Foreign policy of Austria
In the interwar period as well as during the Cold War , the Republic of Austria pursued a policy of " perpetual neutrality " at the interface between two opposing military alliances in order to contribute to the stability of the region and to the cooperative reorganization of East-West relations . After the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe and since Austria 's accession to the EU in 1995, the government in Vienna sees its main task as bringing stability to the new eastern EU countries and especially to the Balkans. Austria therefore sees itself as a bridge to Central and Eastern Europe.
The foreign policy of Austria focuses on an active and formative foreign cultural policy . An attempt is made to make Austria's location in Europe and the world understandable and perceptible through cultural means.
The Austrian government is responsible for foreign policy with the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs .
History of Austrian Foreign Policy
Monarchia Austria approx
In 1742 the Secret House, Court and State Chancellery was created in Vienna for matters of foreign policy . The foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy has been based on a traditional marriage policy (Felix Austria) and aimed at hegemony since the rise of the House of Austria as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession and the Venetian-Austrian Turkish War , but especially since the defeats in the War of the Polish Succession and the Russian-Austrian Turkish War over Germany and Italy. Since the rise of Prussia as a result of the Silesian Wars , Austria has endeavored to achieve a balance between the five major European powers . For a long time, these two foundations of Austrian diplomacy (marriage alliances, equilibrium politics ) clearly differed from the imperialist and militarist foreign policy of France or Prussia, and reached their climax with the overthrow of all alliances and the Holy Alliance agreed upon at the Congress of Vienna .
Austria-Hungary
Until the establishment of the Austrian Empire, Habsburg foreign policy was primarily subordinate to dynastic and religious interests. After the loss of sovereignty over Italy ( Battle of Solferino 1859) and Germany ( German War 1866), as well as since the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, it was increasingly subject to national and nationalistic aspects and was from then on strongly determined by Hungarian interests in the Balkans. This new foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was decisively shaped until 1879 by the Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Andrássy , the first advocate of the Magyarization policy . He and his successors (e.g. Gustav Kálnoky , Stephan Burián , István Tisza ) opposed equal rights for the Slavic ethnic groups internally as well as a reconciliation with Russia and Serbia externally. The economic interests of the Hungarian half of the empire also played a role in foreign policy, as was particularly evident in the “ Pig War” of 1906 (a customs war between Austria-Hungary and the Kingdom of Serbia ). Before that, Austria-Hungary and Serbia were still allies, and Austria had supported Serbia in the Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885/86.
The contrasts with France and the Ottoman Empire were meanwhile rather minor, and an alliance with Germany and England was even desirable. But the three Emperor alliance with Russia and Germany (1872), the Triple Alliance with Italy and Germany (1882) and the Mediterranean Entents with England and Italy (1887) were burdened from the beginning by the Pan-Slavic agitation of Russia and Serbia and by Italian irredentism . The Austro-Russian Balkan rivalry came more and more to the fore after the Berlin Congress of 1878, decisive clashes were the Bulgarian crisis (1885/88), the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and the partisanship for Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War (1913). A strengthening of the Slavic element through direct annexations at the expense of the Russian or Ottoman Empire or Serbia was initially not in the interests of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. After the assassination attempt in Sarajevo and the July crisis in 1914, the most momentous decision in Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was the ultimatum to Serbia, which led to the outbreak of the First World War . The last attempt at an independent foreign policy for Austria-Hungary were the peace efforts of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Ottokar Czernin and Kaiser Karls in 1917. The attempts failed because of the will to make sacrifices and the difficult situation finally came in the Sixtus affair in 1918.
First republic
Austria's foreign policy orientation after 1918 was by no means as clear as the will to join Germany announced when the republic was proclaimed would suggest: Bank capital and trade were looking for new scope for movement and some would like to do so through the Anschluss, others through the old The " Danube Confederation ", which renewed economic ties , was achieved and the foreign policy initiatives moved in both directions. Immediately after the dissolution of the old state, an Austrian government delegation went to Prague to propose negotiations on maintaining an economic community. Prague rejected such cooperation, as did Renner's later proposal for a joint economic parliament of the successor states in Bratislava in March 1919. The free movement of goods was prevented by the successor states - in order to establish their economic self-sufficiency and the basis for regulating trade. The creation of a common economic area for a period of five years on the basis of mutual preferential tariffs, which was later made possible in the peace treaties, was never negotiated.
The “Anschluss” initiatives were also unsuccessful: The secret follow-up negotiations initiated by Otto Bauer in Berlin between February 27 and March 2, 1919 ended with Germany's refusal to provide financial aid for the establishment of the currency unit. Finally, the emerging end of 1918, already prepared for connection prohibition of the German orientation at least at the surface to an end.
The turning point in foreign policy was signaled by the resignation of Otto Bauer on July 26, 1919, who had advocated an all too pointed affiliation policy: The foreign policy concept of the new head of the foreign affairs department, Karl Renner, envisaged consolidation of Austria with the help of the victorious powers and wanted to maintain good relations to expand the neighboring states, but without entering into obligations and alliances that could have hindered a later connection to Germany.
Regulated relations with the new neighboring states initially stood in the way of the territorial issue: there had even been military conflicts with the SHS state and Hungary , which could only be partially resolved diplomatically by means of the referendum in Carinthia in 1920 and the referendum in Ödenburg in 1921. The rapid, large-scale clarification of the common border alone enabled an early rapprochement between Austria and Czechoslovakia . Both states were interested in good interstate relations: Austria for economic reasons, Czechoslovak foreign policy because it sought to establish the Czechoslovak Republic as the center of the new Central European peace system, as a guarantor of the status quo. The danger of revisionism in Hungary, where after the overthrow of the Soviet republic under Béla Kun in August 1919, a right-wing authoritarian government under Miklós Horthy came to power, and the danger of a restoration of the Habsburgs brought the two states closer together.
On January 12, 1920, Karl Renner, on the one hand, and Edvard Beneš and President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, on the other hand, concluded a secret agreement in Prague , a kind of defensive alliance against restoration efforts in Hungary, for which further contracts in the area of citizenship, the drawing of borders and the separation of archives and art collections were to be prepared . Domestically, the Christian Socials and the Greater Germans, and foreign policy especially Hungary and Italy, which showed more and more interest in the Danube region, were disgruntled by this treaty, which quickly became public. Nevertheless, in an unclear political situation, Austrian foreign policy had managed to create a certain maneuvering space for itself, despite the precarious economic situation, by making use of the rapidly changing international balance of power. From an economic point of view, the years 1918 to 1921 were the years when the successor states of Austria were sealed off in terms of trade policy. Regulated trade relations could only be established slowly: But as early as 1919 a number of intergovernmental agreements on food and fuel procurement were concluded. The trade exchange was initially carried out via compensation agreements. These were subsequently replaced by provisional trade agreements and associated quota agreements in which the release of certain export quotas was fixed. Between 1919 and 1921, trade agreements were concluded with all successor states.
Contacts with the ČSR were also expanded under the following governments. Since the Foreign Office, which with its civil servants had a decisive influence on the course of foreign policy, considered good contacts to the ČSR to be beneficial, especially because of the urgently needed restructuring loan, another summit was held on December 16, 1921 in Lány near Prague. The discussions were concluded with a basic agreement between the two countries, the ČSR granted Austria a restructuring loan. Again, the rapprochement with France's Central European allies was not without controversy: The Greater German People's Party withdrew from the conservative-bourgeois Schober government and, together with the Social Democrats, ultimately overthrew it in parliament.
From 1921 onwards, the question of the region's economic and political future became more and more the focus of foreign policy initiatives: Prague responded negatively to an American proposal to convene an economic conference in Bratislava, where the questions of a customs union and monetary unit of the successor states should have been discussed. The conferences in Rome (May to June 1921) and Portorož (October to November 1921), once under Italian and the other time under French aegis, were intended to block German hegemonic efforts and reintegrate the Danube region under French or Italian control. But in the end it was precisely these conferences, although they pretended to be interested in the integration of the Danube region, that sanctioned the state and economic separation as well as the liquidation of former state institutions of the Danube monarchy.
In 1921, the question of granting a large international loan to clean up the Austrian currency became more and more central to Austrian foreign policy. The primary goal was - as emerges from the coalition agreement of May 1922 between the Christian Socialists and the Greater German Party - the "Anschluss", if not immediately, then at least in an evolutionary way. Seipel's travel diplomacy in August 1922 to Prague, Berlin and Verona was intended to induce political and financial circles there to provide financial aid to Austria. The fear of an Austrian move that would have fundamentally changed the balance of power in the Danube region, be it in the form of the "Anschluss" or an Italian-Austrian customs union, ultimately led the League of Nations to reaffirm the ban on joining in the Geneva Protocols of October 4, 1922 and at the same time approved a loan of 650 million gold crowns to Austria. Behind this foreign policy, however, were quite old aspirations of great powers: the Austrian "great statesman" would have to wait as long as the time was ripe for neither the "Anschluss" nor the "Danube Confederation" under the Catholic-German auspices. This "German-Austrian mission" in the Danube region was carried out by Seipel in a national council debate on the occasion of an additional agreement to the trade treaty with Hungary on June 27, 1928: Austria had to step out of the narrowness of its economic borders, but the Central European question would not be resolved if the large state, which fills the actual Central Europe, the German Reich, is not part of this solution . A solution that was also close to the Social Democrats, as Otto Bauer's contribution showed in the same debate: We cannot be integrated into a Yugoslav-Czech economic system any more than in an Italian one . The same applies to Karl Renner's contribution What should become of Austria? in the “struggle” in 1930. However, Austria's foreign policy room for maneuver was now severely restricted, and the phase of active foreign policy, which included a personal union between the head of government and the head of the foreign affairs department, ended.
With 1929 the signs of an "Italian course" in Austrian foreign policy intensified: At the beginning of the thirties Italy and Hungary had expanded their contacts with the bourgeois governments, their domestic political ambitions with an "evolution to the right" and the gradual destruction of democratic institutions with the Italian and Hungarian foreign policy interests were congruent.
But despite the Italian orientation, Germany was not completely lost sight of: Even before the signing of the friendship treaty with Italy on February 6, 1930, Austrian politicians assured Germany that they would not do anything that would prejudice any future possibilities. The Austrian Social Democrats were critical of rapprochement with Italy and warned against attempting an economic rehabilitation of the country through Italy. These tendencies and the emerging influence of Germany, which wanted to convert its growing economic power in south-eastern Europe into political capital, called the other powers interested in the Danube region on the scene. In the early 1930s, Austria was at the center of numerous economic and political central European federation plans. At the beginning of 1932, the French Prime Minister André Tardieu presented a plan for the rehabilitation of the Danube area in order to stop the attempts to join forces that had become apparent in the failed project of a customs union between Germany and Austria and to secure the own security system. This envisaged a regional amalgamation of the Czech Republic, Yugoslavia, Romania, Austria and Hungary on the basis of mutual tariff preferences: only the countries addressed expressed themselves skeptically to negative. On the political level Austria was reserved because economic agreements like the "Tardieu Plan" could block the "Anschluss". At the London Four Power Conference from April 6th to 8th, 1932, the plan finally fell due to resistance from Germany and Italy: Germany had thus managed to keep open access to south-eastern Europe, which National Socialist Germany then knew how to use.
Mussolini supported an initiative by the Hungarian Prime Minister István Bethlen for a customs union between Austria, Italy and Hungary at the beginning of 1932 with the aim of disintegrating the French central European security system and building a barrier against German south-east European policy . Austria, however, opposed these attempts and advocated the expansion of the preferential system: the increase in exports and the protection of the protectionist interests of domestic agriculturists and industrial groups should be enforced.
In 1932/33 a "power triangle" between Dollfuss , the Heimwehr and the National Socialists had developed in the middle class in Austria . Their common interest in eliminating the organized labor movement was diametrically opposed to their interests in redefining the power structure of this triangle. The implementation of Dollfuss' program - independence from Germany, elimination of parliamentary democracy and personal dictatorial power - was not possible without the foreign policy backing of fascist Italy, which increasingly proved itself to be a European power: the meetings of Dollfuss and Mussolini were intended to clarify the agreement of interests . The Hirtenberg arms affair in January 1933, when the social democratic "Arbeiter-Zeitung" revealed an arms delivery from Italy to Hungary and the Home Guard, led to Dollfuss' loss of prestige abroad, which encouraged him to accelerate the genuinely Austrian fascization program for Italy to implement gave military guarantees. According to "Plan 34", Italian troops were supposed to secure the German-Austrian border so that Germany could not exploit the situation for its own purposes and the Austrian executive would have a free hand in dealing with potential "insurgents".
In view of this development, the Austrian Social Democrats turned around and tried to play through the remaining foreign policy alternatives to the "Anschluss" and an alliance with Italy: Especially from 1932 and after the National Socialists came to power in Germany, ideas of a Danube federation were in the foreground, a work by Karl Renner, before and later a representative of the connecting line, spoke out in favor of independence and the political neutralization of the country, and Otto Bauer voted at the extraordinary party congress of the SDAPÖ in October 1933 for a neutralization of the country under international law, on the basis of which economic ties were established with the neighbors should be. In a memorandum to the Second International , Karl Renner rejected the Anschluss with the consent of the party executive and advocated a political and economic Danube Entente.
With the conclusion of the Roman Protocols on March 17, 1934 between Austria, Hungary and Italy, Italy was at the height of its influence in Austria. In reliance on questionable support from Italy and Hungary, Dollfuss sacrificed the Austrian government's freedom of movement in domestic and foreign policy .
But the "Roman Alliance" was fragile, expansion into Germany was a step desired by Hungary in particular, while Austria was interested in an international guarantee of its independence. Immediately after the civil war , Italy, France and Great Britain issued a guarantee of the integrity of Austria on February 17, 1934, which was supplemented by a Franco-Italian "Danube Pact". The initiative supported by the Little Entente at its meeting in Bled in August 1935 provided for the collective safeguarding of Austria's independence: Austria and its neighboring states should mutually commit themselves
"Not to interfere in the internal affairs of the other, and not to suggest or support any action aimed at forcibly altering the territorial unit or the social order of one of the contracting countries."
At the same time, the military began to take action. Already in the twenties the neighbors had plans for deployment and division, but Austria had only played a minor role in the military plans of the Little Entente. The Austrian General Staff, on the other hand, ran through four fictitious threat cases: the "T" case for the ČSR, "U" for Hungary, "S" for Yugoslavia and "I" for Italy, but never the threat from Germany. However, individual cases were only worked out operationally and specifically after Hitler's seizure of power , the rearmament of Austria and the introduction of general conscription in 1935 by the "DR" and "T and Ju" operational areas.
With the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935, which documented Italy's return to an aggressive colonial policy, Italy lost its interest in the Danube region: for Austria, which did not participate in the League of Nations sanctions against Italy, the "trap" of foreign policy isolation opened. With the attempts at rapprochement by the Little Entente - especially the ČSR - another possibility arose: although the ČSR was largely deprived of its ability to influence Austrian politics with the elimination of social democracy, the establishment of the dictatorship in Austria was a purely internal matter and showed interest in maintaining Austrian independence. The admission of Schutzbündlers and the activities of social democratic emigration put a strain on relations, but this did not prevent Prague from seeking a compromise with Austria: the authorities worked together - at least in Prague - in spying on emigrants, and the Austrian efforts to achieve a more positive one Reporting in the Czechoslovak media was quite successful. The looming disintegration of the Little Entente, which was not only not a nucleus for a general understanding in the Danube region, but even a means to prevent further economic ties in Eastern Central Europe, facilitated exploratory talks between the two more and more isolated states in terms of foreign policy.
Several meetings of high-ranking Austrian and Czechoslovak politicians at least indicated the possibility of rapprochement. In 1935, Milan Hodža presented a plan that should enable the states of the Danube region to develop a new economic and political system of cooperation. Schuschnigg's lecture trip to Prague on January 16, 1936, which included a visit to Edvard Beneš , who had become President after Masaryk's death, and Prime Minister Milan Hodža, was accompanied by speculations about the actual foreign policy intentions of the two neighboring states: Italy and Hungarians were just as upset about a possible rapprochement as Germany. The diplomatic attempts at rapprochement between the Czechoslovak Republic and Austria were finally brought to an end by an additional protocol to the Roman Protocols negotiated on March 17, 1936, which, at the initiative of Hungary, enforced increased barriers against the integration of other states into the system of the Roman Protocols. The participating States undertook not to conduct political negotiations with the government of a third State without first contacting the other two States that have signed the Rome Protocols.
The initiatives of Czechoslovakia to induce Austria to change its attitude - as at the two meetings of Schuschniggs and Hodžas in 1937, or the concession in the treatment of social democratic emigration by interpreting the asylum law of the Czechoslovakia more and more restrictively - were pure retreats "Austrofascist aversions" against democratic Czechoslovakia turned out to be too strong. In addition, the July 1936 Agreement , which contained the possibility of permanent German interference in a secret additional protocol, marked a turning point in Austrian foreign policy: In May 1937, a German-Austrian agreement was reached regarding an exchange of information about the ČSR, in November In 1937 a study was carried out in the event of the Axis powers' action against the Soviet Union and an invasion of the ČSR. In return for a possible participation of Austria in this operation, a guarantee of the independence of Austria, South Tyrol and the German-speaking areas of the Czechoslovak Republic was brought into play: From March 1, 1938, concrete preparatory work for a "study on the possibility of an attack against Czechoslovakia" trackable.
Shortly before March 12, 1938, Austria was isolated in terms of foreign policy and, paradoxically, at the goal of the policy it had tacitly pursued for decades: the " Anschluss ".
Second republic
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In 1945, the Republic of Austria was born for the second time with the declaration of independence . In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty with all four occupying powers ended the era of occupied post-war Austria and - in contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR - gave the country back its full state sovereignty , which it had lost during the National Socialist era . In return for this, the Second Republic had to declare its "perpetual neutrality " and establish it in a constitutional law. In September 1955 the last Soviet soldiers left the national territory. Those of the Western Allies followed on October 25, one day before the National Council passed the Neutrality Act. In the following decades, the Austrian economy developed similarly to the German economy (see also the economic miracle ). As a result of the confiscations by the USIA group, however, the economy in the former Soviet zone had a lot of catching up to do compared to the western federal states, which was only compensated for decades later.
Due to its politically neutral position, Austria became an important refuge for those involved in the uprising in Hungary in 1956 and for many participants in the Prague Spring in 1968. In 1956, when especially Eastern Austria was still badly affected by the occupation, humanitarian aid was for the neighboring country is very large. Entire settlements were built for refugees. Although a large proportion of the refugees were mainly taken in from overseas countries, a large number of them stayed in Austria. The armed forces , which had only just been reorganized, also had their first practical test. In both cases, ORF also played a major role in informing the population in the neighboring countries concerned as neutral as possible as the state broadcaster . At the beginning of the 1970s, Austria was the first stopover on the way to the West for thousands of Jewish emigrants who emigrated from the Soviet Union.
Through Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky , who was one of the first Western politicians to hold talks with Arafat and Gaddafi , Austria was given an important role in the Middle East conflict . Vienna has become home to many international organizations such as the UN , the IAEA and the OPEC .
As a result of recent history, the experiences after the “Anschluss”, the crimes during the time of National Socialism in Austria and the complete defeat of the Hitler Empire in World War II , the understanding of Austrian identity also changed . While the self-image and the relationship to the state in the First Republic were still largely shaped by German national ideas, this idea now increasingly faded into the background. This Austrian national consciousness, which was also linked to a demarcation from the new Federal Republic of Germany , also had the consequence that many Austrians, "ordinary citizens" and politicians, now wanted to see themselves as the first victim of the National Socialists (also known as the "victim myth" or " Victim thesis ”), although Hitler had brought about the“ Anschluss ”to the cheers and with the approval of large sections of the population. The involvement in the crimes of the Third Reich was therefore hardly dealt with for a long time. This “blind spot” in historical awareness attracted international attention in 1986 in the Waldheim affair during Kurt Waldheim's candidacy for the federal presidency . Despite worldwide outrage over Waldheim's initially secretive SA membership and his role in the German Wehrmacht , he won the presidential election in the second round of voting. It was only under the government of Chancellor Franz Vranitzky in 1991 that there was an express declaration that the Austrians shared responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism.
With the collapse of the communist regimes in the Eastern Bloc countries, the fall of the Iron Curtain and the opening of the borders with Western Europe in 1989, the country lost its character as a Western democratic outpost. Consequently, Austria joined the European Union in 1995 , which for a long time was considered unthinkable due to the Neutrality Act, and joined the Schengen area , which eliminated border controls with Germany and Italy on December 1, 1997.
The " black-blue coalition " of the bourgeois-conservative ÖVP with the right-wing populist FPÖ in February 2000 led to the "freezing of relations", the so-called "sanctions", of the other EU countries against the Austrian federal government as well as to protracted demonstrations (see also Thursday demonstrations ) by opponents of the blue-black government. The policy of the European Union towards the government coalition hardly had any real political impact on Austrian domestic politics, but rather led to a short-term strengthening of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition and a comparatively greater rejection of the EU. Based on the recommendation of the “Council of Wise Men” (Wise Men’s Report ) ultimately set up by the EU countries, the 14 EU countries lifted the “sanctions” again in September 2000.
On January 1, 1999, the new EU currency, the euro , was also introduced in Austria as book money , and from January 1, 2002, the euro also replaced the shilling currency as a means of payment .
The following years were mainly characterized by the accession negotiations of the ten Eastern and Southern European countries to the EU ( eastward expansion ), the transit agreement and the protests against the Czech Temelín nuclear power plant . The latter led at times to a bad political climate between Prague and Vienna. The renegotiations for the transit contract failed in 2003.
Since 2004, the Austrian Federal President has participated in the annual meeting of the heads of state of the German-speaking countries (consisting of EU and non-EU members). This format goes back to the wish of the Swiss head of state and the subsequent initiative of the then Austrian Federal President Heinz Fischer .
Engagement in the UN
After New York and Geneva, Vienna is the third official seat of the United Nations Secretariat and therefore traditionally attaches great importance to this element of foreign policy. In total, over 50,000 Austrians have served under the UN flag as soldiers, military observers, civilian police and civilian experts all over the world. In addition to the UN agencies, there are a number of other international organizations in Vienna. These include the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the headquarters of the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), founded in Baghdad in 1960, and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Together with Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa and Thailand, Austria has the initiative in the discussion and negotiation process that is to lead to a nuclear weapons ban treaty in July 2017 . In 2014, for example, the Austrian government hosted the third conference on “Humanitarian Effects of Nuclear Weapons”. A call, supported by 127 states, was published to work together internationally to outlaw, forbid and destroy nuclear weapons .
See also
Individual evidence
- ↑ a b c Vladimir Petrovich Potjomkin : History of Diplomacy, Volume Two, Die Diplomatie der Neuzeit (1872–1919) , pp. 25–30 and 38–43. SWA-Verlag Berlin 1948.
- ^ Romania's accession to the Triple Alliance (1883) was also burdened by Romanian irredentism towards Hungary and the oppression of the Romanians in Hungary.
- ↑ Spain also joined the Mediterranean Entente in 1887.
- ↑ Hochenbichler 1971, 88-90.
- ↑ Holzgreve 1980, 29.
- ↑ Stenographic Protocols. 46 Meeting of the National Council of the Republic of Austria. III. Legislative period. June 27, 1928. p. 1365.
- ↑ Stenographic Protocols. 46 Meeting of the National Council of the Republic of Austria. III. Legislative period. June 27, 1928. pp. 1359 f.
- ↑ Karl Renner, What should become of Austria? In: Der Kampf / XXIII / 1930, 49–62.
- ↑ Stuhlpfarrer 1989, 270.
- ^ Pál Szende, The Danube Federation. In: Der Kampf / XXV / 1932.
- ↑ Weber 1985, 112.
- ↑ Kerekes 1977, 162.
- ↑ Ádám, 98.
- ↑ Bihl 1979, 125.
- ↑ Stuhlpfarrer 1989, 278.
- ↑ Höslinger 1991, 61.
- ↑ Haas, 1981b, 320.
- ↑ Bihl 1979, 135.
- ↑ d'Lëtzebuerger Land - At the German Confederation in Eupen (September 2nd, 2016)
- ↑ a b Positions on the ban negotiations , with voting results of the UN General Assembly on December 23, 2016, ICAN website, accessed on May 28, 2017.
- ^ Reaching Critical Will, "Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons"
literature
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- Franz Cede and Christian Prosl : Demand and Reality. Austria's foreign policy since 1945 . Studien Verlag, Innsbruck / Vienna / Bozen 2015, ISBN 978-3-7065-5430-5 .
- Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (ed.): Foreign policy report . Vienna (published annually).
- Michael Gehler : Austria's Foreign Policy of the Second Republic. 2 vols. Studienverlag, Innsbruck et al. 2005, ISBN 3-7065-1414-1 .
- Wolfgang Gieler , Moritz Botts (ed.): Foreign policy of European states, from Albania to Cyprus. Political science text and study books. Scientia Bonnensis 2007, ISBN 978-3-940766-01-4 .
- Hanns Haas: Discussion on the contributions Hummelberger and Suppan. In: Rudolf Neck , Adam Wandruszka (Ed.): Anschluss 1938. Protocol of the symposium in Vienna on March 14th and 15th, 1978. Vienna 1981, pp. 312–329.
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