Sino-Japanese relations

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Sino-Japanese relations
Location of China and Japan
China People's RepublicPeople's Republic of China JapanJapan
China Japan
Historical mortgages overshadow the Japanese-Chinese relationship to this day: bronze in the Nanjing Massacre Museum

The Sino-Japanese relations are for Japan and the People's Republic of China heavily loaded extremely important and because of the past. They are the two regional great powers in East Asia , which have long been linked in a cultural exchange via the bridging country Korea , Buddhism , Confucianism and the Chinese written culture . In recent years, close economic ties have (again) been established between the two countries.

Long history of conflict

In the First and Second Sino-Japanese War , China was given a humiliation felt to this day. The Nanking massacre and other Japanese war crimes are a heavy burden, with the Chinese regularly criticizing that Japan has not apologized adequately.

Even today, both countries are serious competitors in many fields. Although Japan renounced militarism after the surrender in 1945 , Japan is still perceived as a military threat in China today. Above all, Japan's close relationship with the USA and the unofficial, since 2005 official support for the former Japanese colony of Taiwan as a protecting power are viewed very critically. The permanent seat on the UN Security Council , which Japan is seeking, is categorically rejected by China. The People's Republic of China has been permanently represented there since 1971. Japan and China are also in great competition in fields that are not directly political. For the Chinese national pride it is difficult to bear the fact that there is only one Chinese winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature ( Gao Xingjian , 2000), but already two Japanese ( Kawabata Yasunari 1968 and Ōe Kenzaburō 1994).

Japan experienced a rapid economic upswing after the Second World War, which China has caught up with since the 1980s, also with Japanese investments. Today companies in both countries compete on the world market. On the one hand, Japanese companies benefit from this because they supply machines for industry and use the pool of cheap labor themselves. On the other hand, they have to be very careful that the know-how they bring to the joint ventures with Chinese companies does not lead to independent competition.

Basic data Japan - PR China

Japanese Foreign Ministry data:

  • Diplomatic relations: since September 29, 1972
  • Number of Chinese citizens living in Japan: 462,396 (Dec. 2003; Statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Justice)
  • Long-term Japanese citizens residing in the PRC: 99,179 (Oct. 2004; with Hong Kong and Macau )
  • Trade volume (2011): USD 349 billion. This means a doubling since 2004; At that time the main items were exports of USD 94.2 billion (textile products, foodstuffs, machinery) and imports of USD 73.8 billion (textile products, machinery, metal products).
  • Japanese direct investment: $ 66.6 billion (total up to 2004)
  • Overview of Japan's Economic Cooperation: (June 2005)
    • Loans: 3,133.1 billion yen (total through FY 2004)
    • Aid: 145.7 billion yen (total up to FY 2004)
    • Technical cooperation: 144.6 billion yen (total until FY 2003)

Important events in Sino-Japanese relations

overview

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Japanese-Chinese relations have changed several times, from hostilities and radio silence to very close cooperation in many fields. In relative terms, however, it must be admitted that this applies to many of China's external relations.

Japan's priorities in relation to China have also changed over time. After the Second World War, Japanese politics was integrated into the alliance system of the USA and supported its policy of containment towards communist China. The government in Beijing was not recognized and instead diplomatic relations were maintained with the Republic of China in Taiwan . However, this policy was in contrast to public opinion in Japan, which wanted diplomatic relations and trade with the mainland as well. The leaders of this movement were the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party , who included better relations with Beijing in their propaganda efforts. In addition to the feeling of cultural solidarity, there were also solid economic interests in the Chinese raw materials and the Chinese market. The Japanese government was forced to balance loyalty to the alliance and its own interests. After the People's Republic took a first step towards opening up with its admission to the UN in 1971 and Richard Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy in 1972, and then under Zhou Enlai in 1976 with the Four Modernizations , Sino-Japanese relations also became established better.

Since then, Japan has not only been the most generous donor of development aid and loans, measures that are now being scaled back and are due to expire at the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing . Since then, the economic relations between the two countries have become very close and form the cornerstone of the relationship.

chronology

Before the 20th century

Traditionally, the Chinese Empire saw itself as a hegemon over the known world. Foreign embassies had to be tribute embassies of the peoples in the periphery. In the 19th century the Qing emperors sent an English envoy home with the words that the English had nothing of interest, but that they would be happy to recognize the legitimacy of the British crown in return for a tribute .

This claim may have been justified during the times of the Han or Song emperors, but in the second half of the 19th century China had cut itself off from the world for too long, suffered from a corrupt Manchu administration and was affected by famine, floods and civil war , particularly plagued by the Taiping Uprising (1851–1864). There was a lack of everything, but above all of investment capital, educated skilled workers and political stability. China no longer had strong central power, and the regional governors had had their own tax revenue and troops since the Taiping uprising. There were also attempts at modernization in China, but they did not go far enough and ultimately failed not only because of the growing pressure from the new colonial powers from the West, but also because of the Dowager Empress Cixi , who played off reformers from the south and traditionalists from the north against each other. Their own power was assured, but the crucial problems of these difficult decades remained unsolved.

The industrialization and the spread of European colonial empires had decided tilted the balance of power towards Europe. The weakened Qing dynasty was hopelessly inferior militarily and economically and had to gradually give up its imperial areas of influence, open ports and distribute concessions. Hong Kong fell to the British (1842), Macau to Portugal, Vietnam fell to France (1885), parts of Manchuria and control of Outer Mongolia to Russia. And then China grew into an Asian competitor.

Japan had also been in isolation for the past few centuries, but experienced a period of stability and an economic boom. The forced opening from 1853 onwards was a signal for Japan to move on. This did not take place bloodlessly, but the army of recruits rebuilt according to Western methods was able to put down the uprisings of traditional samurai ( see Boshin War ). The reformers prevailed, and as a result of the Meiji Restoration , Japan experienced rapid industrialization and militarization.

How far Japan was ahead of its former “big brother” China was to be seen in the First Sino-Japanese War .

Two wars

An intra-Korean conflict led to the intervention of the protective power China in Korea in 1884, which under the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin also gave Japan the right to invade. The Japanese put on a coup and set up a pro-Japanese government, and war breaks out. The modernized Japanese army destroys the Chinese fleet and advances on land towards Manchuria. China surrenders and must recognize Japan's hegemony over Korea, Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands .

With the victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the Russian-occupied Manchuria is formally returned to China, but Japan secured Liaoning and Port Arthur and concessions to build the South Manchurian Railway.

Japan now has resource-rich colonial areas, Korea (rice), Taiwan (sugar) and Manchuria (coal and iron ores). The infrastructure, especially the railways and ports, are being expanded to serve the rapidly growing Japanese industry. A cultural imperialism tries to "Japaneseize" these areas, Shinto is introduced as the state religion and Japanese as the language of instruction in schools.

In 1908 China boycotted Japanese goods as a protest against the land grabbing.

The collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the ensuing civil war of the warlords made business easy for Japan, as individual local military rulers needed foreign support to finance their wars. There is also nothing left on the Chinese side that can oppose the further spread of Japanese colonialism. The only force that has not collaborated with the Japanese at any point is the Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 .

In the Treaty of Versailles , the former German colonies in China are surrendered to Japan, which leads to the student protests of May 4, 1919 . In 1931 the Kwantung Army provoked the Mukden Incident , and in the Manchurian Crisis that followed , Japan finally occupied Manchuria . The puppet state of Manchukuo under the last Chinese emperor Pu Yi is founded, and ultimately it is another Japanese colony. The Japanese are also trying to support the Mongols against China, thereby expanding their influence further. As a doctrine of an increasingly openly expansionist policy in China, the Japanese Foreign Ministry published the Amau Declaration in 1934 , which disapproved of the military support of other great powers for China as interference and claimed Japanese supremacy in China.

At the same time, China has been weakened by the Chinese civil war between the communists under Mao Zedong and the nationalists ( KMT ) under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiǎng Jièshí). The nationalists had resigned themselves to the Japanese occupation of northern China and concentrated entirely on the fight against the Communist Party, but the communists were able to evade extermination through the Long March in 1934/35. Due to the severe privations and the many victims, the Long March became the actual founding myth of the Communist Party.

In December 1936, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's troops mutinied in the so-called Xi'an incident and took him prisoner. By appointing the general, both parties could negotiate, and an alliance against the Japanese was formed. Zhou Enlai will represent the communists at the KMT . However, the Chinese united front is far from stable, and the US, fighting on the opposite front against Japan after 1941, must exert pressure to prevent the nationalists from cracking down on communist partisans.

The incident at the Marco Polo Bridge on July 7, 1937 sparked the Second Sino-Japanese War . Sometimes you can read in historical works that Japan did not want this war. At that time, however, the government in Tokyo was completely dominated by the military and the entire economy was geared towards war and expansion, so that such statements seem very implausible. The army of the Chinese nationalists was hopelessly inferior to the invading Japanese, and by the end of 1937 they had to give up all centers of power on the coast and withdraw far inland. Nanking is abandoned by nationalist forces and the Japanese army massacres the civilian population. But the Japanese should not have an easy victory, because the Communist Party had already gained experience in the resistance struggle from its conflict and was now organizing the impoverished and hopeless peasants. It comes to partisan war in its most terrible form: partisans attack the weak points of the military, the military reacts with massacres of the civilian population, which is under general suspicion, which in turn attracts the partisans even more. This vicious circle continued to build up, and only when Japan was defeated on the Pacific side by the USA and was forced to surrender by the atomic bomb did the Japanese armies in China also surrender on September 9, 1945. On the Japanese side there were 1.1 Millions of soldiers killed, the Chinese army lost 3 million soldiers. But the number of murdered Chinese civilians is disproportionate to this; the number of deaths can only be estimated, according to some sources it is 17 million.

Further war crimes committed by the Japanese are still a heavy burden for Sino-Japanese relations: women from the conquered areas were forcibly recruited as prostitutes, so-called comfort women, for brothel soldiers.

In Manchuria, the military doctor Ishii Shirō is building research stations for biological weapons with the 731 unit , in which prisoners of war and Chinese civilians are kept as laboratory animals and killed "in the name of science" during inhumane experiments. But it doesn't stop there: Pathogens like the plague are unleashed on Chinese villages and cities, killing thousands.

All war crimes were hushed up after the war. The leading doctors of Unit 731 even manage to go unpunished in exchange for their research results in the Tokyo trials . It was not until the 1990s that research and publications by human rights groups succeeded in making some of the Japanese war crimes public and wresting concessions from the Japanese government. (see also the section 90s below)

1950s: Korean War, Unofficial Contacts, and Hostilities

Japan had to surrender in September 1945 , its army was disbanded and an end to militarism was written into the US-dictated constitution . In China, the Second United Front , directed against Japan, collapsed , and the Chinese civil war ended in 1949 with the Communists' victory over the Kuomintang , which withdrew to Taiwan . However, the Japanese surrender also resulted in millions of Japanese soldiers in China at the end of World War II, who had to be repatriated to Japan with American help. Three million Japanese were in Chinese captivity, plus a large number of Japanese soldiers who were being held in Manchuria by the Soviet Red Army . Almost 1,000 soldiers classified as war criminals were transferred to China by the Soviet Union. Not all Japanese soldiers were demobilized; after Japan's surrender, Japanese in Yan Xishan's Northern Army fought against the People's Liberation Army , there were Japanese who fought on the side of the Kuomintang, other contingents fought the People's Liberation Army and refused to surrender to anyone other than the government troops. On the other hand, there were also Japanese who had joined the communist troops.

China feared a strengthening of Japanese militarism with US aid, even though Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru rejected rearmament. For this reason, the new government aimed for a Japan that was independent of US politics and at the same time tried to isolate the government on Taiwan . This policy, summarized as Fight the USA, Support Japan, went hand in hand with Sino-Soviet attempts to bring about a communist overthrow in Japan. Japan, on the other hand, was urged by the US not to negotiate or trade with communist states, especially during the Korean War . The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance contained the clause that both sides would stand by each other in the event of an attack by "Japan or another state allied with it".

For its part, after the People's Republic was proclaimed, Japan was interested in receiving a list of all the Japanese still detained in China and bringing them back to Japan as soon as possible. China only negotiated this Japanese concern informally, pointing out that there were no diplomatic relations. This had the advantage for China that the state did not have to feel bound by the outcome of the negotiations; often the outcome of the negotiations was not even put on paper. In January 1953, delegations from the Chinese and Japanese Red Crosses met to negotiate the return of prisoners of war from China to Japan. The later Japan expert of the communist party Liao Chengzhi was named as head of the delegation in place of the allegedly ill chairman of the Chinese Red Cross Li Dequan . China used these negotiations to enter into conversation with a much wider spectrum of Japanese society than was previously possible, and the CP was also able to establish contact with the anti-communist Liberal Democratic Party . A communiqué was signed on March 7, 1953, allowing 26,000 Japanese to return home. On October 30, 1953, the Chinese Red Cross chairwoman Li Dequan announced the completion of the repatriation of these people, and the image of China in Japanese society improved significantly as a result. However, unknown numbers of Japanese were still wanted and China refused to negotiate the war criminals. A second agreement for the return of Japanese citizens was signed in November 1954.

For its part, China had a keen interest in breaking its economic isolation. Liao Chengzhi had also used his participation in international conferences to exchange ideas with the respective Japanese delegations. He was able to establish contacts with like-minded Japanese on a non-governmental level, which marked the beginning of the so-called “people's diplomacy”. On June 1, 1952, an unofficial trade agreement was concluded between Japan and China, in which Liao was likely to have played a key role. However, this agreement did not lead to a significant increase in the volume of trade - not least because of its disapproval by the Japanese government. On October 29, 1953, the parties signed a second private trade agreement that led to a breakthrough in economic relations. A third agreement was concluded in May 1955. The approach proposed by China to separate business and politics has borne fruit; at the same time, however, China insisted on bartering , which contributed to the very slow development of economic relations.

In the second half of 1955, the People's Republic of China suddenly demanded more concession from Japan in order to resolve Japanese concerns. Mao Zedong had directly and openly set the establishment of formal diplomatic relations - and thus the isolation of Taiwan - as a condition in order to negotiate the release of the remaining 1,069 Japanese citizens detained as war criminals. An exchange between the consuls general in Geneva on the subject of war criminals, but also over 40,000 other Japanese, about whom no information was available, came to nothing. The main reason for China's hardened negotiating position is likely to be found in the fact that China itself was in negotiations with the USA about the release of prisoners of war from the Korean War and did not want to weaken its negotiating position. At the same time, however, China sent contradicting signals regarding further trade relations.

Numerous delegations from the Japanese Parliament , the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Council for Resumption of Relations with the Soviet Union and China are visiting Beijing, but tensions have not been alleviated. Negotiations on a new trade agreement dragged on for almost two years. However, Japan was allowed to hold a trade fair in Beijing and mutual visits increased. On June 24, 1956, the Red Cross organizations of the two states signed a final agreement and a further 335 war criminals were released. China now increasingly directed its advertising in Japanese society through the Socialist Party of Japan and liberal politicians from the Liberal Democratic Party , while attacking pro-Taiwanese or pro-American politicians. The lead role in these operations fell to Liao Chengzhi . In the summer of 1956, a delegation of former Japanese military personnel around Endo Saburo visited Beijing, which led to a scandal due to comments made by some delegation members critical of Beijing.

In 1956 Nikita Sergejewitsch Khrushchev initiated the de-Stalinization with his secret speech , as a result of which the Soviet Union and Japan established diplomatic relations . In response, the People's Republic tried to forge better relations with third world countries outside the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong took the political weakening of Khrushchev as an opportunity to find his own way in building socialism. In the course of the Hundred Flower Movement and the repression that followed, Chinese foreign policy also hardened, China strengthened its contacts with the left-wing opposition in Japan and violently attacked Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke . Conversations on various topics remained without result.

In 1958, China wanted to push ahead with the rapid construction of socialism independently of Soviet aid and launched the great leap forward . The need for trade and cooperation with other states has been denied. A fourth trade agreement, which was fully negotiated in 1958, was ratified by the Japanese government only under certain conditions. China protested and took this and the Nagasaki flag incident as an opportunity to break off talks and verbally attack the Japanese government. China tried to stimulate trade with other countries and called on the overseas Chinese to boycott Japanese products. The policy of building better relations with third world countries also arose from the desire to cut Japan off from raw material sources.

Contact between Japan and China was minimal in the period immediately following the Nagasaki incident. In July 1958, China informed a JSP delegation headed by Miyazaki Seimin that Japan would have to comply with three political principles in order to resume talks:

  • The Japanese government should not show hostility towards China
  • Japan should not hinder efforts to establish normal relations between the two countries
  • Japan should not take part in any conspiracy that would lead to the formation of "two China" ( Republic of China in Taiwan and People's Republic).

In the first half of 1959, trading with Japanese firms that accepted the political conditions resumed. LDP-affiliated companies were banned from trading. The JSP and JKP leaderships were persuaded in February 1959 to form a united front with the People's Republic of China against the Japanese government. At the same time, Beijing insisted on only talking to the government about improving relations and opposed "people's diplomacy." After the June 2, 1959 elections in Japan , Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan contacted Zhou Enlai to seek a way out of the impasse. Against the background of deteriorating relationships v. a. Ishibashi and Liao Chengzhi took the first steps towards normalization on India and Indonesia, the looming Sino-Soviet rift and the improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the USA . At the same time Japan developed its own principles, including the non-recognition of the People's Republic and the primacy of close relations with the USA. However, Beijing rejected the Japanese proposal to mediate between Beijing and Washington: In a communiqué of September 20, 1959, Beijing criticized American influence over Japan and the Soviet attempts to reduce tensions with the United States. Beijing tacitly abandoned its own three principles and had to accept that Japan was negotiating a security agreement with the US .

1960s: resumption of trade

Only after Beijing's break with Moscow and the resulting international isolation of China does it become necessary to improve contacts with Japan again.

The People's Republic of China resumed trade with Japan in the late 1960s . However, Beijing made the condition that trade would only take place on an interstate basis and that private trade would be indirectly approved by the Japanese government. Only Japanese companies that agreed to the 1958 Three Principles were allowed to trade.

In November 1962, a five-year (1963-1967) trade agreement was concluded in Beijing, which is also called the Liao Takasaki Memorandum after the signatories Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke . Sino-Japanese relations were thus elevated to a semi-official status, albeit still far removed from regular diplomatic relations . With the failure of the Great Leap Forward , China had found that it was impossible to build up heavy industry entirely on its own. Therefore, Japanese production technology should be purchased. The business was to be financed with medium-term loans from the Japanese Export-Import Bank ( nihon yushutsunyū ginko日本 輸出 入 銀行). Furthermore, the PRC received the right to open a trade mission in Tōkyō. As part of the agreement, supported by guarantees from the bank, a synthetic textile factory valued at around USD 20 million was delivered to VR. But protests from the Republic of China in Taiwan dissuaded the government in Tōkyō from further factory export plans. The Chinese government responded by reducing trade and stepping up its propaganda to portray Japan as the lackey of the United States.

The outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 caused a further collapse of the Sino-Japanese trade, as the civil war-like conditions prevented further development of the Chinese economy. Japan, on the other hand, was less dependent on China as a partner due to its growing economic power and integration in the international trade network. The establishment of the ASEAN alliance in 1967 by Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore and the subsequent development of the economy in these countries not only provided Japan with sources of raw materials, but also a sales market. In contrast to the PR China, the ASEAN countries encountered Japan without any ideological conflicts , although they were all former Japanese colonies . On the contrary, all the heads of government in these countries endeavored to keep Soviet-Communist or Maoist movements in their countries small and therefore sought contact with Japan and the West as a whole.

The Vietnam War played another role. The American troops in Asia had to be concentrated on the Mekong, and Japan had no choice but to build up its own self-defense forces to ensure its own protection. This development was observed very closely by the Chinese side, as they still feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism. The US , however, was seen as a greater threat to China, and from the mid-1960s an even greater threat: the Soviet Union . The tussle between the two main powers in the Eastern bloc had become so intense that in 1969 there was an armed incident on the Ussuri .

1970s: Friendship treaty and establishment of diplomatic relations

The admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations in 1971 , with the simultaneous expulsion of Taiwan, was still against the interests of Japan under Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, operated by Albania, India and some recently decolonized African states . The Guomindang government in Taipei had become an important economic partner.

To the rapprochement policy of the USA under Richard Nixon in February 1972 , known as ping-pong diplomacy , Japan reacted “shocked” to the outside world. In the LDP there were factions that were still in favor of an alliance with Taipei and supporters of rapprochement with Beijing. The opposition was similarly divided. The negotiations between the PR China and the USA, originally directed as an alliance against Moscow after the Sino-Soviet rift , now gave the Japanese government under Sato's successor, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei , a certain amount of leeway to take the initiative and to move closer to the PRC to search.

This leeway allowed Prime Minister Tanaka to travel to Beijing in an official capacity in September of the same year. In a joint statement , he and Chairman Mao Zedong put an end to the almost eighty years of hostility between the two countries. Japan recognized the Communist Party government as the only legal Chinese government following its one-China policy , which automatically meant an end to official diplomatic relations with Taiwan . In return, China renounced reparations claims from the Second World War , from which China emerged as a victorious power. In the mid-1950s, these claims were around $ 50 billion. Official diplomatic relations were established on December 29, 1972. Further negotiations on a peace and friendship treaty and agreements on trade, shipping, air transport and fishing were agreed. In January 1974 an agreement on civil aviation, shipping, fishing and trademarks was signed. Further negotiations on agreements on technical cooperation, cultural exchanges and consular matters were also undertaken.

Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty began in 1974, but a Chinese demand posed diplomatic problems for the Japanese government: because of Sino-Soviet disputes , Beijing demanded an anti-hegemony clause against the Soviet Union to be included in the contract. However, Japan was keen to remain neutral on this issue. The Soviet side emphasized that such a treaty would strain the Japanese-Soviet relations . A compromise could not be found and the talks broke off in September 1975.

However, the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 brought things back into motion. The four modernizations under Prime Minister Zhou Enlai , which were implemented from 1978, promised Japan profitable business in special economic zones . But public opinion in Japan had also turned, people in Japan were now more willing to side with China, and the demands for an anti-hegemony clause in the direction of the Soviet Union were no longer an obstacle. February 1978 became a long-term one Private trade agreements were concluded, and Japan received much-needed raw materials such as coal and crude oil in exchange for power plants and equipment, technology, building materials and machinery.

At the same time, peace negotiations began, but were briefly impacted by an incident on the controversial Senkaku Islands (Chinese: Diaoyutai) between Taiwan and Okinawa . Armed Chinese fishing boats had invaded the surrounding waters, but both sides kept cool and the matter was settled. Peace negotiations resumed in July. After an agreement on the anti-hegemony question was reached, the peace treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China was signed on August 12, 1978. The agreement entered into force on October 23, 1978.

1980s: development of complementary interests

The domestic political problems and the unpredictability of the reforms made the People's Republic a difficult partner for China. In the 1980s, however, there was significant progress in the field of trade and economic cooperation.

Political questions remained unanswered. The growing Chinese self-confidence led to a textbook dispute for the first time in 1982 , when history books played down the war crimes of the Japanese troops in the Second Sino-Japanese War . Japanese politicians have also issued an official apology for what happened at the time.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (82-87) and US President Ronald Reagan (81-89), both of whom can be classified as " hawks ", strengthened the Japanese-American relationship in defense against communism. Cooperation was agreed for the SDI missile defense system . However, China's relations with both nations were only briefly affected, because China was still considered a counterweight to the Soviet Union. Japan's economic involvement also served political goals: China was to be opened to the west, and close economic ties were the insurance against a swing back Beijing towards Moscow and a possible return to foreign policy provocation such as the incident in the Senkaku Islands.

China's interests lay primarily in not being reduced to a satellite state by Moscow under the Brezhnev Doctrine . The rivalries between the two fore-powers in the Eastern bloc took place in foreign policy towards third parties, in which both states supported different communist movements in Africa and the Middle East. The conflict intensified in 1979 when the Vietnamese People's Republic, which was loyal to Moscow, invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Pol Pot regime, which was loyal to Beijing. China starts a punitive expedition to Vietnam ( Sino-Vietnamese War ), but has to admit defeat to its small, battered neighbor in the south. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet troops stood on the entire northern border of China (Mongolia is also loyal to Moscow). In addition, Moscow increased the number of stationed SS-20 missiles and Tu-22M bombers, enlarged the Pacific fleet and the number of missile -armed submarines.

For Japan, too, security concerns about the Soviet Union increased. The armament of the USA set a new arms spiral in motion, and Moscow's tone of voice towards Japan became sharper. The presence of Soviet troops in Vietnam and Afghanistan posed a potential threat to the oil supply routes from the Middle East to Japan. So there were similarities in the security interests of Japan and China.

The new closeness was underpinned diplomatically when the General Secretary of the CPC, Hu Yaobang , visited Japan in November 1983, and Nakasone paid a return visit to China in 1984. Both Japan and China now aimed to isolate the Soviet Union beyond the Eastern Bloc in terms of foreign policy. They supported the attempts of the ASEAN states to persuade Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Japan froze development aid for Vietnam and instead helped Thailand take care of the war refugees. In addition to Thailand, China also supported the Cambodian resistance groups. In addition, both organized the condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and refused to recognize the government established by the USSR in Kabul. Instead, it supported Pakistan. Japan as a supporter of South Korea and China as a supporter of North Korea also stood behind the attempt to reduce tensions between the two states.

Trade between the two nations now flourished too, growing from around one billion US dollars in the early 1970s to around eight billion dollars in 1982. Japan became China's largest foreign trade partner, with a share of 20%. However, at this point in time Japan was much better integrated into world trade, so that conversely, China trade in Japan only had a share of 3%. In the early 1980s, China also obtained around half of its foreign loans from Japan. Japan still mainly procured raw materials from China (especially coal, oil, tungsten and chromium ), while Japan mainly supplied heavy industry products ( steel , plant and machinery, chemical products, synthetic textile fibers). The necessary industrial infrastructure to be self-sufficient with these products should not be built by China until the following years. Japan's companies, meanwhile, focused on doing business building China's infrastructure, and aid was channeled into these areas as well. Some Chinese raw material sources also had to be tapped if one wanted to import these raw materials. On the other hand, a pressing economic problem was the growing trade deficit on China's side.

In 1985, another political crisis got in the way of the prosperous business when the Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine . The textbook dispute flared up again the next year. The Communist Party of China, otherwise not exactly squeamish in dealing with the opposition, allowed demonstrations and protests against Japan (a practice that China should use more often as a diplomatic leverage, most recently in 2005). Sino-Japanese relations saw a further setback when the pro-Japan Hu Yaobang was ousted from office in 1987.

A new turning point was the bloody outcome of the student protests on Tian An Men Square in 1989, which brought China negative media coverage worldwide. The archenemy Soviet Union with the wall opener and reformer Mikhail Gorbachev was now considered the darling of the West. China was no longer needed as a counter-power; instead, the Beijing leadership was allowed to repeatedly listen to human rights appeals internationally . China was briefly isolated again and tried to at least save relations with Japan.

The 1990s and the new millennium: visit by the emperor, closer contacts and new relationships

After some negotiations, Japan left it as a reaction to withdraw a rate of development aid, after which it was back to normal operations . For comparison, the EU is still maintaining its arms embargo against China, which was passed in 1989. A clear symbol of the improved relations was the visit of Tennō Akihito in October 1992. In the nineties the relationship between China and Japan was not marked by political quarrels after a long time, one can see from the still current dispute over Diaoyu / Senkaku and those there suspected natural gas deposits.

This time the upheavals took place on the economic side. After the bubble economy burst, Japan slipped into a crisis, the so-called “lost decade”, while China experienced a constant boom with economic growth of at least 5% per year. Within a very short period of time, China has caught up with Japan, if not overtaken (in purchasing power parity statistics , China is now ahead of Japan, but far behind in terms of GDP per capita). China has industrialized itself on a massive scale and now consumes most of its raw materials itself.

Nevertheless, Japanese companies are still making profits in China: many are involved in Chinese companies through joint ventures and thus benefit from the low Chinese wages and the lack of employee rights. Chinese companies such as Haier , Lenovo or TCM have now grown into full-blown competitors.

In addition, Japanese companies are taking advantage of the growing Chinese market, although the focus has long since shifted from heavy industry to the consumer market: cars, consumer electronics , cosmetic products , luxury goods ...

Japanese series, films, and music, along with their Western counterparts, are influencing the new Chinese pop culture . The Chinese black market for copied silver discs has created a very special kind of cultural exchange here . Only the massive spread of Japanese porn films has left behind a distorted image of the neighbor in addition to breaking up conservative Chinese views.

Conversely, people in Japan are no longer culturally interested in what is happening in the USA or in Europe, they are also looking more at their Asian neighbors again.

Current interests

Japan

The Japanese side is particularly interested in further improving economic relations. She is counting on further reforms by the Chinese government, which should make China a modern industrial nation. In particular, the investment conditions for Japanese companies in China are to be further improved through a series of measures:

  • Infrastructure improvement
  • more transparent legislation
  • better protection of copyrights and patents
  • Enforce better payment practices
  • the stabilization of the banking sector and a free capital market
  • the opening of further markets, for example in the insurance sector.

Japan, on the other hand, would like to leave the troubled past behind by pointing out extensive aid payments in the post-war period. The armament of the Chinese military, which was made possible by the economic boom, is being watched critically. The balance of power in Asia is increasingly shifting towards China.

China

The Chinese leadership, on the other hand, relies heavily on the symbolic effect of politics. The Communist Party has repeatedly used the aversion of the population to Japan, especially because of the Japanese war crimes, to drown out domestic political criticism. The recurring criticism of Japan's handling of the past should also be read against this background.

While bad relations with Japan can therefore be wanted domestically, China, on the other hand, is economically dependent on good relations. Not only is Japan its largest trading partner, it is also the main development aid donor and the largest investor and technology provider. This double play makes the behavior of the Chinese side difficult to predict.

The threatening backdrop that Beijing builds up now and then is primarily aimed at preventing Japan from further involvement in Taiwan. However, this strategy can also strike back against China if the current benevolence of many political and business leaders turns to fear of Chinese dominance.

partnership

Both countries need each other to clarify the pressing questions in East Asia: Working together on environmental protection, working together to create a single economic area, and working together on the North Korean issue.

Hu Jintao's state visit to Japan in May 2008: “Warm Spring, Eternal Peace”?

From May 6 to 10, 2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a much anticipated and long-term visit to Japan. Chinese state media extensively celebrated Hu's visit as a “warm spring journey”. The state visit - the first by a Chinese head of state for ten years - was originally supposed to take place during the cherry blossom season at the beginning of April. Beijing reportedly postponed the summit due to upset over pesticide-contaminated food from China and other unresolved issues. After the profound distortions in the relationship between the two states, especially during the reign of Junichiro Koizumi , the "mere fact that this visit is taking place at all is progress, it is the result of a reality that neither of the countries can ignore: each needs the other", judged the BBC .

On the occasion of a speech at Waseda University in Tokyo, Hu stressed that China will continue to go steadfastly on the path of peaceful development. Hu Jintao also reiterated that China is pursuing a defensive defense policy and not engaging in an arms race. China therefore does not pose a military threat and will not seek hegemony or expansion . Hu said the story should be viewed as a mirror. One should cherish and maintain peace in the future. The friendship between China and Japan should be cultivated across generations. Both peoples should enjoy eternal peace, said Hu Jintao.

Hu Jintao and the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda signed the "joint declaration on the comprehensive expansion of strategic relationships for mutual benefit" in Tokyo on May 7, 2008. It is the fourth political document between China and Japan. The statement said that both sides agreed that Sino-Japanese relations were among their most important bilateral ties. The only alternative for both countries is to maintain a peaceful and friendly cooperation in the long term. Both countries would therefore comprehensively expand strategic relations for mutual benefit. The goal of peaceful coexistence , cross-generational friendship, beneficial cooperation and joint development should be realized.

It was also said that both countries would regard each other as mutual cooperation partners and pose no threat to one another. Rather, they wanted to support the peaceful development of the other side. In this sense, problems between the two countries would be resolved through consultation and negotiation. Hu Jintao said the joint declaration between China and Japan would play an important and guiding role in the future development of bilateral relations. Both sides avoided addressing historic mortgages that had historically weighed on relationships. One of the most important results is likely to be an apparently extensive convergence in the long-standing dispute over the oil and gas fields in the East China Sea . Prime Minister Fukuda stated that “a solution is in sight”. Both sides emphasized that solutions still had to be found regarding “minor details”.

After the last panda bear in Japan, Ling Ling, died at the end of April, it was seen as a particularly warm gesture that Hu Jintao promised Tokyo's Ueno Zoo a pair of panda - as a symbol of friendship between the two countries.

New pragmatism: "Profound changes in Japanese-Chinese relations"

“The Sino-Japanese relationship is going through a profound change. This time, little was discussed about the two main subjects of the past Sino-Japanese talks, history-related matters and Taiwan, ”said China expert Ryosei Kokubun, a professor at Keio University in Tokyo. The outcome of the state visit suggests that both Japan and China have begun to focus more on specific national interests rather than "philosophical issues," said Kokubun. Despite efforts to highlight their improving relationships, the Sino-Japanese relationship still had hurdles to overcome. In the short term, China needs Japan's support for the Olympic Games, said Kokubun. Fukuda had agreed to benevolently consider his participation in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics , but it was "still too early" to make a decision. Fukuda had welcomed Hu's decision to enter into dialogue with a delegation from the Dalai Lama and urged the Chinese leadership to allay international concerns about the human rights situation in Tibet . Around 1,000 activists demonstrated for political and religious freedom in Tibet during Hu Jintao's arrival in Tokyo.

Both sides also underlined their interest in an update of the Kyoto Protocol to curb climate change . In a separate declaration, China made a rather non-binding commitment to “examine methods and measures” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

With regard to the Taiwan conflict , the joint statement merely confirmed that Tokyo would "resolutely maintain" the position expressed in the 1972 joint communique.

The Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Wen Jiabao , last paid an official visit to Japan from April 11 to 13, 2007. A joint press release stated, among other things:

  • The Japanese and Chinese sides confirmed that they would continue to uphold the principles of the “Joint Declaration by the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China”, the “Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China” and the “Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration” .
  • Both sides are determined to look at history openly, to look to the future and to jointly develop a bright future for bilateral relations. Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side said it would adhere to the position expressed in the "Joint Statement by the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China".
  • On the basis of the joint Sino-Japan press release issued on the occasion of Prime Minister Abe's visit to China in October 2006, both sides advocate the creation of "mutually beneficial relationships based on common strategic interests" [...]

It remains to be seen whether Beijing's diplomatic rapprochement with Tokyo through this and Hu Jintao's state visit will help defuse ongoing fundamental disputes and potential conflicts. At the end of March 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Ma Xiaotian, met in Beijing with the Japanese Deputy Defense Minister Masuba Kohe to discuss defense security . It was the eighth meeting of its kind between China and Japan. Regarding the Taiwan question and other defense issues, both sides reached a consensus, according to a report by Radio China International , without specifying the details. Masuba Kohe had also here affirmed that the Japanese government was consistently sticking to its position on this issue. The pledges made in the Sino-Japanese declaration and other political documents stand, Kohe said.

Japan's 2006 Defense Program, Renewal of the US Pact

Against the background of the growing influence and not least increased by a forced upgrade power of China and the resultant perceived or real punctuated equilibrium in his region, but also in the face of threats from North Korea and terrorism is also Japan from its after World War II long Time largely established military restraint adopted. Japan's 2006 defense program named China, along with North Korea, a "priority security problem." The then Japanese Foreign Minister (until 2007 ) Taro Aso described China as a “considerable threat” and “a country in which the military comes first”. Such clear statements were seen by observers against the background of several territorial disputes, for example over resource-rich islands between Tokyo and Beijing - at least in this matter a solution seems to be emerging after Hu's state visit in May 2008.

However, that does not change anything about Tokyo's close military reinsurance with Washington. “The new agreement between Tokyo and Washington, described as 'historic', is forged by the Japanese and Americans not only for the fight against terrorism , but also with a view to the situation in Asia . The challenge from China - its economic rise, its military armament, its anti-democratic system of government - is particularly complex, ”said a 2006 report by Deutschlandfunk on the renewal of the Japanese-US defense pact. Hisahiko Okazaki, expert on foreign policy , addressed the need to contain China from a Japanese perspective straight away : “The most important question of the 21st century is the rise of China and the threat posed by its military power ( see People's Liberation Army ). Peace in East Asia will only be preserved if there is a balance of power between China on the one hand and the Japanese-American alliance on the other. If this alliance is strong, the balance will not be jeopardized for the next ten or twenty years. If it is weak, it will collapse pretty soon. "

See also

Wikisource: Peace Treaty of 1978 (English)  - sources and full texts

bibliography

  • Michael H. Hunt: The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy . Columbia University Press, New York 1996
  • Yutaka Kawashima: Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century . Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC 2003
  • Barbara Barnouin, Yu Changgen: Chinese Foreign Policy During the Cultural Revolution . Columbia University Press, New York 1998
  • Dick Stegewerns (Ed.): Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan . Routledge Shorton, New York 2003
  • Jian Sanqiang: Foreign Policy Restructuring as Adaptive Behavior: China's Independent Foreign Policy 1982–1989 . University Press of America, Maryland 1996
  • Norman Sun: Trade between Mainland China and Japan under the “LT” Agreements . Hong Kong Economic Papers, Hong Kong
  • Till Winfried Bärnighausen: Medical human experiments of the Japanese troops for biological warfare in China, 1932–45 . 1999

Web links

Commons : Sino-Japanese Relationships  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

The Sino-Japanese summit in Tokyo in early May 2008

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Kitaoka Shinichi: Response to China's Japan critics (Embassy of Japan, News from Japan No. 9/2005; originally in: Japan Echo, 2005)
  2. ↑ Japan – China Relations ( English ) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved February 10, 2019.
  3. ^ Sheila A. Smith: Japan, China, and the Tide of Nationalism. cfr.org, September 19, 2012 , accessed September 20, 2012
  4. ↑ a b Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 96-97 .
  5. ↑ a b Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 100-102 .
  6. ^ Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 99 .
  7. ^ Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 116-117 .
  8. ^ Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 117-119 .
  9. ^ Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 121-123 .
  10. ^ Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 123-125 .
  11. ↑ a b Kurt Werner Radtke: China's relations with Japan: 1945-83; the role of Liao Chengzhi . Manchester University Press, Manchester 1990, ISBN 0-7190-2795-0 , pp. 125-130 .
  12. ↑ Gao Haikuan: Japan continues a dangerous path ( Memento of October 7, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Switzerland, June 16, 2004)
  13. ↑ China and Japan seek 'warm spring' (BBC News, May 5, 2008)
  14. ↑ Hu Jintao gives speech at Waseda University in Tokyo (Radio China International, May 8, 2008)
  15. ↑ China and Japan publish joint declaration on the expansion of strategic relations (Radio China International, May 8, 2008)
  16. ↑ Reiji Yoshida: Fukuda, Hu put focus on future - Japan, China bypass history issues, hint at gas-field deal in crucial summit ("Japan Times", May 8, 2008)
  17. ↑ Joint Japanese-Chinese press release (Embassy of Japan, Berlin; Tokyo, April 11, 2007)
  18. ↑ China and Japan talk about defense security (Radio China International, March 31, 2008)
  19. ↑ Martin Fritz: Farewell to pacifism - Japan deepens the security pact with the USA ( Deutschlandfunk , July 8, 2006)