Fraternization (war)

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As fraternization , even fraternisation (fraternization of Latin frater : "brother") is, in war or in the occupation cooperation of soldiers each hostile factions or between occupation soldiers and the local population called. Often fraternization is forbidden to soldiers by the military leadership.

Fraternization therefore often has military-law connotations, in contrast to the term fraternization , which also means the cooperation of several individuals, groups of persons and states in phases of peace .

Fraternization theory

According to the political scientist Robert Axelrod, fraternization is a form of cooperation. In his work Die Evolution der Zusammenarbeit (The Evolution of Cooperation) , published in the English original in 1984 , he writes that, from a modeled game theory point of view, fraternization resembles an iterative prisoner's dilemma , since smaller, locally limited units in quieter front sections of the trench warfare in the First World War can be idealized as players. Due to the longer temporal binding of the opposing units on a section of the front, the soldiers (viewed as players) interact several times, which leads to the application of conditional strategies that would not occur in the case of a one-off event. For Axelrod, the ceasefire is the condition that leads to fraternization in war. This situation arises from internal factors such as the simultaneous consumption of meals, signs between opponents and external factors such as reluctance due to periods of bad weather. A similar counter-action to an action between the soldiers as a retaliatory measure hinders fraternization, which is why the units and soldiers renounce it as passive behavior. An " eye-for-eye " situation applies , which, according to Axelrod, is referred to in English as " Tit for Tat ". This forces the acting soldiers, according to their own will to survive, to passivity. In addition, renunciation is maintained by showing the possibility of a disproportionate counter-reaction by demonstrating the potential. The principle of “two for one” or “three for one” is the answer to unacceptable measures by the enemy. This prevents overreaction.

Fraternization bans from a behavioral point of view

According to a human-ethnological assessment by the behavioral researcher Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt , aggressiveness is clearly weakened in the case of: “personal awareness . For this reason, laws against fraternization are always passed in war, which are intended to prevent the opponents from getting to know each other personally and switching to friendly behavior. "

Fraternization during the First World War

situation

Fostering the aggressive spirit was important for the staffs . The allies pursued a Zermürbungsstrategie (Engl. War of Attrition - trench warfare '), which should lead to them by equal losses on both sides to net income because sooner or later the German forces would be exhausted first. The First World War was a zero-sum game at the state level , in which one side lost the other. At the local level, however, this led to mutual reluctance. As early as 1914, after the war of movement had solidified to a positional war, there was fraternization.

By Christmas 1914, an "extensive" fraternization developed. The simultaneous intake of meals related to early weapons breaks (brief truce ), which were communicated for example by air shots. In addition, there were signs that excluded areas of the battlefield from combat operations. An eyewitness reported: "In one section, the time from eight to nine in the morning was devoted to" private affairs "and certain areas marked by a pennant were forbidden for snipers on both sides." The fraternization even took on unexpected forms for a short time. For example, football was played between British and Germans.

The fraternization at Christmas time was noticeable . By Christmas 1914, thousands of German soldiers fraternized with English, French and Belgian soldiers. Such scenes were also repeated in 1915 and especially on the New Year's days of 1915 and 1916. Tobacco, drinks and food were exchanged in “ no man's land ”.

Means against fraternization

German and British troops during the Christmas peace

Propaganda was used against fraternization . News about fraternization was suppressed by the censors . There was also an express ban on fraternization.

The warring parties' leadership countered the truce that had already arisen in 1914. Military orders should make it clear that soldiers "were in France to fight, and not to the enemy to fraternize (Fifth Battalion the Camaronians 1936, 28)." In addition, there were courts-martial the soldiers to entire battalions -tried . Due to the countermeasures of the bars, the number of fraternizations decreased. During the war, soldiers and the population were interested in the fate of those who were judged by the execution of the death penalty . This led to debates in parliament. Some shootings were classified as errors of justice and "corrected".

Propaganda was carried out unsystematically and "instinctively" at Christmas time. However, the soldiers were hardly motivated by "critical and combative" Christmas poems, as they knew the reality of the war. Another means was the staged "Christmas party in the field", in which, ideally, Wilhelm II himself took part.

The tactics of shock troops , first used in the Brusilov offensive in 1916 - brief fire attacks by artillery shelling, followed by an infantry attack - changed the behavior practiced up to then.

Because of the increased number of descriptions of the species: “There are positions in which you chat with the Germans. They show us photos and take us by the hand, but not when officers are present, as this is strictly forbidden - even a conversation ”, a first directive was issued on December 4, 1917 to the army to prohibit such encounters, that of Henri Philippe Pétain was signed. Another instruction followed on January 29, 1918.

Occupation in Germany

Around 500 children arose from relationships between white German women and black French colonial soldiers who were used in the occupation of the Rhineland . The rejection of the German population towards children in the 1920s and later is characterized by the topos “Rhineland bastard” (see also: Mulatto ).

Fraternization during the Spanish Civil War

Committee of International Civil Service 1936, The members worked to save children at risk

situation

In the Spanish Civil War between July 1936 and April 1939 there was an overthrow. "The uprising in Spain was entirely due to endogenous causes." The right-wing General Francisco Franco launched a coup against the Spanish Republic . In contrast, volunteers from the Communist International fought for a communist Spanish republic . These are known as the International Brigades .

In the course of sympathy, refugees from Spain have been accepted in different countries, although the numbers vary. According to Huge Thomas , there were around 352,000 Spanish Republican refugees living in emigration in July 1939, 200,000 of them in French camps, 150,000 in Latin America and 50,000 of these returned after the war. The fate of the orphans led to fraternization and was exploited for political propaganda purposes.

Fraternization with the International Brigades

The interbrigades were set up on October 9, 1936. Military commander of the XI. International Brigade was Manfred Stern (General Kleber). Among the communist-minded part of the population there was fraternization with the international brigades, such as the party members of the Spanish communist party PCE . The military system of the Spanish Republic was completely dominated by the communists and the political commissioners of the Soviet Union due to the arms deliveries. The exact number of Soviet specialists is given as a maximum of 2150, with no more than 800 Soviet specialists staying in Spain at any time. A total of around 40,000 interbrigadists fought in the Spanish Civil War.

The fraternization also included love affairs and sexual adventures between Spaniards and women from abroad. Before returning home, seven out of 70 to 80 American interbrigadists married a Spanish fighter. There were also pregnancies of women in relationships.

Fraternization with the German Empire, Italy and Portugal

German officer of the Condor Legion training candidate officers for the putschists

At the beginning of the conflict, Franco accepted the support offered to the German Reich, which had been Nazi since 1933 . As part of this assistance, military equipment was delivered to the putschists and military personnel advice was given. In addition to the German Reich, the Kingdom of Italy under Benito Mussolini was also involved in the conflict on the part of the putschists, initially more than Hitler. From August 28, 1936, the prohibition on active combat participation was lifted and in November 1936 a closed air force corps of 4,500 men was relocated from Germany to Spain. The contingent deployed, named in the “ Legion Condor ”, participated under changing command until the victory of the Francoist troops in the civil war.

The trust and appreciation led to a fraternization of the insurgent Spaniards with the first commander Hugo Sperrle , whom they "let go with a heavy heart". The 19,000 so-called “volunteers” - soldiers deployed on a rotation of nine months - shared a bond with their Spanish partners in the fight against communism , which was not least reflected in veterans' associations after the end of the Second World War . How far this bond went can be seen in the enthusiastic greetings of the Spanish troops on the battlefield, for the German soldiers by shouts such as “Viva Alemania” or “Viva el Führer”. Streets were named in Alemania and the German flag fluttered along with the Portuguese and Italian flags in some front gardens. Numerous citizens took part in the collection of signatures for thanks to the "great helpers from the north". With the intention of helping later cases, contracts were concluded to consolidate the "friendly relations" between the German Reich and Spain.

Fraternization during and immediately after World War II

During the Second World War there were various forms of fraternization. “Collaboration” has become the generally recognized technical term in European occupation research for the modus vivendi that was created in the occupied countries between the local governments or administrations and the occupying power. "Collaboration" has recently replaced the previously used terms "cooperation policy" or "negotiation policy" with a specific meaning. The transition to fraternization, especially in the case of ideological ties, is fluid.

Situation in the western areas occupied by the German Reich

National Socialist social policy during the war was determined by the idea of ​​gender relations, i.e. providing for the family of the Wehrmacht soldiers . The state subsidized family maintenance. This was supposed to create loyalty to the regime and the population's consent to the war, but it turned out to be an obstacle to the mobilization of female workers from 1940 onwards. Non-conforming behavior that violated the racial principles of the regime, such as relations with prisoners of war and forced laborers or alleged "anti-sociality" , were fined and the family's livelihood deprived. Depending on the severity, it was also sanctioned with admission to a concentration camp or the death penalty .

In order to prevent fraternization, the foreign volunteers of the German armed forces should go into their own Wehrmacht brothels. In practice, this regulation has not always been implemented. The gap between the ideological norm and social reality was confirmed when subordinate bodies sometimes acted differently from the orders of their superiors. Personal contacts that could not be channeled and regulated by the Wehrmacht leadership were prevented. The spread of sexually transmitted diseases should be prevented. Wehrmacht members with venereal diseases were threatened with a vacation ban.

In contrast to Eastern Europe, Belgium, Holland, Northern France, Denmark and Norway did not have concerns about contact with the civilian population for “racial” reasons, but “fraternization” was rejected by the National Socialist rulers. On April 19, 1939, Heinrich Himmler issued the "prohibition of sexual intercourse with women of a different race." On January 20, 1942, the order was extended when it now said that it "only applies to the occupied Russian territories". Sexual contact with women in the occupied territories was therefore prohibited for members of the SS organizational units, such as the Waffen-SS or the “ Lebensborn e. V. ". In September 1943, Himmler spoke out to workers from Estonia and Latvia in favor of lifting the ban. He made distinctions among members of the Baltic States and ordered that the ban be upheld for Lithuanians.

Benelux

The people of Belgium greet the advancing German soldiers

During the Second World War, the Benelux countries were under German occupation from May 10, 1940 to May 5, 1945. The campaign in the west is now widely regarded as a “clean” war. Contrary to the fears from the experiences of the First World War, the civilian population was little affected. After the armistice "the Germans even took care of the orderly return of the refugees to their homeland". The German Reich tried to get the approximately 8.8 million Dutch to their side by appointing the civilian Reich Commissioner Arthur Seyß-Inquart , who worked with the Dutch National Socialists. A fascist organization in Belgium that arose around 1930 , the Rexists under the leadership of the Walloon populist Léon Degrelle as a Catholic-Walloon movement, fraternized with the National Socialist German occupiers in Belgium.

Before the occupation, unemployment was high in the Netherlands. Dutch industrialists and officials of the economic bureaucracy took steps towards economic cooperation with the occupiers. As early as July 1940, tens of thousands of Dutch people were working for German projects. By 1940, 100,000 Dutch people had gone to work in the German Reich largely voluntarily. By the summer of 1941, 189,000 workers came from Belgium voluntarily. The German Reich became a trading partner under "increased cooperation", despite all the difficulties before the war, because not least the separation from the world market and the colonies had to be compensated for. In 1940/41, the collaboration of the economy brought about a "boom" which only declined with the integration into the German war economy under Albert Speer .

In the Netherlands, from May 1940, the Waffen SS regiment "Westland" was advertised, which at the end of the year comprised 4,814 Dutch people. Also Flemish nationalists in northern Belgium volunteered for the Waffen-SS. During the Second World War, around 40,000 Dutch served in the Waffen-SS and formed the largest non-German contingent. This comparatively high number was used for political propaganda purposes.

Denmark

Gestapo helpers brought in for public humiliation by Danish resistance fighters

During the Second World War, Denmark was under German occupation from April 9, 1940 to May 5, 1945. According to Warring: In contrast to its other occupation regimes in Europe, “when Denmark surrendered , Germany committed itself to precisely that obligation which was basically excluded with the jus ad bellum : the preservation of the territorial and state integrity of the country, thus non-interference in internal affairs ”. But this form of occupation was increasingly undermined and openly abandoned in 1943 in favor of direct intervention. The policy of cooperation with the German occupation was supported by the vast majority of the Danes, even if there was no sympathy for the Germans. There were reservations about the German occupation, but the government asked the Danish officials to maintain social interaction. One of the reasons for this was that the Allies disregarded Danish sovereignty and occupied the Faroe Islands, Iceland and Greenland, against the protest of the government, whereas for the Germans the occupation should be and remain "peaceful".

Denmark had suffered from high unemployment in previous years. Numerous jobs were created by the occupation. During this time the German-Danish Committee for Trade Agreements agreed on cooperation for Danish temporary workers in Germany. By 1941, 64,000 Danish citizens had been recruited. A total of 80,000 to over 100,000 Danes found work in Germany.

As early as May 1940, advertising for the SS-Standarte Nordland began , in which Danes and Norwegians fought. On June 29, 1941, the Freikorps Danemark was raised, in which volunteers served who were released from duty and were granted exit permits to fight abroad for the German Reich. These units only operated on the Eastern Front.

According to Warring, the boundaries between public and private were crossed because both parties “ willy-nilly ” acted in a double function: both the soldier and the woman were a private person and occupier or “fraternizer” in one. Despite the increase in partisan action towards the end of the war, there were seldom negative reports about Danes from German soldiers. The Wehrmacht doctor Georg Pawlowski wrote: "In terms of fraternization, I would like to add that during the occupation there was a very amicable relationship between the German soldiers and the Danish civilian population." A thoroughly hostile attitude among the Danish population, which after the surrender under the Danes was predominant is put into perspective by the high number of children from relationships between Germans and Danes. As early as December 5, 1940, Reich Commissioner Wilhelm Redieß wrote to Himmler that, after talking to the flight area commander in Aalborg, Denmark, 800 pregnancies were reported for 48,000 residents and 4,000 German air force soldiers. Havrehed, on the other hand, estimates the number of German-Danish children to be around 400–500. After the surrender, these women were publicly denounced and humiliated without any legal basis or legal protection.

Refugees from the eastern German territories are taken care of on February 12, 1945 at a temporary collection point in Denmark

After the advance of the Red Army , hundreds of thousands of people, mainly from Pomerania , Gdansk and West and East Prussia, were brought to safety across the Baltic Sea on Hitler's orders from February 1945 . The Danish authorities refused to help. “During the negotiations, the Danish officials, with the support of the political leaders […], took a clear stance. The Germans should not be helped with billeting and feeding the refugees. On the contrary, they should be forced to confiscate and to requisition cards for groceries. ”On February 9, 1945, the first refugees arrived in Copenhagen on the refugee ships. Schools, hotels and sports facilities were requisitioned for their reception. There were different reactions to those arriving. There was fear and reluctance from bad experience. The Danes were aware of the resistance fighters' acts of revenge if they kept in contact with refugees.

After the unconditional surrender of the Wehrmacht , the British General Dewing and the army command clarified the fate of the German soldiers in Denmark. Except for the sick and injured, the armed forces marched back into German territory in trains. So by July 29, 1945, 257,617 soldiers had left Danish territory. On the march back of the German troops there was no harassment, but there were often small deals between soldiers and Danes. For example, weapons were exchanged for food.

The refugees were taken to camps for detention. For Danes, who did not necessarily have contact with the refugees in the camp administration, any contact with the internees and stay at the boundary fences was forbidden. There were warning signs at the camps threatening punishment for violations. Corresponding warnings in German were issued within the camps. In the regulations for German refugees of the Kgl. Danish Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of July 1945, for example, was ordered under point 21: "Refugees are not allowed to stay at open windows facing the street."

France

German soldiers among native Marseillais
German soldier drinking champagne with a civilian woman
Officer in front of group of foreign soldiers of the Wehrmacht

For the " Fortress Europe " workers were wanted to build the " Atlantic Wall ". Local civilians had to carry out construction work as forced labor for the Todt organization . The Service du travail obligatoire (STO) was added later. In addition to the fortification of the Atlantic Wall, a "second position" for "coastal defense in the depths" was expanded from October 1943. Keitel agreed that civilians should be used in the construction, but attached importance to "reasonable pay" and fixed working hours. In addition, the French were not allowed to be used indiscriminately, otherwise negative economic and political repercussions were feared. The troops had to moderate their demands and should, for reasons of expediency, orient themselves to the civil population for the provision of the work. "Discontent" was "to be avoided from the start" ". Economic considerations prompted the Germans to "treat the French gently" because the German Reich was "dependent on the voluntary and goodwill of the French under all circumstances". In April 1944, the Wehrmacht employed around 350,000 French people, and in some areas even more civilians were deployed than soldiers. In addition, around 185,000 had been recruited for voluntary work in Germany by spring 1942.

Leonardo Conti wrote to Himmler on May 29, 1942 that 30,000 children in France had been born to French women with German fathers. Born on French territory, these children were French, which is why a possibility of naturalizing French mothers who married German soldiers was sought. Around 1943 Hitler made his rejection clear, provided that they were of illegitimate origin and thus not "of the same blood." This regulation of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which implemented Hitler's order, caused problems for French mothers whose German husbands died before marriage.

On February 4, 1943, a Franco-German agreement was reached on the conditions of the evacuation because the Allied bombing of the port cities resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. For this purpose, the civilian population was asked by the Vichy government , which collaborated with the Germans, to move inland. In general, the population rarely complied with the mostly voluntary calls. In preparation for the invasion, Eisenhower decided in the spring of 1944 to bomb the French transport system in preparation. This was intended to paralyze German troop movements. The French civilian population was affected. An "alienation with our French allies" was accepted.

The treatment of Allied prisoners of war remained within the spectrum of the Geneva Conventions. Captured opponents should be treated "decently but harshly", as was the case with the 2nd Panzer Division . The 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" did the same with British prisoners of war. Both useless brutality and unnecessary fraternization should be prevented, and possible fraternization of the soldiers at the front should be nipped in the bud, as several instructions prove. Private conversations with prisoners were prohibited. “In the event of a violation, every Führer must immediately and vigorously take action”, ordered the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Götz von Berlichingen” . Although there are no known fraternities at the front, the opposing soldiers were able to meet on friendly terms. The polite and decent treatment was emphasized in his diary by a soldier of the 731 Grenadier Regiment, who was captured in late August 1944. In contrast, there are statements about the “looting” of German soldiers when they were captured.

Of all the prisoners in German hands, the American and British soldiers undoubtedly occupied a privileged position. Proof of this is provided by the criminal “ bullet decree ” issued by the OKW on March 4, 1944. It stipulated that escaped prisoners of war should be handed over to the SD if they were caught again. However, the British and Americans were excluded from this. Moreover, in the course of the war - albeit sporadically - there were several exchanges of prisoners of war between the Western powers and the German Reich. At the beginning of November 1944, through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross , this was also possible with the French government under de Gaulles .

With the liberation by the Allies, there was no exuberant reception. The reason given for this is "the relatively peaceful life in Normandy during the German occupation", where the population was not particularly badly affected. The "well-meaning population is under the protection of the German Wehrmacht," said a call from the military commander shortly after the fighting began. "Reprisals are to be avoided", even ordered the dreaded 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" . In theory, the German troops were instructed by the military leadership not to carry out any confiscations. This order was renewed in mid-July by Günther von Kluge for the entire western area. When requisitioning the Field command was on. This was often not possible in practical implementation alone, as the prevailing shortage of supplies for the German armed forces led to the opposite action. With the retreat of the German "hereditary enemy", the Allies were received in some cases "very friendly".

Norway

Soldier with children
German private of the Luftwaffe tries local food

During the Second World War, Norway was under German occupation from April 9, 1940 to May 8, 1945. On April 10, the negotiations between the German Reich and the Norwegian King Haakon VII and the legal Norwegian government about a desired "peace occupation" failed . The king and his government fled to a British warship on June 7, 1940 and left Norway for exile in London. Vidkun Quisling's illegal seizure of power initially supported the German government, but quickly realized that he could not be kept under the "dogma of the" legal revolution "and forced him to resign on April 15, 1940. Instead, Hitler's government set up the Norwegian Reich Commissioner and on April 24, 1940, commissioned Josef Terboven to manage it.

Economic and administrative cooperation with the occupying power became a matter of course and generally accepted. Germany became Norway's most important trading partner from the autumn of 1940, which led, for example, to participation and cooperation in plans to expand the Norwegian aluminum industry. Numerous German construction projects led to a “boom” in Norway, which inevitably led to contact between Norwegians and Germans. In October 1940, for example, 58,000 Norwegians were already employed in such activities. This created upheaval in the labor market, affecting a total population of 2.9 million, and led to labor shortages.

The German occupation troops had fewer problems with the local resistance than with securing supplies and protecting the long, confusing coastline. The labor shortage led to the intensification of recruitment. The advertisement for the Waffen SS Regiment "Nordland" began in January 1941 in Norway. As a result, Norwegians voluntarily entered and were used in the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" .

Around every tenth woman between the ages of 15 and 30 had close contact with Germans. 40,000 to 50,000 Norwegian women are said to have had sexual contact with German members of the armed forces. The first Norwegian-German children were born in the spring of 1941, and the number rose to 2524 by the end of 1942. A Mothers Aid Department was set up in the occupied area to look after the mothers . V. headquarters in Munich. In the homes of Lebensborn e. V. have their children. For the children there was an initial kit including a pram, and the women received a monthly maintenance payment of 30 Norwegian kroner (from 1944 fifty kroner). The relationships had produced an estimated 7,600 and 10,000 to 12,000 children, respectively. If the marriage had taken place, after a “thorough political and racial assessment” of the bride and “proof of Aryan descent ”, the women could move to the “Old Reich”. In addition to voluntary emigration, there is also said to have been pressure to move to the family of SS and Wehrmacht members through Lebensborn e. V. Society demoted these German girls to traitors. During the occupation there were around 500 marriages between Germans and Norwegians.

Situation in the eastern areas occupied by the German Reich

Russia, local Wehrmacht volunteers
Cossacks in the Wehrmacht

German society's image of Russia was not entirely negative. This built on the historically glorified common struggle of the Wars of Liberation and the long cooperation between Prussia and Russia. In addition, there was a mutual fascination with the radical right of the Weimar period and the Bolsheviks , who both shared the rejection of Polish statehood.

There was initially great support in the western outskirts of the Soviet multi-ethnic state, as the willingness to do so was high due to the experience with the tsarist rule. In the meantime, the Hitler-Stalin Pact disappointed the population. When the Wehrmacht advanced into the newly formed border provinces of the Soviet empire, they were welcomed by the majority as liberators, not least due to the terror of the Soviet Union, which had affected more than 500,000 civilians with mass arrests and mass deportations.

Soviet Union

Fraternization was forbidden. Omer Bartov recalls a campaign in the Wehrmacht, for example by the Greater Germany Division , the 18th Panzer Division or the 12th Infantry Division , to prevent soldiers from "fraternising" with Russian women. Relationships were forbidden because they were “racially inferior” and therefore “unworthy” contact for a German soldier. The troops were instructed to exercise the greatest restraint. Women were suspected of being agents or partisans.

The German soldiers could not have any interest in the radicalization of the fighting because of the postulate of self-preservation: If "pardon" was given, this was also a signal to the other side. In combat operations, dealing with women of the Red Army turned out to be problematic for the soldiers, because they were "heavily inhibited" by the "categories of the soldierly men's association in which women simply did not appear on the battlefield." Soldiers had a feeling of "indifference" towards prisoners, which appeared in exceptions of good to bad treatment. The suggestion of German war propaganda ensured that the defector rate remained conspicuously low because “Soviet captivity is worse than death”. Hitler and his "opponent" Stalin did not want "that the troops on the Eastern Front would give the wrong opinion that they would be treated according to the treaty in the event of captivity by the Russians."

Hitler initially took the strict view: " Only Germans are allowed to carry arms, not Slavs, not Czechs, not Kossack [sic] or Ukrainians ." In contrast, Himmler considered recruiting and deploying auxiliary troops from selected ethnic groups. Even before October 6, 1941, unarmed Soviet prisoners of war were employed as cooks, drivers or "body Russians" and then armed volunteer units were deployed . From November onwards, pioneer companies made up of Russian pioneers and Ukrainians were formed. The task of fighting partisans in the hinterland was assigned to the non-German fighters. It was necessary to create the same conditions as for German soldiers, according to the command situation, which was evident, for example, when the troops were fed. The "volunteers" were paid 8 rubles a day, married couples 10 rubles, and as "armed state residents" they were subject to German jurisdiction in criminal offenses. For Christian Hartmann , the collaboration presents itself as “an alternative to the deadly conditions of existence in the camps” and an action motivated by it.

Eastern regions (example Poland and Czechoslovakia)

Soldiers of the Azerbaijani Infantry Battalion 111 during the Warsaw Uprising

The social and cultural policy in occupied Poland was aimed at destroying its Polish character; it continuously intervened in the everyday life of the entire population and in interpersonal relationships and triggered changes in the attitudes of the Polish majority towards the German minority and its culture. Polish elites who entered into a collaboration with the occupiers, which could be described as collaboration, only existed in exceptional cases.

There was fraternization with the “ Goralenvolk ”, which corresponded to the National Socialist ideas of the survival of Germanic heritage in the southern Polish territories and was led by a small group of southern Polish publicists from national politicians of the Association of the “Gorals”. The executive organs of the occupation policy were, among other things, the Polish police and the "construction service". One can speak of approaches from coexistence to collaboration, especially in the areas of the approved press, journalism, theater and musical life. A number of Polish writers entered the German service and worked together with Nazi cultural policy, as they secured their existence with it or had anti-communist attitudes.

In the area of ​​“dirty” economic interests, there was a previously little suspected degree of collaboration between the Polish citizens and the occupiers. Cases in which Poles cooperated with German authorities to “settle accounts” with neighbors were also particularly frequent. This proportion of the population was between five and ten percent who went about small business or "irregularities of any kind" with the occupiers. As a result of allegations of collaboration with the enemy, death sentences and executions were carried out in Poland by the Polish underground state. Since the beginning of 1939, the German Reich recruited skilled workers from the area of ​​the former Czechoslovakia. By the end of the year there were 52,000 volunteers. Around 110,000 Polish foreign workers stayed in Germany during the war.

Regardless of the ban on sexual relations with Polish women, these did not fail to materialize and often led to unwanted pregnancies. Women who then had an abortion, which was generally severely punished, were exempt from this regulation, as "there was no interest in protecting the transfer of Polish blood," wrote Himmler in March 1942. Sexual intercourse between Czechs and Germans was also prohibited . In addition, "those who were not able to Germanize" who showed anti-German attitudes, had already made political or criminal appearances or entered into intimate relationships with a married German, especially a soldier's wife, were taken to concentration camps by the state police.

Eastern regions (example Ukraine)

Propaganda Company Soldier is entertained by Soviet women in Ukraine

The areas with Ukrainian population were divided into individual administrative districts with different rulers. Galicia became part of the Generalgouvernement , Bukovina , Bessarabia , Transnistria and the area between the Dniester and the southern Bug including Odessa (referred to as " Transnistria ") Romanian and finally a separate Reichskommissariat Ukraine was created for the rest , which Erich Koch together with East Prussia was led. The easternmost areas, which were close to the front, were administered directly by the German military. Thus, this meant that despite the principle of unification of all Ukrainians, this did not happen under a common rule.

Situation in the territories occupied by the Soviet Union (before the German invasion of the Soviet Union)

Within a few days the Red Army occupied the Soviet division at the end of September 1939. In the course of the annexation until the outbreak of war between the German Reich and the Soviet Union, West Ukraine, West Belarus and later the Vilnius area were the target of numerous ordinances, which the complete political, economic and social unification of the Polish territories with the Soviet Union. Moscow declared the advance of the Red Army an "act of solidarity". Officially, the troops entered as “liberators of their Ukrainian and Belarusian brothers from the yoke of the Polish Pane”. In November 1939, the incorporation of Poland was completed after the confirmed candidates had decided by "elections" (October 22, 1939) in the previous month to apply for admission to the Soviet Union, which was granted.

Sections of the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Jewish populations initially reacted with indifference or satisfaction to the collapse of Poland, as they were only marginally represented in the ruling structures of the Polish state's restrictive minority policy. This often happened where Belarusians and Ukrainians formed the majority of the population, as in some eastern voivodships . Poor strata advocated the measures of parceling out larger lands belonging to rich and wealthy farmers. While part of the Polish intellectual elite was persecuted, imprisoned and deported, the Soviet state flattered those who collaborated. The extent and intensity of the collaboration, however, were not uniform. The Polish communists practiced ideological cooperation with the USSR from the beginning . The Jews in particular were said to have welcomed and supported the invaders. At least that is how the stereotype of “Jewish communism, which in reality was more complex and confused” spread in the collective memory of Poles.

Situation in the areas occupied by the Allies

Allied fraternization ban

Photo collage with pictures of concentration camp victims: remember! No fraternization! A warning against fraternization with the enemy. Published in The Tacoma Sunday News Tribune ; (Washington June 3, 1945).

The decree CCS 551 of the Western Allies is designated as a fraternization ban , in which it was specified that "fraternization between Allied troops is to be strictly prohibited with German officials and the population." This directive was valid from April 28, 1944, which included the Field Manual FM 27-5 expand. For Austria there were different guidelines in the CCS 551 directive, which were regulated in Appendix B with the introduction: “The political goals of the occupation of Austria differ fundamentally from those of occupied Germany in that the main purpose of the liberation is. etc. ”The previous directive was replaced by the JCS 1067 directive , which determined the main features of the US occupation policy from April 1945, under the“ spirit of the Morgenthau Plan ”with the motivation:“ Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation, but as defeated Enemy nation. "

Two years later a new JCS 1779 directive arose with the OMGUS report, which was submitted to the military government in Germany on July 11, 1947. This envisaged increasing the creative leeway for the American offices in Germany and thus brought cooperation and collaboration to the fore, in contrast to the destructive "hands-off" occupation policy that had been practiced until then.

In the autumn of 1944, Allied units set foot on German soil for the first time. Aachen was conquered and the further advance was only a matter of time. The Allied command of the troops therefore considered the prohibition of dealing with the German population for several reasons:

  1. Resistance: Fear of guerrilla attacks was widespread among Army headquarters . German acts of sabotage and underground movements were feared.
  2. War guilt / re-education : Germans should be taught that they are all guilty of war and its crimes; they should be aware that Americans continue to view them as enemies.
  3. Homeland: The declared American war goal, the annihilation of National Socialism, should be demonstrated in one's own country, thereby avoiding the idea that the Army was not proceeding decisively enough. Shortly after the troops marched in, there was criticism based on pictures in the press depicting GIs who had fraternized with Germans.
  4. Political reason: Franklin D. Roosevelt was "extremely afraid of public opinion in the US" because there were "very extensive trade relations between American industry and Hitler".

In the training film No Fraternisation desk of the US Army from 1945 to the warnings and admonitions are:

“Germany seems defeated. You see ruins, you see flowers, you see beautiful landscapes. Do not get confused; you are in enemy territory. Be on your guard, be suspicious; every German can be a danger. There must be no fraternization. Fraternization means: make friends, but the Germans are not our friends. You can't come and hold out your hand and say, we're sorry. They are not sorry that they caused the war, but that they lost it. "

Fraternization of British soldiers, July 1945

The loosening of the fraternization ban took place step by step, although conversions increased by the beginning of the invasion of Germany. First, on June 8, 1945, the ban on children was restricted. On July 14th, permission was given to “hold conversations with adult Germans in the streets and squares.” Interpretations by the Civil Affairs Division circumvented the formal prohibition that Military Governor Patton applied shortly thereafter. The non-fraternization order was finally repealed on October 1, 1945.

Fraternization with Americans

Most of the Germans adhered to the regulations of the American occupying power. After a few weeks, the military government began to see signs of some sort of normalization of life, contrary to fears of acts of sabotage. The first collaboration at the end of 1944 resulted from the rebuilding of bridges, the repair of water pipes and the repair of the electricity network.

According to Murphy's observations, the common American soldiers were not behaving according to orders. Despite the "No Fraternization" order, the GIs distributed sweets to children. Through the children they came into contact with their parents, from which a "friendly" relationship developed. The Stars and Stripes Editor-in-Chief Arthur Goodfriend assesses the GIs by saying, “The nature of the American soldier is such that he tends to be kind and generous in his treatment of other people, friends and foes be. The very factors that, as we like to think, make an American an American - the principle of fairness, decency, and the idea expressed in the phrase "Don't give a man a push when he's down" - are what make the Oppose non-fraternization orders. In fact, the tendency is to pick up the opponent from the ground, carry him into his corner, wipe his dust and shake his hand in the best sporting tradition. ”According to a commander whom Goodfriend spoke to in Aachen, the soldiers and everyone would be over-friendly Exhortations did not work. The implementation of the order indirectly represented an obstacle to the detachments of the military government, and was a "threat" to the official mission, because the display of "the contempt for the world" without personal gestures hindered cooperation with German officials, doctors, craftsmen or managers and thus stood in the way of the task of arranging the situation behind one's own lines. So most American officers found pragmatic manners.

The fraternization of the American occupation soldiers with the "daughters of the country" began on the day of the invasion. The decisive factor was the personal thirst for adventure and the need for distraction, tenderness and sexual adventure. The propaganda representation of the "dangerous Nazi heroin" was not confirmed either. In addition to the common soldier, this also affected officers. The latter thus ran a high risk of punishment. Women and girls who got involved with Americans were referred to with the widespread topos "Ami-Liebchen". Other names for these women were "GI-Liebchen", "Dollarflitscherl", "Gold Diggers", "Amischickse", "Salzach Geishas" and "Chocolate Girls". However, the great majority of women and girls had no relationship with the soldiers, as there was hardly any time when the troops passed through, wives and fiancés hoped for their husbands and neighbors and relatives exerted pressure through social control. In contrast to the negative figure of the “Ami lover”, these women were characterized as positively rated “rubble women”. With leaflets and posters, a part of the German population directs itself against, among other things, discharged soldiers against the faithless girls, which shows the attitude as follows in the mocking verse from the Heilbronn area: Every Ami-Hürle hot a Armbandührle, but unsoiner - the hot nothing! Other reasons for fraternization, which were not isolated cases, were items that the GIs were actually not supposed to own and therefore kept with Germans. Common hobbies, such as hunting, also led to fraternization between German and American troops during the occupation.

The marriage ban for soldiers in the US Army in Germany was not officially lifted until mid-December 1946, while in the American occupation zone (in Württemberg and Baden) around fifty illegitimate "occupation children" were born every week. By 1949 there were an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 so-called fraternizations with a German bride in the German-American occupation area alone. Other sources estimate the number of marriages at 33,000. According to Davis, between 20,000 and 30,000 "occupation children" were born between '45 and '49. A special situation arose for the children from relationships with black GIs. In the files of the youth welfare offices it is recorded that some women went into hiding and left their babies with the landlord or neighbors, in the hope of avoiding the shame of a “mixed race negro” in this way. According to Anette Brauerhoch, there is “astonishing public clinging by women to their children” in Germany. The post-war study of 1949 and that of 1954 confirm the fact that “compared to other countries such as England and Japan, the German mothers of black children of all people were the least willing or anxious to have them adopted or put in a home. “On an American initiative, children's homes were built for black occupation children who were rejected by mothers.

Fraternization with Soviet soldiers

Already during the Second World War and under the negative experiences in occupied Poland up to Operation Barbarossa , the leadership of the Soviet Union initiated a change at the level of propaganda. To invent friendship, Polish and German communists living in exile in Moscow made plans for their own homeland. Already at the beginning of the 1940s, Stalin was looking for an improvement in its image. Accordingly, he initiated steps to dissolve the Comintern in May 1943, since the accusation of external control by Moscow was primarily on the communist parties abroad. To influence the public, the propaganda created the rhetoric of the “National Front” against fascism, which was reached from the “United Front” through the “Popular Front”. In addition to the Wehrmacht soldiers at the front and the German public, the prisoners of war were also to be influenced. Even during the war, efforts were made in the USSR to re-educate German prisoners by the NKVD. In addition to denazification, the aim was to recruit new cadres for reconstruction and administration. The central anti-fasc school was located near Moscow in Krasnogorsk until the end of the 1940s, where numerous graduates were trained and, after their return to Germany, entered the service of the SED propaganda apparatus.

The initially deployed military commanders of the Red Army functioned for a time as the sole force of order. They took over all economic, administrative and political functions. Their almost unlimited power, as well as the lack of printed and therefore binding orders, led to administrative arbitrariness. On June 5, 1945, the Soviet troops formally and legally took over governance in the Soviet occupation zone . The SMAD was formed for further administration . The employees of the SMAD authority avoided any public fraternization with the Germans. This would have meant a burden for his own career, after all, in the homeland, which was shaped by Stalinist politics, all contacts with a Western way of life were generally considered punishable.

The election results achieved by the SED in the founding phase of October 20, 1946 show an approval of between 43.5 and 49.1%, which, however, alienates the picture due to the merging of the KPD and SPD into the SED, because in Berlin the SPD achieved it alone 48.7% and misplaced the KPD with 19.8%. These results illustrate the basic socialist mood, but also the majority negative attitude towards the SED and projected into the occupying Soviet Union.

Remarks

  1. ↑ cf. Numbers in International Brigades .
  2. ↑ Created on October 15, 1942 when the 731 Infantry Regiment of the 711th Infantry Division was renamed.
  3. ↑ Original excerpt from CCS 551: “The administration shall be firm. It will be just and humane at the same time with respect to the civilian population as far as consistent with strict military requirements. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population. "
  4. ^ Original excerpt from CCS 551: "The political aims of the occupation of Austria will differ fundamentally from those of the occupation of Germany in that their primary purpose will be that of liberation. Though it will be of great importance that the occupying forces in Germany should make a good impression on the inhabitants, this will be of even more importance in Austria (...). The attitude to the Austrian population should be more friendly than in Germany. There will be no need to discourage some degree of fraternization. In addition to the four points enumerated in the last sentece in this paragraph the following should be added: ›To liberate Austria from German domination and pave the way for a free and independent Austria.‹ "
  5. ↑ Original excerpt from JCS 1067: "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation."
  6. ↑ Translation: "Hands off! or hands off! "

See also

Web links

Wiktionary: fraternize  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

literature

  • John D. Montgomery: Aftermath: Tarnished Outcomes of American Foreign Policy. Aubern House, Dover (MA) 1986, ISBN 0-86569-126-6 . (English).
  • Eiji Takemae, Robert Ricketts (transl.), Sebastian Swann (transl.): The Allied Occupation of Japan . Continuum International Publishing Group, London 2003, ISBN 0-8264-1521-0 (English reprint).

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 65 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  2. ↑ Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 68 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  3. ↑ a b c Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 70 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  4. ↑ a b c Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 70 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  5. ↑ Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 71 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  6. ^ A b Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 72 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  7. ↑ Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 76 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  8. ↑ Till Bastian: The Century of Death. On the psychology of violence and mass murder in the 20th century . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000, ISBN 3-525-01457-0 , pp. 249 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  16. ↑ Robert Axelrod: The evolution of cooperation . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59172-9 , p. 74 f .
  17. ↑ Jörg Duppler and Gerhard P. Groß: End of the war 1918 - event, effect, aftermath . Series of publications by the Military History Research Office . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag , Munich 1999, ISBN 3-486-56443-9 , p. 205 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  92. ^ Rolf-Dieter Müller: On the side of the Wehrmacht. Hitler's foreign helpers in the crusade against Bolshevism 1941–1945 . Christoph Links, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-86153-448-8 , p. 153 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  95. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 533 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  96. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 526 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  97. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 529 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  99. ↑ a b Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 623 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  100. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 623 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  102. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 625 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  103. ^ Christian Hartmann: Wehrmacht in the Eastern War. Front and military hinterland 1941/42 . Oldenbourg, Munich 2010, ISBN 978-3-486-70225-5 , p. 634 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  104. ^ Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 80 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  105. ^ A b Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 83 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  106. ^ Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 84 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  107. ^ A b c Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 326 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
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  109. ↑ Volker Kopp: Giving the Führer a child. The SS organization Lebensborn e. V. Böhlau, Cologne 2007, ISBN 978-3-412-21606-1 , p. 184 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  110. ↑ a b Ernst Lüdemann: Ukraine, CH Beck, Munich, 1995, p. 57.
  111. ↑ a b Andreas Kappeler: Little History of the Ukraine, CH Beck, Munich, 1994, p. 218.
  112. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 32 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  113. ^ Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 96 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  114. ^ A b c Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 33 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  115. ^ Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 97 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  116. ^ Bernhard Chiar: The Polish Home Army . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-486-56715-2 , p. 99 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  117. ↑ a b c d Dieter Waibel: From benevolent despotism to the rule of law . JCB Mohr, Tübingen 1996, ISBN 3-16-146604-7 , pp. 42 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  118. ↑ Dieter Waibel: From benevolent despotism to the rule of law . JCB Mohr, Tübingen 1996, ISBN 3-16-146604-7 , pp. 41 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  119. ↑ Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Directive JCS / 1067 . Accessed on January 8, 2013 (partial excerpts (German and English) online at: germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org “GH-Institute”, Washington DC.).
  120. ↑ Directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): Directive JCS / 1067 . (PDF 75 kB) Retrieved January 8, 2013 (complete as PDF (English) online at: usa.usembassy.de US Embassy).
  121. ↑ Dieter Waibel: From benevolent despotism to the rule of law . JCB Mohr, Tübingen 1996, ISBN 3-16-146604-7 , pp. 43–48 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  122. ↑ Dieter Waibel: From benevolent despotism to the rule of law . JCB Mohr, Tübingen 1996, ISBN 3-16-146604-7 , pp. 82 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  123. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 186 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  124. ^ A b c d Johannes Kleinschmidt (lecture): Americans and Germans in the Occupation - Relationships and Problems . Retrieved on January 8, 2013 ("State Center for Political Education Baden-Württemberg").
  125. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 187 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  126. ↑ State Center for Civic Education Ba-Wü: Documentation of the symposium on October 11, 1996 in Stuttgart City Hall. Retrieved December 25, 2012 .
  127. ↑ Frank Schumann, Peter Kroh: Berlin after the war . Berlin 2010, ISBN 978-3-360-01991-2 , pp. 269 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  128. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 203 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  129. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 203 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  130. ^ A b c d Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 204 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  131. ↑ Calendar sheet - October 1st, 1945 ban on fraternization lifted. In: one day . October 4, 2007, accessed January 8, 2013 .
  132. ^ A b Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 183 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  133. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 189 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  134. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 190 ( limited preview in Google Book Search).
  135. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 191 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  136. ^ A b Karen Hagemann, Stefanie Schüler-Springorum : Heimat-Front - Military and Gender Relations in the Age of World Wars . Campus, Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 3-593-36837-4 , p. 39 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  137. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 191 ff . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  138. ^ Klaus-Dietmar Henke: The American occupation of Germany . Oldenbourg, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-486-56175-8 , pp. 202 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  139. ↑ Documentation of the symposium on the anniversary of the Stuttgart speech by US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes on August 6, 1946: Americans and Germans during the Occupation - Relations and Problems ( Memento of August 18, 2007 in the Internet Archive ), State Center for Civic Education Baden- Württemberg
  140. ↑ Kelmuth A. Niederle, Ulrike Davis-Sulikowski, Thomas Fillitz: Fruits of Time . Universitätsverlag Vienna, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-85114-518-6 , p. 60 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  141. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 38 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  142. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 39 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  143. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 44 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  144. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 46 f . ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  145. ↑ Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 47 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  146. ^ A b Hans Ehlert and Matthias Rogg : Military, State and Society in the GDR . Christoph Links Verlag, Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-86153-329-4 , p. 731 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
  147. ^ A b Jan C. Behrends: The invented friendship. Propaganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR . Böhlau, Cologne 2006, ISBN 978-3-412-23005-0 , pp. 127 ( limited preview in Google Book search).