Federal intelligence services

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The federal intelligence services in Germany are :

In addition, each of the 16  federal states has a state authority for the protection of the constitution , so that there are 19 official intelligence services in Germany . Other federal public agencies have in some cases similar tasks and powers to the federal intelligence services, without being officially classified as intelligence services or being subject to their specific control. These include the Federal Criminal Police Office , the Customs Criminal Police Office , the Federal Office for Information Security , the Center for Information and Communication Technology of the Federal Police and the Strategic Reconnaissance Command of the Bundeswehr .

Legal basis

At the constitutional level, the legal basis for the BfV is regulated in Article 73, Paragraph 1, Number 10, letters a) and b) and Article 87, Paragraph 1, Clause 2 of the Basic Law (GG). According to this, the federal government has the exclusive legislation on cooperation between the federal government and the states to protect the free democratic basic order , the existence and security of the federal government or a state (constitutional protection) and to protect against efforts in the federal territory that result from the use of force or on it directed preparatory actions endanger the foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany. By federal law, it can set up a central office for the collection of documents for the protection of the constitution and protection against efforts in the federal territory which endanger foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany through the use of force or preparatory actions aimed at it. For the BND and MAD, the legislative and government construction expertise is derived from 73 Art. Para. 1 and Article 87. Para. 3 GG from what the federal government exclusive power to legislate on the foreign affairs and defense has and for matters on the the federation has the right to legislate, independent higher federal authorities can be established.

The basic legal basis for federal intelligence services are the BND Act , the Federal Constitutional Protection Act (BVerfSchG) and the MAD Act . The statutory regulation of their powers had become necessary after the Federal Constitutional Court had established the basic right to informational self-determination in the census judgment at the end of 1983 . The federal intelligence services are subject to the separation requirement between the police and intelligence services . The exchange of knowledge between you and other authorities is regulated in up to 26 BVerfSchG. BND and MAD law refer to the BVerfSchG.

Commissioner for the federal intelligence services

The task of the Commissioner for the intelligence services of the Federation occupies Secretary of State in the Federal Chancellery true, currently John Geismann . It coordinates and intensifies the cooperation between the three federal intelligence services and their cross-departmental cooperation with other authorities and agencies. The intelligence officer takes part in the parliamentary handling of budgetary matters for the three services. He supports the coordination and preparation of meetings of the parliamentary control body and he heads the State Secretaries' Committee for Secret Intelligence and Security .

In order to fulfill his tasks, he is subordinate to a department in the Federal Chancellery (currently: Department 7, previously Department 6), which is responsible for the Federal Intelligence Service subordinate to the Federal Chancellery in addition to coordinating the federal intelligence services.

The commissioner has cross-departmental tasks without affecting the departmental responsibility of the federal ministries in accordance with Article 65 paragraph 2 of the Basic Law (GG). The cooperation of the BfV with the state authorities for the protection of the constitution is not one of its tasks.

The commissioner has the right to request information from the federal ministries and intelligence services about suspected intelligence cases and other special incidents as well as the working methodology, the information and filing system, the organization, budget planning and personnel structure planning. It can also propose measures in the area of ​​cooperation between services. He is involved in draft legislation and in the drafting of regulations that affect one or more of the federal intelligence services or their cooperation with other agencies. He can also hold direct meetings with the heads of the services and their representatives at any time.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Home Affairs (BMI) and the Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg) inform the commissioner for the intelligence services about suspected intelligence cases and other special incidents from the area of ​​the BfV or the MAD, which, when they become known, the political or could find public interest and can therefore be of importance to the Federal Chancellor.

After the establishment of the three federal intelligence services, a central coordination post was required, which reports directly to the Federal Chancellor or the Federal Chancellery. From 1949 to 1964 this work was taken over by the Federal Defense Council and from 1964 to 1969 by the Federal Ministry for the Affairs of the Federal Defense Council (Federal Minister: Heinrich Krone ). This was the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany that the coordination of the federal intelligence services was brought together in one place. After the Crown Ministry was dissolved in 1969, the newly established Federal Security Council was entrusted with the task of coordination. In fact, however, this task was taken over by the head of the Federal Chancellery.

With the organizational decree of January 29, 1975 by Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt , the function of "Commissioner for the intelligence services" was created. The chief of the Federal Chancellery (chief BK) was appointed as the commissioner. This could either be Federal Minister for Special Tasks (BMin) or State Secretary (StS). He was also known colloquially as the “coordinator”. Later this designation was passed on to the head of the intelligence service department in the Federal Chancellery, usually a ministerial director (MinDir). He was also the agent's deputy.

With the organizational decree of November 15, 1984 (entry into force), the State Secretary became the Federal Chancellor's agent for the intelligence services. The BND was also “subordinate to” him. With the organizational decree of May 3, 1989 (entry into force), “a minister of state or state secretary in the portfolio of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Chancellery” was appointed as the commissioner. A head of department in the Federal Chancellery was declared a representative. The department headed by this should support the representative in fulfilling his tasks. The BND was again subordinated to the head of the Federal Chancellery.

The ministers of state Waldemar Schreckenberger and Lutz Stavenhagen had the technical supervision over the BND, whereas the official supervision for legal reasons with the civil servant head of the Federal Chancellery. The Minister of State were in a public official relationship , but no officials (public law service relationship ).

List of agents for the federal intelligence services

Surname Term of office (beginning) Term of office (end) Political party rank
Manfred pupil January 29, 1975 1st December 1980 SPD StS, chief BK
Manfred Lahnstein 1st December 1980 April 28, 1982 SPD StS, chief BK
Gerhard Konow April 29, 1982 4th October 1982 - StS, chief BK
Waldemar Schreckenberger 4th October 1982 May 3, 1989 CDU StS, until November 15, 1984 also chief BK
Lutz Stavenhagen May 3, 1989 2nd December 1991 CDU Minister of State (Germany) to the Federal Chancellor
Bernd Schmidbauer December 18, 1991 1998 CDU Minister of State (Germany) to the Federal Chancellor
Frank-Walter Steinmeier 1998 November 22, 2005 SPD StS, chief BK
Thomas de Maizière November 22, 2005 October 28, 2009 CDU BMin, boss BK
Ronald Pofalla October 28, 2009 17th December 2013 CDU BMin
Peter Altmaier 17th December 2013 2014 CDU BMin
Klaus-Dieter Fritsche 2014 2018 CSU StS
Johannes Geismann 2018 officiating CDU StS

Coordinator of the federal intelligence services

The head of Department 7 responsible for Federal Intelligence Services (until 2018 Department 6) in the Federal Chancellery, currently Bernhard Kotsch , is the coordinator of the Federal Intelligence Services and the representative of the Commissioner for the Federal Intelligence Services. He reported to him about the intelligence situation.

List of coordinators of the federal intelligence services

Surname Term of office (beginning) Term of office (end) Political party Official title
Franz Schlichter 1975 1980 Ministerial Director
Gerhard Ritzel 1981 1983 Ministerial Director
Hermann Jung 1981 1992 Ministerial Director
Rudolf Dolzer 1992 1996 Ministerial Director
August Hanning 1996 1999 Ministerial Director
Ernst Uhrlau 1999 November 30, 2005 SPD Ministerial Director
Klaus-Dieter Fritsche December 1, 2005 December 2009 CSU Ministerial Director
Günter Hot 2010 2018 CDU Ministerial Director
Bernhard Kotsch 2018 officiating Ministerial Director

Intelligence department in the Federal Chancellery

The Department of 7 under the direction of Bernhard Kotsch is responsible for the Federal Intelligence Service and the coordination of the intelligence services of the Federal Department of the Federal Chancellery.

The department is structured as follows:

history

From 1951, Unit 5 was the point of contact for the Gehlen Organization , the forerunner of the BND. When the BND was established on April 1, 1956, Section 5 was also responsible for it. Department 5 was headed from 1955 to 1964, with an interruption in 1958, by Ministerialrat Günter Bachmann , who had been an assistant in the department from 1952 .

In 1964, Ministerialrat Hans-Georg Walter von Koester took over the management of the department. It was renamed Division I A / 5 in 1965, Division III / 1 in 1966 and Division I / 2 in 1967 and upgraded to Group I / 2 in the summer of 1969. In addition to the BND, the department was responsible for the State Secretaries' Committee for Intelligence Services and Security and had to manage the business of the working group for secret intelligence . In matters of the BND and the common affairs of the intelligence services, Division I / 2 was directly subordinate to the head of the Federal Chancellery, otherwise Division I under the direction of Horst Osterheld . In 1969, Ministerialdirigent Franz Schlichter took over the management.

At the beginning of 1973, the new Group 07, reporting directly to the head of the Federal Chancellery, was created under Schlichter's leadership, which took over responsibility for the affairs of the BND and the common affairs of the intelligence services from Division I / 2, as well as the subject areas that had dealt with them. In 1974 she also took over responsibility for the protection of the constitution from Section I / 2, which was incorporated into Group 1/3 (later 13). In 1975 Group 07 was expanded significantly, it was divided into sections and its head was appointed as the representative of the intelligence officer. From then on, the group officially had the coordinating function for the federal intelligence services. In addition, Group 07 took over responsibility for the budget of the BND. In 1976 it was divided into sections 071 to 076.

In 1977, Group 07 was converted into Department 6 and continued to be headed by Franz Schlichter, who was appointed Ministerial Director and continued to be the representative of the Commissioner for the Intelligence Services. The department was responsible for the BND, the coordination of the federal intelligence services and security protection and was divided into divisions 61 to 66. In 1981, Group 61 was formed in the department, responsible for the BND. Divisions 61 and 62 became divisions 611 and 612, the other divisions moved up numerically (63 to 62, etc.).

In 1985 the area of ​​security was outsourced from Department 6. The responsibilities of coordinating the federal intelligence services, covered by Divisions 62 and 63, have now been grouped together, as are the affairs of the BND, thereby enhancing the department's value. The group management was responsible for the coordination of the intelligence services in general and in particular with regard to organizational and budgetary matters , administration and technology, and was also responsible for G-10 procedures (previously Unit 63). Unit 621 corresponded to the previous Unit 62 with the coordination of the intelligence services in general cooperation, the exchange of information, the management of the State Secretaries' Committee for Secret Intelligence and the responsibility for the Parliamentary Control Commission.

In 1994 group 62 was expanded to include unit 622. It was responsible for the international proliferation of armaments, international drug trafficking , intelligence gathering and exploitation of information.

During Helmut Kohl's last term of office , the groups in Department 6 were abolished. However, the unit names remained three-digit. The divisions 601 to 605 passed. The previous group leader 62 became department head, group leader 61 his deputy.

After Gerhard Schröder took office , Department 5 (social and political analysis; cultural affairs) was temporarily closed and the previous department 6 became the new department 5. At the end of 1988, a new department 5 (political analysis and fundamental issues) was created for the BND and the department responsible for coordinating the intelligence services was given number 6 again.

In March 2018, when the Merkel IV cabinet began, Department 6 was given the current name, Department 7. This means that the department always had the “last” number of the departments of the Federal Chancellery.

Presidential Round and Intelligence Situation

As early as 1967, the “Great Situation” took place every Tuesday morning in the Federal Chancellery, which was also attended by a representative of the BND. Under Willy Brandt , the President of the BND gave weekly lectures at the Federal Chancellery. After the Office of the Commissioner for the Intelligence Services was created in 1975, it met regularly on Tuesday mornings under his chairmanship with the presidents of the intelligence services. In addition, the State Secretaries of the Federal Foreign Office , the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Defense, as well as Department Heads 1 and 6 from the Federal Chancellery, took part.

BMJ, GBA and BKA have been involved since the September 11, 2001 attacks . The ND situation is the weekly, systematic presentation of foreign and security-relevant information by the heads of the security authorities of the Federal Republic for the purpose of informing the Federal Intelligence Officer. The subsequent presidential round is a politically executive consultation in the closest leadership of the security authorities. Its purpose is the exchange of information, advice, decision-making and preparation of decision-making in the responsible departments and business areas in questions of external and internal security . The issues in the presidents' round are regularly content of great importance in terms of foreign and / or security policy .

The purpose of the preliminary round is to create the opportunity to address and discuss questions in detail that might not be addressed in the large group, at least not to the same extent. The group meets at lunch, "at which the departments or, in particular, the presidents of the BND, BfV and BKA authorities have the opportunity to present things that are important to them to coordinate with other departments and also with the Federal Chancellery and the Intelligence Officer . There is no fixed agenda. "

control

The control of the three federal intelligence services is essentially the same.

Parliamentary control

The parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services of the Federation is up to the German Bundestag . He has various options for doing this.

Parliamentary control body

The main body of the German Bundestag for the control of the federal intelligence services is the Parliamentary Control Committee (PKGr). The body has also been constitutionally anchored in Art. 45d GG since 2009 .

G 10 commission

The G 10 Commission controls the restrictions on the fundamental rights of letter , post and telecommunications secrecy under Article 10 Act .

Trust body

Pursuant to Section 10a (2) of the Federal Budget Code , the German Bundestag can delegate the approval of expenditures that are subject to confidentiality to the trust committee. The German Bundestag made use of this right. The trust committee decides on the economic plans of the federal intelligence services as part of budget discussions. In the federal public budget, only the final amounts of these economic plans are listed for the responsible ministries, without any further breakdown. Specifically, the tasks of the trust committee essentially consist in adopting the business plans for the three federal intelligence services in the course of the annual budget procedure while maintaining secrecy, and during the current year to monitor how the intelligence services handle the budget funds made available to them.

Committee according to Article 13 paragraph 6 of the Basic Law

If the federal intelligence services carry out acoustic surveillance of the living space and thus restrict the basic right to inviolability of the home under Article 13 of the Basic Law , the committee based at the German Bundestag under Article 13, Paragraph 6 of the Basic Law is responsible for their control. It exercises its parliamentary control on the basis of the annual report on acoustic monitoring of living spaces, which the federal government must submit. So far, however, only repressive surveillance measures have been carried out by the law enforcement authorities on the basis of the Code of Criminal Procedure , i.e. not by the intelligence services. The body has nine members.

Defense Commissioner of the German Bundestag

The Defense Commissioner of the German Bundestag can control the MAD because it is part of the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Defense . He can request information and access to files from the Federal Minister of Defense, the MAD and his employees, forward a process to the authority responsible for initiating criminal or disciplinary proceedings and visit the MAD at any time without prior notification. ( Section 3 of the Armed Forces Commissioner Act )

Every MAD soldier has the right to contact the Armed Forces Commissioner directly without having to follow official channels . Due to the fact that the defense commissioner has been called upon, he may not be disciplined or discriminated against. ( Section 7 of the Armed Forces Commissioner Act)

General parliamentary control

In addition to the above-mentioned special committees and organs, which are supposed to take account of the special need for scrutiny of the secret work of intelligence services in the democratic constitutional state , there are the usual elements of general parliamentary control of the executive such as debates, current hours , large and small questions and committees of inquiry . The special feature of the MAD is that the Defense Committee can declare itself to be a committee of inquiry according to Art. 45a Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law. Between 1956 and 1987 the Defense Committee declared itself a committee of inquiry ten times, three times specifically about the MAD. Control is also exercised through reporting in the respective departmental committees for Home Affairs and Home Affairs (BfV) and Defense (MAD). There is no departmental committee for the BND.

Executive and regulatory control

The federal intelligence services are subject to legal supervision , i.e. the control of lawful conduct, and technical supervision , i.e. also the control of appropriate action, of their respective higher-level departments, which are at the same time the highest federal authorities and federal ministries . For the BND this is the Federal Chancellery (Department 7), for the BfV the BMI (Section ÖS I 2) and for the MAD the BMVg (Section R II 5).

There is internal control by the staff representatives , which represent the rights of the employees in relation to the respective service. For the BND there are restrictions according to § 86 of the Federal Personnel Representation Act (BPersVG), for the BfV according to § 87 BPersVG. This is to ensure the effective fulfillment of tasks and the necessary confidentiality. There are no corresponding restrictions for the MAD.

Judicial control

The actions of the federal intelligence services are generally subject to judicial control. According to Section 40 of the Administrative Court Regulations (VwGO), administrative judicial channels are open for actions and applications against the intelligence services because a public-law dispute of a non-constitutional nature is to be assumed. Anyone can lodge an objection ( preliminary proceedings ) against official decisions ( administrative acts ) of the intelligence services . A notice of objection is issued by the respective intelligence service itself, because all federal intelligence services are higher federal authorities ( Section 73, Paragraph 1, Clause 2, No. 2 VwGO). Furthermore, an action for rescission or an obligation ( § 42 VwGO) can be filed. The refusal of a request for information because the refusal is an administrative act are, for example, capable of appeal .

To enforce press information claims, a general performance suit is required . If the illegality of a measure, for example a G 10 measure , is to be determined, an action for a declaratory judgment ( Section 43 VwGO) is admissible. However, there is the practical problem here that those affected generally only find out about the measure after the measure has been completed and sometimes never know about it ( Section 12 G10).

Those involved in the proceedings have the right to inspect files ( Section 100 VwGO) and the negotiations are public ( Section 169 VwGO). If the supreme supervisory authority refuses to submit documents for reasons of confidentiality at its due discretion, the legality of the withholding can be enforced in an in-camera procedure ( Section 99 VwGO) at the request of one of the parties involved and if the court of the main issue considers the withheld documents to be relevant to the decision "Specialist senates for in-camera proceedings" ( Section 189 VwGO) set up specifically by the higher administrative courts and the Federal Administrative Court . The blocked documents must be submitted to the specialist senates in full and without blackening, which is in line with the rule of law.

The Cologne Administrative Court is responsible for the BfV and the MAD, both of which are based in Cologne . The special feature of the BND is that, in accordance with Section 50 (1) No. 4 VwGO, the Federal Administrative Court has jurisdiction in the first and last instance. For disputes against measures under Article 10 law that is Berlin administrative court jurisdiction because the G-10 are arranged measures for the intelligence services of the Federation of BMI, which has its first service based in Berlin. For damages claims from the violation of public law obligations is the ordinary courts in accordance with § 40 para. 2 Alt. 2 VwGO opened.

In principle, a constitutional complaint before the Federal Constitutional Court is also possible, including in the event of a violation of fundamental rights and exhaustion of legal recourse.

Other state control

Federal Audit Office

The Federal Audit Office exercises financial control over the federal intelligence services. The annual accounts as well as the budget and economic management are checked. The examination is carried out by the so-called college of three. It informs the trust committee, the PKGr, the Federal Ministry of Finance and the respective highest federal authorities about the examination results .

Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information

The Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI) has extensive information and access rights to the federal intelligence services to review the data protection regulations. He can formally complain about violations and submit the complaints to the German Bundestag in a report that appears every two years.

Independent body

The independent body is a three-person body located at the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) to monitor the lawfulness and necessity of the BND's international-foreign telecommunications intelligence .

Public control

media

The intelligence services are also monitored by the critical public and the media ( fourth power ), even if this is less effective than other government agencies due to the secret workings of the federal intelligence services. Investigative research and inquiries from the media as well as the resulting reporting have a great control effect. However, these are in some cases considerably restricted by criminal law regulations (such as on secrecy and treason ), as there is no legally regulated whistleblower protection in Germany .

Citizens' rights to information

There is no right to information under the Freedom of Information Act ( Section 3 No. 8). The federal intelligence services, however, notify the person concerned of any personal data stored in accordance with Section 15 (1) BVerfSchG (for the BND in conjunction with Section 22 BNDG or for the MAD in conjunction with Section 9 MADG ) Request for information free of charge, provided that it refers to a specific issue and shows a particular interest in information. The obligation to provide information does not extend to the origin of the data and the recipients of transmissions. ( Section 15 (3) BVerfSchG) Furthermore, the information can also be generally refused if the G10 Commission determines according to Section 12 G10 that a notification may be postponed permanently.

Right of petition

There is also the right, in accordance with Article 17 of the Basic Law, to address petitions to the Petitions Committee of the German Bundestag , without restriction for the intelligence services sector. On the basis of inquiries from citizens, but also on its own initiative, the Petitions Committee can request information about the federal intelligence services from the relevant departments.

criticism

The extensive control mechanisms ensure that the federal intelligence services act in accordance with the law. However, the complex control system also leads to considerable bureaucratic effort for the services and ties up staff who are lacking for the core intelligence mission. On the other hand, it is criticized that even the existing control mechanisms are not sufficient to ensure effective protection of fundamental rights (see for example under criticism of the PKGr ).

See also

literature

  • Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke , Kurt Graulich , Josef Ruthig : Federal Security Law - BPolG, BKAG, ATDG, BVerfSchG, BNDG, VereinsG . 2nd Edition. CH Beck, Munich 2019, ISBN 978-3-406-71602-7 .
  • Jan Hendrik Dietrich et. al .: Intelligence services in a democratic constitutional state . In: Contributions to security law and security policy . tape 1 . Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018, ISBN 978-3-16-155923-5 , p. 45-53 .
  • Jan-Hendrik Dietrich, Sven-R. Eiffler (Hrsg.): Handbook of the law of the intelligence services . Boorberg, Stuttgart 2017, ISBN 978-3-415-05921-4 .
  • Tobias Kumpf: The control of the intelligence services of the federal government - To reform the control of the intelligence services and to control the observation of the intelligence services of members of the Bundestag (=  constitutional law in research and practice . Volume 115 ). Dr. Kovač, Hamburg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8300-7873-9 .
  • Christoph Gröpl : The intelligence services in the regulations of the German security administration - legitimation, organization and delimitation issues . Diss. In: Series of publications on public law . tape 646 . Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1993.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c d Announcement of an organizational decree by the Federal Chancellor. (PDF) May 3, 1989, accessed December 19, 2018 .
  2. ^ Hans-Otto Kleinmann: Heinrich Krone diaries . In: Heinrich Krone diaries. First volume: 1945–1961, 1995 pp. XXII – XXV.
  3. ^ Bernadette Droste: Handbook of the constitution protection law . Boorberg, Stuttgart a. a. 2007, ISBN 978-3-415-03773-1 , pp. 670 f ., Annex 5 (full copy of the unpublished decree).
  4. ↑ a b Stefanie Waske: More liaison than control - the control of the BND by parliament and government 1955–1978 . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-16347-5 , p. 224 .
  5. ^ Bernadette Droste: Handbook of the constitution protection law . Boorberg, Stuttgart a. a. 2007, ISBN 978-3-415-03773-1 , pp. 612 , footnote 24 .
  6. ^ Bernadette Droste: Handbook of the constitution protection law . Boorberg, Stuttgart a. a. 2007, ISBN 978-3-415-03773-1 , pp. 672 f ., Appendix 6 (full copy of the unpublished decree).
  7. ^ Bernadette Droste: Handbook of the constitution protection law . Boorberg, Stuttgart a. a. 2007, ISBN 978-3-415-03773-1 , pp. 674 f ., Appendix 7 .
  8. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 298 .
  9. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 230 .
  10. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 308 .
  11. ^ Ritzel, Gerhard. In: Cabinet minutes of the federal government online. Federal Archives , accessed on May 6, 2020 .
  12. ↑ Uhrlaus' permanent representative was Ministerialdirigent Peter Staubwasser (as of October 13, 1999)
  13. ↑ Organization plan of the Federal Chancellery. (PDF) In: bundesregierung.de. August 15, 2019, accessed May 6, 2020 .
  14. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 92 .
  15. ^ Bachmann, Günter. In: Cabinet minutes of the federal government online. Federal Archives , accessed on May 6, 2020 .
  16. ^ Koester, Hans-Georg Walter von. In: Cabinet minutes of the federal government online. Federal Archives , accessed on May 6, 2020 .
  17. ↑ This was made up of state secretaries from the AA, BMI, BMJ, BMVg and BMB , chaired by the Chief Federal Committee .
  18. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 183 .
  19. ^ Schlichter, Franz. In: Cabinet protocols of the federal government online. Federal Archives , accessed on May 6, 2020 .
  20. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 193 .
  21. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 230-232 .
  22. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 247 .
  23. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 295 .
  24. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 316 .
  25. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 325 f .
  26. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 403 .
  27. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 164 .
  28. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 215 .
  29. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 274 .
  30. ↑ Thomas Knoll: The Bonn Federal Chancellery. Organization and functions from 1949–1999 . 1st edition. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2004, ISBN 978-3-531-14179-4 , pp. 379 .
  31. ↑ Decision recommendation and report of the 1st committee of inquiry according to Article 44 of the Basic Law. (PDF) In: http://www.bundestag.de/ . German Bundestag, June 18, 2009, p. 178 ff. , Accessed on December 19, 2018 .
  32. ↑ German Bundestag - Confidential Committee. In: http://www.bundestag.de/ . German Bundestag, accessed on December 17, 2018 .
  33. ↑ Committee according to Article 13 Paragraph 6 of the Basic Law. In: http://www.bundestag.de/ . German Bundestag, accessed on December 17, 2018 .
  34. ↑ Helmut R. Hammerich : "Always on the enemy!" - The Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) 1956–1990 . 1st edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , Göttingen 2019, ISBN 978-3-525-36392-8 , pp. 91 .
  35. ↑ Tobias Kumpf: The control of the intelligence services of the federal government - to reform the control of the intelligence services and to control the intelligence service observation of members of the Bundestag . Publishing house Dr. Kovac, Hamburg 2014, ISBN 978-3-8300-7873-9 , p. 219 f .
  36. ↑ a b c d Elisabeth Buchberger: Judicial legal protection against intelligence activities . In: Jan-Hendrik Dietrich et al. (Ed.): Intelligence services in the democratic constitutional state . tape 1 . Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018, ISBN 978-3-16-155923-5 , p. 107-124 .
  37. ↑ Helmut R. Hammerich : "Always on the enemy!" - The Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) 1956–1990 . 1st edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , Göttingen 2019, ISBN 978-3-525-36392-8 , pp. 90 .
  38. ↑ Helmut R. Hammerich : "Always on the enemy!" - The Military Counter-Intelligence Service (MAD) 1956–1990 . 1st edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht , Göttingen 2019, ISBN 978-3-525-36392-8 , pp. 101 .