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  WestLB AG
Country GermanyGermany Germany
Seat Dusseldorf
legal form Corporation
Bank code 300 500 00
Association Rheinischer Sparkassen- und Giroverband , Düsseldorf and Sparkassenverband Westfalen-Lippe , Münster
Business data 2011
Total assets EUR 167.9 billion
Employee 4,188
Board Dietrich Voigtländer (Chairman), Hubert Beckmann (Deputy Chairman), Thomas Groß, Werner Taiber
WestLB headquarters in Düsseldorf, Herzogstrasse 15
Building Friedrichstrasse 62–80

The WestLB AG was an international Landesbank with headquarters in Dusseldorf , as bank all banking transactions could operate. Her customer focus was on supporting and advising medium-sized and large companies and institutional investors , which she accompanied worldwide. It also acted as the giro center for the savings banks and house bank for the state of North Rhine-Westphalia .

As of June 30, 2012, WestLB was split into three parts, with Portigon AG becoming WestLB's legal successor.


Founding phase from 1832

Predecessor institutions were the Provinzial-Hülfskasse Westfalen in Münster , founded on January 1, 1832, and the Rheinische Provinzial-Hülfskasse in Cologne , established on February 7, 1854 , whose registered office was relocated from Cologne to Düsseldorf on July 10, 1877. There the bank had been using business premises in the Provinzial-Ständehaus since 1881 . These rooms were no longer sufficient for the Provinzialbank, so that in 1895 they had the former official residence of the governor in Friedrichstrasse / Fürstenwall converted into a commercial building and expanded with an extension on Fürstenwall at construction costs of 231,000 marks . In February 1896 there were 106 savings banks with the Landesbank.

It had previously received a new statute on February 17, 1888 and was now called the "Landesbank der Rheinprovinz". Its Westphalian counterpart was renamed "Landesbank der Provinz Westfalen" in 1890. On June 20, 1914, the Rheinisch-Westfälische Sparkassentag in Cologne decided to use the Landesbank der Rheinprovinz instead of the Stadtsparkasse Köln as a giro center for the savings banks. Due to the German banking crisis from 1931, the largest of the Landesbanken, the Landesbank of the Rhine Province , was on the verge of collapse. The latter had refinanced long-term municipal loans through short-term investments by the savings banks and in July 1931 had got into a liquidity crisis. She had to stop her payments on August 7, 1931. In August 1931, a branch of the Deutsche Girozentrale in Cologne took over the coordination of the savings bank giro traffic. A support of the Reichsbank with a line of 200 million RM eliminated the liquidity problems of the Landesbank.

From it emerged on April 1, 1935 the "Rheinische Girozentrale und Provinzialbank" and on October 1, 1943 the "Landesbank für Westfalen (Girozentrale)" (after the merger between the Landesbank and the Westphalian Pfandbriefamt). Long-standing and well-known chairman of the Rheinische Girozentrale was Fritz Butschkau in 1945 , who held this position until his retirement in June 1968. The Koblenz branch of the "Rheinische Girozentrale und Provinzialbank" was transferred to LRP Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz in April 1958 . In order to bundle the Landesbank activities in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia - as in other federal states - in a single state bank, the "Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale" (WestLB) was created on January 1, 1969 by merger , which, like its predecessor institutes, is an institution under public law was. Due to the merger, it had two headquarters in Düsseldorf and Münster; it also operated branches in Cologne, Dortmund ( WestLB Dortmund ), Bielefeld and Essen. Their main tasks consisted of the function of a Landesbank as the house bank of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and a giro center with the tasks of a savings bank central bank . From 1969, architect Harald Deilmann created representative, terraced bank buildings in corporate design for the main branches, then also for the domestic branches and for some foreign branches . In Düsseldorf, the bank buildings were laid out from 1974 onwards around the historic bank building as a neighboring building; today they are called "Herzogterrassen". After the Provinzial Rheinland moved in May 1995, WestLB acquired its building at Friedrichstrasse 56-60 in order to use it for its own purposes.

Merger and expansion phase from 1969

From January 1969, under its first chairman, Ludwig Poullain , WestLB pursued an expansion policy that went beyond its Landesbank and central giro function and opened up new business areas such as industrial credit , industrial holdings and international business. Industrial financing was very important to WestLB, as the highly industrialized state of North Rhine-Westphalia was interested in a secure and optimal loan supply for companies. This made WestLB the most important economic and industrial policy instrument of the state government, which was represented on the bank's supervisory board by its respective finance minister. The acquisition of industrial holdings began in the year WestLB was founded. In December 1969 she acquired shares in Preussag AG with an initial stake of 26%, followed by Beton- und Monierbau (October 1972/8%), Ruhrkohle AG (1984), Gerresheimer Glashütte (1985), Deutsche Babcock (1987), Friedrich Krupp AG (1988), LTU (1989), Horten AG (1990), Hoesch AG (1991), Harpener (1992) or Gildemeister AG (November 1995/12%). These bank holdings secured the state indirect influence on central economic sectors and led to a changed location and industrial policy in North Rhine-Westphalia.

The Bank supported structural change by bringing in corporate crises guessed companies assisted (Gildemeister, German Babcock, Gerresheimer Glas or hoarding) or mergers forced. Friedel Neuber let the steel company Hoesch disappear under the roof of Krupp (September 1992), then merged Krupp with Thyssen (March 1999) and merged the energy companies RWE and VEW (July 2000). In May 1994 he arranged for Metro to take over Horten. Between 1985 and 1991 the bank had more than doubled its shareholding, from 1.75 to 4.36 billion DM. There were also undesirable developments. In 1977, when 23% of WestLB stake strength concrete and Monierbau AG began a corporate crisis, you gave the bank in October 1978 on a capital increase by issue of shares (89 million DM) and (via a guarantee from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia DM 70 million) and a federal guarantee (50 million DM) additional funds totaling 209 million, some of which were used to repay WestLB loans. However, this did not overcome the crisis. This crisis remained largely hidden from creditors and shareholders. The company went bankrupt in September 1979, which brought WestLB a loss of DM 80 million. In the foreign business that accompanied the export / import of North Rhine-Westphalian medium-sized companies, losses of 270 million DM were previously incurred in foreign exchange trading - parallel to the Herstatt Bank and other banks - in 1974. This foreign business was supported by foreign branches. From 1972 branches or subsidiaries were founded abroad, for example in Luxembourg in 1972 , in London in 1973 and in New York City in 1975 . In 1986 WestLB was represented in 13 locations worldwide: Paris , Zurich , Moscow , Rio de Janeiro , Toronto , Hong Kong , Tokyo , Beijing , Melbourne and Beirut . This made the bank the largest and most internationally oriented Landesbank in Germany. For other Landesbanken it developed into a strategic role model, which was expressed, among other things, by the fact that other Landesbanken included the ending "LB" in their names.

Growing company size

WestLB's participation in LTU enabled the bank to enter the tourism sector by enabling LTU to take over the Thomas Cook Group in October 1992 . This was followed in November 1992 by the pool company Walter Kahn KG a minority stake in the tourism group TUI and in December 1993 the takeover of the loss-making Cologne-Düsseldorf Deutsche Rheinschiffahrt with the aim of restructuring .

In 1995, WestLB had  risen to become the third largest bank in Germany as a result of years of expansive growth policy - measured in terms of total assets :

Credit institution Balance sheet total 1995
in billion DM
Deutsche Bank AG 721.655
Dresdner Bank AG 484,482
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 428.622
Commerzbank AG 404.167
Bayerische Vereinsbank AG 359,543
  • Source: Richard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled , 1999, p. 82

With this, WestLB had reached a size that meant serious competition for the large private banks .

An EU directive of December 1989 also forced German credit institutions to increase their equity . In order to be able to maintain the existing business volume , the federal states had to increase the equity ratio of their Landesbanken by June 1993 from 5.6% to 8%. The deficit state budgets failed as a source, so that in December 1991 the state of North Rhine-Westphalia increased the bank capital with the state's own housing development agency (Wfa) through contributions in kind with a nominal value of 24.9 billion DM and thus WestLB by 2.5 billion DM. DM overcapitalized. As a result, WestLB now had a solvency ratio of 8.7% with eligible equity capital of around EUR 2 billion, giving the bank credit potential of DM 31 billion.

This practice of contributions in kind - also in other federal states - met with growing criticism from German private banks, who saw this as a competitive advantage for the Landesbanken. The Federal Association of German Banks (BdB) therefore intervened in March 1993 with the EU in Brussels, whose competition commission was not very familiar with the special situation of the German banking system at the time. This was followed by political pressure, which WestLB gave in by increasing the original interest rate on the contribution in kind from 0.6% to 5.5%. In 1995 the issue of Anstaltslast and guarantor liability was taken up by the EU Competition Commissioner and the contribution in kind was identified as state aid that distorted competition ; the main investigation began in October 1997. By decision of July 8, 1999, the Commission classified the contribution in kind as unlawful State aid which had to be returned.

Conversion of WestLB to WestLB AG

In March 2003 the European Court of Justice declared this Commission decision null and void , but at the same time it encouraged the Commission to take a new and formally correct decision. In addition, at the same time, the European umbrella association of the national associations of the private banking industry had submitted a complaint to the EU Commission that the guarantor liability for public-law credit institutions, which had been practiced for years, was to be regarded as state aid and not compatible with European competition law. The EU Commission agreed with this view. In order to avoid years of legal dispute in both proceedings, an out-of-court compromise was reached in July 2001 under the name " Brussels Concordance ", according to which, among other things, guarantor liability was to be generally abolished by 2005. WestLB had meanwhile acted and in November 2000 announced the split into "WestLB AG" as the commercial bank and a development bank under the name "NRW.Bank". Due to the legal form, commercial banking activities were no longer connected with the criticized institutional burden and guarantor liability. In January 2001 the EU Commission informed the federal government that Anstaltslast and guarantor liability were to be assessed as aid.

As a result, with effect from August 30, 2002, Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale (previously WestLB) was split up into Landesbank NRW (today: NRW.BANK ) and WestLB AG . The NRW.BANK operates since then as public institution "public mission activities" for North Rhine-Westphalia (for example, promotional loans). The WestLB AG operate in the legal form of joint-stock company and elimination of guarantor liability and institutional liability competitive business called as a bank and a central bank of the Rhine and the Westphalian savings banks . As a compensation for the savings bank associations as major co-owners, the stable income business areas Landesbausparkasse as well as investments in the Rheinische and Westfälische Provinzialversicherung were separated from WestLB and transferred to them. In April 2002 WestLB transferred its private banking with over 1,000 customers to Merck Finck Privatbankiers . With the spin-off of the development bank activities , the Landesbausparkasse and the Provinzialversicherung in August 2002, WestLB lost stable income (“ cash cows ”), which it tried to offset with capital market transactions.

Under Jürgen Sengera , investment banking was promoted from September 2001 onwards, for which the US investment banker Robin Saunders was responsible, particularly in the London branch . After a number of successful, large-volume transactions, in 1999 she acquired the British electrical appliance rental company Boxclever , which had emerged from the merger of two companies and in December 1999 received loans from the bank totaling DM 1.35 billion. The bank's board of directors disregarded a negative vote from its own credit bureau. Growing economic problems meant that in May 2003 the loans had to be classified as “acute risk of default”. A special audit by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) from May 2003 revealed gross deficiencies in the bank's risk management and an additional provision of EUR 120 million, which led to Sengara's resignation in July 2003. According to the BaFin report , the members of the board of directors had dispensed with traditional credit checking methods and thus violated Section 18 of the German Banking Act. In February 2004 the bank announced a loss of 2.3 billion euros in the previous financial year, which was largely made up of provisions. The bank had to post a loss of 427 million euros at Boxclever after a sale to the financial investor Fortress Investment Group in 2004 .

In addition, in 2004, as part of a compromise with the Federal Association of German Banks in the Wfa dispute, WestLB made a compensation payment of 1.4 billion euros to the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. In return, the country carried out a capital increase of 1.5 billion euros at the bank.

Accumulation of Risks

In January 2004 Thomas R. Fischer took over the chairmanship and began to realign the business model . In general, after the guarantor liability ceased to exist, Landesbanken had difficulties opening up new markets beyond their Landesbank and central giro function. On the one hand, the function as the house bank of the federal states played only a minor role at the Landesbanken; on the other hand, they largely held back from traditional savings bank markets. The Landesbanken increasingly became internationally operating universal banks that were active in industrial, foreign, private equity and later capital market / investment banking. Almost all Landesbanken - including large banks and some large savings banks - had risky exposure to US subprime loans on the international capital market , including WestLB. In August 2007, the WestLB Group's securities portfolio in the US subprime sector totaled 1.25 billion euros, when 98% of the often incorrectly rated paper still had at least an A rating from the US rating agencies . The escalating banking and financial crisis led globally to enormous losses in value (also) at banks. In January 2008, WestLB had to announce a loss of 1 billion euros.

In April 2007, it was surprisingly announced that WestLB was its largest shareholder with a 14% stake in DaimlerChrysler . The reason, however, was that the shares were only "parked" for others at the bank as part of the controversial dividend stripping . Only a few days after the bank was able to present a positive pre-tax result of EUR 1.0 billion for 2006, the public was informed on April 10, 2007 of high losses in proprietary trading in shares. As of April 2007, WestLB's proprietary trading resulted in losses of 604 million euros. The reason for this was the failed speculation on price differences between ordinary and preference shares of the same issuer . In July 2007, Fischer was dismissed from the board. Alexander Stuhlmann became his successor in the chairmanship .

High burdens from bad investments

In the third quarterly report of 2007, the bank reported still manageable burdens from the beginning global financial crisis amounting to 355 million euros. In February 2008, however, the owners had to decide on extensive rescue measures on a much larger scale. The bank outsourced risky securities valued at 23 billion euros to a newly established special purpose vehicle under the working title of “Phoenix” outside the bank. As a result, the bank freed itself from on-balance sheet burdens from this portfolio . The special purpose vehicle was financed by guarantees from the owners to the amount of 5 billion euros, with the first 2 billion being borne by the state of North Rhine-Westphalia alone, proportionately and any additional charges. The EU Commission assessed this measure as restructuring aid and initiated an investigation. In May 2009, a permit was granted, which, however, was linked to strict restructuring requirements; WestLB had to give up its second headquarters in Münster at the end of 2009.

The 2007 financial year ended with a loss of 1.6 billion euros for the bank. The bank announced a further reduction of 1,300 to 1,500 jobs. It was also decided to focus strictly on the original tasks of a regional commercial bank as part of the savings bank organization . Alexander Stuhlmann left the bank at the end of April 2008 (his position was only planned for one year from the start). His successor as chairman of the board was Heinz Hilgert . On December 13, 2008, after a meeting of the supervisory board, it was announced that the bank was negotiating state guarantees with BaFin . On May 18, 2009, Heinz Hilgert resigned from the board. He justified this step, which was surprising for the public and the employees, with a lack of support from the owners in securing the bank's future.

Finding a solution and splitting up

Merger and sales attempts

Like other Landesbanks, WestLB has been committed to reorganizing the German Landesbanken landscape since the beginning of the financial market crisis. In 2007 there were negotiations with the Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and with the Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen (Helaba), both of which were unsuccessful. After a called master plan resolution of the "Association head" of the savings banks associations in the DSGV of 10 November 2008, the SME business in WestLB was one of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and BayernLB merged bank will be slammed, while the capital market business in one of Helaba and Deka Bank fused Institute should be brought in. These discussions were without result.

In June 2010, the SoFFin bank rescue fund commissioned the former CDU politician and lawyer Friedrich Merz to initiate a process for selling WestLB to a private buyer. In addition, the investment bank Morgan Stanley was looking for buyers on behalf of WestLB . Due to the poor market situation, observers did not expect a sale of WestLB as a whole. In November 2010, relevant talks with BayernLB failed. Merz still hoped in April 2011 to have time for a purchase agreement by the end of August 2011. The high fee awarded to Merz (5000 euros per day) and other lawyers caused criticism in several media.

Establishing a "bad bank"

In November 2009, WestLB was the first German bank to transfer risky securities to a so-called bad bank called “ Erste Abwicklungsanstalt ” (EAA) on the basis of new legal options for German credit institutions ( Financial Market Stabilization Act ) . Securities with a volume of 77 billion euros with the Phoenix portfolio from 2008, the balance sheet date 31 December 2009, the carrying amount transferred. The EU again considered the transaction to be illegal aid, as the assessment was not based on actual economic value. The bank, on the other hand, considered that it had complied with all the rules, especially as previous aid problems had been taken into account.

EU requirements

The EU Commission approved the risk shield for WestLB in May 2009, but WestLB had to reduce its total assets and risk-weighted assets by 50% each, close branches at home and abroad and sell holdings. At the end of 2009, WestLB will close its Münster, Bielefeld and Dortmund locations as a result of EU requirements; Cologne followed in July 2010. In November 2010, EU Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia stated that the assets transferred to the Bad Bank were overvalued. The Commission put the amount of aid at EUR 3.4 billion. Brussels sees the state aid measures as an irresponsible destruction of taxpayers' money and a distortion of competition. The EU Commission demanded a new restructuring plan with very strict conditions. A new owner would have to be found by 2011 and the balance sheet total would have to be halved by then.

The WestLB board of directors emphasized, however, that no state aid had been received during the transfer, and this was proven by corresponding calculations. The EU Commission feared that (similar to Hypo Real Estate ) more and more state aid would be needed to save the bank from collapse, as it did not have a viable business model . After the failure of the merger talks with BayernLB on November 4, 2010, Competition Commissioner Joaquín Almunia said: “The Commission has serious doubts that the current restructuring plan is suitable for restructuring the bank.” Almunia did not want to be on the date for the change of owner prescribed by the Commission shake ("The time is running"). The decision about this should be made as soon as possible.

North Rhine-Westphalia's Finance Minister Walter-Borjans emphasized that closing WestLB would cost billions. On June 24, 2011, it was announced that the owners wanted to liquidate the bank. The EU Commission approved this wind-up plan in December 2011.

Splitting up

On March 22, 2012, a restructuring plan was announced at the balance sheet press conference, in the implementation of which WestLB was split into three parts on June 30, 2012:

  • The Portigon AG is the legal successor of WestLB. She has under the bank no. 100437 has a full banking license as a deposit bank and provides services for banks, in particular portfolio control and management, credit analysis, treasury, finance and controlling, risk controlling, credit administration, IT services and various corporate center functions. According to EU requirements, the company must be sold or liquidated by the end of 2016 at the latest.
  • The first EAA (EAA) was founded in December 2009, took over in two stages assets and liabilities of WestLB AG and will go for the value-friendly as possible liquidation of these positions to the 2027th It is also known colloquially as a bad bank . The subsidiary WestImmo was also transferred to the EAA.
  • A so-called "Verbundbank NRW" continues business with the North Rhine-Westphalian savings banks, medium-sized corporate customers and municipalities under the umbrella of Frankfurter Helaba . On September 1, 2012, Helaba began operating in the S-Group and corporate customer business at the Düsseldorf location. The transfer of the "Group Bank NRW" to Helaba was with the commercial register - registration completed on 17 September 2012 found. At the same time, the last business areas were payment transactions and securities custody business from the former WestLB to Helaba. As part of the transaction, Helaba took over a business volume of more than EUR 40 billion and 450 employees from the former WestLB.

It is planned to reduce the number of employees at Portigon AG from 4,500 to 1,500 in 2016. According to the Handelsblatt , aid from owners and the federal government in the period from 2002 to 2012 totaled 21 billion euros.

Key figures

identification number 2009 2010 2011
Balance sheet total (billion €) 242.3 191.5 167.9
Number of employees 5,214 4,712 4,188

Ownership structure

Were shareholders of WestLB AG


Members of the Management Board on June 30, 2012

CEO over time

See also

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. a b Master data of the credit institute at the Deutsche Bundesbank
  2. a b c d WestLB AG, balance sheet press conference, financial information  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.westlb.de  
  3. ^ Architects and Engineers Association Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf and its buildings , 1904, p. 186
  4. Helmuth Poensgen , Die Landesbank der Rheinprovinz , in: Staats- und socialwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Issue 155, 1910, p. 181
  5. Hans Pohl, Die Rheinischen Sparkassen , 2001, p. 112
  6. Hans Pohl, Die Rheinischen Sparkassen , 2001, p. 137
  7. Hans Pohl, Die Rheinischen Sparkassen , 2001, p. 154
  8. ^ Winfried Reimann, Public Banks in Time , 1992, p. 201
  9. Ludwig Poullain, Activity Report , 1979, p. 84
  10. Daniel Seikel, The Struggle for Public Law Banks , 2013, p. 117
  11. ^ Richard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled , 1999, p. 127
  12. ^ Daniel Seikel, The Struggle for Public Law Banks , 2013, p. 118
  13. Monopoly with hoarding packages . In: Der Spiegel . No. 22 , 1994, pp. 91 ( online ).
  14. A banker is shopping . In: Die Zeit , No. 31/1992
  15. Daniel Seikel, The Struggle for Banks under Public Law , 2013, p. 117, FN 34
  16. Growing distrust . In: Der Spiegel . No. 25 , 1992, pp. 104 f . ( online ).
  17. WestLB builds tourism holding . In: Der Spiegel . No. 42 , 1992 ( online ).
  18. Directive 89/647 / EEC of December 18, 1989, ABl. L 386/14 (PDF)
  19. WestLB Annual Report 2002 pp. 56 and 57
  20. Karel Van Miert : Market, Power, Competition , 2000, p. 105
  21. ^ Daniel Seikel, The Struggle for Public Law Banks , 2013, p. 144
  22. ^ European Court of Justice, judgment of March 6, 2003, Az .: CJE / 03/13
  23. ^ Daniel Seikel, The Struggle for Public Law Banks , 2013, p. 162
  24. WestLB Annual Report 2002. p. 4
  25. Wolfgang Köhler, Wall Street Panik: Banks Out of Control , 2008, p. 150
  26. WestLB press release of May 23, 2003  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.westlb.de  
  27. Manager-Magazin from July 14, 2003 "Auditors track down serious errors"
  28. WestLB Annual Report 2004.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF) pp. 4 and 5@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.westlb.de  
  29. Harald Noack, Mechthild Schrooten: The future of the Landesbanken - between consolidation and a new business model . (PDF) Friedrich Ebert Foundation , September 2009, p. 9
  30. Harald Noack / Mechthild Schrooten: The future of the Landesbanken - between consolidation and a new business model . (PDF) Friedrich Ebert Foundation , September 2009, p. 23
  31. Banking Crisis: WestLB Reports Billion Euro Loss as German Stocks Plunge . Spiegel Online INTERNATIONAL, January 21, 2008
  32. ^ Alan N. Peachey: Great Financial Disasters Of Our Time . 2011, p. 398
  33. WestLb press release of April 10, 2007 "WestLB is promoting the investigation of rule violations in retail" ( Memento of October 9, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  34. WestLB press release from July 26, 2007 "Alexander Stuhlmann is the new CEO of WestLB AG" ( Memento from August 6, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
  35. WestLB press release of December 6, 2007 "WestLB earnings burdened by capital market crisis - operationally still on course" ( Memento of February 12, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
  36. WestLB press release dated February 8, 2008 "WestLB AG owners decide on extensive risk protection" ( Memento of February 4, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  37. WestLB press release of May 12, 2008 "European Commission confirms WestLB's restructuring plan" ( Memento of May 21, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  38. "Focus" of September 22, 2009: "WestLB gives up second headquarters in Münster"
  39. WestLB Annual Report 2007 ( Memento of October 31, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF)
  40. WestLB press release of April 30, 2008 "WestLB says goodbye to CEO Alexander Stuhlmann"  ( page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.westlb.de  
  41. Rheinische Post: WestLB wants double-digit billions from the federal government . FinanzNachrichten.de of December 13, 2008 (accessed December 13, 2008)
  42. WestLB boss Hilgert throws down . ( Memento from August 1, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) FTD online, May 18, 2009
  43. Savings banks want to reorganize Landesbanken . Handelsblatt, November 14, 2008
  44. soffin.de, press release from June 17, 2010
  45. a b Stern: A Merz Special Fee , April 12, 2011
  46. FTD: Merz, the guarantor for a hanging game ( memento from June 19, 2010 in the Internet Archive ), June 17, 2010
  47. a b c “We still have time”. - The talks with BayernLB have failed, now a new partner is being sought. In an interview, WestLB boss Voigtländer says how he sees the future of the bank. In: zeit.de of November 5, 2010
  48. ^ First "Bad Bank" in Germany (accessed December 15, 2009)
  49. ksta.de November 5, 2010: Commission sees black for WestLB
  50. WestLB on the dump . In: Kölner Stadtanzeiger , November 6, 2010
  51. rp-online.de November 6, 2010 (interview) ( Memento from November 19, 2010 in the Internet Archive )
  52. Report on NZZ-online , June 24, 2011; Retrieved June 24, 2011
  53. WestLB disappears from the market WDR.de June 29, 2012 ( Memento from September 11, 2012 on WebCite )
  54. ↑ Clear the way for WestLB smashing ( memento from November 8, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Stuttgarter-Zeitung.de, June 19, 2012, accessed on June 20, 2012
  55. Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, list of approved credit institutions from January 1, 2012 ( memento of the original from December 24, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.bafin.de
  56. Hans-Dieter Brenner : Helaba is becoming a constant in North Rhine-Westphalia and Brandenburg . In: Börsen-Zeitung Spezial No. 198 of October 13, 2012, banking location Düsseldorf , p. 12
  57. Handelsblatt of March 21, 2012, A Painful Day for WestLB
  58. a b c d Annual Report 2010  ( Page no longer available , search in web archivesInfo: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.@1@ 2Template: Toter Link / www.westlb.de  
  59. WestLB website ( Memento from April 16, 2009 in the Internet Archive )

Coordinates: 51 ° 12 ′ 53.9 ″  N , 6 ° 46 ′ 40.3 ″  E