Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda
Leader	Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri
Founder	Osama bin Laden
Founded	1988
Headquarters	None; independently-operating cells
Ideology	Qutbist Sunni Islam
International affiliation	Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other cells worldwide

al-Qaeda or al-Qaida or al-Qa'ida (Arabic: القاعدة Template:ArabDIN, trans. 'the base') is the name given to an international alliance of militant Sunni Islamist organizations established in 1988 by Osama bin Laden. al-Qaeda's ideology can be placed within the Qutbist strain of Sunni-Islam, but also has been heavily influenced by Takfir. Osama bin-Laden oversees al-Qaeda's finances and, with Ayman al-Zawahiri, provides ideological and strategic guidance. al-Qaeda's objectives include the elimination of foreign influence in Muslim countries, eradication of those deemed to be "infidels", elimination of Israel, and the creation of a new Islamic caliphate.

The United Nations Security Council and several UN member states have labeled al-Qaeda a terrorist organization. Its affiliates have executed multiple attacks against targets in various countries, the most prominent being the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. In response to the September 11 attacks, the United States government launched a broad military and intelligence campaign, known as the War on Terrorism, with the goal of dismantling al-Qaeda and killing or capturing its operatives. Al-Qaeda does not have a formal structure, but recruits field operatives to work independently in support of its goals.

Due to its lack of formal structure, al-Qaeda's size and degree of responsibility for particular attacks are difficult to establish. While the governments opposed to al-Qaeda claim that it has worldwide reach, other analysts have suggested that those governments, as well as Osama himself, exaggerate al-Qaeda's significance in Islamist terrorism. The neologism "Al-Qaedaism" is applied to the wider context of those who independently conduct similar acts through political sympathy to al-Qaeda ideology or methods or the copycat effect.

Pronunciation, etymology, and origin of the name

In Arabic, the name (القاعدة al-qā'ida) has four syllables, and is pronounced [al'qɑː.ʕi.da]. However, as two of the Arabic consonants in the name ([q] and [ʕ]) are not phonemes found in the English language, the closest naturalized English pronunciation would be [æl'kɑː.i.də], although [æl'kaɪ.də] and [æl'keɪ.də] are also heard.

The name of the organization comes from the ordinary Arabic noun qā'idah, which means 'foundation, basis' and is used both in geometry ('base' of a triangle) and in the military (a military/naval/air- 'base'). The initial al- is the Arabic definite article 'the', hence, 'the base'.

Osama bin Laden explained the origin of the term in his videotaped interview with al Jazeera journalist Tayseer Alouni in late October 2001:

The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda [meaning "the base" in English]. The name stayed.

An alternative theory, presented in the BBC film series "The Power of Nightmares", states that the name and concept of al-Qaeda was first used by the U.S. Department of Justice in January 2001, at the New York City trial of four men accused of the 1998 United States embassy bombings in East Africa. By alleging Osama bin Laden's leadership of the organization, it became possible to charge bin Laden in absentia with the crime using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, also known as the RICO statutes.

According to this theory, the name "al-Qaeda" was first provided to US prosecutors by Jamal al-Fadl, a former Sudanese employee of bin Laden. After Fadl was caught stealing $110,000 from bin Laden, he turned himself over to U.S. agents.

The series alleged that once the U.S. Department of Justice popularized the name of al-Qaeda, bin Laden continued to use it because the notion that he was working with an armed group proved a potent political strategy. The documentary claims that bin Laden, working with an isolated group of Islamists that had once fought alongside the mujahedeen, began using the term after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Journalist Peter Bergen cites a document from 11 August 1988 establishing al-Qaeda and referring to it as "the base." The document contained the minutes of the first meeting establishing the organization: "This document outlines the discussion between bin Laden, referred to as 'the Sheikh', and Abu Rida, or Mohamed Loay Bayazid, to discuss the formation of a 'new military group', which would include 'al Qaeda (the base).'"

The term also appears with the spelling 'Al-Qaida' in an executive order issued by President Clinton in 1998 less than two weeks after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Executive order 13099 was issued on August 20, 1998 and lists the organization as one of several associated with Osama bin Laden, who the document named as a terrorist threatening the Middle East peace process. This is nevertheless consistent with the term having been introduced to U.S. intelligence by Jamal al-Fadl, who had been providing the CIA with intelligence about bin Laden since December 1996.

In April 2002, the group assumed the name Qa'idat al-Jihad (the base of Jihad). According to Diaa Rashwan (a senior researcher at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies), this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt's Al-Jihad group, led by Ayman El-Zawahri, with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid 1990s."

The United States Department of Defense defines the organization as

A radical Sunni Muslim umbrella organization established to recruit young Muslims into the Afghani mujahideen and is aimed to establish Islamist states throughout the world, overthrow ‘un-Islamic regimes’, expel US soldiers and Western influence from the Gulf, and capture Jerusalem as a Muslim city.

This definition was given in response to a request made by Moazzam Begg, who was being held in extrajudicial detention in the Guantanamo Bay detainment camps. Begg was being accused of assisting or being a member of al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

History

Map of major attacks made by Al Qaeda

Jihad in Afghanistan

The origins of the terrorist group can be traced to the period following the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan of April 1978, which brought revolutionary Marxists to power. Starting with the organization of Maktab al-Khidamat in 1984, a cadre of foreign Arab mujahedeen, financed by bin Laden and other wealthy Muslim contributors, joined the ongoing counterrevolution against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The U.S. viewed the conflict in Afghanistan as an integral Cold War struggle, and the CIA provided assistance to anti-Soviet forces through the Pakistani ISI in a parallel program called Operation Cyclone. The U.S. took advantage of this movement's ambitions and bred them to suit their needs. The U.S. government maintains such support was limited to the indigenous Afghan mujahedeen, and Osama bin Laden's participation in the conflict was unrelated to CIA programs. Regardless, the US program encouraged similar funding systems to come through the Arab Muslim world.

Origins in Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK)

Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khadamat (Office of Services, MAK) — a Mujahid organization fighting to establish an Islamic state during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in 1980. Bin Laden was a founding member of the MAK, along with Palestinian militant Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. The MAK was a small organization in Afghanistan with no direct combatants. The role of the MAK was to raise and channel funds from a variety of sources (including donations from across the Middle East, primarily from wealthy individuals) into recruitment and training of mujahedeen from around the world in guerrilla combat, as well as care for Afghan refugees. During the war, the American and Pakistani intelligence services supported the native Afghan mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet occupation. MAK, while supportive of the indigenous mujahedeen's cause, was a separate grouping made up of foreign Muslims. Up to 35,000 foreign mujahedeen from 43 countries were supported in this manner between 1982 and 1992.

After a protracted and costly nine-year war, the Soviet Union finally withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. Mohammed Najibullah's socialist Afghan government was rapidly overthrown by elements of the mujahedeen. With mujahedeen leaders unable to agree on a structure for governance, chaos ensued with control of ill-defined territories falling under constantly reorganizing alliances.

Due to U.S. efforts to undermine the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, some have speculated it may have contributed to creation of the organization, while others have strenuously denied this assertion. Robin Cook Former Foreign Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons writing for the Guardian, spoke of al-Qaeda as an unintentional product of Western interests:

Bin Laden was, though, a product of a monumental miscalculation by Western security agencies. Throughout the 80's, he was armed by the CIA and funded by the Saudis to wage jihad against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida, literally "the database", was originally the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen who were recruited and trained with help from the CIA to defeat the Russians. Inexplicably, and with disastrous consequences, it never appears to have occurred to Washington that once Russia was out of the way, Bin Laden's organization would turn its attention to the west.

However, Peter Bergen, a CNN journalist known for conducting the first television interview with Osama bin Laden in 1997, refuted Cook's notion, stating on August 15 2006:

The story about bin Laden and the CIA -- that the CIA funded bin Laden or trained bin Laden -- is simply a folk myth. There's no evidence of this. In fact, there are very few things that bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the U.S. government agree on. They all agree that they didn't have a relationship in the 1980s. And they wouldn't have needed to. Bin Laden had his own money, he was anti-American and he was operating secretly and independently. The real story here is the CIA did not understand who Osama was until 1996, when they set up a unit to really start tracking him.

The CIA was watching Osama bin Laden at least by early 1995 due to the discovery of the Oplan Bojinka plot, which in part involved a suicide airplane attack on CIA Headquarters.

Monte Palmer, senior fellow at the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies in Cairo, noted: "It now appears that the American-sponsored jihad in Afghanistan was the first step in transforming the jihadist movements of Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan into an international network capable of challenging the United States. A coalescing of the jihadist movement would have occurred with or without Afghanistan, but the Afghan experience accelerated this process by years if not decades."

Expanding Operations

Toward the end of the Soviet military mission in Afghanistan, some mujahedeen wanted to expand their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, such as Israel and Kashmir. A number of overlapping and interrelated organizations were formed to further those aspirations.

One of these was the organization that would eventually be called al-Qaeda, formed by Osama bin Laden with an initial meeting held on August 11, 1988. Bin Laden wished to establish nonmilitary operations in other parts of the world; Azzam, in contrast, wanted to remain focused on military campaigns. After Azzam was assassinated in 1989, the MAK split, with a significant number joining bin Laden's organization.

In the United States, funds for activities are dispersed through a program called the Office of Services. In November 1989, Ali Mohammed, a former special forces Sergeant stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, left military service and moved to Santa Clara, California. He traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan and became deeply involved with bin Laden's plans. A year later, on November 8, 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of Mohammed's associate El Sayyid Nosair, discovering a great deal of evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers. In 1991, Ali Mohammed is said to have helped orchestrate Osama bin Laden's relocation to Sudan.

Gulf War and the start of U.S. enmity

Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 had put the country of Saudi Arabia and its ruling House of Saud at risk as Saudi's most valuable oil fields (Hama) were within easy striking distance of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, and Saddam's call to pan-Arab/Islamism could potentially rally internal dissent. In the face of a seemingly massive Iraqi military presence, Saudi Arabia's own forces were well armed but far outnumbered. Bin Laden offered the services of his mujahedeen to King Fahd to protect Saudi Arabia from the Iraqi army.

The Saudi monarch refused bin Laden's offer, opting instead to allow U.S. and allied forces to deploy on Saudi territory. The deployment angered Bin Laden, as he believed the presence of foreign troops in the "land of the two mosques" (Mecca and Medina) profaned sacred soil. After speaking publicly against the Saudi government for harboring American troops, he was quickly forced into exile to Sudan and on April 9, 1994 his Saudi citizenship was revoked. His family publicly disowned him. There is controversy over whether and to what extent he continued to garner support from members of his family and/or the Saudi government.

Shortly afterwards, the movement that came to be known as al-Qaeda was formed.

Sudan

In 1991, Sudan's National Islamic Front, an Islamist group that had recently gained power, invited al-Qaeda to move operations to Sudan. For several years, al-Qaeda operated several businesses (including import/export, farm, and construction firms) in what might be considered a period of financial consolidation. The group built a major 1200-km (845-mi) highway connecting the capital Khartoum with Port Sudan. However, they also ran a number of camps where they trained operatives in the use of firearms and explosives.

In 1996, Osama bin Laden was asked to leave Sudan after the United States put the regime under extreme pressure to expel him, citing possible connections to the 1994 attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while his motorcade was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Controversy exists regarding whether Sudan offered to turn bin Laden over to the U.S. prior to the expulsion. There is an audio tape (Audio) (Transcript) recording of former President Bill Clinton talking about the offer from the Sudanese government. There are conflicting reports on whether the Sudanese government indeed made such an offer, but they were in fact prepared to turn him over to Saudi Arabia, who declined to take him. Osama bin Laden finally left Sudan in a well-executed operation, arriving at Jalalabad, Afghanistan by air in late 1996 with over 200 of his supporters and their families.

Bosnia

The October 1991 secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the equally multicultural Yugoslav Federation opened up a new ethno-religious conflict at the heart of Europe.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is ethnically diverse, with a slight Muslim majority and significant numbers of ethnic (Orthodox Christian) Serbs and (Roman Catholic) Croats distributed across its territory. The territories comprised the central component of former Yugoslavia, whose disintegration saw ethnic Serbs and ethnic Croats within Bosnia, supported by irredentist movements in the adjacent states of Serbia and Croatia, engage in a three-way conflict against the Bosniak core.

Radical Muslim veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan seized on Bosnia as a new opportunity to defend Islam. Besieged on two fronts and seemingly abandoned by the West, the Bosnian regime was willing to accept any help it could get, military or financial, including that of a number of Islamic organisations, including al-Qaeda.

Several close associates of Osama bin Laden (most notably, Saudi Khalid bin Udah bin Muhammad al-Harbi, alias Abu Sulaiman al-Makki) joined the conflict in Bosnia. While al-Qaeda might initially have seen Bosnia as a possible bridgehead enabling the radicalization of European Muslims for operations against other European nations and the United States, Bosniaks had been secularized for generations, and their interest in fighting was largely limited to securing the survival of their nascent state.

The "Bosnian Mujahidin" (comprising largely Arab veterans of the Afghan war and not necessarily members of al-Qaeda) thus operated as a largely autonomous force within central Bosnia. While their bravery in the fray initially attracted a small number of native Bosnians to join them, their brutality against civilians came to appall many native Bosnians and repel new recruits. At the same time, their vigorous attempts to Islamicize the local population with rules on appropriate dress and behavior were widely resented and thus went unheeded. In his book Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: the Afghan-Bosnian Network, Evan Kohlmann summarizes: "In spite of vigorous efforts to ‘Islamicise’ the nominally Muslim Bosnian populace, the locals could not be convinced to abandon pork, alcohol, or public displays of affection. Bosnian women persistently refused to wear the hijab or follow the other mandates for female behavior prescribed by extreme fundamentalist Islam."

The signing of the Washington Agreement in March 1994 brought to an end to the Bosnian-Croatian conflict. While the "Bosnian Mujahidin" remained to fight on in the war against the Serbs, the Dayton Peace Accord of November 1995 ended the conflict for good, with international aid contingent on the disarming of foreign fighters. With Bosnian government support, NATO forces took effective action to close the bases of these fighters and deport them. A limited number of former mujahedeen who had either married native Bosnians or who could not find a country to go to were permitted to stay in Bosnia and granted citizenship. However, with the war in Bosnia over, many committed and battle-hardened veterans had already returned to familiar territory.

With the Bosnian effort experiencing only limited success, al-Qaeda turned its resources towards its next phase of global expansion.

Refuge in Afghanistan

After the Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan was effectively ungoverned for seven years and plagued by constant infighting between former allies and various mujahedeen groups.

Throughout the 1990's a new force began to emerge. The origins of the Taliban (literally "students") lay in the children of Afghanistan, many of them orphaned by the war, and many of whom had been educated in the rapidly expanding network of Islamic schools (madrassas) either in Kandahar or in the refugee camps on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

According to Ahmad Rashid's well-regarded book Taliban, five leaders of the Taliban were graduates of a single madrassa, Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, near Peshawar, situated in Pakistan but largely attended by Afghan refugees. This institution reflected Salafi beliefs in its teachings, and much of its funding came from private donations from wealthy Arabs, for whom bin Laden provided conduit. A further four leading figures (including the perceived Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar Mujahed) attended a similarly funded and influenced madrassa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

The ties between Afghan Arabs and the Taliban ran deep. Many of the mujahedeen who later joined the Taliban fought alongside Afghan warlord Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi's Harkat i Inqilabi group at the time of the Russian invasion. This group also enjoyed the loyalty of most Afghan Arab fighters.

The continuing internecine strife between various factions, and accompanying lawlessness following the Soviet withdrawal, enabled the growing and well-disciplined Taliban to expand their control over territory in Afghanistan, and they came to establish an enclave which it called the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In 1994, they captured the regional center of Kandahar, and after making rapid territorial gains thereafter, conquered the capital city Kabul in September 1996.

After Sudan made it clear that bin Laden and his group were no longer welcome that year, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan — with previously established connections between the groups, a similar outlook on world affairs and largely isolated from American political influence and military power — provided a perfect location for al-Qaeda to establish its headquarters. Al-Qaeda enjoyed the Taliban's protection and a measure of legitimacy as part of their Ministry of Defense, although only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the Pakistani border regions are alleged to have trained militant Muslims from around the world. Despite the perception of some people, al-Qaeda members are ethnically diverse and connected by their radical version of Islam.

An ever-expanding network of supporters thus enjoyed a safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan until the Taliban were defeated by a combination of local forces and United States air power in 2001 (see section September 11 attacks and the United States response). Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders are still believed to be located in areas where the population is sympathetic to the Taliban in Afghanistan or the border Tribal Areas of Pakistan.

Start of militant operations against civilians

In 1993, al-Qaeda associate Ramzi Yousef used a truck bomb to attack the World Trade Center in New York City. The attack killed six people, injured 1,042, and caused nearly $300 million in property damage, but did not destroy the complex. Yusef was later captured in Pakistan.

In 1996, al-Qaeda announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they felt were Islamic lands. Bin Laden issued a fatwa, which amounted to a public declaration of war against the United States and any of its allies, and began to focus al-Qaeda's resources towards attacking the United States and its interests.

On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, along with three other Islamist leaders, co-signed and issued a fatwa (binding religious edict) under the banner of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders (al-Jabhah al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya li-Qital al-Yahud wal-Salibiyyin) declaring:

[t]he ruling to kill the Americans and their allies- civilians and military— is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Makka) from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty Allah, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together,' and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah'.

Neither bin Laden nor al-Zawahiri possessed the traditional Islamic scholarly qualifications to issue a fatwa of any kind; however, they rejected the authority of the contemporary ulema (seen as the paid servants of jahiliyya rulers) and took it upon themselves. 1998 was also the year of the first major terrorist attack reliably attributed to al-Qaeda- the U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa, resulting in upward of 300 deaths. A barrage of missiles launched by the U.S. military in response devastated an al-Qaeda base in Khost, Afghanistan, but the network's capacity was unharmed.

Bin Laden then turned his sights towards the United States Navy. In October 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemen bombed the missile destroyer U.S.S. Cole in a suicide attack, killing several sailors and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the United States itself.

September 11, 2001 attacks and the United States response

File:Apicofwtc.jpg

Al-Qaeda is best known for the September 11, 2001 attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans.

The September 11, 2001 attacks are attributed by most observers to al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the 1998 fatwa issued against the United States and its allies by bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others. Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda operative Mohammed Atta as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Hamibali as the key planners. While messages believed to be from bin Laden after September 11,2001 have praised the attacks, a statement issued six days later through Al Jazeera allegedly denied his involvement.

The attacks were the most devastating terrorist acts in American history, killing nearly 3,000 people, destroying four commercial airliners, leveling the World Trade Center towers, and damaging The Pentagon.

Evidence has since come to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the east coast of the U.S. Had these attacks gone ahead, most of the eastern seaboard of the United States would have been devastated. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was thought that the US retaliation would be too great, most likely an attack on Afganistan by the United States' nuclear weapons.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, the United States government decided to respond militarily, and began to prepare its armed forces to overthrow the Taliban regime it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. Before the United States attacked, it offered Taliban leader Mullah Omar a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The Taliban offered to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the United States would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. U.S. President George W. Bush responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over", and British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power". Soon thereafter the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the Afghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban government.

Canadian Troops in Afghanistan

As a result of the United States using its special forces and providing air support for the Northern Alliance ground forces, both Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged Gardez region of the nation. Again, under the cover of intense aerial bombardment, U.S. infantry and local Afghan forces attacked, shattering the al-Qaeda position and killing or capturing many of the militants. By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared an initial success. Nevertheless, a significant Taliban insurgency remains in Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda's top two leaders, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, evaded capture.

Debate raged about the exact nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks, and after the U.S. invasion began, the U.S. State Department also released a videotape showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power. Although its authenticity has been questioned by some, the tape appears to implicate bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks and was aired on many television channels all over the world, with an accompanying English translation provided by the United States Defense Department.

In September 2004, the U.S. government commission investigating the September 11 attacks officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives. In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a videotape released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon: "As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."

By the end of 2004, the U.S. government claimed that two-thirds of the top leaders of al-Qaeda from 2001 were in custody (including Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Saif al Islam el Masry, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri) or dead (including Mohammed Atef). Despite the capture or death of many senior al-Qaeda operatives, the U.S. government continues to warn that the organization is not yet defeated, and battles between U.S. forces and al-Qaeda-related groups continue.

See also: Responsibility for the September 11, 2001 attacks

Activity in Iraq (al-Qaeda in Iraq)

File:Zarqawi001.jpg

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a well-known figure in Iraq, was killed in a U.S. Airstrike on June 7 2006 in an al-Qaeda Safehouse in Baquba, Iraq

See also: Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda

Osama bin Laden first took interest in Iraq when the country invaded Kuwait in 1990, raising concerns the secular Baathist government of Iraq might next set its sights on Saudi Arabia, homeland of bin Laden and Islam itself. In a letter sent to King Fahd, he offered to send an army of mujahedeen to defend Saudi Arabia.

During the Gulf War, the organization's interests became split between outrage with the intervention of the United Nations in the region, hatred of Saddam Hussein's secular government, and concern for the suffering of Islamic people in Iraq. Many scholars claim that the alleged link between Saddam's regime and Al-Qaeda (which substantiated the WMD justification for the Iraq invasion) was non-existent and exaggerated.

Al-Qaeda was in contact with the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar al-islam from its inception in 1999. Several Afghan veterans, Arab and Kurd, entered the enclave controlled by Ansar al-Islam from Iran. Among them was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who left the Kurdish zone before the allied invasion in 2003.

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq, al-Qaeda took more formal interest in the region and is known to have been responsible for actively organizing and aiding local resistance to the occupying coalition forces and the emerging government. Militant allies of Al-Qaeda bombed both the local United Nations and Red Cross headquarters later that year. In 2004, the main al-Qaeda bases in Iraq were raided by U.S. forces besieging Fallujah. Despite the loss of these key positions and many of its fighters, al-Qaeda continued to mount attacks across Iraq. During Iraq's elections in January 2005, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for nine suicide blasts in the Iraqi capital Baghdad. Many Iraqi attacks linked to the Sunni al-Qaeda were sectarian bombings of Shia civilians, who were apparently considered infidels.

Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi formally merged his organization "Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad" with al-Qaeda on 17 October 2004, and the organization began to use the banners of "Al-Qaeda in Iraq". In the merger, al-Zarqawi declared loyalty to Osama bin Laden. Al-Zarqawi was killed by U.S. air strikes on a safe house near Baqubah, Iraq on June 7, 2006. Before his death, it appears al-Zarqawi was trying to use Iraq as a launching pad for international terrorism, most notably dispatching suicide bombers to attack hotels in Amman, Jordan. It is unknown the extent of al-Zarqawi's relation to the larger al-Qaeda terrorist network, though it appears the renaming of his insurgent cell was a move to boost legitimacy and recruitment rather than an actual sharing of goals, members, and weapons.

Since the killing of al-Zarqawi, it is widely believed Abu Ayyub al-Masri took over as head of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Although the group has failed in its primary goal of driving U.S. and British forces from Iraq and destroying the Shiite-dominated government set up by the occupation, al-Qaeda in Iraq has effectively ignited widespread sectarian violence across the country. Al-Qaeda in Iraq now operates primarily as part of the Mujahideen Shura Council, an umbrella organization of Sunni militant groups in Iraq who resist solidarity with Shiites, and vow to continue resistance.

On September 3, 2006 the second-in-command of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Hamed Jumaa Farid al-Saeedi (also known as Abu Humam or Abu Rana), was arrested north of Baghdad, along with a group of his aides and followers.

Al-Qaeda allegedly in Kashmir

On July 13, 2006, a man claiming to be a spokesperson for al-Qaeda called up a local news agency in Srinagar to announce the arrival of the group in Kashmir. The alleged al-Qaeda spokesman said its arrival was a "consequence of Indian oppression and suppression of minorities, particularly Muslims." There have been reports that al-Qaeda men had infiltrated the Kashmir Valley over the past few years, particularly after the US pursued the group following its invasion of Afghanistan. Also, it has been said that links have been found between al-Qaeda and terror groups like LeT of Pakistan.

Al-Qaeda Activities in Somalia

Main article: Battle of Mogadishu

Activities of al-Qaeda in Somalia are alleged to have begun as early as 1992. The organization's role during the course of the 1992–1994 UN missions was limited to a handful of trainers. Ali Mohamed and other al-Qaeda members purportedly trained forces loyal to warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid. Osama bin Laden himself claimed in an interview with ABC's John Miller to have sent al-Qaeda operatives to Somalia. One of the al-Qaeda fighters present during the interview claimed to have personally slit the throats of three American soldiers in Somalia. Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down, states the terrorist organization did train some of Aidid's men on how to fire rocket-propelled grenades to destroy U.S. helicopters, but they were not personally part of the fight with US forces in the Battle of Mogadishu.

Ties to 1998 Embassy Bombings

It is believed several terrorist attacks were orchestrated from Ras Kamboni, in the extreme southern tip of Somalia adjacent to Kenya, including the 1998 United States embassy bombings and the 2002 Mombasa hotel bombing.

On June 22, 2006, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer announced the U.S. was seeking the assistance of the Islamic Courts Union in the apprehension of suspects who carried out attacks against its East African embassies in 1998 and an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya in 2002.

She listed the following persons as suspected of being in Somalia (name and nationality):

• Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, Comoros
• Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, Kenya
• Abu Taha al-Sudan, Sudan

Ties to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

• Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, a military leader in the Islamic Courts Union, and formerly leader of Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) was designated under US Presidential Executive Order 13224 as a terrorist financier on June 3. 2004.

• Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) youth movement, Hizbul Shabaab, was said to have gone to Afghanistan to train with Al-Qaeda before 2001, according to Matthew Bryden of International Crisis Group.

On July 1, 2006, a Web-posted message purportedly written by Osama bin Laden urged Somalis to build an Islamic state in the country, and warned Western countries that his al-Qaeda network would fight against them if they intervened there.

On November 26, 2006, the U.S. Embassy in Kenya issued a travel alert to US citizens regarding travel to Kenya or Ethiopia after letters allegedly written by the Somalian leader of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, encouraged suicide terrorist attacks on US citizens in those two countries.

On November 30, 2006, the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) claimed three suicide bombings costing eight lives were the work of al-Qaeda operatives working in the country.

On December 14, 2006, the US Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer warned that al-Qaeda cell operatives were controlling the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the Islamist faction of Somalia rapidly taking control of the southern area of the country. The next day, December 15, 2006, ICU Information Secretary Abdirahim Ali Mudey denied the allegation as baseless. That same day Frazer announced the United States has no intention of committing troops to Somalia to root out al-Qaeda.

On December 20, 2006, war in Somalia erupted between the ICU and the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian allies. Salad Ali Jelle, Defence Minister of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government, claimed Abu Taha al-Sudan led the Islamists fighting against the government in the town of Iidale. On December 25, 2006, Ethiopia began bombing two airports in Somalia. In justifying the attack, the Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi stated that his country was "at war" with Islamist militants in Somalia.

American officials state that Ras Kamboni served as a training camp for extremists with connections to al-Qaeda. US security concerns in the Horn of Africa, particularly at Ras Kamboni, heightened after the attacks on 9/11. On December 16, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz said the US was meeting with various Somali and Ethiopian contacts to "observe, survey possible escape routes, possible sanctuaries" for al-Qaeda operatives. On March 2, 2002 a briefing was held in the Pentagon to discuss the possible use of Ras Kamboni by terrorist groups, including al-Ittihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and Al Qaeda. In December 2002, the U.S. established the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) to monitor developments in the region and train local militaries on counterterrorism.

On January 8, 2007, during the Battle of Ras Kamboni, it was reported an AC-130 gunship belonging to the United States military had attacked suspected al-Qaeda operatives in southern Somalia. It was also reported that the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower had been moved into striking distance. The gunship flew out of its base in Djibouti. Many bodies were spotted on the ground, but the identity of the dead or wounded was not yet established. The targeted leaders were tracked by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as they headed south from Mogadishu starting on December 28.

On February 15, in Houston, Texas, U.S. citizen Daniel Joseph Maldonado (Daniel Aljughaifi) was charged with "training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside the United States." He had been extradited by Kenyan authorities after he fled there. In the charges, it was alleged he took part in training at camps near Kismayo and Jilib where members of Al-Qaeda were present and was willing to become a suicide bomber if he became wounded.

Organization structure and membership

The chain of command

Though the current structure of al-Qaeda is unknown, information mostly acquired from Jamal al-Fadl provided American authorities with a rough picture of how the group was organized. While the veracity of the information provided by al-Fadl and the motivation for his cooperation are both disputed, American authorities base much of their current knowledge of al-Qaeda on his testimony.

Bin Laden is the emir and Senior Operations Chief of al-Qaeda (although originally this role may have been filled by Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi), advised by a shura council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members, estimated by Western officials at about twenty to thirty people. Ayman al-Zawahiri is al-Qaeda's Deputy Operations Chief and Abu Ayyub al-Masri is possibly the senior leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

• The Military committee is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
• The Money/Business committee runs business operations. The travel office provides air tickets and false passports. The payroll office pays al-Qaeda members and the management office oversees profit-driven businesses. In the 9/11 Commission Report, it is estimated that al-Qaeda requires $30,000,000 USD per year to conduct its operations.
• The Law committee reviews Islamic law and decides if particular courses of action conform to the law.
• The Islamic study/fatwah committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
• In the late 1990s there was a publicly known Media committee, which ran the now-defunct newspaper Nashrat al Akhbar (Newscast) and handled public relations. It is currently assumed that media operations are now outsourced to internally redundant parts of the organization.

The number of individuals belonging to the organization is also unknown. According to the controversial BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares, al-Qaeda is so weakly linked together that it is hard to say it exists apart from Osama bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges is cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that meets the description of al-Qaeda exists at all. The extent and nature of al-Qaeda remains a topic of dispute.

Political revolt or structured paramilitary organization

Some organizational specialists have said that al-Qaeda's dispersed network structure, as opposed to a hierarchical structure, is its primary strength. The decentralized structure enables al-Qaeda to have a worldwide distributed base while retaining a relatively small core. While an estimated 100,000 Islamist militants are said to have received instruction in al-Qaeda camps since its inception, the group is believed to retain only a small number of militants under direct orders. Estimates seldom peg its manpower higher than 20,000 worldwide.

For its most complex operations (such as the 9/11 attacks on the US) all participants, planning, and funding are believed to have been directly provided by the core al-Qaeda organization. But in many attacks around the world where there appears to be an al-Qaeda connection, its precise role has been less easy to define. Rather than handling these operations from conception to delivery, al-Qaeda often appears to act as an international financial and logistical support-network, channeling income obtained from a network of fundraising activities to provide training and coordination for local radical groups. In many cases it is these local groups, only loosely affiliated to core al-Qaeda, which actually undertake the attacks.

File:Australian embassy bombing flag.jpg

The Australian flag continues to fly in front of a neighbouring building devastated in the 2004 Jakarta embassy bombing

Australian tourists and interests have been targeted in a series of devastating attacks north of Australia in the southern islands of Indonesia, on the southern edge of southeast Asia. These attacks and plots have been attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda's affiliate in the region. The 2002 Bali bombing, 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, 2004 Jakarta embassy bombing and the 2005 Bali bombings provide some insight into al-Qaeda's decentralized method of operations. The attacks showed far greater coordination and effectiveness than might historically have been expected from regional militant networks. But police investigations and subsequent trials showed that while al-Qaeda was believed to have provided expertise and coordination, much of the planning and all the personnel who undertook the attacks came from local radical Islamist groups.

Al-Qaeda has been known to establish and foster new groups to further the radical Islamic interest in local cablish's. The Taliban might be deemed to fall into this category, the roots of the organization formed from radicalized students from the bin Laden funded-medressas of the Afghan refugee camps at the time of the Russian occupation.

Al-Qaeda members who carried out suicide bombings, hijackings and other terrorist attacks

9/11 hijackers (American Airlines 11):

• Mohammed Atta
• Satam al-Suqami
• Waleed al-Shehri
• Wail al-Shehri
• Abdulaziz al-Omari

9/11 hijackers (United Airlines 175):

• Marwan al-Shehhi
• Fayez Banihammad
• Mohand al-Shehri
• Hamza al-Ghamdi
• Ahmed al-Ghamdi

9/11 hijackers (American Airlines 77):

• Hani Hanjour
• Khalid al-Mihdhar
• Majed Moqed
• Nawaf al-Hazmi
• Salem al-Hazmi

9/11 hijackers (United Airlines 93):

• Ziad Jarrah
• Ahmed al-Nami
• Saeed al-Ghamdi
• Ahmed al-Haznawi

7/7 Suicide bombers (London):

• Mohammed Sidique Khan
• Shehzad Tanweer
• Germaine Lindsay
• Hasib Hussain

Suspects at large
(1998 Embassy Bombings and 2002 Kenya hotel bombing):

• Fazul Abdullah Mohamed Killed in a U.S. Airstrike on January 8 2007
• Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan
• Abu Taha al-Sudan

Other al-Qaeda leaders:

• Osama Bin Laden
• Saif al-Adel
• Sulaiman Abu Ghaith
• Abu Hafiza
• Abu Faraj al-Libbi (arrested in Pakistan, 2005)
• Abu Mohammed al-Masri
• Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (captured
  in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, 2003)
• Thirwat Salah Shirhata
• Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (killed in June 2006)
• Ayman al-Zawahiri
• Abu Zubaydah (captured in 2002)

Activities

Incidents attributed to al-Qaeda

Main article: Al-Qaeda terror campaign

Israel

Despite bin Laden's repeated references to the Palestinian cause in his manifestos and interviews, some in the region villainize the organization for allegedly ignoring the Palestinian cause. There could be an endless list of reasons why al-Qaeda is seemingly inactive in the Palestinian territories. One theory is that al-Qaeda is unwilling to co-operate with the mainly Sh'ia groups such as Hezbollah who fund the Palestinian feud against Israel. Another theory suggests that Palestinians don't wish to be stained further by the extremist ideology driving al-Qaeda followers, and prefer to conduct combat according to their own principles.

Al-Qaeda is suspected, however, to have planned and carried out two nearly simultaneous terror attacks against Israeli civilian targets in Mombasa, Kenya, on November 28, 2002. The one successful attack, a car-bomb placed in a resort hotel popular among Israeli tourists, claimed the lives of 15 people. The hotel bombing occurred 20 minutes after a failed attack on an airplane, when a terrorist fired an SA-7 MANPAD against an Israeli airliner carrying 261 passengers, which was taking off from the airport. The rocket narrowly missed its target and landed in an empty field.

Internet activities

In the wake of its evacuation from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. As a result, the organization’s use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, encompassing financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, as well as information dissemination, gathering, and sharing. Abu Ayyub al-Masri’s al-Qaeda movement in Iraq regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the Mujahideen Shura Council, has a regular presence on the web where pronouncements are given by Murasel. This growing range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and epic-themed videos with high production values that romanticize participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda, for example, posted a video of captured American contractor Nick Berg being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of Paul Johnson, Kim Sun-il, and Daniel Pearl, were first posted on jihadist websites.

With the rise of “locally rooted, globally inspired” terrorists, counter-terrorism experts are currently studying how al-Qaeda is using the Internet – through websites, chat rooms, discussion forums, instant messaging, and so on – to inspire a worldwide network of support. The July 7 2005 bombers, some of whom were well integrated into their local communities, are an example of such “globally inspired” terrorists, and they reportedly used the Internet to plan and coordinate. A group called the "Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe" has claimed responsibility for these London attacks on a militant Islamist website – another popular use of the Internet by terrorists seeking publicity.

The publicity opportunities offered by the Internet have been particularly exploited by al-Qaeda. In December 2004, for example, bin Laden released an audio message by posting it directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to al Jazeera as he had done in the past. Some analysts speculated that he did this to be certain it would be available unedited, out of fear that his criticism of Saudi Arabia — which was much more vehement than usual in this speech, lasting over an hour — might be removed by al Jazeera editors concerned about offending the Saudi royal family.

In the past, Alneda.com and Jehad.net were perhaps the most significant al-Qaeda websites. Alneda was initially taken down by an American, but the operators resisted by shifting the site to various servers and strategically shifting content. The U.S. is currently attempting to extradite an information technology specialist, Babar Ahmad, from the UK, who is the creator of various English-language al-Qaeda websites such as Azzam.com. Ahmad's extradition is opposed by various British Muslim organizations, such as the Muslim Association of Britain.

Finally, at a mid-2005 presentation for U.S. government terrorism analysts, Dennis Pluchinsky called the global jihadist movement “Web-directed,” and former CIA deputy director John E. McLaughlin has also said it is now primarily driven today by “ideology and the Internet.”

Financial activities

Financial activities of al-Qaeda have been a major preoccupation of the US government following the September 11 2001 attacks. It was discovered by investigative reporter Denis Robert that funds from Osama bin Laden's Bahrain International Bank transited through illegal unpublished accounts of "clearinghouse" Clearstream, which has been qualified as a "bank of banks".

Notes on naming

Al-Qaeda's name can also be transliterated as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, el-Qaida, or al Qaeda. In Arabic it is spelled القاعدة. Its Arabic pronunciation (IPA [ælˈqɑːʕɨdæ]) can be approximated as IPA [æl 'kɑː-idɛ], which for English speakers could be spelled "el/al-kAH-ee-deh," with the emphasized "AH" and "ee" clearly separated. However, English speakers more commonly pronounce it in a manner influenced by its spelling - IPA /ɑɫ 'kaɪdɘ/ for American English, /aɫ 'kaɪdɘ/ in British English. Listen to the US pronunciation (RealPlayer).

See also

• 9/11 Commission
• Adam Yahiye Gadahn - (Arabic: آدم يحيى غدن‎; born
  September 1 1978) is an American-born member of
  the al-Qaeda organization
• Al-Qaedaism
• Al Barakaat
• Armed Islamic Group
• Ayman al-Zawahiri
• Egyptian Islamic Jihad
• Insurgency in Saudi Arabia
• Islamist terrorism
• Islamic Fundamentalism
• Jamaat-e-Islami
• Ladenese epistle
• List of alleged al-Qaeda members
• List of terrorist organisations

• Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
• Muslim Brotherhood
• Osama bin Laden
• Osama bin Laden tapes
• The Power of Nightmares; BBC documentary
• Psychological operations
• Religious terrorism
• Steven Emerson
• Takfir Wal Hijira
• Takfiri
• Taliban Movement
• Terrorist incidents
• Wahhabism
• Islamofascism
• Talibanization
• Al-Qaedaism

Further reading

• Alexander, Yonah (2001). Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network. Transnational Publishers, Incorporated. ISBN 1-57105-219-4. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Bell, J. Bowyer (2002). Murders on the Nile: The World Trade Center and Global Terror (1st edition ed.). Encounter Books. ISBN 1-893554-63-5. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Bergen, Peter (2002). Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (1st Touchstone edition ed.). Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-3495-2. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Bergen, Peter (2006). The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda's Leader (reprint edition ed.). Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-7892-5. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Bin Laden, Osama (2005). Bruce Lawrence (Ed.) (ed.). Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. James Howarth (Translator). Verso. ISBN 1-84467-045-7.
• Burke, Jason (2004). Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 1-85043-396-8.
• Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10 2001 (reprint edition ed.). Penguin (Non-Classics). ISBN 0-14-303466-9. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Corbin, Jane (2003). Al-Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World. Nation Books. ISBN 1-56025-523-4.
• Devji, Faisal (2005). Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-4437-3.
• Esposito, John L. (2002). Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. Oxford University Press, USA. ISBN 0-19-515435-5.
• Friedman, George (2005). America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and Its Enemies (reprint edition ed.). Broadway. ISBN 0-7679-1785-5. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Gerges, Fawaz A. (2005). The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-79140-5.
• Gerges, Fawaz A. (2006). Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy. Harcourt. ISBN 0-15-101213-X.
• Gunaratna, Rohan (2003). Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (reissue edition ed.). Berkley Trade. ISBN 0-425-19114-1. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Habeck, Mary (2006). Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. Yale University Press. ISBN 0-300-11306-4.
• Hamud, Randall B. (2005). (Ed.) (ed.). Osama Bin Laden: America's Enemy in His Own Words (1st edition ed.). Nadeem Publishing. ISBN 0-9770935-0-6. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help); |editor= has generic name (help)
• Kepel, Gilles (2004). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 1-85043-722-X.
• Mamdani, Mahmood (2004). Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror. Pantheon. ISBN 0-375-42285-4.
• Reynalds, Jermey (October). War of the Web: Fighting the Online Jihad. World Ahead Publishing. ISBN 0-9746701-7-0. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
• Roy, Olivier (2004). Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13498-3.
• Scheuer, Michael (2006). Through Our Enemies' Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America (revised edition ed.). Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-967-2. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Smucker, Philip (2004). Al Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail. Potomac Books. ISBN 1-57488-628-2.
• Whelan, Richard (2005). Al-Qaedaism: The Threat to Islam, The Threat to the World (1st edition ed.). Ashfield Press. ISBN 1-901658-54-6. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Williams, Paul L. (2002). Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror (1st edition ed.). Alpha. ISBN 0-02-864352-6. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)
• Williams, Paul L. (2005). The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime, And the Coming Apocalypse. Prometheus Books. ISBN 1-59102-349-1.
• Wright, Lawrence (2006). The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Knopf. ISBN 0-375-41486-X.

Videos

• Template:Google video
• Template:Google video
• Template:Google video
• (1) Al-Qaeda Internet News Broadcast Celebrates U.S. Hurricanes and Gaza Pullout, Reports Zarqawi's Anti-Shiite Campaign and Chemical Mortar Shells in Iraq at MEMRI
• (2) Al-Qaeda's Internet News Broadcast Expresses Solidarity with Al-Jazeera Reporter Tayseer 'Alouni Who Was Sentenced to Seven Years in Jail by a "Crusader Infidel Spanish Court" at MEMRI
• Inside 9/11 (2005) from The National Geographic Society. An Emmy nominated documentary that covers the events, principals,and organizatons that lead to 9/11.

External links

• Al-Qaeda Videos
• JihadMonitor.org Open Sources Project on Jihadist Terrorism
• Rewards for Justice - Most Wanted Terrorists
• Al Qaeda Training Manual used by British alleged member of Al Qaeda, Manchester, England (URL accessed March 2005)
• PBS FRONTLINE "Al Qaeda's New Front" January 2005
• Al-Qaida has been more active in Britain
• Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive; Alan Cullison, The Atlantic Monthly, September 2004.
• The making of the terror myth; Guardian; October 15 2004
• The Power of Nightmares; A three-part BBC documentary about the War on Terrorism
• Middle East Media Research Institute TV clips
• Al-Qaida at Curlie