Reich Concordat

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The 1933 Concordat between the Holy See and the German Reich ( RGBl. 1933 II, p. 679).

As Reich Concordat of on July 20, 1933 between is Holy See and the German Reich closed state church contract referred. The relationship between the Empire and the Roman Catholic Church was regulated in this international treaty . It is still valid.


The consequences of the Kulturkampf in Prussia , the overthrow of most of the European monarchies as a result of the First World War in 1918, the state reorganization of Europe according to the Paris suburb treaties and the regaining of state sovereignty of the Vatican through the Lateran treaties made it necessary for the Catholic Church to reorganize its international relations to regulate. The first comprehensive codification of Latin canon law in the Codex Iuris Canonici (CIC) of 1917 was a further motivation to relate external legal relationships to the CIC by means of concordats. Under Pope Pius XI. and his cardinal state secretary Pietro Gasparri , numerous concordats were concluded, among others with Latvia in 1922, Portugal in 1928, Italy in 1929 and Austria in 1933.

After earlier agreements on the relationship between state and churches in the Reich had lost their validity as a result of the November Revolution and the Weimar Constitution (WRV) of 1918/19, both the Holy See and politicians of the Catholic Center Party repeatedly tried to conclude them in the 1920s of a new concordat between the Holy See and the German Empire .

The apostolic nuncio in the German Empire, Eugenio Pacelli (who later became Pope Pius XII), was able to conclude concordats with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929) and Baden (1932) at the state level . On the imperial level, however, the negotiations failed for various reasons: With the unstable kingdom governments of the Weimar Republic difficult lengthy negotiations were on the one hand to lead, on the other hand, all governments refused constant, on the issue of religious schools , of religious education , the recognition only of church marriages "in Cases of moral emergency ”and the financial contributions of the state to the church according to Article 138 of the WRV to meet the demands of the Curia .

Negotiations and conclusion in 1933


Soon after the seizure of power by the Nazis under Adolf Hitler negotiations were resumed on a Reich Concordat. It is historically certain that the initiative came from the German government. On the other hand, there are doubts about when to contact us again. Heinrich Brüning reports in his memoir that Hitler and Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen had already offered the then chairman of the Center Party, Ludwig Kaas , the quick conclusion of a Reich Concordat at the beginning of March 1933 , should the Center approve the Enabling Act .

Historical research, however, often doubts these statements, since Brüning's memoirs from the time after his chancellorship are repeatedly determined by attempting personal justifications and his relationship with Kaas has also been considered badly shattered since autumn 1931. The “rally of the German bishops” of March 28, 1933, in which the episcopate relativized the previously valid warnings against the NSDAP, can be used as an indication of Brüning's presentation . On the one hand, this can be interpreted as an effort not to jeopardize upcoming concordat negotiations, but on the other hand, it can also be interpreted as the mere acceptance of the "unexpected peace offer" that Hitler made in his government declaration of March 23, 1933, in which he guaranteed the churches their rights and Christianity as " “the unshakable foundation of the moral and moral life of our people” that churches made. Already at the beginning of March 1933 Pope Pius XI. meanwhile revised his attitude to National Socialism. In several audiences, the Pope praised Hitler as a champion against Bolshevism and also took up the praise in a weakened form in a speech he delivered to the Roman consistory on March 13th. Although Pius was to change his stance again at the beginning of May under the impression of increasing state reprisals against Catholic politicians, officials and clergy in Germany, the positive view of Hitler's anti-communism improved the negotiating climate at the first explorations.

The negotiations

Franz von Papen publicly announced on April 2, 1933 that the Reich government was seeking to conclude a concordat. Later (even before 1945) von Papen always pointed out that the initiative within the Reich government came from him. The credibility of this claim is also controversial in research, but after the conclusion of the Concordat in 1933 the Holy See repeatedly pointed out, without being contradicted, that the initiative had in any case come from the ranks of the Reich government, whether through von Papen or another member, is not clear.

Hitler was very interested in the conclusion of a concordat. He hoped, similar to the provisions of the Italian Concordat of 1929, to be able to keep the clergy away from party political activity and, sooner or later, to be able to switch off the political representation of Catholics in the Reich, the Center Party, if National Socialism was shown to be church-friendly and thereby increasingly penetrate the Catholic voter pool.

The first round of negotiations took place in the Vatican at Easter 1933. The new Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli offered the German head of delegation von Papen, in accordance with the provisions of the CIC , can. 139, to restrict the political activities of the clergy to such an extent that they would de facto only have been possible with papal dispensation , which the Holy See largely wanted to forego. In return, the German Reich should go far to meet the Church in the question of denominational schools and religious instruction.

However, this offer did not go far enough for Hitler. He wanted to enforce a generally stipulated ban on political activity for clerics and was prepared to accept Pacelli's school-political demands to a large extent. The German bishops intervened against the pastors' complete withdrawal from the political arena and wanted the protection of the Catholic associations to be taken into account.

After the open street terror of the SA against the journeyman's day of the Kolping Society in Munich on June 11, 1933, the last demand appeared urgent. The bishops believed that only by guaranteeing the Catholic associations in a Concordat the dressing Catholicism before the DC circuit to save.

In the decisive second round of negotiations from July 6th to 8th in Rome, in addition to Pacelli, Alfredo Ottaviani , Giovanni Battista Montini , the Archbishop of Freiburg, Conrad Gröber, as representative of the German bishops and Ludwig Kaas, as representative of political Catholicism, took part on the Catholic side . On the German side, in addition to von Papen, Eugen Klee , Counselor of the German Embassy to the Holy See, and the Ministerial Director in the Interior Ministry, Rudolf Buttmann, were represented.

The conclusion of the contract

From left to right: Prelate Ludwig Kaas , Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen , Undersecretary of State Giuseppe Pizzardo , Cardinal State Secretary Eugenio Pacelli and Ministerial Director Rudolf Buttmann during the signing act (between Pacelli and Buttmann: Substitute Alfredo Ottaviani ), picture from the Federal Archives

The second round of negotiations worked out the text of the contract that was later adopted by July 1st. The German bishops advised Pacelli to accept it, presumably fearing that the German Catholics and the Catholic associations could be subject to even harsher repression if the concordat failed.

Von Papen obtained Hitler's approval for the draft on July 2nd. After the forced dissolution of the Bavarian People's Party and the Center Party on July 4th and 5th, the Holy See also no longer had any consideration for political Catholicism, and so the negotiating partners initialed it on July 8th.

On the same day, Hitler revoked all coercive measures against Catholic organizations and clergy in an ordinance, thus confirming the hopes that the Catholic side had placed in the Concordat.

The Reich Concordat was solemnly signed by Pacelli and von Papen in the Vatican on July 20, and ratification by the German Reich took place on September 10, 1933.

The contract

The Concordat regulates the mutual rights and obligations of the German Reich and the Catholic Church in the Reich territory.

Form of contract

The Concordat consists of three parts:

  • The negotiated results were written into 34 articles.
  • An additional protocol contains more detailed provisions on 13 articles.
  • For the planned introduction of general conscription, an appendix regulates the exemption of candidates for the priesthood from this military service and, in the event of mobilization, the inclusion of clerics , religious and priesthood candidates in the medical service.

While the negotiated results and the additional protocol were published, the appendix was kept secret because its regulations violated the Versailles Treaty .

A fourth part was to list the Catholic organizations protected under Article 31 and to be signed later; but that did not happen.

Content of the contract

The main agreements of the Concordat are:

  • Freedom to profess and practice the Catholic religion in public (Article 1)
  • Continuation of the Bavarian Concordat from 1924, the Prussian Concordat from 1929 and the Baden Concordat from 1932 (Article 2)
  • An ambassador of the German Empire will reside with the Holy See, a papal envoy in the capital of the empire . (Article 3)
  • free correspondence between the Holy See and all German Catholics (Article 4)
  • Clergymen receive the same protection from the state as state officials (Article 5)
  • Clerics and religious are free from the obligation to assume public office (Article 6)
  • Recognition of the nihil obstat by the state (Article 7)
  • no foreclosure on the clergy's official income (Article 8)
  • Protection of the "duty of pastoral secrecy" and thus u. a. the secret of confession (Article 9)
  • Spiritual clothing may only be worn by clergymen. Punished like the abuse of military uniforms (Article 10)
  • Preservation of the diocesan organization and circumscription and regulation in the event of new formations or changes (Article 11)
  • Regulation for the establishment or conversion of church offices (Article 12)
  • Church congregations and other church organizations are corporations under public law (Article 13)
  • Right of churches to levy church taxes (final protocol on Article 13)
  • Right of the church to freely occupy its offices, but state veto right ( political clause ) for newly appointed bishops, extension of the right to elect bishops for cathedral chapters based on the model of the Baden Concordat to the dioceses of Mainz, Rottenburg and Meißen, academic university education as a prerequisite for spiritual office ( Article 14)
  • Regulations on orders and religious cooperatives, in particular on the (German) citizenship of clerical superiors (Article 15)
  • Loyalty oath of the bishops "in the hand of the Reich Governor": "Before God and on the Holy Gospels I swear and promise, as befits a bishop, loyalty to the German Empire and the country. I swear and promise to respect the constitutional government and to have it respected by my clergy. In my dutiful concern for the well-being and interest of the German state, I will try to prevent any damage that could threaten it in the exercise of the spiritual office assigned to me. "(Article 16)
  • Protection of property, assets, rights and buildings for worship (Article 17)
  • State services to the church can only be abolished “by amicable agreement”. (Article 18)
  • Guarantee of the Catholic Theological Faculties (Article 19)
  • Right of the Church to Determine the Formation of the Clergy (Article 20)
  • Catholic religious education is a regular subject. (Article 21)
  • Catholic religion teachers may only be employed with the consent of the bishop. (Article 22)
  • Retention and establishment of Catholic denominational schools (Article 23)
  • Teacher to cath. Elementary schools must be the cath. Belong to the church and meet the requirements of the catholic Denominational school correspond; Establishment of institutions for the training of Catholic teachers (Article 24)
  • Establishment and management of private schools by religious orders and religious congregations (Article 25)
  • Permission for church weddings before civil weddings in danger of death and "cases of moral emergency" (Article 26)
  • Guarantee of independent ( exempt ) military chaplaincy under the direction of the Army Bishop (Article 27)
  • Approval or establishment of pastoral care in "hospitals, penal institutions and other public buildings" (Article 28)
  • Treatment cath. Members of "a non-German ethnic minority" such as those of "members of German descent and language" in the state of this minority (Article 29)
  • Obligation to pray on Sundays and public holidays "after the main service [...] for the well-being of the German Reich and the people" (Article 30)
  • Catholic associations may only be active within state associations, outside of them only for purely religious, purely cultural and charitable tasks. Which associations these are will be agreed later. State associations will not hinder religious behavior. (Article 31)
  • The Holy See issues regulations that exclude clergymen and religious from membership in political parties and “working for such parties”. (Article 32)
  • The Reich will make similar regulations for non-Catholic denominations. (Final Protocol on Article 32)

Content of the secret attachment

"In the event of a restructuring of the current German military system in the sense of the introduction of general conscription, the use of priests and other members of the religious and religious clergy to perform military service will be regulated in agreement with the Holy See according to the following guiding principles:

a) Philosophy and theology students in ecclesiastical institutions who are preparing for the priesthood are exempt from military service and the preparatory exercises, except in the case of general mobilization.

b) In the case of a general mobilization, the clergy who are employed in the diocesan administration or in the military chaplaincy are free from the provision. The ordinaries, the members of the ordinariats, the heads of the seminaries and church convicts, the seminar professors, the pastors, curates, rectors, coadjutors and the clergy, who permanently preside over a church with public worship, count as such.

c) The other clergy, if they are declared fit , join the armed forces of the state in order to devote themselves to pastoral care with the troops under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the army bishop , if they are not called up for medical service.

d) The other clerics in sacris or religious who are not yet priests are to be assigned to the medical service. The same should happen as far as possible with the candidates for the priesthood mentioned under a) who have not yet received the higher ordinations. "

Consequences of the Concordat

By concordat conclusion with the Holy See, the National Socialists succeeded in temporarily calming down many of their critics from political Catholicism and attenuating the widespread distrust of parts of the Catholic population against National Socialism, which they regarded as unchristian and hostile to the Church. At the same time, the Holy See had succeeded in strengthening the still young state sovereignty of the Vatican through international recognition at state level and in enforcing the demands of the Curia, which had always been rejected by the governments of the Weimar Republic.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Concordat, there were not a few voices from the camp of staunch National Socialists who saw the treaty as an unacceptable concession on the part of the government and in the following years called for the unilateral termination by the state. B. Joseph Roth (1897–1941) from the Reich Ministry of Churches . Your strategy might have achieved its goal if Hitler had not wanted to avoid open confrontations with the Church since the beginning of the war.

The detailed secret report by the Catholic priest Hans Barion (1899–1973), who teaches canon law at the State Academy in Braunsberg, on the Reich Concordat , which he drafted for Berlin ministerial circles in the summer of 1933 and which was rediscovered not so long ago, is likely to be unique . The National Socialist theologian not only tries to portray the Concordat as an eminent defeat of the state against the “political Catholicism” of the Roman Curia, but also makes subtle suggestions for an interpretation that is as friendly to the state as possible.

Overall, however, the Concordat is judged not only domestically but also internationally as a gain in prestige for Hitler that should not be underestimated. After the so-called seizure of power , the German Reich had succeeded in extending the Berlin treaty with the USSR and the new conclusion of the four-party pact before the conclusion of the Concordat, but the Concordat was still the greatest success of the up to then - also as a form of moral recognition National Socialist foreign policy.

The Concordat gave the Catholic associations a respite, as the repression against them actually subsided for a short time. Even if the National Socialists' struggle against association Catholicism was resumed a few weeks after the conclusion of the Concordat, the agreements in Article 31 protect the associations insofar as their membership decreased steadily due to pressure from the regime, but until the end of the regime perfect Gleichschaltung escaped and were able to preserve remnants of organizational autonomy. The political abstinence of the associations was, of course, a prerequisite for continued existence. In fact, the large social organizations, for example, increasingly withdrew into the interior of the church. The officially non-denominational, but Catholic Christian unions, which were then dissolved in the spring of 1933, did not fall under the Concordat.

The departure of the Vatican from political Catholicism led to the end of the Catholic parties Zentrum and BVP even before the signing of the Concordat. The additional ban on the clergy to get involved in political parties (Article 32) also deprived political Catholicism of this last opportunity to express itself. However, it protected the pastors and clergy from participating in the NSDAP and also worked here as a means of avoiding the co-ordination of the Catholic Church, a consequence that the Nazi regime certainly had not intended.

How the Concordat and its consequences should be viewed politically in retrospect is historically controversial. All positions are represented between express criticism and decidedly positive assessment, depending on how the real extent of the international and domestic political impact and the scope of action of those involved is assessed. Sometimes the ideological point of view plays a role in the assessment.

Post concordat period

It was only when the National Socialists broke more and more parts of the Concordat agreements or simply ignored them that there was open criticism in the German episcopate. Previously, the bishops had largely remained silent and refrained from intervening in favor of threatened Catholic associations and daily newspapers, often on the grounds that the situation of the Catholics would not be made worse by public opposition to Hitler by the bishops. But there were also pastors like the Freiburg Archbishop Gröber , who sympathized with National Socialist politics and therefore considered the repression against Catholic associations and daily newspapers to be merely “excesses of subordinate party offices”. Since the end of 1935 there were violent disputes between parts of the Catholic Church and the Hitler government over the school system, the medals and the persecution of clergymen in the foreign exchange and morality trials. The criticism of the Nazi church policy finally culminated in the encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge (1937) by Pope Pius XI. In it, Pius accused the National Socialists of "making the reinterpretation of the contract, the circumvention of the contract, the erosion of the contract, and finally the more or less public breach of contract the unwritten law of action". The protest remained largely ineffective, however.

Continuation of the contract after 1945

After the Second World War it was initially disputed whether the Reich Concordat would continue to exist because the denominational school prescribed it. During the preliminary discussions on Article 7 of the Basic Law (school system and religious instruction), repeated applications were made to incorporate the provisions of the Reich Concordat into the Basic Law. However, the motions did not get through, and the term Catholic religious instruction, which is emphasized in the Reich Concordat, was not used in the Basic Law. As Carlo Schmid reported in his memoirs, the “Nazi-friendly attitude of certain parts of the Catholic hierarchy in Germany” was also discussed during the time of National Socialism . After all, the problem was hidden in the general formulation of Article 123 of the Basic Law on the continued validity of law and contracts. This Basic Law article declared all state treaties concluded by the German Reich to be valid if they met certain formal requirements. The Reich Concordat was implicitly recognized with Article 123, Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law, without having to be listed. According to Schmid, one of the reasons was that if the Concordat continued to apply, the bishoprics in the eastern areas of the German Empire would be treated by the Vatican as bishoprics in Germany as long as they were only under Polish administration but had not (yet) been formally ceded .

When the state of Lower Saxony passed a new school law that contradicted the agreements of the Reich Concordat, there were differences of opinion between Lower Saxony and the federal government , which therefore appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court in March 1955 .

The concordat judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court

In response to a complaint from the Apostolic Nuncio Aloysius Muench , the Federal Government requested that the Federal Constitutional Court determine that the Reich Concordat of July 20, 1933 remained unchanged law in the Federal Republic of Germany and that the State of Lower Saxony by enacting Sections 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8–15 of the law on public schools in Lower Saxony of September 14, 1954, violated the Reich Concordat, which was transformed into federal law, and thus violated the right of the federal government to respect the international treaties that are binding on it. The government of the State of Lower Saxony applied for the federal government's application to be rejected. The state governments of Bremen and Hesse joined the proceedings and applied for the federal government's applications to be rejected.

The files of the Foreign Office and the Reich Chancellery relating to the Concordat were submitted by order of the court. Oral negotiations took place from June 4 to 8, 1956. The state of Hesse submitted a request for evidence, whereupon the court ordered the federal government to submit all its correspondence with the Holy See regarding the Reich Concordat.

In the subsequent concordat judgment of March 26, 1957, the Federal Constitutional Court found that, as a national court, it could not decide the validity of international law between the contracting parties (external relationship). But it could measure the domestic effectiveness against the standard of the Basic Law. The Reich Concordat was validly concluded, the announcement in the Reichsgesetzblatt by Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler, Reich Minister of the Foreign Baron von Neurath and Reich Minister of the Interior Frick took place on September 12, 1933.

The court initially determined that the Federal Republic of Germany is identical to the German Reich in terms of international law (see legal position of the German Reich after 1945 ). Since despite the massive breaches of contract on the part of Nazi-ruled Germany, the Concordat was never terminated, but rather these violations were reprimanded, the Concordat continues to exist and binds the Federal Republic. Although it was concluded on the basis of the National Socialist Enabling Act and thus did not come about in the process provided for by the Weimar Imperial Constitution , the way it came about was, as with other pre-constitutional law, harmless, since the National Socialist tyranny had actually already prevailed at this point in time.

Because the Basic Law assigns legislative competence for school law exclusively to the states , the regulations of the Reich Concordat have become state law in this respect . The question is, therefore, whether the federal states are prevented by federal law from changing these state legal regulations in contradiction to the international legal obligations.

Article 123 (2) of the Basic Law, which contained the state treaties concluded by the German Reich , was created with regard to the Reich Concordat. The constitution has not recognized its binding force; but he did not refuse her either. The continued validity of the Reich Concordat had remained open because its validity and binding nature had been questioned and because it was left to the parties involved to assert rights and objections to the content of the contract.

Rather, the Basic Law - in contrast to the Weimar Constitution - deliberately assigned school law exclusively to the Länder. Article 7 of the Basic Law and Article 141 of the Basic Law (the so-called Bremen Clause ) finally enumerated the federal law commitments according to the will of the Parliamentary Council . This already results from the fact that the “Bremen Clause” violates the Reich Concordat and therefore cannot oblige the states to comply with it at the same time. As a result, the federal states are not obliged to comply with the school regulations of the Concordat. Therefore, the application of the federal government with the decision formula:

"The application of the federal government is rejected."


Summary of the legal situation and criticism

In summary, the legal situation is such that the Reich Concordat binds the federal government and the states under international law. The Basic Law, however, in this respect contradicts international law , has given the states the opportunity to deviate from these regulations. If they do, they may be acting contrary to international law, but the federal government cannot prevent this. According to domestic law, the states are even obliged to do so if provisions of the Reich Concordat contradict national constitutional law.

The Reich Concordat is sometimes referred to as the only foreign policy agreement from the time of the National Socialist German Reich that is still valid today, but this is doubtful in view of other international agreements from this time. In any case, numerous even older agreements, for example from the time of the Empire and the Weimar Republic, continue to apply .

In addition to the circumstances in which the Concordat came about, critics claim above all that it undermines the separation of state and church . Article 18 of the Concordat continues state services to the Catholic Church and is thus in contradiction to Article 138 of the Weimar Constitution, which continues through Article 140 of the Basic Law and demands that the " state services based on law, treaty or special legal titles to religious societies through the state legislation "should be replaced, which has not happened in the more than 100 years that have passed since the promulgation of the Weimar Constitution. However, this is countered by another party that replacing the state benefits does not mean letting them be dropped without replacement, but instead placing them on a new legal basis.

Practical Consequences of the Concordat

Loyalty oath of Cologne Archbishop Rainer Maria Woelki before the North Rhine-Westphalian Prime Minister Hannelore Kraft and State Secretary Jacqueline Kraege as the representative of the State of Rhineland-Palatinate on September 18, 2014

The practical consequences of the Concordat into the 21st century will grow and a. out:

  • Article 7: If the missio canonica and thus the nihil obstat are withdrawn from a theology professor, a new position must usually be set up for him at the university concerned or a suitable vacancy must be found.
  • Article 9: No access by courts and authorities to the knowledge of clergy who fall under the "duty of pastoral secrecy".
  • Article 13: Immediate retention of church tax.
  • Article 16: Before taking office, every new bishop has to take the oath of allegiance to the Prime Minister.
  • Article 22: Catholic religion teachers lose their permission to teach religion and, if applicable, their official / employee status, if the bishop withdraws the missio canonica .
  • Article 27: For the military chaplaincy , expenses for personnel, business operations, vehicles and premises are covered from the defense budget.
  • Article 31, last sentence: In principle, no events (e.g. football matches) during the main worship services.
  • Secret appendix, paragraph a): Candidates for the priesthood are exempt from basic military service in the Bundeswehr .


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Web links

Historical discussion

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Heinrich Brüning: Memoirs 1918–1934. Stuttgart 1970, p. 655 f.
  2. Assessment of Cardinal Faulhaber in a letter to the Bishop of Linz Gföllner, quoted from Bernhard Stasiewski (ed.): Files of German Bishops. Volume I, p. 48.
  3. Carsten Nikolaisen (ed.): Documents on the church policy of the Third Reich. Volume I: The year 1933, Munich 1971, p. 24.
  4. Thies Schulze: Anti-Communism as a political guide of the Vatican? The Holy See and the Nazi regime in 1933 , in: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 60/3 (2012), pp. 353–379.
  5. ^ Nikolaisen: Documents I, 103.
  6. Alfons Kupper (ed.): State files on the Reichskonkordatverhandlungen 1933 , Mainz 1969, pp. 384–407.
  7. Vatican: Text of the Reich Concordat
  8. ^ Lothar Schöppe: Concordates since 1800 , Frankfurt am Main / Berlin 1964, p. 35.
  9. See H. Kreutzer, The Reich Church Ministry in the Structure of National Socialist Rule , Düsseldorf 2000.
  10. Thomas Marschler : Canon Law in the Bannkreis Carl Schmitt: Hans Barion before and after 1945 , Verlag nova et vetera, Bonn 2004, ISBN 3-936741-21-2 .
  11. See Karl Egon Lönne: Catholicism Research. In: GG 1/2000, pp. 128-170, especially pp. 161-170.
  12. ^ Carlo Schmid: Memories , Goldmann Verlag, 1981, p. 386 f.
  13. BVerfGE 6, 309 - Reich Concordat
  14. ^ Rolf Hosfeld / Hermann Pölking: The Germans 1918 to 1945. Life between revolution and catastrophe , Piper, 2009, ISBN 978-3-492-04925-2 , p. 251.
  15. Cf. only Roman agreement for the standardization of rules on security seizure of aircraft of May 29, 1933 (RGBl. 1935 II, p. 301), in force since January 12, 1937, mutual assistance agreement with Greece of May 11, 1938 (RGBl. 1939 II, p. 848) and the agreement with Denmark of June 17, 1936 (RGBl. II, p. 213); on this, for example, the collection of texts by Jayme / Hausmann, Internationales Privatrecht , 14th edition, Munich 2009.
  16. § 12 WPflG