Demonstration on June 2, 1967 in West Berlin

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The demonstration on June 2, 1967 in West Berlin against the state visit of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a decisive event in West German history : police officers surrounded the demonstrators, beat them up, picked out individuals at random, mistreated them and alleged murder by the police. The police officer Karl-Heinz Kurras shot and killed the demonstrator Benno Ohnesorg while his colleagues beat him up.

As a result, the West German student movement spread and radicalized in the 1960s . Social and police reforms under the SPD-FDP government since 1969 as well as the terrorism of the Red Army faction since 1970 and the June 2nd movement since 1972 go back to this historic event.

prehistory

European trip of the Shah

Heinrich Lübke, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Farah Pahlavi, Wilhelmine Lübke (from left to right) in Augustusburg Castle in Brühl (Rhineland) , May 27, 1967

Federal President Heinrich Lübke invited the Shah after his state visit to Iran in October 1963. On October 24th, 30 Iranian students went on hunger strike in Erlangen to draw attention to serious violations of human rights in Iran. The Bavarian Ministry of the Interior banned the strike after three days and instructed the Bavarian immigration authorities to check all activities of Iranian students in Bavaria to determine whether they endangered security and order as well as the good relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and Iran. Some students went on hunger strike anyway, putting their lives in danger. West German media reported almost exclusively on Lübke's state visit and the strike ban, not on the reasons and goals of the strikers. A rare exception was an article by Ulrike Meinhof in the magazine “ Koncrete” (January 1964).

The Shah visited the Federal Republic as the third stop on his planned European trip to Czechoslovakia (at that time ČSSR) and France . On the return trip he visited Turkey . On May 28, 1967, he met Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and other high-ranking German politicians in Bonn for talks. The main focus was on bilateral economic relations and the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

Education and protests

The Socialist German Student Union (SDS) organized protests against a foreign state guest, the Congolese dictator Moïse Tschombé, for the first time in December 1964 . In West Berlin, the demonstrators bypassed the police barriers. Limited rule violations gave the protests a more public hearing. From 1966 the SDS made the Vietnam War its main theme. He planned an anti-war demonstration for June 3, 1967 and wanted to concentrate his own efforts on it.

The entire German tabloid press and the newspapers of the market-dominant Axel Springer Verlag welcomed the visit of the shepherd couple and reported for months in detail about their lifestyle. In contrast, the Iranian exile Bahman Nirumand tried to explain the social situation of the Iranian population. In 1960 he founded the left-wing “ Confederation of Iranian Students ” (CIS) in Heidelberg . At the suggestion of Hans Magnus Enzensberger , he wrote a book about Iran, which appeared in January 1967 in the Federal Republic ( Persia. Model of a developing country or The dictatorship of the free world ). West German press reports about attempts by the Iranian government to prevent the book promoted its popularity.

In February 1967 Nirumand initially unsuccessfully asked the Berlin SDS to take action against the Shah's visit. From May the AStA of the FU invited him to a panel discussion on Iran for June 1st. The Iranian embassy asked the German government to work towards a ban on the event and threatened to otherwise cancel the Shah's visit. The FU director Hans-Joachim Lieber rejected the ban. The Commune I gave on May 24 leaflets against the Shah out, which they ascribed to the SDS. On May 30th, the CIS itself published a “profile” that presented the Shah as a wanted criminal under the heading “Murder!”. A distributor and a translator received a criminal complaint for insulting a foreign head of state.

Bahman Nirumand during his lecture on the eve of the Shah's visit

On the evening of June 1, Nirumand described the undemocratic conditions in his home country in front of an audience of 3,000 to 4,000 in the FU's Audimax. Student leader Rudi Dutschke said that the fight against oppression in Iran is also about Vietnam. The AStA called for rallies against the Shah the following day. The AStA chairman reported the evening demonstration to the authorities. The audience affirmed the three proposed protest locations: from 12:00 p.m. in front of Schöneberg Town Hall , from 3:00 p.m. on Kurfürstendamm and from 7:00 p.m. in front of the Deutsche Oper . Benno Ohnesorg had also read Nirumand's book and heard his lecture. He decided to join the demonstration the following day.

Police strategy

The riot police in West Berlin also had paramilitary tasks until 1970 and was considered a reserve for the Allied troops. Over 50 percent of the staff consisted of former Wehrmacht officers . At that time, the training was still heavily influenced by the military. Ideologically and organizationally, the police were primarily geared towards warding off a suspected danger from East Berlin and through communist allies inside. Legal standards and operational concepts originated largely from the time of the Weimar Republic . There was a great deal of discretion in the definition and treatment of self-defense situations.

The police in West Berlin intensified their action against demonstrators since 1966. At a “walking demonstration” on December 17, 1966, they used civilian-clad “riot squads” for the first time, who attacked suspected ringleaders from the crowd and these of the uniformed police handed over. 80 people were arrested, including children. More than 40 of them could not be proven to be involved.

In a letter to Interior Senator Wolfgang Büsch on April 13, 1967 , Police President Erich Duensing spoke of a “student war” that could not be mastered with the police, but only with public prosecutors and courts. In his reply on May 8, however, Büsch expected an intensified confrontation that would make larger police deployments necessary. He wrote:

“The police officers deployed will only be able to meet these requirements if they always have the certainty that their superiors will stand up for them even if the subsequent tactical and legal examination reveals errors. However, this assumes that these errors do not have to be viewed as breaches of duty. "

Büsch therefore rejected de-escalation measures and wanted to counter the student protests by increasing the use of force without the police officers deployed having to fear criminal prosecution.

On May 28, 1967, the Federal Criminal Police Office warned the West Berlin Senate of a possible attack by Iranians in exile on the Shah. Springer newspapers reported on alleged attack plans by the students. During the Shah's visit to Munich (May 30th), students disrupted the smooth process by handing out leaflets that portrayed the Shah as corrupt. As a result, representatives of the Federal Government and the West Berlin Senate considered on June 1, 1967, to cancel the Shah's planned visit to Berlin. Wolfgang Büsch decided against it because a short-term cancellation would have acted as a buckle before the protests and would have triggered a devastating response from the press.

On May 30th, police commander Hans-Ulrich Werner explained to Büsch the allocation of space for the expected protest demonstration in front of the Deutsche Oper: Leave the southern sidewalk free so that “all the troublemakers have to be in one place”. Werner had worked as a police officer in the fight against partisans during the Nazi era and was therefore criticized in 1962. The then Interior Senator Heinrich Albertz had kept him in office. As governing mayor, Albertz agreed with Federal Interior Minister Paul Lücke and the Federal President's Office that the entire area around the Deutsche Oper should be cordoned off. His secretary informed the Senate Interior Administration, which was responsible for supervising the police, by telephone. Deputy Police President Georg Moch , who represented Duensing during his vacation, also refused to allow the southern sidewalk in front of the opera.

course

In front of the Schöneberg town hall

The Shah was supposed to sign the city's Golden Book in the morning of June 2, 1967 in the Schöneberg Town Hall . The Embassy of Iran had been given permission that Iranian Shah followers ( " Jubelperser ") were able to welcome the Shah before his hotel in West Berlin. On June 1, 1967, however, she announced that Shah supporters would come to Schöneberg Town Hall. Duensing agreed and ordered them to be "well packed" to the side. The next morning they arrived in Schöneberg with two city buses. The police headquarters there, contrary to instructions and despite warnings from several police officers, placed them in a strip directly in front of the town hall stairs, which was only separated from the counter-demonstrators by simple movable barriers. They carried portraits of the Shah, banners with wooden slats and clubs with them. According to several witnesses, the press spokesman for the Senate Hanns-Peter Herz said to the waiting journalists: "Well, these guys can be prepared for something today, there will be a thrashing tonight!" According to another version, he said: "Tonight there will be wedges!"

Demonstrators and spectators in front of the Schöneberg town hall

Up to 2000 people had gathered in front of the town hall by 11:45 a.m. The banners read, for example, “Stop torturing political prisoners”, “Welcome Mr. Dictator”, “Murderer”. Upon the arrival of the Shah, his supporters demonstrated loudly for him to shield him from the protests. The opponents of the Shah shouted “murderer, murderer” and demanded amnesty for political prisoners in Iran. After the Shah entered the town hall, his supporters passed the front row of the police, attacked the counter-demonstrators with wooden slats, clubs and steel pipes and injured dozen of them, some seriously. The police stood right next to them and did not intervene, even though those affected asked them to. However, they arrested some of the demonstrators who overpowered and handed over to the Shah supporters. After about five minutes, more mounted police arrived and in turn beat the demonstrators. The RIAS reporter Erich Nieswandt observed the events from the town hall window above the stairs and reported live: “You have to honor the truth, the Persians [...] were the first to take their posters off their sticks and randomly into them with these sticks The radio and press reports motivated even more students to go to the evening demonstration.

Heinrich Albertz only found out about the presence of the Shah supporters during the brawl. He urged the police to keep them away from the students in the evenings. Later he tried to determine who was responsible. He found that around 150 Shah supporters had arrived in West Berlin on special flights on June 1 and had been paid for to cheer. He was convinced that the Iranian secret service SAVAK had hired them and that the Foreign Office and the Federal Intelligence Service had known about the entry of these "thugs".

In front of the Deutsche Oper

Demonstrators, spectators and police officers in front of the Deutsche Oper

In the evening the couple, Heinrich Lübke and Heinrich Albertz attended a performance of the Magic Flute in the Deutsche Oper. Before that, the police had set up barriers that left the southern sidewalk of Bismarckstrasse free. A construction fence bordered this narrow corridor at the rear. Police guards with dogs controlled the building site behind it. Before that, around 2,000 demonstrators and spectators gathered until 7:00 p.m. At first the mood among them was relaxed and cheerful. Duensing, who was not there, ordered the pavement in front of the opera to be cleared at 6:30 p.m. The chief of operations did not receive the order until 7:00 p.m. and found that the crowd had completely occupied the sidewalk and was already too big to evacuate in time. The Shah supporters arrived around 7:30 p.m. and, despite Albertz's instructions, were posted to the side in front of the other spectators. They teased her with gestures and verbal abuse. At the same time, police beat spectators sitting on it from the back of the site fence with batons and took others from trees. The student Reiner L. was overlooked and observed the events from the top of a tree. The police repeatedly grabbed individual demonstrators at random from the crowd, dragged them across the street and beat them in front of everyone, even after they were arrested. Some raptors grabbed her arms and legs and hurled her back into the crowd. Requests for the service numbers of such officers were ignored or responded with beatings. A student who wanted to ask the head of operations for moderation and to do this stepped over the barricade was immediately encircled, thrown into the street, kicked and punched with fists. Four policemen continued this for minutes in a corner to the side of the opera house, watched by opera guest Neil Acherson inside.

At 7:50 p.m. Duensing ordered the operations manager to clear the opera forecourt at some point during the three and a half hour opera performance. Albertz mistakenly suspected in 1981 that he himself had caused the police to violently break up the demonstration because he had said to an officer after entering the opera: "I hope that this drama will not be repeated when it leaves." At 8:00 pm the Shah's motorcade arrived. The demonstrators welcomed him with boos and chants like "Shah, Shah, Charlatan", "Shah-SA-SS" and "Mo, Mo, Mossadegh ", reminiscent of the democratically elected Iranian head of government who was overthrown by the Shah. Some tossed eggs and tomatoes, which were accessible on a van parked by strangers, and hard rubber rings from the construction site. However, they missed the opera goers 40 meters away. The police officers threw smoke candles from Commune I and their own tear gas grenades back into the crowd. The demonstrators did not throw paving stones behind the site fence. Only after the evacuation began, according to eyewitnesses, a stone flew over the crowd from the construction site and hit a police officer in the face.

After the Shah entered the opera house, many wanted to leave the square. At the same time, the police officers formed three rows of two at the level of the opera entrance and drew their batons. At around 8:05 p.m. there was a loudspeaker announcement that demonstrators had stabbed a police officer. Witnesses felt this was a deliberate stimulation. A police officer threatened: “You killed one of us. […] Now we're giving it to you! ”According to the later investigation report, the announcement should not have been made until 9:00 pm and should not have influenced the events before the opera. Until 11 p.m. the police called on “the good-willed Berlin population” over loudspeakers: “Do not make yourself in common with these subjects. Clear the Kurfürstendamm immediately. There has already been one fatality: a police officer has been stabbed by a demonstrator. "

Police beat a protester lying on the ground with batons.

The demonstrators opposite the opera entrance spontaneously shouted "sit down" and sat down in the street, but were then beaten from all sides, so that panic broke out. The police jumped over the barriers at a run, trampled over the injured people who were sitting and lying on the ground, and beat them again if they tried to get up and run away. The Shah supporters participated with wooden slats. Fritz Teufel , who remained seated, received particularly severe blows and kicks. Fleeing people pushed in the site fence, but were pushed back into the crowd by the police behind it with dogs. Against those who managed to escape, more police teams advanced with clubs, dogs and iron bars and drove them back into areas that had already been cleared. A student who asked where she should go got the answer: “It's too late.” Individual police officers tried to hold back beating colleagues. One of them apologized to a seriously injured student: "For God's sake, don't believe that everyone is like that." According to many witnesses, the police only now asked to leave Bismarckstrasse. Nobody heard an earlier announcement. Other officials beat the fugitives on the edge of the cauldron and used water cannons and tear gas against them. The police had prepared this procedure internally and called it the “liver sausage tactic”.

Fatal shot

The student Benno Ohnesorg took part in the demonstration in front of the opera and followed the police who were chasing protesters into a back yard of the building at Krumme Strasse 66. He and another student were caught there by the police riot troops, held and beaten by three officers. The civil officer approached Kurras, drew his service weapon and fired at 8:30 p.m. from about one and a half meters away at the back of Ohnesorg's head. Ohnesorg died within the next hour, likely while the ambulance was driving until he was admitted to an emergency room at around 9:30 p.m.

Reactions and consequences

ruling mayor

Heinrich Albertz (SPD) heard a rumor during the opera performance that a student, then a police officer, had died. He then drove home. He learned of Ohnesorg's death through radio news at midnight on June 3, but not what caused it. At around 1:00 am, he made a statement prepared by the Senate Press Chief Hanns-Peter Herz: “The city is running out of patience. A few dozen demonstrators, including students, have earned the sad merit of not only verbally abusing a guest from the Federal Republic of Germany in the German capital, but also one dead and numerous injured - police officers and demonstrators. The police, provoked by rowdies, were forced to crack down on them and use their batons. I expressly and emphatically say that I approve of the behavior of the police and that I have convinced myself through my own eyes that the police have restrained themselves to the limits of reasonableness. "

So he blamed the demonstrators for the police operation and the death of Ohnesorg. In the days that followed he couldn't find a word for his relatives either. On June 8th, he declared in front of the House of Representatives : “The dead student is hopefully the last victim of a development that has been triggered by an extremist minority that is abusing freedom in order to achieve its ultimate goal, the dissolution of our basic democratic order. I am passionate about this: Anyone who confuses cause and effect is already complicit. "

In the following months Albertz gave up his unconditional support for the police. Intensive discussions with the Protestant theology professor Helmut Gollwitzer and Bishop Kurt Scharf , who made church rooms available to the students for discussion meetings, contributed to this. In his radio speech on September 3, 1967, Albertz recalled the experiences of the Weimar Republic : “Freedoms of this kind lead to nothing other than fascist counter-pressure and the formation of authoritarian forms of government. We learned that bitter enough before 1933. "

On September 15, 1967 in the House of Representatives, Albertz attributed the police operation to false East-West front thought patterns. In response to allegations that he had adopted too soft an attitude towards the students, he replied:

“This is where we all have deeply neglected: that we did not speak earlier, more often and more clearly, especially with young people, about the possibilities and impossibilities of our politics. [...] I now believe that more important than anything that regulatory bodies in our city have to do with extreme minorities or otherwise are political answers that we have to give. […] I was weakest when I was toughest, on that night of June 2nd, because I was doing the wrong thing there objectively. "

This referred to his nightly justification of the police operation and blame on the students. Because of intrigues on the part of the right wing of the party, which had wanted to overthrow him since taking office in April 1967, no majority could be found for the interior department. Albertz then resigned on September 26, 1967.

West Berlin Senate

On the afternoon of June 3, the SPD-led Senate passed a 14-day “non-approval of demonstrations”, even though the Berlin constitution did not permit a general ban on gatherings. Furthermore, youth senator Kurt Neubauer (SPD) called for all those arrested as “ringleaders” to be deported from Berlin and for an appropriate order from the Allies to be obtained. Others wanted demonstrators to have a psychiatric assessment. Following the proposal of Justice Senator Hans-Günter Hoppe (FDP), the Senate set up rapid courts for the arrested.

The SPD MPs Gerd Löffler and Dietrich Stobbe , who had been in Krummen Strasse near the scene of the crime on June 2, pointed out in the Senate meeting that it was only the evacuation of the opera forecourt that caused the escalation of violence on both sides.

The demonstration ban was lifted on June 12th to avoid clashes at a student demonstration that day.

police

Police chief Erich Duensing was informed about Ohnesorg's shooting by a police officer by no later than 1:00 a.m. on June 3. He reported to Albertz the following morning about a "ricochet" who had accidentally hit Ohnesorg. The Senate spokesman explained this version at a press conference, but was already confronted with contradicting testimony there.

According to student research at the time, 20 police officers, 28 according to other information, were slightly injured on June 2, 27 of whom were treated on an outpatient basis. Of an unknown number of injured demonstrators, around 45 were hospitalized. The police imposed a day-long news blackout on her so that relatives did not find out her whereabouts or the type and degree of injury. Seriously injured people who did not want to disclose their personal details, including the woman who accompanied Ohnesorg's transport, were also refused treatment.

On June 3, the Berlin police union demanded tougher measures against the “rampant hustle and bustle of this mob” and a departure from the course of the “soft wave” in the “treatment of these criminals.” The police prevented further demonstrations with roadblocks and a massive presence and also blocked that From the FU campus. A police poster declared the demonstration ban as follows:

“Anyone who uses violence to undermine the legal order of our country and eliminate our social order has forfeited the right to invoke democratic freedoms. [...] Let us therefore resolutely oppose those forces that by far exceed the level of freedom of expression and freedom of demonstration. "

There was no evidence of evidence at the crime scene. According to the police report, which was based solely on statements by the police officers present, Kurras should have shot in self-defense. He had exchanged the magazine of his service weapon on the evening of the crime and brought his clothes to the dry cleaner the following day. In the following days, he gave three different versions of the sequence of events, which only matched on the first point: he felt threatened by the demonstrators, so he pulled his gun and released the safety catch.

  • Then he fired one or two warning shots, one of which hit Ohnesorg as a ricochet.
  • In the scuffle, his weapon accidentally went off.
  • Two men with "flashing knives" attacked him while he was on the ground and he tried to protect himself by using a firearm.

He represented the third version in the press for months and later in his trial without any objection from the authorities.

Duensing described the police crackdown on journalists on June 5th as follows:

"If we don't see the demonstrators like a liver sausage, then we have to pierce the middle so that it bursts apart at the ends."

On June 7th Duensing was given leave of his own accord and retired early on September 22nd.

Parliamentary inquiry

An investigative committee set up on June 7th by the West Berlin House of Representatives was supposed to investigate the behavior of demonstrators and police during the Shah's visit "with the help of the results of the public prosecutor's investigation" and to determine who caused "incidents and unrest" at the Free University and in the city. It met under the chairmanship of Gerd Löffler (SPD) from June 23 to September 1967.

The committee found that the responsible Senate Councilor Hans-Joachim Prill (SPD) had not passed on Albertz's order to block a large area of ​​the opera area to Duensing. Prill stated that the governing mayor had no direct authority to issue instructions to the police. Prill also did not inform the police about a judgment of the Federal Administrative Court from February 1967, which warned the proportionality of the funds even in the event of riots. Duensing told the committee that the mayor's office had not informed him of the large-scale cordon he wanted. He also only found out about the "Jubelpersern" on June 1st, but not from their clients. He had ordered them to be "well packed" on the edge behind the police belt. Why this was disregarded remained unclear. Duensing also rejected the right of protocol chief Ruprecht Rauch to give instructions to the committee. He had tried to enforce the extensive cordon on June 2nd by telephone, but in vain. It also remained unclear why paving stones and hard rubber rings had remained accessible on the building site south of the sidewalk occupied by the police and who had ordered over 100 ambulances to the location of the expected protests.

The committee interrogated some of the arrested students and accused them of insulting, assaulting, damaging property, breach of the peace, favoring criminal offenses and resisting state power, even though they denied this and other eyewitnesses reported unresisting behavior. The final report approved the action of the emergency services as lawful, if not always proportionate, and only criticized the failure to investigate the Shah supporters and the behavior of individual police officers. He recommended that the head of department III in the Senate Department of the Interior be dismissed and the police chief retired early. In doing so, he admitted that they shared responsibility. He did not ask for any further consequences.

The investigation report of the AStA, the student testimonies collected there and further claims derived from them were not taken into account. The House of Representatives ignored the AStA's criticism that the committee had failed to prove its most important theses and accepted its report without objections. On September 19, 1967, Büsch, who had previously offered his resignation twice, resigned and thus assumed responsibility for the police operation on June 2.

Judiciary

The accused police officer Kurras in court

Proceedings were initiated against Karl-Heinz Kurras on suspicion of negligent homicide ; manslaughter charges were not admitted. He was on leave from the police force for the duration of the trial. At the main hearing in November 1967, he claimed that a group of up to ten people had surrounded him on Krummen Strasse, beat him up and attacked him with knives. That's why he fired one or two warning shots; the second shot was released in the scuffle and accidentally hit Ohnesorg. Only one of 80 witnesses questioned confirmed this sequence of events. An expert opinion certified that Kurras had limited perception and judgment. The judge obeyed and acquitted him, although he assumed that the defendant had made untruthful statements.

Otto Schily put one of the plaintiffs, Ohnesorg's father, a successful lawyer revision against the judgment. In the following main hearing before the Berlin Regional Court in 1970, Kurras was acquitted again because no one could prove that he had acted at fault.

According to a ruling by the Berlin Administrative Court, there was no legal basis for using baton in front of the opera. From the outset, the use of riot troops was only suitable for escalating the conflict. However, only 13 of the 200 police officers involved were charged. Three police sergeants were sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment for bodily harm while in office. The rest of the proceedings were dropped, including those against the three police officers who beat Ohnesorg and others in the courtyard. The testimony of witnesses was not taken into account in the taking of evidence. Three out of six Persian intelligence officials charged were convicted of assault. The other charges against her, including one for breach of the peace , were suppressed.

Forty-five students arrested on June 2nd were mostly released after a few days. Some students who were arrested in the following days for violations of the public assembly ban were sentenced - largely unnoticed by the media - to three months' imprisonment without parole without a trial. A leaflet found with them served as evidence of the fact, which showed the attorney general and protested against his unequal treatment of Kurras and the student Fritz Teufel . He was arrested as an alleged stone thrower, charged with trespassing, and remained in jail for almost six months. In his trial, which opened on November 27, his lawyer was able to refute the allegations, so that he was acquitted on December 22, 1967.

media

At that time, the newspapers of the Axel Springer AG publishing house had a 66.5 percent share of the West Berlin newspaper market. They had positioned themselves in advance against demonstrating students. The Berliner Bild-Zeitung called on the population on June 2, 1967: Help the police to find the troublemakers and eliminate them! On June 3, they did not report anything about anyone who had been shot, although six journalists were at the scene at the time of the crime. In a partial edition of the Berliner Morgenpost it was said that around midnight a student had died in the hospital as a result of a fractured skull. The reporter later stated that he had not heard of a shot the night before.

The Bildzeitung wrote under the title "Bloody Riots: 1 Dead":

“Yesterday rioters struck in Berlin who think they are demonstrators. The noise was no longer enough for them. You must see blood. They wave the red flag and they mean the red flag. This is where fun and democratic tolerance stop. We have something against SA methods. ... Anyone who wants to demonstrate here should do it peacefully. And those who cannot demonstrate peacefully belong in prison. "

A photo showed a bleeding police officer.

The BZ editorial mentioned one fatality but no cause of death. He described a "street battle": "Left-wing demonstrators" had "attacked the police with smoke bombs, stones and eggs." A photo showed a student who was proven to have been injured on the head by police batons and was led away by the police, with the line: One was covered in blood Woman is brought to safety. The commentator wrote:

"The Berliners have no sense and no understanding of the fact that their city is being turned into a circus arena for immature ignoramuses who throw bags of paint and rotten eggs at their opponents ... Those who produce terror have to accept hardship."

On June 4, the Berliner Morgenpost commented on the fatal shot that had now become known: The police were to blame for it, "riot radicals" had provoked the clashes. The shot was "fired in self-defense at human discretion":

“Benno Ohnesorg is not the martyr of the FU Chinese, but their victim ... Some louts demanded the resignation of Police President Duensing ... The measure is now full. The patience of the Berlin population is exhausted. We are finally tired of being terrorized by a half-adult minority, most of whom still enjoy our hospitality. "

All Springer Verlag newspapers described the course of events as well as Kurras: he was "pushed into a courtyard by the demonstrators, detained there and threatened with knives." On June 5, the Bildzeitung wrote under the headline "Students threaten: We shoot back" :

“If the police shoot us again, we will fire back. We are already in the process of getting gas pistols. "

The author of the article stated that the title and alleged quotation were added to the text without his knowledge.

A little later, some German commentators criticized the police operation in West Berlin. Thus wrote Karl Heinz Bohrer in the FAZ on 12 June 1967: The police have left "... without serious need of planning, a brutality run as previously was known only from newspaper reports of fascist or semi-fascist countries ... The same police who on Afternoon of a […] Persian beating guard, how they attacked German demonstrators with slats and killers, apparently saw the time come on the same evening to cool their hats on those who did not want to stop showing their unroyalist views to the high-ranking guests of the state.
What the chief of operations had ordered is the same as lighting a fire in a cinema and locking the exits. "

Heinz Grossmann commented on June 26, 1967 in Die Zeit :

"You will have to get used to the fact that the secret police of some democratic model country - Persia, Spain or Greece - is allowed to function as an auxiliary police in our country."

In Stern commented Sebastian Haffner the operations:

“It was a systematic, cold-bloodedly planned pogrom , committed by the Berlin police to Berlin students. [...] She cut them off, surrounded them, pressed them together, and then with unrestrained bestiality, clubbed and trampled them on the defenseless, stumbling over each other, falling. "

Only a few journalists did their own research into the incident. The magazine actually published on July 7, 1967, entitled "Please, please, do not shoot!" Impressions of about 12 witnesses to the events in the backyard Krumme Straße 67, Christa Ohnesorg lawyer Horst Mahler had collected. Also, the mirror , the time and the Frankfurter Rundschau gathered testimony for demonstration course. It was only their special editions that made the student demands public in the following days.

East Berlin newspapers presented the event as a crime intended and covered by the Senate for the entire West Berlin police. For example, the SED central organ Neues Deutschland wrote on the front page on June 4 that it had caused a “terrible bloodbath” among the demonstrators. The following sentence only named Ohnesorg as a victim. The Junge Welt claimed on June 5 that he had been "shot from behind by the West Berlin police ..." and spoke of a "police massacre". The SED agitation department instructed all GDR press organs on June 6th to portray Ohnesorg as the victim of a “plot” to “ bring West Berlin into line with the Kiesinger / Strauss government's tightened right- wing policy ”. One should show all the details of the "monstrous crimes in West Berlin" in words and pictures and quote Western sources in detail. The police action had "all the characteristics of a well-prepared escalation of terror", which, in addition to the students, should also intimidate "the working people". The GDR newspapers complied with this requirement in the following days by emphasizing the brutality of the West Berlin police on the basis of selected testimonies from Western newspapers. They took over the thesis of an " emergency exercise " from the rebellious students in the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin , which served the police operation and which the "opinion factory Springer" had helped to prepare.

West Berlin students

On the morning of June 3, students found the FU building locked. The police broke up a spontaneous funeral procession through the city center with reference to the general ban on gatherings. By 4:00 p.m., over 6000 students gathered on the FU grounds. When strong police surrounded them and threatened to evict them by force, they responded with a sit-in strike . Thereupon Wolfgang Wetzel, the dean of the economics and social science faculty, opened the lecture halls to the students; Albertz withdrew the eviction order.

Rudi Dutschke then demanded the resignation of Albertz, Duensing and Büsch, a “de-fascization” of the West Berlin police and the deletion of all official “black lists” of potential political opposition members. The background to this was that in 1966 the Berlin police had repeatedly given the FU rectorate lists of personal data from arrested students, who were then disciplined and partially de-registered in order to “pacify” the FU. Klaus Meschkat demanded the expropriation of the Springer concern due to constitutional provisions of West Berlin and the Basic Law . Ohnesorg's murderer must be punished, state receptions for dictators must be prohibited.

The assembly, including some celebrities and professors, agreed to these demands. In addition, an appeal was issued to all FU members for at least one week about the "concealment of the facts by politicians, police and press", the "factual state of emergency", "tendencies towards a bureaucratic abolition of democracy", "terror practiced by the executive organs" and university opportunities to “restore, defend and develop democracy in Berlin”. Almost all FU faculties agreed. The plan for a self-governing “critical university”, which was set up the following autumn, arose from the student-led teaching on these topics.

On June 4th, the AStA of the FU issued its own press release:

"We are stunned by the lie of the police who describe the murder as self-defense ... We realize that we are powerless, considering most of the reports in Berlin's communications media. We hope that journalists will finally report the truth. "

On June 5, 1967, the FU General Assembly formed an “investigation committee” to investigate the causes, facts and consequences of the incidents. He asked witnesses only to report to him and not to testify to the police or other official bodies, as there was fear of manipulation and prosecution. About 600 people answered the call. Almost all of them contradicted the police account of the course of events. They also tried to identify and report police officers who had committed attacks using photos and recognition. In addition, the FU students formed a “committee to educate the population”, which rejected misrepresentations by authorities and the media and tried to create a counter-public. This partly succeeded with leaflets, street stalls and public discussions distributed in all parts of the city. An “Action Committee to Organize the Funeral Services” worked with Christa Ohnesorg to prepare the transfer and burial of her husband.

Federal German student and pupil movement

Ohnesorg's shooting marks a turning point in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Since then, the student movement has also spread to West German universities. In addition, a nationwide pupil movement spread: On June 18, 1967, 29 socialist pupil groups formed at West German secondary schools joined together at their first federal congress in Frankfurt am Main to form the “Action Center for Independent and Socialist Pupils” (AUSS). The Berlin SDS quintupled its membership with 800 members. Many West German student groups, youth organizations and professors expressed their solidarity with the Berlin Free University students, founded action groups on the causes and consequences of Ohnesorg's death and protested against the behavior of the Berlin authorities and the Springer press. The criticism of undemocratic tendencies in the executive and judiciary increased. As a moral protest, the anti-authoritarian revolt gained plausibility.

For many students at the time, Ohnesorg's shooting was not an isolated act, but the result and temporary climax of an increasing propensity for violence on the part of state authorities to suppress protests for human rights and democratization. They interpreted the events on June 2, 1967 as an "emergency exercise" by the state against critical minorities:

"The police measures during the Shah's visit [...] make it clear what threatens us with the planned emergency laws."

The campaigns initiated in previous years against and against the Axel Springer Group received strong support. Ulrike Meinhof commented on the event on a radio broadcast: “The protests against a police chief exposed our state itself as a police state. Police and press terror reached their climax on June 2nd in Berlin. It was then that we understood that freedom in this state is freedom for the police stick and freedom of the press in the shadow of the Springer concern is the freedom to justify the stick. "

At a congress of the Free University of Berlin on the evening of June 9th in Hanover after a funeral march, some of its participants, around 5,000, discussed "University and Democracy - Conditions and Organization of Resistance", also about the consequences of Ohnesorg's killing and the dealings with the authorities and media with it. There, Dutschke called for the formation of action centers in all university cities, which should, for example, organize sit-in strikes against the bans on demonstrations.

In the Federal Republic of Germany there were now more violent clashes between demonstrators and police, for example during the Shah's visit to Hamburg on June 3, 1967. At the same time, attempts at education and reform at universities increased. For the first time, police training and the methods it used also came under public criticism. In 1970, this resulted in a reform of the Assembly Act and police training.

The anniversary of Ohnesorg's death also became a reference point for West German terrorism in the 1970s. Ralf Reinders explains the naming of the June 2nd movement, founded in January 1972 , as follows:

"Everyone knew what June 2nd means ... With this date in the name it is always indicated that they shot first!"

In addition, the “June 2nd Command” claimed responsibility for the bomb attack on the Axel Springer AG publishing house in Hamburg.

Consequences in Iran

Before his visit to Germany, the Shah is said to have received reports that the former head of the SAVAK, Teymur Bachtiar , was planning an attack on him there. Two days after the Shah's return to Iran, General Alavi Kia, head of SAVAK's European office, was released. The Shah was convinced at this point that Kia was connected with Bakhtiar. The SAVAK was instructed to “hunt and kill” Bakhtiar. In Iran, opposition members spread rumors that Benno Ohnesorg had been shot by SAVAK. Bakhtiar was charged with being an instigator in the attempted assassination of the Shah. On September 23, 1967, he was sentenced to death in absentia.

In September 1967, Federal Interior Minister Paul Lücke traveled to Tehran, among other things to apologize to the Shah on behalf of the Federal Government for the protests during his visit to the Federal Republic. The Shah informed him that he felt personally injured by the demonstrations against him. Lücke was only able to dissuade him with some effort from taking legal action against the demonstrators in German courts. However, a return visit by Chancellor Kiesinger to Iran in September 1968 was harmonious.

New findings on the shooter and investigations from 2009

On May 21, 2009, the federal commissioner for the Stasi files announced the discovery that Kurras had been an unofficial employee (IM) of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) since 1955 and a member of the SED since 1964 . The scientists involved in the file evaluation considered a Stasi order for the killing shot to be "unlikely".

Kurras admitted his IM work, which was documented until 1967. This triggered a new debate about the reception of the fatal shot. Peter Schneider, for example, asked “whether the history of the Federal Republic would have been different after June 2nd if the Stasi identity of Kurras had become known then […]. I answer yes to this question, but I can only support it with speculation. "

A university study commissioned by Berlin Police President Dieter Glietsch showed in March 2011 that Kurras and other agents of the Stasi had no influence on the decisions of the West Berlin police. An investigation initiated by the Federal Prosecutor's Office in October 2009 found no evidence of a murder order by the Stasi until August 2011. The investigators again refuted the self-defense claimed by Kurras, because after previously disregarded witness statements and checked film material, he had unconditionally drawn the gun and shot at Ohnesorg. In November 2011, the Berlin Public Prosecutor's Office closed the investigation against Kurras: The evidence was not sufficient to reopen proceedings for Ohnesorg's intentional or negligent homicide. Assumptions that Ohnesorg was shot in the Stasi order to radicalize the student movement have been considered obsolete by media commentators since January 2012 due to new indications for his “targeted execution” and its cover-up by West Berlin police officers.

Apology from the Berlin Justice Senator on the 50th anniversary

At a commemorative event on the fiftieth anniversary of the event on June 2, 2017 in front of the Schöneberg Town Hall, the Berlin Senator for Justice Dirk Behrendt ( Greens ) said: “Today I want to kill the victims of this violence and arbitrariness, whose perpetrators were not prosecuted or not sufficiently prosecuted I apologize ". The police did not protect the demonstrators from the violent Shah supporters and did not determine their personal details, but instead turned against the students under the motto “Stick free”. Behrendt praised the day as a turning point in post-war history, because "the youth began to question their parents' Nazi past". The modern and cosmopolitan Federal Republic would be unthinkable without the protests.

It was criticized that the rest of the Berlin Senate did not take part in the commemoration and that Behrendt neither named Benno Ohnesorg nor mentioned the behavior of the police on the evening before the opera or the acquittals for Kurras. Among the approximately 200 participants were some earlier demonstrators on June 2, 1967, including Wolfgang Wieland (Greens) and Benno Ohnesorg's son Lukas. When asked how he explained the silence of those responsible: "One could almost assume that it will continue to be covered up."

Film adaptations

The events were worked up in numerous films, partly as the main story, partly as part of the history of the RAF.

literature

  • Uwe Soukup : June 2nd, 1967: A shot that changed the republic. Transit, Berlin 2017, ISBN 3-88747-343-4
  • Eckard Michels : Shah visit 1967. Fanal for the student movement. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2017.
  • Willi Baer , Carmen Bitsch, Karl-Heinz Dellwo (eds.): June 2, 1967. Laika, Hamburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-942281-70-6 .
  • June 2, 1967. Students between emergency and democracy. Documents on the events on the occasion of the Shah's visit. Introduction by Knut Nevermann . Published by the Association of German Student Associations (vds). Pahl-Rugenstein, Cologne 1967
  • The student demonstrations during the Shah's visit to Berlin in the German daily press. Institute for Demoscopy, Allensbach 1967
  • Winfried Schulz: The opinion of the daily newspapers in the Federal Republic of Germany on the police operation during the Shah's visit. Institute for Journalism, Johannes Gutenberg University, Mainz 1967

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Peter Brückner: Ulrike Meinhof and the German situation. 4th edition, Klaus Wagenbach, Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-8031-2407-7 , p. 122 f.
  2. ↑ Philipp Rock: Power, Markets and Morals - On the role of human rights in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the sixties and seventies. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2010, ISBN 978-3-631-59705-7 , p. 195
  3. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, p. 14f.
  4. ↑ a b c Pepe Egger (Tagesspiegel, June 1, 2017): June 2, 1967: The day on which Benno Ohnesorg died
  5. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, p. 16
  6. ^ Marc Tschernitschek: The shooter Benno Ohnesorgs: Karl-Heinz Kurras, the West Berlin police and the Stasi. Tectum, Marburg 2013, ISBN 978-3-8288-3121-6 , pp. 27-31.
  7. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, pp. 14 and 25.
  8. ^ Klaus Huebner : Memories of the Berlin Police President. 1969-1987. Berlin 1997, p. 49f.
  9. ↑ Bernhard Frevel, Hermann Groß, Carsten Dams (Ed.): Handbook of the Police in Germany. Wiesbaden 2007, ISBN 3-531-15709-4 , p. 95
  10. ^ Fritz Sack: The reaction of society, politics and the state to the student movement. In: Federal Minister of the Interior (ed.): Protest and reaction. Opladen 1984, p. 117
  11. ↑ Peter Damerow and others (ed.): The not declared emergency. In: Hans Magnus Enzensberger (Ed.): Kursbuch Nr. 12, Frankfurt am Main 1968, p. 29
  12. ↑ Heiko Drescher: Genesis and background of the demonstration criminal law reform of 1970 taking into account the historical change in the forms of demonstration (PDF) p. 88
  13. ↑ Marc Tschernitschek: Der Todesschütze Benno Ohnesorgs , Marburg 2013, p. 28f. and footnotes 27-28 ; Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, p. 16.
  14. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, pp. 25–28
  15. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, pp. 16–23. Kai Hermann: The police battle of Berlin . In: Die Zeit , No. 23/1967
  16. ^ Heinrich Albertz: Flowers for Stukenbrock. Radius, Stuttgart 1981, ISBN 3-87173-595-7 , p. 245.
  17. ^ Heinrich Albertz: Flowers for Stukenbrock. 5th edition, Stuttgart 1981, p. 246f.
  18. ↑ Uwe Soukup: June 2, 1967. Berlin 2017, pp. 48–58. Jürgen Zimmer: Fox hunting in Bismarckstrasse. What the Berlin police understand by "soft wave" - ​​an eyewitness report . In: Die Zeit , No. 23/1967. Carsten Seibold (Ed.): The 68er. The festival of rebellion. Knaur, Munich 1988, ISBN 3-426-03927-3 , pp. 140-143.
  19. ↑ Uwe Soukup: Der 2. June 1967. transit, Berlin 2017, pp. 91-101
  20. ^ Heinrich Albertz: Flowers for Stukenbrock. Stuttgart 1981, p. 147
  21. ^ Knut Nevermann: June 2, 1967 , Cologne 1967, p. 141
  22. ↑ Volkmar Deile , Reinhard Henkys and others (ed.): And not subject to anyone. Heinrich Albertz on his 70th birthday. Rowohlt, Hamburg 1985, ISBN 3-499-15536-2 , p. 22f.
  23. ↑ Heinz Grossmann, Oskar Negt : The resurrection of violence. Springer blockade and political reaction in the Federal Republic. European Publishing House, Frankfurt am Main 1968, p. 15
  24. ↑ Volkmar Deile et al. (Ed.): And not subject to anyone , Hamburg 1985, p. 23f.
  25. ^ Heinrich Albertz: Flowers for Stukenbrock. Stuttgart 1981, p. 246
  26. ^ Karl A. Otto : APO . Cologne 1989, p. 239
  27. ↑ Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, p. 162
  28. ↑ Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz: Rudi Dutschke. A biography . 4th edition, Cologne 1996, p. 129
  29. ↑ Hans Joas : Textbook of Sociology. 2nd edition, campus, 2001, p. 628
  30. ↑ Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, p. 134 f.
  31. ^ Fritz Sack: The reaction of society, politics and the state to the student movement . In: Federal Minister of the Interior (ed.): Protest and reaction . Opladen 1984, p. 164 f.
  32. ^ A b Sven Felix Kellerhoff : Berlin, June 2, 1967: At 8:30 p.m. the shot that changed Germany was fired . ( Memento from June 2, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) In: Berliner Morgenpost , May 30, 2007
  33. ↑ quoted from Katja Apelt: The day on which democracy was shot . In: Berliner Kurier , June 2, 2007
  34. ↑ Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, pp. 24–36 and pp. 235–245
  35. ^ Ludwig von Friedeburg : Free University and Political Potential of Students. Neuwied / Berlin 1968, p. 430f
  36. ↑ Treason before the shot . In: Der Spiegel . No. 22 , 2009, p. 49 ( online ).
  37. ↑ Hammerhart: Figures from June 2, 1967 ( Memento from March 8, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  38. ↑ Heiko Drescher: Genesis and background of the demonstration criminal law reform of 1970, taking into account the historical change in the forms of demonstration . (PDF) p. 90ff
  39. ↑ Uwe Bergmann: The 2nd June 1967. In: Bergmann, Dutschke, Lefèvre, Rabehl (Ed.): Rebellion der Studenten , 1st edition 1968, p. 32
  40. ↑ cited after 60 years in Germany: The revolution that was shot . ( Memento from March 6, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) online project of the University of Darmstadt
  41. ↑ Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, p. 157
  42. ↑ a b Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, p. 155f.
  43. ^ Welt am Sonntag , June 4, 1967; after Spiegel 26/1967, p. 62
  44. ↑ APO archive: Brief Chronology
  45. ↑ Peter Carstens: The case of Ohnesorg. Turning point for Otto Schily . In: FAZ , June 2, 2007, p. 8
  46. ↑ Uwe Soukup: How did Benno Ohnesorg die? Berlin 2007, p. 68.
  47. ↑ Heinz Grossmann: The Jubelperser. The time No. 26/1967
  48. ↑ Sebastian Haffner: Night of the Long Sticks. June 2, 1967 - a planned pogrom (Stern 26, 1967)
  49. ↑ Gretchen Dutschke-Klotz: Rudi Dutschke , p. 131f; Special reports partly reissued in Der Spiegel Spezial, June 1988 and Zeit magazine No. 25/1992
  50. ^ Mareike Witkowski: The SED and the APO. Reception of the student movement in the GDR press. BIS-Verlag of the Carl von Ossietzky University, Oldenburg 2008, ISBN 978-3-8142-2116-8 , pp. 53-57
  51. ↑ Obituary for Prof. Dr. Dr. hc Wolfgang Wetzel. ( Memento of March 6, 2008 in the Internet Archive ). In: Institute for Statistics and Econometrics at the University of Kiel , 2004.
  52. ↑ Wolfgang Lefévre: Wealth and Scarcity. Study reform as the destruction of social wealth . In: Uwe Bergmann u. a. (Ed.): Rebellion der Studenten , 1968, p. 146
  53. ↑ Uwe Bergmann: June 2, 1967. In: Bergmann, Dutschke, Leféfre, Rabehl (ed.): Rebellion of the students. Rowohlt, Reinbek near Hamburg 1968, p. 31; Convention resolution cited in the power and impotence of the movement. 40 years later: a look back at June 2, 1967 . In: analyze & kritik - newspaper for left-wing debate and practice , No. 517, May 18, 2007
  54. ^ Siegward Lönnendonker and others (eds.): Freie Universität Berlin 1948–1973. University in Transition , Part V, Document 727, p. 178
  55. ↑ Jürgen Miermeister, Jochen Staadt: Provocations. The student and youth revolt in their leaflets 1965–1971. Luchterhand, Darmstadt / Neuwied 1980, ISBN 3-472-61322-X , pp. 97–111
  56. ^ Tilman Fichter , Siegward Lönnendonker: Berlin: Capital of the Revolt (archive "APO and social movements")
  57. ^ Karl A. Otto: From the Easter March to the APO. History of 1960–1970. Frankfurt am Main / New York 1977, p. 161 ff. Gerd Langguth: The protest movement in the Federal Republic of Germany 1968-1976. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1976, ISBN 3-8046-8520-X , p. 43 ff.
  58. ↑ Hans Joachim Winkler (ed.): The establishment answers the APO. 2nd Edition. CW Leske Verlag, Opladen 1968, Zeittafel, p. 165
  59. ^ Pavel A. Richter: The Extra-Parliamentary Opposition in the Federal Republic of Germany 1966–1968 . In: Ingrid Gilcher-Holthey (Ed.): 1968. From the event to the subject of historical science. Göttingen 1998, p. 46 ff. Tilman Fichter , Siegward Lönnendonker: Brief history of the SDS . 4th edition 2007, p. 159ff.
  60. ^ Joint declaration of numerous university groups from June 8, 1967, quoted from Knut Nevermann: June 2, 1967: Students between Notstand and Democracy , Cologne 1967, p. 108f. Overall: the undeclared emergency. documentation and analysis of a summer in berlin. In: Hans Magnus Enzensberger (Ed.): Kursbuch 12. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1968
  61. ↑ Examples from Karl A. Otto: APO , p. 238f
  62. ↑ Jutta Ditfurth: Ulrike Meinhof. The biography. Ullstein, 2007, ISBN 3-550-08728-4 , p. 210
  63. ↑ Bernward Vesper (ed.): Conditions and organization of the resistance. The congress in Hanover. Minutes, leaflets, resolutions. Voltaire Verlag (series: Voltaire Flugschrift 12), 1st edition, Berlin 1967; 2nd edition, Frankfurt am Main 1968
  64. ↑ Heiko Drescher: Genesis and background of the demonstration criminal law reform of 1970, taking into account the historical change in the forms of demonstration (PDF)
  65. ↑ Ralf Reinders, Ronald Fritzsch: The June 2nd Movement. Conversations about hash rebels, the Lorenz kidnapping, jail. Edition ID-Archiv, Berlin / Amsterdam 1995, p. 39
  66. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 435 f.
  67. ↑ Abbas Milani: Eminent Persians. Syracuse University Press, 2008, p. 435 f.
  68. ↑ Philipp Rock: Power, Markets and Morals - On the role of human rights in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the sixties and seventies. Frankfurt am Main 2010, pp. 195–198
  69. ↑ Mechthild Küpper: Stasi employees shot Benno Ohnesorg . In: FAZ , May 21, 2009
  70. ↑ New research: Ohnesorg's gunman is said to have been a Stasi spy. In: Spiegel Online , May 21, 2009
  71. ↑ Excerpts from files on Kurras from the BStU's holdings.
  72. ^ Sven Röbel, Peter Wensierski : GDR spy. New Stasi files discovered by shooter Kurras. ( Memento from June 2, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) In: Spiegel Online , May 30, 2009
  73. ↑ Peter Schneider: A poor, aggressive drip . In: Der Spiegel . No. 22 , 2009 ( online ).
  74. ↑ New study: Kurras was an isolated case . In: BZ , March 24, 2011
  75. ↑ Hans Leyendecker : Investigations into the death of Benno Ohnesorg: The new picture of the ice-cold killer . In: Süddeutsche Zeitung , August 1, 2011
  76. ↑ Proceedings against Kurras discontinued: Ohnesorg case filed . In: Berliner Zeitung online , November 22, 2011
  77. ↑ Case of Kurras: Ohnesorg Death: Truth Covered Up? In: BZ , January 22, 2012. How Benno Ohnesorg died: A targeted execution . In: taz , January 22, 2012
  78. ^ Senator apologizes for police operation in June 1967. Berlin.de, June 2, 2017.
  79. ↑ Plutonia Plarre: Sorry for June 2, 1967: gesture without a name. taz, June 2, 2017