive". Truman, the former gentlemen's outfitter , was less bothered by this than MacArthur's "greasy cap, obviously worn for twenty years." The unstructured or timed meeting quickly took the form of a free-flowing discussion between the President and his advisers on one side and MacArthur and the commander in chief the US Pacific Fleet Arthur W. Radford on the other side. Among other things, the situation around Formosa in the Philippines and the wars in Indochina and Korea were discussed . MacArthur later noted that "no new guidelines, war strategy, or international policy have been proposed or discussed." Robert Sherrod , present as media correspondent, felt as if he had "seen nothing but political showmanship."
MacArthur made statements at the conference that were later used against him. When asked about the likelihood of Soviet or Chinese intervention in Korea, Truman replied:
“Very little. Had they intervened in the first or second month this would have been crucial. We are no longer afraid of their intervention. We are no longer submissive. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. It is estimated that no more than 100–115,000 of these are at Yalu. Only 50-60,000 could be brought across the Yalu. You have no air force. Now that we have bases for our air forces in Korea, the Chinese attempt to advance on Pyongyang would mean the greatest slaughter. "
He continued to express his hope that 8th Army could be withdrawn to Japan by Christmas. When Bradley asked if a division could be moved to Europe, he replied that it could be done in January. In fact, by the time of the conference, Chinese troops were already beginning to cross the Yalu into North Korea, and by November 180,000 were in the country.
Chinese intervention
On his return from Wake Island, MacArthur was faced with the task of carrying out the promises made. On October 24th, he ordered the commander of the 8th Army, Lieutenant General Walton Walker , and that of the X Corps , Maj. Gen. Edward Almond, "to advance at full speed and taking full advantage of all their forces." In addition, he approved the use of non-South Koreans Troops near the Chinese and Soviet borders. Collins viewed this as a violation of the orders issued by the JCS on September 27, but MacArthur noted that it was "a matter of policy" according to the original guidelines. According to him, this was on Wake's topic. Nobody, including Truman, confirmed this. Not informed about the discussion, he told journalists on October 26th that Koreans and not Americans were occupying the border regions. Within days, the UN forces encountered the first Chinese troops , and the Onjong and Unsan Battles developed.
Truman later stated in his reasoning that MacArthur's dismissal was not a consequence of the military setbacks in November and December 1950. In a later statement he made it clear that MacArthur was no longer responsible for them than General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was responsible for those caused by the German Ardennes Offensive around the turn of the year 1944 to 1945. However, various historians come to the conclusion that they were Truman's decision very well influenced. They rely on other later statements by Truman, such as the following: "I thought he was a great strategist until he invaded North Korea without the knowledge that he was supposed to have about the incoming Chinese."
In an attempt to slow the Chinese advance, MacArthur ordered the bombing of bridges over the Yalu River . After consulting with his advisors, Truman stated that he would not authorize such operations, which led to the withdrawal of orders by the JCS. After protests by MacArthur, the President and the JCS finally approved the bombing, provided that there would be no violations of Chinese airspace. Maj. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell later described this before the Congressional Committee of Inquiry into MacArthur's dismissal as undue political interference in military operations. The many bends of the Yalu made the crossing of the river partly unavoidable for the UN pilots, and they partly got caught in enemy anti-aircraft fire. Within a few weeks, MacArthur had to withdraw his troops and both he and President Truman had to grapple with the possibility of giving up Korea completely.
Nuclear weapons
MacArthur did not advocate the use of nuclear weapons to improve the military situation. In his testimony before the Senate Investigative Committee, he said he never recommended their use. In 1960 he attacked a statement by Truman that he wanted to use nuclear weapons, whereupon Truman retracted it because he had no documented evidence to support his claim. MacArthur once proposed the use of radioactive waste to seal off North Korea, according to Maj. General Courtney Whitney . This plan was based on a proposal by Louis Johnson in 1950, but was never proposed to the JCS. Richard Nixon responded in a renewed discussion of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1985 by reporting on a conversation with MacArthur:
“MacArthur once spoke very eloquently to me about it, walking down the hall of his apartment in the Waldorf [-Astoria Hotel]. He thought it was a tragedy that the bomb was ever detonated. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions that apply to conventional weapons should apply to nuclear weapons, that the military objective should always be to minimize harm to noncombatants ... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in the use of force only against military targets and that is why the nuclear cause put him off, which I think says only good things about him. "
Bradley had proposed to the JCS in July 1950 that MacArthur have nuclear weapons ready for use. After examining the proposal, the JCS decided against it. Nevertheless, ten Boeing B-29 bombers were relocated to Guam . Truman publicly denied considering the use of nuclear weapons, but approved the relocation of all of its components, with the exception of the fission core, to Guam.
At a press conference on November 30, 1950, Truman was asked about the use of nuclear weapons:
"Q .: Mr. President, I wonder if we can trace this reference to the atomic bomb? Did we understand you correctly that the use of the atom bomb is currently under discussion?
Truman: Always has. It is one of our weapons.
Q .: Does this mean, Mr President, use against military targets or against civilian targets?
Truman: This is a matter for the military personnel to decide. I am not a holder of authority to interfere in such matters.
Q: Mr President, perhaps it would be better if we were allowed to quote your comments directly on this matter?
Truman: I don't think so - I don't think this is necessary.
Q: Mr President, you said it depends on the actions of the United Nations. Does this mean that we would not use the atomic bomb unless it was approved by the United Nations?
Truman: No, it definitely doesn't mean that. The crackdown on communist China depends on the actions of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will be able to use the weapons as he always has. "
The implication of the press conference was that the power to dispose of nuclear weapons had been transferred to MacArthur. Truman was forced to publish a clarification that "only the President can order the use of the atomic bomb and no such order has been issued." Truman had raised one of the most sensitive issues in the relationship between civil administration and the military in the period after World War II : the civilian control of nuclear weapons enshrined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
On April 5, 1951, the JCS drafted orders that would allow MacArthur to launch attacks on Manchuria and the Shandong Peninsula if Chinese air strikes against his troops came from there. The following day, Truman met with Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission , Gordon Dean, and prepared to hand over nine Mark 4 atomic bombs to the military. Dean raised concerns about transferring the type of mission decision to MacArthur, who had no in-depth technical knowledge of the bomb and its effects. The JCS were also not entirely satisfied, fearing MacArthur might give rash orders. They therefore decided to subordinate the nuclear task force to the Strategic Air Command .
Foreign policy pressure
U.K. Prime Minister Clement Attlee was bothered by Truman's behavior and sought to revive the World War II-era Quebec Accord. This stated that the United States would not use nuclear weapons without obtaining the consent of the United Kingdom. The fear was that the United States might drift into war with China. On a state visit to the United States in December 1950, Attlee expressed the concern of British and other European governments that "General MacArthur was leading the way." Since MacArthur's views on the importance of Asia in world politics were well known, they feared he might draw the focus of the United States from Europe to Asia. On this matter, Bradley, who had been more of an Anglophobic since World War II, defended MacArthur.
American considerations in January 1951 to withdraw UN troops from Korea alarmed the British. For them, the unity and mutual trust of the NATO powers in Europe depended directly on the troop presence in Korea, even if it was only a small bridgehead to Busan. General Bradley once again defended MacArthur's actions and reasoning, but it was now clear that he was straining relations between the two countries. In the American Congress, the alliance with the United Kingdom was unpopular. Opposition leader Joseph William Martin attacked Truman for following Attlee's Britain into "slavery to the government and crippling guilt".
Public statements
A journalist asked MacArthur on December 1, 1950 whether the ban on operations against Chinese troops beyond the Yalu was "an obstacle to efficient military operations." He replied that it really was "an enormous obstacle unprecedented in military history". On December 6, Truman issued a directive requiring all military officers and diplomatic personnel to have all but routine reports cleared by the State Department prior to publication and to “refrain from direct discussions on military and foreign policy with newspapers, magazines and other public media Major General Whitney shared with MacArthur his assessment of the Directive that the restrictions "only applied to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence and personal conversations." On February 13 and March 7, 1951, MacArthur made similar comments in press releases.
In February and March 1951 the fortunes of war turned again and MacArthur's forces advanced north. Seoul, which fell on January 4th, was recaptured on March 17th. This raised hopes in Washington that China and North Korea might be receptive to a ceasefire offer, and Truman prepared a statement in that direction. MacArthur learned of this through the JCS on March 20 and warned the new Commander of the Eighth Army, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway , that political bias could soon curtail planned operations. On March 23, he published a communiqué offering the Chinese a ceasefire:
“Of even greater importance than our tactical successes was the clear disclosure that this new enemy, Red China, of such fluffy and lauded military might, lacks the industrial capacity to provide many of the critical materials needed to wage a modern war put. It lacks the basis of production and the raw materials that are required for the production, maintenance and deployment of even moderate air and sea power, and it can have the goods necessary for successful ground operations - such as tanks, heavy artillery and others, which science has introduced into the conduct of military operations Subtleties - do not deploy. Previously, its great numerical potential may have filled this void, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone no longer outweigh the vulnerabilities inherent in such shortcomings. Control over the sea and air space, which in turn means control over supplies, communication and transport, are no less important and decisive today than in the past. When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority to groundfire power in the adversary's case, the resulting inequality cannot be overcome by bravery, no matter how fanatical, or the most shocking indifference to human loss.
This military weakness has been clearly and no doubt exposed since Red China entered its undeclared war in Korea. Even amid the constraints currently hampering the activity of the United Nations forces and the military advantage it accrues to Red China, it has shown its utter inability to use force to complete the conquest of Korea. The enemy must now be painfully aware that a decision by the United Nations to move away from its tolerant efforts to confine the war to Korea by expanding our military operations to its coastal areas and domestic bases will lead to the risk of impending military collapse would condemn. In establishing these basic facts, there should be no insurmountable difficulty in reaching a decision on the Korean problem if matters are resolved in their own way, without being burdened by outside reasons not directly related to Korea - such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations. "
The following day, MacArthur authorized Ridgway to advance up to 20 miles north of the 38th parallel. Truman later said, "I was ready to dump him in the North China Sea [sic] ... I've never been this angry in my life." Truman believed that MacArthur's communiqué, which had not been handled according to the December directive, came before his own deliberations. He later wrote:
“This was one of the most extraordinary statements by a United Nations military commander in relation to his own responsibilities. It was an act that completely ignored any directives to refrain from any statements on foreign policy. It was an open disregard of my orders as President and Commander-in-Chief. This was a challenge to the presidential constitutional authority. She also insulted United Nations policies. By doing this, MacArthur left me no choice - I could no longer tolerate this insubordination. "
But for the moment he did. There had been serious political confrontations between the civil administration and the military before, most notably that between President Abraham Lincoln and Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in 1862. Another example was the recall of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott by President James K. Polk to the Mexican -American War . Before firing MacArthur, Truman studied history books to find out exactly how Lincoln and Polk dealt with their generals. Truman later said that Polk was his favorite president because "he had the courage to tell Congress to go to Hell on foreign affairs."
There were serious political differences between MacArthur and the Truman administration. One was MacArthur's deep-seated belief that it was impossible to separate the struggle against communism in Europe from that in Asia. This belief was seen as the result of being stationed in East Asia for too long and in the fact that, as the commander of a scene, he was only responsible for part of the Far East and therefore lacked an overview. Another important difference was MacArthur's opinion that China was not, as Acheson claimed, “the largest and most important satellite of the Soviet Union”, but an independent state with its own agenda of, in MacArthur's words, only intermittently “for its own benefit Soviet Russia is allied. ”If MacArthur's thesis had become universal, the expansion of the war to China would not have provoked the entry of the Soviet Union. The JCS emphatically denied this, although it contradicted their position that Europe, not Asia, was the main focus of the Soviet Union. There was little support for MacArthur's position even among Republican Party politicians.
On April 5, opposition leader Martin read out a letter dated March 20 that he had received from MacArthur. In this he criticized the priorities of the Truman administration in Congress. He wrote:
“It is strangely difficult for some to realize that it is here in Asia that the communist conspirators decided to make their race to conquer the world and step into the game that has emerged on the battlefield; that here we are fighting Europe's war with arms while diplomats continue to fight with words; that if we lose the war with communism in Asia, the fall of Europe is inevitable; if we won, Europe would very likely avoid war and also be free. As you pointed out, we have to win. There is no substitute for victory. "
MacArthur later wrote that Martin published the letter "for some unknown reason and without asking me," but it was not marked confidential or unofficial.
Discharge
On the morning of April 6, 1951, Truman met with Acheson, Bradley, Harriman, and Marshall in his office to discuss what to do with MacArthur. Harriman was clearly in favor of a dismissal, which Bradley objected to. Marshall asked for more time to reconsider the case, while Acheson personally welcomed a discharge but did not say so. He merely warned Truman that such a move would be "your government's greatest struggle." At a second meeting the following day, in addition to Bradley, Marshall also spoke out against dismissal. On April 8th, the JCS met with Marshall in his office. Each of the chiefs individually expressed the opinion that MacArthur's whereabouts were desirable from a "military standpoint," but noted that military considerations did not prevail. They feared that "if MacArthur is not released, a large part of our people will assume that the civil authorities no longer control the military." On April 9, Truman met again with his four advisors in an office. Bradley briefed him on the JCS view and Marshall said he agreed with them. Truman wrote in his diary, “It is the unanimous opinion of all that MacArthur will be fired. All four advise. ”Before the congress, the JCS later stated that they had only“ agreed ”with the dismissal and had not“ proposed ”her
On April 11, 1951, Truman wrote an order to MacArthur, signed by Bradley:
“I deeply regret that it has become my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces, you as Commander, Allied Powers; Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander-in-Chief, Far East; and to replace Commanding General, US Army, Far East.
You will send your commands to Lt. Gene. Matthew B. Ridgway passed. You are authorized to give the necessary orders should you wish to travel to a location of your choice.
My reasons for your replacement will be made public at the same time as the previous order is sent to you and will be included in the next message. "
The Time Magazine quoted Truman in a published December 3, 1973 Edition, in the early 1960s to have said:
“I fired him because he didn't respect the president's authority. I didn't fire him for being a stupid bastard when he was, but that's not a generals rule breaking. If it were, half to three quarters of them would be in jail. "
Although Truman and Acheson accused MacArthur of disobedience, the JCS avoided making any suggestion in this direction. MacArthur was not dismissed for outright disobedience. Failure to obey was a military offense, and MacArthur, like Billy Mitchell in the 1920s, could have called for a public court martial. The outcome of such proceedings was not foreseeable and in the event of an acquittal, the court could have ordered his re-establishment. The JCS acknowledged that there is "little reason that General MacArthur ever failed to carry out a direct order from the Joint Chiefs or acted contrary to an order." Bradley found:
“In fact, MacArthur extended it, but never violated any of the JCS directives. He violated the President's Decree 6th directive passed on to him by the JCS, but this is not a violation of any JCS order. "
It was intended that MacArthur should be informed personally of his release from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace , who was on a visit to the front in Korea. This was supposed to happen at 8 p.m. on April 11, Washington, DC time, which corresponded to 10 a.m. the following day, Tokyo time . Pace did not receive the message due to transmission errors. In the meantime, journalists began inquiring whether rumors of MacArthur's dismissal were true. Truman then decided “that we cannot afford to accommodate the personal delivery of the order by Minister Pace” and called a press conference at which he gave a prepared report to the press:
“It is with deep regret that I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to fully support the policies of the United States and United Nations governments on matters relating to their official duties grant. Given the specific responsibilities given to me by the United States Constitution and the additional responsibilities entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I need to change command in the Far East. I have therefore relieved General MacArthur from his command and designated Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor.
A full and lively debate on national policy issues is an essential element of the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is essential that military commanders be guided by policies and directives conveyed to them in the manner dictated by our laws and constitution. This consideration is particularly binding in times of crisis.
General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is well established. The nation owes him gratitude for his outstanding and extraordinary service which he rendered to his country in positions of great responsibility. For this reason I repeat my regret at the necessity of the action to which I felt obliged in his case. "
In Tokyo, MacArthur was having lunch with Senator Warren G. Magnuson and William Stern of Northwest Airlines at the American embassy when Colonel Sidney Huff, his adjutant he already knew from the Philippines, stepped in and informed MacArthur's wife that he had one public broadcaster heard of his dismissal. She immediately told her husband. Japanese radio stations quickly picked up the story, but the official notification didn't arrive until half an hour later.
reasons
Primacy of politics
The primacy of politics over the military has been an American tradition since the founding of the state. In the second volume of his memoirs, first published in 1956, Truman wrote:
“If there is one fundamental element in our constitution, it is civilian control by the military. Politics is made by elected political officials and not by generals or admirals. MacArthur has repeatedly shown that he was unwilling to accept government policies. By his repeated public statements, he not only confused our allies about the true course of our policies, but also turned his own policies against those of the President ... If I had allowed him to challenge the civil authorities in this way, I would have violated my oath to respect and defend the constitution. "
As a result of the dismissal, the White House received many letters and messages, in large part of which the public expressed their support for MacArthur. Many considered him the better man in terms of character, decency, honor, and service. Letters of support for Truman mainly related to the primacy of politics.
Civilian control of the military was not guaranteed by the constitution. It merely divided the responsibilities for the military between the executive and the legislature. This meant that any attempt by one side to claim control would likely conflict with the other. Debates about civilian control have usually been about which side has the executive control function and not how the control is carried out. The fathers of the constitution did not care about the management of a large and technically sophisticated military machine, since such a machine did not exist in their time. It only emerged in the course of the 19th century, influenced by the French Revolution and the technical advances stimulated by the Industrial Revolution . The founding fathers understood the civilian control of the military to be control over a people's militia .
The functioning of this principle for a long time was due to the geographical and political isolation of the United States. Compared to European countries, the United States was under little pressure to carry out the necessary reforms that professionalized the military. Nevertheless, in the half century after the American Civil War, the institutions necessary for a professionalized military emerged, including the Naval War College and the Army War College .
The Spanish-American War revealed administrative and organizational weaknesses and subsequently triggered extensive reforms, the most extensive of which were implemented in the army under War Minister Elihu Root . They included the establishment of a general staff and the improvement of the army education system. The more advanced and thus more complicated technology led to the fact that the military became progressively more professional in order to be able to cope with the resulting challenges. American military culture traditionally consisted of loyalty to superiors and reverence to civilian control, creating tension between obedience to the policies of the current administration and the constitutional authority to advise Congress.
President as Commander in Chief
In the Federalist Papers , Alexander Hamilton had argued:
“The President is to be the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. In this case his authority would be nominally the same as that of the King of Great Britain, but is essentially much less. She would mean nothing more than the high command and command of the military and maritime forces as the Confederation's first general and admiral; while that of the British King extends to declaring wars and setting up and ordering fleets and armies, everything that falls to the legislature, taking into account the constitution. "
Disregarding this argument, Truman sent troops to Korea on June 26, 1950 without a congressional mandate. Only the following resolution of the UN Security Council legitimized military support for South Korea. The United Nations Participation Act provided the basis for this. It states that the President does not have to consult the Congress in order to comply with demands of the UN Security Council, provided that these are made in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter of the United Nations .
The Congressional Committee of Inquiry, convened as a result of the dismissal, found that Truman's actions violated both constitutional and legal requirements. While former presidents had ordered military operations in the shadows of the legislation, these were "fights with pirates, landing small naval contingents on wild or semi-wild coasts, sending smaller troops to pursue bandits or cattle thieves across the Mexican border, and the like." Vito Marcantonio , who was in opposition to the Korean War, argued that “when we accepted the United Nations Charter, we did not agree to replace our constitution with the United Nations Charter. The power to declare war and wage war has been entrusted to the representatives of the people in the United States Congress. "
Senator William F. Knowland noted that:
“Article I of the Constitution puts the power to declare war on Congress, not the executive. We are obviously slipping into a constitutionally shady zone in which the executive can lead us to war, the fourth largest in our history, without a declaration or resolution by Congress that a state of war started by others already exists. If Congress acts within its constitutional authority, any statement for or against the resolution will become part of the Congressional Record and both the press and the public will be fully informed. The open vote showed how each member voted. This is responsible and accountable governance.
When five or seven men can meet in a secret meeting at Blair House or the White House and lead this nation in the fourth largest war in our history from the losing side without their opinions and proposals being documented or available and without their positions in Knowing this cause, we have a war-making, Congressional power working in the open for the executive, working on camera. This is not, I will add, responsible or accountable governance. "
The view that the President, as Commander in Chief, had extraordinary or even absolute power came to be known as the Imperial Presidency after a book by Arthur M. Schlesinger was published. In it, Schlesinger notes that Truman's deployment of troops to Korea and MacArthur's dismissal represented a significant expansion of presidential powers under the umbrella of the Commander-in-Chief. Technological progress forced soldiers in small groups to fight increasingly further apart. This created a new focus on individual determination. The old advantage of obedience was replaced by that of loyalty, which increasingly focused on the president.
Apolitical military
Another American tradition was that of the apolitical military, although it did not go back to the founding time, but only to the Civil War. During the 19th century, career officers rarely took part in elections. This was less due to a generally low interest in politics than in the life of the soldier itself. Military personnel often relocated their units between the individual states of the Union and the areas of the bases were often federal territory, which is why officers were not allowed to vote according to the laws of most states. The real principle of the apolitical military prevailed during William T. Sherman's tenure as Commanding General of the United States Army from 1869 to 1883, who abhorred politics.
In contrast to their European counterparts - and later also Japanese - the American admiralty and generals did not have any influence in foreign policy or were involved in it. However, this was mainly due to the fact that the army still existing in MacArthur's youth, mainly stationed on the inner-American border to the wilderness, had no need for this. This non-entanglement did not change until after the Spanish-American War, when units of the military were stationed for long periods outside of the American continent in the Pacific, East Asia and the Caribbean.
The concept of different theaters of war developed during the Second World War. In such well-defined areas of command, military and political concerns and objectives tended to mix. As commander in the Southwest Pacific, MacArthur was under both the Australian and US governments. This made him, in the words of President Roosevelt, “both an ambassador and commander in chief.” MacArthur's lack of support for the Allied “Europe first” strategy caused resentment in Washington as he arbitrarily bypassed the chain of command over Australian Prime Minister John Curtin .
General Marshall expressed this conflict in his testimony to the U.S. Senate:
“It grows out of the inherent difference between the position of a commander, whose role is limited to a particular area and adversary, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense and President, who are responsible for the absolute security of the United States […] And must balance the interests and tasks in one part of the world with those in another in order to achieve a balance […]. There is nothing new about this divergence in our military history [...]. What is new, and necessitated the absolute necessity of General MacArthur's dismissal, is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure with, and disagreement with, United States foreign policy. [... He] has strayed so far from established United States politics that there are serious doubts as to whether he could be allowed longer to have the authority to make decisions that would transfer normal command functions to a scene commander. "
Aftermath
Reactions
The news of MacArthur's dismissal shocked much of Japan. The Japanese parliament passed a gratitude resolution in his honor and Tennō Hirohito visited him personally at the American embassy. Never before had a Japanese emperor visited a non-noble person. The Mainichi Shimbun newspaper wrote:
“MacArthur's dismissal is the biggest shock since the war ended. He did not treat the Japanese people like a conqueror, but like a great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not only material help and a democratic reform, but a new way of life, freedom and dignity of the individual [...]. We should continue to love and trust him as one of the Americans best understood Japan's position. "
In the Chicago Tribune , Senator Robert A. Taft advocated the immediate initiation of impeachment proceedings against Truman:
“President Truman must be removed from office and sentenced. His hasty and vengeful removal of MacArthur is the culmination of a series of acts which have shown that he is morally and mentally unfit for this high office. The American nation has never been in greater danger. She is led by a fool, surrounded by villains. "
Newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times concluded that MacArthur's "hasty and vengeful" dismissal was the result of external pressure. The United Kingdom and the British socialists in Attlee's government in particular had pushed for it. Republican Senator Kenneth S. Wherry , known in the party for his harsh words, claimed the dismissal was the result of pressure from "the socialist government of Great Britain".
Upon his release, MacArthur flew back to the United States, whose mainland he had not set foot in fourteen years. On his arrival in San Francisco he was received by the commander of the 6th US Army , Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer . He then took part in a parade in his honor that attracted 500,000 people. When he arrived at Washington National Airport , the JCS and General Jonathan M. Wainwright received him . Truman sent his advisor Vaughan, which was taken as an insult, as large parts of the public and the professional military perceived him as a corrupt intimate of Truman. "It was a shameful thing to fire MacArthur, and even more shameful to send Vaughan," someone wrote to Truman.
MacArthur attended a joint session of Congress where he delivered his later famous " Old Soldiers Never Die " speech in which he stated:
“Efforts have been made to twist my position. Indeed, it has been said that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war like only a few men living now know and nothing - and nothing shies off me anymore. I have long advocated its complete abolition and its great destructive power, both with friends and foes, has shown it to be pointless to solve international conflicts [...]. But once we are forced to war there is no alternative but to use whatever means available to bring it to a quick end. The goal of war is victory, not constant indecision. In war there can be no substitute for victory. "
In response, the Pentagon issued a press release stating that "The President's act of dismissing MacArthur followed the unanimous recommendations of the President's top civil and military advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff." MacArthur flew after his speech on to New York City, where the largest confetti parade to date was held in his honor. He later participated in other mass events in Chicago and Milwaukee. Until the end of his life, he took the position that he had been proved right in the dispute over the expansion or limitation of the Korean War.
Investigation by Congress
In May and June 1951 the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted "an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the dismissal of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur." Due to the explosive political and military issues, the committee of inquiry met in camera and the minutes were not published until 1973, heavily censored. Senator Richard B. Russell chaired the two committees during the investigation. A total of fourteen witnesses were called: Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Forrest Sherman, Adrian S. Fisher , Dean Acheson, Albert C. Wedemeyer, Louis A. Johnson, Oscar C. Badger , Patrick J. Hurley , David C. Barr, and Emmett O'Donnell.
The interrogation of Marshall and the JCS disproved many of MacArthur's arguments. Marshall stated explicitly that there was no disagreement between himself, the President and the JCS. At the same time, they revealed their own reluctance to confront MacArthur; They also stated that they had not always kept him fully informed of all government decisions. Vandenberg questioned the effectiveness of air strikes on bases in Manchuria, while Bradley noted that the communists in Korea themselves were also waging a limited war and so far there have been no attacks on UN air bases and ports or on their own "privileged shelter" Japan came. They came to the conclusion that it was not worth the damage to expand the war, but made it clear that they would be ready to do so if the communist side escalated or this continued to show no willingness to negotiate. They were also inconsistent with MacArthur's assessment of the combat effectiveness of the South Korean and National Chinese forces. Bradley said:
“Red China is not the powerful nation that seeks to rule the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would lead us to the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy. "
The committee concluded that "the removal of General MacArthur was the constitutional jurisdiction of the president, but the circumstances were a blow to national pride." They further found that "there was no serious disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy. ”They recommended“ The United States should never again be involved in war without the approval of Congress. ”
Public opposition
Polls conducted after the committee of inquiry concluded showed that the public continued to oppose Truman's decision and was more inclined to believe MacArthur than Bradley or Marshall what had happened. By mid-1951, Truman's approval rating had dropped to 23 percent, which was below Richard Nixon's lowest of 25 percent in the Watergate affair and Lyndon B. Johnson's 28 percent at the height of the Vietnam War in 1968. As of September 2012, this is the lowest approval rate for an incumbent president ever determined by the polling institute Gallup .
The increasingly unpopular Korean War continued and a series of corruption scandals further shook the Truman government. In the presidential election of 1952 Truman did not run again due to low support in his own party and the candidate of the Democratic Party, Adlai Stevenson , tried publicly as far as possible from the person Truman and his government. The Republican presidential candidate and former General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower won the election and subsequently increased the pressure on the People's Republic of China by expanding conventional bombing in Korea and renewing the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. A favorable political climate as a result of the death of the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin led to the signing of an armistice agreement by the warring parties at the end of July 1953. The American leadership believed that they had achieved the ceasefire by threatening the use of nuclear weapons, which is why they repeatedly pronounced this when tensions with the People's Republic of China renewed in the 1950s.
With their support of Truman, the JCS were considered politically burdened. Senator Taft particularly distrusted Bradley due to his strong focus on Europe, which he believed was at the expense of Asia. He therefore advised Eisenhower after his election to replace the JCS as soon as possible. The first to be relieved of his post was Vandenberg, who suffered from terminal cancer and had already made his resignation plans public. Eisenhower replaced him on May 7, 1953 by General Nathan F. Twining . Soon after, he replaced Bradley with Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command . Collins was followed by Ridgway and Admiral William Fechteler , who had succeeded Sherman, who died in July 1951, as Chief of Naval Operations, handed over his post to Admiral Robert B. Carney .
Effects
MacArthur's dismissal had a long-term impact on civil-military relations in the United States. At a meeting between President Johnson and General William Westmoreland in Honolulu in 1966 on the occasion of the Vietnam War, the former remarked: “General, I have a lot to talk about with you. I hope you don't do MacArthur. ”For their part, Westmoreland and other senior officers avoided questioning the president's role as commander in chief or showing disagreement with his policies. In his 1997 book Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam , then Lieutenant Colonel Herbert R. McMaster concluded that the JCS had failed to Openly and professionally advise Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara or Congress without any ulterior motive of potential personal consequences. The book proved extremely influential in military circles. The then chairman of the JCS, Henry H. Shelton , had a copy distributed to every general in the US military. In February 2012, Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis published a report called Dereliction of Duty II accusing senior military officials of deceiving Congress about the course of the war in Afghanistan . General David Petraeus in particular , whom he describes as a "real war hero - possibly of the same type as Patton, MacArthur and Eisenhower", is guilty of this, according to Davis.
On the one hand, MacArthur's dismissal set a precedent that indicated that generals and admirals could be dismissed at any time for any public or private statement regarding non-compliance with government policy. Major General John K. Singlaub criticized planned cuts in the troop strength of the United States in South Korea in 1977, whereupon President Jimmy Carter dismissed him for statements that were “inconsistent with national security policy”. During the Second Gulf War , then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney dismissed Chief of Staff of the Air Force Michael J. Dugan in 1990 , who made a number of statements to the media during a visit to Saudi Arabia that were considered to be “poor judgment in a very sensitive area Time ”. Three years later, Maj. Gen. Harold N. Campbell was fined $ 7,000 and retired after calling President Bill Clinton a "dope-smoking", "apron-hunting" and "conscientious objector" president. General Stanley A. McChrystal was sacked by President Barack Obama in 2010 after he and members of his staff criticized senior government officials in an article in Rolling Stone magazine . This drew comparisons with MacArthur's dismissal, since the war in Afghanistan at that time, similar to the one in Korea in 1951, did not go as hoped.
On the other hand, "[the dismissal]" left an ongoing public perception that the military really knows best about issues of war and peace, "a philosophy known as" MacArthurism ". During the 1992 presidential election , Bill Clinton used the approval of former JCS chairman Admiral William J. Crowe and 21 other retired generals and flag officers to prove that despite doubt, he was fit for command in chief. In later presidential elections, candidates made repeated use of this practice. During the 2004 presidential election , twelve retired generals and admirals backed Democratic candidate John Kerry , including again Admiral Crowe and former Chief of Staff of the Air Force Merrill McPeak , who also defended Kerry on television commercials against accusations made by Swift Boat Veterans For Truth . Later, former Four Star General Tommy R. Franks spoke at the Republican National Convention while another, John M. Shalikashvili , spoke at the Democratic National Convention .
In early 2006, six former generals, John Batiste , Paul D. Eaton , Gregory Newbold , John M. Riggs , Charles H. Swannack and Anthony C. Zinni, stood in for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the so-called "General Revolt" . They accused him of “miserable” military planning and a lack of strategic understanding. The ethics of a system in which active generals are compelled to publicly support policies which they privately consider detrimental to the nation and which cost the lives of military personnel generated critical public reactions. The satirist Stephen Colbert took this system at a dinner at the White House in 2006, which also President George W. Bush and the chairman of the JCS Peter Pace were present, to the ridiculous. In November 2006, Rumsfeld resigned from his position as Minister of Defense. In 2008, JCS Chairman Michael G. Mullen felt compelled to write an open letter reminding all soldiers: "The US military must remain apolitical at all times."
Remarks
- ↑ Some kind of fuss? In: Der Spiegel . No. 19 , 1951, pp. 14 ( online ).
- ↑ Logic and the Dead . In: Der Spiegel . No. 21 , 1951 ( online ).
- ^ A b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 365.
- ↑ a b c Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 17-19.
- ^ L. Lewis: The Revolt of the Admirals. 1998, p. 38.
- ^ L. Lewis: The Revolt of the Admirals. 1998, pp. 30-34.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, p. 27.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, pp. 89-103.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, p. 101.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, p. 393.
- ^ Peter Lowe: An Ally and a Recalcitrant General. Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950–1. 1990, pp. 625-626.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 14.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 52-53.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 58-60.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 65-66.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 68-69.
- ↑ a b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 71-72.
- ↑ United Nations: Resolution 83 (1950) of June 27, 1950. June 27, 1950. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 76-77.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 78-79.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, p. 102.
- ^ Peter Lowe: An Ally and a Recalcitrant General. Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950–1. 1990, p. 629.
- ^ A b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 106-107.
- ^ A b James I. Matray: Truman's Plan for Victory. National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. 1979, p. 320.
- ↑ James I. Matray: Truman's Plan for Victory. National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. 1979, p. 323.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 138-140.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 127 and 145.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, p. 147.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 87.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, pp. 150-151.
- ^ A b James I. Matray: Truman's Plan for Victory. National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. 1979, pp. 326-328.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year 1972, p. 370.
- ↑ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: The Truman Library: Holding the Line 24–28 August 1950. ( Memento of the original from March 4, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Statement to the 51st National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars by General Douglas MacArthur discussing US foreign and military policy in the Far East. Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary's Files. ( Memento of the original from July 30, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 96.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 216.
- ^ A b Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 98.
- ^ Office of the Secretary of Defense: Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson. ( Memento of the original from June 9, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ^ A b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 179-181.
- ↑ James I. Matray: Truman's Plan for Victory. National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. 1979, p. 331.
- ^ D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, p. 485.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: George C. Marshall to Douglas MacArthur, September 29, 1950. Naval Aide Files, Truman Papers . September 29, 1950. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ↑ The art of acting . In: Der Spiegel . No. 15 , 1950 ( online ).
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 183.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 194.
- ^ A b c d Steven Casey: Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion. 2008, pp. 113-115.
- ↑ a b c d D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, pp. 590-591.
- ^ A b Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 111-113.
- ^ D. Clayton James: 1941-1945. 1975, p. 526.
- ^ A b John Edward Wiltz: Truman and MacArthur. The Wake Island Meeting. 1978, pp. 170-172.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Notes Regarding President Truman's Trip to Hawaii, October 9, 1950. Secretary of State File, Acheson Papers. October 9, 1950. Retrieved September 1, 2012
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964. 1985, pp. 500-501.
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964. 1985, pp. 503-504.
- ↑ a b c D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964. 1985, pp. 514-517.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, p. 362.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Substance of Statements made at Wake Island Conference, dated 15 October 1950, compiled by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from notes kept by the conferees from Washington. Papers of George M. Elsey . Pp. 10-11.
- ^ A b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 212.
- ↑ a b c d Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 119-120.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 218.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 234-235.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 366.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 135.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 242.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 244-246.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 286-287.
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964 1985, pp. 578-581.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 320.
- ↑ Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session: Military Situation in the Far East. 1951, p. 77.
- ^ Gar Alperovitz: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. 1995, p. 532.
- ^ Roger Dingman: Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War. 1988-1989, p. 57.
- ^ Roger Dingman: Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War. 1988-1989, p. 63.
- ^ A b Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: The President's News Conference. ( Memento of the original from September 27, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. November 30, 1950. Retrieved October 6, 2012.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 288.
- ^ A b Roger M. Anders: The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War. Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control. 1988, pp. 1-2.
- ↑ Bruce Cumings: Why Did Truman Really Fire MacArthur? ... The Obscure History of Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War Provides the Answer . 2005. Retrieved October 6, 2012.
- ^ Roger M. Anders: The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War. Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control. 1988, pp. 3-4.
- ^ Roger Dingman: Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War. 1988-1989, p. 72.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 289-292.
- ^ John W. Spanier: The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. 1959, pp. 166-167.
- ↑ a b Peter Lowe: An Ally and a Recalcitrant General. Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950–1. 1990, pp. 636-637.
- ↑ a b c d Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 230-233.
- ^ Peter Lowe: An Ally and a Recalcitrant General. Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950–1. 1990, pp. 638-641.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 170.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Harry S. Truman to Omar Bradley, with attachments . December 6, 1950. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 175.
- ↑ James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, p. 373.
- ^ Billy C. Mossman: Ebb and Flow. November 1950 - July 1951. 1990, pp. 202-204.
- ^ Billy C. Mossman: Ebb and Flow. November 1950 - July 1951. 1990, pp. 328-330.
- ^ A b Billy C. Mossman: Ebb and Flow. November 1950 - July 1951. 1990, pp. 344-347.
- ^ D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, p. 586.
- ^ Davis McCullough: Truman. 1992, p. 998.
- ↑ Harry S. Truman: Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Years of Trial and Hope. 1965, pp. 441-442.
- ↑ a b Mackubin Thomas Owens: Civilian Control. A National Crisis ?. 1994-1995, pp. 72-75.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 183.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 187.
- ^ D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, pp. 614-615.
- ↑ a b c Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 222-227.
- ^ Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. 1964, p. 389.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 180.
- ↑ a b c James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. Volume III 1950–1951: the Korean War, Part One. 1998, pp. 246-247.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Diary entries, 6-7, April 1951, Truman Papers . April 7, 1951. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 214.
- ^ Foundation for the National Archives: Relieving MacArthur of his command. ( Memento of the original from June 13, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. April 11, 1951. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ↑ Time Magazine: HISTORICAL NOTES: Giving Them More Hell . December 3, 1973. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964 1985, p. 594.
- ^ Phillip S. Meilinger: Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General. 1989, p. 179.
- ^ A b James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year. 1972, pp. 376-377.
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964. 1985, pp. 596-597.
- ^ Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum: Proposed draft messages to Frank Pace, Douglas MacArthur, and Matthew Ridgway . April 1951. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ^ A b John W. Spanier: The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. 1959, p. 9.
- ↑ Harry S. Truman: Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Years of Trial and Hope. 1965, p. 444.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 203.
- ^ A b Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 163-165.
- ^ A b Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 32-35.
- ^ Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 166-167.
- ^ Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 233-237.
- ↑ Richard D. Challener: Admirals, Generals, and the American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. 1973, pp. 46-49.
- ^ Robert J. Rice: McNamara and Rumsfeld. Control and Imbalance in Civil-Military Relations. 2008, pp. 22-23.
- ↑ Alexander Hamilton: Federalist Papers No. 69 . New York Times, March 14, 1788. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ↑ Louis Fisher: The Korean War. On What Legal Base Did Truman Act ?. 1995, p. 32.
- ↑ Louis Fisher: The Korean War. On What Legal Base Did Truman Act ?. 1995, p. 29.
- ^ A b c Louis Fisher: The Korean War. On What Legal Base Did Truman Act ?. 1995, pp. 34-35.
- ↑ Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session: Military Situation in the Far East. May 15, 1951, p. 852.
- ^ Arthur M. Schlesinger: The Imperial Presidency. 1973, pp. 131-136 and 188.
- ^ Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 303-305.
- ^ Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, pp. 258-259.
- ^ Samuel P. Huntington: The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. 1957, p. 230.
- ↑ Richard D. Challener: Admirals, Generals, and the American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. 1973, pp. 77-80.
- ^ A b Paul Hasluck: The Government and the People, 1942–1945. 1970, p. 161.
- ^ Gavin Merrick Long: MacArthur as Military Commander. 1969, p. 225.
- ^ D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, p. 603.
- ^ William Raymond Manchester: American Caesar. Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. 1978, pp. 652-653.
- ^ Davis McCullough: Truman. 1992, p. 1008.
- ^ A b Steven Casey: Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion. 2008, pp. 235-236.
- ^ A b D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964. 1985, pp. 611-612.
- ↑ San Francisco Chronicle: MacArthur welcomed in SF April 18, 1951, p. 1. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ^ Stanley Weintraub: MacArthur's War. Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero. 2000, p. 2.
- ↑ Public Broadcasting Service: MacArthur's Speeches: “Old soldiers never die ...” . Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ↑ Public Broadcasting Service: Pentagon Statement of Relief of Gen. MacArthur, 1951 . April 19, 1951. Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ^ Public Broadcasting Service: American Experience: MacArthur . Retrieved September 2, 2012.
- ^ D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964. 1985, pp. 619-620.
- ↑ The Mirror: Douglas MacArthur. 26.I.1880 - 05.IV.1964. 1964, p. 104.
- ^ A b c d John Edward Wiltz: The MacArthur Hearings of 1951. The Secret Testimony. 1975, pp. 167-169.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, p. 210.
- ↑ Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session: Military Situation in the Far East. 1951, p. 732.
- ↑ a b c Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session: Military Situation in the Far East. 1951, pp. 3601-3605.
- ↑ Steven Casey: Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion. 2008, pp. 253-254.
- ↑ Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. 2008, pp. 246 and 326.
- ^ A b Steven Casey: Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion. 2008, pp. 326-327.
- ^ Rosemary J. Foot: Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict. 1988-1989, pp. 111-112.
- ^ Robert J. Watson: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume V 1953-1954. 1998, pp. 14-15.
- ↑ Stephen A. Danner: The Truman-MacArthur Tug of War. A Lingering Aftermath. 1993, pp. 14-15.
- ^ A b c Martin L. Cook: Revolt of the Generals. A Case Study in Professional Ethics. 2008, pp. 4-7.
- ↑ The New York Times: Dereliction of Duty II . February 11, 2012, Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ^ Daniel L. Davis: Dereliction of Duty II: Senior Military Leaders' Loss of Integrity Wounds Afghan War Effort. 2012, p. 64.
- ↑ Time Magazine: General on the Carpet . May 30, 1977. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Eric Schmitt: Confrontation in the Gulf; Air Force Chief is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan; Cheney Cites Bad Judgment . The New York Times, September 18, 1990. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ^ Marc D. Charney: Contempt of Clinton; The Chain of Command Reins In a General . The New York Times, June 20, 1993. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Michael D. Shear, Ernesto Londoño and Debbi Wilgoren: Obama to meet with McChrystal before making 'any final decisions' on dismissal. The Washington Post, June 22, 2010. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Glenn Thrush: Obama's real McChrystal problem: Afghanistan plan in trouble. Politico, June 22, 2010. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ a b Tampa Bay Times: An old soldier is still in the fray. ( Memento of the original from June 6, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. October 18, 2009. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson: The Role of the Military in Presidential Elections. 2009, p. 58.
- ^ Richard H. Kohn: Tarnished Brass. Is the US Military Profession in Decline ?. 2011, p. 29.
- ^ Martin Sieff: The Anger of the Generals Unprecedented in Modern Times . Space Daily, April 19, 2006. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ^ David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt: More Retired Generals Call for Rumsfeld's Resignation. The New York Times, April 14, 2006. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Tom Baldwin: Revenge of the Batteres Generals. The Times, April 19, 2006. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ^ Kristin Roberts: Rumsfeld resigned before election, letter shows . Reuters.com, August 16, 2007. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
- ↑ Thom Shanker: Top-ranking officer warns US military to stay out of politics . The New York Times, May 25, 2008. Retrieved September 3, 2012.
Quotes
- ↑ "the removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional powers of the President but the circumstances were a shock to national pride."
- ↑ "respect the authority of the President"
- ^ "Produce men such as Robert E. Lee, John J. Pershing, Eisenhower and Bradley and at the same time produce Custers, Pattons and MacArthur."
- ↑ "extraordinary self-control"
- ↑ "violent temper and paroxysms of ungovernable rage"
- ↑ "Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."
- ↑ "desperate rearguard action"
- ↑ "well-equipped, well-led, and battle-trained, and which have at times out-numbered our troops by as much as twenty to one"
- ↑ "make that decision when it becomes necessary to do it."
- ↑ "the worst possible place ever selected for an amphibious landing."
- ↑ "We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush them."
- ↑ "Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia."
- ↑ "one of the greatest, if not the greatest generals of our generation"
- ↑ "as I am President,"
- ^ "As long as action by UN military forces offers a reasonable chance of successful resistance."
- ↑ "The success of Inchon was so great and the subsequent prestige of General MacArthur was so overpowering, that the Chiefs hesitated thereafter to question later plans and decisions of the general, which should have been challenged."
- ^ "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel. Announcement above referred to may precipitate embarrassment in the UN where evident desire is not to be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage, rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so. "
- ↑ "would be delighted to meet the President on the morning of the 15th at Wake Island."
- ↑ "insulting"
- ↑ "greasy ham and eggs cap that evidently had been in use for twenty years."
- ↑ "No new policies, no new strategy of war or international politics, were proposed or discussed."
- ↑ "witnessed nothing but a political grandstand play."
- ↑ "Very little. Had they interfered in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand has in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably not more than 100-115,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50-60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no Air Force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter. "
- ↑ "drive forward with all speed and full utilization of all their force."
- ↑ "a matter of policy"
- ↑ "I considered him a great strategist," Truman later recalled, "until he made the march into North Korea without the knowledge that he should have had of the Chinese coming in."
- ^ "MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy the bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants ... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off, which I think speaks well of him. "
-
↑ "Q. Mr. President, I wonder if we could retrace that reference to the atom bomb? Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration?
Truman: Always has been. It is one of our weapons.
Q. Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, or civilian—
Truman: It's a matter that the military people will have to decide. I'm not a military authority that passes on those things.
Q. Mr. President, perhaps it would be better if we are allowed to quote your remarks on that directly?
Truman: I don't think — I don't think that is necessary.
Q. Mr. President, you said this depends on United Nations action. Does that mean that we wouldn't use the atomic bomb except on a United Nations authorization?
Truman: No, it doesn't mean that at all. The action against Communist China depends on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has. " - ↑ "only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given."
- ↑ "General MacArthur was running the show."
- ↑ "slavery to government and crippling debt"
- ↑ "a handicap to effective military operations"
- ↑ "an enormous handicap, unprecedented in military history"
- ↑ "Refrain from direct communications on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, and other publicity media."
- ↑ "solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence or personal conversations"
- ^ "Of even greater significance than our tactical successes has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capability to provide adequately many critical items necessary to the conduct of modern war. He lacks the manufacturing base and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns. Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction numbers alone do not offset the vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the seas and the air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications and transportation, are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with an inferiority of ground firepower in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss. These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under the inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy, therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our military operations to its coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty in arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits, without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa or China's seat in the United Nations. "
- ↑ "I was ready to kick him into the North China Sea [sic] ... I was never so put out in my life."
- ^ "This was a most extraordinary statement for a military commander of the United Nations to issue on his own responsibility. It was an act totally disregarding all directives to abstain from any declarations on foreign policy. It was in open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander-in-Chief. This was a challenge to the authority of the President under the Constitution. It also flouted the policy of the United Nations. By this act MacArthur left me no choice - I could no longer tolerate his insubordination. "
- ↑ "he had the courage to tell Congress to go to Hell on foreign policy matters."
- ^ "The Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite"
- ↑ for its own purposes is allied with Soviet Russia.
- ↑ “It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory. "
- ↑ "for some unexplained reason and without consulting me"
- ↑ "the biggest fight of your administration"
- ↑ "military point of view"
- ↑ "if MacArthur were not relieved, a large segment of our people would charge that civil authorities no longer controlled the military."
- ^ "It is of unanimous opinion of all that MacArthur be relieved. All four so advise. "
- ↑ "concurred"
- ↑ "recommended"
- ↑ "I deeply regret it did Becomes my duty as President and Commander-in-Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander-in-Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, US Army, Far East. You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gene. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select. My reasons for your replacement, will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message. "
- ^ "I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail. "
- ↑ "Little evidence that General MacArthur had ever failed to carry out a direct order of the Joint Chiefs, or acted in opposition to an order."
- ↑ "In point of fact, MacArthur had stretched but not legally violated any JCS directives. He had violated the President's 6 December directive, relayed to him by the JCS, but this did not constitute violation of a JCS order. "
- ^ "That we could not afford the courtesy of Secretary Pace's personal delivery of the order"
- ↑ “With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of his commands and have designated Lt. Gene. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor. Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In the time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling. General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case. "
- ^ "If there is one basic element in our Constitution, it is civilian control of the military. Policies are to be made by the elected political officials, not by generals or admirals. Yet time and again General MacArthur had shown that he was unwilling to accept the policies of the administration. By his repeated public statements he was not only confusing our allies as to the true course of our policies but, in fact, was also setting his policy against the President's ... If I allowed him to defy the civil authorities in this manner, I myself would be violating my oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. "
- ^ "In the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton argued that: The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature. "
- ↑ "fights with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like."
- ^ "When we agreed to the United Nations Charter we never agreed to supplant our Constitution with the United Nations Charter. The power to declare and make war is vested in the representatives of the people, in the Congress of the United States. "
- ^ "Article I of the Constitution gives the power to declare war to the Congress and not to the Executive. We are apparently now drifting into a twilight constitutional zone where the executive can put us into war, the fourth largest in our history, without a Congressional declaration or a Congressional resolution recognizing that a state of war started by others already exists. When Congress acts under its constitutional power, every statement for or against the resolution is part of the Congressional Record, and the press and the public are fully informed. The roll-call vote shows how each member voted. This is responsible and accountable government. If five or seven men can meet in a closed session in the Blair House or the White House, and put this nation into the fourth largest war from a casualty standpoint, in our history without their statements and recommendations being recorded or available, and without their positions on this matter being known, we have the war-making power transferred from the Congress, operating in the open, to the Executive, operating en camera. That is not, I submit, either responsible or accountable government. "
- ↑ "an ambassador as well as Supreme Commander."
- ↑ “It arises from the inherent difference between the position of a commander whose mission is limited to a particular area and a particular antagonist, and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States […] and must weigh the interests and objectives in one part of the world with those in others to attain balance […]. There is nothing new in this divergence, in our military history […]. What is new and what brought about the necessity for General MacArthur's removal is the wholly unprecedented situation of a local Theater Commander publicly expressing his displeasure at, and his disagreement with, the foreign policy of the United States. [... He] had grown so far out of sympathy with the established policies of the United States that there is grave doubt as to whether he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority in making decisions that normal command functions would assign to a theater commander . "
- ^ "MacArthur's dismissal is the greatest shock since the end of the war. He deals with the Japanese people not as a conqueror but a great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not material aid and democratic reform alone, but a new way of life, the freedom and dignity of the individual [...]. We shall continue to love and trust him as one of the Americans who best understood Japan's position. "
- ^ "President Truman must be impeached and convicted. His hasty and vindictive removal of General MacArthur is the culmination of series of acts which have shown that he is unfit, morally and mentally, for his high office. The American nation has never been in greater danger. It is led by a fool who is surrounded by knaves. "
- ↑ "hasty and vindictive"
- ^ "The Socialist Government of Great Britain"
- ↑ "It was a shameful thing to fire MacArthur, and even more shameful to send Vaughan,"
- ↑ “ Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me — and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes… But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision. In war there can be no substitute for victory. ”
- ^ "The action taken by the President in relieving General MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of the President's principal civilian and military advisers including the Joint Chiefs of Staff."
- ↑ "an inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur"
- ↑ "privileged sanctuary"
- ^ "Red China is not the powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. "
- ↑ "there was no serious disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy."
- ↑ "the United States should never again become involved in war without the consent of the Congress."
- ^ "General, I have a lot riding on you. I hope you don't pull a MacArthur on me. "
- ↑ "a real war hero - maybe even on the same plane as Patton, MacArthur, and Eisenhower"
- ↑ "inconsistent with announced national security policy"
- ↑ "dope smoking"
- ↑ "skirt chasing"
- ↑ "draft dodging"
- ^ "[The relief] left a lasting current of popular sentiment that in matters of war and peace, the military really knows best,"
- ↑ "MacArthurism"
- ↑ "Generals revolt"
- ↑ "abysmal"
- ↑ "The US military must remain apolitical at all times."
literature
- Gar Alperovitz: The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth. Knopf, New York 1995, ISBN 0-679-44331-2 , OCLC 32347917 .
- Roger M. Anders: The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War. Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control In: Military Affairs. 52, No. 1, 1988, doi: 10.2307 / 1988372 , ISSN, pp. 1-6.
- Steven Casey: Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-971917-4 , OCLC 227005561 .
- Richard D. Challener: Admirals, Generals, and the American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1973, ISBN 0-691-06916-6 , OCLC 600228 .
- Martin L. Cook: Revolt of the Generals. A Case Study in Professional Ethics. In: Parameters. 38, No. 1, 2008, pp. 4-15, ISSN 0031-1723 , OCLC 230969357 ; carlisle.army.mil (PDF; 212 kB) accessed on September 1, 2012
- Steve Corbett and Michael J. Davidson: The Role of the Military in Presidential Elections. In: Parameters. 39, No. 4, 2009, ISSN 0031-1723 , OCLC 590032905 , pp. 58-72; carlisle.army.mil (PDF; 282 kB) accessed on September 1, 2012.
- Stephen A. Danner: The Truman-MacArthur Tug of War. A Lingering Aftermath. Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1993, OCLC 50988290 .
- Daniel L. Davis: Dereliction of Duty II: Senior Military Leaders' Loss of Integrity Wounds Afghan War Effort . (PDF) The New York Times, New York City 2012. Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- Roger Dingman: Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War. In: International Security. 13, No. 3, 1988-1989, doi: 10.2307 / 2538736 , ISSN, pp. 50-91.
- Louis Fisher: The Korean War. On What Legal Base Did Truman Act ?. In: The American Journal of International Law. 89, p. 1, January 1995, doi: 10.2307 / 2203888 , ISSN, pp. 21-39.
- Rosemary J. Foot: Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict. In: International Security. 13, No. 3, 1988-1989, doi: 10.2307 / 2538736 , ISSN, pp. 50-91.
- Alonzo L. Hamby: Man of the People. A Life of Harry S. Truman. Oxford University Press, New York 1995, ISBN 0-19-504546-7 , OCLC 31605426 .
- Paul Hasluck : The Government and the People, 1942-1945 (= Australia in the War of 1939-1945. Series 4, 2). Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1970, ISBN 0-642-99367-X , OCLC 33346943 .
- Samuel P. Huntington : The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1957, ISBN 978-0-674-81736-4 , OCLC 569431 .
- D. Clayton James: 1941-1945 (= The Years of MacArthur. 2). Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1975, ISBN 0-395-20446-1 , OCLC 12591897 .
- D. Clayton James: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1964 (= The Years of MacArthur. 3). Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1985, ISBN 0-395-36004-8 , OCLC 36211311 .
- Richard H. Kohn: Tarnished Brass. Is the US Military Profession in Decline ?. In: Army History. 78, 2011, ISSN, pp. 27-31; history.army.mil (PDF; 7.26 MB).
- Andrew L. Lewis: The Revolt of the Admirals. Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1998, OCLC 42472510 .
- Gavin Merrick Long: MacArthur as Military Commander. Batsford, London 1969, ISBN 978-0-938289-14-2 , OCLC 464094918 .
- Peter Lowe: An Ally and a Recalcitrant General. Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950–1. In: The English Historical Review. 105, No. 416, July 1990, ISSN, pp. 624-653.
- Douglas MacArthur: Reminiscences of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Bluejacket Books, Annapolis 1964, ISBN 1-55750-483-0 , OCLC 220661276 .
- William Raymond Manchester : American Caesar. Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964. Little, Brown, Boston 1978, ISBN 0-440-30424-5 , OCLC 3844481 .
- James I. Matray: Truman's Plan for Victory. National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. In: The Journal of American History. 66, No. 2, September 1979, doi: 10.2307 / 1900879 , ISSN, pp. 314-333.
- Davis McCullough: Truman. Simon & Schuster, New York 1992, ISBN 0-671-45654-7 , OCLC 181114919 .
- Phillip S. Meilinger: Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the Life of a General. Indiana University Press, Bloomington VA 1989, ISBN 0-253-32862-4 , OCLC 18164655 .
- Billy C. Mossman: Ebb and Flow. November 1950 - July 1951 . (= United States in the Korean War. ). Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington DC 1990, ISBN 0-16-023487-5 , OCLC 19846599 . Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- Mackubin Thomas Owens: Civilian Control. A National Crisis ?. In: Joint Forces Quarterly. 6, 1994-1995, ISSN, pp. 80-8; dtic.mil (PDF; 283 kB) accessed on September 1, 2012.
- Michael D. Pearlman: Truman and MacArthur. Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Indiana 2008, ISBN 978-0-253-35066-4 , OCLC 159919446 .
- Robert J. Rice: McNamara and Rumsfeld. Control and Imbalance in Civil-Military Relations. Center of Military History, United States Army, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 2008, OCLC 230824985 .
- Arthur Meier Schlesinger junior : The Imperial Presidency. Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1973, ISBN 0-395-17713-8 , OCLC 704887 .
- James F. Schnabel: Policy and Direction: the First Year . (= United States Army in the Korean War. ). United States Government Printing Office , Washington DC 1972, OCLC 595249 . Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy. Volume III 1950–1951: the Korean War, Part One (= History of the Jount Chiefs of Staff. ). Office of Joint History, Office of the Charman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC 1998, OCLC 40664164 .
- Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings, 82d Congress, 1st session: Military Situation in the Far East . US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 1951, OCLC 4956423 . Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- John W. Spanier: The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1959, OCLC 412555 .
- The art of acting . In: Der Spiegel . No. 52 , 1950, pp. 15-17 ( online ).
- Some kind of brawl? In: Der Spiegel . No. 19 , 1951, pp. 14-16 ( online ).
- Douglas MacArthur 26.I.1880 - 05.IV.1964 . In: Der Spiegel . No. 16 , 1964, pp. 104 ( online ).
- Harry S. Truman: Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Years of Trial and Hope. New American Library, New York 1965, OCLC 535475907 .
- Robert J. Watson: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume V 1953-1954 (= History of the Jount Chiefs of Staff. ). Office of Joint History, Office of the Charman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC 1998, OCLC 48758299 .
- Stanley Weintraub: MacArthur's War. Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero. Free Press, New York 2000, ISBN 0-684-83419-7 , OCLC 41548333 .
- John Edward Wiltz: The MacArthur Hearings of 1951. The Secret Testimony. In: Military Affairs. 39, No. 4, December 1975, doi: 10.2307 / 1986818 , ISSN pp. 167-173.
- John Edward Wiltz: Truman and MacArthur. The Wake Island Meeting. In: Military Affairs. 42, No. 4, December 1978, doi: 10.2307 / 1986484 , ISSN, pp. 169-176.
Web links
- Bruce Cumings: Why Did Truman Really Fire MacArthur? ... The Obscure History of Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War Provides the Answer . History News Network, 2005; Retrieved September 1, 2012.
- Collection of primary sources on MacArthur's discharge in the Truman Library. (English) accessed on September 1, 2012.
- The Truman vs. MacArthur Controversy: Speeches, Documents, Letters, etc. Collection of speeches, documents, letters and other things about the dispute between Truman and MacArthur. PBS.org (English) accessed on September 1, 2012.
- American Experience video on the life of Truman on PBS.org with a chapter on MacArthur's dismissal . Accessed September 1, 2012.
- Mac, war and the elections . In: Der Spiegel . No. 16 , 1951 ( online ).