Bavarian Landesbank

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  Bavarian Landesbank
logo
BayernLB.jpg
BayernLB headquarters
Country GermanyGermany Germany
Seat Munich
legal form Institute of public right
Bank code 700 500 00
BIC BYLA DEMM XXX
founding June 27, 1972
Association German Savings Banks and Giro Association
Website bayernlb.de
Business data 2018
Total assets EUR 220.2 billion
insoles EUR 147.539 billion
Customer credit € 186.685 billion
Employee 7,703
management
Board Stephan Winkelmeier (Chairman)
Edgar Zoller
Marcus Kramer
Michael Bücker
Markus Wiegelmann
Supervisory board Wolf Schumacher (Chairman)

The Bayerische Landesbank ( BayernLB ) is a public-law institution based in Munich . As a Landesbank , it is the house bank of the Free State of Bavaria and the leading institute for the Bavarian savings banks . With the exception of the management of savings deposits , the institute conducts all kinds of banking business as a universal bank. BayernLB was founded by the state law of June 27, 1972 , which regulated the merger of Bayerischer Gemeindebank - Girozentrale - and the state-owned Bayerische Landesbodenkreditanstalt. The then existing addition " Girozentrale " was dropped.

The original plan of the Bavarian state government to completely privatize BayernLB in the legislative period up to 2013 has been postponed because the European Commission is placing greater emphasis on the restructuring and sustainability of the bank and is no longer pushing for rapid privatization. Following the conclusion of the state aid proceedings by the EU Commission on July 25, 2012 and as part of the restructuring of the bank, BayernLB is concentrating on providing the Bavarian and German economy with a wide range of financial services.

Balance sheet

With a consolidated balance sheet total of 220.2 billion euros (2018), Bayerische Landesbank is the seventh largest credit institution in Germany and the second largest Landesbank in Germany after Landesbank Baden-Württemberg . It has equity of 11.3 billion euros (2018), belongs to the Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe and is a member of the German Savings Banks and Giro Association .

Key figures 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Balance sheet total (billion €) 344.4 415.6 421.7 338.8 316.4 309.2 286.8 255.5 232.1 215.7 212.2 214.5 220.2
Profit after tax (€ million) 989 175 −5,358 −3.093 590 86 755 131 −1,320 496 550 679 828
Number of employees 11.006 19,226 20,285 11,821 10,853 10,893 9,932 8,568 6,842 7,082 7.133 7,219 7,703

owner

BayernLB Holding AG has been the sole owner of the bank since September 9, 2002 . The Freistaat Bayern and the Sparkassenverband Bayern are indirect owners through this holding company . Since December 2008, Bavaria has been the indirect majority owner of the bank with around 94%. This was the result of a capital increase of 10 billion euros by the state of Bavaria, which became necessary as a result of the financial crisis . The remaining 6% belonged to the Bavarian Savings Bank Association. Under pressure from the European Commission , the Bavarian Savings Banks Association took over shares of the Free State of Bavaria in the Landesbank for around 830 million euros . Since then Bavaria has held 75% and the Bavarian Savings Banks Association 25% of the shares in the holding company. This transaction amounted to a subsequent contribution by the savings banks to the rescue of the Landesbank.

organs

Organs are the executive board , the eleven-member supervisory board and the general assembly.

The general assembly is essentially responsible for passing resolutions on the bank's statutes .

Locations

Plan of the Munich location
Brienner Str. 16 - part of the HQ complex, formerly the Munich branch of the Disconto-Gesellschaft

In addition to its headquarters in Munich, BayernLB has a branch in Nuremberg and sales offices in Düsseldorf , Stuttgart , Frankfurt am Main , Hamburg , Berlin and Leipzig . The network of branches abroad has already been significantly reduced. A total of 7 branches / representative offices abroad, mainly in Asia and Canada , were closed. The locations in Paris , New York , London , Milan and Moscow will be retained, but the scope of business activity has been significantly reduced at all branches. BayernLB also supports the German economy in China through the German Centers in Shanghai and Taicang .

Business areas

As a legally dependent institution, the bank runs the Bayerische Landesbodenkreditanstalt , an organ of state housing policy. LBS Bayern, the public building society in the Free State of Bavaria, was sold to the Bavarian savings banks at the end of 2012 for EUR 818 million as a condition for the approval of the aid by the EU Commission and has therefore no longer been owned by BayernLB since January 1, 2013.

In an amendment to the law on July 27, 2009, the tasks of the credit institution were redefined. The bank is now to strengthen competition in Bavaria through its business activities and to ensure the supply of the economy, in particular small and medium- sized enterprises, and the public sector with monetary and credit services. Your business area has to concentrate on Bavaria, Germany and the neighboring economic areas in Europe. It is the house bank of the Free State of Bavaria.

In its commercial banking function, it offers its customers the full range of services in private, industrial, investment and international business. This also includes securities trading. One focus is the medium and long-term issuing business. The bank refinances itself by issuing debentures and bonds of all kinds and is therefore one of the most important issuing institutions in Germany.

As a state and municipal bank, BayernLB is at the service of the Free State of Bavaria and its municipalities by providing comprehensive credit and financial advice in the performance of their public tasks, particularly in structural funding. She oversees bond issues , other financial transactions, and state funding programs. The savings banks are supported by the bank through their clearing function in payment transactions as well as in securities services and international business. With syndicated and corporate loans, you can count on the experience of your central institution.

In its business strategy, BayemLB focuses on Bavarian and German corporate and real estate customers, savings banks, the public sector in Bavaria and private customers who are served by the group subsidiary DKB . Business areas such as asset-backed assets (ABS), investment banking, secured loans / debt-financed acquisitions (secured lending / acquisition financing) without reference to Germany and ship and aircraft financing, which are no longer part of BayernLB's core business, were discontinued. In addition, activities in the areas of international project finance and international real estate finance were scaled back. In addition, following the approval of the aid by the EU Commission on July 25, 2012, BayernLB will reduce its total assets by 50% compared to the 2008 base.

Subsidiaries

BayernLB owns 49.9% or more of the following larger companies:

Shares in BayernLB
Companies Seat Percentage ownership %
German credit bank Berlin 100.0
BayernInvest Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft mbH Munich 100.0
Real IS AG Munich 100.0
LB Immobilienbewertungsgesellschaft mbH Munich 100.0

The Bayerische Landesbodenkreditanstalt is a dependent institution .

As a result of conditions in connection with the approval of the aid by the EU Commission, BayernLB gradually parted from its shares in SaarLB from 2010 onwards . In 2013 the remaining shares were sold to the federal state of Saarland .

In addition, the sale of investments in KGAL GmbH & Co. KG was completed in April 2014.

As a result of the Landesbank's crisis, the Free State of Bavaria had to give it massive financial support. These subsidies were only tolerated by the European Union under the condition that the Landesbank parted ways with its residential subsidiary GBW or that it sold a large part of its real estate portfolio. Finance Minister Markus Söder refused to participate in the bidding process for 32,000 GBW apartments on behalf of the Free State and thus to keep them in public ownership. Ultimately, Patrizia AG won the bid, which a consortium of affected municipalities led by the state capital Munich outbid. In order to protect the tenants, Söder assured a "Social Charter XXL". However, due to loopholes in the purchase agreement, complaints about the conversion of rented apartments into owner-occupied apartments, the resale of apartments to third parties or painful rent increases increased among tenants' associations throughout Bavaria.

history

On April 21, 1884, King Ludwig II signed the "Law Regarding the Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt" in Hohenschwangau . The aim of the law was to "facilitate the procurement of capital for the execution of cultural undertakings". The “Royal Highest Ordinance” of June 4, 1884 set up the Landeskultur-Renten-Kommission, whose task it was to examine and approve loan applications as well as to effect the execution of the loan and to monitor the use of loans. The commission was subordinate to the State Ministry of the Interior and the "bureau business" was also carried out in the Interior Ministry. In the beginning there was no business building of its own and the “staff” consisted of a few civil servants who were spread over various ministries and state institutions and who had to do their jobs for the Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt part-time.

In 1904 the loan from the Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt reached 3 million marks.

The representatives of the Bavarian savings banks founded the Giroverband on December 9, 1914, and with it a central clearing office for check and giro transactions. At that time, the promotion of cashless payment transactions was an urgent task.

An independent office for the Girozentrale was established in Nuremberg in 1917. The business transaction was initially taken care of by the Städtische Sparkasse Nürnberg on a part-time basis. The "Girozentrale Bavarian Savings Banks" also received full-time management for the first time.

The Girozentrale moved from Nuremberg to Munich in 1920. Its tasks have been significantly expanded: The focus was in particular on supplying the municipalities with long-term loans, which were refinanced by issuing fixed-interest municipal bonds. The corporate customer business and the consortium business with the savings banks also grew steadily. In 1925, the Girozentrale was organizationally separated from the Sparkassenverband and renamed the "Bayerische Gemeindebank (Girozentrale) Public Bank Authority".

In 1929 the Bayerische Landesbausparkasse was founded as a department of the Bayerische Gemeindebank. In the same year, the Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt became an independent legal entity under public law with significantly expanded tasks such as B. Lending for social housing. She received the right to issue the fixed-interest Landeskultur-Rentenbriefe.

In accordance with its tasks, the Landeskultur-Rentenanstalt was renamed the Bayerische Landesbodenkreditanstalt in 1949 .

On July 1, 1972, the Bayerische Gemeindebank and the Bayerische Landesbodenkreditanstalt merged to form the Bayerische Landesbank Girozentrale . The Bavarian State Parliament finally passed the law on the Bayerische Landesbank in June 1972 . The future institute was equipped with a capital stock of 400 million DM, in which the Free State of Bavaria and the Bavarian savings banks each held half. The Landesbank defined itself mainly as a savings bank central bank, the house bank of the Free State of Bavaria, a credit institute of the municipalities and a universal bank with a focus on securities and international business. In addition, through the Landesbausparkasse, managed as its department, and the Landesbodenkreditanstalt, the bank was able to cover important urban and residential construction tasks. The balance sheet total of the new Landesbank in 1972 was almost DM 30 billion. At the end of 1972, the bank had 3,500 employees, most of them in Munich and only a small part in the only branch in Nuremberg at the time.

A consortium led by the Bayerische Landesbank is granting the GDR a loan of 1 billion Deutschmarks . In July 1983, the federal government guaranteed its repayment. The loan was arranged - surprisingly for many - by Franz Josef Strauss . In the election campaign before the Bundestag election on March 6, 1983 , Strauss had denied any further support for the GDR; so he broke a campaign promise. This led to numerous withdrawals from the CSU . The two CSU members of the Bundestag Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt also resigned; they formed a party called The Republicans . After the loan was paid out, the GDR implemented some humanitarian relief. The self-firing systems on the inner-German border are being dismantled.

In March 1997 a financial crisis began in Thailand; it spreads to several Asian countries and is known as the Asian crisis . The Bayerische Landesbank loses around 1.3 billion DM in the process. Nevertheless, the then head of Asia at Bank Alfred Lehner subsequently rose to head of the Landesbank.

In August 1999 it became known that 778 million of the 1.3 billion DM were lost because the Singapore branch extended loans and thereby borrowed 100 percent of the shares - apparently worthless. At the end of 1999 Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber Lehner urged in vain to resign.

In the year 2000 further defects of the branch in Singapore become known; Bavaria's Finance Minister Kurt Faltlhauser urges Lehner to resign.

In February 2001 it became publicly known that the Federal Banking Supervisory Office threatens to dismiss Lehner if he does not resign voluntarily. The office accuses him of lack of professional aptitude. Lehner, who wanted to remain in office until November 2001, announced his early resignation on May 31, 2001.

With the new market presence now under BayernLB , the time began for the Landesbank after the state liability guarantees were discontinued.

In May 2007 BayernLB acquired a 50 percent stake plus one share in the Austrian Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA) for 1.625 billion euros .

The effects of the financial market crisis in 2008 hit BayernLB, the bank had to be supported due to the losses from the ABS portfolio and received equity capital of EUR 7 billion from the Free State and guarantees of EUR 15 billion from the federal government. On March 1, 2008, the CEO Werner Schmidt resigned, his successor was Michael Kemmer , the previous CFO and Deputy CEO.

In December 2009, BayernLB sold its shares in HGAA to the Republic of Austria for a symbolic price of EUR 1 after it became known that HGAA had new financial requirements of at least EUR 1.5 billion. The CEO Kemmer then resigned, with high bonus payments in the game, and the Deputy CEO Stefan Ermisch temporarily took over the management of BayernLB.

The events in connection with the acquisition of HGAA were investigated in 2010 by both a parliamentary committee of inquiry and the Munich public prosecutor's office. The focus was particularly on former members of the board of directors of BayernLB and the asset manager Tilo Berlin. On April 15, Gerd Häusler , who was previously Deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors of BayernLB , took over as Chairman of the Board of Management of BayernLB.

In January 2011, the former BayernLB board member Gerhard Gribkowsky was arrested on suspicion of bribery , breach of trust and tax evasion by the public prosecutor . He is said to have received US $ 50 million through a foundation in connection with a deal involving shares in Formula 1 , disguised as a consultancy agreement . As a member of the Board of Management from 2002 to 2008, Gribkowsky was responsible for risk management and avoidance of loan defaults and was in charge of selling BayernLB's stake in Formula 1. In January 2011, BayernLB demanded 200 million euros in damages from Gribkowsky for the debacle at Hypo Group Alpe Adria, which lost 3.7 billion euros.

On April 1, 2015, the liquidation proceedings were opened via Banque LBLux and the banking license was returned. The company was then changed to "Banque LBLux in Liquidation".

Public perception, criticism and controversy

Proximity to the Bavarian state government

Critics and opposition in the state parliament accuse the bank of being too compliant to the wishes and ideas of the Bavarian state government. In 1983, for example, Prime Minister Franz Josef Strauss arranged the billion-euro loan to the GDR, which was then tight in foreign currencies, through the Bayerische Landesbank. At that time, a consortium under the leadership of the bank lent the other German state DM 1 billion, soon after which it was guaranteed by the federal government, following an assurance on June 29, 1983.

In 1993, the bank was sentenced to high compensation payments to defrauded small investors in connection with the mega petrol affair.

Commitment to the Kirch Group

The financial institution's increasing difficulties in financing the group of media entrepreneur Leo Kirch (1926–2011) was associated with the political resolution to make Munich the most important German media location. In 2002 the Kirch group became finally insolvent. Its largest creditor was Bayern LB with around 2 billion euros. As a result, Bayern LB's risk provisioning had to be increased significantly. Due to the problematic risk controlling and other failures, the bank had to lay off a large number of employees. The bank's peripheral areas were particularly affected.

Engagement in Singapore and Croatia

In 1997, the bank decided to discontinue its share credit business after its Singapore branch was exposed to dubious Malaysian borrowers. The lending in Asia was associated with a damage potential of 800 million D-Marks , which was later reduced by partial repayments. The possibly useless purchase by a Croatian bank cost 80 million euros.

GBW sale

As a result of the debacle over Hypo Alpe Adria , the Free State of Bavaria had to give the Landesbank a massive financial support. These subsidies were only tolerated by the European Union under the condition that the Landesbank parted ways with its residential subsidiary GBW or that it sold a large part of its real estate portfolio. After the Bavarian Finance Minister Markus Söder refused to participate in the bidding process for 32,000 GBW apartments for the Free State and thus to keep them in public ownership, Patrizia AG was ultimately awarded the contract, which affected a consortium led by the state capital of Munich Municipalities outbid. In order to protect the tenants, Söder assured a " Social Charter XXL". However, due to loopholes in the purchase agreement, complaints about the conversion of rented apartments into owner-occupied apartments, the resale of apartments to third parties or painful rent increases increased among tenants' associations throughout Bavaria.

Meanwhile, some municipalities bought back apartments from the GBW portfolio.

After the rents for many residents rose sharply and people were systematically pushed out of the apartments in order to rent or sell them at high prices, the controversial sale of the GBW apartments was again the subject of a debate in the Bavarian state parliament in October 2016 .

Armaments technology

According to a study by the Cluster Munition Coalition 2010, BayernLB was involved in the financing of cluster bombs . This study is continued annually. In 2012, this participation will no longer be reported, but progress on the relevant exclusion criteria. In 2013 BayernLB is no longer mentioned.

BayernLB was criticized by the non-governmental organization Urgewald for financing arms exports to the Arab region.

Engagement in ecologically questionable projects

In response to criticism from various associations, BayernLB financed the nuclear power plants in Belene , Olkiluoto and Mochovce .

BayernLB co-financed the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline , which is planned across an Indian reservation and is seen by the inhabitants as a threat to their livelihoods.

Mailbox companies

BayernLB is one of the 28 German banks that founded letterbox companies according to the Panama Papers published in March 2016 . According to a report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung , BayernLB founded 129 letterbox companies through its subsidiary Banque LB Lux in Luxembourg . The subsidiary brokered the establishment of letterbox companies in Panama from 2005 to 2010 . BayernLB stated that its subsidiary Banque LB Lux was sold in 2013 and announced further investigations.

Effects of the real estate and financial market crisis

At the beginning of 2008, BayernLB also came under financial pressure from 2007 as a result of the financial market crisis . Like IKB Deutsche Industriebank , BayernLB had invested in real estate loans on the subprime market . As a result, the bank had to make value adjustments of EUR 600 million affecting the income statement and carry out further book value reductions of EUR 1.3 billion in its trading positions. BayernLB boss Schmidt resigned on March 1, 2008 because of the real estate crisis. In the 2007 annual financial statements, which were prepared for the first time in accordance with IFRS rules, risk provisioning left its mark: Consolidated net income fell from EUR 1000 million in 2006 to EUR 92 million in 2007.

When the first quarterly figures for 2008 were published, the real extent of the crisis became apparent: In addition to the 2007 value adjustments of EUR 2.3 billion, a further EUR 2 billion was added in the first quarter of 2008. The critical overall portfolio was even put at 24 billion euros. The crisis spread to the CSU and its former party chairman Erwin Huber , who was held responsible as chairman of the bank's board of directors and Bavarian finance minister. In response to pressure from the opposition in the Bavarian state parliament , a committee of inquiry was set up to investigate the charges against BayernLB.

According to the bank's ad hoc announcement of October 21, 2008, a loss of around 1 billion euros is expected in the third quarter of 2008, to which developments on the financial market have contributed. To strengthen its equity base, BayernLB will apply for federal funding from the financial market stabilization fund amounting to 5.4 billion euros. The targeted cost-saving program over a period of three years will be increased from 150 to a total of 400 million euros, which will involve a reduction in staff.

In March 2009 losses in 2008 of 5 billion euros are announced. Of this, the state was ultimately left with 10 billion euros in costs.

rescue package

The Free State of Bavaria will provide ten billion euros in capital to rescue the bank, said Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer . At the end of November 2008, it became known that BayernLB's financial gap was much bigger than expected: Since the end of October 2008, its financial needs have almost doubled. The federal government's aid fund is to provide preventive guarantees for a further 15 billion euros.

At the beginning of December 2008, a comprehensive savings package was decided. The bank is cutting 5,600 jobs across the group. Bavaria wants to support the Landesbank with an equity injection of 10 billion euros without the help of the federal government. The Bavarian cabinet has decided on a second supplementary budget. The federal government is providing an additional guarantee of 15 billion euros for bonds.

BayernLB submitted a restructuring plan to the EU Commission at the end of April 2009. The state aid proceedings initiated by the EU Commission were concluded on July 25, 2012. The EU Commission approved, subject to certain conditions, the aid that BayernLB had received from the Free State of Bavaria in the wake of the financial market crisis.

On the occasion of BayernLB's annual press conference in March 2011, SPD parliamentary group leader Markus Rinderspacher called for a repayment plan for the state bank debt to the Bavarian tax authorities. The Bavarian taxpayer has to raise almost 940,000 euros every day just in interest for the 10 billion loan, 39,155 euros an hour (in 2011 343,000,000 euros, in 2012 355,300,000 euros). Rinderspacher publishes the growth in debt interest in steps of a second on the website of the SPD parliamentary group.

In June 2017 BayernLB (Bayerische Landesbank) was able to terminate the EU state aid proceedings early with a repayment to the Free State of Bavaria totaling almost 5.5 billion euros. According to an EU decision, BayernLB had to pay a total of EUR 4.96 billion to the Free State from 2012 to 2019 at the latest. The early repayment of the outstanding state aid was made possible by the positive business development of BayernLB and the associated more solid capitalization of the bank. BayernLB's financial stability was also recognized when the relevant authorities (ECB, Bundesbank, Bafin and EU Commission) approved the payment of the silent participation.

Legal measures

The Bavarian state parliament in 2009, changes in the July 27 Law on Bayerische Landesbank decided. The newly inserted Article 1a creates the legal prerequisites for converting the bank, as has already been politically announced. The regulations on their tasks have been made more precise, which is particularly noticeable in the move away from the global business area. The previous equal composition of the board of directors between the state and the savings bank side has been changed. Due to the necessary support measures also by the state, the raising of equity had moved massively in the direction of the Free State. Its influence in the supervisory body has therefore been strengthened.

Participation in the Hypo Alpe Adria Group

In May 2007 BayernLB took over 50% plus one share in the Austrian bank Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA). Around 1.625 billion euros were paid for this. In the following years, this share was increased to a stake of 67.08% because the subsidiary had financial needs.

BayernLB had signed a consultancy agreement with NM Rothschild & Sons for the purchase . With the acquisition of the stake, BayernLB aimed to anchor the bank even better in business in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The then Bavarian Minister of the Interior and BayernLB Board Member Günther Beckstein explained to the CSU parliamentary group in the state parliament on December 15, 2009 that when the decision in 2007 was made in the Bavarian state government and the Sparkassenverband, there was a positive mood on this, as was the SPD in the state parliament as well as the business press were open to the entrepreneurial decision. Beckstein emphasized that the purchase of HGAA had previously been checked by many experts and was not going it alone. Before the purchase, BayernLB had completed the HGAA's ( due diligence ) audit in the strikingly short period of two weeks and had used information from investment advisor Tilo Berlin , one of the main beneficiaries of the share purchase. Shortly before, Berlin had bought large shares in HGAA for its investors, which were then profitably taken over by BayernLB. After BayernLB bought HGAA, Berlin was CEO of HGAA until March 2009.

BayernLB's board of directors decided on the takeover over a weekend in the so-called circular procedure without further consultation. The document approving the purchase was sent by courier between the board members, an unusual procedure for a 1.6 billion takeover. On the day the resolution was passed, a 100-page table template was presented to the supervisory board of the Kärntner Landesholding responsible for sales. He had a minute to study the syndicate contract. Central questions were not answered.

In autumn 2009 it became clear that after a support measure from the Austrian rescue fund in 2008 of 900 million euros, HGAA needed a further capital injection of at least 1.5 billion euros by the end of 2009 to ensure that it was willing to pay. This was triggered by loan defaults and the necessary risk provisions for further ailing loans. The Bavarian government, represented with three ministers on the Board of BayernLB, declined as the principal owner of the BayernLB, further funds in its Austrian subsidiary inject .

A crisis meeting in Vienna on 13./14. December 2009 at the invitation of the Austrian Finance Minister Josef Pröll resulted in the sale of BayernLB shares for the symbolic price of one euro to the Republic of Austria . The other two HGAA owners, the federal state of Carinthia and Grazer Wechselsendung Versicherung, also gave up their stake in the state for the same amount . After the compromise found, BayernLB lost a total of around 3.7 billion euros that it had invested in HGAA. This includes the stake in the stake of around 2.8 billion euros and loan funds of 825 million euros granted to the subsidiary bank, which they waived repayment during the crisis discussion.

The Austrian central bank governor Ewald Nowotny criticized BayernLB's withdrawal from the HGAA . The Landesbank is now already parting with the third investment, after its shares in BAWAG and the Croatian Riječka Banka . Finance Minister Georg Fahrenschon informed the Bavarian cabinet of the outcome of the Vienna negotiations on December 14th and, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Horst Seehofer, took the first steps in the BayernLB bodies. The chairman of the board, Michael Kemmer , who was responsible for the wrong decision as the finance director in favor of the purchase, announced his resignation, the board member Klaus Weigert, a representative of the finance ministry in the supervisory body, made his post available. In a government declaration to the Bavarian state parliament a day later, Seehofer stated that the acquisition of the stake had been a mistake and promised a comprehensive clarification of the responsibilities without regard to the person. According to the Süddeutsche Zeitung report, the total loss from the HGAA amounted to five billion euros.

Legal processing

The public prosecutor's office in Munich initiated investigations into the former CEO of BayernLB, Werner Schmidt , on suspicion of breach of trust . On October 14, 2009, bank offices and apartments were searched in Luxembourg, Austria and Munich. There was a suspicion that BayernLB had purposely bought the Austrian bank Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA) too expensive and assumed a high debt risk in a manner that was unusual in banking. Schmidt denied that anything had happened with wrong things. In December 2009 it was announced that the former Landesbank boss Schmidt had received a consultancy contract worth 50,000 euros after leaving HGAA there.

As a result, in 2010 the opposition parties in the Bavarian state parliament, the SPD and Free Voters filed criminal charges against the CSU politicians Günther Beckstein, Erwin Huber and Kurt Faltlhauser. As representatives of the Free State of Bavaria, the politicians were on the board of directors of Bayerische Landesbank. However, after the prosecutor's office had not pursued the charges any further due to a lack of initial suspicion, while they had brought charges against the bank's former board members in May 2010, the responsible chamber of the Munich I Regional Court under the presiding judge Hans-Joachim Eckert criticized this decision. It is "incomprehensible why the public prosecutor's office set allegations against individual members of the administrative board, but brought charges against all members of the executive board for breach of trust," wrote the chamber in its decision, referring to the approval of the administrative board for the purchase of HGAA. The court did not follow the arguments of the public prosecutor's office, according to which the members of the administrative board were insufficiently informed by the executive board and were therefore deceived by the executive board, and only admitted the charges against the former bank executive on two smaller points. With this decision, the court rejected the main charge of the public prosecutor's office as a whole, because the Landesbank's Board of Management was unable to identify sufficient suspicion of breach of trust in the purchase of Hypo Alpe Adria. From the point of view of the public prosecutor's office, the court assessed the purchase price, which was already at that time excessive by 550 million euros, as being within the scope of entrepreneurial discretion. This decision was interpreted by the public as a reprimand against the work results of the public prosecutor's office, which the court denied. In fact, the substantive differences between the criminal chamber and the public prosecutor's office were so far-reaching that the latter took its position “energetically” publicly and appealed against the decision of the chamber not to pursue the main charge before the Munich Higher Regional Court . The Higher Regional Court thereupon followed the prosecution's argument that all charges were inseparably linked and therefore had to be negotiated together in the proceedings, and obliged the 6th criminal division to rule on the question of the culpable action of the BayernLB Board of Management accordingly. In January 2014 the proceedings began against the former board members Michael Kemmer , Theodor Harnischmacher, Ralph Schmidt, Stefan Ropers, Rudolf Hanisch, Gerhard Gribkowsky and Werner Schmidt. The suspicion of breach of trust was not confirmed in the course of the negotiations, so that the proceedings against Harnischmacher, Ralph Schmidt, Ropers and Hanisch were discontinued in August 2014 for a small amount of money.

The proceedings against Gribkowsky, former Chief Risk Officer of BayernLB, had previously been discontinued in February 2014 because he could not be proven to have had any significant responsibility or personal enrichment. Even after this appointment, he continued to be heard as a witness in the course of the proceedings against the other board members. His frank admission to the tone of voice on the board of directors, “Pack is doing well, Pack is getting along”, caused some former colleagues to shake their heads. He denied that the purchase of HGAA was made under political pressure with the words “But even if Mr. Faltlhauser and his colleagues had sung this in unison, it would not have put us under so much pressure that we would buy a bank that could not be bought would."

The proceedings ended after 53 days of negotiations in October 2014. Previously, the former BayernLB board member Werner Schmidt had pleaded guilty after an agreement between the litigants of indirectly bribing Carinthian governor Jörg Haider , who has since died, with five million euros. During an interrogation, Schmidt had frankly stated that he had actually saved BayernLB money, insofar as he had negotiated Haider's demands for a bribe of ten million euros as sponsorship for the Klagenfurt football club SK Austria Kärnten by half. However, this was a criminal offense that subsequently led to a conviction. When pronouncing the verdict, Judge Eckert emphasized that Schmidt was acting in the interests of the bank and did not want to jeopardize the deal, but that he had "let himself be dragged over the table by the dazzling figure Haider". Schmidt was sentenced to one year and six months by the court. The sentence has been suspended. He also had to pay a fine of € 100,000. The proceedings against the early Bayern-LB Vice Rudolf Harnisch were also discontinued at the same time against a circulation of 50,000 €.

In January 2012, BayernLB also filed a lawsuit with the Bavarian Administrative Courts in Munich and Würzburg against the former Bavarian Finance Minister Kurt Faltlhauser and the former Chairman of the Administrative Board Siegfried Naser . BayernLB is demanding compensation payments of 200 million euros. The sum is said to be the highest claim for damages that has ever been made against a high-ranking politician in Germany.

In June 2014 Austria attempted to exempt the affected state of Carinthia from the financial consequences of the financial guarantees it had given for bonds from HGAA by means of a debt haircut of up to 890 million euros by means of a special Hypo law. Following a lawsuit by BayernLB and other banks, the Austrian Constitutional Court declared this special law unconstitutional in July 2015 because it violated the fundamental right to property protection.

Investor group Berlin & Co

On January 1, 2010, the Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that the suspicion of insider trading in the sale of HGAA to BayernLB had been reinforced. According to this, when buying the 9.09 percent stake in HGAA , Tilo Berlin's group of investors should have already known that BayernLB would take over the bank a little later at a higher price. As early as January 31, 2007, there was said to have been a secret round of talks about the planned sale at BayernLB's Munich headquarters, at which bank managers Werner Schmidt and Wolfgang Kulterer, confidants of Carinthian Governor Jörg Haider, and Tilo Berlin were present. So far, Schmidt, Kulterer, Berlin and Haider had claimed as witnesses in an investigative committee of the Carinthian state parliament that they only learned of BayernLB's interest in Hypo Alpe Adria from March 2007. As a result, the group of investors around Berlin increased their stake to 25 percent plus one share. After a short time, the group of investors was able to sell their stake in Hypo Alpe Adria on to BayernLB on May 22, 2007 at a high profit. This is said to have been 170 million euros.

Berlin was found guilty in April 2014 and sentenced to a prison term of 26 months in proceedings before the Klagenfurt Regional Court on charges of collusion with investors in connection with the sale of HGAA to BayernLB. His defense appealed to the Supreme Court (OGH), so that the judgment did not become final. In October 2015, the General Procurator recommended that the Supreme Court confirm the judgment against Berlin. In April 2016, the Supreme Court partially overturned the first instance judgments. In the opinion of the court, the findings made by the lower court were not sufficient to confirm the allegation of unfaithfulness. In this respect, the procedure must be repeated.

literature

Web links

Commons : BayernLB  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

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Coordinates: 48 ° 8 ′ 41.5 ″  N , 11 ° 34 ′ 25 ″  E