History of Iran since 1979

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The history of Iran since 1979 begins with the Islamic Revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic , which has existed in Iran since April 1, 1979. For almost four decades, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had ruled the oil-rich country as a monarch with the support of Western states, especially the USA . On January 18, 1979, the Shah fled Iran from unrest, as a result of which the Shiite cleric Ruhollah Khomeini rose to become secular leader. Since then, Iran’s top legal scholar has also been the most important political power, along with the Guardian Council , made up of strictly religious clergy. There is also a popularly elected president. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Iran are, however, heavily manipulated, among other things by the fact that the Guardian Council decides on the admission of the candidates.

Under changing presidents the regime has retained its essential structure. Because of its politics, it is largely isolated internationally. Abroad, above all, criticizes Iran's suspected attempts to manufacture nuclear weapons. Israel in particular sees itself threatened by this. Former President Mahmud Ahmadineschād (2005-2013) is known as a radical anti-Semite and Holocaust denier , as is the regime as a whole for its human rights violations. In addition, the years 1980–1988 were overshadowed by the Iran-Iraq war , with allegedly several hundred thousand deaths on both sides.

Coat of arms of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left the country on January 16, 1979. Two weeks later, Khomeini returned to Tehran . There was no doubt that it would largely determine the political development of the country. In a referendum on March 31, 1979 , according to the preamble of the constitution, allegedly 98.2% of Iranians voted for the establishment of an Islamic republic.

Khomeini had already drawn up a draft constitution for the country, exiled by the Shah (Turkey, Iraq, France), which will be changed in negotiations between all the factions involved in the revolution in the expert assembly and finally the Iranian people to vote on December 3 was submitted. In this way, through the influence of the liberal-Islamic forces around Mehdi Bāzargān , democratic elements were included in the constitution. The principle of the rule of the supreme legal scholar ( velayat-e faghih ) developed by Khomeini remained in all drafts.

The new constitution of Iran was adopted by referendum on December 3, 1979 . According to official information, as in the referendum on March 31, approval was almost 100%, but other sources only speak of around 60%. Thus the former constitutional monarchy of Iran became the Islamic Republic, a Shiite state of god, led by the highest religious authority. The German Ambassador Ritzel reported from Tehran on December 4, 1979:

“The constitutional referendum passed without serious disputes. There were clashes in Tabriz between constitutional opponents from the Shariatmadaris camp and Khomeini supporters, and in the large cities of Balochistan there was no voting at all because the polling stations were blocked. But the worst fears did not materialize. ... Revolutionary spokesman Habib announced yesterday evening the next stages in the state process of the Islamic Republic. After that, elections for President and Majles (Parliament) are planned in two months. At the end of this week Khomeini will presumably name the half of the 'Guardian Committee' to be determined by him according to the constitution (control of the parliament's legislation for its compatibility with Islamic principles). "

The Khomeini era (1979–1989)

The first spiritual and political leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini . From him comes the draft constitution and the principle of the rule of legal scholars. When he took office in 1979, the situation in Iran was extremely explosive. The broad opposition front that overthrew the Shah in the Islamic Revolution was extremely heterogeneous and often only united in the aim of abolishing the Shah's regime. Khomeini, however, embodied the leader of the most important movement, the Islamic opposition, and thus became a symbol of the revolution in general. This authority enabled him to integrate the most important groups in the early stages of the young Islamic Republic.

Thus, Mehdi Bazargan , a leading member of the National Front , chosen as the first prime minister. Representatives from the communist and socialist camps, e.g. B. Tudeh Party officials received posts in the state apparatus. In 1980, after the abolition of the Prime Minister's office, Abolhassan Banisadr was elected the first President of the Islamic Republic. The People's Mujahedin ( holy fighters of the people ), who had also fought against the Shah, resisted the complete political control of Khomeini, as they saw it as a dictatorship as in the times of the Shah. A battle broke out between them and the Khomeini regime, which resulted in bloody clashes.

The persecution of opponents of the revolution began immediately after the constitution was passed. Here the remaining Shah supporters and monarchists first came into focus. It did not take long, however, before the enemy image of the revolution was extended to the USA and Israel . The Tehran hostage drama at the US embassy in 1979 resulted in 52 American citizens being held for a total of 444 days. This incident brought US-Iranian relations to a standstill and resulted in hostile relations between the two states.

There were two main items on Khomeini's agenda: firstly, the consolidation of the republic and secondly, the export of the revolution .

Securing power and stabilizing the system were of particular importance in the first years of the revolution. Khomeini initiated a comprehensive Islamization (also known as the Cultural Revolution ) of Iranian society. He introduced a strict dress code for women, banned non-Islamic newspapers and parties and made it unmistakably clear that any violation of a rule imposed by the revolutionary regime would be seen as an attack on the revolution and would be punished accordingly.

The integrative attitude towards the groups involved in the revolution was also abandoned. Mehdi Bāzargān and all other representatives of a non-Islamist policy who had just held state offices suddenly saw themselves being persecuted by the Khomeini militia, the so-called revolutionary guards (also known as the Revolutionary Guard in many sources). This resulted in bloody and brutal scenes. From 1980 to 1982, the Khomeini regime acted with ruthless severity against anyone who it believed represented a threat to the Islamic Republic. There were public mass executions and downright arrest orgies by the Revolutionary Guard. In 1982 alone, between 5,000 and 10,000 people were executed. The prisons hold up to 40,000 political prisoners, most of whom imprisonment means starvation, torture and illness. The brutality of the action certainly contributed significantly to the fact that the opposition within the country had soon reduced to an almost irrelevant level. Only the Modjahedin offered violent resistance. Between them and the Revolutionary Guards there were repeated street battles with many dead. Ultimately, the regime and the militias loyal to Khomein prevailed. The Modjahedin remained active through assassinations and armed resistance well into the 1980s.

Cemetery of Iranian soldiers who died in the Iran-Iraq war in Yazd
Memorial for war victims in Qazvin

The achievement of the stability of the system can be traced back to another factor. On September 22nd, 1980, Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein attacked the Islamic Republic of Iran and started the First Gulf War (also known as the Iran-Iraq War ). From an Iraqi point of view, it was believed that they could take advantage of Iran's internal instability. But it didn't work out. Instead, an eight-year, grueling war developed that claimed a total of nearly a million victims. (The estimates vary widely; there are at least 300,000 Iranians, including 50,000 to 100,000 children and young people.)

During the course of the First Gulf War, Iranian attention was focused on the external threat, so that opposition members had even less chance of success in raising awareness of the enemy in their own country. In view of the war, the military also stood united behind Khomeini. After Banisadr was ousted as president by parliament in June 1981 due to his increasing opposition to Khomeini and his rapprochement with the Modjahedin, Mohammad Ali Rajai won the subsequent elections and became the new president in July ( see: Presidential election in Iran in July 1981 ). However, he was assassinated in August and was replaced by Seyyed Ali Khamenei in October of the same year, who held the office of President until Khomeini's death ( see: Presidential election in Iran in October 1981 , presidential election 1985 ) and then became chief legal scholar . Domestically, the lines of conflict between the Khomeini parliamentarians became increasingly clear.

Roughly classified, the left-wing Islamists quarreled with the conservative Islamists, who rejected this model, demanding greater regulation of the market by the state. Khomeini was an arbitrator here more than once, but without ever finally taking sides. The Guardian Council, as an opponent of parliament, contributed to extremely lively disputes in the Iranian state apparatus. In 1988 Khomeini set up the Arbitration Council on the basis of the constant conflicts between Parliament and the Guardian Council , which, similar to the German Mediation Committee, was supposed to settle the disputes about finding compromises.

For Khomeini, who by 1983 had dissolved all noteworthy domestic opposition groups and had their members executed, the war soon developed into a war for his goal of exporting the Islamic revolution. Iraq, which is partly Shiite, offered itself for this purpose, if its dictator Saddam Hussein could have been overthrown in the course of the war. Otherwise, Chomenei avowedly wanted to introduce his state model in all Islamic countries, if necessary with military force.

Since 1987, Chomenei has slowly deviated from the idea of ​​exporting a revolution. He promised himself the right to stand beyond religious regulations and now to assume the absolute rule of the highest legal scholar. With the adoption of the UN Armistice Agreement in 1988, Iran recognized that it could not bring the revolution to Iraq. The enterprise for which hundreds of thousands of Iranians had lost their lives had failed. However, there were good reasons for Khomeini to end the war. The empty state coffers gave rise to fear of a system collapse, the losses in the population were enormous and the economy had almost completely come to a standstill after eight years of war.

Nevertheless, Khomeini's reputation among the Iranian population was unbroken. He was still venerated as a saint and he could still base his power on his charismatic charisma. Khomeini's credibility, however, suffered in 1986 when the Iran-Contra affair was exposed, when it became known that Iran, with Khomenei's knowledge, had concluded secret agreements with the USA, according to which Iran received American weapons and released captured Americans in return.

Khomeini's health had deteriorated considerably by 1988 and people began to think about their successor. The most promising contender was Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri , the only Grand Ayatollah who accepted Khomeini's welayat-e-faghih . The other spiritual leaders of Shia Islam continued to refuse to meddle in politics. Montazeri, who was named Khomeini's successor by the assembly of experts in 1986 , fell in the case of Khomeini because of overly critical statements regarding the war, because of his plan to hold new elections immediately after Khomeini's death, taking into account all parties, and because of the influence of Rafsanjani, the Montazeri fought, in disgrace. After he had campaigned for the pardon of Mehdi Hashemi, who had been sentenced to death , but who had publicly “confessed” to betraying the revolution, the break finally came in 1989. Montazeri woke up with utterances like: “ The radical fundamentalists are to blame for the fact that we have such a bad reputation abroad. We need a variety of opinions and not just a single opinion that is monopolized by a single political line . ”In the western media the appearance of a democrat, but increasingly isolated himself in the Iranian leadership.

There was no one to whom the constitutional criteria for the chief legal scholar applied and who was also ready to take over political rule. This fact, in connection with Khomeini's poor state of health, led to the constitutional revision on July 28, 1989. From then on, the post of supreme legal scholar no longer had to be occupied by an ayatollah. Instead, it was stipulated that political and social skills should be the decisive factor.

Khomeini died on June 3, 1989. The President Seyyed Ali Chāmene'i , who has been in office since 1981, was appointed as his successor .

The Khamenei era (since 1989)

At the time of his assumption of office as leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyyed Ali Khamenei held only the rank of Hodschatoleslam in the hierarchy of the Shiite clergy . Although he was formally "upgraded" to Ayatollah in the course of assuming office without having to pass the relevant examination procedure, he never achieved the necessary reputation within the Shia clergy that would have justified this rank. From the beginning of his term in office, Khamenei had a much more difficult position than Khomeini. He lacked the support of the religious population that Khomeini still knew for sure.

Two other factors led to the fact that Khamenei has not yet been able to achieve the status of Khomeini: On the one hand, the office of prime minister was abolished in the course of the constitutional amendment, and the state president was given his powers and duties. This office had gained considerably in power because from now on the President represented Iran externally and was at the same time the executive power within. It was foreseeable that the country's politics in the future would depend on the cooperation between the president and the leaders. Second, Khamenei was not a charismatic like Khomeini. He found it difficult to excite the masses just by his presence.

Despite the relatively poor conditions, Khamenei assumed a powerful office with extensive to totalitarian powers. His share in the rule had lost respect and trust precisely because the decisive legitimation, namely the representative function of the greatest secular-religious capacity - the 12th Imam - was no longer given due to the weakening of the clerical requirements for the office. An opposition movement that could have been dangerous to Khamenei was not in sight.

Rafsanjani government (1989–1997)

In July 1989 Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni was elected to the office of Iranian President ( see: Presidential election in Iran 1989 ). Much of the country was in ruins during the initial phase of his tenure. The war had badly damaged the infrastructure and the economy. After the end of the war there was hope that the situation would improve.

Rafsanjani was an influential politician even before 1989. He has been in constant positions of power since the 1979 revolution. He was a member of the Revolutionary Council , President of Parliament until 1989 and belonged to the Khomeini clique. He probably had a considerable influence on the constitutional amendment and the increase in power of the state presidency, which he made a prerequisite for his candidacy. In the new role of head of government, Rafsanjani was determined to stimulate the economy and to make progress towards prosperity by liberalizing the market.

In the duo at the head of the Iranian state, Rafsanjani was clearly the more present alongside Khamenei. The President knew how to implement his economic policy and at the same time to embark on a new foreign policy course. His term of office was marked by many attempts at cautious rapprochement with the West. There were still anti-USA and anti-Israel demonstrations and rallies, but Rafsanjani defused Europe and stopped talking about exporting the revolution.

Rafsanjani’s efforts in this regard were undermined by several assassinations by members of the Iranian secret service on opposition members in exile abroad. The most important incident of this kind, which after the investigation brought German-Iranian relations to a standstill, was the so-called Mykonos assassination in Berlin in 1992 , in which three high-ranking Iranian exiles were killed. The Iranian leadership, and thus Rafsanjani himself, was shown to have known about the attack in advance.

The president also faced problems within Iran. The greatest resistance to Rafsanjani’s market liberalization came from the left-wing Islamist faction in parliament, which considered state dirigism to be the more appropriate answer to the economic situation in the post-war period. Already in Khomeini's time, the left-wing Islamists had often laid claim to the shaping of economic policy, but an escalation could always be prevented by Khomeini's mediation skills. This faction was also a thorn in the side of Khamenei, one more reason why he initially let Rafsanjani do his thing. This managed to remove all left-wing Islamists from government circles and important state offices by 1990.

Although Rafsanjani was able to implement his plans, he did not manage to revive the economy sustainably. Instead, he had clearly taken on himself by taking out foreign loans for investment purposes and mass importing consumer goods. In 1993 the Islamic Republic of Iran was practically insolvent. Rafsanjani had accumulated around US $ 25 billion in national debt within four years . In addition, the inflation rate has risen disproportionately since 1992 . There were civil unrest and protests.

In 1993, Rafsanjani was re-elected ( see: Presidential election in Iran 1993 ), but it became clear that he would have to reckon with significantly more resistance and interference from the top legal scholar in his second legislative term. Indeed, Khamenei came more and more to the fore. He publicly blamed Rafsanjani for the country's catastrophic situation and made far more extensive use of his power than he did at the beginning of Rafsanjani’s first term. So he gradually installed his followers in important offices over the head of the president, prevented laws and pushed Rafsanjani to the brink of insignificance in the last years of his term of office.

The economic situation worsened again in 1995 when US President Bill Clinton implemented a complete trade and investment boycott against Iran in the so-called Iran-Lybia Sanctions Act (ILSA), which continues to this day.

In the mid-1990s there was great dissatisfaction in Iranian society because of the failures of the government, the clashes between the spiritual leader and the president, and the country's international isolation. Voices grew louder calling for a reform of the inflexible system, which was often incapable of action because of the veto options for the Guardian Council and the highest legal scholars.

In the 1997 presidential election, Rafsanjani was not allowed to run again. The way was clear for political change.

Chātami government (1997-2005)

Mohammad Chātami

In 1997, the Guardian Council only allowed four of 238 applicants to run for president. All others were rejected on the grounds that they were incompatible with “Islamic principles”. The election was won, surprisingly for many, by Mohammad Chātami ( see: Presidential election in Iran 1997 ). He was Minister of Culture under Rafsanjani and resigned in 1992 in protest at the increasing restrictions on freedom of expression. Since then he has not been politically active. He was persuaded to run for office. His electoral success appeared particularly astonishing after the previous government's bitter struggle against the camp of moderate left-wing Islamists, to which Chātami was assigned.

Despite his political history, the Guardian Council had approved him and Chātami already hinted in the election campaign how important he thought reforms (for example in the state apparatus and on the subjects of human rights, oppression of women, censorship, foreign policy isolation). With these issues he hit the nerve of many young Iranians who were disappointed with their state. Chātami received 70% of the vote. He was supported by the Participation Front of Islamic Iran , founded in 1997 , which developed into the most important reform party in Iran.

In the western democracies in particular, it was hoped that the influence of Chātami would lead to a reform of the Iranian state and that the self-healing powers of the strengthening Iranian civil society and a democratization process were invoked . Indeed, at the beginning of his reign, his successes looked promising. He had pushed through a liberalization of the press landscape and thus helped the critical voices in the country to be heard more. In Iran, a critical discourse established itself about the achievements of the Islamic Revolution on the one hand and democracy, human rights and the rule of law on the other. When the conservative forces realized that Chātami could indeed develop into an integrating figure for political and social change, they introduced countermeasures.

In 1998 the VEVAK secret service carried out a series of murders and kidnappings of opposition and intellectuals. These attacks on the stability of the young government, known as chain killings , were the most violent outbreaks of violence since the waves of executions under Khomeini. Chātami condemned the murders sharply and did not allow himself to be dissuaded from his reform course. He not only had the religious hardliners against him, but also parliament . There the conservatives had a majority, prevented the reform laws of Chātami and in some cases introduced laws that were regressive from a reformist perspective.

With the parliamentary election on February 18, 2000 , the tide seemed to be turning in favor of Chātami; the reformers were now also the strongest faction in parliament. Chātami, on whose political agenda for the first time in the history of Iran after 1979 women's rights played an important role, now wanted u. a. loosen the rigorous gender segregation in Iranian society. However, the majority in parliament turned out to be worthless because the Guardian Council intervened in Chātami's political process.

Mohammad Chātami in December 2003

The results were sobering for supporters of the reform movement. From then on, the Guardian Council not only blocked almost all laws of the Chātami government, it also revoked a large number of laws that had already been passed and entered into force. Critical newspapers have been closed, journalists arrested, and the tone and dealings with critics of the regime have generally been tightened. The political style of the reformers was called secularism and opposed by the conservative side . Chātami resignedly stated that he had no more power than any other Iranian and thus expressed the spreading mood in Iran. Resignation and disinterest spread when it became clear that the spiritual leader Khamenei could ultimately direct the fate of the state.

In the presidential election in June 2001 , Chātami received 77% of the vote, despite the looming powerlessness. Nothing changed in the balance of power. Khamenei remained the strong man in the background who ensured that there could be no serious attempt to change the political system with its theocratic and democratic institutions in the long term. For this reason, the reform movement around Chātami is often only credited with a reform of the discourse that did not affect the institutional order of the country. The resignation led to ever lower voter turnouts. In the local elections in 2003, only 36% of those eligible to vote went to the polls. In the parliamentary elections a year later, a new low of 50.7% was reached. In the run-up to the elections, 2,500 (mainly reform-oriented) of the 8,000 applicants were excluded from the election by the Guardian Council. The Conservatives achieved a grandiose election victory. This is an indication that the supporters of the reform movement in particular have refrained from voting.

Chātami's second term ended in 2005. According to the Iranian constitution, he was not allowed to run again. His eight-year tenure had great success in foreign policy. Chātami was internationally respected and managed to relax relations with many states as well as with the EU . Foreign minister was Kamal Kharrazi for the entire eight years . Foreign policy setbacks were the inclusion of Iran in the axis of evil under George W. Bush , and the failure of the Swiss memorandum . In domestic politics, Chātami finally had to bow to the power of the spiritual leader Khamenei.

Ahmadinejad government (2005-2013)

2005 presidential campaign.
Mahmud Ahmadinejad in September 2007

In the 2005 presidential election came Rafsanjani again as the most promising candidate. Rafsanjani tried to convey the image of a cosmopolitan and reform-oriented president, which, in addition to his image as a pragmatist and man of action, also earned him the most votes. But with 21% it clearly missed the required absolute majority.

A novelty in the history of Iran came about: A runoff election between the two most successful candidates had to bring the decision. Tehran's mayor Mahmud Ahmadineschād , who was in office at the time of the election, received the second largest number of votes . He was a politically rather unknown figure, but had already attracted attention several times through radical statements against Israel and the "enemies of Islam". His election campaign was inconspicuous, he won his votes mainly in the slums of Tehran, whose residents he promised an improvement in living conditions, work and a future. There are rumors that there was election rigging.

The Iranian civil society, which had been highly praised in many Western newspapers just a few years earlier, could not be mobilized enough for the runoff election to prevent this development. Mahmud Ahmadineschād clearly won the runoff election with almost 62% of the vote. With him, the so-called fundamentalists , hardliners or radical Islamists entered the Tehran government. Most of his cabinet members are former members of the Revolutionary Guard. Their appearance - threats against Israel and hostile slogans against the US and Europe - drove Iran back into foreign policy isolation after slight rapprochement with the Western world under the Chātami government. The first foreign minister under Ahmadineschād was Manutschehr Mottaki . He was considered a follower of Larijani , a competitor of Ahmadinejad. Mottaki was released while visiting Senegal . His acting successor was the MIT graduate Ali Akbar Salehi . During his trip to Africa, Mottaki had allegedly tried to excuse illegal and secret arms deliveries that were supposed to be shipped to Nigeria and further to Gambia - against its own president - without the knowledge of the Tehran Foreign Office - but with the knowledge of influential circles close to the president . The Gambia had ended diplomatic relations with Iran, the ambassador in Lagos, Nigeria was exchanged, and one of two diplomats who had fled to the embassy was taken back on the plane.

Since Ahmadineeshad came into power, the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program has intensified and threatened to escalate several times. According to information from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran maintains several nuclear facilities that were not specified when Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . Since then, foreign countries have assumed that Iran wants to manufacture atomic bombs . The Iranian government repeatedly refers to the right to civilian use of nuclear energy as laid down in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty . Ahmadineschād said Israel's presence in Jerusalem must become history, which was initially incorrectly translated and spread as "Israel must be wiped off the map". This has fueled concerns that Iran will soon have nuclear weapons and threaten or attack Israel.

Map with the most important locations of the Iranian nuclear policy.

On December 15, 2006, the local elections and the elections to the Expert Council were the first elections after Ahmadinejad took office. Surprisingly, with a national average of 65%, an exceptionally high voter turnout was achieved, which ended the trend of recent years. Across Iran, the radical Islamists around Ahmadineschād suffered a defeat, although this time the Guardian Council again significantly restricted the number of candidates.

Not only in the city and local councils did the candidates from the presidential camp fare significantly worse than the conservatives and in many places also than the reformers. In Tehran's 15-member city council, the only representatives of the radicals are in 8th and 15th place. In other cities their results were even worse, even in the stronghold of Qom they could only win 30% of the votes. The election of the Council of Experts, which appoints the spiritual leader of Iran and can theoretically remove it again, also ended disappointingly for Ahmadineschād's candidate, his “spiritual foster father” Mesbah Yazdi . After a bitter election campaign, he was defeated by the surprise winner Rafsanjani and even only ended up in 6th place.

The clear election results and the high voter turnout were universally interpreted as a “memorandum” for Ahmadineschād and the uprising of Iranian society. The hope was fed, especially in Western newspapers, that the people of Iran would ultimately get rid of the "problem" of Ahmadinejad by means of the democratic elements of their constitution. It was considered rather unlikely that Khamenei would hinder such a development. Ahmadinejad's advances also seemed a little too radical for the spiritual leader.

Mass election event by Mir Hossein Mousavi

Ahmadinejad's reputation was subjected to another test on March 14, 2008 in the general election . Before the election, however, the Guardian Council already excluded the majority of the reformist candidates from the election, so that the clear victory of the conservative forces is not very meaningful. Since the reformers did not play an important role in the Iranian parliament, the faction within the conservative wing moved increasingly into the focus of Western media. The main focus here was on the differences of opinion between the camp around President Ahmadineschād and the MPs around Ali Larijani , the former Iranian negotiator in the nuclear negotiations. Larijani, who was one of the moderate conservatives, was after Mir Hossein Mousavi as a promising challenger to Ahmadinejad in the presidential election on June 12, 2009 .

The election sparked the greatest unrest since the Islamic Revolution . Ahmadineschād was declared the election winner on election evening with 62.63% of the vote. The expected close result did not materialize, which raised suspicions of election manipulation. The most promising opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who received only 33.75% of the vote, openly spoke of electoral fraud and called for new elections. As a result, his followers took to the streets in many major Iranian cities. The protests after the elections lasted for several months. Several people were killed in clashes between the demonstrators and the security forces. Despite the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations, the protests continued to increase, especially towards the end of 2009.

In March 2011, Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani succeeded former President Hashemi Rafsanjani as Chairman of the Expert Council . In April 2011, Khamenei intervened directly in government affairs and reversed a decision on a ministerial post for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ahmadineschād had accepted the resignation of the secret service minister Heydar Moslehi , but Khamenei recalled him to office.

In the parliamentary elections in March 2012 , observers expected a clash between supporters and opponents of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad within the conservative camp because of the reformers' failure to take part.

Rouhani government (2013–)

On April 11, 2013, Hassan Rouhani , who by Iranian standards is moderate and politically close to the former President Rafsanjani, announced his candidacy for the June 2013 presidential election . Among other things, he expressed his intention to introduce a civil rights charter, to rebuild the economy and to improve cooperation with the world community, in particular to overcome the isolation of Iran and the sanctions that led to a devastating economic crisis due to the dispute over the Iranian nuclear program . During the election campaign, Rouhani vigorously defended his approach as chief negotiator and insisted in a TV interview that the nuclear program had never been halted under his leadership of the negotiations, and that the expansion of the Iranian nuclear program had been successfully advanced. "Prudence and hope" is the motto of the government he wants to form. According to preliminary information from the Interior Ministry, Rouhani won the election in the first round with 18,613,329 votes and a rate of 50.71 percent. In August 2013, Rouhani nominated the conservative cleric Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi as Minister of Justice.

Shortly before a visit by Rouhani to the UN General Assembly in New York on September 25, 2013, he and the highest religious and political leader Ali Khamenei announced that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard should stay out of politics in the future. The Guard maintains close ties to Rouhani's predecessor Ahmadineschād and had a corresponding influence on his politics during his presidency. In addition, around a dozen political prisoners were released early from prison on September 18, 2013. a. the human rights activist Nasrin Sotudeh . Some observers saw this as Rouhani's first attempt to implement his election promise to allow more political freedoms in Iran in the future, but at the same time as a signal that Iran is hoping to ease relations with Western countries. Indeed, Rouhani succeeded in opening direct talks between the United States and Iran over the nuclear dispute. Others, like Human Rights Watch , welcomed the releases, but saw them as little more than a symbolic gesture, given that hundreds of political prisoners were still in Iranian prisons. The regime must also ensure that those released are not again targeted by the security forces and the judiciary.

Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi sharply criticized President Hassan Rouhani's human rights record and accused the government of lying about the release of political prisoners. None of their expectations are met. According to Ebadi, Rohani may have “the reputation of a moderate reformer”, but so far has been sending the “wrong signals” with regard to human rights. Ebadi and Amnesty International also point to the sharp rise in the number of executions to a record level since Rouhani took office.

Although Rouhani did not display the excessive anti-Israel rhetoric of his predecessor, he did not change the content. On the occasion of al-Quds Day in 2014, he declared that there could be no diplomatic way out for the Palestinians, only that of resistance: “What the Zionists are doing in Gaza is an inhuman genocide , so the Islamic world today must unite its hatred and declare resistance to Israel. ”In a panel discussion at the 44th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum , he also denied the WEF founder Klaus Schwab's question whether he was also seeking friendly relations with Israel, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has not yet recognized. His emphasis on the peaceful use of nuclear power and his offer to mediate in the Syrian civil war , in which Iran is involved on the side of Bashar al-Assad , attracted international attention in mid-September 2013. Critical voices noted that Rouhani was pretending "as if he were a neutral observer" even though Iran has long been a war party.

timeline

Chronicle 1979–1989
1979
1978-1979 Islamic Revolution .
March 31 Referendum on the constitution.
April 1st Proclamation of the Islamic Republic of Iran . Mehdi Bāzargān becomes the first Prime Minister. Ruhollah Khomeini becomes Supreme Legal Scholar (Rahbar).
5th of May Foundation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard .
November 4th The hostage-taking of Tehran begins .
1980
January 25th Abu l-Hasan Banisadr is elected first president.
April, 30th The Iranian Embassy in London was held hostage by Iraqis.
August 11th Mohammad Ali Rajai becomes the new Prime Minister.
September 22 The Iraq begins the first Gulf War .
1981
24th July Presidential election in July 1981 : Mohammad Ali Rajāʾi becomes President. The new Prime Minister is Mohammed Jawad Bahonar .
August 30th Both Rajāʾi and Bahonar are killed in an attack.
September 2nd Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani becomes the new Prime Minister.
October 2nd Presidential election in October 1981 : Seyyed Ali Chāmene'i becomes new President. Mir Hossein Mousavi becomes the new Prime Minister.
1983
1983 Iraq uses tabun and mustard gas .
November 8th Iran is suing the UN Security Council against the use of chemical weapons.
1985
August 16 1985 presidential election .
1986
October The Iran-Contra affair is exposed.
1988
February Khomeini founds the Arbitration Council in response to the dispute between Parliament and the Guardian Council .
July 18th Khomeini signs the ceasefire agreement. The war with Iraq is over.
1989
14th of February Khomeini declares the Indian - British author Salman Rushdie to be outlawed .
March, 20th Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri falls out with Khomeini and is deposed as his successor.
3rd of June Khomeini dies. The previous President Seyyed Ali Chāmene'i will be his successor.
July 28th Constitutional revision. The office of the state president will be strengthened, that of the prime minister will be abolished and the requirements for the office of spiritual leader will be reduced.
Chronicle 1989–2009
1989
July 28th 1989 presidential election . Ali Akbar Hāschemi Rafsanjāni becomes the new president.
1992
10th of April Parliamentary election 1992 .
17th of September Mykonos attack in Berlin.
1993
June 11th 1993 presidential election . Rafsanjani is confirmed in office.
1995
20th of April Bill Clinton announces a total trade and investment boycott against Iran.
1997
May 22 1997 presidential election . The reformer Mohammad Chātami becomes the new president.
1998
November Assassinations of opposition and intellectuals begin ( chain killings ).
2000
February 18 The reformers won the 2000 parliamentary elections .
2001
8th June In the 2001 presidential elections , Chātami was re-elected by a large majority.
2003
October 10th Shirin Ebadi receives the Nobel Peace Prize .
2004
May 7th In the 2004 parliamentary elections , the conservative forces won a clear victory.
2005
17th of June In the 2005 presidential election , there is no winner. Rafsanjani and Mahmoud Ahmadineschād have to stand in the first runoff election in Iranian history.
June 24th Ahmadinejad wins the runoff election and becomes the new President of Iran.
October 26th Ahmadineschād gives a speech in which he demands that the "occupation regime in Jerusalem" be history.
2006
January The nuclear facilities sealed by the IAEA are put back into operation and the nuclear dispute escalates.
15th December The local elections bring Ahmadinejad's camp a bitter defeat.
2008
the 14th of March The 2008 parliamentary elections are won by the conservatives.
2009
June 12 2009 presidential election .
June Protests after the elections .
2012
2nd March Calls for boycotts and reformers not taking part in the 2012 general election .

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Michael Ploetz, Tim Szatkowski: Files on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1979. Vol. II: July 1 to December 31, 1979. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2010, p. 1873.
  2. Amir Taheri: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution. Hamburg 1985, p. 390.
  3. I'm afraid we'll go to hell . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1989, pp. 160-168 ( online - February 27, 1989 , here p. 160).
  4. I'm afraid we'll go to hell . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1989, pp. 160-168 ( online - February 27, 1989 , here p. 167).
  5. Christopher de Bellaigue: In the rose garden of the martyrs. Munich 2006, p. 188.
  6. Translation of Ayatollah Khomeini Letter Dismissing Montazeri ( Memento from July 29, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (English)
  7. I'm afraid we'll go to hell . In: Der Spiegel . No. 9 , 1989, pp. 160-168 ( online - February 27, 1989 , here p. 165).
  8. Helene Mutschler: Quiet change or standstill?
  9. A cleric without charisma ( Memento from November 29, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  10. a b Wilfried Buchta: A quarter of a century Islamic Republic of Iran. P. 13.
  11. Katajun Amirpur / Reinhard Witzke: Schauplatz Iran. Freiburg im Breisgau 2004, p. 103f.
  12. Wilfried Buchta: A quarter of a century Islamic Republic of Iran. P. 12.
  13. Christopher Lockwood: Calls for reform grow louder as Iran goes to polls ; Electronic Telegraph No. 729, May 24, 1997 (English)
  14. Michael Rubin : Iran's Myth of Moderation ( Memento from June 18, 2009 in the Internet Archive ); March 18, 2002. (English)
  15. ^ Johannes Reissner: Stability Analysis Iran; In: Sigrid Faath (Ed.): Stability Problems of Central States ; Hamburg 2003
  16. Katajun Amirpur: Is there still a reform process in Iran? P. 21.
  17. Michael Rubin : WHAT ARE IRAN'S DOMESTIC PRIORITIES? ( Memento of April 23, 2007 in the Internet Archive ); MERIA Journal Vol. 6, No. 2; June 2002 (english)
  18. Matthias Nass: The agony of not voting . In: Die Zeit of February 26, 2004
  19. Naika Foroutan: Iran after the elections - the end of reforms from above
  20. ^ Andreas Jacobs: The presidential elections in Iran. In: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Ed.): Analyzes and Arguments , No. 21/2005 PDF ( Memento from September 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  21. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Relations between the EU and the Islamic Republic of Iran .
  22. ^ Reformers openly speak of fraud. In: Spiegel Online . June 19, 2005.
  23. ^ Heinrich Böll Foundation , Bahman Nirumand , December 2010: Iran Report. Gambia breaks off relations with Iran .
  24. Katajun Amirpur: The Iranian key phrase . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung of March 15, 2008, p. 15.
  25. ^ Mariella Ourghi : Agitator of the last fight. In: Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 26, 2008.
  26. Bahman Nirumand : Great defeat for radical Islamists. In: Heinrich Böll Foundation (Ed.): Iran Report, No. 01/2007, p. 3f.
  27. ^ Defeat for radicals around Ahmadinejad (tagesschau.de archive) on www.tagesschau.de
  28. ^ Memorandum for Ahmadinejad's hardliners on www.spiegel-online.de
  29. Ulrich Ladurner : Swelling battle howls. In: The time. No. 4/2007 of January 18, 2007
  30. Dieter Bednarz: The Ahmadinejad Principle . In: Der Spiegel . No. 13 , 2008, p. 122-123 ( online - March 22, 2008 ).
  31. Bahman Nirumand : Larijani: West must take the message of the Iranian people seriously. In: Heinrich Böll Foundation (Ed.): Iran Report. No. 04/2008, p. 4.
  32. ^ Protests in Iran are expanding, Deutsche Welle dated December 28, 2009 ( Memento dated December 31, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  33. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6969094.ece
  34. Bahman Nirumand : Deposed secret service minister remains in office. In: Heinrich Böll Foundation (Ed.): Iran Report. No. 05/211, p. 3f.
  35. ↑ Choice of fate for Ahmadinejad . In: Der Spiegel . No. 2 , 2012 ( online - January 9, 2012 , 76).
  36. TV interview with Rouhani during the election campaign ( memento of July 2, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) (accessed on February 24, 2014).
  37. The Iranian President Rouhani asks: “We should have stopped the nuclear program?” ( Memento from April 28, 2015 in the Internet Archive ), From Tunis to Tehran (Jungle World Blog), August 7, 2013.
  38. ^ After Rohani's Election: How Washington Should Engage Iran ( Memento of February 21, 2015 in the Internet Archive ), goingtotehran.com (book blog), June 18, 2013, accessed on February 24, 2014.
  39. presstv.ir Rohani becomes Iran's new President (accessed June 15, 2013)
  40. president.ir - cf. khodnevis.org ( Memento from December 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) & irannewsupdate.com ( Memento from December 3, 2013 in the Internet Archive )
  41. Thomas Pany: The slow end of the enemy image Iran? . Telepolis, September 19, 2013, accessed the following day.
  42. Nina Fargahi: Tehran releases political prisoners . NZZ, September 19, 2013, accessed the following day.
  43. ^ President Rohani: Iran releases prominent regime critics . Spiegel Online, September 19, 2013, accessed September 20, 2013
  44. sueddeutsche.de Rohani declares no use of the atomic bomb (accessed on September 20, 2013)
  45. Iran frees political prisoners ahead of Hassan Rouhani's UN visit , The Guardian, September 18, 2013.
  46. ^ Nobel laureate Ebadi criticizes the human rights situation in Iran , Deutsche Welle, December 9, 2013.
  47. ^ Nobel laureate Ebadi criticizes Rouhani and Westen , orf.at, November 5, 2013.
  48. Ebadi criticizes Rohani's Rights Record Radio Free Europe , November 6, 2013.
  49. IRAN: President Rouhani must deliver on human rights promises ( Memento of January 3, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Amnesty International, November 25, 2013.
  50. See UN report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran of October 23, 2014; accessed November 2, 2014, p. 4, Fig. 1. ( Memento from March 22, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 784 kB)
  51. a b spiegel.de Gaza conflict: Millions of Iranians demonstrate against Israel (accessed on July 27, 2014)
  52. The Standard: Iran advertises, Israel warns
  53. Rohani offers himself as a mediator ( Memento from September 21, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) In: Tagesschau , September 20, 2013.
  54. Reinhard Baumgarten: Moderate in tone, tough in the matter ( Memento from August 20, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) In: Tagesschau , September 18, 2013.
  55. ^ Rohani wants to mediate in the Syria conflict , Spiegel Online , September 20, 2013.