German military missions in the Ottoman Empire

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The German military missions in the Ottoman Empire were military-political projects to modernize the army of the Ottoman Empire during the German Empire . The military missions under the Prussian generals von der Goltz and Liman von Sanders , along with the construction of the Baghdad Railway, made a significant contribution to the intensification of German-Ottoman relations, which prompted the Ottoman Empire to enter the First World War on the side of the Central Powers .

prehistory

Since the end of the second siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire had been in retreat in Europe. The many defeats of the Ottomans had led to their moral weakening, which resulted in the gradual disappearance of the Turkish threat perceived in Christian Europe . 1730 the Sultan Ahmed III. overthrown by the Janissaries , who established an arbitrary rule on it. After the Russo-Austrian Turkish War against Russia and Austria in 1739, France, as Turkey's leading ally, brokered the Peace of Belgrade and was finally officially recognized as the protector of the Latin Christians (Catholics) in the Ottoman Empire. In the second half of the 18th century a momentous turn in political power began, which instead of the German emperor made the Russian tsar the pioneer against the Ottomans. Since then, the Ottomans have been threatened mainly by Russia.

Early contacts

The alliance of Frederick the Great in 1761 (Alliance von Bunzelwitz ) first brought relationships with the ambitious Prussia , which led to a lasting spiritual bond between the two peoples and ultimately to the alliance in the First World War. In order to force Austria to withdraw from the Turkish war , Friedrich's successor Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia concluded an offensive alliance with the Turkish sultan on January 31, 1790.

From 1798 to 1800, Napoleon's Egyptian expedition led to a temporary break between France and the traditionally friendly Ottoman Empire. Britain came into the political field of vision of the Ottomans. The Napoleonic Egypt adventure heralded a new era for the Middle East and the Ottomans. The military reforms at the beginning of the 19th century were followed by civil ones - dependent on and under pressure from the great powers, which increasingly offered the Ottoman Empire protection from Russia. But the civil reforms also favored growing Arab nationalism (see also Watan ) and the national movements of the Balkan peoples. In response to this, the sultan pursued a reactionary policy at the end of the 19th century, which finally collapsed in the Young Turkish Revolution in 1908. During the 19th century, France in particular proved to be a model for the Turks, particularly in the literary and educational field. Militarily and economically, on the other hand, at the turn of the 20th century, German influence increasingly prevailed.

The recruitment of foreign experts in the modernization of the Ottoman army had already been all reform-oriented sultans since Abdülhamid I (1774–1788) and Selim III. (1788–1807) to Mahmud II. (1808–1839). The most recent German military reforms finally fall in the time of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) and Mehmed V (1909–1918).

The military reforms of the 18th and early 19th centuries

General Horace-François Sébastiani, portrait of Jean-Baptiste Paulin Guérin

In contrast to earlier reform periods, Abdülhamid I had not commissioned defectors who had converted to Islam to carry out the reform. Instead, he enabled Western advisers to serve for a limited period of time. B. the Baron von Tott . With the exception of the establishment of a naval base in Sinop , the scope of the reforms was mainly limited to Constantinople .

His nephew Selim III. sought the help of the traditionally friendly France for the reform of the Ottoman military, but hesitated in 1804 - also caused by the dishonesty of French politics - until the European successes of the French army in 1805, finally in 1806 to a French military mission in Constantinople Opel under Ambassador and General Sébastiani led , which fortified the Dardanelles and successfully repelled the English attack in 1807. But the mission was abrupt after uprisings by Janissary auxiliaries ( Yamak ) and Janissaries by the deposition of Selim III. Finished in 1807.
A gradual reform process began under Mahmud II in 1809. He signed a peace treaty at the Dardanelles with the British envoy, Sir Robert Adair (later replaced by Stratford Canning , appointed Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe in 1852) with the secret agreement of assistance from the British Navy in the event of an attack by France, Austria or Russia to the Ottoman Empire in the Adriatic or Aegean Sea. He succeeded in winning over the ulema , which exerted great influence on the people , and in 1826 suppressed an uprising by the Janissaries against the introduction of European military customs and abolished the Janissary Army.

German military reform in the Ottoman Empire from 1882

prehistory

Since the first half of the 19th century under Sultan Mahmud II , Prussian officers had served briefly in the Ottoman army , but closer contacts between Constantinople and Berlin were rare until well into the Bismarck era . Nevertheless, from 1835 to 1839 the then captain von Moltke led a mission of eight officers and sixteen non-commissioned officers.

In the second half of the 19th century, the rising German industrial power was increasingly characterized by the fact that Sultan Abdülhamid II had no territorial-colonial interests in the areas touching the Ottoman Empire, while England had occupied Egypt in 1881 and the Suez canal regarded as the gateway to Asia, Australia and Africa, France is Tunisia incorporated and Syria 's target, Russia the Caucasus threatened and even Italy in Tripolitania and the Dodecanese speculated. The economic influence of the Germans was also insignificant until the late 1880s compared to France, which remained at a high level, and England, which was now declining sharply. After the defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877/1878 , the Sultan was forced to use foreign aid for the reorganization of the Ottoman armed forces in order to be able to ward off the threats posed by foreign and domestic political opponents. With the establishment of the German Empire after the military victory against France , the Sultan found the new German superpower to be both particularly suitable and, due to its until then limited influence in the Ottoman Empire and Otto von Bismarck's cautious attitude towards political involvement in the Orient, relatively unsuspicious harmless compared to France and England. Bismarck finally approved the expansion of the already traditional sporadic cooperation into a first German military mission after careful examination of any foreign policy consequences, but continued to treat the " oriental question " officially as a means of balancing the great powers and not as a German political and economic end in itself.

procedure

Count von Moltke

In 1882 Sultan Abdülhamid II was looking for a new staff of military advisers. Count von Moltke , the most famous Prussian officer who had served Sultan Mahmud II, entrusted General Otto Kähler with this task, who was particularly active as the economic representative of the Krupp company . Colonel Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz , since 1883 in the education service of the Ottoman General Staff School, after the death Kahler (November, 1885) Head of Mission. Corvette Captain Starke was appointed naval advisor in 1884. In 1895 von der Goltz returned to the German Empire, whereupon the German embassy set up a military attaché for reporting, procuring armaments contracts and filling selected military positions with German officers. Among other things, von Morgen and Major von Strempel were appointed as military attachés .

Ambassador Baron Marschall von Bieberstein

In the aftermath, too, the Germans tried hard to cultivate relationships. In 1897, the former State Secretary of the Outer Baron Marschall von Bieberstein was appointed ambassador by the Kaiser. During the second imperial visit to Constantinople in 1898, the later Chancellor, Count von Bülow, was in the wake to support the ambassador in promoting economic influence. The means of baksheesh already made available by Goltz is also used for this, from which Izzet Pascha in particular makes a profit.

scope

Like Kähler before, von der Goltz also pushed ahead with imports of German weapons: for example, he had hundreds of heavy cannons and field guns shipped over Hamburg to fortify the Dardanelles (1885: 500 heavy and heaviest Krupp guns), while Krupp specialists kept the old ones The fortifications of the Çatalca line west of Constantinople were brought up to the latest technical standards. In 1886, for example, he placed an order for a torpedo boat flotilla for a shipyard in Elbing , and it was decided to re-arm the Turkish army with 500,000 rifles and 50,000 modern carbines from Mauser and Loewe .

from Goltz

His attempt to build a functioning general staff, however, was hampered by rivalries within the Ottoman high command. At least von der Goltz was able to induce the sultan to reorganize the military structure and thus to accelerate mobilization and the transmission of orders from the high command to the combat units and to distant garrisons. Thanks to his personality, Von der Goltz was able to refute the objections raised by the ulema and managed to get Sultan Abdülhamid II to send selected officers to Potsdam for further training . There were seldom more than 20 officers per year in the German Reich, but often for longer periods of time. The organization was organized much more thoroughly than the English training of Turkish cadets in Woolwich under Sultan Mahmud II. By the time of the Young Turkish Revolution, around 100 officers had been trained in the Prussian-German military.

effect

The victory in the “30-day war” against Greece in 1897 was regarded as a success of the German military reformers, and the use of the Anatolian Railway for military purposes was also tested. This also resulted in a temporary consolidation of the sultan's rule, which abruptly ended even the efforts of the Europeans to find a solution to the Armenian question for years and which prevented the division of "Turkey", especially on the basis of German intercession. Nevertheless, the German side rated the success of the reorganization of the Ottoman army as very moderate and slow-moving - largely due to the passive handicap of the Sultan himself. In order not to lose the good political contact with the Sultan to other powers, the mission remained exist and, above all, pushed ahead with armaments orders from the German arms industry.

In the armaments business, the Germans (especially Krupp) actually succeeded in establishing a monopoly in the Ottoman Empire for the time being through the mediation of the military mission, and the French ( Schneider-Creusot ) and the English ( Vickers , Armstrong Whitworth ), who were still dominant in the 1970s, to displace. However, after the collapse of the Ottoman army in the Balkan War, the German military mission and armaments industry received the - politically and economically motivated - international and Young Turkish accusation that German weapons technology was to blame for the failure of the Ottoman army. Although most of the belligerents were armed with Krupp guns, the campaign diminished the prestige and influence of the Germans and benefited the English and French arms industry, whereupon the Ambassador Baron von Wangenheim launched a second military mission - with more powers - as a suitable means of dealing with the allegations and its consequences.

The Baghdad Railway

In addition to the concession to build the Anatolian Railway, the arms deal was followed by the one for the Baghdad Railway , which was decisive for German influence in the Ottoman Empire.

The work of the first military mission under von der Goltz was of great importance, not least because of the training of a German-friendly or at least German-friendly core of Young Turkish officers who, even after the Revolution, through the Young Turks who generally turned much more towards France and England in 1908, the ties to the German Army did not lose and occupied some of the most important posts. In May 1909, for example, the Ottoman Chief of Staff Ahmed Izzet Pascha obtained that von der Goltz - now Colonel General - was reappointed to the Ottoman army. And Izzet Pascha also knew the later head of the second military mission, Liman von Sanders , from his time with the hussars in Kassel.

German military mission in the Ottoman Empire under Liman von Sanders from 1913

prehistory

In the period before the First World War , the state of the Ottoman army and the navy was utterly desolate. The empire found itself in a field of tension between pan-Islamic , Ottoman , Pan- Turkish and Pan- Turkic currents. Before the Balkan War, the German military reformers under General Field Marshal von der Goltz received little practical support from Sultan Abdülhamid II , who lived in constant fear of a revolution supported by the military, to effectively modernize the Ottoman military. The reorganization of the army following the plan of Marshal Izzet Pascha (Turkish: Ahmet İzzet Paşa) after the Sultan's deposition (1909) by the Young Turks also happened without the German instruction officers being able to influence and led to the catastrophic defeat of the Balkan War of 1912/13. Only the division of the Balkan states postponed the fall of the Ottoman Empire and secured the Ottomans control over the Bosporus and the remaining European territories. Both Russia and the Entente France / Great Britain saw their own vital interest in control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus , also in view of the looming power vacuum .

procedure

Officers of the German military mission leaving for Turkey in December 1913. In the middle (with cap) Otto Liman von Sanders, the head of the mission.

In this situation, on May 22, 1913, the Ottoman Empire made an official request to send a German general to reorganize the army. On June 30, 1913, Liman von Sanders was appointed head of the new military mission in Constantinople by the emperor , whereupon the Ottoman government began negotiations with the German in August 1913 and the German military mission under the leadership of the German lieutenant general and now Ottoman general (in short then endowed the German general and Ottoman marshal) Liman von Sanders with far-reaching powers and charged with the second reorganization of the army. The legacy of the former Minister of War - Grand Vizier and General Shevket Pascha (Turkish: Şevket Paşa) - who had declared to the German Ambassador Baron von Wangenheim before his assassination that the German Empire had to take on a special role in the restructuring of the Ottoman state was thus realized which "must be reformed from the ground up " " under the almost dictatorial direction of a German general " . Diplomatically, the question of the dispatch of German military advisers to Turkey led to considerable entanglements with other great powers that were not interested in a German presence on the Bosporus and in Turkey's military regain (so-called Liman von Sanders crisis ).

Ismail Enver Bey

Delayed as a result of the assassination of Shevket Pasha, Liman von Sanders finally received the emperor's permission in November to sign the treaty approved by the German military leadership, the Foreign Office and the Turkish Council of Ministers. A few days after the German military mission arrived in Constantinople in December 1913, the previous Minister of War Izzet Pascha resigned in favor of the young Major Ismail Enver Bey (later Enver Pascha ), who shared Shevket Pasha's trust in the German and Turkish armies, whose military inexperience was but this led to serious conflicts with the technically extremely conscientious - but diplomatically little gifted - Liman von Sanders. Within only seven months, Liman von Sanders, through relentless and tireless work, brought the Ottoman army to a level of clout that the Entente had not even rudimentarily expected due to the experience of the Balkan war.

However, the activities of the German military mission with the prospect of a strengthening of the Ottoman army also became the occasion for an international crisis , which was later attributed in part to triggering war, as Russia and the Entente felt they were being forced to act.

After the outbreak of the European war on August 1, 1914, the contract of the military mission initially provided for the recall of the German officers. On August 2, however, Grand Vizier Said Halim Pascha and Minister of War Enver concluded a secret alliance treaty with the German Reich, into which, after Liman's advice, a passage was added in the event that the military mission remained, giving the German officers an “ actual Influence on the warfare ”assured.

Nevertheless, Germany continued to fear that Turkey, which was formally maintaining its neutrality, would be overwhelmed and pressed for a swift entry into the war. The fortification of the Dardanelles could not be operated effectively because of the presence of a British naval mission.

SMS Wroclaw

In accordance with the German Army Mission, the British Admiral Limpus was commissioned to reform the navy as early as 1912 , whose military mission - already over 70 naval officers in August 1914 - is now officially ended by the Ottoman government on August 15, 1914, i.e. shortly after the Snubber confiscation of the battleships Reschadie (Turkish Reşadiye ) and Sultan Osman I by the English on August 1, 1914, followed by the spectacular handover of the SMS Goeben (renamed Jawus Sultan Selim , Turkish: Javuz Sultan Selim ) on August 12, 1914 and the SMS Breslau (renamed Midilli ) in the Ottoman service with German occupation by Rear Admiral Souchon . Admiral Wilhelm Souchon was appointed Commander in Chief of the Ottoman fleet by the Sultan. The British naval mission had been in a tradition binding on naval minister Dschemal (Turkish Cemal), since before Limpus, Rear Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble was used as early as 1908 and Admiral Hugh Williams in 1910, albeit with no real possibility of effective modernization.

Liman von Sanders Pasha as Turkish Commander in Chief in World War I (1916)

The Ottoman Empire disembarked the last British officers on September 15, 1914 and finally, after the hastily carried out fortification of the Dardanelles under German leadership, officially closed the straits to international shipping on September 27, 1914, which led to attacks on October 29, 1914 almost simultaneously The Ottoman-flagged fleet under Admiral Souchon in the Black Sea against the Russians and a British attack against Ottoman merchant ships leaving the port of Smyrna (Turkish İzmir ) came and on November 12, 1914 the Ottoman government of the Triple Entente waged war explained. Liman von Sanders now got into violent conflicts with the German ambassador regarding the expeditions of special units planned by the German military attaché and the ambassador, as he judged them from a strictly military point of view and did not want to bow to the political interests and expansion wishes of Berlin or those of the Young Turks . It was therefore decided that he would be replaced by General Field Marshal von der Goltz. After this measure was abandoned again, but the agreements regarding the posting of Freiherr von der Goltz were not reversed, he arrived in Constantinople on December 12, 1914 and was initially employed as the Sultan's military adviser, possibly to help the Ottoman side To convey the message and military mission, which, however, was not very successful due to the apathy of Mehmed V. On March 24, 1915, Liman von Sanders received the supreme command of the newly formed fifth army to defend the Dardanelles through Enver , which, in addition to the previous mobilization, was the first major test of the reorganized army.

Erich von Falkenhayn

After the loss of Baghdad in March 1917 - which both the Turkish officers after the death of Freiherr von der Goltz in April 1916 through strategic mistakes in the east and Envers's German advisors - the previous moderate military support was abandoned by taking the initiative of the military attaché and against violent protests from Liman von Sanders, the Army Group Yıldırım (German designation: “Army Group F”; “Yıldırım” = lightning) is built up with an almost purely German general staff. If the military mission had restricted the use of German officers and German formations as far as possible and focused on the training of Turkish officers, support with money and war material and the provision of German officers for the command of the troops, etc., "Jilderim" is now an army group in German responsibility under General Erich von Falkenhayn . Composed of Turkish armies with the support of German troops and aid formations - including the new " Asia Corps " about a tenth of the total strength - Jilderim was supposed to recapture Baghdad, but must then be relocated to the Sinai front from autumn 1917, as the English are now advancing from Egypt - provoked by the unsuccessful Ottoman expedition to the Suez Canal, enforced against Liman von Sanders in August 1916.

During the imperial visit in October 1917, a military convention initiated by the German military attaché in the early summer of 1917 was signed by the ministers of war Hermann von Stein and Enver, which came into effect immediately and was intended to replace the contract of the military mission. After Liman von Sanders, who was only notified in October, proposes that the contract, which ran until December 14, 1918, be dismissed, the entry into force is postponed until after the end of the war. The convention corresponds to the system of the first German military reform , that is, officers working individually, only under a certain supervisory function of the most senior officer in each case. When Liman von Sanders was informed at the beginning of February 1918 that the head of the Ottoman General Staff - von Seeckt - would soon take over the military mission , he asked again for his recall, as he wanted the German troops to be the responsibility of the Refusing to supply the Ottoman troops to overwhelmed Turkish headquarters. However, as in mid-April 1918 after a very similar course of events, he continues to function.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk

After the English pushed back von Falkenhayn in Palestine, who worked poorly with the Turkish officers, Enver asked Liman von Sanders on February 19, 1918 to take over command of Jilderim. The latter only takes on the unpromising task under the condition of "unreserved support", but Enver actually pursues Caucasian expansion plans and thus ties up the troops that are lacking in the defense of Palestine. Nevertheless, under Liman von Sanders, the British advance was successfully contained and delayed.

In the armistice of Mudros ( Limnos ) on October 30, 1918, Grand Vizier Izzet Pascha was able to persuade the English admiral and head of the Allied delegation Sir Somerset Calthorpe to withdraw German and Austro-Hungarian officers and troops. Liman von Sanders then hands over the command of his troops to Mustafa Kemal Pascha on October 31, 1918 in Adana . As commander in chief of all German officers and troops still in "Turkey", he regulates their return to Germany in consultation with the English military authorities that have meanwhile arrived in Constantinople. At the end of January 1919, the disembarkation of the remnants of the military mission and troops began, while Liman von Sanders was held in Malta as a prisoner of war by the British until August 1919 .

scope

In the following, military missions and units detached due to the war are treated together.

The approximately 40 instruction officers - the contract stipulated 42 - followed in December 1913 by around 30 more and, especially with the start of the war in 1914, many additional and detached units (officers, men, specialists, personnel, etc.). At the beginning of 1916 there were already around 200 officers in the service of the mission, which from the winter of 1916/1917 developed into a large German stage authority that took over the work of the previous liaison officers as well as the administration of all German personal data and court matters. At the end of the war, around 800 German officers and 12,000 men were repatriated via Gibraltar alone . It is estimated that the maximum number of Germans used in the Ottoman Empire could have been 18,000 to 25,000 men.

All the more important functions in the general staff, artillery, technical troops, armaments industry, navy and other services had to be assigned to Germans, as well as simpler personnel (non-commissioned officers, foremen, foremen) and even factory workers, since the Ottoman Empire did not have appropriately trained workers.

The Germans took over the complete repair of the defenses of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, operation of the heavy artillery, reinforcement of the fortifications, the liaison system, laying of the sea mines, the defense of the submarines, air force, all weapons, ammunition and explosives factories , the naval arsenal, the docks and much more and staffed it.

The neglected and undeveloped military hospital system was brought up to war-ready status under Suleyman Numan Pascha through the merit of the mission's highest medical officer, the Bavarian hygienist Georg Mayer (2nd from left) . The clothing and hygiene of the troops, the internal condition of the military buildings and stables as well as the care of the horses were in a badly neglected condition when the military mission began. The training of the officers was theory-heavy and not focused on responsibility for troops and material. In the first half of 1914, the infantry, field artillery and foot artillery school in Constantinople and the cavalry non-commissioned officer school in Ajas Agar were manned by German leaders and teachers, and an officer riding school and a school for training the train were founded by the Germans. Professor Mayer campaigned for the reclassification of the Ottoman medical system into medical companies, field and war hospitals based on the German model, but this could only be partially implemented. After the outbreak of the war it became clear that the focus of the medical service had to be on epidemic control, as the number of Turkish failures caused by epidemics and infectious diseases far exceeded those caused by wounds.

A comfortable travel and supply connection to Germany was only possible after the successful campaign of the Central Powers against Serbia in autumn 1915. With the opening of the Balkans train Berlin-Vienna-Constantinople, the Germans no longer had to smuggle the urgently needed war material through the strict Romanian controls, but were able to transport it via Serbia and Bulgaria through territory controlled by their own forces to Constantinople. The first of these Balkan trains arrived on January 17, 1916 at the terminus in Sirkedschi / Constantinople (Turkish: Sirkeci / İstanbul).

Effect and evaluation

The German military mission under Liman von Sanders has experienced very different assessments in public and historiography, which were determined less by the different state of research than by very different interests, knowledge of which is important to understand the dispute:

Politically

William Orpen : The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors . Signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919
War Welfare poster promoting Turkish troops in Galicia .

After they had only been able to hinder - but not prevent ( Baghdad Railway ) - the influence of the German factor in the Ottoman Empire, which had grown at their expense from the late 1880s , it was the enemies of the German Empire - especially France and Great Britain - in the War, as well as after their victory, was about ascribing the sole war guilt to the Germans for the outbreak of the world war, manifested in the War Guilt Article of the Versailles Treaty . Downplaying their own colonial, imperial and economic interests in the Orient, they accordingly assumed that the Germans had economic, political and military influence and colonial-imperial interests in the Ottoman Empire, which the German Empire in the accused form did not have before, during or after the Bismarck era had ever had. The German military mission and later the war alliance of the Ottoman Empire with the Central Powers might therefore serve as a pretext for carrying out the violent occupation of the straits, which the great powers Russia, England and France had long considered, and presenting it as an exemption from German control.

In contrast to this representation, however, at the beginning of the military mission in autumn 1913, the elaborately developed German influence in the Balkans (Greece, Romania, Serbia) and in Turkey had to be largely surrendered to the French due to the economic overextension of German forces. German capital had to decide whether it should invest in armaments exports (especially Krupp ) in the Ottoman Empire, borne by loans and supporting the German export economy , or in long-term strategic but temporarily unprofitable planning (Baghdad Railway). The decision was made on the latter. In the spring of 1914 the Ottoman Empire had taken out a new loan in Paris. England, on the other hand, continued to enjoy the Ottoman trust in awarding important shipyard contracts (1911 to the end of 1912 for naval shipyards to Armstrong Whitworth and Vickers , and for the battleships Reschadie and Sultan Osman I to Armstrong ).

The historiography of the Weimar Republic endeavored to refute this accusation that the Germans were solely or primarily responsible for the war in a broad-based academic study. Revisionist currents also tended to reduce German engagement to pure brotherhood in arms or mutual aid with the Turks, for example based on the old Prussian-Turkish connections. The German interests and goals in the “oriental question” were less taken into account in such representations, albeit very late in comparison to the other great powers and sometimes more modest.

Marxist-Leninist-motivated representations, on the other hand, have tried, for example, to apply the template of capitalism - in its imperialist phase - to German-Ottoman relations and paint a picture of the Ottoman Empire as a “semi-colony” of German capital. The German military mission was sometimes viewed from this perspective. Representations from Turkey also regularly refer to the interpretations advocated by the GDR historian Lothar Rathmann . As early as the beginning of the 20th century, the Young Turks had subordinated the German Reich to territorial interests in the Ottoman Empire.

German foreign policy in particular avoided any support for territorial expansion plans and settlement activities in order not to endanger the commitment in the Ottoman Empire and its symbol - the Baghdad Railway. Abdülhamid II also incorporated German capital (Baghdad Railway) in order to spread the economic dependence of the Ottoman Empire on a broader basis than was the case with the establishment of the internationally controlled “Ottoman Public Debt Commission” (“ Administration de la Dette Publique Ottomane “) Was the case in 1881 after the national bankruptcy. Accordingly, the aim of Shevket Pasha was to take advantage of the rivalry and competition of the great powers in the division of influence over the Ottoman Empire, by drawing on all of these powers for the reform of the unstable state - with the German military mission being a part. In addition, the Young Turkish leadership harbored far-reaching, expansive goals that might be able to divert attention from the defeats in the Balkan War and the internal conflicts in the state. The dispatch of the military mission followed the Young Turks' own interests and was not based on German pressure, even though Ambassador Wangenheim had promised to counteract an anti-German government in the Ottoman Empire in April 1913. It was precisely Liman von Sanders' restriction to a purely military activity of the German military mission without taking into account political intentions that had convinced the Young Turkish leaders to join the Central Powers. There was no monopoly German control over Turkey, militarily, politically or economically. However, the military mission for the German side was a basic condition for an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and should serve to relieve the Germans if possible in the event of war that was already foreseeable and the impending two-front war. However, since the German Empire in Europe had isolated itself from the great powers under Kaiser Wilhelm II and not least through its Orient policy, the military mission and German presence in the straits itself united Russia with England and France. The military mission thus indirectly triggered the war, as the great powers England, France and Russia did not have to consider it necessary in their overpowering alliance to accept the German advance in the Orient and found a sufficient reason for the German presence in the strait To work towards partitioning the Ottoman Empire.

Military

Caricature by Gustav Brandt with an allusion to the " sick man on the Bosporus ": "Pay attention, children, it will make the Turks even better!"

In those matters in which the military mission was able to obtain the support of the Ottoman officers and responsible persons (especially Envers) against initial reservations, its work became very effective. The military reorganization by the military mission under Liman von Sanders was so successful, despite the short time until the beginning of the war, that the victory in the Battle of the Dardanelles came as a complete surprise to the Entente.

The fact that the Young Turks' wishes for expansion and the war goals of Berlin could not be achieved was less due to the military preparation and implementation than to the inadequate infrastructure and administration in the Ottoman Empire, its excessive economic demands despite German support and the unrealistic goals on the German and Turkish side. the Liman von Sanders lamented during the war. It is true that Liman von Sanders persistently resisted the Turkish and German projects of the Enver, the embassy and the military attaché because, in his opinion, they arose less from military needs than from political-national desires and impaired the defensive power of the Ottoman army. But the arguments often ended with an order from the emperor to Liman von Sanders to give in. Some of the best Ottoman troops were surrendered to European theaters of war against the advice of the military mission. Ultimately, overlapping competencies with the German embassy and its military attaché, as well as with various higher-ranking officers, encouraged intrigues and made strict military leadership more difficult.

The promotion of the training of Turkish officers for self-employment had been consistently pursued by Liman von Sanders in his general staff, which was practically completely occupied by Turkey, and had been working honestly towards strengthening the Ottoman military force in accordance with the contract. The occupation of important posts by German officers after the beginning of the war - beyond what was stipulated in the mission contract - was initially due to the lack of suitable Ottoman officers. In the further course, however, it was pushed on by Enver against the will of Liman von Sanders and subsequently led to a deterioration in “ German-Turkish cooperation ”. Enver tried with the help of the Ottoman General Staff, which was dependent on him as nominal chief, and its German (deputy) chiefs, to soften the independent position of the military mission and the contract on which it was based. Even the victory in the Battle of Dardanelles did not result in recognition of the German military mission from the Ottoman side. On the contrary, the Ottoman headquarters and in particular Enver endeavored to discredit the leadership of the mission and gain influence over it after the military success. Although inadequate measures and operations by the Ottoman army command subsequently led to the defensive strength of large parts of their army being reduced, Enver took credit for the most significant victory of the war. In fact, it is due to the German military mission, the head of which Liman von Sanders, as a strategic father, had saved the Ottoman Empire from unhindered access by the Entente, based on a few officers to be highlighted (including the still unknown Mustafa Kemal Bey), but primarily on the unprecedented one Tenacity of the Anatolian Soldier.

The self-confidence of the Turks to be able to hold their own against the major European powers in the war, however - despite the overstrain and the collapse in the war - was sustainably strengthened again by the often successful battles on the side of the Central Powers. The goal of the Young Turks, through the German military reform, to put themselves in a position to win a war of liberation against the great powers on their own without losing independence from the Germans, was then actually achieved under the nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal Pascha, who emerged from the Young Turkish movement (later “Ataturk”) in the Turkish War of Liberation (Greco-Turkish War iw S.) 1920–1922 and the partition of Turkey, which began with the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, is prevented.

Members of the German military missions in the Ottoman Empire (selection)

The signatories of the Treaty of Sèvres
Rank Surname Peace Office Field site
Marshal Otto Liman from Sanders Chief of Military Missions Commander in Chief of the 1st Army
Major general Robert Bührmann Chief of the Military Mission deputy commander in chief
Lieutenant General Friedrich Bronsart von Schellendorf Sous chief of the Great General Staff Chief of the General Staff in the Grand Headquarters
general Erich Weber Inspector General of the Engineer and Pioneer Corps 3rd author of Turkey
Colonel Hans Kannengießer Director of the Army Department in the War Department Director of the Army Department in the War Department
Lieutenant colonel Otto von Feldmann Chief of the III. Department in the Great General Staff Chief of the Army General Office
Lieutenant colonel Friedrich Kreß von Kressenstein Chief of the Army Department in the War Ministry Head of Operations at Grand Headquarters

See also

literature

Primary sources

  • Josef Drexler: With Jilderim to the holy land. Memories and glosses on the Palestine campaign 1917–1918. Self-published by the author in 1919.
  • Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz: Strength and Weakness of the Turkish Empire. German Rundschau. Volume XXIV. October 1, 1897.
  • Hans von Kiesling: With Field Marshal von der Goltz-Pascha in Mesopotamia and Persia. Leipzig 1922. (As lieutenant colonel, Kiesling was von Goltz's last general staff officer).
  • Otto Liman von Sanders: Five Years in Turkey. Scherl, Berlin 1920.
  • Helmuth von Moltke: Letters about conditions and events in Turkey from the years 1835 to 1839. VIII. Volume of the collected writings. 2nd-8th Edition. Mittler and Son, Berlin 1876–1917.
  • Joseph Pomiankowski : The collapse of the Ottoman Empire - memories of Turkey from the time of the world war. Amalthea, Vienna 1928.
  • Friedrich Schrader : Constantinople in the past and present. Mohr, Tübingen 1917.
  • Amand Freiherr von Schweiger-Lerchenfeld: The Orient. Vienna, Leipzig 1882.

Secondary literature

  • Necmettin Alkan: German world politics and the competition of powers for the Ottoman inheritance. German-Ottoman relations in the German press, 1890–1909. Lit, Münster 2003, ISBN 3825870332 .
  • Helmut Becker: Aesculapia between imperial eagle and crescent. Medical services and disease control in the Turkish Empire during the First World War. Murken-Altrogge, Herzogenrath 1990.
  • Nikolaus Brauns: German-Turkish relations before the First World War 1914. Master's thesis. Institute for Modern History at the University of Munich. Winter semester 1996/1997, unpaginated version.
  • HSW Corrigan: German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914: A Re-Assessment. Past and Present. No. 36, April 1967, pp. 144-152.
  • Theodor Heuss : Mehemed Ali. In: Theodor Heuss: Shadow conjuring. Marginal figures in German history. Klöpfer & Meyer, Tübingen 1999, ISBN 3-931402-52-5 .
  • Peter Jung: The Austro-Hungarian Desert War. Graz 1992.
  • Hans Werner Neulen: Field gray in Jerusalem. The Levant Corps of Imperial Germany. 2nd Edition. Universitas, Munich 2001. (also published under the title Adler und Halbmond. The German-Turkish Alliance 1914–1918. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin 1994.)
  • Bernd Langensiepen , Dirk Nottelmann , Jochen Krüsmann: Half moon and imperial eagle - Goeben and Breslau on the Bosporus 1914–1918. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg 1999, ISBN 3-8132-0588-6 .
  • Alan Palmer : Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire. Heyne, Munich 1994, ISBN 3-471-78427-6 . (Original: The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire , London 1992; reprinted by Fall River Press 2011, ISBN 978-1-435139510 ).
  • Gregor Schöllgen : Imperialism and Balance. Germany, England and the Oriental Question 1871–1914. Munich 1984.
  • Birgit Ströbel: On the history of the relations between the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire ( Memento from October 2, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 86 kB), published by the “Scientific Services” department of the German Bundestag .
  • Ulrich Trumpener: Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914–1918. New Jersey 1968.
  • Jehuda L. Wallach : Anatomy of a military aid. The Prussian-German military missions 1835-1919. Munich 1976.
  • Curd-Torsten Weick: The difficult balance. Continuities and breaks in German policy towards Turkey. Hamburg 2001, pp. 5–28.
  • Gerhard Wiegand (Ed.): Half moon in the last quarter. Letters and travel reports from old Turkey from Theodor and Marie Wiegand 1895 to 1918. Munich 1970.
  • Alexander Will: No Reach for World Power: Secret Services and Propaganda in the German-Austrian-Turkish Alliance 1914-1918 , Böhlau Verlag, Cologne / Vienna 2012, ISBN 978-3-412-20889-9 .

Notes and individual references

  1. ↑ Spuler, Bertold, in: Verlag Ploetz (ed.): Extract from the story , 28th edition, Ploetz, Würzburg 1976, pp. 1–2135, ISBN 3-87640-000-7 , pp. 1165–1167
  2. ↑ B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, p. 1166
  3. ↑ B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, pp. 1166f
  4. ↑ a b c d B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, p. 1167
  5. ↑ a b B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, p. 1168
  6. ↑ a b B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, pp. 1168, 1170
  7. ↑ a b B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, pp. 1168, 1171
  8. ↑ Palmer, Alan: Verfall und Untergang des Ottmanischen Reiches , Heyne, Munich 1994 (Original: London 1992), pp. 1–448, ISBN 3-453-11768-9 , pp. 249, 387
  9. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 80
  10. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 81
  11. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 87, 91f., 102
  12. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 89f., 97, 99ff.
  13. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 102, 104
  14. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 108f.
  15. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 110-112
  16. ↑ a b B. Spuler, in: Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, p. 1169
  17. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 121f.
  18. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 138-141ff.
  19. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 246f.
  20. ↑ Below, Karl Friedrich von Vincke , Traugott Wilhelm von Mühlbach, Friedrich Wilhelm von Laue and Friedrich Leopold Fischer
  21. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 243-246
  22. ↑ a b Nikolaus Brauns: German-Turkish relations before the First World War 1914 , master's thesis at the Institute for Modern History at the University of Munich, winter semester 1996/1997, unpaginated version, chap. 6.3.4
  23. ↑ a b A. Palmer 1994, p. 237
  24. ↑ a b c N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 3.1.
  25. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 2.3.
  26. ↑ a b c N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.2.
  27. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 4.2.
  28. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 288
  29. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 247
  30. ↑ a b c N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.3.1.
  31. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 274f.
  32. ↑ a b A. Palmer 1994, p. 319.
  33. ↑ a b c N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.5.2
  34. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 275
  35. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 247f.
  36. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 248
  37. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.3.2.
  38. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 274
  39. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 4.5.1.
  40. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 268-272
  41. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 272f.
  42. ↑ a b B. Spuler, in: Verlag Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, p. 1171
  43. ↑ a b c d N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.4.3.
  44. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 5.5.1., Chap. 5.5.2.
  45. ↑ a b c d N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.4.1.
  46. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.5.3
  47. ^ Liman von Sanders, Otto: Five Years Turkey , Scherl, Berlin 1920, pp. 1–408, p. 12
  48. ^ B. Spuler, in: Verlag Ploetz (Ed.) 1976, pp. 1171f.
  49. ↑ Pomiankowski, Joseph: The collapse of the Ottoman Empire - memories of Turkey from the time of the world war , Amalthea, Vienna 1928, pp. 1-444, pp. 28f.
  50. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 32-34
  51. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 35
  52. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 28-41
  53. ↑ a b A. Palmer 1994, p. 317
  54. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 36
  55. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 309, 316, 320
  56. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 11
  57. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 55-58, 144-148
  58. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 38-41
  59. ↑ a b c d e f N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.6.2.
  60. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 37
  61. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 75-80
  62. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 33f.
  63. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 322
  64. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 75-77
  65. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 320-323
  66. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 310, 320
  67. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 78
  68. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 111ff.
  69. ↑ a b A. Palmer 1994, p. 324f.
  70. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 325
  71. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 79, 87f.
  72. ↑ a b O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 61f., 166, 171-173, 182-184, 219ff.
  73. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 98-102
  74. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 101f.
  75. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 77
  76. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 169f.
  77. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 191-195, 217f.
  78. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 203
  79. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 219-222
  80. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 220, 225f., 240, 275
  81. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 342
  82. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 235
  83. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 245–247
  84. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 275-277
  85. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 247-252ff.
  86. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 343, 346
  87. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 348f.
  88. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 386f.
  89. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 398-406
  90. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 32
  91. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 143
  92. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 194f.
  93. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 53f.
  94. ↑ a b J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 53
  95. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 22f.
  96. ^ A b Ernst-Jürgen Finke, Gerd Machalett: The medical care of the German military mission in the Middle East 1914-1918. In: Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift (WMM) 59 (2015), issue 8, pp. 248-258.
  97. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 19-21
  98. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 41
  99. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 20-22
  100. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 32f.
  101. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 54 and Appendix 3
  102. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 4.5.2.
  103. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 4.5.4.
  104. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 4.4.
  105. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 259f.
  106. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 321
  107. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 78f.
  108. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 7.1.
  109. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 1.2.
  110. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 5.1.
  111. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 7.2.
  112. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 6.1.1.
  113. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 3.2.
  114. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 5.4.2.
  115. ↑ a b N. Brauns 1996–1997, chap. 7.3.
  116. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 10
  117. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 5.4.4.
  118. ↑ N. Brauns 1996-1997, chap. 7.4.
  119. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 21-23
  120. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 327
  121. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 40–43, 56, 153, 164, 180, 238
  122. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 294-296
  123. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 241
  124. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 51
  125. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 334
  126. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 37-40, 55f., 239f., 260f.
  127. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 407f.
  128. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 329ff.
  129. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 97-99
  130. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 217
  131. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 154–158
  132. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 56-58
  133. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 27-29, 276f.
  134. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 126
  135. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 30ff., 264, 299
  136. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 31f., 219ff.
  137. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 32, 246
  138. ↑ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 143–148, 194–196, cf. “Jilderim”: p. 275
  139. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 36f.
  140. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 198, 227, 238-241, 242f.
  141. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, pp. 328f.
  142. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 144-146
  143. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, p. 112
  144. ^ O. Liman von Sanders 1920, pp. 134f., 242
  145. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, pp. 145f., 241f.
  146. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 328
  147. ↑ J. Pomiankowski 1928, p. 154
  148. ↑ This refers to the possible territory of today's Turkey, at that time officially the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Mehmed VI. belonging, consisting primarily of Asia Minor and Thracian areas, including the proportionally Kurdish, Greek or formerly Armenian populated regions. Not included are the "non-Turkish" - including Arab and European - provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, which were not included in the basic program of Kemalism (" National Pact " - 1920) (Verlag Ploetz (ed.): Excerpt from history , 28. Aufl., Ploetz, Würzburg 1976, pp. 1-2135, p. 1829; A. Palmer 1994, pp. 378-380).
  149. ^ Verlag Ploetz (ed.): Excerpt from history , 28th edition, Ploetz, Würzburg 1976, pp. 1–2135, p. 1829
  150. ↑ A. Palmer 1994, p. 366ff.