Hasan-i Sabbāh

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Depiction of Hasan Sabah in a 19th century engraving

Hasan ibn Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Jafar ibn Husain ibn Muhammad ibn Sabbah al-Himyari ( Arabic الحسن بن علي بن محمد بن جعفر بن الحسين بن محمد بن صباح الحميري, DMG al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Ǧaʿfar b. al-Ḥusain b. Muḥammad b. Ṣabbāḥ al-Himyarī ; * around 1050 in Qom or Ray , † May 23, 1124 in Alamut ), shortened Hasan-i Sabbah ( Persian حسن صباح, DMG Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ , [ hæˈsæne sæˈbːɔːh ], Arabic حسن الصباح, DMG Ḥasan as-Sabbah / Hasan, descendant of the Sabbah), a medieval was Persia acting missionary ( da'i ) of the Shiite Islamic religious community of Ismailis . In 1094 he was one of the decisive actors who contributed to the division of this community and who thus advanced to the organizational founding father of the branch of the Nizari Ismailis, or simply the Nizarites , the numerically largest Ismaili religious community of today.

The image of this historical person as well as that of the community (šīʿa) they founded was shaped well into the 20th century by a largely uncritical narrative repetition of medieval historiography, which was based exclusively on reports from partisan enemies of faith, or even ignorant outsiders well-founded. The narrative of the prevailing Sunni-Islamic historiography portrayed Hasan-i Sabbah as a heretic ( mulḥid ) who had renounced the Islamic faith , who founded a sect of his disciples misguided into the occult, who were repeatedly referred to as "the hashish people" (al- Ḥašīšiyyūn) were vilified. Under the corrupted term assassin , this story took on a form distorted by legends and myths in Christian-European historiography, in which his person was ranked first in the sequence of the "ancients from the mountains" , those invisible with many mysteries Leader of the infamous assassin sect from the Orient.

Life

origin

Hasan was probably born at an undisclosed point in time in the Persian Ghom , but perhaps also in Ray . His clan, however, was of Arab descent, originally from the Himyar region in what is now Yemen . His father had emigrated from his homeland first to Iraqi Kufa , then to the Persian Ghom, from where he finally moved to Ray. At the age of seven Hasan became interested in science and aspired to become a devout scholar. His religious creed was that of a Twelve Shiite whose doctrine of the faith was already adhered to by his father.

Conversion

At the age of seventeen Hasan made friends with the mint master Amira, who professed Ismaili religion and with whom he has since been in dispute about the right faith. Hasan argued against Ismailism, since it was suspected of being influenced by ancient philosophy , which in the Muslim majority society of that time was branded as pagan polytheism. But as the dispute progressed, Hasan began to increasingly question his religious convictions and to find arguments for the Imamate of Ismail (died around 760). When he was attacked by a serious illness shortly afterwards, Hasan recognized it as an invitation from God to reconsider his previous confession. After he had recovered, Hasan had the local saddler Abu Najim Sarradsch explain the Ismaili creed in more detail until he was finally convinced of its truthfulness (ḥaqq) . While he was stripping off his father's confession, in a secret meeting with the saddler he accepted the Ismaili creed: strictest secrecy of the doctrine to the outside world and obedience to the rightly guided “leader” ( Arabic امام, DMG imām ) of the Shia, the Fatimid caliph of Cairo .

From now on Hasan was admitted to the secret teaching sessions of his new religious community, the "sessions of wisdom" (maǧālis al-ḥikma) , to study the inner (bāṭin) sense behind the external (ẓāhir) wording of the divine revelation recorded in the Koran . Through his scholarship and early pious lifestyle, he was quickly found worthy of a certain position within the hierarchy of the Ismaili mission ( daʿwa ) . In the summer of 1072 the chief missionary of the Persian Ismailis Abdalmalik-i Attasch became aware of Hasan during a stay in Ray and made him his deputy two years later. For the next two years Hasan worked in this position in the Persian capital, Isfahan , to support his master in attracting new followers. At that time, this activity had to be carried out underground with extreme caution, which corresponded to the political circumstances of the time in which Hasan lived.

Until the middle of the 11th century, Ismailism, like Shia in general, flourished for about a hundred years in Persia and Iraq, without any state persecution. During this time, the missions of the Twelve and Ismailis were able to attract numerous new followers to their communities until their teachings dominated as interpretations of the faith of Islam. The basis for the Shiite character of these regions of the Muslim world ( umma ) , which extends to the present day , was decisively shaped at that time. Hasan's father immigrated to Persia, not least because he was already an avowed Twelve Shiite. The prerequisites for this development lay in the rule of the Buyid dynasty , which had lasted since 945 and was itself of Persian descent and adhered to a Shiite creed. Although their rule was legitimized by serving the Sunni caliph dynasty of the Abbasids , the Buyids have in fact kept the Abbasids as puppets in Baghdad and neutralized them as political power. As the Prophet's deputy ( faalīfa ) in command of the faithful, however, the Sunni Abbasids received no recognition from the Shiites.

Pilgrimage to Cairo

In contrast, the relationship between the Ismailis and the caliphate of the Fatimids, who reside in Cairo, Egypt, was fundamentally different. For the Fatimid caliphs were at the same time the recognized imams of their religious community who, from their point of view, descended from Ali and were appropriately endowed with the divine power of blessing (baraka) and designation (naṣṣ) inherited from the prophet's son-in- law, and who were legitimized to be imamates and caliphates. From this point of view, the Ismailis were, for their part, a minority among the Shiites, since the twelve who were competing with them and also more numerous belonged to a different line of imams that had existed in secrecy ( ġaiba ) for some time . For both Shiite groups, however, the situation had changed fundamentally by the middle of the 11th century. The rule of the Buyids had collapsed in 1055 under the pressure of the west migration of entire Turkish peoples from the Central Asian steppe area into the Persian-Iraqi region. The leading clan of the Turks, the Seljuks , had professed Sunni Islam and legitimized their assumption of power not least with the overthrow of the Shiite Buyids. Since then, an expression of their commitment to the Sunna has been their use ( jihād ) against any appearance of deviance from orthodox, that is, Sunni Islam. Shiite teachings have since been suspected of heresy and their followers, as apostate heretics, have been subject to state-sanctioned persecution. Especially in the urban milieu, the Ismailis suspected of being philosophers had since then only been able to move in compliance with the principles of caution ( taqīya ) , which in case of doubt included the public denial of their belief. Teaching sessions and missionary work now had to be organized underground. The physical threat from the Seljuks became a crucial aspect in the biography of Hasan-i Sabbah and the Ismaili Shia in Persia.

In 1076 Hasan was commissioned by his master to travel to Cairo, where he should deepen his studies in teaching and science. The Ismaili mission had its administrative center in the Egyptian metropolis and, as the residence of its imam, it was also its spiritual center, making a trip there a veritable pilgrimage for every believer. Recognizing the rightful Imam is the first pillar of Islam for Ismailis, which means that an encounter with him was associated with no less prestige than that of a pilgrimage ( ḥaǧǧ ) to Mecca . It is not known that Hasan ever undertook this. His journey led via Azerbaijan first to Mayyafaraqin , where, after a public dispute with other scholars, he revealed his Ismaili sentiments and was therefore banished from the city by the local judge ( qāḍī ) . Traveling on via Mosul , Sinjar and ar-Rahba , crossing the Syrian desert , he had reached the Syrian capital Damascus at the beginning of 1077 . Hasan had to travel incognito through war zones, as the Seljuks had continued their expansion across the Euphrates at that time and thus started a direct confrontation with the Fatimids. When Hasan entered the city, the defeated army of the Turkish Condottieri Atsiz had just entered, who had previously suffered a heavy defeat against the Fatimid vizier Badr al-Jamali while attempting to conquer Egypt . And his onward journey was probably interrupted here by two sieges undertaken in quick succession by Fatimid armies, both of which were unsuccessful. Hasan was only able to continue his journey in the summer of 1078. His next stations took him along the port cities of Beirut , Sidon , Tire and Akkon to Caesarea Maritima , from where he reached the Nile Delta in Tinnis after a seven-day ship passage. On August 29, 1078, he finally arrived in Cairo.

His autobiographical tradition only has superficial reports about Hasan's stay in Cairo. He was received here with great respect by the learned authorities of his Shia and earned their recognition in disputes for his pious erudition and eloquence. He was only denied a personal audience with Imam-Caliph al-Mustansir , although the general recognition of the missionary from Persia had reached his palace rooms, whereupon the Imam made a short letter to Hasan and repeatedly praised him. The denied audience before the Imam, however, throws light on Hasan's relationship with the political authorities of the court in Cairo. The true ruler of the Fatimid caliphate since 1074 was General Badr al-Jamali , who after an era of anarchy had taken over the vizier, restored order with the toughest of violence and thus ensured the survival of the caliphate. The person of the Imam-Caliph, however, had resigned behind him to a mere puppet for legitimizing rule, similar to what was already the case with the Abbasids in Baghdad with the Seljuks. In June 1078, shortly before Hasan moved into Cairo, the vizier had also taken over the office of chief missionary (dāʿī d-duʿāt) , the highest clerical authority of the Ismaili Shia, although as a poorly educated layman he had absolutely no sensitivity for religious matters Sentiment of the believers. The annexation of this office was motivated solely by power politics, as the path to the imam caliph led exclusively through the leadership language of the chief missionary in his capacity as the “gate” (bāb) to the imamate. Obviously Hasan had not only taken public offense at the conditions in the mission leadership, which cost him the prospect of an audience, but by interfering in the succession question in the Imamate, he may have drawn the vizier's disfavor. At the court of Cairo he had made friends with the already grown-up Prince Nizar , the eldest son of al-Mustansir, and publicly spoke out in favor of his designation as future imam. In doing so, however, he had once again opposed the vizier, who at that time had married the four-year-old Prince Ahmad to one of his daughters and had promoted his successor for the highest spiritual dignity of the Ismaili Shia.

Hasan's continued quarrel with the vizier, who was also formally his superior in the mission leadership, finally resulted in his rival-ordered banishment from Egypt in January 1080. On a ship he was supposed to be taken from Alexandria to the far west ( maġrib ) with a few " Franks " , but he was able to get rid of his guard in the port city and go underground for several years. Eventually he was able to arrange a passage into the Levant, where he got caught in a severe storm, which Imam al-Mustansir had prophesied to him with the assurance that the ship would not sink. Driven by the storm to Gibelet under the rule of the Byzantine Empire , it headed from there to St. Symeon, the port of Antioch . Moving on from there via Aleppo and Baghdad , Hasan reached his native Isfahan on June 10, 1083.

Leader of the Persian Ismailis

In the years that followed, Hasan was incessantly engaged in recruiting new followers for the Ismaili imam. His superior Ibn Attasch must have died during this time, whereupon Hasan was able to take control of the Persian mission, displacing the son of his former master in it. His field of activity spanned almost all the Persian provinces, all of which he personally traveled to instruct his subordinates in the mission hierarchy. All of this had to be done in secret, under the eyes of the spy system of the hated Seljuks, especially in Isfahan, the main residence of their sultans. Probably also as a reaction to the Turkish foreign rulers, in the late 11th century local Persians showed themselves to be more receptive to Shiite teachings and joined the communities of the Twelve and the Ismailis in large numbers, which with the increasing success of the mission before the Seljuks did not let hide more. Their sultan at that time was Malik Shah I , but the most dangerous opponent of Hasan was to prove to be the sultan's ruling vizier Nizam al-Mulk , one of the most capable statesmen of his time and the real architect of the Seljuk state. The later legend of Hasan's relationship to the vizier of the Seljuks portrayed a lifelong archenemy, according to which they both competed as courtiers for the favor of the Sultan Alp Arslan (d. 1072) at a young age . When Hasan was inferior to his rival in this contest, he not only broke with his loyalty to the sultan, but also fell into religious heresy and since then has the sultans, their loyal servant Nizam al-Mulk and orthodox Islam with irreconcilable hatred fights.

Hasan's identity as the leader of the Ismailis branded as heretic was soon revealed, whereupon a wanted note was made for him, but he was always able to evade the grip of the state authorities anew. Also thanks to the support of his followers, who practiced unshakable loyalty to him. He had advanced to become the undisputed leader of the Ismailis in Persia, of whom he was soon dubbed “Our Lord” (sayyidnā) . As the highest present authority of the Shia in this part of the Muslim world, at the epicenter of Seljuk-Sunni power, the Ismailis have put all their trust in the leadership skills of their chief missionary in a successful resistance struggle. Together they shared the fate of incessant persecution, and the mutual ties between the missionary and his followers were correspondingly close. The authorities of the senior missionary and the imam, who were formally in the hierarchy above Hasan, resided almost unreachable in distant Cairo, were tied up in the military defensive struggle in Syria and were thus hardly able to provide their supporters in Persia with effective support. The legends surrounding the Persian Ismailis, which soon began to emerge, interpreted their loyalty in a blind duty of obedience to their leader, according to which Hasan's disciples willingly abducted themselves with a knife and thrown themselves from the walls of their fortresses to their death. At least that is the story of the Baghdad scholar Ibn al-Jschauzi (d. 1201) in his work “The Devil's Deceptions” (Talbīs Iblīs) .

Hasan's absolute authority over his Schia was based not least on his role model-giving lifestyle and religious convictions. With the radical zeal of a convert he defended the legitimacy of the Ismaili imamate, whose interpretation (taʾwīl) of divine revelation he had made entirely his own. His scholarship in religious matters as well as his leadership in political affairs was beyond question. The piety of one subject to revelation ( Muslim ), which he exemplified in the strictest asceticism, served his followers as an example of an exemplary lifestyle and was imitated by them. Even opponents of faith from the ranks of the Sunnah could not avoid recognizing Hasan's unconditional observance of the law derived from Revelation ( šarīʿa ) , in which he did not tolerate any compromises and in which he often surpassed many of his contemporaries to the extreme. He condemned one of his two sons to death because he had devoted himself to drinking wine in violation of God's commandments.

The state of Alamut

The pressure of persecution on Hasan had finally made his missionary work in the big cities such as Isfahan, Ray and Qom impossible, whereupon he had to relocate his work to the more rural regions of Persia, as the Ismaili Shia were now forced to largely emigrate from the urban milieu. His field of activity is now focused on the on the south coast of the Caspian Sea lying regions Gilan , Daylam , Tabaristan and Mazadaran , all from the mountain of Alborz are detected, the valleys offered a safe refuge for his community, as they not only isolated from the domination centers the Seljuks, but also because of their geographical nature, were difficult to access. He quickly succeeded in turning the urban centers of these landscapes such as Qazvin , Rudbar , Gorgan and Damgan into strongholds of his community, from which he was able to convert the village communities in the remote valleys just as quickly.

The rock of Alamut.

But his strategic approach included above all the acquisition of military properties, of which Rudbar in particular with his fortified mountain peaks had several of them, which could serve as places of retreat for the community in times of violent confrontation. All of these fortresses were held by Seljuk garrisons and the Ismailis had no military resources to enable them to carry out protracted sieges. In order to achieve their goal, they had therefore relied on a tactic devised by Hasan, which was still used in the future as a weapon in the fight against enemies. Their first target was the mountain fortress Alamut, one of the most strongly fortified and also the most difficult to conquer castles in the Elburs. But instead of gathering a siege army around them, which Hasan did not have at their disposal, he let the castle garrison infiltrate gradually with every change of personnel by devout Ismailis in the camouflage of Seljuk mercenaries. In some cases he had also succeeded in secretly persuading other soldiers to convert to the Ismaili creed and thus to pull them to his side. When his supporters were finally in the majority under the castle garrison, Hasan, disguised as a teacher, gained access to the fortress himself on September 4, 1090, where he instructed the children of the castle garrison outside. When he saw the appropriate time for dawn, he ordered his supporters to drop the masquerade against the castle commander, who was taken by surprise to realize that he had been surrounded by enemies for some time. The castle commandant, who was born in Aliden , was not only lost his life, he was also compensated by Hasan with the purchase price of 3,000 gold dinars for the loss of the fortress, whereupon he and his few remaining loyal soldiers could leave in free escort.

So the fortress of Alamut passed into the possession of the Ismailis without a fight, who chose Hasan as his new headquarters. Allegedly he had not left the "eagle's nest " (from the Persian Olah amūt ) until the end of his life thirty-four years later. He is also said to have only left his house there on two occasions and only to have climbed the roof twice. Only the closest people of trust and the closest subordinates in the hierarchy of command were allowed to visit him there to receive instructions. Otherwise, however, he had used the seclusion for the study of learned scriptures and his own writing. With this form of self-chosen isolation, Hasan laid the foundation for the legend of the invisible and mysterious master. The habitus of the withdrawn ascetic, who lived under modest conditions, had been imitated into contemporary history and thus decisively influenced the image of the radical Islamist leader. The capture of Alamut sparked the general uprising. In quick succession, with the same procedure, further fortresses were occupied by his followers, which suggests that strategic planning had taken place long in advance. The tactic of infiltration was not limited to taking possession of certain localities. As it turned out, Hasan had succeeded in the previous years in persuading some regional governors to convert to Ismailism, who after winning Alamut on his instructions gave up their loyalty to the Seljuk Sultan and now confessed to him. In a stroke of a hand he was able to take possession of a compact ruling territory including several fortifications, with which he in fact established a proper Ismaili state in what is now northern Iran. The separation of a separate principality with the claim to sovereignty over the Seljuk Sultanate, however, was not Hasan's objective. His activities were understood by him and his followers as a resistance movement against a hated foreign rule, with the ultimate goal of eliminating it and, ultimately, the Sunni Abbasid caliphate. Continuing to advertise his imam as the sole rightful caliph, Hasan continued to exert his influence throughout Persia. Further fortresses and entire stretches of land were able to win his supporters in the mountainous region of Quhestan in what is now eastern Iran. And some positions around the capital Isfahan were soon under his authority.

Willingness to make sacrifices

The emergence of a Shiite opposition directed against them could not be accepted by the Seljuks without reaction. Already in the year after the capture of Alamut, vizier Nizam al-Mulk sent an army to recapture it. Because the fortress 'storerooms were not yet full at this point in time, the defenders' resilience threatened to wane due to the rapid onset of food shortages. But Hasan had succeeded in maintaining his people's perseverance. Among other things, with a faked letter from Imam al-Mustansir, which urged the community to persevere unconditionally. After all, it was the Seljuks who had to withdraw after their supplies ran out. A second attack on Alamut followed in 1092, but this time the Ismailis were better prepared for defense. While the enemy army was encamped in front of Alamut, the inhabitants of the valleys, organized in military communities, wore down the enemy's willingness to fight through fast night guerrilla attacks. In addition, they cut off his food supply, so that, like him the year before, he had to give up the siege again and withdraw.

Depiction of the assassination of the vizier Nizam al-Mulk in a Persian edition of the Chronicle of Rashid ad-Din, early 15th century. Topkapı Palace Museum Library ( TSMK H. 1653, fol. 360v).

The attack of 1092 was part of a larger offensive against pockets of resistance orchestrated by Nizam al-Mulk. Parallel to Alamut, he had also sent an army against the Ismailis of Quhestan, which besieged their headquarters, the castle of Dara near Tabas . Despite all the defensive successes of the past two years, Hasan had come to the conclusion that the movement he led was threatened with collapse under the continuing military pressure. His followers may know how to defend hilltop castles and guerrilla actions in difficult-to-access valley regions, but they lacked any military training for open field battles against the much better armed enemy, nor were they too numerous for such confrontations. Hasan's answer was to use more economical warfare, in which the enemy was to be hit directly on his head by means of a quick action. On October 14, 1092, the vizier Nizam al-Mulk set up camp for the night in the village of Sahneh near Nehawand during an inspection trip . As evening fell, he was being carried from his palace tent to his private tent in his litter, a young Sufi, a certain Bu Taher from Arran in the Dailam province, approached the litter. When the vizier lifted the curtain in a patronizing manner, the supposed supplicant immediately drew a knife hidden in his robe and stabbed the vizier with it, who immediately bled to death from the wound. Hasan is said to have commented on the death of his archenemy in just one sentence:

"The murder of this Satan is the beginning of bliss!"

The successful assassination attempt on the leading statesman of the Seljuq empire had shocked it; all military activities against the Ismailis were stopped immediately, ensuring their survival. As luck would have it, just a few weeks later, in November 1092, Sultan Malik Shah I also died of natural causes. The harmony between the Seljuks had come to an end when the sultan's sons claimed the throne and began to fight each other. Freed from the worst pressure of persecution, the Ismailis steadily fueled the dispute among their enemies by carrying out further attacks in quick succession against its leadership cadre. Any appearance of renewed unity among the enemy had to be suppressed. Soon the attacks were not restricted to political authorities, including local representatives of the state such as police officers and judges, or even religious leaders of the Sunna became declared targets as soon as they argued particularly zealously against Ismaili in their sermons or in their reports ( fatwā ) declared their interpretation of faith as heretical.

The political assassination represented an innovation in the repertoire for the confrontation of the Ismaili Shia with their enemies. The striving of the community and its leaders for political supremacy in the Muslim world had previously only the usual means of propaganda, preparation for insurrection and of course direct military means Known confrontation. The weakening of the enemy through the targeted elimination of his leadership cadre, however, was only devised and implemented by Hasan. The association of the political assassination with the supporters he led quickly influenced the opinion of the majority society in the Near and Middle East about them. In combination with the ability of infiltration, which they had already often practiced, it had given the community its very own characteristic, for which they became notorious beyond the borders of Persia, which was due not least to the way in which the crime was carried out. The assassins sent by Hasan usually struck at the time of day or in the presence of several witnesses. Central mosques were chosen as frequently chosen crime scenes, where they could strike from the crowd on the occasion of the Friday sermon. The presence of a bodyguard was not undesirable. Only a knife was used as a tool, which is why the perpetrators had to reach the selected target at least within arm's length. This practice was intended to create a psychological terror against the enemy, who could not feel safe at any time of the day, no matter where he was and how many bodyguards he was around. This so suggested power of the omnipresent threat was regularly demonstrated in spectacular attacks. For example, on August 8, 1100, an assassination squad murdered a high-ranking minister in the sultan's palace in Isfahan, only a few steps away from the private apartments of the present sultan Muhammad I. Tapar . This scenario was repeated on May 16, 1116, when the Emir Ahmadil al-Kurdi was stabbed to death by a three-man command in the presence of several high dignitaries of the state in the Sultan's Palace of Baghdad .

As a final consequence of this approach, the attackers assumed a high degree of willingness to make sacrifices. The traditional reports of the hostile Sunna had in it a heretical, because the precepts of Islam violated striving to commit suicide recognized, through which the assassins would have hoped to gain access to heavenly paradise. This claim first and foremost served to insinuate heresy, it quickly became independent and even found its way into reports by Christian authors, with which it finally became part of the "black legend" afflicted with the Ismailis. In fact, the willingness to make sacrifices required of the assassins was not connected with a request to consciously commit suicide. According to the Ismailis, the state of the paradisiacal original state of faith in God could only come about through the inspiration of their Imam. Nonetheless, the possibility of an assassin's own death was to be taken into account when carrying out the crime, especially if the selected target had a bodyguard corps. Escape planning also only played a subordinate role in preparation for the crime; The priority was to eliminate the target. Even the first "Devoted" ( fidā'ī ) had stumbled in his flight over a tent trick, so overtaken by the guards of the Nizam al-Mulk and were killed instantly. The possibility of his own death was understood by the Ismailis as the ultimate demonstration of personal purity of faith in the rightly guided Imam, in which the believer as a "martyr" (Sahid) with martyrdom his confession could prove unequivocally to this.

This special expression of the willingness to make sacrifices, which can be found in a different form in almost all belief concepts, in which the Ismailis inexplicably and apparently willingly accepted death for outsiders at the command of their master, had already led contemporary observers to try various explanations. Quite a few explained this by a magical power inherent in Hasan-i Sabbah, by means of which he made his followers into instruments of his will, who, following his commands, accepted their own death without hesitation. Such considerations were not limited to the repeated assassinations, and this also explained the unbroken influx of believers for the Ismaili doctrine, which had long since been condemned as heresy by the religious authorities, despite all persecution measures. In addition to an ominous magic power, the scholar Ibn al-Jschauzi (d. 1201) speculated a little later that the administration of a brew with hallucinogenic effects was behind the secret with which Hasan-i Sabbah had turned his followers into unwilling recipients of his orders. Ibn al-Jschauzi was the only one with this opinion in Muslim historiography, but the Ismailis of the Nizarite branch had long since been decried as "hashish people" (al-Ḥašīšiyyūn) , so that the assumption of drug consumption quickly became obvious lay. Thanks to the fantastic stories about the “old man from the mountains” conveyed by Marco Polo to the west of Europe, this aspect also became part of the “black legend” knitted around the Ismailis that surrounded this community well into the 20th century. The fact that behind the secret of the increasing spread of Ismaili teachings the missionary persuasiveness of Hasan-i Sabbah and behind the sacrifice of his followers their religious fanaticism may have been, was only incidentally taken into account by the writing observers of that time.

The Ismaili Schism

The history of the Muslim world in the Orient in the last decade of the 11th century is characterized by a series of turning points. The beginning of the Christian-European crusade movement fell during this time and with it the establishment of Christian feudal states along the Levant coast that began in 1097 and divided the Muslim world into two geographical areas like a wedge. This land grab was favored by a simultaneous process of decomposition within the two most important Muslim powers of that time, the Seljuks and the Fatimids. The collapse of the inner unity of the former was decisively promoted by the assassin of Nizam al-Mulk sent by Hasan in 1092. But the missionary also played a major role in the erosion of Fatimid power.

The political power of the Ismaili religious community had experienced its state-theoretical manifestation in the Fatimid caliphate. The caliph of the Fatimids was ex officio also the imam of the Ismailis. But while the caliphate was territorially limited to Egypt, Syria and parts of the Arabian Peninsula, the Shia following the Imam was present in all regions of the Muslim world, in Persia led by Hasan-i Sabbah. The cohesion of the Ismailis expressed itself in the recognition of a common spiritual head, the rightly guided "chief" (imām) . This recognition was based on the conviction of the designation (naṣṣ) of the holder of this dignity by his predecessor. The Imamate of the Ismailis was and is dynastically inherited; its owners are seen as direct descendants of Ali and the Prophet's daughter Fatima , from which their legitimation is derived. Hasan-i Sabbah, who spoke on behalf of the Persian religious community, recognized the imamate of al-Mustansir without reservation, even if the chief missionary, the almighty vizier Badr al-Jamali , still stood between the missionary and the imam in the clerical hierarchy to whom Hasan cultivated a negative, even hostile, attitude since his stay in Cairo. The hated vizier had died in the spring of 1094, but his son al-Afdal Shahanshah had succeeded him in both offices , and he continued seamlessly with his father's policy, which included control over the Imam-Caliph. In December of the same year al-Mustansir finally died and the vizier took care of the enthronement of the young prince Ahmad, who was also his brother-in-law, under the ruler's name al-Mustali in a quick coup-like action . Allegedly, he had previously received the legitimizing designation of the father as his successor. Prince Nizar, however, the firstborn of the late Imam-Caliph, claimed to have received such a designation years earlier and in turn made a claim to the throne. It did not take a year before the succession struggle in Cairo was decided. The defeated Prince Nizar was captured by the vizier and locked in a dungeon, in which he soon found death.

At his headquarters in distant Alamut, Hasan had no direct influence on the events in Cairo, but bearing in mind the personal closeness to Prince Nizar that he had there during his stay, his downfall could not be accepted without a reaction from him. According to his autobiography, Hasan is said to have been convinced of the designation in favor of Nizar since his time in Cairo, regardless of the fact that at the time he was unable to meet with al-Mustansir personally. To what extent his attitude was influenced by personal hostility towards the vizier family must remain unexplained. In any case, from his point of view, the succession to the throne in Cairo must have corresponded to a usurpation that had promoted a false imam to the head of the Ismaili Shia, while a shameful murder was committed on the rightful imam. The allegiance to the rightful Imam was and is essential for a believing Ismailite, for only a properly guided Imam guarantees the believer's participation in the inner / true meaning of the divine revelation recorded in the Koran. But only the one who was designated as a predecessor could be recognized as a properly guided imam. The death of Nizar could not be used as an argument in favor of an imamate of al-Mustali, since the inheritance of dignity can only take place in the strictest dynastic linearity from father to son. Now the actual power of Hasan-i Sabbah was to be revealed to his followers when he publicly condemned the succession of al-Mustali at the head of the religious community as usurpation and rejected it as unlawful. Instead of this, Nizar is the only legitimate, because designated imam, and consequently the community can only be led by him or by an imam descending from him. The entire Persian religious community stood united behind the declaration of their long-time leader, who renounced his loyalty to the mission leadership in Cairo. This marked the beginning of the split in the Ismaili Shia, which has continued to this day, because the co-religionists in Egypt and Yemen recognized the succession of al-Mustali as a fait accompli. Both of the splinter groups thus formed retained the Ismaili constitution of faith, each of them being the guardians, only that both groups now each followed their own line of imams.

For Hasan, the detachment of his congregation from the mission leadership in Cairo was accompanied by a not insignificant problem. Their recognized Imam Nizar was dead, which raised questions about the community's right to exist. Hasan avoided this question by referring to a concept that had already been tried and tested by the Ismailis by declaring the Imamate to have entered concealment (ġaiba) . In the meantime, however, his undisputed leadership authority as a guarantor (ḥuǧǧa) for the existence of the hidden imam had to guarantee the cohesion of the still young “followers of Nizar”, but a physically absent imamate could not remain a permanent solution, since it was with the claim to the continuation of true Ismailis it was not possible to agree that a present imamate demanded. This question remained unanswered during Hasan's lifetime. It was not until 1164 that the Nicarite-Ismailite imamate in Alamut was supposed to emerge from his concealment in the person of Imam Hassan II , who was considered the great-grandson of Nizar. According to the Nizarite historiography, Hasan-i Sabbah succeeded in evacuating a son of Nizar to Alamut during the battle for the throne in Cairo in 1094/95, which ensured the continuation of the imamate.

Assassins

The division of the Ismailis into two competing factions had promoted Hasan-i Sabbah to the political leader of just one of these, who can be called the Nizari-Ismailis, or Nizarites, for the sake of clarity. In this role his spatial influence had expanded beyond the borders of his Persian homeland. For it is not only here that the Ismailis committed themselves to the Imamate of Nizar, whom he supported. An important center of Ismaili was Syria, where it had always been represented and where its mission had once started. In contrast to Persia, when the schism broke out in 1094, the Shia split up into both factions. The majority joined the Mustali branch, but the Nizarites have been a significant minority here ever since. Both factions met here immediately adjacent in enmity, since each of them rejected the legality of the imamate of the other as usurpation. At the same time, both branches had to fight off the persecution of the ruling Seljuks here. The situation became more complicated in 1097 with the arrival of the Christian crusaders from Europe who, with the Kingdom of Jerusalem they founded , pushed a geopolitical wedge between Syria and Egypt. This had worked to the advantage of the Nizarites, since the Christians had cut off the Cairo-based leadership of their opponents from Syria, while all communication routes from Persia remained open. With all due consideration for the usual caution against the Seljuks in Syria, Hasan's mission was able to appear unrivaled and increase the following of his Shia. The geographical distance to Persia had given the Syrian Nizarite community a certain degree of autonomy. With the arrival of the Crusaders, they had to deal with different political conditions than their fellow believers in Persia. And yet they too recognized Hasan's leadership authority as the guarantor of the hidden imam. The leadership of the Syrian Nizarites was soon brought together under the leadership of a senior missionary who was hierarchically subordinate to and appointed by the guarantor. Most of the leaders of the Syrian Nizarites were also Persians, who introduced into Syria the practices already tried and tested in their homeland. The first assassination attempt was carried out here on May 1, 1103 in Homs .

From Cairo, the schism and the unfolding of the Nicarite competition in Syria went uncommented for more than two decades. The shrinking Fatimid caliphate had focused all its concentration on the defensive battle against the Crusaders. It was not until the assassination of the vizier al-Afdal Shahanshah on December 11, 1121 that the Cairo court compelled a statement. The murder was officially blamed on the Nizarites, which they willingly declared for themselves, since in their view the victim had carried the main responsibility for the schism. But some also suspected an overthrow within the palace, in which the caliph al-Amir wanted to get rid of his overpowering vizier and diverted his suspicions directed against the Nizarites. Al-Amir had succeeded his father al-Mustali, who died in 1101, in the dignity of the caliph and, as the new imam of the Mustali branch, he also took over the latter's claim to sole representation of all Ismailis. From the point of view of the Nizarites he was also considered an illegitimate usurper, while from his point of view they were considered apostates. The shifting of responsibility for the murder of the vizier had prompted al-Amir to issue a more detailed statement in which he intended to defend the legality of his imamate and the conduct of the vizier in 1094 against the position of the Nizarites. An expert opinion drawn up in December 1122 by the spiritual authorities in Cairo, who were admittedly sympathetic to him, had confirmed the existence of his father's designation for the successor to his grandfather, highlighted the falseness of the claim once made by Nizar and thus posthumously legitimized the actions of al-Afdal Shahanshah. At the same time, al-Amir's claim to the Imamate was confirmed as legitimate. Published as a missive, this report, the "Amir'sche Guideline" (al-Hidāya al-āmirīya) , was addressed to the supporters of al-Amir in Syria. But it was also sent to Alamut - "in the furthest Khorasan " - whose leadership there should explain whether their opposition to his imamate. According to the chronicler Ibn Muyassar (d. 1278), who later wrote about these events in detail , this request was addressed to Hasan-i Sabbah personally, who declared his support for the supposedly illegitimate Imamate of Nizar, or gave up completely and together with his followers to " Truth ” (ḥaqq) should return, that is, under the domination of al-Amir, with which a reunification of the Ismailis should be brought about.

The spiritual leader of Alamut, who does not appear by name, but can only be identified with Hasan-i Sabbah, had noted a short answer under the letter - "where there was still room" - and had it delivered to Cairo. The report was declared null and void and with it the legitimacy of the Imamate of the Mustalites; the division of the Ismailis was thus additionally cemented. In 1123 al-Amir reacted to this rejection by starting the propagandistic struggle against competition from Persia, for which he gave his supporters in Syria the pamphlet "The striking of the conquering lightning - refuting the arguments of the wicked" (Īqāʿ ṣawāʿiq al- irġām fī idḥāḍ ḥuǧaǧ ulaʾika l-liʾām) sent precise instructions. Interesting is the choice of words used by al-Amir, who twice denigrated the Nizarites as "hashish people" (al-Ḥašīšiyyūn) , which is why he was responsible for the earliest known use of this term in connection with the Nizarites. Especially in the Middle East, this defamation became common practice in relation to the Nizarites, with a corresponding impact in the writing guild of that time. With the Christians of the Crusader states living in the immediate vicinity, this group became known exclusively through the corruption of this term, which was adopted from the Arabic into its Latin. Because of its ongoing association with the ominous murderer sect from the Orient, this term is used in all Romance languages ​​and in English as the word for "assassin / assassination attempt". Only after the death of Hasan-i Sabbah did the Nizarites give an answer in their very own way, when one of their assassination teams murdered al-Amir on October 7, 1130 while riding in Cairo.

Late years

In the turmoil of the civil war that broke out among the Seljuks in 1092, the movement led by Hasan-i Sabbah continued to prosper and gain new positions throughout Persia. In October 1096 the second great fortress was won in Dailam, that of Lamassar , followed in 1100 by Gerdkuh near Damgan, both of which were in no way inferior in strength to those of Alamut. Also in the year 1100 the Nizarites took the castle Shah-Dez ("royal castle"), which was only a few kilometers away from the capital Isfahan, for which a son of Hasan's old teacher Ibn Attasch was responsible drew. At the same time, more and more assassinations were carried out against the leadership of the Seljuks. The military power of the Seljuks was undermined by the infiltration of entire regiments of their army with Nizarites. The reaction followed the end of the fratricidal war in 1105, after Sultan Muhammad I Tapar was able to assert himself as sole ruler. On July 25, 1107, after a long struggle, he succeeded in retaking Shah-Dec. During the two-month siege, the Sultan took the opportunity of an interdenominational dialogue with the Nizarites. In this dispute their representatives insured in a report prepared by them (fatwa) the religious scholars of the Sultan, the absolute submission (Islam) the followers of their Shia under the transmitted by the Prophet revelation of God in obedience to the commands derived from it (šarī'a) . Their beliefs would not differ fundamentally from those subject to the Sunnah (muslimūn) , only on the question of legitimate leadership over the entire community would exist. The main purpose of this was to reject the charge of heresy, but this declaration was rejected by the opposing party as not being true, and the dispute ended without result. After the castle fell, all captured Nizarites were executed as heretics and rebels, including the son of Ibn Attash.

Against Alamut, new offensives were launched in 1108 and 1109, but the Nizarites were always able to defend themselves successfully. On the occasion of the siege undertaken in 1109, a religious debate was held here too, in which Hasan-i Sabbah was likely to have personally participated. As with Shah-Dec, it ended with no result. Throughout the Middle Ages, the Nizarites, like Ismailis in general, were to remain afflicted with the smell of heresy as a consequence of the dogmatic fronts that hardened in the 11th and 12th centuries. The recognition of their theological affiliation to the "house of submission" ( dār al-islām ) remained unmatched for Hasan-i Sabbah throughout his life. One of the most serious allegations directed against him personally was the allegation that he was doing propaganda for a new religion. The verdict on him and his followers fell accordingly in the then prevailing historiography, in which he was stylized as an arch heretic par excellence and his followers were regarded as sectarians who were misguided by him. Only in the beginning of modern times, after the end of the Turkish and Mongolian rule, was his Shia attested to this recognition, at least in Persia of the native Shiite Safavid dynasty . It still exists today with a physically present imamate, to whom the majority of all Ismailis have followed since the late 19th century. The successful formation of the Shia of the Nizari-Ismailites is without a doubt the most lasting and momentous result in the historical work of Hasan-i Sabbah.

In the summer of 1117 the Seljuks launched their last large-scale offensive against the Nizarites; Alamut and Lamassar were placed under siege at the same time. And as in 1092, the impending doom was thwarted by death. After Sultan Muhammad I died on April 18, 1118, the enemy armies dispersed and the sultanate fell apart again and now finally in the struggles of the late Seljuks. This was followed by the propaganda confrontation with the Mustali Ismailis in 1122/23. In May 1124 Hasan fell ill. Only lying on his death bed did he arrange the succession over the leadership of the Nizarites before his death on the night of May 23, 1124 (6th Rabīʿ ath-thānī 518 AH ). He had survived his own two sons because he himself had once ordered their execution. One because he had surrendered to the consumption of wine in violation of God's commandments, the other because he had mistakenly suspected him of betraying himself and the imam. In addition to the sons, Hasan is also mentioned as the father of several daughters whom he and their mother sent to Gerdkuh after 1100, where they led a simple life. Hasan appointed his long-time confidante Kiya Buzurg-Umid , the conqueror of Lamassar, as the new leader of the Shia, while the imamate continued to remain in secrecy. According to an editor of his autobiography, Hasan-i Sabbah led a life of strict asceticism, piety and fear of God until his death. He was buried in a specially built mausoleum near Alamut, which became a much visited place of pilgrimage for his Shia until it was destroyed by the Mongols in 1256.

Written estate

Not uncommon for a Shiite cleric, Hasan-i Sabbah was known for his literary work and is said to have left behind an extensive literary oeuvre on his death. This work has not passed on to posterity in the original, after all, the Nizarite-Ismailite legacy of scriptures fell as a product of a doctrine of regular waves of destruction recognized as heresy. Especially after the fall of Alamut in 1256 by the Mongols, their library, which is known for its large collection of books, was subjected to a thorough review, after which all writings that had been declared heretical were destroyed.

Responsible for this was the secretary of the Mongol rulers Ata al-Mulk Dschuwaini (d. 1283), who was a staunch Sunni and who described the fall of the heretic state of Alamut in his own work "The History of the World Conqueror " ( Tāriḫ-e Ǧihān- gušā ) in its last chapters. Dschuwaini had taken over entire passages from the autobiography of Hasan-i Sabbah, which was entitled "The Adventures of Our Lord" (Sar-guzašt-e Sayyidnā) and was written in Farsi , going into more detail on the history of Ismailism . The drafting of personal vitae was and is widespread in Shiite circles. They serve to highlight one's own merits to the Shia and to document the ideological proximity to the Imam. After Dschuwaini, his student Raschid ad-Din (d. 1318) had the opportunity to read the autobiography and to quote it in his "Sum of the Chronicles" ( Ǧāmiʿ at-tavārīḫ ) , here even more extensively than with his teacher. Since both authors, as followers of the Sunnah, have not faced the missionary person and the Shia led by him with an open mind, it must remain open to what extent they made changes to their work when editing his vita. A comparison can no longer be made because the original work has not been preserved. A third author who quoted the Vita in detail is Kaschani (d. 1337) in his "Quintessence of the Chronicles" (Zubdat at-Tavārīḫ) . Their works are thus the main source for the biography of Hasan-i Sabbah. In all cases it is uncertain to what extent the copyists copied from the same manuscript.

The three Persian authors were also familiar with the theological treatise “The Four Chapters” (al-Fuṣūl-e arbaʿa) written in Farsi , which is only cited in fragments in the “Book of Groups and Beliefs” (Kitāb al-milal waʾl-niḥal) des al-Shahrastani (d. 1153), which was written around 1127. In this book, Ismaili beliefs are explained in detail. Since it was supposed to serve as a spiritual guide for their mediators, the clerical leader Hasan-i Sabbah, who was above them at the time, is suspected to be behind their authorship.

Hasan's authorship of a letter addressed to Sultan Malik Shah I and dated between 1083 and 1092 is considered certain, which, as a reply to a request from the Sultan, defends the author's religious views and, above all, the accusation of propagating a new religion rejects. Personal details described here, such as a trip to Egypt and a dispute with the vizier Badr al-Jamali, point to Hasan-i Sabbah as the author.

literature

  • Christopher de Bellaigue: In the rose garden of the martyrs. A portrait of Iran. From the English by Sigrid Langhaeuser, CH Beck, Munich 2006 (English original edition: London 2004), pp. 324–329
  • Farhad Daftary , The Ismāʿīlīs: Their History and Doctrines. Cambridge University Press 1990.
  • Farhad Daftary, The Assassin Legends: Myths of the Ismaʿilis. London 1994.
  • Farhad Daftary, Ismaili Literature: A Bibliography of Sources and Studies. London 2004.
  • Farhad Daftary, Ismailis in Medieval Muslim Societies. London 2005.
  • Willi Frischauer , The Aga Khans . The Bodley Head. London 1970. p. 40. ISBN 0-370-01304-2
  • Asaf Ali Asghar Fyzee , al-Hidayatu'l-amiriya, Being an Epistle of the Tenth Fatimid Caliph al-Amir bi-ahkāmi'l-lāh. London 1938.
  • Heinz Halm , caliphs and assassins. Egypt and the Middle East at the time of the First Crusades 1074–1171. CH Beck, Munich 2014.
  • Heinz Halm, The Assassins. History of an Islamic secret society (= CH Beck Wissen 2868). CH Beck, Munich 2017.
  • Bernard Lewis , The Assassins. A Radical Sect in Islam. London 1967. As a translation into German (by Kurt Jürgen Huch), Die Assassinen. On the tradition of religious murder in radical Islam. Frankfurt am Main 2001.

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Remarks

  1. The uncertainty in determining the place of birth results from the processing of the Hasan Vita by the three Persian chroniclers of the 13th and 14th centuries. Ray named the first of them, Dschuwaini, as the place of birth, although he had allowed himself a few careless shortenings in his editing. See Lewis, p. 200, note 1. The one that took place with Raschid ad-Din and Kaschani was much more detailed, and both give Qom as the place of birth of Hasan before his family moved on to Ray. For Qom see Lewis (2001), p. 63; Daftary (1990), p. 311, (2005), p. 127. For Ray Halm (2014), p. 66, (2017), p. 17.
  2. This term is derived from the root Arabic ام, DMG amma , “go ahead, lead (by way of example)” and is related to Arabic امة, DMG umma  'Nation, Volk' andام, DMG umm 'mother' (cf. H. Wehr: Arabic dictionary for the written language of the present , Wiesbaden 1968, p. 22).
  3. See Halm (2014), p. 76.
  4. For an overview of the texts ascribed to him and their editions, see Daftary (2004), p. 114 ff.
predecessor Office successor
Alamut captured by the Seljuks Ruler of Alamut
1090–1124
Kiya Buzurg-Umid