Blood and Iron
“Blut und Eisen” is a linguistic image used in politics in Germany, especially since the Napoleonic Wars . However, its origins date back to early history . In the 19th and early 20th century, this pair of words was associated with the idea of either the founding of a German nation -state brought about by military means or a power -state - military approach. The buzzword "blood and iron" gained notoriety through a speech that the Prussian Prime Minister Otto von Bismarck gave during the Prussian constitutional conflict on September 30, 1862 before the budget committee of the Prussian House of Representatives . As a result, both opponents and supporters of the Prime Minister saw the pair of words as a strategy of Bismarckian politics: the aim of "Blood and Iron" was to use foreign policy successes to distract from domestic tensions.
Under the impression of the so-called German wars of unification of 1864, 1866 and 1870/1871, the term then developed into a founding myth of the German Empire . According to this, Bismarck used “blood and iron” to break the centuries-old resistance of other European powers against a unified German state and welded the German states together through a common war of arms . The dominance of the military and the authoritarian state in the society of the German Empire was essentially based on this narrative . After the First World War , “blood and iron” formed a historical contrast for right-wing extremists to the government of the Weimar Republic , which was perceived as weak in power . The National Socialists tried to follow the foreign policy tradition of Bismarck's "blood and iron" policy.
Development of the term before 1862
The linguistic connection between the key words "blood and iron" has its origin in the advent of metal weapons. The implements of war were first made of bronze and later of iron . The Greek epic of the Iliad already interlaced battle scenes with descriptions of "blood and iron". Another level of meaning of "blood and iron" can be found for the first time in a commentary by the Roman rhetoric teacher Quintilian or one of his students. The passage says, "Murder seems to mean blood and iron" ("Caedes videtur significare sanguinem et ferrum"). The words come from a legal definition of murder . According to this interpretation, "killing by an iron weapon that causes blood to flow" was murder in the legal sense.
time of the coalition wars
The buzzword "blood and iron" gained importance during the coalition wars at the beginning of the 19th century. Supporters of German nationalism thus campaigned for a fight against Napoleon's rule . The idea behind this was that the foundation of a German nation -state could only be enforced with the use of military force. Such an idea remained widespread among the liberal bourgeoisie in the decades that followed. The "blood and iron" imagery was also reflected in the nationalist poems of the writers Max von Schenkendorf , Theodor Körner and Ernst Moritz Arndt . According to the Germanist Gunnar Müller-Waldeck , her poetry contributed to the fact that "Blood and Iron" developed into the cipher of "a heroic - paternalistic value system": The topos is inherent to the ideal of a "fortified people's empire".
"Blood and Iron" plays an important role in the poem Das eisenen Kreuz , written in 1813 during the wars of liberation . It was written by the student and war volunteer Max von Schenkendorf:
Because only iron can save us,
and only blood can redeem us
from the heavy chains of sin,
from the arrogance of evil.
In the poem, Schenkendorf praised the Iron Cross , a military order of merit established in 1813 and awarded in Prussia for special achievements in war. There is also a reference to "blood and iron" in Arndt's fatherland song from 1812: "Today we want to redden the iron man for man / with blood".
Time of the Italian nation building
The idea of a national unification enforced by force with "blood and iron" was reactivated by the Sardinian War of 1859. Under the direction of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont , an Italian national state began to take shape. The liberal majority in the Prussian House of Representatives therefore believed that the German question could only be solved by means of war. Comparable beliefs also existed in the Italian national movement. The later Italian Prime Minister Camillo Benso von Cavour declared that the "Italian question [knows] only one solution: the cannon". However, Cavour's understanding of a "blood and iron" policy differed from that of the later Prussian Prime Minister Bismarck. While Bismarck in his "blood and iron" speech of 1862 contrasted war as a political means with the supposedly weak "speeches and majority decisions" of parliament, Cavour recognized parliamentary majorities as a power factor for his politics. In 1859, while still serving as the Prussian ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Bismarck used a formulation resembling “blood and iron”. He spoke of the Latin phrase " ferro et igni ", which means something like "through iron and fire". With this term, Bismarck spoke out in favor of asserting Prussian interests in the German Confederation more energetically, if necessary by using military means. The binding of Austrian soldiers through the Sardinian War is a suitable political opportunity for this. Literally, Bismarck meant that Prussia's federal obligations to the German Confederation "sooner or later ferro et igni [translated: by iron and fire] will have to heal".
Bismarck's "Blood and Iron Speech" of 1862
Appointed Prime Minister of Prussia in 1862 , Bismarck took up the "blood and iron" phrase during the Prussian constitutional conflict . The background to this was a dispute over military-political issues between the Prussian House of Representatives and the Crown . On September 23, 1862, the House of Representatives removed all costs for army reform from the state budget and sent a budget commission to negotiate with the government. At the meeting on September 30, 1862, Bismarck delivered his so-called "blood and iron" speech to the commission. Researchers are still arguing about their exact motives to this day. According to historian Lothar Gall , Bismarck tried to downplay the conflict. Bismarck promised the deputies the possibility of a common foreign policy. The historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler , on the other hand, believes that Bismarck only wanted to explore "chances of agreement" with Parliament when he appeared. The prime minister had only shown himself to be “moderate in places”. Bismarck explained to the members of the Budget Commission:
“Germany does not look to Prussia's liberalism , but to its power; Bavaria , Wuerttemberg , Baden may indulge in liberalism , but none of Prussia's role will be assigned to them; Prussia must gather her strength and hold together for the favorable moment, which has already been missed several times; Prussia's frontiers according to the Vienna Treaties are not favorable to a healthy state life; The big questions of the time are not decided by speeches and majority decisions – that was the big mistake of 1848 and 1849 – but by iron and blood.”
With this formulation, Bismarck tried to win over the Prussian House of Representatives for army reform. He argued that the revolution of 1848/1849 failed to achieve national unity due to a lack of military power. Whether Bismarck already had the long-term goal of German unification in mind with his speech of 1862 or merely made a statement about Prussia's current power politics is a matter of debate in research. Bismarck himself interpreted his statement decades later in the first sense. In a debate on the Polish question in the Prussian House of Representatives on January 28, 1886, he said:
“I can't help that I wasn't understood at the time; I spoke quite clearly about it in the well-known, and not quite well-known statements, which were characterized by the words 'Blood and Iron', perhaps more clearly than it was good at the time. It was a matter of military questions, and I said: put as strong a military force as possible, in other words as much blood and iron as possible, in the hands of the King of Prussia, then he will be able to carry out the policy that you want; she doesn't bother with speeches and marksman 's festivals and songs, she only gets along with 'blood and iron'. (Bravo! right.) That's the thing. I might have been understood if I hadn't had too many rivals in this field of establishing Germany at the time. (Laughter.)”
The historian Lothar Gall also interprets Bismarck's words of 1862 as an "offer of cooperation in the sense of a resolutely advancing Kleindeutsch national policy". Michael Epkenhans , on the other hand, warns against overestimating the "blood and iron" speech. Bismarck was not primarily concerned with “realizing the small-German solution as demanded by the national movement”. Rather, it was crucial for Bismarck to maintain a position in the German Confederation that was equal to that of Austria . For such an increase in Prussia's power, Bismarck was also prepared "to adopt the wishes of the national movement [...]." Dieter Hein also thinks that the speech does not allow conclusions to be drawn about Bismarck's "firmly defined national political program". The image of the new Prime Minister's policy aimed at national unification from the outset was more of a retrospective attribution by his contemporaries.
The historian Wolfram Wette, on the other hand, classifies the speech as one of Bismarck's "programmatic intentions". The prime minister had already wanted to outline "the path to German unification" under Prussian dominance and had clearly declared himself anti-liberal to the existing "Prussian military and power state". The British historian Richard J. Evans also explains Bismarck's words about "blood and iron" with Prussian power interests: The Vienna Congress of 1814/1815 had strengthened the territorial division of Prussian state territory. The economically prosperous provinces in the west (the Rhineland and Westphalia ) were separated from the eastern areas of Prussia by the Kingdom of Hanover , among other things. With “Blood and Iron” Bismarck would have wanted to present his military goal of a contiguous national territory. Bismarck consequently saw no other way out than the "destruction of the German Confederation". Christoph Nübel interprets the speech to mean that Bismarck saw war as a possible political tool. In this he did not differ from other heads of government of his time.
Immediate public response
Bismarck's original wording "iron and blood" became public knowledge a short time later in the rearranged form of "blood and iron". The speech sparked protests from MPs. They and the liberal public accused Bismarck of wanting to establish a “tyranny based on foreign policy adventures” ( Eberhard Kolb ). The press also portrayed Bismarck as an "unscrupulous violent man" with reference to the "blood and iron" speech. The aim of a "blood and iron" policy was to distract from domestic conflicts through future foreign policy successes. Rudolf Virchow , a spokesman for the German Progressive Party , expressed this assessment during the meeting of the budget commission. Bismarck himself attempted to counter such an interpretation. Shortly after his speech – also during the session – he explained:
“He must guard himself against looking for external conflicts in order to get over internal difficulties; that would be frivolous; he would not seek bargains; he speaks of conflicts that we would not avoid unless we sought them.”
Well-known Prussian personalities also commented on Bismarck's words. In October 1862, during a speech to party friends, the writer Rudolf Löwenstein , a member of the Berlin Progressive Party , reversed the original meaning of "blood and iron": A national unity in Germany would be as certain "as a law of nature would have to be fulfilled with necessity." ; not with iron and blood, of course, but rather with iron and coal”. With the slogan "iron and coal", Löwenstein took up the then widespread notion that the economic boom of the time would bring the German states together. The iron and coal industry formed an important basis. The amount of hard coal mined in the area of the German Customs Union alone rose from 3.5 million tons in 1850 to 26.3 million tons in 1869. During the same period, pig iron production increased from 220,000 tons to 1,413,000 tons. The historian Heinrich von Treitschke , supporter of a violent, small-German solution under Prussian leadership, was also opposed to Bismarck's 1862 speech. In a letter, Treitschke confided to his friend Wilhelm Nokk :
“You know how passionately I love Prussia; but when I hear such a shallow Junker as this Bismarck bragging about iron and blood with which he wants to subjugate Germany, it seems to me that the vulgarity is even outdone by the ridiculousness.”
The historian Thomas Nipperdey explains such assessments by later “Bismarck admirers” by saying that Bismarck violated the norms of political language of his time with the brutal formulation of “iron and blood”. While many liberals would have supported a "blood-and-iron" policy, they would not publicly articulate it in such language.
Due to the negative public response to the speech - as Bismarck was to claim three decades later in his " Thoughts and Memoirs " - the Prussian King Wilhelm I thought about dismissing him as Prime Minister, who had just been appointed Prime Minister. According to historian Christoph Nonn , Bismarck was actually on the verge of having the shortest prime minister in Prussian history. Robert-Tarek Fischer disagrees . Wilhelm I could not have afforded to remove Bismarck after only a week in office. This "would not have shed a good light on his judgement". In order to ensure his influence on the king in view of the public mood, Bismarck felt compelled to travel to Jüterbog to meet the king, who was returning to Berlin from Baden-Baden on October 4, 1862 . Referring to the inflexible attitude that Charles I of England had taken towards Parliament in the 17th century, Bismarck was able to convince Wilhelm I to continue the conflict with Parliament together until the point of breaking the constitution.
Reception after 1862
empire founding time
The martial image as a "man of blood and iron" became an integral part of the Bismarck myth . Both opponents and supporters of Bismarck saw "blood and iron" as a main idea of his policy. The image of the "Iron Chancellor" was further cemented by the wars against Denmark in 1864 , against Austria in 1866 and against France in 1870/1871 . Bismarck now finally had the public reputation of being a warmonger, although it was mostly overlooked that there were also groups on the side of the Prussian opponents of the war that were ready for an aggressive foreign policy. The warlike characterization of Bismarck in public also endured after Bismarck had decided not to strive for any further expansion of the German Reich .
A few years after the speech of 1862, “blood and iron” was given a positive reinterpretation: Bismarck created the German national state in a battle between German culture and the Romance peoples through “blood and iron” and the wars of unification . This put an end to centuries of paternalism over Germany by neighboring countries. With the story , a high level of sacrifice was demanded during the First World War. In the essay "Blut und Eisen" from 1867, the publicist August Ludwig von Rochau distanced himself from his earlier critical attitude towards Bismarck. Its national policy has been successful, which is why a moral assessment of government measures is secondary. The Germanist Rolf Parr attributes the public potency of the words "blood and iron" to the popularity at that time of a linguistic combination of symbols of nature and technology. With "iron" contemporaries would have thought symbolically of blacksmithing, foundry or architecture. Consequently, Bismarck was interpreted as a "smith" of the German Empire who welded the individual countries together. Following such an image, Bismarck's contemporaries also described him as a creative "artist" who created a "work of art", the German Reich, with "blood and iron".
According to Armin Jähne, since Bismarck's speech, "blood and iron" have also become synonyms for "politics of violence, military pressure and war" in common parlance. “Blood and Iron” was closely related to a changed understanding of politics. Against the background of the emergence of the Italian nation state and Bismarck's new actions, the ideals of the revolution of 1848/1849 seemed to be losing their power and, on the other hand, military-power-state action was gaining in importance. In an appeal from 1869 , the Catholic People's Party defined "blood and iron" as a policy that sees "in people only an object for militarism and in their activities only a source for the tax screw". Like many democrats, the Prussian MP and doctor Johann Jacoby was critical of the public shift in favor of a policy of “blood and iron” following the German War of 1866:
"Let's not delude ourselves about the political significance of military successes. Although other peoples of Europe may have achieved their state unity by force, through a kind of blood and iron policy, the German people, a thousand years of history testifies to it, have always successfully resisted such attempts at unification.”
According to Jacoby, a unity imposed militarily by Prussia contradicted the historical tradition of freedom in Germany. In doing so, Jacoby was still sticking to a position that was frequently expressed during the revolution of 1848/1849. In the period when the Reich was being founded, however, there was a tendency that the majority of liberals were now willing to let the ideal of political freedom take a back seat to that of national unity. Unity, according to the frequently held view, can only be achieved “ realpolitik ” through power politics. The Volkszeitung of August 18, 1865 , as the mouthpiece of the left-wing spectrum of the Progressive Party, opposed this attitude. It declared that the national unity created by “blood and iron” would “destroy the last traces of freedom even if it were possible ].” The Prussian implementation of German unity not only split the liberal forces. The social democrat Wilhelm Liebknecht advocated a greater German solution and was critical of the national politics of the Prussian power state. A poem he wrote in 1868 bears witness to this:
"Blood and iron unite servants -
so we shall now stand forever!
Let's go, God of human rights ,
to unity through freedom!"
The German Imperium
In the German Empire, "blood and iron" played an important role in the interpretation of German history. The slogans were often contrasted with the unsuccessful attempt at national unification in 1848/1849 , the " revolution from below". Accordingly, the successful establishment of the German Reich was the achievement of the military and a “ revolution from above ” emanating from the Prussian state . Thus, the national "Blood and Iron" performance gave the officers a high level of recognition among the German bourgeoisie. Wolfram Wette sees "blood and iron" as the central "thought pattern" of German militarism at the time: the term is associated with the idea of "a positive role for violence in history", which not only supported nationalism, but also the early German workers' movement represented. The thought pattern of "blood and iron" was also criticized: as a pacifist counter-concept to "blood and iron", the term "sword belief" coined by the educator Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster , for whom this belief was an expression of a "general idolatry of power" in Germany was. With him, the peace movement criticized the militaristic attitude in society. Foerster interpreted the “sword belief” as a symptom of a “national disease”.
The writer Gabriele Reuter used in her 1895 published novel Aus Gute Familie. A girl's tale of woe uses the formula of "blood and iron" to criticize the existing national system. The main protagonist of the novel visits a spa towards the end of the book. Reuter writes about the spa complex:
“Women – women – nothing but women. Hundreds of them stream together from all parts of the fatherland here at the steel springs, as if the abundance of blood and iron with which the German Reich was forged to mighty greatness had been sucked out of its daughters' veins and bones, and they couldn't help themselves from the loss recover."
In Peter Sprengel 's opinion, Reuter's "blood and iron" reference establishes a connection with Bismarck's anti-parliamentary style of politics and the warlike, militaristic attitude of the German Empire. The protagonists of the novel suffer under its conditions. According to Jenny Bauer, Reuter's allusion to "blood and iron" is intended to show women soldiers in particular who, despite their "motherhood that constitutes the Reich," find little relief in society.
In his novel Frau Jenny Treibel , the writer Theodor Fontane also alluded ironically to "blood and iron": During a dinner, the character of the novel Corinna Schmidt, daughter of a high school professor, said that the factory owner Treibel represented a "blood and iron theory". Corinna is referring to the fact that Treibel has blue paint made for uniforms. For this reason, the entrepreneur is now convinced that he must show a military attitude. He goes together with a lieutenant - ultimately unsuccessfully - in the regional election campaign.
In 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II used the term “blood and iron” to justify the so-called penitentiary bill . The draft law directed against the social- democratic labor movement was preceded by a bricklaying strike in Potsdam . The monarch saw the public protest in the immediate vicinity of the New Palace , his residence, as a provocation. He spoke in the Privy Council of "relying on the bayonets in an emergency, since it seems that in Germany without blood and iron healthy conditions cannot be brought about, even internally". In doing so, he transferred the “blood and iron” phrase to the area of domestic politics. The government draft law that was then drafted was intended to massively restrict the possibility of going on strike. However, the rejection of the draft law by the Reichstag caused the Kaiser's plan to fail.
World wars and interwar period
The Bismarck myth continued to play a major role during the First World War . For example, German annexation advocates referred to Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron". After Germany lost the First World War, Bismarck's image changed altogether. The Reich Chancellor developed into an anti-republican symbolic figure for politically right-wing forces and stood for a supposedly glorious German past. For example, the publicly influential Berlin pastor Otto Dibelius used the catchphrases “blood and iron” in 1919 to criticize the Peace Treaty of Versailles . He said that because of this peace order, "therefore nothing could live in the hearts of German men other than the thought of liberation through blood and iron." With these words, Dibelius expected and demanded a military revision of the Versailles Treaty . Nationalist forces also used the pair of words to criticize the Berlin government's tense foreign policy situation. Heinrich Class , chairman of the Pan-German Association , accused Chancellor Wilhelm Cuno in 1923 of not pursuing a “blood and iron” policy. According to Claßen, Bismarck would never have tolerated a French occupation of the Rhineland . Bismarck's historic achievement of "liberating" Germany had been gambled away. The publicist August Georg Kenstler , who was active in the Völkisch movement , also systematically spread the formula of “ Blood and Soil ” for the first time, based among other things on “Blut und Eisen” (Blood and Iron). Under this term, an agricultural policy and racist ideology was later to develop.
|The old motto in the "new" kingdom:
blood and iron
|John Heartfield , 1934|
|The Museum of Fine Arts, Houston|
Link to the picture
The National Socialists placed their foreign policy activities in the tradition of "blood and iron": The rearmament of the Wehrmacht , the willingness to take diplomatic risks and the preparations for war were compared with the early Bismarck era. At the same time, Nazi politicians such as Adolf Hitler also distanced themselves from Bismarck. The increasingly cautious foreign policy of the former Prussian Prime Minister after 1870 and his small-German solution excluding Austria did not fit in with National Socialist ideas. Hitler himself, however, frequently referred to phrases used by Bismarck and now part of common parlance. On July 28, 1922, during a speech in Munich to party supporters, he alluded to Bismarck's "Blood and Iron" speech of 1862. Hitler – at that time still only party chairman of the NSDAP – claimed that Bismarck had already said that “the fates of the peoples” […] “were decided not by majority decisions” and “treats, but by blood and iron”. With the formulation, which falsified the content of Bismarck's speech, Hitler attempted to historically justify his own aversion to international treaties.
In 1934, the artist John Heartfield caricatured the Nazi rulers’ reference to “Blood and Iron” . One of his works entitled "The old motto in the 'new' Reich: blood and iron" shows four bloody axes tied together in the shape of a swastika . The main symbol of the National Socialists appears in this way as an instrument of murder.
The English economic historian John Maynard Keynes questioned the myth of “blood and iron” for the founding of the German Empire around 1920 . According to him, "coal and iron" rather than "blood and iron" would have made Germany's national unification possible. "Coal and iron" stood for the most important branches of industry in the German Confederation. An industrial-economic development advantage of Prussia compared to Austria favored the small German solution . The German economic historian Volker Hentschel agrees: Prussia's economic and political involvement in the German Confederation - such as the founding of the Customs Union - paved the way for the Prussian-German nation state long before the wars of unification. Hans-Ulrich Wehler disagrees . He argues that the majority of Zollverein members in the War of 1866 were Austrian allies and fought against Prussia. In his opinion, the development towards a national state dominated by Prussia was only the consequence of a policy of “blood and iron” and the three German wars of unification. According to the Hungarian historian Iván T. Berend , "coal and iron" contributed to Prussia's military successes: the Krupp cast steel factory played an important role in armaments for war. Krupp's Prussian steel cannons had a range that was about twice as long as the conventional bronze guns of the enemy.
Another research question related to "Blood and Iron" concerns the political consequences of the founding of the Reich in the sense of the German special path thesis. According to this, national unification through "blood and iron" upgraded military values to such an extent that German society subsequently differed greatly from those in Western countries such as France, Great Britain and the United States of America. As a consequence, the development paved the way for Germany, among other things, to go into the First World War. The high standing of the officers as a result of the founding of the Reich, which was enforced with "blood and iron", also prevented the military from being subordinate to parliament, in line with the Sonderweg thesis. Since the unification process did not come about under a democratic sign, no development towards a government responsible to parliament could take place despite universal suffrage . The historian Jakob Vogel puts such assessments into perspective: Despite the strong influence of militarism on the German Empire, the France of the Third Republic, for example, could also be characterized as a “société militaire”, a military society.
- On Bismarck's "blood and iron" speech: Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung , issue of October 1, 1862.
- On Bismarck's "blood and iron" speech: National-Zeitung (morning issue), No. 458 of October 2, 1862. Digitized by the Bavarian State Library in Munich.
- On the subsequent description of Otto von Bismarck's speech: Thoughts and memories . Volume 1, Cotta, Stuttgart 1898, pp. 283-284. On the digital copy from page 283 and 284.
- August Ludwig von Rochau : blood and iron. In: Weekly Journal of the National Association . No. 85 of January 3, 1867, pp. 668-669. For the digital copy from page 668 and page 669.
- Armin Jähne : Blood and Iron. In: Kurt Pätzold, Manfred Weißbecker (ed.): Keywords and battle cries. From two centuries of German history. Volume 1, Leipzig 2002, ISBN 3-86189-248-0 , pp. 76–82.
- Christoph Jahr : Blood and Iron. How Prussia conquered Germany. 1864-1871. Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-75542-2 .
- Amerigo Caruso: Blood and iron inside too. Social Conflicts, Mass Politics and Violence in Germany Before 1914. Campus, Frankfurt/New York 2021, ISBN 978-3-593-51328-7 .
- Duden entry "Blood and Iron" see: Quotations and Sayings. 2nd, revised and updated edition [editorial processing: Maria Grazia Chiaro and Werner Scholze-Stubenrecht], Mannheim et al. 2002, p. 87.
- ↑ Heinrich Dormeier: Bismarck in the caricature of foreign countries. Selection, Introduction and Commentary. Museum Association of the German Historical Museum, Berlin 1990, p. 84.
- ↑ Armin Jähne: Blood and Iron. In: Kurt Pätzold, Manfred Weißbecker (ed.): Keywords and battle cries. From two centuries of German history. Volume 1, Militzke, Leipzig 2002, ISBN 3-86189-248-0 , pp. 76–82, here p. 76.
- ↑ Armin Jähne: Blood and Iron. In: Kurt Pätzold, Manfred Weißbecker (ed.): Keywords and battle cries. From two centuries of German history. Volume 1, Militzke, Leipzig 2002, ISBN 3-86189-248-0 , pp. 76–82, here p. 77. For the ancient text, see Quintilian: The Lesser Declamations Vol. I & II, edited and translated by DR Shackleton Bailey , Volume 2, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2006, p. 306.
- ↑ Günter Hess: On the Flight of Words and Images. Büchmann's treasury of quotations as a medium of German educational and ideological history in the 19th and 20th centuries. In: Karl Richter, Jörg Schönert and Michael Titzmann (eds.): Literature and the Sciences 1770-1930. Verlag für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Stuttgart 1997, ISBN 3-476-45191-7 , pp. 233-294, here p. 276.
- ↑ Ernst Lautenbach: Latin - German: Quotations Lexicon. Credits. LIT, Münster/Hamburg/London 2002, ISBN 3-8258-5652-6 , p. 116.
- ↑ a b Amerigo Caruso: Nation State as Telos. The conservative discourse in Prussia and Sardinia-Piedmont 1840-1870. Oldenbourg, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-11-054207-3 , p. 398.
- ↑ a b Christoph year: blood and iron. How Prussia conquered Germany. 1864-1871. Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-75542-2 , p. 99.
- ↑ Gunnar Müller-Waldeck: From the thirst for French blood. Observations about Arndt's hate songs and their historical fate. In: Dirk Alvermann, Irmfried Garbe (ed.): Ernst Moritz Arndt in his time - Pomerania before, during and after the Napoleonic occupation. Series V - Research on Pomeranian history. Publication of the Historical Commission for Pomerania. Böhlau, Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2021, ISBN 978-3-412-52132-5 , pp. 181-193, here p. 183.
- ↑ Armin Jähne: Blood and Iron. In: Kurt Pätzold, Manfred Weißbecker (ed.): Keywords and battle cries. From two centuries of German history. Volume 1, Militzke, Leipzig 2002, ISBN 3-86189-248-0 , pp. 76–82, here p. 78.
- ↑ Johannes Fried: The Germans - An Autobiography. Beck, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-406-72038-3 , p. 169.
- ↑ Rudolf Parr: "Two souls live, alas! in my chest". Structures and functions of the mythification of Bismarck (1860–1918). Fink, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-7705-2727-5 , p. 86.
- ↑ Michael Epkenhans: Unification through "iron and blood". Military history in the age of the founding of the empire from 1858 to 1871. In: Karl-Volker Neugebauer (ed.): Basic course in German military history. The time up to 1914. From a warband to a mass army. Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59009-8 , pp. 303–377, here p. 324.
- ↑ Gian Enrico Rusconi: Cavour and Bismarck. Two statesmen caught between liberalism and Caesarism. Oldenbourg, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-71533-0 , p. 14.
- ↑ a b Armin Jähne: Blood and Iron. In: Kurt Pätzold, Manfred Weißbecker (ed.): Keywords and battle cries. From two centuries of German history. Volume 1, Leipzig 2002, ISBN 3-86189-248-0 , pp. 76–82, here p. 79.
- ↑ Jost Dülffer, Martin Kröger, Rolf-Harald Wippich: Avoided wars. De-escalation of conflicts between the great powers between the Crimean War and the First World War 1865-1914. Oldenbourg, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-486-56276-2 , p. 37.
- ↑ Lothar Gall: Bismarck: The White Revolutionary. Propylaea, Frankfurt am Main and others 1980, ISBN 3-549-07397-6 , pp. 255–256.
- ↑ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German social history. Volume 3: From the "German double revolution" to the beginning of the First World War 1849-1914. Beck, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-406-32263-8 , p. 271.
- ↑ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way west. Vol. 1: German history from the end of the Old Kingdom to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2000, p. 154.
- ↑ Bismarck's speech on the "Poland Question" before the Prussian House of Representatives (January 28, 1886). (PDF; 151 kB). Retrieved 24 November 2021 from germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org .
- ↑ Lothar Gall: Bismarck: The White Revolutionary. Propylaea, Frankfurt am Main and others 1980, ISBN 3-549-07397-6 , p. 257.
- ↑ Michael Epkenhans: The founding of the empire in 1870/71. Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-75032-8 , p. 32.
- ^ a b Dieter Hein: German history in the 19th century. Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-67507-2 , p. 84.
- ↑ Wolfram Wette: Militarism in Germany. History of a warlike culture. Primus, Darmstadt 2008, p. 44.
- ↑ Richard J. Evans: The European Century. A continent in transition. 1815-1914. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Munich 2018, ISBN 978-3-421-04733-5 . ( limited preview in Google book search)
- ↑ Christoph Nübel: The state based on blood and iron. The military in Bismarck's state thinking. In: Ulrich Lappenküper, Ulf Morgenstern (eds.): Beliefs, changes and attributions. Otto von Bismarck's understanding of the state. Nomos, Baden-Baden 2019, ISBN 978-3-8487-4915-7 , pp. 103-128, here p. 109.
- ↑ Eberhard Kolb: Otto von Bismarck. A biography. Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66774-9 , p. 72.
- ^ Otto Plant: Bismarck. Volume 1: The founder of the empire. Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-54822-2 , p. 188.
- ↑ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German social history. Volume 3: From the "German double revolution" to the beginning of the First World War 1849-1914. Beck, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-406-32263-8 , pp. 271–272.
- ↑ Lothar Gall: Bismarck: The White Revolutionary. Propylaea, Frankfurt am Main and others 1980, ISBN 3-549-07397-6 , p. 258.
- ↑ Christoph Jahr: Blood and Iron. How Prussia conquered Germany. 1864-1871. Beck, Munich 2020, ISBN 978-3-406-75542-2 , p. 94.
- ↑ Harald Biermann: Ideology instead of Realpolitik. Little German liberals and foreign policy before the founding of the Reich. Droste, Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 3-7705-2727-5 , pp. 140–141.
- ^ a b Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1800-1866 . Civil world and strong state. Beck, Munich 1983, ISBN 3-406-09354-X , p. 762.
- ↑ Christoph Nonn: Bismarck. A Prussian and his century. Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67589-8 , p. 143.
- ↑ Christoph Nonn: Bismarck. A Prussian and his century. Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67589-8 , p. 355.
- ↑ Robert-Tarek Fischer: Wilhelm I. From the Prussian king to the first German emperor. Böhlau, Cologne 2020, ISBN 978-3-412-51926-1 , p. 195.
- ↑ Heinrich August Winkler : The long way west . Vol. 1: German history from the end of the Old Kingdom to the fall of the Weimar Republic. CH Beck, Munich 2000, p. 154 f.
- ^ Otto Plant: Bismarck. Volume 1: The founder of the empire. Beck, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-406-54822-2 , p. 699.
- ↑ Heinrich August Winkler: Forever in Hitler's shadow? Notes on German History. Beck, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-56214-3 , pp. 25–27.
- ↑ Hilmar Sack: History in the political space. Theory - practice - professional fields (= public history - history in practice). UTB, Stuttgart 2016, ISBN 978-3-8252-4619-8 , p. 16.
↑ Gian Enrico Rusconi: Cavour and Bismarck. Two statesmen caught between liberalism and Caesarism. Oldenbourg, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-71533-0 , pp. 110–111.
August Ludwig von Rochau : blood and iron. In: Weekly newspaper of the national association. No. 85 of January 3, 1867, pp. 668-669. For the digital copy from page 668 and page 669 .
- ↑ Rudolf Parr: "Two souls live, alas! in my chest". Structures and functions of the mythification of Bismarck (1860–1918). Fink, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-7705-2727-5 , pp. 76–77.
- ↑ Rudolf Parr: "Two souls live, alas! in my chest". Structures and functions of the mythification of Bismarck (1860–1918), Fink, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-7705-2727-5 , p. 71.
- ↑ Rudolf Parr: "Two souls live, alas! in my chest". Structures and functions of the mythification of Bismarck (1860–1918). Fink, Munich 1992, ISBN 3-7705-2727-5 , p. 172.
- ↑ Jörn Leonhard: Politics - a symptomatic outline of historical semantics in a European comparison. In: Willibald Steinmetz (ed.): »Politics«. Situations of word usage in modern Europe. Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-593-38446-7 , pp. 75–133, here p. 123.
- ↑ Jörn Leonhard: Bellicism and nation: war interpretation and nation determination in Europe and the United States 1750-1914. Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58516-2 , p. 614.
- ↑ Jörn Leonhard: Bellicism and nation: war interpretation and nation determination in Europe and the United States 1750-1914. Oldenbourg, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58516-2 , pp. 613–614.
- ↑ Lothar Gall: Liberalism and the nation state. German Liberalism and the Founding of the Reich. In: Ders: bourgeoisie, liberal movement and nation. Oldenbourg, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-486-56247-9 , pp. 190–202, here p. 197.
- ↑ Dirk Blasius, Lothar Gall, Krista Segermann: Unity. In: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze, Reinhart Koselleck (eds.): Basic historical concepts. Historical encyclopedia of political and social language in Germany. Volume 2: E-G. 1975, ISBN 3-12-903860-4 , pp. 117–151, here p. 146.
- ↑ Axel Kuhn: The German labor movement. Reclam, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 978-3-15-017042-7 , p. 82.
- ↑ Karl-Volker Neugebauer: The Emperor's »shimmering defense«. Military history of the German Empire from 1871 to 1914. In: Ders. (ed.): Basic course in German military history. The time up to 1914. From a warband to a mass army. Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-59009-8 , pp. 378–486, here p. 452.
- ↑ Wolfram Wette: The Wehrmacht. Images of enemies, war of annihilation, legends. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 3-10-091208-X , p. 142 f.
- ↑ Wolfram Wette: Militarism in Germany. History of a warlike culture. Primus, Darmstadt 2008, ISBN 978-3-89678-641-8 , p. 157.
- ↑ a b Jenny Bauer: Gender discourses around 1900. Literary drafts of identity in the context of German-Scandinavian spatial production. Transcript, Bielefeld 2016, ISBN 978-3-8376-3208-8 , pp. 157–158.
- ↑ Jenny Bauer: Gender discourses around 1900. Literary identity designs in the context of German-Scandinavian spatial production. Transcript, Bielefeld 2016, ISBN 978-3-8376-3208-8 , p. 157.
- ↑ Peter Sprengel: History of German-language literature 1870-1900. From the founding of the empire to the turn of the century (= history of German literature from the beginnings to the present. Volume 9/1). Beck, Munich 1998, ISBN 3-406-44104-1 , p. 4.
- ↑ Humbert Settler: Corinna's Flirt in "Frau Jenny Treibel". Fontane's artistically enigmatic speech formation. Heimatverein “Niedersachsen” e. V., Scheeßel 2004, ISBN 3-9807741-4-7 , p. 20. On the wording in the novel: Theodor Fontane: Mrs. Jenny Treibel or where the heart finds itself. Boer, Berlin 2020, ISBN 978-3-96662-078-9 , p. 38. (google.de).
- ↑ Amerigo Caruso: Blood and iron also within. Social conflicts, mass politics and violence in Germany before 1914. Campus, Frankfurt/ New York 2021, ISBN 978-3-593-51328-7 , pp. 29-30.
- ↑ Wolfgang K. Hünig: British and German Cartoons as Weapons in World War I. Invective and Ideology of Political Cartoons, a Cognitive Linguistics Approach. Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 978-3-6315-0211-2 , p. 125.
- ↑ Robert Gerwarth: The Bismarck Myth. Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, ISBN 0-19-928184-X , p. 172.
- ↑ Robert Gerwarth: The Bismarck Myth. Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, ISBN 0-19-928184-X , p. 173.
- ↑ Rolf Schieder: 1914-1945. Metamorphoses of a Preacher. In: Tobias Braune-Krickau, Christoph Galle (ed.): Sermon and politics. On the cultural history of the sermon from Charlemagne to the present. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2021, ISBN 978-3-8471-1309-6 , pp. 277-296, here p. 285.
- ↑ Robert Gerwarth: The Bismarck Myth. Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005, ISBN 0-19-928184-X , p. 73.
- ↑ Klaus Bergmann : Agrarian romanticism and big city hostility (= Marburg essays on political science 20 ). Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1970, p. 289.
- ↑ Manfred Schlenke: National Socialism and Prussia/Prussianism. Report on a research project. In: Otto Büsch (ed.): The image of Prussia in history. De Gruyter, Berlin/New York 1981, ISBN 3-11-177687-5 , pp. 247–264, here p. 254.
↑ Herbert D. Andrews: Hitler, Bismarck, and History. In: German Studies Review. 14, issue 3 (Oct. 1991), pp. 511–532, here pp. 513–514.
Günter Schubert : Beginnings of National Socialist foreign policy. Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne 1961, p. 71.
- ↑ Jennifer Lynde Barker: The Aesthetics of Antifascist Film Radical Projection. Routledge, London/New York 2013, ISBN 978-1-138-69579-5 , p. 49.
- ↑ Volker Hentschel: Prussia's contentious history. 1594-1945. Droste, Düsseldorf 1980, ISBN 3-7700-0560-0 , p. 235.
- ↑ Dieter Hein: German history in the 19th century. Beck, Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-406-67507-2 , p. 65.
- ↑ Volker Hentschel: Prussia's contentious history. 1594-1945. Droste, Düsseldorf 1980, ISBN 3-7700-0560-0 , p. 235.
- ↑ Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German nationalism until 1871. In: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.): Crossroads of German history. From the Reformation to the turning point 1517-1989. Beck, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-406-39223-7 , pp. 116–129, here p. 128.
- ^ Iván T. Berend: An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Europe. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, ISBN 978-1-107-03070-1 , p. 224.
- ↑ Jakob Vogel: Nations in step. The cult of the "nation in arms" in Germany and France (1871–1914). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen 1997, ISBN 3-525-35781-8 , p. 19.
- ↑ Jürgen Kocka: bourgeoisie and special way. In: Peter Lundgreen (Hrsg.): Social and cultural history of the bourgeoisie. A review of the Bielefeld Collaborative Research Center 177 (1986-1997). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2000, ISBN 3-525-35683-8 , pp. 93–110, here p. 95.
- ↑ Klaus von Beyme: History of political theories in Germany 1300-2000. Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2009, ISBN 978-3-531-91986-7 , p. 575.
- ↑ Jakob Vogel: Nations in step. The cult of the "nation in arms" in Germany and France (1871–1914). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen 1997, ISBN 3-525-35781-8 , p. 20.
- ↑ Christoph Nonn: Bismarck. A Prussian and his century. Beck, Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-406-67589-8 , p. 142.