Battle of Cherkassy

The battle of encirclement west of Cherkassy ( Russian Корсунь-Шевченковская операция was Korsun-Schewtschenkowsker surgery) part of the Dnieper-Carpathian Offensive and lasted from 24 January to 17 February 1944. The combat action took place on the middle Dnieper during the Second World War at the Eastern Front . In addition to the infantry troops, up to four Soviet tank armies were also involved in this operation. The fighting took place in the middle of winter and included dramatic battles in which the bulk of the German 8th Army was surrounded by Soviet troops and suffered heavy losses when it broke out.

prehistory

In the second half of January 1944, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front ( Army General Nikolai Watutin ) had reached the Korosten - Kazatin - Kanev line after the Zhitomir-Berdychev operation . The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front were stretched over 600 kilometers and consisted of seven armies and several armored armies. While the left flank was still anchored on the Dnieper River , the right flank extended into the Sarny area more than 300 kilometers west of the Dnieper. After the Kirovograd operation , the 2nd Ukrainian Front (Colonel General Ivan Konjew ) was on the advance until January 16, the new front strengthened on 250 kilometers east of Smela, west of Kirovograd to north of Novgorodka . Konev's front consisted of six armies and one tank army, one cavalry and three mechanized corps were in reserve. The seam line to the 1st Ukrainian Front ran on the Dnieper southeast of Kanev. The 73rd Rifle Corps (Major General Batizki ) of the 52nd Army had liberated Cherkassy on December 14th with the 373rd, 254th and 294th Rifle Divisions, then on the right, the 206th Rifle Division of the 27th Army secured the Dnieper section.

Situation of the 8th Army before the offensive

German Panzer IV

On the opposing side, the German 8th Army was under General of the Infantry Otto Wöhler . It existed next to the III. Panzer Corps from the XI. and XXXXII. Army corps with 14 divisions (including three tank divisions and one motorized brigade) with around 170,000 soldiers, 2,600 guns and 310 tanks. At the line Kanev - Swenigorodka - Smela the German 8th Army held a front of 90 kilometers from south to north and on the Dnieper 125 km front from east to west. On the right wing of the 8th Army on the border with the 1st Panzer Army , the XI. Army Corps a longer front than the XXXXII. Army Corps. The northeastern section of the front projecting towards the Dnieper did not permit large-scale operations because the area there was swampy and large forests made movement difficult. The remnants of the 112th , 255th and 332nd Infantry Divisions , which had already been combined in Corps Division B , were deployed here. The front between Moschny and Smela was criss-crossed by heavily irrigated areas and almost inaccessible to heavy equipment. Numerous rivers, ravines with steep slopes and numerous large settlements reinforced the German defense lines. The defense system of the trenches and the communication links were well developed, and a large number of bunkers reinforced the positions. The most important bases in front of the front and on the flanks were secured with minefields and wire barriers. The river Tjasmyn crossing there could be used as a line of defense by the 389th Infantry Division deployed there .

The strongest German defense line was created in the section between Kagarljk and Moschny. The first position ran along the banks of the Tjasmyn and the heights beyond. The second line of defense ran over the Gniloi Taschlyk and Tischkowka, but was not fully developed. The position was extended to the southeast along the Olshanka section, on the Mlejew and Topilno site. The area south of Olschany was not so well developed by the German defense. In the area west and north-west of Kirovograd there were several German tank divisions during the Kirovograd operation , two of which were still in the 8th Army reserves. In the area southwest of Ochmatow there were further tank reserves of the 1st Panzer Army, which could be quickly relocated to the Korsun area. On January 22nd, the XI. Army corps between Smela and Bereznjaki local defensive battles, especially the area Balandino - Krasnoselka was fiercely contested. The aerial reconnaissance revealed that the Red Army was concentrating new forces between Balandino-Krasnoselka. The 389th Infantry Division was attacked south of Balandino, the Soviet attacks were repulsed. As a precautionary measure, the 8th Army command decided to pull out the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions to create a reserve. The attacks of the Soviet troops between Balandino and Krasnoselka continued throughout the evening with artillery fire, Soviet attacks were concentrated in the east of the village of Burtki.

For the planned offensive, the Stawka sent strong reinforcements to the 1st Ukrainian Front: from January 22nd to February 3rd, around 400 new T-34 tanks were sent to the front to replenish the armored forces there. In accordance with the directive of the High Command, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts began to prepare the offensive operation. The command of the 1st Ukrainian Front concentrated its strike group east of Stavishche . The troops on the left flank of the 40th Army with the 47th Rifle Corps (167th and 359th Rifle Divisions) and the 104th Rifle Corps (58th and 133rd Rifle Divisions) became the right flank of the 27th Army with the 180th and 337th Rifle Divisions reinforced. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, previously part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, also came to the 2nd Ukrainian Front as reinforcements.

Soviet attack planning

Army General Ivan Konev

The start of the Soviet offensive was initially set for January 25, 1944 at 8:30 a.m., but it was initiated one day earlier. According to the Stavka directive of January 20, the main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, consisting of the 53rd Army , the 4th Guards Army and two mechanized corps, had to attack Zvenigorodka and Novo-Mirgorod and to communicate with the forces at Shpola of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 5th Guards Panzer Army (18th, 20th and 29th Panzer Corps with 218 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns) was to enter in the area of ​​the 53rd Army and break through via Shpola in the direction of Zvenigorodka. The 4th Guards and the 53rd Army had to deploy 14 rifle divisions on a 19 km front between Werbowka and Wasiliwka in the direction of Shpola and Zvenigorodka. In addition to this main attack, two side attacks were to take place with the 5th and 7th Guard Army west and southwest of Kirovograd and the 52nd Army in the direction of Maloje Staroselje and Gorodishche in order to tie up the German tank reserves in the Kirovograd area. As soon as the attacks of the 5th and 7th Guards Army had diverted attention from the actual main attack section, the offensive of the 52nd Army was to begin in close cooperation with the actual main strike group. The left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, consisting of the 5th Guards Panzer Corps and a combined group of the 27th Army, consisting of the 337th and 180th Rifle Divisions, was to attack eastwards at Talnoje one day later and then break through to Shpola . The group destined for the main attack to the east consisted of the 6th Panzer Army, the 47th Rifle Corps and the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army . According to these plans, the armies were given the following tasks: The 4th Guards Army, (7 rifle divisions, one in the second squadron) with a firepower of up to 100 guns per kilometer (including 82 mm and 120 mm mortars), should be the front attack between Werbowka and Balandino over a width of 10 kilometers. This army was supported by the 52nd Army on the right on the Gniloi Tashlyk River. The 53rd Army on the left (10 rifle divisions, including one in the second squadron) had to break through on the front line from Balandino to Wasiliwka in a width of 9 kilometers and to advance on Tischkowka and Meschirowka. The 5th Guards Panzer Army, destined for the operational breakthrough, was to be introduced in the 53rd Army section before the evening of the first day of the attack and to reach the Shuravka, Listopadowo and Tashkowka lines to a depth of 24 kilometers, then to 50 km by the end of the second day of the attack advance further towards Wasilkowka, Skotorewo and Krymki. Depending on the situation, this army should then continue the attacks against Zvenigorodka or Petrakowka. In the north, the 52nd Army led a supporting attack along the left flank in the direction of Gorodishche .

The 6th Panzer Army , destined for the main strike on the 1st Ukrainian Front, was not set up until January 21st. It consisted of the 5th Guards Panzer Corps and the 5th Mechanized Corps, there were initially no further forces to reinforce. The previous commander of the 5th Guards Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General Andrei Kravchenko , had been appointed commander of the 6th Panzer Army. On January 26th, this army comprised only 91 tanks and 16 self-propelled guns; the 47th Rifle Corps was also added as reinforcements during the operation. After the 6th Panzer Army had penetrated the German defense, it was to advance to Zvenigorodka and establish contact with the 5th Guards Panzer Army. In the meantime, units of the 40th Army (the 136th Rifle Division, a regiment of the 167th Rifle Division and the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade) were to carry out attacks in the Basow, Rizino and Jankow regions. The 40th Army's strike group (51st and 104th Rifle Corps) was tasked with breaking through the German defense front between Tynowka and Kosjakowka and covering the entire operation from the south. The divisions of the 27th Army were supposed to break through the opposing defenses between Kosjakowka and Koshevatoje and develop the offensive on Korsun . The operational preparations are to be continued, even if intensive fighting is already taking place at the front.

Participating Soviet armed forces

The forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Front destined for the first attacks totaled 27 rifle divisions with 255,000 men, plus a mechanized corps and four armored corps with almost 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. About 5,300 guns and grenade launchers and 1,054 aircraft were used in the double attack. At the climax of the Kesselschlacht, around 45 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions with around 336,000 soldiers were deployed in addition to the tank armies.

Left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front

27th Army : Lieutenant General Sergei Georgievich Trofimenko

• 180th, 206th and 337th Rifle Divisions
• 54th and 159th fortified room
• 298th Guards, 713th and 1892th Artillery Regiments

6th Panzer Army : Lieutenant General Andrei Grigoryevich Kravchenko

• 5th Mechanized Corps, Lieutenant General MW Volkov (2nd, 9th and 45th Mechanized Brigade)
• 233rd Panzer Brigade, Major General MI Saveliev
• 5th Armored Guard Corps, Lieutenant General WM Alexejew (20th, 21st and 22nd Guard Armored Brigade, 6th Guard Mechanized Brigade)

40th Army : Lieutenant General Filipp Feodosjewitsch Schmatschenko

• 47th Rifle Corps (74th, 167th and 359th Rifle Divisions)
• 104th Rifle Corps (58th, 133rd and 136th Rifle Divisions)
• 50th Rifle Corps (4th Airborne Guard Division, 38th, 240th and 340th Rifle Divisions)
• 51st Rifle Corps (42nd Guards, 163rd and 232nd Rifle Divisions)

Parts of the 1st Panzer Army

• 11th Guards Panzer Corps: Lieutenant General Andrei Getman (40th, 44th, and 45th tank brigade, and 27th motorized rifle brigade)
• Independent 156th Panzer Regiment

Front reserve:

(from February 6th) 2nd Panzer Army , Lieutenant General Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov

• 11th Panzer Corps: Major General Filipp Nikitowitsch Rudkin (20th, 36th and 65th Tank Brigade, and 12th Motorized Rifle Brigade)
• 16th Panzer Corps: Major General Iwan Wassiljewitsch Dubowoi (107th, 109th and 164th tank brigade and 15th motorized rifle brigade)

(from February 11th) 47th Army , Lieutenant General Vitali Polenow

• 106th Rifle Corps (58th, 133rd, 359th Rifle Division)
• 67th Rifle Corps (151st, 221st and 302nd Rifle Divisions)
• 6th Guards Cavalry Corps (8th and 13th Guards, 8th Cavalry Divisions)

2nd Ukrainian front

Commander: Army General Ivan S. Konev

52nd Army : Lieutenant General Konstantin Apollonowitsch Korotejew

• 78th Rifle Corps (62nd Guards Rifle Division, 7th Guards Airborne Division)
• 73rd Rifle Corps (254th, 294th and 373rd Rifle Divisions)
• 173rd Armored Brigade
• 378th and 379th independent tank battalions

4th Guard Army : Major General Alexander I. Ryschow , from February 2nd General Ivan K. Smirnov

• 20th Guards Rifle Corps (5th Guards Airborne Division, 66th Guards and 375th Rifle Divisions)
• 21st Guards Rifle Corps (69th Guards and 138th Rifle Divisions)
• 27th anti-aircraft artillery division
• 33rd Armored Artillery Brigade

5th Guards Panzer Army : Lieutenant General Pavel Alexejewitsch Rotmistrov

• 18th Panzer Corps, Major General VI Poloskov (110th, 170th and 181st Tank Brigade, 32nd Mechanized Brigade)
• 29th Panzer Corps, Major General Ivan Fyodorowitsch Kiritschenko (25th, 31st and 32nd Panzer Brigade, 53rd Mechanized Brigade)
• 20th Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General IG Laszarjew (8th Guard, 80th and 155th Tank Brigade, 7th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade)
• 116th Armored Brigade

53rd Army : General Ivan Vasilyevich Galanin

• 48th Rifle Corps (14th Guards, 252nd and 299th Rifle Divisions)
• 75th Rifle Corps (116th, 213rd, 214th and 233rd Rifle Division)
• 25th, 66th, 78th, 80th, 89th and 138th Rifle Divisions
• 34th separate tank regiment
• 16th Artillery Breakthrough Division

Front reserve

• 49th Rifle Corps (6th and 94th Guards, 84th Rifle Divisions)
• 26th Guards Rifle Corps (25th Guards, 6th and 31st Rifle Divisions)
• 33rd Rifle Corps (50th and 297th Rifle Divisions, 89th Guards Rifle Division)
• 8th Mechanized Corps (66th, 67th, 68th Mechanized Brigade)
• 5th Mechanized Guards Corps (24th Guards Tank Brigade, 10th, 11th and 12th Guards Mechanized Brigade)
• 11th and 26th anti-aircraft artillery divisions

5th Guards Cavalry Corps : Lieutenant General Alexei Gordejewitsch Seliwanow

• 11th and 12th Guards and 63rd Cavalry Divisions

course

Attack by the 2nd Ukrainian Front

Two-sided pincer attack by the Soviet fronts

On January 24th, the 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked with the 4th Guard Army and the 53rd Army from the east in the direction of Shpola . The attack was well prepared and came as a surprise to the German command. After a short, strong artillery strike, the attack of the Soviet infantry battalions followed on a 16 km front. Between Werbowka and Wasiliwka the German 389th Infantry Division had to retreat to intermediate positions behind them. By the end of the day, the German front was indented to a depth of 2 to 6 km.

The main forces of the 4th Guards and 53rd army sat on the morning of January 25 their offensive continued in the afternoon also attacked the 5th Guards Tank Army under General Rotmistrov one working in the field of 53. Army between Kochanówka to Butyrki was introduced . The army had 156 operational tanks and self-propelled guns. These included 49 tanks in the 18th Panzer Corps, 42 in the 29th Panzer Corps and 51 in the 20th Panzer Corps. The 20th and 29th Panzer Corps formed the first meeting. The 18th Panzer Corps, which followed behind the 29th Panzer Corps, formed the second squadron and was supposed to protect the left flank during the advance. General IG Laszarew, the commander of the 20th Panzer Corps, deployed the 8th Guards and 155th Panzer Brigades in the front meeting and reinforced the attack with the mobile artillery regiments in 1895 and 1834 and a battery of the anti-tank artillery regiment 1505. motorized rifle brigade followed in the second season. The corps commander kept the 80th Tank Brigade and the 406th Guards Mortar Battalion in reserve. The 20th Panzer Corps was to take Shuravka at the end of the day and force the advance on Lebedin . The 29th Panzer Corps was introduced at Turia in the area of ​​the 75th Rifle Corps on the left flank of the 20th Panzer Corps and was to advance towards Lipjanka by the end of the day . After intense fighting, at the end of the day the troops of the 4th Guard Army had penetrated the eastern part of Telepino and Radvanovka , the armed forces of the 53rd Army had occupied Pisarewka and Reimentirowka.

Army General Konjew and General Rotmistrow watch the deployment of the 5th Guards Tank Army

On the second day of the attack, the depth of the penetration on the German front had been extended to 22 kilometers, and Werbowka was occupied by Soviet troops. The 8th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel WF Orlow), supported by the self-propelled artillery regiments in 1834 and 1895, pushed the German forces out of the area to the east of Kapitanowka. Around noon, the 155th Panzer Brigade encompassed Tishkovka from the north and approached the eastern outskirts of Shuravka. At the end of the second day of the attack, the units of the 20th and 29th Panzer Corps had reached the Kapitanowka-Tischkowka line and on the third day extended the penetration to a depth of 32 kilometers.

The planes of the 2nd Air Force (1st Ukrainian Front) and 5th Air Army (2nd Ukrainian Front) protected the Soviet attacking forces. In January, the units and formations of these air armies carried out 14,739 sorties, including 5,140 assault, 3,386 bomber and 6,213 combat missions. The most violent aerial battles occurred over the sector of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. By the end of January there were 402 air battles in which 272 enemy aircraft were destroyed.

The decisive battle from January 26th

Attack by Soviet tanks in the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky area

The following day, the Soviet offensive developed successfully in depth: After the breakthrough of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies along the Shuravka and Novo-Mirgorod line, the attack wedge was concentrated in the area northeast of Kapitanowka in order to advance quickly into the enemy rear. The German 57th Infantry Division (Major General Trowitz ), which held a position on the Irdyn swamp drained by the River Tjasmyn (Irdyn) , was brought in to support the attacked 389th Infantry Division . This, however, was already largely destroyed by the Soviet attack, the remains of which was from the in Smela holding 72nd Infantry Division (Colonel Hohn added).

On the morning of January 26th, German counterattacks were launched in two directions in order to intercept the enemy tank corps that had broken in and to rectify the critical situation. The German XXXXVII. Panzer Corps also attacked from the south with three tank divisions, but immediately met strong resistance from the Soviet 5th Guard Army. In the west, too, where the 1st Ukrainian Front opened its offensive, the Soviet troops made a breakthrough at Boyarka.

The counterattacks of the 3rd, 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions (Colonel Unrein ) were carried out by units of the SS division "Wiking" (SS-Gruppenführer Gille ) from the woods west of Pastorskoje and by counterattacks by the 72nd and 389th Infantry Divisions (Major General Kurt Kruse) in the direction of Ositniaschka and Zlatopol as well as by units of the 106th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Werner Forst) in the direction of Ositniaschka. In the north of the already looming boiler operation, units of the 57th and 389th Infantry Divisions attacked the Soviet burglary wedge. The combat group Langkeit of the 14th Panzer Division received the order to counter-attack Ositniaschka. During this action, Soviet troops attacked southeast of Rossochowatka and threatened to cut off the 14th Panzer Division from the 3rd Panzer Division (Colonel Lang). The combat group Langkeit had to turn around immediately and try to re-establish the lost contact with the 3rd Panzer Division. The cut off battle group Brese of the 14th Panzer Division held positions on the hills west of Ositniaschka, but was already surrounded by Soviet troops. Instead of being able to stop the Soviet advance, Colonel von Brese had to watch as the majority of the 5th Guards Panzer Army advanced to Tischkowka and Kapitanowka.

While the 14th Panzer Division fought for their positions, the 11th Panzer Division was the last German hope to stop the Soviet march through. Before the start of the Soviet offensive, the 11th Panzer Division (Lieutenant General von Wietersheim ) had been withdrawn from the fighting area and relocated further south to the Novomirgorod area, and now they were returning to Novo Arkhangelsk in a hurry . It seemed likely that the 11th Panzer Division was able to advance further on the morning of January 27th, its success remained doubtful because of its low combat strength, although it had received the Assault Gun Battalion 905 as reinforcement. The latter fought its way west of Pisarowka to the 205.4 hill, while the 111th Panzer Grenadier Regiment invaded the southern district of Tischkowka. It was not only possible to take Tischkowka and the eastern outskirts of Kapitanowka, but also to cut off the rear lines of the 5th Guards Panzer Army. General Rotmistrow had already thrown the second squadron of his 5th Guards Panzer Army - the 18th Panzer Corps - into battle. At the same time, the 29th Panzer Corps was ordered to protect the Vodyanoje-Lipyanka line. The successes of the German 11th Panzer Division on the southern flank of the 5th Guards Panzer Army were unsettling for Rotmistrov, but did not prevent further advance. Since supplies were available, the Soviet 20th Panzer Corps was able to resume the offensive after Shuravka was occupied in the late afternoon. Two tank brigades continued in the valley northwest of Shuravka, and at 11 p.m. the Soviet vanguard penetrated the suburbs of Lebedin. The 29th Panzer Corps, operating on an axis south of the 20th Panzer Corps, made less progress, but had occupied Turija by the end of the day.

The advancing fresh armored troops of the Soviet 18th Panzer Corps (General VI Polotskow) were able to stop the enemy counterattacks and restore the interrupted communications . In the main direction of attack towards Zvenigorod, the offensive was continued by the 20th Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General IG Laszarew). The 155th Panzer Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel II Proschin) together with the 8th Guards Tank Brigade (Colonel Orlov) liberated Schpola on January 27th . In addition, the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps (General Seliwanow ) was thrown into battle. While the offensive on Marianowka and Olschana penetrated, the cavalry corps in the rear was supposed to cut off the enemy connections and disorganize the command. At the end of the day the 5th Guards Panzer Army had achieved the following points: The 29th Panzer Corps (Major General Kiritschenko ) had reached the front of Vodianoje, Lipyanka and Meschigorka; the 18th Panzer Corps had concentrated on the section Tischkowka and Pisarewka, the brigades of the 20th Panzer Corps consolidated the front between Schpola, Lebedin and Kapitanowka.

On January 28, the rifle units, which had advanced quickly behind the 20th Panzer Corps, reached the line Ekaterinovka - Pastorskoye - Shuravka - Tischkowka and Pisarewka. At the same time, with the advance of the armored corps towards Zvenigorodka, an external front was created along the lines Zvenigorodka, Shpola and Turija. The German 3rd Panzer Division (Colonel Lang) and the 18th Artillery Division were able to close the already lost connection with the German III. Restore armored corps. The Soviet front commander, on the other hand, ordered a series of regroupings aimed at strengthening the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies. In order to create a more stable outer front to the south, Konev decided to combine three divisions of the 53rd Army (6th Guard, 84th Guard and 94th Guard Divisions) to form the 49th Rifle Corps, which was assigned to the commander of the 5th Guard. Panzer Army was subordinated. The commander of this army received the order to prevent an enemy breakthrough from south to north and to hold the line Zvenigorodka, Jurkowka, Skotorewo and Wodianoje. The 20th Panzer Corps organized a permanent defense in the western and southwestern area of ​​Zvenigorodka, it was instructed to be ready to regroup in order to repel enemy counter-attacks. The 18th Panzer Corps was to be concentrated at Krymki and counterattacks in the direction of Jurkowka, Skotorewo and Lipyanka were to start. The 29th Panzer Corps had to prevent the enemy from advancing in the direction of Lebedin and Schpola. The next day the 20th Panzer Corps and the 233rd Panzer Brigade including the self-propelled artillery regiment 1228 captured Zvenigorodka.

The new German counter-attacks that had reached Schpola tried to cut off Soviet armored forces there. Together with the rifle units of the 4th Guards and 53rd Army, the troops of the 5th Guards Panzer Army were able to repel all German attacks. During the fighting, the towns of Kapitanowka, Tischkowka, Shurawka and Turija changed hands several times. With two of its brigades, the 20th Panzer Corps reached Zvenigorodka on January 28th, where it reached communication with the 233rd Tank Brigade and the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 5th Guards Panzer Corps (from the 1st Ukrainian Front). The distance between the brigades of the Soviet 20th Panzer Corps at Zvenigorodka and the 7th Guards-motorized rifle brigade in Shpola was almost 30 kilometers. Another interval of 10–12 kilometers also existed between the 7th Panzer Brigade and the right wing of the 29th Panzer Corps. The rifle units of the 53rd Army and the 2nd Squadron of the 5th Guards Panzer Army followed, the 18th Panzer Corps was still tied along the Kapitanowka and Tischkowka line. At the same time, the 29th Guards Panzer Corps had occupied the Towmach, Lipjanka and Meschigorka line, and the 18th Guards Panzer Corps repelled violent enemy tank attacks in the Zlatopol area. On January 28, the encirclement of the German group in the Korsun area was completed. But there were still a few passages through which German troops could break out of the encirclement. In order to create a solid boiler front, the rifle units had to form an inner front. The subsequent operational cooperation between the 5th Guards Panzer Army and the left wing of the 27th Army was aimed at preventing the German forces in the Korsun pocket from returning south.

During the following day (January 29) the Soviet armored troops penetrated the enemy front and the following rifle divisions began to advance rapidly towards Olschana. After the conquest of Zvenigorodka, the 20th Panzer Corps sent strong outposts to Olschana and, together with the 1st Motorized Guard Regiment and units of the 5th Guard Cavalry Corps, smashed enemy connections in the enemy rear. The rifle divisions, which were now operationally subordinate to the commander of the 5th Guards Panzer Army, advanced from Shpola and Jurkowka to Zvenigorodka. The 84th Rifle Division reached Shpola on January 31 and took a line of defense along Iskrennoje and Wasilkowo (2 km southwest of Shpola). In order to create a reliable defense here, in addition to the 49th Rifle Corps, the 5th Pioneer Brigade from the reserves of the 5th Guards Panzer Army was deployed. The operations of these armed forces were supported from the air by the 1st Fighter Corps.

Attack by the 1st Ukrainian Front on January 26th

Soviet artillery

On the morning of January 26th, the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front also went on the offensive from the west. Around 16 rifle divisions and 3 tank corps with 2736 guns and grenade launchers as well as 307 tanks and self-propelled guns were used. After a 35-minute artillery strike, the 40th Army attacked, on the left wing of the 27th Army the 6th Panzer Army (with 160 tanks and 50 self-propelled guns in the first squadron) advanced in a south-westerly direction towards Zvenigorodka . The attack, which was concentrated on 27 kilometers between Tinowka and Koshewatoje, hit the section of the German VII Army Corps (General der Artillerie Hell ). In the first season the 5th Mechanized Corps (Major General Volkov) and in the second meeting the 5th Guards Panzer Corps was set up at a width of 4.5 km. The 5th Mechanized Corps was able to advance south of Tinowka together with the 104th Rifle Corps in the direction of Schubennj Staw, the Soviet tanks penetrated the German 34th Infantry Division (Major General Hochbaum ). The troops of the 6th Panzer Army suffered considerable losses and had to temporarily switch to defense. The German troops also successfully resisted the Soviet 40th Army. The 27th Army, set up in the north, did not achieve any quick success with the 180th and 337th Rifle Divisions.

The German III. Panzer Corps (General Breith) immediately launched a counterattack from the area west of Vinnitsa . Parts of the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions (Major General Back and von der Meden ) carried out successful counterattacks against the right flank of the Soviet 40th Army in the direction of Ochmatow. The 1st Czechoslovak Brigade, which had been relocated here from the Belaya Tserkov area, also fought as part of this army (50th, 51st and 104th rifle corps) . The Stawka also deployed the 11th Guards Panzer Corps (from the 1st Panzer Army) to reinforce the attacking troops. In operational order, the corps was deployed in the area of ​​the 40th Army. The offensive of the right-wing formations of the 27th Army (337th and 180th Rifle Divisions) also developed successfully. In the area of Monastyryschtsche the advance of the 11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (55th and 64th Guards Tank Brigade) took place. The 874th anti-tank and 978th ​​anti-aircraft artillery regiments were sent here to support the fight.

Though slowly, the offensive then developed more successfully. The newly deployed 11th Guards Panzer Corps (General Getman) led a flank thrust that reached the line Tsibulija - Iwachno and went on the defensive there together with the 340th Rifle Division of the 40th Army. The situation with the attacked at Baranje-Pole German 88th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Rittberg ), which for XXXXII. Corps belonged to became the most threatening. The connection between the 88th and 198th Infantry Divisions, and thus also between the XXXXII. and VII Army Corps was interrupted. After the front Soviet shock group had overcome the resistance of the German 34th , 82nd and 198th Infantry Divisions , they tried to develop their attack more deeply. The 88th Infantry Division was thrown back to the east on Boguslaw, Medwyn and Boyarka fell into Soviet hands. The 198th Infantry Division (Major General Ludwig Müller) deployed on both sides of the Gniloi Tikisch was also defeated and pushed to the southwest together with the VII Army Corps (34th Division).

On January 27, the Soviet 6th Panzer Army was reinforced by the 47th Rifle Corps (167th, 359th Rifle Division) under Major General IS Schmigow. The defensive position of the German 198th Infantry Division was bypassed in the village of Winograd from the south and north. The rifle divisions of the Soviet 27th Army were able to accelerate the advance after the 5th Mechanized Corps under Major General Volkov was assigned to Zvenigorodka. The independently operating tank group under Major General MI Saveliev with the 233rd Panzer Brigade and the self-propelled artillery regiment 1228 (39 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns and 200 motor vehicles) were put at the forefront. Units of the 47th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, the 6th Panzer Army and the 27th Army fought tenaciously on the front line from Chervona via Winograd , Boyarka and Medwyn to Boguslav on January 28th . Units of the 136th Rifle Division, a regiment of the 167th Rifle Division and units of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade fought on the pocket front at Tichanowka and Dubrowka.

The Korsun boiler is closed

German transport aircraft ( Ju 52 ) on the Korsun airfield

On the morning of January 28, the union of the Soviet spearheads made: The tip of the 6th Panzer Army penetrated vigorously from the region of Boyarka and Lysyanka after Swenigorodka ago. The 233rd Panzer Brigade of the 5th Mechanized Corps (Major General Volkov) met units of the 20th Panzer Corps (Lieutenant General Laszarew ) of the 5th Guards Tank Army north of Zvenigorodka . Along the way, this brigade, together with units of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade, liberated their own circled units. The arrival of the 233rd Panzer Brigade at Zvenigorodka and the pressure of the 47th Rifle Corps forced the enemy to retreat, further units of the 20th Panzer Corps broke through. On the evening of January 28, the 6th Panzer Army, reinforced by units of the 47th Rifle Corps, occupied the line Winograd, Chizhowka, Ryschanowka, Popowka and Olchowetz with the front facing southwest. At the same time the 27th Army had reached the Medvyn, Jatsuki, Boguslav and Kozhevatoje lines. It was possible to enclose about six German divisions in a pocket west of Cherkassy in the area around Korsun and Boguslaw. According to Soviet information there were 80,000 soldiers in the boiler, according to German information there were 56,000 men.

Destroyed German vehicles after the attempted breakout from the Korsun pocket

On January 30th, the Soviet troops reached the Topilno - Tereschki line. On January 31, Burty and Olschana were occupied, where a connection with the armed forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front was also established. The armed forces of the 4th Guard Army and the left wing of the 53rd Army started their offensive against the German troops in the pocket at the same time. Your offensive also developed successfully. On January 31st, the enemy group to the northeast of Zvenigorodka was half encircled by troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which had reached Gniloi Tashljk. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps played an important role in the tank battles.

At the end of January the troops of the 6th Panzer Army had created a new external front in the south of the pocket. The troops of the 27th Army had encircled the pocket from the west and were approaching Korsun. At the same time the 27th Army, the 4th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps continuously increased the encirclement. The German counter-attacks from the Uman area were now directed against the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front to the northeast. The attacks were directed against the base of the Soviet breakthrough at Tsherwona and Rubannji Most, but were successfully repulsed by units of the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army and the 47th Rifle Corps.

As a result of the ongoing fighting, the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front occupied the following positions on January 30th: The 5th Mechanized Corps was concentrated in the area around Winograd; the 233rd Panzer Brigade operated north of Pavlovka. The bulk of the 5th Guards Panzer Corps was concentrated in the Wodjaniki area on the Ryschanowka, Popowka and Olchowetz line. After overcoming the German resistance, the 47th Rifle Corps fought its way further south at Rubannji Most and Pavlovka. One of the battalions of the 167th Rifle Division and units of the 20th Guards Panzer Corps defended themselves in the Zvenigorodka area, while the troops of the 27th Army continuously fended off enemy counterattacks against their right flank. At that time the 27th Army was on the line Medvyn, Jatsuki, Boguslav and Koschewatoje. The 6th Panzer Army had the task of preventing the enemy from entering from the southwest from Rusalowka and Pavlovka in the direction of Lysyanka. The army was supposed to protect the Schubenj Chischowka and Ryschanowka sectors. After overcoming the stubborn German resistance, the 47th Rifle Corps fought its way south via Rubannji Most, Rizino and Pavlovka. The 27th Army in the northeast was instructed to hold the line Kwitki, Taraschcha, Schanderowka and Deschki unconditionally, because this prevented the enemy from advancing west and southwest in the direction of Lyssyanka.

As early as January 31, the order of the 1st Ukrainian Front determined to proceed with new attacks from the southwest from Rusalowka, Rubannyi Most and Pavlovka and from the northeast from the Steblev, Schanderowka and Tarashcha line against Lysyanka. At the same time, the German troops carried out a series of counter-attacks against both specified axes. The Soviet units fended off all German attempts to advance from the southwest to Lysyanka and there to connect with his encircled forces. At the same time, the forces of the 27th Army continued to push against the inner ring of the pocket.

During the operations the front troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front were continuously reinforced:

• from the 57th Army: 49th Rifle Corps (from January 29th), the 80th Guards Rifle Division (from January 29th), the 27th Artillery Brigade (on January 30th) and the 27th Separate Flamethrower Battalion and the 176th Flamethrower -Company (on January 30th)
• from the 7th Guards Army: the 27th Panzer Brigade (from February 4th), the 78th Guards Rifle Division (from January 25), the 94th Guards Rifle Division (from January 25), the 5th Engineer Brigade ( on January 25) the 303rd Rifle Division (on January 31), the 11th Artillery Brigade (from January 31), the 41st Guards Rifle Division (from February 5) and the headquarters of the 33rd Rifle Corps (on February 7th)
• of the 5th Guards Army: the 116th Rifle Division (on February 13), the 34th Anti-Tank Brigade (on February 4), the 110th Guards Rifle Division (on February 1), the 84th Rifle Division (on February 29) January 1st), the 6th Guards Rifle Division (January 31st), the 49th Light Artillery Brigade (February 1st) and the 44th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (February 1st).
• The forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front were also strengthened: From February 6, the deployment of the 2nd Panzer Army (General Bogdanov ) also began from the west .

From February 1st to 3rd, repeated counter-attacks by XXXXVII followed. Panzer Corps, using parts of the 11th, 14th and 3rd Panzer Divisions that had been transferred from Zlatopol. Their attempt to break down the defense front of the 5th Guards Tank Army northwest of Mokraja Kaligorka in the direction of Iskrenoje failed. All German attacks were repulsed. On February 3, the armed forces of the 52nd Army had secured the Sofievka, Baibuzy and Burty line, and by evening the troops of the 53rd Army had reached the line from Lipyanka and Vasilivka.

General situation on the front in early February

German armored personnel carriers and tanks during a relief attack

The armed forces of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Front had encircled the German XI. and XXXXII. Army corps consolidated in the Korsun area. Around 27 rifle divisions with around 336,700 soldiers were now on the attack together with the 2nd Ukrainian Front, plus a mechanized corps and four armored corps with 513 tanks, 5,300 guns and grenade launchers and 772 aircraft. The section from Tinowki to Zvenigorodka was held by troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front: the 104th Rifle Corps (58th, 133rd, 136th Rifle Divisions) and the 47th Rifle Corps (167th and 359th Rifle Divisions) of the 40th Army and the Area of ​​the 6th Panzer Army: the 5th Guards Panzer Corps and the 5th Mechanized Corps. At the beginning of February the German troops tried to cut a corridor to the trapped troops opposite the new front to the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the Novo-Mirgorod and Tolmasch area. The 2nd Ukrainian Front led from Zvenigorodka to the east: in the area of ​​the 5th Guards Panzer Army there was also the 49th Rifle Corps (6th and 94th Guards, 84th and 375th Rifle Divisions) and then the 53rd Army (1 Guard Airborne, 6th, 14th Guard, 25th, 66th, 78th, 80th, 89th, 138th, 213rd and 214th Rifle Division). The outer encirclement front extended from Ochmatow via Schubennyi, Chizhowka, Ryzhanowka and Popowka to Olchowetz, where the units of the 6th Panzer Army united with the units of the 5th Guards Panzer Army. Troops of the 52nd Army held new positions from Sofievka to Burty. The front line of the inner ring of encirclement in the 4th Guard Army and the 27th Army ran over Schanderowka, Deschki and south of Mironowka in the direction of Berezowa and Sofijewka. The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps fought as a reserve in the second squadron near Olschana. The 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army and the 6th Panzer Army defended the outer front from Ochmatow to Olchowetz. Further to the east, the units of the 5th Guards Panzer Army defended from Zvenigorodka to Lipyanka, while the 53rd Army extended further to Vasilivka.

The German troops made desperate attempts to break open the encirclement. Around 6 infantry, 1 armored division and 1 armored infantry brigade (88th, 82nd, 72nd and 57th infantry divisions), the 5th SS armored division "Wiking" and the SS armored infantry brigade stood in the pocket "Wallonia". In addition, there were parts of the 198th and 389th Infantry Divisions , as well as the Panzergrenadier Regiment 108 of the 14th Panzer Division and the artillery regiment 108th units of Corps Division B, the 112th Infantry and the 213rd Security Divisions defended the northern and northwestern Boiler front.

In the south of the Kessel a new outer front of the 1st Panzer Army and 8th Army had emerged, including the 3rd , 17th , 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions , the 34th , 198th, 167th , 320th and 376th Infantry. Division and 4 assault gun brigades. Altogether around 90 tanks and 750 assault guns. Between February 4th and 10th the 1st and 16th Panzer Divisions , the 1st SS Panzer Division , the 106th Infantry Division as well as 4 tank battalions and 3 assault gun brigades were brought in. From the bridgehead Nikopol was in the section of XXXXVII. Panzer Corps (General Vormann) first parts of the 24th Panzer Division arrived at Gorni Taschlyk and Novo Ukrainka . Hitler had promised to deploy the entire 24th Panzer Division under Lieutenant General von Edelsheim , which, however, could not be brought in completely from the Nikopol area because it was not possible to weaken the forces there.

In the south and south-east of the basin the new front ran at XXXXVII. Panzer Corps along the large forest areas to Guta Mishiritskaya, along the western bank of the Ross rivers and via Bolshoi Staroselje to Orlovets. The southern bank of the Ross River, with its swampy bed, was well suited for defense. Vorobyevka, Buda-Vorobyevskaya and Tagancha were prepared as strong points in the depth of the defense. The presence of swampy forest areas on the Olshanka and Fossa rivers contributed to strong defenses, especially the anti-tank system. The defensive belt there ran on the southern bank of the Ross, on the northwestern outskirts of Popowka and on the eastern outskirts of Berkozowka and Pjatikhatki. The forest south and south-east of Potashnia was developed into the center of resistance and reinforced with a large number of wooden barriers and minefields.

Relief attacks from February 4th

At dawn on February 4th, the Wehrmacht launched a new counter-offensive: the III. Panzer Corps (General Hermann Breith ) should head towards Medwyn with four armored divisions and the XXXXVII. Panzer Corps (General Nikolaus von Vormann ) attacked from the south with equal strength and tried to connect with the enclosed northern group. The III. Panzer Corps attacked Pavlovka and Krasilowka via Boyarka with 80 tanks from the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by the Bäke heavy tank detachment (a combined tank formation with Tiger I and Panther V tanks under Lieutenant Colonel Franz Bäke ), while the 1st Panzer Division (Major General Richard Koll ) started again in the direction of Lyssyanka. The Soviet 11th Guards Panzer Corps (General Andrei Getman) participated in the defense and was subordinated to the 40th Army in the attack field. The task of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was still to narrow the front of the encircled enemy group through joint operations with the forces of the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The 3rd and 13th Panzer Divisions (Major General Mikosch ) started at the same time from the Konstantinovka-Roskoschewka line and the 11th and 14th Panzer Divisions (Colonel Grässel group) between Skotorewo-Kawunowka with about 130 tanks in the direction of Shpola and Lebedin. After intense fighting, the German troops succeeded in conquering the towns of Tynowka, Pawlowka, Wotjlewka and Tatjanowka, the further advance was stopped by the Soviet defense on the Tolmasch, Wodianoje and Lipjanka line. The XXXXVII. Panzer Corps was unable to achieve any further success and was then stopped 30 kilometers from the Kessel Front by the Soviet 5th Guard and 53rd Army.

The command of the 1st Ukrainian Front ordered countermeasures: The 40th Army was to penetrate the enemy front with a counterstrike at Goisika and the Olschanka sector and also attack the Kuty, Antonowka and Krachkowka line to the southeast. The newly introduced 6th Panzer Army was supposed to push back the German units in a south-easterly direction by means of a concentrated attack on the Ryschanowka and Popowka lines and to reach the desired line from Krachkowka, Poluschinzy, Pashchewoje and Sokolowotschka. After the concentration was complete, the newly introduced Soviet 2nd Panzer Army was given the task of setting up a counterstrike in the direction of Tscherwona, Tynowka and Votjlewka. In order to fortify the front between Shuravka, Lebedin and Shpola, the front command of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reinforced this section of the area with infantry, tanks and artillery from the unit of the 7th Guards Army in the south.

On February 5, General Vormann launched another tank attack with up to 90 tanks from the Skotorewo and Wodianoje line in the direction of Lebedin. Simultaneously with the tank attacks against Schpola and Lebedin, the German command formed a tank detachment under Colonel von Haack , which tried southwest of Zvenigorodka to connect with the encircled group from the Rusalowka, Buki and Rizino line in the direction of Lysyanka. In order to weaken the encircled German forces, the commander of the Soviet 52nd Army was instructed, together with the 206th Rifle Division of the 27th Army, to lead an energetic attack across the Bolshoi Staroselje line in the direction of Valyav. This was intended to separate the German Gorodisch group from the Korsun group. During the offensive, units of the left flank of the 40th Army and the units of the 6th Panzer Army encountered stubborn German resistance and sustained tank attacks. In order to destroy the German Panzer Division that had advanced on Kutschkowka and Kosiakowka, the front commander of the 2nd Panzer Army ordered an immediate counterattack. In the following fighting, the Soviet troops surrounded the armored wedges of the III. Panzer corps that penetrated on February 4th with up to 40 tanks at Tatyanowka and Votjlewka.

On the morning of February 6th, the III. Panzer Corps repeatedly attacked the 6th Panzer Army, as a result of the fighting they succeeded in penetrating the western edge of the village of Votjlewka and occupying the western part of Vinograd. The German troops reached the Kosiakowka, Antonowka and Kutschkowka lines. During the night the Soviet 6th Panzer Army regrouped in order to regain lost positions by working together with the 2nd Panzer Army. Throughout February 7th, the 6th Panzer Army fought strong enemy tank attacks. By the evening the units of the 2nd Panzer Army pushed the enemy tanks out of Antonowka again, after intense fighting these troops drove the enemy back from Kosiakowka and Kutschkowka, both places initially remained in German hands.

On February 8, the Soviet front command had given the enclosed armed forces under General von Stemmermann in the Kessel an ultimatum, which was rejected. During the whole of February 9, the German 1st Panzer Division concentrated in the Buki area and prepared the next breakthrough on Lyssyanka. Using the 16th Panzer Division and the 1st SS Panzer Division, they attacked simultaneously from Pavlovka (northern part) and Kutschkowka on February 8 and again captured Votjlewka and Tatyanowka. The III. Panzer Corps reached the Gniloy-Tikitsch across its entire width, the remaining 30 kilometers to the boiler could not be overcome. The Soviet 27th Army repulsed all German attacks that were carried out between Steblew- and Tarashcha in the direction of Schanderowka and Lyssjanka.

On the morning of February 10, the armed forces of the right wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, cooperating with units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, launched a decisive offensive that was to split the pocket. The 202nd Rifle Division of the newly deployed 47th Army strengthened the eastern Kessel front at Stawischsche, the 340th Rifle Division from the right flank of the 40th Army was brought forward to Teterewka and Kowalewka. The approaches to Velikaya Bereznjaka and Krutja Gory were shielded by an artillery brigade. The units advanced under difficult conditions and occupied a number of important points. In carrying out the task, the 5th Guards Panzer Army supported the 29th Panzer Corps near Losowatka, the 18th Panzer Corps near Michailowka and the 20th Panzer Corps with the front facing southeast in the Zvenigorodka area.

On February 11th, fierce battles were fought in the entire sector of the 2nd and 6th Panzer Army, but they only led to insignificant tactical successes. Several divisions of the III. Panzer Corps tried to break through Lysyanka to the southern boiler front. As expected by the Soviet leadership, the enemy launched an offensive in the morning from the Roskoschewka and Rizino line in the direction of Lysyanka with the 1st and 17th Panzer Divisions and the 1st SS Panzer Division, covered by the 16th Panzer Division in the Votjlewka area. On Hitler's orders, only a connection to the Stemmermann Corps was to be established, while the boiler still had to be completely held. Attacking north-west, Kichinzy was reached, other units advancing from the south-east were in the area four kilometers south-east of Korsun. With the 8th Army, the Haack combat group proved its worth in view of the already weakened combat strength of the four regular armored divisions of the XXXXVII. Panzer Corps extraordinary. Despite strong resistance, this group succeeded in forming a bridgehead at Jerki and in making a successful advance on the highlands southeast of Zvenigorodka, thereby tying up considerable enemy armored forces. In addition, the flank effect threatening the breakthrough wedge of the III. Armored Corps eliminated. After the previous sector had been handed over to rifle units, the 2nd Panzer Army took over the Domukowka, Chesnowka and Pisarewka line with the mission of preventing the enemy from advancing further northeast. At the same time, the 206th Rifle Division of the 27th Army east of Pisarewka was given the task of preventing a German breakthrough at Chilki to the southwest. The German attack was led by two groups: a group of about 110 tanks from the Tarasowka and Rubannyi Most line towards Slepok to encompass Bosowka from the south and Frankowka; the other group with 90 tanks from the Rizino region in the direction of Chizowka and Shabinka.

In order to avoid a German breakthrough at the Soviet liaison, the 2nd Ukrainian Front took measures to reinforce the threatened line between Mortzy and Maidanowka, to which units of the 5th Guards Airborne Division and the 62nd Rifle Division were dispatched. The 2nd Panzer Army, together with the 104th Rifle Corps of the 40th Army, was supposed to try to blow up the southern Kesselring. The Soviet attack, which was planned for February 8, could only begin on February 11 due to the weather. The 1st Panzer Army succeeded on February 11 in winning three bridgeheads over the Gniloi Tikitsch. At the end of the day the villages Frankowka and Buschanka were reached, the muddy terrain east of the Gniloi Tikitsch left for the weakened forces of the III. Panzer Corps no more successes. On the afternoon of February 11, the German 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions attacked von Erki northwards and von Steblew continued the attacks against Lysyanka from the southwest and northeast.

On the morning of February 12th, the 1st Panzer Division (General Koll) renewed its attacks, and by the end of the day they had succeeded in reaching Lysyanka from the southwest. At the same time, the section on the right flank of the Soviet 27th Army at Steblew and Tarashcha was attacked from the pocket. At the end of the day it was possible to push back the Soviet units and to occupy Chilki and Novo-Buda. The break-open of the boiler ring did not succeed and now had to be done from the inside.

Soviet response

Shrinkage of the boiler

Army General Konev asked the troops of the 27th Army to hold their positions, but the 4th Guards Army was to attack from south to north in order to push the enemy into the flank. Further maneuverable forces were made available on the outer front of the pocket to serve as a reserve against the enemy armored groups advancing near Lisjanka. The entire 5th Guards Panzer Army had to support the 4th Guards Army against the encircled enemy. In order to strengthen the positions of the 27th Army, the 18th Guards Panzer Corps marched off to Dschurschenzy. This army was ordered to repel the German attacks on Steblew and Schanderowka. The troops of the 53rd Army had to form a rigid anti-tank defense on the outer front, the newly introduced units of the 57th Army had to reinforce the southern defensive front of the 5th and 7th Guards Army.

On February 12, the left wing of the Soviet 27th Army, consisting of the 180th, 337th and 202nd Rifle Divisions and the down-to-earth 54th and 159th Brigade, was reinforced to attack at Steblew. In order to strengthen the internal encirclement at Schanderowka, where troops of the 27th Army were also deployed, Army General Konev ordered the deployment of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps to the west. For the occupation of the defense along the Gniloi Tikitsch river, troops of the 4th Guard Army were brought in on the Oktyabr, Lyssyanka, Maidanowka, Zvenigorodka line, which made it possible to hold on to the enemy tanks in the area between Rubanow and Rizino. The Soviet 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, which had been fighting on the Valjava, Werbowka, Gorodishche and Vyazovok lines since February 3, was given the task of reaching the Novo-Buda and Komarowka region and, together with the 29th Panzer Corps, the enemy from these points and to prevent an enemy breakthrough in the south-west.

On February 14th, the 52nd Army with the 294th Rifle Division and parts of the 206th Rifle Division of the 73rd Rifle Corps liberated the small town of Korsun-Schewchenkowski, so the Germans lost the airfield in the basin that was supplied via Uman. The German attacks in the Zvenigorodka region have already been weakened considerably. Therefore, on the night of February 14th, the 18th and 20th Panzer Corps were relieved by forces of the 49th Rifle Corps and only immobile tanks were left behind. The 18th Panzer Corps reached Dschurschenzy with 30 tanks still ready for action and on February 14 built defenses to the south and southwest. The 29th Panzer Corps reached the Komarowka region. The 20th Panzer Corps, which deployed the 8th Guard and 155th Panzer Brigade at the front, carried out heavy defensive battles against the German 1st Panzer Division on the northern and northwestern outskirts of Lyssjanka. The 7th motorized rifle brigade held in the Zvenigorodka area and the 80th tank brigade cooperated with the 4th Guards Army in the liberation of Korsun. The front commander had regrouped the 5th Mechanized Guard Corps and the 27th Panzer Brigade to the west and ordered Steblew to be attacked and the encircled German troops to be pushed back northwards behind the Ross sector.

In the meantime, through persistent fighting, the encirclement was closed so tightly that the entire area in the pocket could be shelled by the Soviet artillery. The III. Panzer Corps to push back through strong tank attacks from the Rusalowka and Rizino lines, units of the 47th Rifle Corps and the 6th Panzer Army and to advance to Lysyanka. On February 15, at 8.00 a.m., the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army attacked in the direction of Komarowka, Schanderowka and Steblew, while part of their armed forces repelled enemy attacks on Lyssyanka. The 29th Panzer Corps and the armed forces of the 25th and 32nd Panzer Brigades occupied the central part of Komarowka, but here they were stopped because there was no bridge over a marshy river. The 18th Panzer Corps defended along the south-western outskirts, with difficulty the 155th and 8th Guards Tank Brigades of the 20th Panzer Corps held up the enemy on the northern outskirts of Lysyanka. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

Lossy German outbreak

Eruption towards the southwest, February 16, 1944

Eruption over Lyssyanka and the Gniloi Tikitsch

On February 15, General Wenck , Chief of Staff of the 1st Panzer Army, recognized that the offensive of III. Panzer Corps got stuck in the face of Soviet defenses on the 1st Ukrainian Front; the tank detachments Frank and Bäke came about 20 kilometers to the encircled forces and then had to go over to the defense. In the north-west and west of Lysyanka the situation got worse and worse: the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions were no longer able to adequately repel the dangerous counter-offensive of the 2nd Panzer Army, the SS-Leibstandarte was fixed at Winograd.

When it became apparent that the German attack would stall a few kilometers from the boiler, Field Marshal von Manstein approved the outbreak without prior agreement with Hitler. Due to a lack of vehicles and fuel, the III. Panzer Corps did not reinforce its units in the Lysyanka and Oktyabr area. On February 15 at 11:05 am the order to attack was issued by radio to the trapped troops: “Ability to act III. Armored corps limited due to weather and supply. Group Stemmermann has to make the decisive breakthrough to Dschurschenzy and Höhe 239 about 2 km south of it on its own. ”The divisions of III. Tank corps were able to provide support by holding the enemy forces concentrated in the Pochapinzy-Dschurschenzy area and attempting to pick up the escaping troops on the dominant high ground northwest of Pochapinzy. The preparation for the breakout was difficult in the narrow space and could only be conducted at night because of the Soviet artillery.

The Stemmerman group eruption began at 11:00 p.m. on February 16. The plan stipulated that the eruption had to take place on a front only 4.5 kilometers long. The enclosed divisions were grouped in such a way that they should break out at Lyssyanka over the Gniloi Tikitsch to the southwest. To the southeast of Chilki and near Dschurschenzy, Corps Division B (Colonel Fouquet) was concentrated on the right flank, while the 72nd Infantry Division, which was still powerful, was set to break through in the middle ahead. Three groups were formed to compete one after the other in the dark. In the first group were the infantry, in the second the still mobile heavy weapons and in the third group the train and the artillery should follow. The 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" (General Gille) deployed on the left was destined to advance in the center north of Komarowka past the height 239 to the south on Lysyanka. The battle formation of this division was also divided into several squadrons. A fusilier battalion, reinforced by tanks and assault guns, was at the head, in the second season the grenadier regiment "Westland" and the battalion Narwa and the armored infantry regiment "Nordland". The rearguard formed the SS storm brigade "Wallonia" (SS-Standartenführer Degrelle ), behind them east of Schanderowka the 88th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General von Rittberg) and the 57th Infantry Division (Major General Trowitz).

The leading meeting of Corps Department B and the 72nd Division was able to reach the German outposts on the Lyssyanka via Dschurschenzy and Höhe 239 before sunrise. General Stemmermann was killed during the outbreak when his command vehicle was hit by a Soviet anti-tank shell near Dschurschenzy. The columns of the 72nd Division and "Wiking" were completely mixed up when the outbreak occurred. They had hardly been able to take heavy weapons with them, but had taken in many lightly wounded people. Corps Division B covered regimental group 112 ID. on the right flank at Chilki and Chischinzy and tried to pull away with the other forces. The rapid onset of the Soviet counterattack inflicted terrible losses on the columns at the second meeting. Units of the 5th and 18th Panzer Corps near Dschurschenzy and the 41st Guards Division east of Height 239 began to form a strong barrier and opened fire with dozens of tanks. The connection to the following 2nd meeting broke off, Soviet tank fire hit the tightly closed columns. The massive grenades that hit the ground forced the mass of soldiers to the ground. The decimated remnants of the German units tried desperately to evade through the forest area south of the height 239 near Potschapinzy. Effective countermeasures were not possible without armor-piercing weapons. In the terrible mess, the 3rd meeting in the dark ran into the front season. At the same time, the units of the Soviet 27th Army were ready to initiate an intensive pursuit. Circled formations of the German rear guard continued to attack to break out of the Steblew area to the southwest. In Schenderowka , the rearguard cut off from the 57th Infantry Division had to hand over about 1,500 seriously injured people to the Red Army.

The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front had squeezed the pocket until evening and continued to attack it. Apathy and despair filled the kettle. The order of the division commander, Major General Trowitz, to the Artillery Regiment 157 was that another attempt to break out should be made that night. Most of the German troops changed the direction they had commanded, which was under constant artillery fire, and bypassed the 239 hill to the east, where they again encountered Soviet positions. Columns that had broken through reached the Gniloi Tikitsch at daybreak and found no bridges or useful crossing points to reach the German lines.

At 3 a.m. on February 17, the remains of the trapped German troops with about 5 batteries and 20 tanks formed a shock group that tried to break out of the encirclement to the southwest. The column with 5000 men advanced to Dschurschenzy until 9.30 a.m., while another column advanced via Komarowka to Pochapintsy. They were attacked by units of the 206th Rifle Division, the 18th Panzer Corps (the 5th Guards Armored Army) and units of the 5th Guards Airborne Division and two divisions of the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps from the northwest. At the same time the 29th Panzer Corps attacked from Komarowka, the troops of the 2nd Panzer Army carried out heavy tank attacks northeast of Lysyanka. Apathy and despair spread among the cut off German units. No crossings were found on the Gniloi Tikitsch, many tried to swim across the ice-cold Gniloi Tikitsch. Those who did not drown were faced with new Soviet positions on the opposite bank. Special Soviet detachments either captured or killed those arriving. By the evening of February 17, the cut off German units had been completely destroyed. During February 18, units of the 27th Army and the 4th Guard Army cleared and occupied the area around the villages of Dschurschenzy, Pochapinzy and Komarowka.

Result

The six enclosed German divisions suffered heavy losses in men and officers and when they broke out they left behind all heavy military equipment. According to German information, around 40,000 soldiers managed to break out, 18,000 soldiers died or were left in the boiler, where they were taken prisoner. According to Soviet information, however, 55,000 German soldiers were killed in the boiler and 18,200 were taken prisoner (as early as February 18, for reasons of propaganda, the Red Army announced that more than 52,000 dead remained on the battlefield during the entire operation and 11,000 soldiers and Officers were captured, with all equipment either destroyed or captured). Most of the prisoners were brought in by troops of the 4th Guards Army in the Oktyabr-Dschurschenzy-Pochapinzy area during the cleaning of the cauldron (6400 soldiers alone on February 17th and 18th), another 7,583 prisoners were taken by the 27th Army in the same period made.

The losses of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Front amounted to 80,188 men, including 24,286 dead and missing as well as 55,902 wounded and sick, 728 tanks were lost. These losses occurred during the encirclement, the encirclement and the attempted escape in the period from January 24th to February 17th, 1944.

Army General Watutin was seriously wounded by Ukrainian UPA insurgents on February 29 and died on April 14. The commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Konev, was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union for his victory in Korsun . On the left wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Soviet 13th and 60th Army advanced south of the Pripyat Marshes , defeating the remains of the German XIII. Army Corps at the Battle of Rovno and advanced to Lutsk . In the south, the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts attacked simultaneously along the Dnieper River and captured Krivoy Rog .

literature

• General Swiss military magazine : The outbreak from the Cherkassy pocket, Volume 115 (1949), Issue 6, pp. 391-410 .
• Niklas Zetterling / Anders Frankson: The Korsun Pocket - The Encirclement and Breakout of a German Army in the East 1944, Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, Philadelphia ISBN 1932033882 .
• Илья Борисович Мощанский : 1944-й От Корсуни до Белграда . Вече, Moscow 2008.
• David Glantz : The Battle for the Ukraine - The Red Armys Korsun-Shewchenkovski Operation, 1944 Frank Cass Publishers Portland, Oregon 2003, ISBN 0-7146-5278-4 .
• Vladimir O. Daines (Владимир Оттович Дайнес): Дмитриев-Севская наступательная операция from Советские танковые армии в бою (Soviet tank armies in battle), Moscow 2010, ISBN 978-5-699-41329-4 .
• Carl Wagener : Army Group South, Podzun Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1972, p. 261 f.
• Earl F. Ziemke: Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. (Army Historical Series). Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, Washington DC 1987. ( Online , p. 126)
• WI Festjkow / KA Kalashnikov: Красная Армия в победах и поражениях 1941–1945, Moskwa 2003.

Web links

• Zetterling / Frankson: The Korsun Pocket (English)
• Илья Борисович Мощанский: От Корсуни до Белграда (Russian)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Korsun-Shevchenkovskier Operation in Russian Civilization , on rustrana.ru ( Memento from August 4, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (Russian)
2. ↑ Spiegel 1965
3. ^ War diary of the 4th Guards Army for February 1944, p. 62.
4. ↑ War Diary of the 27th Army for February 1944, p. 66.