Mohammad Mossadegh

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Mohammad Mossadegh (1951)

Postage stamp from the Iranian Post Office commemorating the 100th birthday of Dr. Mossadegh

Mohammad Mossadegh ( Persian محمد مصدق[ mohæˈmːæd mosæˈdːeɣ ]; * 1880 or * June 16, 1882 in Tehran ; † March 5, 1967 in Ahmad Abad , Alborz Province , Iran) was an Iranian politician. Mossadegh was a co-founder of the National Front and twice Prime Minister of Iran between 1951 and 1953.

At the age of 14 he became finance administrator of Khorasan Province . From 1909 to 1914 he studied economics and law in Paris and Neuchâtel, and received his doctorate with a legal dissertation. After returning to Iran, he returned to work as a tax officer. After the end of World War I, Mossadegh became governor of Fars Province.

Mossadegh became Minister of Justice in 1920 and Minister of Finance in the cabinet of Prime Minister Ahmad Qavām in 1921 . The financial reform he proposed was rejected by parliament and Mossadegh resigned from office. In 1923, Mossadegh became Iran's Foreign Minister in Hassan Pirnia's cabinet . After Hassan Pirnia resigned, Mossadegh ran for parliamentary elections and was elected as a member of the 5th and 6th legislative periods. In 1928 Mossadegh withdrew from politics because the law forbade the acceptance of public office by Iranians with dual citizenship. After the Anglo-Soviet invasion in 1941, Mossadegh ran again for parliament and became a member of the 14th legislature. Mossadegh was defeated in the elections for the 15th and 16th legislative periods, but was then able to win a by-election in June 1950. The election for the 16th legislative period was initially controversial, as Mossadegh had already passed the maximum age limit for MPs, which is limited to 70 years by the constitution.

From 1951 to 1953 - with a brief interruption in July 1952 - Mossadegh was Prime Minister of Iran. His time as Prime Minister was marked by the conflict with the British government after the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company , which sparked the Abadan crisis . Mossadegh was overthrown militarily on August 19, 1953 by intelligence services of the USA and Great Britain ( Operation Ajax ), then charged with treason and sentenced to three years in prison and subsequent house arrest. Mossadegh lived on his estate in Ahmad Abad until his death.

Life and political career

Mirza Hedayat (seated in the middle) with Mirza Mohammad (right) in Khorasan (ca.1892)

origin

Mohammad Mossadegh was (prop. Hedayatollah), the son of Mirza Hedayat Ashtiani, Vazir Daftar, a financial manager (Mostofi) , and the Qajar born -Prinzessin Schahzadeh Nadschmeh-al-Saltaneh (1858-1933). Mirza Mohammad, as Mohammad Mossadegh was called "Mossadegh" before the surname was adopted, was through the line of his mother Nadschmeh-al-Saltaneh - a granddaughter of Abbas Mirza  - cousin of Nāser ad-Din Schāh and sister of Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma , a nephew of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah . Mirza Mohammad's father, Mirza Hedayatollah, was the cousin of Mostofi-al-Mamalek, the father of Hassan Mostofi . Mirza Mohammad had two brothers, Mirza Hossein and Mirza Ali. Mirza Mohammad received his school education from private tutors.

Treasurer (Mostofi)

Mirza Mohammad (ca.1896)

On September 9, 1888, his father asked Nāser ad-Din Shāh that his son Mirza Mohammad should be appointed Mostofi-aval (First Treasurer ). Nāser ad-Din Shāh complied and put Mirza Mohammad on the court's payroll as Mostofi-aval . Mirza Mohammad was nine years old at the time. At the age of twelve, Mirza Mohammad was hired by Mirza Mahmoud, the treasurer of Khorasan , and was paid with a monthly income of 120 tomans from the “cash differences” account. During this time Mirza Mohammad was trained as a Mostofi.

When his father died on August 29, 1892, Nāser ad-Din Shāh appointed Mirza Mohammad's older brother, Mirza Hossein, as Vazir Daftar (Minister). The younger brother, Mirza Ali, was given the title of Movasegh-al-Saltaneh (The Trusted One of the Kingdom) by Nāser al-Din Shāh and Mirza Mohammad was given the title of Mossadegh-al-Saltaneh (The Righteous One of the Kingdom). At the age of 13, Mohammad Mossadegh-al-Saltaneh had four incomes: part of the pension of his grandfather Firuz Mirza, a brother of Mohammad Shah , an honorary salary as Mostofi, the salary as a financial employee of Khorasan and, after the death of his father, also a part of his pension.

In 1895, three years after his father's death, his mother Nadscheh-al-Saltaneh married Mirza Fazl-Allah Vakil-al-Molk, the private secretary of Mozaffar al-Din Shah . Mirza Mohammad's aunt and his mother's sister, Nadschmeh-al-Saltaneh, were already married to Mozaffar ad-Din Shah at that time. On December 21, 1896 Mohammad Mossadegh-al-Saltaneh was on the orders of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah the post of financial manager of Khorasan transmitted.

Mohammad Mossadegh-al-Saltaneh made a large fortune under the reign of Mozaffar al-Din Shah. In just ten years, he became one of Iran's largest landowners. In the notes of Saif-Allah Vahidniya , published at the beginning of Iran's Constitutional Revolution , a list of 93 large landowners is listed, on which Mohammad Mossadegh-al-Salteneh also includes his mother, stepfather, brother, two brothers-in-law, his aunt and his Uncle Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma are listed.

The Constitutional Revolution

Mohammad Mossadegh before the Constitutional Revolution (ca.1907)

During the Constitutional Revolution of Iran, which lasted from 1905 to 1911, in which the Iranians fought for a constitution and a parliament against the absolutist rule of Mozaffar ad-Din Shah, Mohammad Mossadegh appeared as an opponent of the parliamentary movement. After the constitution of the first parliament, the deputies were initially occupied with disempowering the financial administrators (Mostofis) and building a transparent financial system that could serve as the basis for the creation of a budget and state administration. It was not until 1911 that these efforts were to be successful with the appointment of the American Morgan Shusters .

Mohammad Mossadegh had expected  to take over the post of his older brother - a Vazir Daftar . After the Constitutional Revolution, however, the previously common direct transfer of an office within a family was no longer possible. Furthermore, the parliament had abolished the previously customary special payments (rosoum) for concessions granted by Mostofis, so that the office had lost its financial attractiveness. Mossadegh decided to give up his post as Mostofi and run for the newly founded parliament. Parliamentarism was still completely new in Iran. The right to vote was a class vote and since the MPs were initially not financially rewarded for their work, several mandates remained without candidates. The formal requirement for the candidacy was that one lived in the constituency that one wanted to represent, was a member of the relevant class, did not hold a public office and was at least 30 years old. In Khorasan, where Mossadegh lived, the mandate had already been granted, but in Isfahan, where Mossadegh's wife owned two estates, there was no representative of the notable class . As the election date had already expired, the governor of Isfahan wrote a letter to the speaker of parliament naming Mohammad Mossadegh as the elected member of Isfahan for the class of notables. However, Parliament's electoral review commission refused to confirm Mossadegh as MP because there had been no election in Isfahan and Mossadegh had not yet reached the age of 30. In addition, he did not live in Isfahan and was not known there. Intervening in parliament was unsuccessful, as MP Seyyed Hassan Taqizadeh prevented a vote in Mossadegh's favor by referring to the electoral review commission. After this defeat, Mossadegh became a bitter political opponent of Taqizadeh. Mossadegh turned to his uncle Abdol Hossein Mirza Farmanfarma , who should use his influence. Farmanfarma, at that time Minister of Justice, turned to the President of Parliament Ehtescham al-Saltaneh, who then proposed in the 190th session of parliament on November 13, 1907 that Mossadegh should be admitted to parliament because of his qualifications as a member of parliament. But this attempt also failed, with the majority of the Majlis's deputies refusing to make an exception to the legal regulations because of Mossadegh. Mossadegh had lost his job as mostofi and the income that came with it. With the new parliamentary system, state posts were assigned according to the law and not, as before, according to family relationships.

In 1907 Mohammad Mossadegh had enrolled in the Tehran University of Political Sciences , headed by Mohammad Ali Foroughi , but did not attend any courses. As a prospective member of parliament, Mossadegh no longer wanted to be considered a student. When he wanted to register for the final exams in 1908, he was refused entry to the Foroughi exams because he had not attended the lectures. This decision established a lifelong hostility between Mossadegh and Foroughi.

In the meantime, the power struggle between parliament and Mohammed Ali Shah had come to a head . On June 23, 1908, the bombardment of parliament with the cannons of the Persian Cossack Brigade began . The 600 armed defenders of Parliament faced 2,000 Persian Cossacks. After four hours the unequal fight was over. The defenders of parliament had to give up. The new elections planned for August 8, 1908 were canceled and Mohammed Ali Shah declared on November 22, 1908 that a parliament fundamentally violated Islamic laws. Parliament was replaced by a high council appointed by Mohammed Ali Shah , which consisted of 50 people personally selected by Mohammed Ali Shah from the classes of large landowners, merchants, notables and Qajar princes. The common people were no longer represented in this high council. The high council drafted bills which were then either rejected by Mohammed Ali Shah or confirmed by his signature. After Mohammad Mossadegh failed in his attempt to become a member of the elected parliament, he has now had more success. He was one of the 50 elect and was appointed to the high council by Mohammed Ali Shah. The following period from June 23, 1908 to July 16, 1909 is called the short period of dictatorship , because it was to be until July 1909 before the fighters of the constitutional movement from Tabris, Gilan and Isfahan liberated Tehran and the dictatorship Mohammed Ali Shahs had put an end to it.

Studied in Paris and Switzerland

In March 1909 Mossadegh traveled by sea via Tbilisi and Batumi to Paris via Marseille ; The Persian Consulate General in Tbilisi was responsible for the formalities. To get a passport from the Foreign Ministry, he needed Mohammed Ali Shah's approval. In January 1909 he received an audience with Mohammed Ali Shah. As a pretext for his urgent trip to Europe, he stated that he had to personally accompany his half-brother Abolhassan Seghat al Dowleh to a boarding school in Europe. Mossadegh received the signature of Mohammad Ali Shah, paid 2,800 Toman "processing fee" to Foreign Minister Saad-al-Dowleh and had his passport issued in the name of Mohammad Mossadegh as an officially registered family name. Mossadegh left his family and all his possessions in Iran and arrived in Paris in March 1909, enrolled his half-brother in a boarding school and awaited further political developments in Iran. On July 13, 1909, Tehran was occupied by the fighters of the constitutional movement, Mohammed Ali Shah fled to the Russian embassy and was deposed by the High Council on July 16, 1909. In October 1909 the elections for the second parliament of Iran took place, which was constituted on November 15, 1909.

After arriving in Paris, Mohammad Mossadegh enrolled as a guest student at the École libre des sciences politiques in March 1909 . He pretended to have been sent to Paris for further training on a grant from the Iranian Ministry of Finance. Enrollment as a regular student was not possible because Mohammad Mossadegh did not have a high school diploma and could not provide any proof of his French language skills. Hassan Vosough , a relative of Mossadegh who had become Finance Minister after the overthrow of Mohammad Ali Shah, wrote a letter to the director of the university at Mossadegh's request that Mohammad Mossadegh did not have a regular degree as proof of further education, but proof of successful attendance individual courses. Thanks to this letter, Mossadegh was able to take the university's exams despite his guest student status.

With the examination results of the Paris Ecole Libre Sciences Politique, Mohammad Mossadegh traveled to Neuchâtel , Switzerland, to enroll as a law student at the University of Neuchâtel for the winter semester of 1910 . The Swiss university administration assumed that the French university administration had already checked Mossadegh's study requirements and admitted Mossadegh to study in Paris, recognizing his academic achievements. At the Ecole Libre Sciences Politique, Mossadegh first reported sick, and after he had passed the first exams at the University of Neuchâtel, he withdrew at the end of the academic year 1910/1911.

In the summer semester of 1913, Mohammad Mossadegh graduated from the University of Neuchâtel with a License à Droit (licentiate in law) and began studying for a doctorate. After the acceptance of his dissertation topic Islamic Inheritance Law by the Faculty Council of the University of Neuchâtel, Mohammad Mossadegh traveled to Tehran for three months. Back in Neuchâtel, Mossadegh began a six-month legal traineeship at the Jean Roullet law firm. In the mornings Mossadegh worked in the law firm and in the afternoons, with the help of an Iranian fellow student, he translated Ali Asghar Madschedi's text from Persian into French. In July 1914, Mossadegh was the work Le droit musulman testament s (secte chiite) PhD .

At the beginning of his work at the law firm Jean Roullet, Mohammad Mossadegh applied for Swiss citizenship, which he obtained without any problems due to a three-year residence certificate and a positive certificate of good conduct from the city of Neuchâtel.

Mohammad Mossadegh (1920)

Return to Iran

On August 2, 1914, at the beginning of the First World War , Mohammad Mossadegh returned to Tehran. In 1916 he became Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance and later Deputy Minister of Finance. In 1919 he succeeded his uncle Prince Farmanfarma as governor of Fars province . The office of governor of Fars, which he had received through the mediation of Prime Minister Hassan Vosough , he held until 1921. His time as governor was overshadowed by the coup of February 21, 1921 , with which Seyyed Zia al Din Tabatabai became the new prime minister. Mossadegh, who was constitutionally appointed governor by Ahmad Shah, refused to cooperate with Tabatabai. Mossadegh narrowly escaped arrest as part of a measure ordered by Tabatabai, which was aimed primarily at large landowners who had not paid their taxes. The massive political resistance of the large landowners forced Tabatabai to resign on May 23, 1921 and Ahmad Qavam became the new Prime Minister.

Finance Minister, Governor, Foreign Minister

On May 28, 1921, Mossadegh became Minister of Finance under Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam . During this period, Mossadegh and Reza Khan , who was Minister of War, worked closely as cabinet colleagues. Mossadegh demanded special powers from parliament in order to be able to fundamentally reform the Ministry of Finance, which parliament initially granted him, but later withdrew. Qavam resigned as Prime Minister on January 26, 1923. Mossadegh should only get a public office again under Prime Minister Hassan Pirnia . Pirnia appointed him governor of Azerbaijan in June 1923, which Mossadegh did not accept because he did not want to leave the capital Tehran. Thereupon Pirnia appointed him foreign minister. Mossadegh and Reza Khan, who continued to hold the War Ministry, were cabinet colleagues in this cabinet as well. On October 23, 1923, however, Pirnia resigned as Prime Minister. Reza Khan was the new prime minister, although Mossadegh was not offered a ministerial post in his cabinet. In the upcoming parliamentary election, Mossadegh therefore applied for a seat in parliament and was elected to the 5th parliament ( Majlis ) as a member of the constituency of Tehran .

MP

After the Iranian parliament deposed Ahmad Shah Kajar in 1925 and installed Reza Khan as the new Shah, Mossadegh fell out with Reza Shah - he was one of the few people who voted against his appointment as Shah in 1925 - and no longer ran for parliament in 1928. Mohammad Mossadegh withdrew from politics.

Mohammad Mossadegh applied for the first time again in 1944 - Reza Shah had since resigned in favor of his son Mohammad Reza - for a mandate and won a seat in the 14th Iranian parliament. The young Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi offered Mossadegh the office of prime minister, but withdrew his nomination because Mossadegh stipulated that he would receive his parliamentary mandate again if he was dismissed as prime minister, which was not possible for constitutional reasons .

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi receives Mohammad Mossadegh (1951)

In the election for the 15th session of parliament, Mossadegh lost his constituency and was not re-elected to parliament. In December 1947, Mossadegh ran for the post of Prime Minister after Prime Minister Qavām resigned , but failed because of a single vote (53 for, 54 against). The majority in parliament voted for Ebrahim Hakimi , who would stay in office for a year. He was succeeded by Abdolhossein Hazhir , who gave up his post after six months and was replaced by Mohammad Sa'ed Maraghei . Hazhir took over the office of court minister in the Maraghei cabinet in a ministry responsible for liaising between the government and the Shah.

Assassination attempt on Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Court Minister Abdolhossein Hazhir

On February 4, 1949, there was a momentous assassination attempt on Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi . The assassin Fachr Arai had fired several shots at the Shah, which injured him but were not fatal. As a result of the attack, the communist Tudeh party was banned, although it could not be proven whether the attacker belonged to the left or the Islamist scene.

During the elections to the 16th parliament in October 1949, Mossadegh and seven of his followers turned to Mohammad Reza Shah and criticized what he believed the government had not carried out correctly. The Shah received Mossadegh and his supporters and promised free and fair elections. After the talks, Mossadegh announced the establishment of a new political alliance - the National Front  - which ran for parliamentary elections in Tehran with twelve candidates. Mozaffar Baqai , who participated in the “National Front” party alliance, founded an election observation organization.

On November 4, 1949, Court Minister Abdolhossein Hazhir was assassinated. Hossein Emami, a member of Fedajin-e Islam who was already involved in the murder of Ahmad Kasravi on March 11, 1946, stabbed Hazhir when he was about to enter the Sepahsalar Mosque in Tehran for an official ceremony. Hazhir died the following day from serious injuries. Twenty-seven members of the National Front, including Mozaffar Baqai, were arrested on suspicion of involvement in the Hazhir assassination attempt. Chalil Tahmassebi, who later murdered Prime Minister Ali Razmara, was among those arrested . Mossadegh left the city of Tehran on the advice of Mohammad Daftari, the son-in-law of Mossadegh and police chief of Tehran, and went to his estate in Ahmad Abad. On November 10, 1949, the parliamentary elections in the constituencies of Tehran were declared invalid because of the assassination attempt on Hazhir. The by-elections for the twelve seats in Tehran took place on February 8, 1950. The National Front won eight of the twelve seats in these elections, but was unable to exercise them at the beginning of the legislative period on February 18, 1950, because the elected were still in prison on suspicion of participating in the assassination attempt on Hazhir or, like Mossadegh, under suspicion who were involved in the crime. The investigation into the assassination attempt on Hazhir ended in early April 1950. Hossein Emami was sentenced to death as a lone perpetrator and executed. Mossadegh, Baqai and the other elected members of the National Front were able to exercise their mandate from April 25, 1950.

Iranian Parliament Oil Commission, Allahyar Saleh (center); to the right of Saleh: Abdollah Moazami, Hassibi, Dr. Schayegan, Chief Justice Soruri, Hossein Makki; left of Saleh: Dr. Matin-Daftari , Dr. Reza-zadeh Schafagh, Abol Qassem Nadschm , Senator Naghavi

Establishment of the Parliamentary Committee on Oil

The question of the oil industry was the dominant political issue in the Iranian parliament from mid-1949. Discussed were the results of the negotiations with the AIOC, which Abdolhossein Hazhir had prepared in 1948 and which were negotiated on July 17, 1949 with an agreement negotiated by Finance Minister Abbasqoli Golschaiyan with the AIOC with a profit-sharing of up to 50 percent and a review of the concession agreement after 15 Years could be completed. On April 13, 1950, Rajab Ali Mansur was given confidence by Parliament as Prime Minister. Mansour saw the ratification of the Gass-Golshaiyan Agreement as his first and most urgent task in order to stabilize the state finances through secure income from the oil concession. Mossadegh personally attacked Mansour in a speech in parliament on June 20, 1950, threatening to chop his head off if he dared to pass the Gass-Golshaiyan agreement with a parliamentary majority. At this meeting it was decided with 51 votes that a special commission for oil issues should be set up, each consisting of three members of the six existing parliamentary commissions. Eleven MPs abstained. The task of the Commission should be to analyze the Gass-Golshaiyan Agreement. Mossadegh, Baqai, Makki, Ghashghaii, Saleh, Shaygan, Ashtiyanizadeh, Keschavarz-Sadr, Seyyed-Ali Behbahani and Nariman voted against the motion to set up the commission. At the following parliamentary session on June 22, 1950, the 18 members of the committee were elected. Surprisingly, Mossadegh, Makki, Saleh, Ghashghaii, Shaygan and Seyyed-Ali Behbahani, who had previously voted against the commission, were also elected as members of the commission. The committee was constituted on June 26, 1950 and elected Mossadegh as its chairman with one vote against.

Prime Minister Mansour, under the impression of the assassination attempt on Court Minister Hazhir just a few weeks ago and the threats directed against him by Mossadegh, drew the consequences and resigned on June 26, 1950. He was succeeded by Ali Razmara . The political dispute between the new Prime Minister Razmara and Mossadegh was marked by a death threat even at the beginning of Razmara's term of office. On June 27, 1950, Razmara presented his cabinet and government program to the Iranian parliament . In the following session, Mossadegh attacked Razmara personally:

“… I swear by one God, blood will flow, blood will flow. We will fight and we may be killed. If you're a military man, I'm more of a soldier than you. I will kill, I will kill you in this Parliament. "

In a special session on December 24, 1950, Prime Minister Razmara said in the Iranian Parliament:

"I would like to make it clear here that Iran currently does not have the industrial means to get the oil out of the earth and sell it on the world market [...] Gentlemen, you cannot even get one with the staff available to you Manage cement factory. [...] I say this very clearly, whoever puts the property and resources of our country at risk is betraying our people. "

On January 11, 1951, the Committee on Oil Issues presented its report to Parliament rejecting the Gass-Golshaiyan Agreement. Parliament asked the committee to draw up a plan for the way forward. Prime Minister Razmara also commissioned a group of experts to examine the question of possible nationalization. The experts Fathollah Nacficy and Baqer Mostofi, who were employed by the AIOC, came to the conclusion that it would be extremely difficult for a national Iranian oil company to be established to break the cartel of international oil companies and get crude oil or refined oil on the world market to sell. Nationalization would lead to a significant loss of income for Iran due to the cartel's blockade.

Assassination attempt on Prime Minister Hajj Ali Razmara

Mossadegh intensified the political conflict with the government on March 7, 1951 with a press release on Prime Minister Razmara's position on the oil issue:

“On behalf of the National Front, I declare that the Iranians only feel hatred for what the Prime Minister has said. We consider a government illegitimate that engages in such slave-like humiliation. There is no avoiding the nationalization of oil. "

Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara was assassinated on the same day. Khalil Tahmassebi, a member of Fedayeen Islam , shot three times and fatally wounded Razmara. He was arrested at the scene. Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani declared the murderer Razmaras to be a “savior of the Iranian people” and demanded his immediate release from prison.

Nationalization of the oil industry under Prime Minister Hossein Ala

In the meantime, Hossein Ala had succeeded Razmara as Prime Minister. One week after the assassination of Razmara, the parliament under Prime Minister Hossein Ala passed the law on the nationalization of the oil industry on March 15, 1951 . On March 20, 1951, the Senate - the second chamber of Iran - approved the law and it came into force with the signature of Mohammad Reza Shah. On April 30, 1951, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was founded to take over the production facilities and refineries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran and to continue the operations of the oil industry, which had passed into the hands of the Iranian state. The Parliamentary Committee on Oil should draw up the implementing provisions for the implementation of the Nationalization Act. As a member of this committee, Mossadegh drafted a nine-point plan and submitted it to parliament without first consulting Prime Minister Ala, which in turn angered him so much that he resigned just a few weeks after taking office. Now Mossadegh's hour had come.

prime minister

Mohammad Mossadegh (1951)

1951

On April 29, 1951, Mohammad Reza appointed Shah Mossadegh Prime Minister. Nine days later, on May 6, 1951, Parliament gave him 99 to 3 votes. The murderer Razmaras, who had made it possible for Mossadegh to take office with his fatal shots, was pardoned by the Iranian parliament in November 1952 on the basis of a resolution drafted by Ayatollah Kashani with the support of the members of the National Front and after his release from prison by Prime Minister Mossadegh in his Office seat received.

Prime Minister Mossadegh visits the USA (1951)

Prime Minister Mossadegh at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, Washington DC

After the Iranian oil industry had been nationalized by law before Mossadegh took office, Prime Minister Mossadegh was given the task of conducting further negotiations with the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The basis of these negotiations was the concession and profit transfer agreement concluded between the AIOC and the Iranian state. According to an agreement of April 29, 1933, which had a term of 60 years, the Persian share of the profit was 20 to a maximum of 25%. Iran wanted to change this distribution key in its favor and insisted on a share of 50%. The discussion about the revision of the profit distribution key was triggered by the fact that US oil companies had granted their partners in Saudi Arabia a profit share of 50% of the oil revenues. Iraq and Kuwait also received a higher share of oil revenues than Iran.

However, the British government did not initially consider changing the existing treaty. The AIOC requested arbitration before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. From June 1951, several British and American delegations visited Tehran to negotiate a settlement. The British were now ready in principle to recognize the nationalization. Ultimately, however, it was not possible to agree on what compensation payments would have to be made to the British for the nationalization of the newly founded National Iranian Oil Company ( NIOC ). Mossadegh only wanted to replace the value of the industrial facilities, while the British also wanted compensation for the concession agreement, which ran from 1933 to 1993 and has now actually become invalid, which Mossadegh again firmly refused.

Prime Minister Mossadegh before the UN Security Council

On July 5, 1951, the International Court of Justice in The Hague, to which the British had appealed, recommended that Iran allow the oil company to continue operating undisturbed during the ongoing negotiations. Iran had refused to participate in the trial. Mossadegh argued that the court only has the power to deal with intergovernmental disputes. The concession agreement of 1933, which provided for the referral to an international arbitration tribunal in the event of contractual disputes, was a contract between Iran and a private company, which, according to the Iranian interpretation of the concession agreement, meant that the court could not have jurisdiction. The representative of Iran in The Hague rejected the recommendation of the court as "null and void" and described it as "interference in internal affairs".

After the failure of the negotiations, the British government turned to the UN Security Council , which decided on October 1, 1951 to accept the British complaint against Iran and to work out a proposed solution. Mossadegh's struggle for the economic interests of his country was not without sympathy from the Western press. The news magazine Time named Mossadegh Man of the Year in 1951 .

1952

Great Britain responded by announcing that it would no longer allow oil exports from Iran and used warships to block the sea in the Persian Gulf . The resulting loss of income from the oil business, also caused by the lack of a sufficient number of local technicians to operate the plants, caused an economic crisis in Iran ( Abadan crisis ) .

Mossadegh resigns - Ahmad Qavam new Prime Minister

On July 6th, the newly elected parliament met and confirmed Mossadegh as Prime Minister with 52 votes from the 65 MPs present. However, the Senate initially refused to approve the reappointment of Mossadegh. Only 14 out of 60 senators supported Mossadegh. The Shah intervened in the Senate on Mossadegh's behalf and on July 10, Mossadegh was appointed Prime Minister by the Shah, with the approval of the Senate. On July 12, Mossadegh stepped before parliament and demanded full powers for six months in order to be able to pass laws without a parliamentary resolution. Although Mossadegh threatened to resign, parliament refused to give his approval. Mossadegh's request that the Shah relinquish supreme command of the army and subordinate the army to the government was rejected by the Shah. Mossadegh then submitted his resignation.

On July 16, 1952, the Shah appointed Ahmad Qavam as the new Prime Minister. Prime Minister Qavam, secretly supported by the British, announced his intention to start negotiations with Britain to end the naval blockade. This departure from the previously pursued policy aroused opposition in the Iranian public and led to massive protests from supporters of various currents, from communists as well as from the clerics led by Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani . In the public perception, Mossadegh symbolized hope, self-respect and the prospect of greatness. Qavam, on the other hand, stood for defeat and offered a return to reality in which the unchangeable could be accepted. On July 20, 1952, the International Court of Justice in The Hague announced that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute between Iran and Great Britain. Mossadegh had triumphed in The Hague with his argument. On July 21, the Tudeh party and the clergy around Ayatollah Kashani called for a day of national resistance to force the resignation of Ahmad Qavam. There was a large demonstration in Tehran with more than 100,000 participants. Prime Minister Qavam called in the army that shot at the demonstrators. At the end of the day, 36 people died. Ahmed Qavam then announced his resignation on the same day.

Mossadegh Prime Minister again

On July 27, 1952, Parliament expressed its confidence in Mossadegh as Prime Minister by 61 votes to 3 against. In addition, Mossadegh received a six-month power of attorney through an enabling law to provisionally enact laws as prime minister without the consent of parliament. In doing so, he upset allies on both the left and the right. While some feared the emergence of revolutionary Marxism, others criticized its apparent departure from the constitutionally prescribed procedure. As Mossadegh relied more and more on the support of the banned Tudeh party, he increasingly struggled with the view that he was a " Trojan horse " of communist infiltration.

With these powers, Mossadegh not only wanted to ensure the country's financial scope for action, but also to tackle legal, educational and electoral reforms. He passed a land reform that set up councils in the villages and reduced the landowners' share of the annual income by 20%, with 10% going to a fund of the village cooperative. He also announced a tax reform designed to ease the burden on low incomes and instructed the Justice, Home Affairs and Education Ministers to work out reforms. While Mossadegh could be largely certain of the support of the Majles , the Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the Shah and which was dominated by the country's elites, was in sharp opposition to Mossadegh's anti-British foreign and liberal domestic policy. When the Senate opposed Mossadegh's reforms, the National Front criticized the Senate as an "aristocratic club" and prompted its dissolution by parliament passing a law that reduced the Senate's term of office from six to two years. After a meeting with Mossadegh, in which he had promised an early Senate election, the Shah approved this law two days later. Mossadegh's land reforms reduced the agricultural profit share of the non-resident landowners. The urban notables, including these landowners in particular, represented the bulk of actual or potential - though not necessarily active - opponents of Mossadegh. Among the notables were professional politicians, senior administrators, and high-ranking military or police officers who interacted with and with each other large merchants were related or socially connected and who also had connections to the court and embassies such as that of Great Britain. They also relied on their own individual clientele , whose interests they promoted in return for their available support when needed. Such clientele also included leaders of mobs who were able to mobilize people from the lower classes.

What was not resolved by the re-establishment of Mossadegh as Prime Minister was the dispute with the AIOC and the British government. The catastrophic economic situation caused by the boycott - half of Iran's state revenue came from oil sales and was now missing from the state budget - led to the first unrest in Iran in October 1952 and to growing dissatisfaction among the population. The handling of the dispute before the UN Security Council was postponed indefinitely by the veto of the USSR on October 19, 1952.

Mozaffar Baqai , the leader of the Labor Party and co-founder of the National Front, was one of the first to openly oppose Mossadegh. On October 21, 1952, Mossadegh signed a law that banned all strikes and allowed the police to arrest people who organized strikes. Anyone arrested should be immediately guilty as long as he could not prove otherwise. This law was unacceptable to Baqai. Prisons in Iran were filling up rapidly, so Mossadegh was forced to build ten new prisons as a top priority. Parliamentary President Ayatollah Kaschani and his supporters, who had initially supported Mossadegh, saw the Enabling Act as a clear breach of the constitution and also turned away from Mossadegh. Mossadegh's main political support was the communist Tudeh party.

1953

On January 6, 1953, Mossadegh applied to parliament for an extension of his power of attorney to continue to govern by decree. In addition to Mozaffar Baqi, other MPs, including Abol-Ghasem Kaschani, opposed Mossadegh. There were street battles between supporters and opponents of Mossadegh in the streets of Tehran. Mossadegh and Kashani agreed to extend Mossadegh's power of attorney and asked the population to remain calm. The law requested by Mossadegh was passed in parliament, but the clashes between supporters and opponents of Mossadegh continued.

In the spring of 1953 there was a dispute in parliament over the constitutional role of the Shah. According to Article 35 of the Supplementary Constitutional Law, “Persian rulership is a trust entrusted to the people as a gift of God to the person of the ruler.” Mossadegh was convinced that the Shah would be a “symbolic” ruler according to the Iranian constitution and that he no executive rights or powers of attorney would be granted. In order to clarify this question, a parliamentary commission consisting of eight members was founded in mid-March 1953. After discussions with Mossadegh and the Shah, the commission came to the conclusion that according to Articles 35, 44 and 45 of the Iranian Constitution, Mossadegh's legal opinion was correct. The decision was based on the question of political accountability: according to the Iranian Constitution, the Shah is free from any political responsibility, whereas the ministers and the government have the task of conducting state affairs on behalf of the Shah, being fully accountable to parliament are. Mossadegh and the Shah agreed to recognize the results of the commission. This posed a problem for the opponents of Mossadegh who planned to overthrow him, because the Shah accepted that he could not dismiss Mossadegh by decree.

In order for the Commission's interpretation to become legally binding, it had to be submitted to Parliament for a decision. However, this did not happen because the MPs who were in opposition to Mossadegh now had a sufficient majority to prevent the quorum required for resolutions by failing to appear. Haerizadeh, the leader of the anti-Mossadegh anti-Mossadegh "freedom faction", declared that "they would boycott the quorum of parliament until the fate of this government is sealed".

Mossadegh blamed "agents and foreigners" for the standstill in parliament and justified the referendum by claiming that almost half of parliamentarians were on the UK payroll, which political scientist Mark J. Gasiorowski believes is a possibly correct thesis. According to Gasiorowski, Mossadegh's decision to hold the controversial referendum to dissolve parliament made the CIA propaganda pre-coup campaign an easy target, possibly helped convince the Shah to support the coup, and also angered some Iranians against Mossadegh. According to Ali Rahnema, Mossadegh decided to dissolve parliament because he was convinced that a considerable number of MPs had been bought by foreign interests. The dissolution of parliament by referendum was a stroke of luck for those who were planning the coup because it created a political vacuum that could justify the dismissal of Mossadegh as legal by a decree of the Shah.

The referendum held on August 3, 1953 to dissolve parliament brought Mossadegh a majority. In Tehran, 155,544 voters voted for and 115 against the dissolution of parliament. The referendum was criticized not only by Mossadegh's opponents, but also by politicians who were friends with him. For example, the rules for a secret ballot were not complied with because the yes votes had to be cast in a different polling station than the no votes. This made it clear to everyone who wanted to vote no. Mossadegh supporters had also gathered in front of the polling stations for no votes, who threatened voters who wanted to vote against the dissolution of parliament.

Although the referendum had no legal implications, as referendums were not foreseen under the Iranian constitution and, under the constitution, the parliament could only be dissolved by the Shah, Mossadegh said in a radio address that the parliament had lost its legitimacy due to the result of the referendum. Mossadegh was hoping for an overwhelming majority in the upcoming elections. After Mossadegh took control of the royal palaces on August 2, 1953, the Shah was no longer allowed to receive visitors without the prior permission of the Prime Minister. The Shah was only able to maintain contact with his co-conspirators with cunning. Kermit Roosevelt Jr. from the CIA and US Ambassador Loy W. Henderson "worked" the Shah into launching Operation Ajax .

The Shah left Tehran on August 11, 1953 for Ramsar on the Caspian Sea - allegedly a planned vacation trip; on August 16, 1953 he flew to Baghdad for a stopover, to Rome on August 18, 1953, and back on August 22 - after the coup on August 19.

The legal situation regarding the political powers of the Shah was again unclear after the dissolution of parliament through Mossadegh's referendum on August 3rd and 10th. The question was whether, in the absence of parliament, the Shah had the constitutional right to dismiss the prime minister and appoint a new one, or whether the prime minister had to hold general elections in order for the new parliament to elect a new prime minister. In Mossadegh's view, only parliament had the right to appoint or dismiss the prime minister. Mossadegh countered those who accused Mossadegh of having triggered a constitutional crisis after the dissolution of parliament due to the referendum on August 3 and 10, respectively, and that the Shah therefore had the constitutional right to dismiss him and appoint a new prime minister that the decree of his dismissal was dated 22nd Mordad (13th August), while the parliament was only dissolved by a newspaper notice of 25th Mordad (16th August).

Military coup

Iranian troops in front of the parliament, Tehran 19th August 1953

A tank of the Iranian army on the way to the house of Prime Minister Mossadegh, August 19, 1953

→ Main article : Operation Ajax

In August 1953, the Mossadegh government was overthrown by the US and UK intelligence services. The coup quickly resulted in a large-scale US involvement in Iranian politics, which the Iranian public viewed as extremely negative. Sections of the army, landowners, conservative politicians and most of the religious establishment helped directly or indirectly with the coup and formed the social basis for the new regime, but were also politically switched off a little later, so that the new regime had no real social basis or Had legitimacy and increasingly had to rely on repressive instruments and the support of foreign powers - especially the USA.

Four months before the coup, on April 4, 1953, the CIA director Allen W. Dulles had allocated a budget of one million US dollars to be used to overthrow Mossadegh (“in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh "). After Mossadegh's radio address and the de facto dissolution of parliament, the way was now free. At the urging of the USA, after long hesitation, the Shah agreed on August 13 to appoint General Fazlollah Zahedi, the former interior minister in the first cabinet of Mossadegh, as the new prime minister. Mossadegh himself created the legal requirements for this with the dissolution of parliament. According to the constitution, the Shah was entitled to remove the prime minister after the dissolution of the parliament that had elected the prime minister and to replace it with an interim prime minister until a new parliament was elected. Parliamentarians had warned Mossadegh against the dissolution of parliament and made him aware that the dissolution of parliament would give the Shah the right to depose him and replace him with another prime minister. The Shah had exercised this right eighteen times in the past. Mossadegh was certain, however, that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi would not dare to take this step.

On August 15, 1953, Mossadegh was informed by telephone of his planned dismissal by the Shah from Noureddin Kianouri , a leading representative of the Tudeh party. Noureddin Kianouri spoke of a "coup against Mossadegh". The Tudeh party had built up a secret network of middlemen in the army up to and including the Shah's Imperial Guard and learned of the plans to oust Mossadegh as prime minister. Colonel Nematollah Nassiri , head of the Imperial Guard, went to the house of Mossadegh on the evening of August 15 and gave him a certificate of discharge signed by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Mossadegh signed receipt of the certificate of discharge. Nassiri left Mossadegh's home but was arrested there. The Imperial Guard had meanwhile moved out to occupy strategically important places in Tehran. Army Chief of Staff Riahi and Foreign Minister Fatemi were initially arrested by the Imperial Guard, but released again on the orders of Mossadegh.

Mossadegh said in a radio address the next morning:

“Last night, a coup was attempted against the government. Most of the traitors are behind bars. Only Zahedi and a small nucleus could escape. I am offering a reward of 500,000 rials for the capture of Zahedi. Death to all traitors! "

After August 16, Mossadegh and his colleagues failed to organize protests to show their strength, and Mossadegh banned all demonstrations. When the CIA-backed Agent Provocateurs began wreaking havoc on August 17, Mossadegh did not deploy security forces to stop them. On August 19, 1953 (Mordad 28, 1332) early in the morning, pro-Shah protesters marched through the streets of Tehran. Around noon, police and military units joined the Mossadegh opponents and stormed the Foreign Ministry, police headquarters and headquarters of the Army General Staff . In order to make the population aware of the Shah's decree that Mossadegh had been dismissed as Prime Minister by the Shah and General Zahedi appointed as the new Prime Minister, General Zahedi's son, Ardeschir Zahedi , had already printed 10,000 copies on August 16 and distribute it among the population and to the press. On August 18, a copy of Mossadegh's certificate of discharge and Zahedi's certificate of appointment, signed by the Shah, was printed on the front page of the Shahed newspaper published by Mozaffar Baqai . Other newspapers published the documents on August 19. The news of Mossadegh's dismissal spread rapidly in Tehran. In the bazaar district, the pro-Shah demonstration gathered around nine o'clock and then marched through the streets of Tehran with shouts of pro-Shah. Pro-Shah demonstrations also took place in the provinces. In Tabriz, Esfahan and Shiraz, civilians and military officials were on the streets shouting, “Long live the Shah.” Public buildings were occupied by the demonstrators and announcements were made on local radio stations in support of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

Mossadegh, who withdrew to his private house during the coup, was protected by officers devoted to him. Most of the armed clashes between Mossadegh supporters and Zahedi troops took place in front of Mossadegh's house and claimed over 200 dead and 300 wounded. Five days after the coup, Mossadegh offered General Zahedi his surrender by telephone. Mossadegh was greeted by Zahedi with the words: “I will not harm you. You will get a fair trial ”arrested and interned in a barracks. Both the general and the Shah, who returned from self-imposed exile in Rome on August 22nd, paid Mossadegh respect and treated his former companion and later adversary comparatively mildly.

Mohammad Mossadegh in Ahmad Abad, 1965

The process and the last few years

Mossadegh was brought before a military tribunal in late 1953 on charges of high treason . The decree of the Shah that Mossadegh faced on the morning of August 16, replacing him as Prime Minister by General Zahedi, Mossadegh would have accepted as an ethical legalist if he had not had the impression that this and the coup were parts of a foreign plot to stop the nationalization of Iranian oil. In his view, simply stepping back would have meant ignoring the will of the people after the aggressor had already been defeated once. Mossadegh himself stated in the trial that had been brought against him after his overthrow: "If it hadn't been for the preservation of the movement to nationalize the oil industry, I would have kissed the royal decree and resigned." Mossadegh, the circumstances were decisive, as there were reports of a coup while he was unable to contact the Shah personally. He also noticed irregularities in the date and design of the decree itself. He concluded that the Shah had signed the edict but was not really informed of its content. But Mossadegh's attempt to save the monarchy on the one hand and defeat the conspirators on the other turned out to be impossible.

Mossadegh was sentenced to death by the military tribunal. Through intervention by the Shah, the sentence was reduced to three years in prison. Mossadegh was released in December 1956 and moved to his private home in Ahmad Abad, Qazvin Province , where he was under house arrest until his death on March 5, 1967 .

After his release, Gérard de Villiers said, the Shah sent an agent to warn Mossadegh to stay out of politics. Mossadegh's answer:

"I would be pretty crazy to take care of a people who let me down in times of need!"

- quoted from Gérard de Villiers

family

Mohammad Mossadegh was married to Shams-al-Saltaneh (Sun of the Kingdom), the daughter of Zia-al-Saltaneh and Zain al-Abedin Zahir al Islam (the 5th Imam Jomeh of Tehran). His wife took over her mother's title Zia-al-Saltaneh after her mother's death . The marriage resulted in two sons (Ahmad, Gholam Hossein) and three daughters (Mansureh, Zia Aschraf and Chadidscheh).

Reception and individual aspects

The discussions about Mossadegh that have continued to this day have led to a deep rift in Iranian society. For some it is a symbol of anti-imperialism , while others blame it for the political undesirable developments in Iran in the post-war period.

"Dictatorship" charge

The contemporary American press had already made allegations that Mossadegh was striving for a dictatorship. In 1953, newspapers such as the New York Times consistently referred to Mossadegh as a "dictator". The political scientist Richard W. Cottam noted on the one hand that Mossadegh had assumed a dictatorial leadership role in 1953 and even held a typically totalitarian plebiscite. On the other hand, Mossadegh's refusal to suppress the communist Tudeh or the feudalist right contributed to the crisis, and the break of the National Front at the turn of 1952-3 forced him to gain the dictatorial control against which he had fought for so long. After Mossadegh's fall, Iran had developed from a loose authoritarianism to totalitarianism by 1960, which was dictatorially controlled by the Shah. William A Dorman and Mansour Farhang point out that Mossadegh's style of government - apart from the plebiscite - was far more democratic than anything Iran had known before. In contrast to the later policy of the Shah, Mossadegh had neither suppressed the press nor had opponents arrested, nor set up a secret police or promoted torture.

Opponents of Mossadegh see the Power of Attorney Act ( ekhtiyarati ) , which Mossadegh had submitted to parliament after the July revolt in 1952 and which was passed on August 3, 1952, as evidence that Mossadegh was a "dictator". The Iranist and economist Homa Katouzian , on the other hand, points out that Mossadegh only received the powers of parliament for a limited time to carry out financial, legal, social and other reforms. Parliament remained in place and debated all matters of political concern on a daily basis. Mossadegh's government has not even prevented conspiratorial activities directed against it, nor has it taken action against serious violations of the law by the right or left opposition. According to Katouzian, Mossadegh would not have been able to run the country under the given conditions without the powers. The country had been in confrontation with a world power, the powerful enemies at home had often taken action against the government outside of parliament, and Iran found itself in serious economic problems due to the international boycott of Iranian oil and the resulting crisis.

democracy

Mossadegh is often portrayed as a champion for freedom and democracy in Iran. Reference is also made to the fact that he was already a member of the first Iranian parliament and actively participated in the Constitutional Revolution from 1905 to 1911.

Mossadegh registered as an MP from Isfahan in the first Iranian parliament, but was not admitted as a MP because he had not yet reached the minimum age of 27 for MPs. The electoral law of the first parliament provided for elections by class. Mossadegh had volunteered to represent the Isfahan landowners because his family owned extensive land in Isfahan. Mossadegh could not prove any election results by the citizens of Isfahan at the parliamentary election commission. In addition, Mossadegh did not live in Isfahan and thus did not meet another requirement of the electoral law of the time. In Ahmad Kasravi's standard work on the Constitutional Revolution of Iran, the name Mossadegh does not appear any further. In the decisive year 1909, in which Sattar Khan , Bagher Khan and Sardar Asad waged a desperate struggle for the Iranian constitution and ultimately prevailed with military means, Mohammad Mossadegh was in Paris. The abolition of the absolutist monarchy in favor of a constitutional monarchy is not associated with the name Mohammad Mossadegh.

Another opportunity for Mohammad Mossadegh to campaign for a free political system in Iran was in 1924. In October 1923 Reza Khan, who later became Reza Shah Pahlavi , became Prime Minister of Iran. On October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Pasha proclaimed a republic in Turkey and abolished the caliphate . On April 20, 1924, the new Turkish constitution came into force, which abolished Sharia law . As early as January 20, 1924, an article appeared in a Turkish newspaper in which the form of government of the republic was also demanded for Iran. Prime Minister Reza Khan advocated the establishment of a republic of Iran, but failed due to resistance from the Shiite clergy, who feared the secularization of Iran and thus a loss of political influence. In particular, it was MP Hassan Modarres who organized parliamentary and extra-parliamentary resistance against the establishment of a Republic of Iran . Mossadegh, who was also a member of the Iranian parliament at the time, neither supported the republican movement nor spoke out against it. Neither in the 40th nor in the decisive 42nd session of parliament, in which the change in the form of government of Iran was discussed, there was a request from Mossadegh.

Another way to establish a democratic system in Iran was during his time as prime minister from 1951 to 1953. After his resignation and reappointment as prime minister (1952), Mossadegh insisted, initially for a period of six months by decree to rule. MEPs discussed this disempowerment of parliament in a very controversial manner, but ultimately agreed because the country was in a serious political and economic crisis. During 1953, the deputies' criticism of Mossadegh intensified, so that he could no longer count on an extension of his powers. He threatened MPs with dissolving parliament, even though as Prime Minister he did not have the constitutional rights to dissolve parliament. Mossadegh therefore held a referendum to dissolve parliament, even though Iran's constitution did not provide for referenda.

Democratically elected Prime Minister

Mossadegh was the only democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, the claim that in the film Women Without Men by Shirin Neshat is quoted. According to the then valid constitution of Iran, however, the Shah appointed the prime minister. This then faced a vote of confidence by Parliament. This is what happened to Mohammad Mossadegh.

Nationalization of the oil reserves

Mossadegh had nationalized Iran's oil reserves, they said, but the demand to nationalize the oil production and processing facilities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was already made on December 24, 1950 by the deputy and leader of the Workers' Party Mozaffar Baqai in the 96. Session of the 16th legislative period of the Iranian parliament introduced as a resolution with the signatures of a total of nine members. Baqai was unable to get the eleven MPs required to propose to sign. The question of the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry was discussed intensively in the Iranian parliament under Prime Minister Ali Razmara . Razmara opposed nationalization because he was convinced that Iran had neither the personnel nor the economic resources to extract, process and market Iranian oil. In addition, natural resources were state property through the constitution of Iran. The question of nationalization thus concerned the technical facilities and refineries of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which is largely owned by the British. After the assassination of Razmara, the nationalization of the oil industry was passed by a majority in parliament under Prime Minister Hossein Ala's bill .

Prime Minister Mossadegh, succeeding Ala, was given the task of defending nationalization against political pressure from Great Britain. An embargo imposed by the British led to an economic crisis in Iran that led to considerable social upheaval. Mossadegh had parliament approve extensive powers that enabled him to govern by decree. Several attempts to mediate, also supported by the USA, to end the political and economic Abadan crisis through a corresponding agreement were rejected by Mossadegh. The parliamentarians, who initially supported Mossadegh's uncompromising stance, increasingly turned away from Mossadegh and wanted an end to this policy.

See also

• Ahmad Qavam
• Hassan Vosough
• List of Prime Ministers of Iran
• Timeline for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry

literature

• Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979.
• Christopher de Bellaigue: Patriot of Persia. Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup. Harper-Collins, 2012.
• Farhad Diba: Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography. Croom Helm, London 1986, ISBN 0-7099-4517-5 .
• Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran . 1st edition. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 .
• Homa Katouzian: Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran. IB Tauris & Co, 1991, ISBN 1-85043-210-4 .
• Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror , John Wiley & Sons , 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
• Mohammad Mussadegh: Musaddiq's Memoirs. (Ed. By Homa Katouzian, Translated by SH Amin and H. Katouzian), JEBHE, London 1988, ISBN 1-870740-00-9 .
• Afsar Soheila Sattari: Civil Societies in Iran: Dr. Mossadegh's theses and achievements. Hamburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-8300-4780-3 .
• Mehdi Shamshiri: Zendeghi Mohammad Mossadegh - biography of Mohammad Mossadegh - from birth to the end of his upbringing and naturalization as a Swiss citizen. 2nd Edition. lulu.com, 2011, ISBN 978-0-578-08305-6 . (Persian) details
• Mehdi Shamshiri: Five historical terrors - Opening the way for premiership of Mossadegh. 2011. (Persian) ISBN 978-0-578-08079-6 . Details
• Until the air clears . In: Der Spiegel . No. 33 , 1951, pp. 13 ( online ).
• Villains, heroes and a lot of nationalism . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung , February 26, 2006; on the background of the Iranian nationalism movement and its main character

Web links

Commons : Mohammad Mosaddegh  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• Literature by and about Mohammad Mossadegh in the catalog of the German National Library

Remarks

1. ↑ The exact date of birth of Mossadegh is controversial and led to a controversy in the Iranian parliament in 1950. According to the electoral law in force at the time, the upper limit for parliamentarians was 70 years. According to the information in the birth book (date of birth: 1258 lunar calendar corresponds to 1879/80), Mossadegh should no longer have been allowed to run for parliament. Mossadegh then stated that the information in his birth book was incorrect and that he was three years younger than stated in the official documents.
   • Winter 1879: Mehdi Shamshiri: Zendeghi Nameh Mohammad Mossadegh. (Biography of Mohammad Mossadegh - From birth to the end of his upbringing and naturalization as a Swiss citizen) 2nd. Edition. lulu.com, 2011, p. 1 and Mehdi Shamshiri: Noyaftehai dar Ertebat ba Mohammad Mossadegh. Pars Printhouse, Huston, undated, pp. 266f. (Copy of an excerpt from the birth register; register entry was made in 1297 (1918) according to Mossadegh's own information for the application for passports for himself and his children. Mossadegh stated his age in 1297 (1918) as 39; these details were followed by two Witnesses - Abol Hasan Tabatabai (half-brother of Mossadegh) and Mirza Kazem Aalam Alsaltaneh confirmed by signature), p. 268 (copy of a document from the commission admitting candidates for election to the 6th Parliament, confirming that Mossadegh was in 1305 (1926) month Tir is 46 years old).
   • 1880: The Islamic Republic of Iran dates the date of birth to 1880 (see commemorative stamp for the 100th birthday of Mossadegh). This date was given by Mossadegh as his date of birth when applying for his passport. In the Encyclopædia Britannica the year 1880 is also found as the date of birth. See britannica.com
   • 1882: A website operated by the followers of Mossadegh, however, shows June 16, 1882. Mossadegh himself indicated the 29th Rajab in 1299 (May 20, 1882) in his memoirs. Mohammad Mossadegh - Born June 16, 1882. In: The Mossadegh Project. Retrieved November 4, 2008 . 

Individual evidence

1. ^ Mossadegh, Mohammed. In: Munzinger Online / Personen - Internationales Biographisches Archiv , URL: munzinger.de (accessed on March 12, 2016)
2. ^ Farhad Diba: Mohammed Mossadegh. A Political Biography. 1986, p. 3 ff.
3. ↑ Ketab Kheyrat Hesan, Tehran 1928 (1307 lunar calendar), p. 28, col. 2.
4. ↑ Gholam Hossein Afzal ol Molk: Afzal al tavarikh. Ketab Khane Melli, Tehran, undated, Vol. 1, p. 355.
5. ↑ Mehdi Shamshiri: Zendeghi Nameh Mohammad Mossadegh. (Biography of Mohammad Mossadegh - From birth to the end of his education and naturalization as a Swiss citizen). 2nd. Edition. lulu.com, 2011, p. 26.
6. ↑ Sayfallah Vahidnia: Khaterat Siasi va Tarikhi. Ferdosi Publications, Tehran 1983, pp. 85-86.
7. ↑ Mehdi Shamshiri: Zendeghi Nameh Mohammad Mossadegh. (Biography of Mohammad Mossadegh - From birth to the end of his education and naturalization as a Swiss citizen). 2nd. Edition. lulu.com, 2011, p. 182 f.
8. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, pp. 58-62.
9. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, pp. 54-57.
10. ↑ Mehdi Malekzadeh: Tarikh Engelab Mashrutiat Iran. Volume 5. n.d., p. 1033.
11. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, p. 65 f.
12. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, p. 68 ff.
13. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, p. 77 ff.
14. ↑ Iraj Afshar (ed.): Mohammad Mossadegh: Khaterat va Taalomat Mossadegh. Entesharat Elmi, Tehran 1979, p. 80 f.
15. ↑ ^{a b} Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press, 2009, p. 112.
16. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press, 2009, p. 114.
17. ^ Catherine & Jacques Legrand: The Shah of Iran. Creative Publishing International, 1989, p. 61.
18. ↑ Mehdi Shamshiri: Panj terror-e tarikhy rah-gosha-ye sedarat-e Mossadegh. 2011, pp. 133-167.
19. ↑ Nasser Najmi: Havades Tarikhi Iran. Tehran 1991, p. 164 f.
20. ↑ Jalil Bozorgmehr: Khaterat Jalil Bozorgmehr az Dr Mossadegh. Tehran 1994, p. 140.
21. ↑ Ahmad Maleki: Tarikhche Vagheiyeh Jebheh Melli. Tehran 1953, p. 8 f.
22. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press 2009, p. 115.
23. ↑ The transcript of the parliamentary scribes on the 16th Majlis, 38th session, 30th Chordad 1329
24. ↑ Law establishing the Oil Commission
25. ↑ Minutes of Parliament of June 22, 1950
26. ↑ Hossein Makki: Ketab-e Siah. Theran 1979, p. 51 f.
27. ↑ Speech transcript of the parliamentary scribes of 16 Majlis, 8th Tir 1329. Quoted from: Ali Mirfetros: Mohammad Mosaddeq - Pathology of a failure. Farhanf, Montreal 2008, p. 57.
28. ^ Full text of the minutes of parliament from June 27, 1950
29. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press, 2009, p. 121.
30. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press, 2009, p. 121.
31. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. UC Press 2009, p. 123.
32. ^ Minutes of the 143rd session of the 16th legislative period of the Iranian parliament
33. ↑ Stephen Kinzer : In the service of the Shah. CIA and MI6 and the roots of terror in the Middle East. Wiley-VCH Verlag, Weinheim, p. 150.
34. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. University of California Press, 2009, p. 141.
35. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. University of California Press, 2009, 142 f.
36. ^ Ali M. Ansari: The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, p. 137.
37. ↑ Afsaneh Najmabadi: Land Reform and Social Change in Iran. University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City 1987, p. 4.
38. ↑ ^{a b} Ervand Abrahamian: Iran between two Revolutions. Princeton UP, 2nd ed., Princeton 1985, p. 273.
39. ↑ Habib Ladjevardi: Constitutional Government and Reform under Mussaddiq. In: James A. Bill et al. Wm. Roger Louis (Ed.): Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil. University of Texas Press, Austin 1988, pp. 73 f.
40. ↑ Sepehr Zabih: The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian revolution. Lake View Press, Chicago 1982, p. 78.
41. ↑ Fakhreddin Azimi: Unseating Mosaddeq - The Configuration and Role of Domestic Forces. In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 1st Ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 27-101; here p. 31 f.
42. ↑ Gholam Reza Afkhami: The life and times of the Shah. University of California Press, 2009, p. 148.
43. ↑ Bahman Nirumand, Keywan Daddjou: With God for Power. Rowohlt Verlag, 1989, p. 83.
44. ^ Wilhelm Litten: The new Persian constitution. Tehran 1907, Reprint epubli 2014, p. 42.
45. ^ Wilhelm Litten: The new Persian constitution. Teheran 1907, Reprint epubli 2014, p. 43 Ҥ 44 The person of the ruler is relieved of responsibility; the ministers of state are responsible to the chambers in all matters. "
46. ^ Wilhelm Litten: The new Persian constitution. Teheran 1907, Reprint epubli 2014, p. 43 Ҥ 45 All orders and handwriting of the ruler in state affairs are only carried out if they have been countersigned by the responsible minister; and responsible for the meaning and content of this command or handwriting is precisely this minister. "
47. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 276 f.
48. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 284 f.
49. ^ Mark J. Gasiorowski: The 1953 Coup d'Etat Against Mosaddeq. In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 1st ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 227-260.
50. ^ ^{A b} Mark J. Gasiorowski: Why Did Mosaddeq Fall? In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Eds.): The 1953 Coup d'Etat Against Mosaddeq. Syracuse University Press, 1st ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 261-277.
51. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. NY, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 287.
52. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracus University Press Volume 1, 2008, p. 243.
53. ↑ de Villiers 1976, p. 271.
54. ↑ de Villiers 1976, p. 272.
55. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 282.
56. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 283 f.
57. ^ Wm. Roger Louis: Britain and the Overthrow of the Mosaddeq Government. In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 1st ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 126-177.
58. ^ Maziar Behrooz: The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh. In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 1st ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 102-125.
59. ↑ ^{a b} Homa Katouzian: Mosaddeq's government in Iranian history - Arbitrary Rule, Democracy, and the 1953 coup. In: Mark J. Gasiorowski, Malcom Byrne (Ed.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse University Press, 1st ed., Syracuse & New York 2004, ISBN 0-8156-3018-2 , pp. 1-26.
60. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 243 ff.
61. ^ Office of the Military Governor of Tehran: Black Book on Tudeh Officers Organization. 1956, ISBN 978-3-8442-7813-2 . epubli.de
62. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 95.
63. ^ Gérard de Villiers: The Shah. The unstoppable rise of Mohammed Reza Pahlewi . Heyne, Munich 1976, ISBN 3-453-00632-1 , p. 276 .
64. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 125.
65. ↑ Darioush Bayandor: Iran and the CIA. New York 2010, p. 154.
66. ↑ de Villiers 1976, p. 299.
67. ^ Mossadegh Trial . In: Der Spiegel . No. 49 , 1953 ( online ).
68. ^ ^{A b} Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, NY 2015, p. 280.
69. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, NY 2015, p. 283.
70. ^ ^{A b} Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 281.
71. ^ Ali Rahnema: Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran. Cambridge University Press, NY 2015, pp. 282f.
72. ↑ de Villiers 1976, p. 318.
73. ↑ Ali Mirfetros: Mohammad Mosaddeq - Pathology of a failure. Farhang, 2008. (in Persian)
74. ^ William A Dorman, Mansour Farhang: The US Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference. Univ. of California Press, Berkeley 1987, pp. 41f.
75. ^ Richard W. Cottam: Nationalism in Iran. Updated Through 1978. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1979, pp. 224, 216f., 277, 288.
76. ^ William A Dorman, Mansour Farhang: The US Press and Iran. Foreign Policy and the Journalism of Deference. Univ. of California Press, Berkeley 1987, pp. 43f.
77. ↑ Ahmad Kasravi: Tārikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran. (تاریخ مشروطهٔ ایران) (History of the Constitutional Revolution of Iran, in Persian) Negāh Publications, Tehran 2003, ISBN 964-351-138-3 .
78. ^ Cyrus Ghani: Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah. IBTauris 2000, pp. 308f.
79. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracus University Press Volume 1, 2008, p. 243.
80. ^ Minutes Majlis Shora Melli, 17th legislative period
81. ^ Minutes of the 96th session of the 16th legislative period of the Iranian parliament
82. ↑ Ervand Abrahamian: Iran between two revolutions. Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 273.