corruption

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Overview of the corruption perception index in international comparison (as of 2018)

Corruption is the abuse of a certain relationship of trust . It can occur z. B. for permits, personal details and awarding of contracts. The abuse consists in obtaining advantages that are not legally entitled.

In the area of ​​public administration and justice, corruption leads to high material damage on the one hand. For example, a company may receive an order even though it is consuming more tax money than a more efficient company, or it may perform worse. On the other hand, there are also intangible effects, such as a loss of confidence in democracy and the rule of law.

The expression comes from the Latin corruptio ('corruption, corruption, corruption'). Harold Dwight Lasswell defines it as a violation of the general interest in favor of a specific benefit.

history

In the feudal European territorial states of the 18th century, corruption was systematically practiced. Frederick II bribed ministers at the court of Empress Maria Theresa and assumed that she in turn bribed his ministers. Diplomats had a certain right to be bribed. Officials of the Prussian court were servants of the king who had to feed on so-called sportsmen , remuneration in cash or in kind, which the recipient of the service had to pay. Until the end of the Empire, Prussian officials received only about two thirds of the salary they needed to finance the lifestyle that was expected of them based on their rank. To compensate, there were grants , a facility that can still be found today in the salary system, and additional permission for part-time work, which was also restricted. A decree of the Prussian king forbade his officials from fiddling in kaschemmen . The full pay of civil servants is a progressive French invention in the recent European past.

Bismarck's reptile fund is also known , a source of money with whose help he was able to finance his political goals independently of parliamentary regulations.

The Habsburg effect describes recently scientifically proven connections to Eastern Europe between the former Habsburg area and people living there today and their lower tendency towards corruption, bribery and higher trust in administration, police and jurisdiction compared to people on the non-Habsburg side the former border.

The International Monetary Fund estimates that bribery causes $ 2 trillion in damage every year. The OECD even anticipates damage of up to 4 trillion dollars. Associated with this are massive negative effects on economic growth and state communities. On a global level, the fight against corruption and the creation of legal certainty (e.g. through contract and register security , formal requirements , independent and effective courts or administration) are therefore the keys to innovation, productivity and prosperity.

Definitions

Corruption in the legal sense

The core element of corrupt behavior is the exploitation of a position of power for personal gain while disregarding universalistic norms of behavior , be it moral standards, official duties or laws . Corruption is a social interaction in which those involved exchange beneficial services, such as influencing decisions for money . In contrast to " win-win ", the effects on third parties involved are hidden or ignored.

Corruption is a kind of compensation deal , but more than just an exchange between two actors for their mutual benefit.

  • The addition of the illegal exchange is not unique: receiving stolen goods is such. B. also an illegal exchange, but no corruption.
  • Corruption can be distinguished from other exchange relationships (e.g. in a market) if one regards it as a phenomenon with three actors involved:
    • the bribing,
    • the bribed
    • and the client of the bribed.
In economic literature, these are referred to as client, agent and principal (see principal-agent theory ). Principal and agent have a contractual relationship in which the principal entrusts the agent with a task and gives him a means to carry out this task and gives him a leeway within which he can act. This is the position of power mentioned. The agent uses this (often against the interests of the principal) in order to be able to offer the client something in exchange.
Corruption describes both the activity of the “giver” and that of the “recipient” (cf. the definition by Myrdal 1989: 405). Many codes call this "active bribery" and "passive bribery" (corruptibility). At least one of the cooperation partners abuses a position of power or trust and therefore gets caught in a norm conflict between particularistic and universalistic norms. Those involved have to weigh up whether they weight the achievable benefit from corruption higher than the risks (the negative sanctions that can be expected ) in the event of a possible discovery.

Under German law

Criminal law does not have an overarching corruption penal provision, but rather sanctions the injustice associated with corruption in various criminal offenses . The German legislator has neither defined the term corruption nor used it in criminal law.

Relevant criminal corruption offenses are in particular

In this way, further criminal offenses, so-called accompanying offenses, are usually realized. The accompanying crimes are often made possible by the corruption crimes.

Furthermore, the penal norms of the Law on Combating International Bribery (IntBestG) and the EU Bribery Act (EUBestG), as well as the Law on Combating Corruption in the Health Care System and the Law on Combating Corruption, are also relevant for Germany. The corruption offenses according to § 299 StGB and bribery in business dealings are prosecuted according to § 301 StGB only on request, unless the law enforcement authority considers an ex officio intervention to be necessary if there is a special public interest in the prosecution.

German Federal Criminal Police Office

The German BKA refers to the definition of criminological research. Accordingly, corruption is the "abuse of a public office, a function in the economy or a political mandate for the benefit of another, at his or her instigation or on one's own initiative, to gain an advantage for oneself or a third party, with the occurrence or in anticipation of the occurrence of damage or Disadvantage for the general public (perpetrators in official or political function) or for a company (regarding perpetrators as functionaries in the economy). "

Situational corruption occurs with a spontaneous decision. In contrast, structural corruption is based on long-term, corrupt relationships and was deliberately planned in advance.

Transparency International

Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. ( Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. )

This definition is in contrast to the old American definition by Harold Dwight Lasswell cited above : "... violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt". At that time it was used as a guideline for the draft of the American anti-corruption law " Foreign Corrupt Practices Act " of 1977 and (only) twenty years later the OECD - " Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction ". In both, the responsibility for the crime (corruption) is also and especially seen with the initiators in their own country.

In that Lasswell only identifies the deliberately caused damage to a public or private community for self-enrichment as a corruption criterion, he includes the active and the passive partner equally - against the background that in almost all cases the "active" is the main beneficiary and initiator of Corruption is.

According to the definition of TI, however, the abuse of one's own position is emphasized as the only criterion. The philosophy behind it is that only those who enable (accept) corruption should be in the legal focus. Ultimately, TI implies that because no morality can be expected from the “active” private industry (cf. WB), the “passive” public official must therefore bear full responsibility.

This “modern” perspective triggered “criticism of Transparency International” in the 1990s . In particular, because TI was brought into being in the same legislative period (1991-1994) when the Bonn parliament explicitly legitimized corruption against officials of the European southern enlargement and the recommendations of the UN and the OECD allowed bribes abroad as tax-deductible .

In the current TI annual report for 2015, according to the Corruption Perception Index CPI, there are more countries in which less corruption was perceived / felt than in 2014 than those in which corruption had increased compared to the previous year. According to the index, the Danes perceive themselves as the leaders among the most corrupt countries in the world. Germany is in 10th place and has therefore improved in our own opinion: In 2014, Germany was still 12th in the self-perception of the business world. Overall, the global business world feels less corrupt compared to the beginning of the financial crisis.

However, the CPI says nothing about the actual extent of corruption. However, it does give business people an impression of the sensitivity to how damaging corruption is perceived on the national market and whether there is therefore the prevailing political will to take action against it. An example of this is the bribe practice that has been common for decades in the Federal Republic of Germany, whereby parliamentarians were excluded from prosecution if they were subsequently rewarded for specific political decisions. Only if the remuneration was paid beforehand could it be legally prosecuted as corruption. With this unusually "liberal" regulation, the German business world had for years undermined the OECD Convention against the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials (1997) and nevertheless awarded itself an extremely high CPI (10-20th place). Curiously, even at the time when bribes were legally tax deductible (Section 4 (5) No. 10 EStG, valid until March 19, 1999). It was not until 2014 that legal corruption was abolished under pressure from the UN, so that Germany was the last state to comply with the UNCAC . Now (2015) German business people feel even more “less corrupt”.

Situation in Germany

Case numbers and damage

According to the 2011 Corruption Situation Report by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), the number of corruption proceedings reported to the police decreased by almost 16 percent to 1,528 in comparison to 2010 (1,813). However, these proceedings include a large number of individual offenses. For example, the number of corruption crimes roughly tripled from 2010 (15,746) in 2011; with 47,795 crimes, the highest figure since 1995 is reported. The violations of the penal norms of §§ 331, 333 StGB (acceptance and granting of benefits) have more than doubled and §§ 332, 334, 335 StGB (corruption and bribery) have increased by around 2.4 times. The offenses of §§ 299, 300 StGB (corruption and bribery in business dealings) show a 3.5-fold increase. This increase is mainly due to two extensive lawsuits in North Rhine-Westphalia against employees of an automobile manufacturer and against civilian employees of the British Army of the Rhine. There are more than 25,800 individual offenses in business dealings.

With a share of 56 percent of the criminal offenses that became known to the police, the focus in 2011 was again in the private sector; public administration accounted for 35 percent. The remaining 9 percent are split between law enforcement and law enforcement agencies (8 percent) and politics (1 percent).

Around 40 percent of the "donors" (BKA jargon for bribers or those granting advantages) were managing directors, around 15 percent were executives. On the “taker” side, around 65 percent of the corrupt activities concerned the clerk and around 30 percent the management level.

In 2011, 41 percent of the benefits for the "takers" consisted of the acceptance of cash, 34 percent of benefits in kind, the rest related to hospitality, celebrations, vacation, travel (see also section "What benefits were provided?" ). About 46 percent of the “donors” benefited from the acquisition of orders, and 19 percent from other competitive advantages (not described in detail by the BKA); 9 percent went to official approvals, 7 percent to internal information and other things.

According to the BKA, monetary damage totaling around 276 million euros was reported for 2011 compared to 176 million euros in 2010 (an increase of around 56 percent). However, the BKA expressly points out that "statements on the monetary dimension of the overall damage caused are (can) only be made with great difficulty, since the financial damage caused by obtaining permits or orders can usually only be described vaguely" and "therefore a Overall picture of the actual extent of the damage caused can only be given to a limited extent ”.

Types of corruption

The Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) differentiates between situational and structural corruption. The Giessen criminologist Britta Bannenberg determined three structures on the basis of her file evaluation of corruption cases: trivial or occasional corruption, structure of the established relationships and network corruption.

Situational corruption

Situational corruption is acts of corruption that are committed spontaneously out of a situation (hence also called spontaneous corruption ); so they are not planned or prepared. The decisive factor is the favorable opportunity (hence Bannenberg: occasional corruption ). According to Bannenberg's research, the event is limited to two or a few people and is not intended to be repeated.

Examples: A drunk driver offers the police officer who is checking him 100 €. The driver hopes for a successful bribe in order to get away without points and driving license withdrawal. A colleague responsible for registering for further training courses / conferences agrees to schedule - and expects something in return.

Structural corruption

In structural corruption, the corrupt act is based on long-term (“grown”) relationships; it is planned and prepared before the offense is committed. Often it is initiated by "feeding"; H. Small gifts of money or other minor benefits are used to test how vulnerable the beneficiary is and how willing he is to continue to act corrupt in the future. The amount and frequency of donations will increase over time. According to Bannenberg, such an approach is limited in terms of space and personnel; it takes place regionally in the economic area of ​​the beneficiary.

Example: "Scientific events" are organized every quarter, at which professors who B. Prepare reports for the cigarette industry, for speeches or lectures, the contents of which have been known for years, enormous fees are paid.

Network corruption

According to Bannenberg, network corruption is “extensive criminal offenses, which in many cases can be assigned to organized crime.” There are many donors, but few recipients. The offenses are often committed over several years, sometimes for decades, regionally, nationally or internationally.

This type of corruption is part of the strategy used by some employees of companies or corporations; it is (mostly) associated with more extensive criminal offenses such as fraud, breach of trust, extortion or tax evasion. Regardless of the type of corruption, the BKA mentions other facts related to corruption, in particular forgery of documents, agreements restricting competition in tenders, thwarting penalties and false certification in office, violation of official secrecy and violations of ancillary criminal law.

Example (supraregional): The head of a building authority meets with the managing directors of certain construction companies sometimes for work lunches in fine restaurants, sometimes for sailing tours, to private golf tournaments or the like, in order - as externally declared - to talk about the economic situation in general and the order situation in particular to exchange, but actually to talk about upcoming orders and possible offers and to agree conditions and prices.

Britta Bannenberg discovered corruption when evaluating criminal files:

  • When awarding large orders to monopoly-like contractors or cartels, for example the construction of airports, sewage treatment plants in large cities, highways, barracks, residential and commercial areas with landfills and noise barriers, the equipment of the police and the armed forces and case complexes in connection with shipyards,
  • in trust and driving license procedures,
  • in connection with immigration authorities and organized crime smuggling activities
  • and in numerous procedures in the medical field (heart valve procedures, medical products).

Forms of corruption

Corruption occurs within the meaning of Sections 331 ff

Accepting advantages and “showing yourself ready to be bribed” is basically always an active act.

The “beneficiary” often actively demands an advantage - this can go as far as blackmail . Potential contractors are then given the alternative: Without a bribe, no order or no official act, e.g. B. no building permit. Requested advantages are always punishable within the meaning of Section 331 (3) StGB. Approval does not lead to impunity.

In the case of the acceptance of advantages according to § 331 StGB, the public official accepts the advantage to which he has no legal claim - as an equivalent for his service. There does not have to be an illegal official act.

Bribery and bribery within the meaning of § 332 and § 334 StGB always go hand in hand with a breach of duty on the part of the "taker", i.e. an illegal official act. The official act can also consist of an omission.

Since Sections 331 et seq. StGB also include advantages that are granted to third parties, sponsoring or making donations (see also party donations ) to public bodies or parties can be a gateway for corruption. Sponsoring and donations basically fulfill the objective fact of granting an advantage within the meaning of §§ 331 ff. StGB.

Who is a public official is determined in accordance with Section 11 (1) No. 2 of the Criminal Code. The members of municipal representative bodies ( city ​​council , municipal council ) are not officeholders unless they are entrusted with specific administrative tasks that go beyond their mandate activities in the municipal parliament and the associated committees. However, the BGH sees a need for legislative action here. In all other areas of public and private life, the changed public understanding of the particular social detriment of corruption has led to a considerable expansion of the criminal liability of corrupt behavior. This development has so far bypassed the fact of bribery of parliamentarians . The criminal offense of Section 108e of the Criminal Code is therefore often viewed as practically meaningless “symbolic legislation” which, with the heading, only pretends at first glance - and specifically to the public - that MPs are at least approximately on a par with public officials from the point of view of bribery offenses . So far, only one MP has been sentenced according to this norm.

A third party within the meaning of Sections 331 ff. StGB can also be the official's own employing body. A criminal offense arises, for example, when sponsoring / donations are coupled with the placing of orders / contracts concluded by the receiving administrative unit (unlawful agreement).

Corrupt acts also include - but not in terms of criminal law - those vacancies in administrations and public companies that are carried out from a party-political point of view: patronage of offices , nepotism (nepotism), clientelism .

Benefits of the taker

With a share of 41.1 percent, cash was the most common benefit on the recipient's side in 2011, immediately followed by benefits in kind with 34 percent (2010 together 97 percent).

Examples: Money (so-called "bribe"): Transfer of cash or transfers to a hidden account or payment for bogus transactions: bogus delivery, expert opinion or advice or valuable gifts in kind such as tickets to important cultural or sporting events or car, yacht, holiday home and free or cheaper services, e.g. B. in a workshop, house building, garden maintenance u. Ä.

Further advantages related to hospitality / celebrations (8.5 percent), travel and vacation (4.3 percent) and participation in events (3 percent).

Examples: Financing anniversaries and birthdays, Caribbean cruises, South Seas vacations, enabling access to exclusive events. The other advantages include discounts, secondary employment, extremely high discounts when buying a car, obtaining a lucrative secondary employment, visiting a brothel , later career or a well-paid job for the bribed person or for one of his relatives .

The BKA puts the monetary benefits of the beneficiaries in 2011 at € 120 million.

Advantages of the donors

On the donor side, obtaining orders was the most common target of corruption in 2011 with a share of 46.3 percent. This is followed by a long way: obtaining other competitive advantages (19 percent), official approvals (8.5 percent) or internal information (7.5 percent).

Examples: (mainly) construction contracts, manipulation of open tenders, preference for so-called “court suppliers” (in the case of limited tenders), approval of subsidies, new constructions, extensions and extensions, innkeeping concessions, betrayal of raids, etc. Ä.

The BKA names shares of further advantages: Selling drugs (5.3 percent), influencing law enforcement authorities (3.9 percent) and advantages below 3.5 percent: payment of bogus and forged bills, obtaining residence and work permits, saving fees , u. a.

For 2011, the BKA has shown the monetary benefits of donors at € 195 million.

Effects of Corruption

Corruption and the fight against corruption are central issues today in both industrialized and developing countries. In international transactions, companies from industrialized countries usually take on the role of active people in corruption and those of the developing countries who take on the passive role. This important area of ​​the often state failure to protect the population, the economy and the community causes anger of the masses against the rulers and other elites in many countries because of the massive effects involved. Internationally, the lack of progress in the fight against corruption undermines the rule of law and belief in democracy.

In the area of public administration and the judiciary , corruption leads on the one hand to high material damage and on the other hand to immaterial effects such as the loss of trust of the citizens in state organs. For example, companies may be awarded contracts even though they provide more expensive or poorer services than companies that would be selected in an objective and transparent invitation to tender . The benefits granted to public officials are usually included in the invoice. Therefore, services are then billed that were either not performed at all or not performed to the extent shown. The taxpayer ultimately bears the financial burden. The rule here is that exploiting public positions for private gain is contrary to the common good.

In the healthcare sector , corruption leads to inflated prices on the one hand and makes access to medical services more difficult on the other. Furthermore, it can lead to the establishment of forms of therapy or drugs that, viewed objectively, do not represent a medically optimal treatment. Even on caregivers during treatment administered gratuities bribe if it benefits up to the tier health two can cause. In many countries, paying bribes is part of everyday life in hospitals, for example to get an appointment for an operation.

In general, corruption means that the services of organizations decrease in scope or deteriorate in quality, but the amount of money to be paid increases. According to the World Bank , each person has to spend around seven percent of their work for corruption damage.

Interstate corruption is a special case, with the active corrupt on the one hand and the passive partner as well as the injured party on the other not belonging to the same jurisdiction. In such cases, within the scope of one's own law, neither a civil servant is corrupted nor the state harmed. This quasi-outsourcing of corruption was practiced in preparation for the euro, especially in the FRG in the 1990s, and had provoked criticism from the OECD, especially since the then Kohl government deliberately co-financed the corruption of German corporations in the European expansion through tax breaks. In addition to the damage to their economies described above, the victim states have to put up with the charge of not taking enough action against corruption.

While national corruption only shows itself as an injustice in competition between large and small - liquid companies have a clear competitive advantage when it comes to corruption - overall, however, it does not noticeably weaken the economy, intergovernmental corruption poses a threat to economies that are legally unprepared (see Greece) represent, which in free trade areas such. B. the European single market are contractually bound to forego any protectionist countermeasures in favor of their national economy (Maastricht 1993).

As a result of the considerable legal differences in the national assessment and prosecution of corruption and the enormous wealth associated with it, an internationally secretive wealth preservation and consulting industry has developed. These consulting firms and offshoring providers do not primarily serve the purpose of legal tax optimization or economic advice , but rather to circumvent regulations and a large number of criminal activities such as money laundering and corruption. By using tax havens and exploiting all possible loopholes, these companies create their own legal system and also conduct massive lobbying work to open up new loopholes and to abolish criminal offenses or formal requirements.

According to an estimate by the International Monetary Fund , corruption consumes the equivalent of 1.3–1.75 trillion euros worldwide . That weakens global economic growth by around two percent. In the current economic growth models is considered corruption as well as money laundering as one of the long-term, sustainable growth preventer.

According to data from the European Commission from 2014, corruption damages the economy in the European Union by 120 billion euros per year. However, the situation is very different in the individual member states. The front runners among those damaged by corruption are Greece, Italy, Croatia, Cyprus, Spain and Bulgaria. In 2014, corruption in Austria caused economic damage of EUR 27 billion and significantly hampered economic growth. At the same time, the Republic of Austria slipped to 16th place in Transparency International's corruption index and is said to have a lot of catching up to do in the fight against corruption.

While the IMF estimates the global annual damage caused by corruption at around 2,000 billion dollars, the OECD even puts it at 4,000 billion dollars. In 2012, according to a study, emerging and developing countries lost a trillion dollars to corruption, money laundering and trade fraud, and the volume of illegal cash flows is growing twice as fast as economic growth.

The corruption dilemma

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The advantage of the corrupt person is usually only a fraction of the damage to the organization that employs or hires him. The extent of this can be compared more with the benefits of the attacker, i.e. the actively corrupt. Profit-oriented companies are therefore careful to prevent their employees from being corrupted. A fundamental dilemma emerges : On the one hand, it is in the interests of companies to prevent passive corruption of their employees, as this damages them. On the other hand, they would like to "invest" in active corruption themselves in order to assert themselves against other market players and B. to acquire lucrative orders through bribes.

This dilemma no longer exists if corruption is effectively prevented in all companies in this market without exception or if it is practiced legally and across the board. The dilemma is precisely that in a situation in which all others do not corrupt, a single company can reap the greatest profits from corruption. The less corrupt, the greater the market share of the few. Every single company has an extremely high incentive to corrupt, be it to make higher profits or not to be the only "dumb" who does not corrupt and therefore has to leave the market. The dilemma indicates that an incomplete fight against corruption can overturn the desired quality and price competition on the market - in extreme cases by a single “black sheep”.

But it also points the way to another way of fighting. By not making a moral appeal to companies to disregard their profit, but by using their profit-making drive to fight corruption. This can be done by changing the dilemma situation itself. If corruption is to be combated, companies must also be offered incentives to actually implement this. Various proposals are being discussed in science, e.g. B. the introduction of corporate criminal law in Germany or the implementation of leniency programs in corruption cases. While corporate criminal law already exists in most European countries, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia only introduced a corresponding legislative proposal in 2014.

It is sometimes claimed that this corruption dilemma does not exist in public companies , because on the one hand the intention to subsidize private companies plays just as important a role as the mere profit-making and on the other hand, potential bankruptcy can be averted by public support. But this is not entirely true. In fact, public companies have few incentives to bribe other companies. But that does not apply to all employees of this company. If a single employee z. B. receives high bonuses for the acquisition of orders, then this has an incentive, for u. Using corrupt funds, however, is largely limited as an individual employee in his financial possibilities. Conversely, public companies and their employees are of course very susceptible to being bribed themselves. Precisely because there is no intention to make a profit, has control over the efficient use of funds, e.g. B. in the award of construction contracts, not to the same extent as in private companies. The possibilities for corrupt actors to acquire pensions through corruption are therefore greater in such companies. It is therefore difficult to find an argument in favor of more public companies in order to prevent passive corruption - quite the opposite of active corruption, which is traditionally the domain of the private sector.

Fight against corruption

Police measures

Whistleblowers can submit their knowledge of corruption to the police authorities as a criminal complaint or anonymously. According to the principle of legality , the police must also investigate anonymous reports. Knowledge carriers can protect themselves from the possible consequences of their report through anonymity.

The Baden-Württemberg police have been using an external, anonymous whistleblower portal to fight corruption since 2012 . The current Internet address is given on the homepage of the Baden-Württemberg police. The system is managed by the Baden-Württemberg State Criminal Police Office . A whistleblower can set up a post box when submitting information. Questions can be asked of the whistleblower via the post box. The volume of reports and the quality of suspicions should be increased through mutual anonymous communication with the whistleblower. The identity of the whistleblower cannot be determined.

General

In order to prevent corruption, according to the principal-agent- client theory, intervention must either be made when granting power (preventing the principal-agent interaction) or when trading between agent and client (preventing the agent-client interaction). In order to prevent agent-client interaction, it must be punished and possible agent-client interactions must be made transparent.

Internationally, attempts are being made to prevent the simple and non-transparent shifting of capital and the associated concealment and money laundering through documenting formal requirements for legal transactions in real estate, corporate capital or company shares, which is not exciting but effective . In many countries, certain legal transactions such as changes in company structures, capital shifts in companies, real estate or company registrations (- which can be suitable for money laundering, concealment or corruption) must be recorded in a court of law or notarized in order to prevent bogus transactions , forgery or backdating of contracts.

The often prescribed identification requirement for banking transactions is also intended to make agent-client interactions transparent. In international practice, however, identification procedures, identity checks and related regulations are deliberately overlooked by financial service providers and banks. Rather, bank-internal compliance institutions are encouraged to look the other way when there is criminal activity or to disguise it.

A suitable country ( tax haven or offshoring ) for the money laundering and concealment associated with corruption would best have anonymous company forms (e.g. British Trusts, Scottish Limited Partnerships or US shell companies), no will for international cooperation and no formal requirements so that the relevant documents are not public and can also be changed retrospectively.

Compliance with the documentation and formal requirements for combating corruption requires the cooperation of state or private bodies. Only if these organs are legally and economically independent of the corrupt perpetrator and this independence is adequately secured can corruption and the actions associated with it be prevented. From an international point of view, these judicial, official or notarial bodies or compliance departments in companies are often poorly paid, bound by instructions, not (economically) independent or deliberately badly organized in order not to be able to monitor compliance with the provisions. Whether there can be fundamentally positive effects from compliance departments that are embedded in the corporate structure to prevent illegal but lucrative actions within the scope of the corporate purpose is controversial, because companies generally maximize their self-interest. In many countries, business associations, but also politicians, try to push back the documentation and formal requirements that are suitable for fighting corruption as "anti-business". Nobel laureate in economics, Joseph Stiglitz, and the Basel criminal lawyer, Mark Pieth, point out that the fight against corruption is not carried out consistently due to extensive lobbying work and that this has prevented effective documentation requirements. In many cases, the financial industry is very focused on influencing changes in the law and their consequences, also with regard to tax havens, in their own way.

The fight against corruption in Germany has traditionally focused primarily on the (criminal) law perspective. However, other specialist disciplines are increasingly considering how to put a stop to the manifold corruption. Through international agreements, the contracting states try to create mandatory criminal law provisions to combat corruption. Transparency International publishes a Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit . Massive weak points in the fight against corruption are the lack of transparency in many legal transactions, the banking sector and, above all, the tax havens. The fight against corruption does not only include clear legal provisions or international agreements, but rather the existing regulations such as register law, formal requirements and the duty of legitimation must be correctly and effectively implemented.

In lobbying there are interactions similar to agent-client interactions. However, this need not necessarily lead to corruption. Lobbycontrol is an association in Germany that reports on the influence of interest groups (clients) on state organs (agents).

Problems

Promotion of corruption

Corruption is promoted or prevented by various circumstances:

  • The “victim” does not recognize the corruption or cannot prove it.
  • Two types of corruption can be distinguished: “The first is related to blackmail. Here, a position of power is exploited to force special services from interaction partners. It is stress corruption. It is particularly widespread in developing countries. The second type dominates in developed constitutional states like Germany. You can characterize it as exoneration corruption. It is perceived as advantageous by those directly involved - like an exchange. However, it is an exchange at the expense of third parties. Relief corruption is always associated with a breach of trust: Here a delegation relationship is abused to generate illegal income. "
  • "The influence of politics on law enforcement authorities in economic proceedings against powerful people, but also influence on administrations in order to obtain contracts to well-known and friendly entrepreneurs, has been proven in several criminal proceedings."
  • “Politicians have no incentive to fight corruption. Rather, they don't want to know anything about the subject. Politicians are also not very aware of injustice. On the contrary, some consider 'commissions' a legitimate part of their income. "
  • “Politicians are not only resistant to giving themselves rules of corruption and submitting to them, they also have the effect that some good approaches in administration have been undone. Munich and Frankfurt had the best anti-corruption strategies. However, these have continuously brought to light cases of corruption, so that the impression arose that Frankfurt and Munich were the only cities that were strongholds of corruption. Politicians who have the incentive to be re-elected can then get too much pressure from the public reactions, so they plead for a change (defuse) of corruption strategies. "
  • "... All of this feeds the fear that especially at a time when organized and white-collar crime threatens to attack state and economic institutions, the German law enforcement authorities do not have the necessary freedom of action to counteract this type of crime, which is new for Germany ... "
  • On the question "How independent are public prosecutors in Germany?" See the lecture of the same name by Dr. Winfried Maier, judge at Munich Higher Regional Court, public prosecutor a. D., Augsburg
  • Control bodies (e.g. supervisory boards or judiciary) belong to the same organization as the corrupted (e.g. employees, managers or civil servants) and they overlap.
  • Those involved are not interested in the company's financial success, but primarily in personal gain.
  • The public prosecutors tasked with fighting corruption are also officials who are bound by instructions. The instructors (including the Minister of Justice) are not bound by the written form. Public prosecutors are often overburdened.
  • The corruption of the pharmaceutical industry to practicing physicians by drug monitoring and the like, is not punishable - at clinicians does.
  • Journalists are allowed to accept press discounts, whereby journalists' associations commit themselves to certain rules in accordance with the press code.
  • Corruption crime is characterized by a high number of unreported cases due to a perpetrator-perpetrator relationship based on conspiracy.

The CPI - "Sensations or Experiences"

Since 1995, are non-governmental organization (NGO) Transparency International annually the Corruption Perception Index (Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI) out. This corruption index aims to show the extent to which corruption is perceived in different countries around the world. In the meantime, it has had a broad impact on the general public, making it more aware of the global problem of corruption.

The extent of corruption in a country cannot be limited using economic methods. Therefore, the CPI inevitably draws back on the assessment of those involved within the clientele economy, whereby only their subjective "perception" in the sense of "sensation" in contrast to the definitive (and courageous) "determination" (engl. "Perception"). "Experience, detection, identification, diagnosis ...") of corruption in one's own country is collected through surveys.

The result of such surveys is much more dependent on the psychology of the respondent's own economic success and seldom on his courage to admit corruption. So it is not surprising that in so-called export countries corruption is hardly (as harmful) perceived, where the efficient acquisition of government contracts is traditionally secured by highly developed client networks that are extremely liquid because of their huge shadow economies. Obviously in these cases the benefit outweighs (almost) everyone.

The national “CPI sensitivity” is favored if the country in question is highly industrialized, where a significant proportion of society is employed and therefore cannot even perceive the activities within the client networks. An even more favorable influence on the CPI is exercised by nationalistic legislation that on the one hand controls domestic corruption to a specified extent, but on the other hand allows it to go unpunished if it is directed exclusively against other national economies . Such authorizing laws for one's own private sector are particularly catastrophic if they are co-financed by the state through tax subsidies worth billions - as happened after the EEC southern expansion in 1981/86 and the EC internal market in 1993.

In this respect, the CPI does not take into account the actually “measured” corruption or the criminal energy in the exporting countries. Instead, it merely represents a perception index of the damage incurred in the victim countries, but not, as is often wrongly cited, the extent of “national” corruption. How could he? After all, corruption is "international" in a globalized world. See 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , 1999 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 2005 United Nations Convention against Corruption .

Anti-corruption tools

This article or paragraph presents the situation in Germany . Help us to describe the situation in other countries.

In major German cities, priority public prosecutor's offices against corruption are increasingly being established - this against the background that the fight against corruption is an extremely complicated undertaking that requires the pooling of resources and skills. The Munich I Public Prosecutor's Office currently has the largest anti-corruption department in Germany. It has the public sector, u. a. helped the city ​​administration of Munich to realize EUR 46 million in damages between 1994 and 2004 - an extent that in this respect only documents the bright field of corruption; the actual damage (including the dark field ) probably goes far beyond that.

Whistleblowers can forward their knowledge of corruption cases to the law enforcement authorities as a criminal complaint . This can also be done anonymously, as according to the principle of legality, the police also have to investigate anonymous reports. With an anonymous report, knowledge carriers can protect themselves from the possible consequences of their report.

In the private enterprise sector , competition - neutral self-commitments are increasingly being initiated by individual sectors (e.g. in the construction industry). They set themselves the collective goal of rejecting corruption in the course of comprehensive ethics management. The establishment of a compliance culture within a company takes a similar approach .

The Business Ethics / Business ethics is concerned in recent times especially with options of preventing and combating corruption. The scientific publication by Pies and others should be mentioned as an example .

Last but not least, there are also approaches to explicit anti-corruption management for public administration . Measures taken at this level to prevent corruption have been implemented in German federal authorities since the Federal Government's guidelines on corruption prevention in the federal administration came into force. The work of Thomas Faust, Organizational Culture and Ethics, provides the basis from the point of view of administrative ethics. Perspectives for public administrations .

Possible instruments for combating corruption in public administration are, for example, risk analyzes for corruption or weak point analyzes for corruption .

International conventions

Based on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of the USA, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), representing the world economy, published a comprehensive report on corruption in business dealings with recommendations for the first time in 1977. The report called on international organizations and national governments to put the issue on their agendas. Today there are a number of international conventions designed to counter corruption and bribery .

OECD Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions

It is an international agreement that obliges the contracting states to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials. The convention was opened for signature on December 17, 1997. Have acceded to the convention. All 34 are now OECD members and the 7 non-members - Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia and South Africa.

The convention serves to protect open and competitively structured markets from the negative effects of corruption and for this purpose provides for the use of criminal law to combat the bribery of foreign public officials in international business dealings.

In Germany, the implementation took place with the IntBestG of September 10, 1998.

Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption

The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of December 17, 1997 entered into force on July 1, 2002. It contains further demands on the fight against corruption. The convention was ratified by Germany on September 1, 2017 and Austria on January 1, 2014.

United Nations Convention against Corruption

United Nations Convention against Corruption

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) entered into force on September 16, 2005.

Austria ratified this convention on January 11, 2006.

In Switzerland, after it was signed on December 10, 2003, parliamentary treatment of the convention was initiated on September 21, 2007 with a message from the Federal Council . The ratification took place on September 24, 2009 without reservation.

Germany signed the convention on December 9, 2003. However, due to the lack of criminal law provisions against the bribery of parliamentarians ( Section 108e StGB old version), this could not be ratified for a long time. It was not until February 21, 2014 that the Bundestag passed a law to tighten the rules against bribery of parliamentarians in the second and third readings , which came into force on September 1, 2014. On September 25, 2014, the Bundestag unanimously approved the ratification, and on October 10, 2014, the Bundesrat approved. The ratification took place on November 12, 2014, so that the convention came into force for Germany on December 12, 2014, as one of the last countries in the world (Art. 68 (2) of the convention).

Examples of corruption cases

Corruption by State:

General cases:

Special cases:

Historically older cases:

People:

Anti-corruption institutions

Commissions:

Academies:

Institutes:

Organizations:

Anti-corruption authorities:

See also

literature

  • Elmar Altvater : Privatization and Corruption. On the criminology of globalization, neoliberalism and the financial crisis . Libri.de, Hamburg 2009, ISBN 978-3-939594-02-2 .
  • Ioannis Androulakis: The globalization of the fight against corruption. A study of the origin, content and effects of international criminal law against corruption, taking into account the socio-economic background . Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-2396-9 .
  • Hans Herbert von Arnim (Ed.): Deficits in the fight against corruption and corruption research: Contributions to the 9th Speyer Democracy Conference on October 26th and 27th, 2006 at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. (= Series of publications by the University of Speyer. Volume 199). Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-428-13242-3 .
  • Britta Bannenberg , Wolfgang Schaupensteiner: Corruption in Germany . Verlag CH Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-54818-0 .
  • Uwe Bekemann: Local fight against corruption . Deutscher Gemeindeverlag Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2007, ISBN 978-3-555-01389-3 .
  • Hartmut Berghoff: From export promotion to criminal offense. The criminalization of foreign corruption in the Federal Republic of Germany since 1990 , in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 17 (2020), pp. 91–115.
  • Hans-Eugen Bühler, Olaf Simons: The dazzling business of Matthias Lackas . Corruption investigations in the publishing world of the Third Reich . Pierre Marteau publishing house, Cologne 2004, ISBN 3-00-013343-7 . (The book shows, among other things, how corruption can overcome difficulties that a regime creates in the loss of reality in its exercise of power.)
  • Federal Criminal Police Office: Corruption Situation Report 2011. Wiesbaden, Dec. 2012.
  • Christian Caracas: Responsibility in international corporate structures according to Section 130 OWiG - Using the example of bribery in business dealings abroad, which is punishable abroad. Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2014, ISBN 978-3-8487-0992-2 .
  • Jens Claussen: Compliance or Integrity Management - Measures against Corruption in Companies . Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg 2011, ISBN 978-3-89518-871-8 .
  • Dieter Dölling (Hrsg.): Handbook of corruption prevention. Beck, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-52296-3 .
  • Jens Ivo Engels : The History of Corruption. From the early modern times to the 20th century. S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2014, ISBN 978-3-10-002225-7 .
  • Thomas Faust : Compliance and Anti-Corruption. , BOD, Norderstedt 2015, ISBN 978-3-7347-7125-5 .
  • Raymond Fisman, Edward Miguel: Economic Gangsters. Corruption and Crime in Business. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2009, ISBN 978-3-593-38973-8 .
  • Ernesto Garzón Valdés: Corruption - On the systemic relativity of a universal phenomenon. In: Harald Bluhm, Karsten Fischer (Ed.): Visibility and Invisibility of Power. Political Corruption Theories . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2002, ISBN 3-7890-8271-6 , pp. 115-138.
  • Niels Grüne, Simona Slanička : Corruption. historical approaches to a basic figure of political communication. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2010, ISBN 978-3-525-35850-4 .
  • Christian Höffling: Corruption as a social relationship . Leske + Budrich, Opladen 2002, ISBN 3-8100-3382-0 .
  • Uwe Holtz , Manfred Kulessa (Ed.): Corruption as an obstacle to development. Can corruption be prevented by a legal framework in Germany? 4 volumes. German Justitia et Pax, Bonn 1995, DNB 96791258X .
  • Leslie Holmes: Corruption: what it does and how we can fight it . Reclam, Philipp, jun. GmbH, Verlag, Ditzingen 2017, ISBN 978-3150204757
  • Stephan A. Jansen , Birger P. Priddat (ed.): Corruption. Unenlightened Capitalism - Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Functions and Consequences of Corruption. VS-Verlag, Wiesbaden 2005, ISBN 3-531-14561-4 .
  • Birger P. Priddat , Michael Schmid (ed.): Corruption as an order of the second kind. VS-Verlag, Wiesbaden 2011.
  • Thomas Kliche, Stephanie Thiel (ed.): Corruption. State of research, prevention, problems . Pabst Science Publishers, Lengerich 2011, ISBN 978-3-89967-694-5 .
  • Christoph Niehus: Corruption and Corporate Management . 2nd Edition. Metropolis Verlag, Marburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-89518-578-6 .
  • Jürgen Roth , Rainer Nübel, Rainer Fromm : "Unwanted charges" - corruption and arbitrariness in the German judiciary . Eichborn-Verlag, Frankfurt 2007, ISBN 978-3-8218-5667-4 .
  • Akatshi Schilling, Uwe Dolata (Ed.): Corruption in the German Economic System . Everyone has their price . R. Mankau Verlag, Murnau 2004, ISBN 3-9809565-0-4 .
  • Jan Sprafke: Corruption, Criminal Law and Compliance. Investigations and reform proposals to § 299 StGB. Logos Verlag, Berlin 2010, ISBN 978-3-8325-2398-5 .
  • Werner Vahlenkamp, ​​Ina Knauß: Corruption - a fuzzy phenomenon as an object of targeted prevention . Results of a research report by the Federal Criminal Police Office. Wiesbaden 1995, DNB 945748167 .

Web links

Wiktionary: Corruption  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
Commons : Corruption  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files
Wikiquote: Corruption  - Quotes

Literature:

Statistics:

Fight against corruption:

Ethics, organizations:

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Arnold A. Rogow , Harold Dwight Lasswell : Power Corruption and Rectitude. Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey 1963, pp. 132-133. Literally: “ A corrupt act violates responsibility toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A system of public or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interests for special advantage are corrupt. ”
  2. ↑ The Habsburg Effect. How the lost empire still shapes the relationship between citizens and their state institutions today. , see. also Sascha O. Becker, Katrin Boeckh, Christa Hainz, Ludger Woessmann: The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy. In: The Economic Journal. Volume 126, No. 590, February 2016, pp. 40–74.
  3. ↑ Cf. Marcus Theurer: Corruption as bad as terrorism , in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 12, 2016.
  4. ↑ Cf. u. a. Easterly, William (2005), "National policies and economic growth: A reappraisal", in: Philippe Aghion, Steven Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier, ch. 15; Jürgen Stark "On the importance of institutions in economic and financial development" in public. Inaugural lecture at the Eberhard Karls University in Tübingen on June 1, 2005; Sebastian Buckup "Economic Growth: A Key to More Productivity" in Die Zeit from August 20, 2015.
  5. ↑ a b c Preventing and combating corruption in public administration. Circular decree of the Ministry of the Interior and Local Affairs, also on behalf of the Prime Minister and all state ministries of August 20, 2014.
  6. ^ State Criminal Police Office Baden-Württemberg: Annual Report 2014, Corruption Crime . S. 18, 19 ( polizei-bw.de [PDF]).
  7. ↑ BKA Korruption Lagebild 2011, p. 5).
  8. ↑ corruption. Federal Criminal Police Office, accessed on May 17, 2020 .
  9. ↑ FAQs on corruption. March 5, 2012, accessed December 16, 2012 . (engl.)
  10. ^ Transparency International Deutschland eV: What is corruption? Retrieved April 24, 2020 .
  11. ↑ Lukas Achathaler, Domenica Hofmann, Matthias Pazmandy: Combating corruption as a global challenge: contributions from practice and science . Springer-Verlag, 2011, ISBN 978-3-531-93305-4 ( com.ph [accessed April 24, 2020]).
  12. ↑ Wilhelm Busch: Once the reputation has been ruined, life is completely unabashed.
  13. ↑ Transparency International Corruption Index 2015 , last accessed on January 27, 2016.
  14. ↑ BKA: Federal Situation Report 2011 Corruption. Wiesbaden, Dec. 2012, pp. 6-17. In the following: Situation report 2011.
  15. ↑ Situation report 2011, p. 18.
  16. ^ For the first time in the situation report 2002 Korruption, p. 5; s. also situation picture 2011, p. 5.
  17. ↑ Britta Bannenberg: Corruption in Germany: Empirical results on corruption. In: BKA research series. Volume 22, 2002, p. 28.
  18. ↑ On the types of corruption cf. Britta Bannenberg: Corruption in Germany and its criminal control. A criminological and criminal law analysis. Luchterhand, Neuwied 2002, ISBN 3-472-05159-0 , p. 111 ff.
  19. ↑ They are so-called accompanying offenses, see BKA situation picture 2011 corruption, p. 7.
  20. ^ BGH, judgment of May 9, 2006 , Az. 5 StR 453/05, full text.
  21. ↑ in particular through the Anti-Corruption Act of August 13, 1997, Federal Law Gazette I p. 2038.
  22. ↑ Andreas Vogel: Sommerfeld has to surrender the mandate: Federal Court of Justice rejects appeal / judgment due to corruption is therefore final. In: Märkische Allgemeine. October 19, 2007.
  23. ↑ Office patronage ( Memento from April 10, 2005 in the Internet Archive )
  24. ↑ The type of advantages and their frequency in percent, including those of the donor side, come from the 2011 Federal Situation Report on Corruption by the BKA, p. 16 f .; the examples in the previous version of the benefits on the recipient side have been retained or supplemented.
  25. ↑ s. also VW process: process of embarrassment. on: Spiegel online. December 20, 2007.
  26. ↑ Situation report, p. 18.
  27. ↑ a b Eric Frey: Transparency founder: Citizens no longer accept corruption. In: The Standard. 18th July 2016.
  28. ↑ Cf. Werner J. Marti: Gift und Lebenselixier In: NZZ. January 18, 2017.
  29. ^ Hans Herbert von Arnim: Corruption, networks in politics, offices and business. Droemer Knaur, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-426-77683-9 , p. 24.
  30. ^ Bastian Obermayer, Frederik Obermaier: Panama Papers. KiWi-Paperback, 2016, ISBN 978-3-462-05002-8 , p. 308 ff.
  31. ↑ What corruption and money laundering cost the world In: Süddeutsche Zeitung May 12, 2016 (accessed on February 19, 2018)
  32. ^ William Easterly: National policies and economic growth: A reappraisal. In: Philippe Aghion, Steven Durlauf (Eds.): Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier, 2005, p. 15.
  33. ↑ cf. Thomas Mayer: Corruption flourishes in EU crisis countries. In: The Standard. February 3, 2014; Corruption costs Europe 120 billion a year. In: The world. 3rd February 2014.
  34. ↑ Corruption costs Austria 27 billion. In: The Standard. March 16, 2012.
  35. ↑ Corruption as bad as terrorism. In: FAZ. May 13, 2016, p. 17.
  36. ↑ A trillion is lost in the fight against corruption. In: The world. December 16, 2014.
  37. ↑ Example of the Siemens Enelpower scandal: Siemens pays € 3.5 million in bribes in order to receive a government contract in Italy worth € 206 million.
  38. ↑ Anonymous whistleblower portal . State Criminal Police Office Baden-Württemberg. Retrieved February 15, 2019.
  39. ↑ according to Florian Klenk, Josef Redl: The great offshore show. In: The Moth. April 6, 2016, p. 16, there is e.g. For example, the price list from legal services provider Mossack Foseca in Panama has a tariff of $ 8.75 per month for backdated contracts.
  40. ↑ See in detail Bastian Obermayer, Frederik Obermaier "Panama Papers" (2016), p. 316ff.
  41. ↑ See Markus Mayr, Alexander Mühlauer "Money laundering? So what!" in SZ from February 9, 2017.
  42. ↑ This is where the offshore money lies in the world. In: FAZ. April 7, 2016, p. 19.
  43. ↑ Jan Dams, Ileana Grabitz , Martin Lutz, Karsten Seibel, Nina Trentmann: Forget Panama - money is really laundered here. In: The world. April 13, 2016.
  44. ↑ cf. z. B. Stefan Hülshörster, Dirk Mirow (ed.): German advice on legal and judicial reform abroad. 2012; Christin Emrich: Intercultural Marketing Management. 2014, p. 356; Felix Brodbeck: Basic beliefs are based on maximizing self-interest. In: Marketing. 10/2013, September 27, 2013.
  45. ↑ see Philip Faigle: We break down the rule of law. In: The time. April 18, 2016.
  46. ↑ See Rene Höltschi "Stiglitz and Pieth call for the isolation of tax havens" in NZZ from November 15, 2016.
  47. ↑ Frederik Obermaier, Bastian Obermayer: "Financial control in Luxembourgish" in SZ from March 14, 2017.
  48. ^ Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit. In: transparency.org. Retrieved August 21, 2012 .
  49. ↑ See Martin Hilti (Managing Director of Transparency International Switzerland) in an interview with K. Wolfensberger "Laws alone are not enough against corruption" in 20 Minuten (CH) on April 5, 2016.
  50. ↑ Ingo Pies : How do you fight corruption? Lessons in economic and business ethics for a 'second order policy'. wvb Wiss. Verlag, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-86573-359-7 , p. 47.
  51. ^ Britta Bannenberg: Corruption in Germany and its criminal control. Luchterhand, Neuwied 2002, ISBN 3-472-05159-0 , p. 334.
  52. ↑ a b Conversation with Dr. Regina Sieh (Munich Public Prosecutor's Office). In: Ingo Pies, Peter Sass, Henry Meyer zu Schwabedissen: Business Ethics Study No. 2005–2: Prevention of white-collar crime: On the theory and practice of fighting corruption. P. 254f. (online at: wcms.uzi.uni-halle.de )
  53. ↑ Conversation with Birgitt Collisi (German Association of Cities). In: Ingo Pies, Peter Sass, Henry Meyer zu Schwabedissen: Business Ethics Study No. 2005–2: Prevention of white-collar crime: On the theory and practice of fighting corruption. Pp. 241-243. (online at: wcms.uzi.uni-halle.de )
  54. ^ Raoul Muhm, textbook LMU, The independent public prosecutor - the Italian model. In: Legal Philosophical Booklets. No. 6 (Principles of Law), 1996, p. 55 ff.
  55. ↑ Winfried Maier: Lecture on the occasion of the 6th Speyer Democracy Conference of the University of Speyer on the subject of "Corruption in Politics and Administration" on October 24th and 25th, 2002. ( Memento of March 6th, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) Augsburg 2002. (PDF; 21 kB)
  56. ↑ a b c paperroom.ipsa.org
  57. ^ Ingo Pies, Peter Sass, Henry Meyer zu Schwabedissen: Business Ethics Study No. 2005–2: Prevention of white-collar crime: On the theory and practice of fighting corruption. (online at: wcms.uzi.uni-halle.de )
  58. ↑ Federal Ministry of the Interior: Guideline of the Federal Government on Corruption Prevention in the Federal Administration. RKI, July 30, 2004, accessed January 20, 2020 .
  59. ↑ a b Carsten Stark (Ed.): Corruption Prevention. Classic and holistic approaches . 1st edition. Springer, Gabler, Wiesbaden 2017, ISBN 978-3-658-06313-9 .
  60. ^ Thomas Faust: Organizational Culture and Ethics. Perspectives for public administrations - . Tenea, Berlin 2003, ISBN 3-86504-032-2 (short review: Faust, Thomas: Organizational Culture and Ethics: Perspectives for Public Administrations. Berlin 2003 ).
  61. ^ Convention against Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. OECD, accessed February 22, 2020 .
  62. ↑ Signatures and ratification status of Treaty 173rd Council of Europe , accessed on August 13, 2019 .
  63. ↑ German Bundestag: Extension of the criminal offense of bribery of parliamentarians (PDF document)
  64. ↑ Articles 1 and 6 of the Forty-eighth Criminal Law Amendment Act
  65. ↑ Germany ratifies UN rules against corruption , accessed on September 26, 2014.
  66. ↑ Federal Council approves convention against corruption , accessed on October 13, 2014.
  67. ↑ BGBl. 2015 II p. 140