Battle of Warsaw (1920)
Polish defense positions in Miłosna near Warsaw
| date | August 13 to August 25, 1920 |
|---|---|
| place | Warsaw |
| output | Victory of the Polish Army |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 7 armies with a total of 32 divisions : 46,000 infantry 2,000 Kavalleristen 730 machine guns 192 artillery - batteries some armor units (mainly Renault FT ). |
4th Army , 3rd Cavalry Corps, 15th Army , 3rd Army , 16th Army , Cavalry Army. 114,000 men in total |
| losses | |
|
4,500 killed, |
10,000 dead |
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The Battle of Warsaw (sometimes referred to as the Miracle on the Vistula , in Polish Cud nad Wisłą ) was the decisive battle in the Polish-Soviet War , which began shortly after the end of the First World War and ended with the Peace of Riga .
The Battle of Warsaw was fought from August 13-25, 1920, when Red Army forces marched on the Polish capital of Warsaw and the nearby Modlin Fortress under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky . On August 16, the Polish armed forces, under the command of Józef Piłsudski, carried out a counterattack from the south, which forced the Soviet troops to make an unorganized retreat east across the Memel . An estimated 10,000 Red Army soldiers were killed, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 66,000 taken prisoner of war . On the Polish side, 4,500 soldiers were killed, 10,000 missing and 22,000 wounded.
Before the Polish victory on the Vistula , both the Bolsheviks and the majority of foreign experts saw Poland on the verge of defeat. The overwhelming and unexpected Polish victory severely weakened the Red Army. In the months that followed, further Polish victories were achieved, Poland's eastern border pushed far to the east and Poland's independence secured in the Riga Peace Treaty .
The battle
The battle plans
The Polish battle plan
In the course of the successful Soviet counteroffensive from May 1920, the Western Army Group of the Red Army under Mikhail Tukhachevsky captured Minsk on July 11 and Hrodna on July 19 . On July 28th the Soviets reached Białystok and three days later the Brest fortress was taken. The withdrawal of the Polish forces from the northeast was initially disorderly and was only carried out in a more organized manner from the beginning of August.
At first, Józef Piłsudski wanted to establish his counter-operation on the Western Bug and in Brest , but the unexpected fall of the fortress thwarted this plan. On the night of August 5th to 6th, Piłsudski came up with a revised plan in the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw . This plan called the Polish forces to retreat across the Vistula and to defend the bridgeheads near Warsaw and the Wieprz . About 25 percent of the available divisions should be concentrated in the south for a strategic counterattack.
Furthermore, Piłsudski's plan for the 1st and 2nd armies of General Józef Haller's central troop units (10½ divisions ) provided a passive role in which they opposed the Soviet frontal attacks on Warsaw from the east and should keep their trench positions at all costs. At the same time, the 5th Army (5½ divisions) under General Władysław Sikorski , who was subordinate to General Haller, was to defend the northern area near the Modlin Fortress and, if necessary, strike behind Warsaw. This was intended to cut off Soviet forces attempting to circle Warsaw from that direction. Furthermore, the 5th Army was to break through the opposing front to invade the rear of the northwestern Soviet front. An additional five divisions of the 5th Army were to defend Warsaw from the north. General Franciszek Latinik's 1st Army was supposed to defend Warsaw itself, while General Bolesław Roja's 2nd Army was supposed to hold the front on the Vistula from Góra Kalwaria to Dęblin .
The most important role, however, was a relatively small (about 20,000 men), newly formed "reserve army" (also storm group ( Polish Grupa Uderzeniowa )), which was personally commanded by Józef Piłsudski and in which the combat-experienced and determined Polish units from the southern Front were pulled together. They were supported by General Leonard Skierski's 4th Army and General Zygmunt Zieliński's 3rd Army, which after retreating from the Western Bug region did not withdraw directly towards Warsaw, but crossed the Wieprz and lost contact with their pursuers. The task of the storm group was to spearhead a rapid northern offensive from the Vistula-Wieprz triangle south of Warsaw, where the Polish secret service had identified a weak point between the Soviet western and southwestern fronts. This blow would cut off supplies and disrupt its movements to the Soviet western front. Ultimately, the gap between General Sikorski's 5th Army and the advancing assault group on the East Prussian border was supposed to close and thus include the Soviet offensive.
Although the plan was based on fairly reliable information from Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio messages , it was described as "amateur" by many high-ranking officers and military experts who were quick to highlight Piłsudski's lack of formal military training. Just a week before the planned counterattack, many Polish units fought in places 150 to 250 km from the assembly points. All troop movements should take place within striking distance of the Red Army. A strong push by the Red Army could destroy plans for a Polish counterattack and jeopardize the cohesion of the entire Polish front. Piłsudski's plan was also criticized by the Polish commanders and officers of the French military mission . Even Piłsudski later admitted in his memoirs that the plan was a dangerous game and that the reasons for the decision to stick with the plan were the defeatist attitudes of the politicians, concerns about the security of the capital and the prevailing sentiment when Warsaw would fall, all would be lost. Only the desperate situation and the realization that under these circumstances it was the only way to avoid the crushing defeat convinced the other commanders to follow the plan. Ironically, when the plan "accidentally" fell into the hands of the Soviets, it was mistaken for a poor attempt at deception and ignored in what turned out to be a mistake.
There is controversy over the authorship of the plan. Because of Piłsudski's political ideas, he was highly unpopular with the right wing of Polish politics. Because of this, after the battle, many journalists claimed that the plan was actually prepared either by the French General Maxime Weygand or by the Polish chief of staff Tadeusz Rozwadowski . According to the latest scientific findings, the French military mission in Poland only proposed a minor tactical counter-offensive by two divisions towards Mińsk Mazowiecki . This was intended to push the Bolshevik forces back by 20 kilometers in order to subsequently reach negotiations for a ceasefire. On the other hand, General Rozwadowski's plan envisaged a deep advance into the Russian lines from the Wieprz area. In contrast, Piłsudski proposed a large-scale operation in which large parts of the forces were used to hit the enemy instead of just pushing them back. The plan was rejected by the French Military Mission, which did not believe the Polish army could regroup after a 600-kilometer retreat.
The Soviet battle plan
Mikhail Tukhachevsky planned to bypass and encircle Warsaw by crossing the Vistula near Włocławek and then deploying his troops north and south of the city and starting the attack from the northwest. Here the cavalry corps under Gaik Bschischkjan should achieve the breakthrough as a mobile shock force. He intended to repeat the classic maneuver of Ivan Paskewitsch with his 24 divisions , who had crossed the Vistula near Thorn during the November uprising in 1831 and reached Warsaw with practically no resistance. This train would also cut off Polish forces from Danzig , the only open port for the shipment of arms and supplies.
The greatest weakness of the Soviet plan was the poorly defended southern flank, which was only secured by the Pripyat swamps and the weak Mosyr group ( Мозырская группа ) named after the place Mosyr ; most of the Soviet southwestern front was engaged in the battle for Lviv . Tukhachevsky knew about this weak point, but several factors pushed him to take this risk. On the one hand, the orders of the political leadership were clear. Lenin expected the revolution to spread in the industrialized countries of Europe. Poland, as Russia's bridge to the West, should therefore be captured as quickly as possible. Furthermore, reports from the Soviet secret service spoke of a coming upheaval in Poland, which only needs a push from the Red Army. On the other hand, the military situation also urged us to act as quickly as possible, as Tukhachevsky knew that the Polish troops were getting stronger every day through conscription and the formation of volunteer units. Experience in the civil war also played a role. As discipline and morale declined, the White Armies had become weaker and weaker the more they were pushed away from their destination Moscow. The fact that the Poles were comparatively very orderly and with numerous retreat battles inland was ignored in view of the rapid advance on Warsaw.
The first phase, August 12th
In the meantime the Bolsheviks advanced. Gaik Bschischkjan's cavalry corps crossed the Wkra together with the 4th Army and marched towards Włocławek . The 15th and 3rd Armies were approaching Modlin Fortress, and the 16th Army was moving towards Warsaw.
The attack on Warsaw began on August 12th with the attack of the 16th Army on the city of Radzymin , which is only 23 kilometers east of Warsaw. The initial success of this attack prompted Piłsudski to postpone his plans for 24 hours.
On August 13, the Red Army launched a frontal attack on the bridgehead in Praga . During the heavy fighting, Radzymin changed hands several times, and foreign diplomats , with the exception of the British ambassador and the representative of the Vatican , hastily left Warsaw. On August 14, the village fell to the Red Army and the lines of General Władysław Sikorski's 5th Army were broken. The 5th Army had to fight three Soviet armies at the same time: the 3rd, 4th and 15th Armies. The area around Modlin was reinforced with reserve troops (the Polish 5th Rifle Division, known as the Siberian Brigade, and Franciszek Krajowski's 18th Infantry Division - both battle-tested elite troops) so that the 5th Army could hold the position until morning.
The situation could be secured at midnight when the 203rd Uhlans - Regiment break through the Bolshevik lines and transmission towers of the Soviet fourth army of Alexander Schuwajew could destroy. This unit had only one remaining transmission mast, which was permanently set to a frequency that was already known to the Polish secret service. Since the Polish secret service did not want the Bolsheviks to know that their codes had been cracked, but the other transmission tower was still to be neutralized, the transmission tower in Warsaw broadcast the book Genesis in Polish and Latin on the 4th Army frequency. The 4th Army then lost contact with their headquarters and continued their march on Thorn and Płock , as Tukhachevski's order to move south did not reach them. The surprise attack of the 203rd Uhlans is sometimes referred to by the Polish side as the miracle of Ciechanów .
At the same time, the Polish 1st Army under General Franciszek Latinik resisted the Red Army's attack on Warsaw with six rifle divisions. The struggle for control in Radzymin forced General Józef Haller, commander of the Polish Northern Front , to start the counterattack of the 5th Army earlier than planned.
During this time, Piłsudski completed his counter-offensive plans. He decided to personally lead the attack and, due to the great risks involved, had already signed a letter resigning from all public office. Then, between August 13th and 15th, he visited all units of the 4th Army, which was located near Puławy , about 100 kilometers south of Warsaw. He tried to strengthen the fighting morale of the soldiers, as many soldiers were tired and demoralized as the numerous recent replacements showed everyone the extent of the Polish losses. Resupplying was a nightmare as the Polish Army was armed with guns from five and rifles from six different countries, each requiring different ammunition. In addition, the equipment was in poor condition. Piłsudski remembers: “In the 21st Division, almost half of the soldiers went to roll call barefoot.” Nevertheless, Piłsudski managed to raise the morale of his troops in just three days and motivate them to do one of their greatest efforts.
The second phase, August 14th
The 27th Infantry Division of the Red Army managed to reach the municipality of Izabelin , 13 kilometers from the capital. The Russian forces were not to get any closer to the city of Warsaw, however, and the course of the battle would soon change.
Tukhachevsky assumed everything went according to his plan, but in reality he fell into Piłsudski's trap. The Russian advance across the Vistula to the north ran into an empty operational area in which there were no significant Polish troops. On the other hand, Tukhachevsky only set up symbolic forces south of Warsaw to secure the vital connection between the north-western and south-western fronts. The Mosyr group entrusted with this task numbered only 8,000 soldiers. Another mistake neutralized the 1st Budjonny Cavalry Corps , which was greatly feared by Piłsudski and other Polish commanders. Due to Tukhachevsky's insistence, the Soviet High Command ordered the 1st Cavalry Corps to march from the south to Warsaw. Budjonny did not carry out this order, however, because of a vine between the commanders of the southwestern front, General Yegorov and Tukhachevsky. In addition, the political games of Stalin , at the time war commissioner, encouraged the disobedience of Egorov and Budyonny. Stalin, in search of personal fame, wanted to conquer the already besieged industrial center of Lviv instead of coming to the aid of Tukhachevsky as ordered. Ultimately, Budjonny's troops attacked Lviv instead of Warsaw, thereby missing the battle for Warsaw. Tukhachevsky later wrote:
"If Stalin and the illiterate Budyonny had not waged their own war in Galicia, the Red Army would not have suffered the defeat that forced us to sign the Peace of Riga."
The Polish 5th Army began the counterattack on August 14th by crossing the Wkra . It faced the combined forces of the Soviet 3rd and 15th Armies (both numerically and technically superior). The battle for Nasielsk lasted until August 15 and ended with the complete destruction of the city. However, the Soviet advance on Warsaw and Modlin was stopped on the evening of August 15 and the Polish troops were able to retake Radzymin on that day, which gave a great boost to the morale of the Polish troops.
From that moment on, General Sikorski's 5th Army drove the exhausted Soviet units away from Warsaw in a lightning-war operation. Sikorski's units, accompanied by the majority of the few Polish tanks , armored vehicles, and artillery from the two armored trains , advanced at a speed of 30 kilometers per day and soon shattered Soviet hopes of completing their containment maneuver from Warsaw to the north.
The third phase, August 16
On August 16, the Polish reserve army , commanded by Józef Piłsudski, began to march north from Wieprz . She faced the Mosyr Group , a Soviet corps that had defeated the Poles during the Kiev operation a few months earlier. However, the Mosyr Group had lost most of its forces in the pursuit of the retreating Polish armies and had been reduced to just two divisions, covering a 150-kilometer front line on the left flank of the Soviet 16th Army. On the first day of the counter-offensive reported only one of five Polish divisions of defense, while the other four with the support of a Cavalry - Brigade were able to advance without resistance 45 kilometers north. In the evening, the city of Włodawa was recaptured by the Polish forces and the communications and supply links of the Soviet 16th Army were interrupted. Piłsudski was surprised by the extent of this quick success. The units of the reserve army were able to advance about 70 kilometers in 36 hours without significant resistance and in doing so split the Soviet offensive. The Mosyr group consisted only of the 57th Infantry Division, which was defeated on the first day of the operation. As a result, the Polish forces were able to take advantage of the large gap in the Soviet front for their northward offensive, pursue the surprised and confused enemy with two armies and defeat him.
On August 18, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, at his headquarters in Minsk , about 470 kilometers east of Warsaw, realized the full extent of his defeat and ordered his remaining troops to withdraw and regroup. He intended to tighten the front, stop the Polish offensive and regain the initiative. However, his orders came too late or not at all. The 3rd Cavalry Corps of General Gaik Bschischkjan continued its advance towards Pomerania , with its sides being threatened by the Polish 5th Army. The 5th Army finally managed to push back the Bolshevik armies and now go into a chase. In order to cut off the enemy's routes of retreat, the Polish 1st Division of this legion undertook a remarkable march from Lubartów to Białystok - 262 kilometers in six days. The soldiers fought in two battles, slept only a few hours and marched up to 21 hours a day. Their sacrifice and perseverance were rewarded by cutting off the entire 16th Soviet Army at Białystok and taking most of the soldiers prisoner.
The Soviet armies in the center of the front fell into chaos. Some divisions continued their struggle in the direction of Warsaw, others turned to withdraw, lost their cohesion and panicked. The Russian commander-in-chief lost contact with most of his forces, and all Soviet plans were overturned. Only the 15th Army maintained its order and tried to carry out Tukhachevsky's order to cover the retreat of the western expanded 4th Army. But the 15th Army was defeated twice between August 19th and 20th, joining the defeated Red Army on the northwestern front. Tukhachevsky had no choice but to retreat completely over the Western Bug . All organized resistance disappeared by August 21, and by August 31, the forces of the Soviet Southwest Front had been completely routed.
Aftermath of the battle
Although Poland won and the Russians were pushed back, Piłsudski's plan to outmaneuver and orbit the Red Army was not entirely successful. Four Soviet armies began marching on Warsaw on July 4th within the north-western front. At the end of August, the 4th and 15th Armies were defeated in the field, their remaining soldiers crossed the Prussian border and were disarmed. However, these troops were released and soon fought against Poland again. The 3rd Army retreated eastward so quickly that the Polish troops could not keep up; accordingly this army suffered the least losses. The 16th Army disintegrated at Białystok , and most of its soldiers became prisoners of war . The majority of Gaik Bschischkjan's 3rd Cavalry Corps was driven across the German border and interned in East Prussia .
The Soviet losses amounted to 10,000 dead, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 65,000 prisoners of war, on the Polish side there were about 4,500 dead, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing. Between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet soldiers were able to reach the border with Germany . After crossing the border with East Prussia, they were briefly interned , then allowed to leave with their weapons and equipment. Poland captured about 231 artillery - guns and 1,023 machine guns .
The southern arm of the Red Army was routed and no longer posed a threat to the Poles. Budjonny's 1st Cavalry Corps, which besieged Lviv , was defeated in the Battle of Komarów on August 31, 1920 and in the Battle of Hrubieszów . In mid-October the Polish army reached the Ternopil - Dubno - Minsk - Drissa line .
Tukhachevsky succeeded in reorganizing his evasive forces in an easterly direction, and he was able to form a new line of defense at Hrodna . In the Battle of the Memel between September 15 and 21, the Polish army was able to defeat the Red Army again and break through the line of defense. After the Battle of Szczara , both armies were exhausted and on October 12, under great pressure from France and Great Britain, an armistice was signed. On October 18, the fighting stopped and on March 18, 1921, the Treaty of Riga was signed, ending hostilities.
Before the Battle of Warsaw, Soviet propaganda had marked the fall of the Polish capital as imminent, and the foreseeable fall of Warsaw was intended to signal the widespread communist revolutions in Poland, Germany, and other European countries that were economically torn by the First World War lay. The Soviet defeat thus put a damper on some Soviet officials, including Vladimir Lenin.
The National Democratic MP in the Sejm , Stanisław Stroński, coined the phrase miracle on the Vistula ( Polish : Cud nad Wisłą ) to express his displeasure with Piłsudski's "Ukrainian adventure". Stroński's idiom was acclaimed by patriotic and devout Poles who were unaware of Stroński's ironic undertone.
Deciphering the Soviet secret codes
According to documents that were found in the Polish central military archive in 2005, Polish cryptologists from Biuro Szyfrów (German: “Chiffrenbüro”) succeeded in deciphering intercepted Russian secret codes as early as September 1919. At least a few Polish victories, not only in the Battle of Warsaw, but in the entire campaign, can be attributed to this circumstance. Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski , to whom this success was attributed, received the order Virtuti Militari in 1921 .
Battle orders
Polish order of battle
3 fronts ( Northern, Central, Southern ), 7 armies with a total of 32 divisions: 46,000 infantrymen; 2,000 cavalrymen; 730 machine guns; 192 artillery batteries; and some armored units (mainly FT ).
| Northern front Haller |
Central front Rydz-Śmigły |
Iwaszkiewicz south front |
|---|---|---|
| 5th Army Sikorski |
4th Army Skierski |
6th Army Jędrzejewski |
| 1st Army Latinik |
3rd Army Zieliński |
Ukrainian Army Petlyura |
| 2nd Army Roja |
Fronts:
- Northern front: 250 km, from East Prussia, along the Vistula, to Modlin:
- 5th Army
- 1st Army - Warsaw
- 2nd Army - Warsaw
- Central front:
- Southern front - between Brody and the Dniester
Soviet order of battle
| northwestern front Tukhachevsky |
|---|
| 4th Shuwayev Army |
| 3rd Cavalry Corps Gaik Bshishkjan |
| 15th Army cork |
| 3rd Army Lazarevich |
| 16th Army Sollogub |
| Budyonny Cavalry Army |
See also
Movie
- 1920 - The Last Battle ( 1920 Bitwa Warszawska , POL 2011, directed by Jerzy Hoffman )
Remarks
- ↑ Janusz Odziemkowski . Wojna Polski z Rosją Sowiecką, 1919-1920 (Poland's war with Soviet Russia, 1919-1920) . In: Mówią Wieki. 2/2005, pp. 46-58.
- ↑ Bernd Ulrich: Line under cruel murder . Deutschlandradio Kultur, 2006
- ↑ Paweł Wroński: Sensacyjne odkrycie: Never było cudu nad Wisłą . In: Gazeta Wyborcza , August 5, 2005.
- ^ Jan Bury: Polish Codebreaking during the Russo-Polish War of 1919-1920 . In: Cryptologia . Vol. 28, No. 3, July 2004. ISSN 0161-1194 .
literature
- Isaak Babel : The cavalry army (Budjonny's cavalry army). Malik, Berlin 1926; from d. Soot. new translation, ed. u. come over. v. Peter Urban. Friedenauer Presse, Berlin 1994 (Orig. I. Babel: Konarmija. Moskva - Leningrad 1926). ISBN 3-921592-84-4 .
- Edgar Vincent D'Abernon : The Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World, Warsaw 1920 . Hyperion Press, Westport Conn 1977. ISBN 0-88355-429-1 .
- Norman Davies : White Eagle, Red Star, the Polish-Soviet War, 1919-20 . Pimlico, London 2003. ISBN 0-7126-0694-7 .
- John Frederick Charles Fuller : The Decisive Battles of the Western World . Eyre & Spottiswoode, London 1954, Cassell, London 2001. ISBN 0-304-35868-1 .
- Jeremy Keenan : The Pole: the Heroic Life of Józef Piłsudski . Duckworth, London 2004. ISBN 0-7156-3210-8 .
- Richard M. Watt : Bitter Glory, Poland and Its Fate, 1918-1939 . Hippocrene Books, New York 1998. ISBN 0-7818-0673-9 .
- Marek Tarczyński : Cud nad Wisłą. Bitwa warszawska 1920 . Inst. Wydawn. Związków Zawod. Warsaw 1990.
- Józef Piłsudski : Pisma zbiorowe . Warsaw 1937, Krajowa Agencja Wydawn, Warsaw 1991 (Neudr.). ISBN 83-03-03059-0 .
- Mikhail Nikolajewitsch Tukhachevsky : Lectures at the Military Academy in Moscow, February 7-10, 1923. Reprint in Pochód za Wisłę (March over the Vistula). Łódź 1989.
- Adam Zamoyski : Warsaw 1920. Lenin's failed Conquest of Europe. William Collins, London 2008, ISBN 978-0-00-722553-8 .
Web links
- Battle Of Warsaw 1920 by Witold Lawrynowicz
- Bolszewik złamany Article in Gazeta Wyborcza on the decryption of the Soviet secret codes (Polish).
- Michael Reinartz: August 13, 1920 - start of the battle near Warsaw WDR ZeitZeichen from August 13, 2020 (podcast)