Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relations

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Iranian-Saudi Arabian Relations
Location of Saudi Arabia and Iran
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Saudi Arabia Iran

The relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are of a strategic rivalry for regional supremacy in the Near and Middle East dominated. They are also of mutual distrust and a religious-ideological hostility between Sunni and Twelver - Shiite influenced Islam.

history

Until World War II

In the course of history there had been numerous states on Iranian soil that had political relations with their neighbors. On the Arabian Peninsula, however, the geographic and climatic conditions prevented the formation of a national unity and identity. The central Arab peninsula therefore did not pursue any foreign policy until the First World War. For this reason, relations between Persia and the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula were restricted to the Persian participants in the Hajj .

The first establishment of mutual relations turned out to be correspondingly lengthy. At the end of 1925, Reza Khan had founded the Pahlavi dynasty , while in the Hejaz Abd Al-Aziz was in the process of establishing himself as king . After Reza Khan's coronation as Shah , Abd Al-Aziz Reza Shah congratulated and promised to protect Persian pilgrims in the Hejaz. As early as 1926, however, there was an incident in which Ichwān troops attacked Shiite pilgrims in Mecca who were holding an Ashura ritual. Persia sent a letter of protest sharply condemning Wahhabism . Subsequently it hesitated to recognize the Hejaz.

In 1928, Abd Al-Aziz suggested that Persia sign a joint security agreement and establish diplomatic relations . In return, the King of the Hejaz would protect the holy places of the Shiites and send his son to Persia with rich gifts. Reza Shah, however, did not want an alliance with Hejaz against the Ichwān, nor were there any other common interests between the two countries. However, Hejaz rejected the claims of Persia such as the Persian jurisdiction over Persian pilgrims. So you just signed a non-binding declaration of non-aggression. In 1930 Habibollah Hoveyda became Persia's first ambassador to the Hejaz, and Rashid Pasha was appointed ambassador for Persia and Iraq. In 1932 Prince Faisal also visited Persia on his return trip from Russia . Reza Shah, however, was not interested in a return visit to Saudi Arabia, and he also decided not to take part in the Hajj . Thus, until the Second World War, bilateral relations were limited to the administration of the Hajj and some trade; some Persians settled in Jeddah . There were border disputes between the two states, but due to the internal instability of both states, they were dormant.

Relations between the two states were, however, repeatedly strained by crises surrounding Persian pilgrims, who repeatedly turned the Wahhabi Saudis against them with their rituals.

Second World War to the Islamic Revolution (1979)

In 1948, Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed diplomatic relations. In the decade after the end of World War II, Saudi Arabia was relatively stable. It improved its relations with the US , which in turn had an interest in Saudi Arabia as an oil supplier and therefore negotiated a defense treaty with the country and provided military training and loans. In Iran, on the other hand, as a result of the occupation during the Second World War, a large section of society had reservations about foreign influence. There was tension between the Shah, the Marxist Tudeh Party , the National Front and the Islamist Fedāʾiyān-e Eslām . They called for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company , the nationalization of which led to the British boycott of Iranian oil and the coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh . The demand for nationalization of the oil reserves and the oil industry spread from Iran to the Arab states, including Saudi Arabia. There Aramco was gradually transferred into Saudi ownership until 1988.

The two countries ostensibly pursued opposing policies on the Israel issue . Iran de facto recognized Israel , not least because of the strong economic ties among the Iranian Jews. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, took part in the war against Israel in 1948 with a few associations , but nevertheless wanted to pursue a foreign policy independent of the Palestine question.

After the military coup in Egypt in 1952, the new ruler Nasser moved his country closer to Moscow. On behalf of the American government, John Foster Dulles toured the region to investigate how to form a regional alliance against socialist governments. His conclusion was that the Arab states were too weak and that the US should concentrate its efforts on the northern states of the region, that is, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. As a result, the USA pursued the establishment of the Baghdad Pact . Saudi Arabia was not intended to be part of this organization and was accordingly sidelined. Nevertheless, the Saudi ruling family understood that they had to come to terms with the USA and implemented limited reforms in the country; but above all they invested in the oil industry. The establishment of the Baghdad Pact polarized the Middle East into a pro-western and a pro-eastern bloc. Saudi Arabia also feared that the Hashimites would gain strength and for this reason prevented Jordan and later Syria from joining this pact. It fought the Baghdad Pact as US interference in the region and concluded tri-material treaties with Egypt and Yemen, and later with Egypt and Syria. There was mistrust between the partners in these contracts; Above all, however, Saudi Arabia suspected Iranian clerics of politicizing the anti-colonialist sentiment of the early 1950s for their own ends.

During this phase the first personal meeting between the monarchs of Iran and Saudi Arabia took place in Tehran. Although they agreed on detailed issues, there was still dissent regarding the Baghdad Pact. Iran finally joined the Baghdad Pact on October 11, 1955.

From 1957 onwards, Saudi Arabia and Iran supported the USA in implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine , which was intended to prevent aggression from communist-dominated countries. In the case of crises in other Middle East countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon or Yemen, both countries could only offer symbolic help. After the coup in Iraq in 1958 , Abd al-Karim Qasim put his country on a pro-Soviet course and withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in March 1959; at almost the same time, Iran signed a military cooperation treaty with the United States. Saudi Arabia, which disliked the strong American presence in the Persian Gulf, did not extend the American right to use the Dhahran airfield . For its part, the US pursued very different policies towards the two states. Although they called for minor reforms in Saudi Arabia, apart from that they largely respected traditional society. In Iran, where the Shah wanted to push through modernization with authoritarian means, they pushed for deep and rapid reforms, which fueled the Iranian opposition to the Shah. This led to the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini , who advocated rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites in the 1960s in order to lessen Western interference in the Muslim world.

In 1964, King Faisal came to the Saudi throne and subsequently strongly advocated Islamic unity. The Shah supported this as long as he believed it was compatible with the requirements of modern times. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia improved, trade tripled between 1964 and 1966, and cooperation in education began. In the wake of the crisis following the split in Yemen, there were South Yemeni attacks on Saudi cities, an attempted coup in Saudi Arabia and political cleansing. During this phase, Iran granted military aid to Saudi Arabia, and Iranian troops were also involved in the suppression of the Dhofar uprising until 1975. Attempts to settle the Iraqi-Iranian border conflict on the Shatt al-Arab with Saudi mediation failed due to the 1968 coup of the Iraqi Baath Party and the subsequent rise of Saddam Hussein . In the context of friendly official meetings between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz in 1966, controversial points regarding the demarcation of the border between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Persian Gulf were resolved. A treaty signed on October 24, 1968 struck the island of Farsi to Iran and the island of Arabia to Saudi Arabia. A 138.7 kilometer long maritime border was drawn and it was agreed not to drill holes less than 500 meters away from the border or to drill holes inclined towards the neighboring country.

The Nixon Doctrine with its two-pillar strategy, developed by the USA in the early 1970s , assigned Iran and Saudi Arabia the main responsibility for security in the Persian Gulf. After Iraq signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, US President Nixon promised Iran all the support it needed . The US saw Iran, with its larger population, stronger economy, and immediate neighborhood, as having greater potential for the Soviet Union to curb the expansion of Soviet influence. Thus, Iran built by far the largest and most modern armed forces in the region. This made Saudi Arabia uncomfortable; on the other hand, the people in Riyadh were satisfied with the containment of the Iraqi threat and were also aware that they would not be hopelessly inferior to Iran if necessary. At the time, Saudi Arabia's state revenue was already well above that of Iran. Although the USA supported both states in order to prevent an aggressive Gulf policy by the Soviet Union and to ensure the security of supplies of crude oil, relations between the two monarchies remained cool. In the context of OPEC in particular, there were repeated conflicts about the right strategy for oil production and pricing.

The importance of oil revenues increased significantly after the 1973 oil crisis . In the 1950s to 1970s, Iran was the undisputed supremacy in the Persian Gulf under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi .

An expression of the rivalry between Iran and the Arab world was also the dispute over the name of the Persian Gulf since the 1960s.

Islamic Revolution

The Iranian revolutionary leader Khomeini
Hajj Memorial (1987), Iran

The situation changed with the so-called Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1979. Shiite Iran became the Islamic Republic . The Iranian leadership tried to export a revolution . The intention was to expand the Islamic Revolution based on the Iranian model into countries with a high Shiite population, Iraq , North Yemen and later Lebanon .

After the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, the young Islamic republic made the Saudi royal family an enemy by supporting the demands of the Shiite Hasa minority in Saudi Arabia ( exporting revolution ) and denying legitimacy to the depraved Islamic regimes .

Iraq-Iran war

In 1980 Saddam Hussein had developed his pan-Arab charter, which stated that all other Arab countries must support Iraq if it is at war with a non-Arab country. Saudi Arabia agreed to this charter in the face of the threat of Shiite uprisings. At the same time, the United States assigned Iraq the main role in restricting the export of revolution by the young Islamic republic. After the Iraqi attack on Iran and the subsequent Iraq-Iran war , Tehran accused the US and Saudi Arabia of inciting Iraq to do so. Contrary to the pan-Arab charter, Saudi Arabia initially refused Iraq military and financial support and let the Iranian leadership know about it. Riyadh was not interested in exacerbating conflicts between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, nor did it want to limit its relations with Tehran to religious issues.

By 1981, however, the radicals in Iran had expanded their influence to such an extent that they ousted President Abolhassan Banisadr and rejected a peace treaty negotiated by Saudi Arabia. In light of these developments, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait each transferred $ 4 billion to Baghdad. Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia was a key supporter of Iraq.

In May 1981, Saudi Arabia was one of the founding members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. This organization was founded on a Kuwaiti suggestion. Even before that, Saudi Arabia had rejected a similar US initiative. The members of the Cooperation Council took different positions with regard to the warring parties and kept the channels open to both Iran and Iraq. However, the Iranian leadership described the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council as part of an American conspiracy and in turn established an office of the Liberation Front for Arabia to undermine the public security of Saudi Arabia.

Although relations with Iraq, which was then ruled by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party , were also difficult, the Saudis supported Iraq with a total of about 25 billion US dollars and logistical aid. The Saudis encouraged the other Gulf monarchies to do the same, so that the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council donated a total of 50 billion US dollars to Iraq in war aid. In 1984, a plane hijacked from Saudi airspace to Iran ended mildly, which brought the two countries back into conversation. During a visit by the Saudi Foreign Minister to Iran in early 1985, Tehran was not prepared to accept peace proposals; in Riyadh people were shocked by the bitter fighting within the Iranian power circle. As a result, Saudi Arabia decided to expand its oil production so much that the price of oil fell from $ 30 to $ 10-15. This measure cost the Saudis billions more, but led to massive problems on the Iranian side in financing the costs of the war. In addition, Saudi Arabia, the other Gulf Cooperation Council states and the United States held joint military maneuvers.

In 1988 Oman mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Before long, Iran agreed to cooperate in mine clearance in the Persian Gulf and to hold secret talks to improve relations with Saudi Arabia.

When the Iraq-Iran war was over in the fall of 1988, Riyadh adopted a conciliatory tone towards Tehran. The Saudi king had personally convinced the conservative clergy that one could not be enemies with Iran forever. On orders from Khomeini, anti-Saudi propaganda in the Iranian media ended in October 1988, although Khomeini was extremely suspicious of Saudi Arabia and expressed this in two places in his will. After Khomeini's death, a pragmatic camp for Rafsanjani , a conservative camp for Khamene'i and a radical camp for power rivaled in Iran . The pragmatists convinced Khamene'i that Iran must put economic development and national interests above religion and ideology, and that interference in other states is contrary to national interests. The radicals were initially marginalized.

In 1988, Saudi Arabia introduced a quota system for Hajj that was coordinated with all countries of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation except Iran. In response, Iran boycotted the Hajj. Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati met Saudi Foreign Minister Saud ibn Faisal in Tehran in May 1991 ; the parties agreed to increase the Iranian quota more than that for other countries. As a result, Iran lifted the boycott and President Rafsanjani admonished all Iranian pilgrims to contribute to the orderly process of the Hajj.

Second Gulf War

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 and Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iran held back and showed foreign policy predictability. The second Gulf War opened up opportunities and risks for Iran: on the one hand, Iraq, which had emerged stronger from the Iraq-Iran war and by which Saudi Arabia also felt threatened, steered into a disastrous war with the USA. On the other hand, the war led to a strong American military presence in close proximity to the Iranian borders. There was disagreement in Tehran on how to respond to this situation. Radical forces (including people like Ali Akbar Mohtaschami and Mohammed Musavi Choeiniha ) advocated going on the side of Iraq in a war against the USA and Saudi Arabia. Liberals like Mohammad Ali Hadi have called for the United States to fight Iraq, once the enemy of the war. In the end, Iran opted for neutrality and condemned the Iraqi invasion, supported UN Resolution 661 and Kuwaiti sovereignty. Saudi Arabia, which had expected Iran to enter the war on the Iraqi side, regarded this as an honorable position , because Riyadh feared a Shiite alliance between Baghdad and Tehran after the foreseeable military defeat of Iraq and an uprising by radical Shiite groups in Saudi -Arabia. The original balance of power between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia became a cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent Iraq from becoming too strong. There is evidence that Tehran and Riyadh had reached an agreement to preserve a weak Iraq, that Tehran would not install an Iran-dependent Shiite government in Baghdad, and that Riyadh should curb its own ambitions in return.

When the Kurds and Shiites revolted towards the end of the second Gulf War , Riyadh and Tehran supported their clients, but did not openly intervene; the Iranian volunteers who wanted to come to the aid of the Iraqi Shiites were refused entry by the Iranian side. It was clear to Tehran that this would have meant a war with the USA. In addition, the Shiite groups in Iraq were at odds with each other and intervention would have strengthened the radicals in Iranian domestic politics. Iranian reluctance, however, enabled Saddam Hussein to put down the uprisings in an extremely bloody manner. Iran’s approach is seen as an important example of pragmatism rather than ideology in foreign policy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States established a new world order that also included more influence in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia actually did not want the US military to be present at all times, but it did purchase large quantities of American armaments. A better integration into the planned regional security structures failed due to the bad American-Iranian relations ; the Iranian side did not see their predictability honored during the Gulf War and assumed that the Persian Gulf should be Arabized . Since Tehran could not counteract by spending more on armaments, it allowed its military to perform more civilian tasks.

Presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani

In June 1991 Iran and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations, with Mohammed Ali Hadi and Abdul Latif Abdullah Al Meymani becoming ambassadors. A year earlier, radical forces in Iran prevented the Rafsanjani government from expressing thanks for Saudi aid to the earthquake victims in Zanjan. Saudi diplomats were attacked when the embassy opened. In December 1991, President Rafsanjani accepted an invitation to Riyadh, where he was able to achieve an extremely important cut in oil production for Iran, which led to a significant increase in the price of oil by May 1992. During another Iranian visit, it was agreed that the Saudi ban on imports of Iranian products and economic cooperation would be lifted. The mistrust remained, however, as both countries struggled for influence in the Central Asian Soviet republics that had recently become independent. Here, Iran and Saudi Arabia regularly supported different sides in the newly emerging conflicts, for example in the Tajik civil war , where Iran supported the government and Saudi Arabia supported Tajik Islamists. In the Middle East conflict , too , both states pursued a fundamentally different policy: Saudi Arabia supported the attempts at the Madrid conference of 1991 to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran, however, continued to demand a one-state solution and supported groups such as Islamic Jihad or - to a lesser extent - the Muslim Brotherhood . Saudi and Iranian interests clashed in the Persian Gulf as well, particularly in the disputes over islands such as Abu Musa claimed by both Iran and the United Arab Emirates and claims by Tehran that it had natural rights because of the high number of Shiites in Bahrain .

In 1993, Washington began implementing a dual containment strategy. The aim was to exclude both Iran and Iraq from all regional arrangements of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Washington justified this, among other things, with the poor human rights situation and the armament in Iran, which Tehran rejected as propaganda. Washington now promoted the development of relations between the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Israel . Iran was bypassed in the establishment of corridors for the transport of energy to and from Central Asia, although it advertised that it could offer the fastest, cheapest and shortest solution. King Fahd turned down an invitation to Tehran. This isolation strengthened the radical forces in Iran: A program to modernize the military was started, while after the collapse of the Soviet Union the whereabouts of Soviet weapons of destruction were unclear. The US asked the European states to stop the export of components for the Iranian nuclear program, while Iran chose Russia as its partner for military cooperation. In 1995 the Iranian government commissioned Russian companies to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant . During the Hajj in 1993, Iranian pilgrims staged violent demonstrations with the tacit condolence of the Iranian government, which led to expulsions and conditions for Iranian pilgrims by the Saudi authorities. Parallel to these developments, President Rafsanjani tried to make arms controls, import limits for weapons and joint military exercises palatable to the neighbors in the Persian Gulf. However, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council rejected this because of their distrust of Iran and Iraq.

Rafsanjani’s victory in the presidential election in Iran in 1993 ushered in a phase of détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In 1993 there were numerous visits, some of them secret. It became clear that the Saudi royal family was less interested in enclosing Iran, but wanted to prevent an Iranian-backed government in Baghdad that was hostile to Saudi Arabia. The two states then made contact with Iraqi opposition groups and the Saudi government tried to make peace with the Shiite leaders in Saudi Arabia. After the end of the Gulf War, the price of oil was stable at around US $ 20 per barrel. Higher oil prices were a particularly important issue for Iran because it urgently needed income from the oil business to finance post-war reconstruction. Saudi Arabia and Iran accused each other of overproduction. In 1993, President Rafsanjani managed to reach an agreement with King Saud on the oil price and even persuaded Saudi Arabia to give up some of the market share in favor of Iran. As early as 1994, however, the price of oil fell again and within OPEC no agreement could be reached on reducing production. The conservative camp in Iran used this situation to make verbal attacks on Saudi Arabia.

In summer 1994, the Iranian leadership sent Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani and Iran's ambassador to Germany Hossein Mousavian to four days of talks with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to Casablanca . Further discussions followed in the autumn. As a result, it was recognized that maintaining a balanced relationship with Baghdad was important. Saudi Arabia has been pragmatic in Iran's support for Shiite groups. A joint security commission, regular meetings at various levels and the simplification of mutual investments were agreed as confidence-building measures. For the first time in history, business people were able to obtain residence permits from the other country. Iran promised Saudi Arabia not to sow hatred between Saudi Arabia and the United States. In Iran it was concluded that Saudi Arabia apparently wanted to become more independent of US security guarantees.

However, bilateral relations improved only slightly, mainly because of the US sanctions against Iran. Tehran tried to appease the US by making concessions on the Middle East conflict. While the Democrats wanted to work towards better relations with Iran, the Republicans - they held the majority in Congress - aimed to tighten sanctions. Iranian help in the liberation of a US hostage in Lebanon was not rewarded by Washington. In the spring of 1995 the US government banned all American companies from trading with Iran. This policy, in turn, strengthened the radicals in Tehran, who recently tried to fuel discord with Saudi Arabia. During this time, the Iranian political leadership learned that the military presence on Saudi soil also caused tensions within Saudi Arabia and that the US fleet should therefore be relocated to Qatar . In February 1996, Israel and Turkey signed a military cooperation treaty, bringing the Israeli air force closer to the Iranian and Saudi borders; at that point Iran and Saudi Arabia had the same interests and began working more closely with Syria and Iraq.

Iran was believed to be the originator of several terrorist attacks that rocked Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the early 1990s. The most momentous of these attacks occurred on June 25, 1996, when 19 American soldiers were killed and 327 injured in the attack on the Khobar towers . The Shiite extremist group Hezbollah Al-Hijaz , which was alleged to have links with Iran, was identified as the first suspect . In addition, some of the masterminds behind the attack fled to Iran. Despite the American casualties, Saudi Arabia was very reluctant to cooperate with the FBI in solving the attack . On the one hand, the royal family did not want to show that the Shiites were ready to fight them by force of arms. In addition, Saudi Arabia feared that the United States could use the attack as an excuse to attack Iran, which would have resulted in even more US military in the region. While the US passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act on August 5, 1996 , Riyadh did not want to sacrifice the détente to radicals on either side. A US court held Iran responsible for the attack for several years, but Iran's authorship has been questioned from several quarters.

Presidency of Mohammed Khatami

In May 1997, Mohammad Chātami won the presidential election . He was Saudi Arabia's preferred candidate, and Saudi Arabia was the first Arab country to congratulate Khatami on winning the election. As a result, parliamentarism was revived in both states, the leaders discussed the development of an Islamic civil society, Chātami spoke of a dialogue between civilizations, and Crown Prince Abdullah of interreligious dialogue . Prince Talal ibn Abd al-Aziz sent Sarmad Zuqh to Iran to discuss civil society's participation in the exchange between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In 1997 Iran was allowed to host the summit of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation . King Abdullah was the first to arrive in Tehran and was greatly honored by the Iranian government. Both sides sent clear signals that they were interested in improving bilateral relations. Iran confirmed its peaceful intentions to the Saudi side, while in the final communiqué of the meeting all states (including Iran) expressed their support for the Middle East peace process and the principles of the Madrid conference. The participants in the summit called on all states of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation to condemn the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act as a violation of international law.

In February 1998 Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Saudi Arabia with a large Iranian delegation for ten days. The Saudi hosts granted the visitors numerous seldom granted privileges, the entire trip was accompanied by very positive reporting and both sides showed a lot of goodwill. Key outcomes of the trip included better cooperation in setting oil prices and starting talks on a security treaty. The Iranian religious leader Ali Khamenei was also invited to Saudi Arabia, but no trip took place. In March 1998 a five-year cooperation agreement was signed and an Iranian warship was allowed to visit the port of Jeddah . However, the hostile relations between the US and Iran continued to strengthen the conservative forces and radicals in both states.

In May 1998 the Clinton cabinet - possibly at Saudi insistence - softened the sanctions against Iran, but in the same month put a ban on foreign companies supplying weapons to Iran, while neighboring Pakistan - probably financially Support from Saudi Arabia - conducted nuclear weapons tests, which Iran welcomed. In July 1998, US ships violated Iranian territory in an attack on Iraq. At the request of Iran, Saudi Arabia prohibited the US from using its territory for attacks on Iraq.

The two countries pursued different goals in Afghanistan . Saudi Arabia recognized the Taliban government in September 1996, while Iran supported the government-in-exile of Burhānuddin Rabbāni . However, following the killing of Iranian diplomats by the Taliban, Saudi Arabia expelled the Taliban representative in Riyadh Maulvi Shehabuddin and withdrew his representation from Kabul . After the conference of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation and the Jerusalem Committee in Casablanca in July 1998, Iran also agreed to a two-state solution to the Middle East conflict. In September, the Saudi leadership emphasized the positive Iranian influence on peace and security in the Gulf. The Saudis urged the United Arab Emirates to give in on the Abu Musa conflict .

In May 1999, Mohammad Khatami visited Saudi Arabia and was received with great warmth. King Fahd stressed the door to better relations was wide open, while Crown Prince Abdullah confirmed that Iran had a right to defense in the face of Israeli nuclear weapons - at the same time the US threatened Iran with an attack on the Bushehr nuclear power plant . However, the Saudis also pointed to the Iranian influence in the Saudi Eastern Province . Numerous visits at parliamentary level followed and numerous agreements on cooperation in business, culture and infrastructure were concluded. Iranian imports from Saudi Arabia as well as trade with the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council grew strongly afterwards, the Islamic Development Bank granted more loans for projects in Iran. In April 2001, a security agreement was finally concluded which primarily dealt with the fight against drug smuggling, terrorism and illegal migration as well as better border controls. Saudi Arabia now accepted Iran's policy on Lebanon, which Hezbollah regards as legitimate resistance fighters against Israeli aggression. Both sides stressed Iraq's territorial integrity. From this visit onwards, Saudi Arabia also asked Iran to settle its differences with the USA and offered to mediate. The Saudi leadership hoped for better cooperation with Iran on security issues and, as a result, a reduction in the US military presence in the Gulf. In 1998, Bill Clinton approached the Iranian leadership with an offer for face-to-face talks sent to Mohammed Khatami through Al Gore and Saudi Arabia. Ali Chamene'i was against taking up direct conversations, so this letter and numerous subsequent gestures were not answered.

Saudi Arabia and Iranian-Qatari relations

In the early 1990s, relations between Qatar and Iran improved significantly, which met the displeasure of the other Arab states in the region, especially Saudi Arabia. However, the Qatari foreign minister managed to allay the neighboring countries' concerns by arguing that his country was reconciled with Iran because it was an important neighbor on the other side of the Persian Gulf and because the government was opposed to the Islamic Republic Qatar had never shown any signs of disrespect. Iran and Qatar traditionally have a warm relationship with each other. As soon as tensions arise between Saudi Arabia and Qatar or one of the other smaller Gulf states, Iran tries to exploit these tensions and influence the balance of power in its favor. When a border conflict arose between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in October 1992, Iran tried to profit from the dispute. They agreed to cooperate in a number of areas such as education, employment, trade or aviation. In 1994, a secret security treaty was even signed promising Qatar Iranian support in the event of extreme need. In addition, under this agreement, Iran promised to guarantee the loyalty of the Qatari Shiites to the Qatari regime. However, this treaty had little practical significance, although on paper it represented great progress for Iran because it had managed to establish such a close relationship with a country in the direct sphere of influence of Saudi Arabia. However, Qatar had already signed a defense cooperation agreement with the United States of America in 1992. In addition, the Shiites in Qatar were only a minority who had historically always been loyal to the Qatari royal family. The largest natural gas deposit in the world is located in the border area between Qatar and Iran. The border between the two states was already established in 1961, but the treaty did not regulate how the proceeds from the extraction of the deposit should be distributed between the states. The question only became topical in the 1980s, when wars made it uninteresting for investors to develop the gas. From the early 1990s onwards, speculation that the two states would work together to produce the gas themselves. Due to the size of the reserves, this would have unpleasant effects for the oil and gas producing countries in the region, because the revenues from them would have shifted the power structure in the region.

The dispute over the island of Abu Musa between the United Arab Emirates and Iran could not change the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia . The dispute had frozen since 1972 but flared up again in 1992. In Riyadh, this dispute and the escalation were probably correctly interpreted as an indication of internal Iranian rivalries for power and the foreign policy course, and the conciliatory tone with Tehran was maintained in order not to strengthen the radicals in Tehran.

Saudi Arabia and Bahraini-Iranian Relations

Bahrain is in the immediate vicinity of the Saudi regions that are inhabited by Shiites. About 60% of Bahrainis are Shiites and use Iran's religious education system. Developments in Bahrain are therefore very relevant for Saudi Arabia, Iran's claim to exercise a protective rule over Bahrain repeatedly causes nervousness in Riyadh. Iran has long been suspected of agitating among the Bahraini Shiites in order to motivate them to overthrow the ruling house: Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Fazel Lankarani openly and repeatedly accused the Gulf monarchies of suppressing the Shiites. The first Shiite uprising broke out in the early 1980s. As a result, the Sunni ruling house made efforts to reduce poverty and marginalization of the Shiites and to make them better socially. When unrest broke out recently during a summit meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain, Iran was suspected to be behind the unrest. The arrest of Shiite clergy by the Bahraini security forces further escalated the situation. As a result, Bahrain asked for help from Saudi Arabia, which, with its troops and advisors, ended the uprising. The unrest flared up repeatedly until 1996, however, and Bahrain openly accused Iran of being behind the developments. The precise influence of Iran is unclear; In any case, one of the causes was the then stagnating Bahraini economy, which had led to rising unemployment and inflation. In any case, the Iranian side acted as carefully as possible so as not to strain relations with Saudi Arabia.

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , the Iranians spontaneously showed sympathy for the victims. In the war in Afghanistan that followed, Iran was cooperative with the United States, even though the radicals in Tehran demanded that Iran fight alongside the Taliban against American troops. The thaw between Tehran and Washington came to an abrupt end with the Karine-A affair and the placement of Iran on the axis of evil . The conservatives in Tehran succeeded in using the national insult against the reformers and pragmatists and weakening Khatami. Relations with Saudi Arabia remained good, however. After the bomb attack on a residential complex in Riyadh in 2003, there was mounting evidence that al Qaeda fighters who had fled Afghanistan had found refuge in Iran; Conservative forces in Iran apparently wanted to use the Al Qaeda members to make an American attack on Iran more expensive. This development demonstrated the conservatives' gain in power and the end of the reform-oriented policies of President Khatami.

Presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

During Mahmud Ahmadineschad's reign, various covert operations caused tensions between the two parties, although their authorship was not clarified or was clarified much later. These operations included the alleged kidnapping of the Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri on his pilgrimage to Mecca in June 2009. He did not return to Tehran from the USA until a year later, was first received as a hero and then arrested as a traitor. A murder plot allegedly carried out by Iranian agents , in which the then Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir , was to be killed with the help of the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas , drew wider circles . In 2012, Saudi Arabia accused Iran of being involved in cyber attacks on Saudi Aramco , which the Iranian side dismissed as absurd . Iran, on the other hand, repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the terrorist Jundollah in Sistan and Balochistan .

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected as Khatami's successor, Saudi Arabia first emphasized the need for good cooperation. The more aggressive foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, especially in Iraq and the Levant, the emphasis on hostility to the USA and the increased efforts on the way to mastering nuclear energy led to a marked deterioration in relations.

In December 2005, Saudi Arabia hosted the 3rd Extraordinary Summit of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation in Mecca. The goal of the Saudis was to create a positive and moderate image of Islam towards the rest of the world. However, Ahmadinejad used the conference to verbally attack Israel by demanding that Israel be removed from the map and moved to Europe . With these statements Ahmadinejad not only snubbed the host, but also hijacked anti-Israeli thinking in the Arab world for its own purposes; Saudi Arabia couldn't condemn it without turning the rest of the Arab countries against it.

After Saddam Hussein was overthrown in the Iraq war in 2003, Iran expanded its influence significantly towards Iraq and Syria. Thanks to the high oil prices, Iran was able to invest in Iraq, provide reconstruction aid and do propaganda. His influence also grew strongly in radical Islamic organizations. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, remained rather passive during this phase. It had few allies among the influential groups in Iraq. Iraq's Sunni scholars followed other currents of Islam, but not Saudi Salafism , while Iraqi Shiites traditionally had strong ties with Iran. For the US democratic elections in Iraq, Iran set itself the goal of bringing a pro-Iranian group to power. For this reason, the Iranians promoted the formation of the United Iraqi Alliance , which brought together several Shiite parties.

Saudi Arabia criticized the US Iraq policy as a gift on the golden plate for Iran and described the election winner and future Prime Minister of Iraq Nuri al-Maliki as an Iranian agent . Attempts to establish their own groups, such as the Sons of Iraq, were unsuccessful . At a conference initiated by Saudi Arabia between the Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites in Mecca, however, the issue of tolerance was very strongly emphasized: the killing of Shiites and Sunnis was banned and the contradiction between the Shia and the Sunna was recognized as a difference of opinion, but not as a fundamental difference in the Denotes faith. In any case, in view of the confusing situation in Iraq, Saudi Arabia largely held back and speculated that Iran would tie up many resources in Iraq for a long time.

In the 2010 parliamentary elections , the Saudi Arabia-backed candidate Iyad Allawi won a majority of the seats, but in the subsequent negotiations on the formation of a government, a coalition was formed under Iranian influence that made Maliki prime minister again. Angry Saudi Arabia subsequently decided not to open an embassy in Iraq.

The Arab Spring interpreted Iran as a continuation of a movement that had begun with its Islamic revolution. However, Saudi Arabia lost some important allies (Tunisia, Egypt) and saw the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a threat to itself. Iran criticized the Saudi deployment of troops to crack down on the protests in Bahrain from 2011 and launched a corresponding media campaign.

In the civil war in Syria , Iran supports the Assad government, because a regime change in Syria would change the balance of power in the Middle East significantly to the disadvantage of Iran. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is working towards regime change. This conflict, in which numerous other players are involved, prevents the improvement of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

After the controversial re-election of Ahmadinejad in 2009 and the protests that followed , Saudi Arabia remains calm and only declares that it does not want to comment on internal processes in other states. In Iran, however, the radicals suspect the US and Saudi Arabia are behind candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi and the protests.

To portray Iran as the main enemy of all Sunnis, the term Shiite crescent , coined in a speech by the Jordanian King Abdullah in 2004 , was used to propagate Iranian support for the Shiites as a threat to the Sunnis through excessive influence.

History since 2009

The religious contrast between Saudi Arabia and Iran now came to the fore. By devout Wahhabi Sunnis in Saudi Arabia, the Shiites are not viewed as Muslims, but sometimes as downright infidels. Ayatollah Khomeini did not regard the Saud dynasty , which had only conquered the Hejaz in 1926 , as legitimate rulers of the holy places of Mecca and Medina in his claim to leadership . Tensions intensified and on July 31, 1987, during Hajj, there was an incident between Iranian pilgrims and the Saudi security forces, in which the Saudi forces fired at the Shiite demonstrators first with tear gas and then with automatic weapons. Officially 402 people died, including 275 Iranian pilgrims. Iran then boycotted the pilgrimage for the next three years.

Like Iran, Saudi Arabia tried to promote its view of Islam abroad. Numerous mosques and Islamic institutions were built in the Islamic world with Saudi Arabian money. In particular, Saudi Arabia promoted a particularly conservative, traditionalist interpretation of Islam with anti-Western tendencies. It is no coincidence that some Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaida have their roots in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, there was Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, which was closely related to the United States. Saudi Arabia built up its own extensive military potential and is still one of the countries with the highest military spending worldwide.

A phase of relaxation emerged at the end of the 1990s when Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz became the Saudi crown prince. He pushed for an improvement in relations with Iran. In May 1999, an Iranian president made the first state visit to Saudi Arabia since the Islamic Revolution. Mohammad Chātami , who is counted among the so-called “moderates” in Iran, agreed to cooperate with the Saudi royal family in economic matters. In April 2001 the countries signed a bilateral security agreement.

The Iraq war in 2003 and the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as the new Iranian President in 2005 intensified the differences.

Saudi Arabia since 2015

With the new Saudi King Salman ibn Abd al-Aziz and his son Mohammed ibn Salman , who took over the office of Defense Minister, Saudi Arabia, according to the Federal Intelligence Service , "has given up its previous foreign policy restraint and is developing into an aggressively acting regional power". The decisive factor for the newly inflamed hegemonic dispute is the decreasing trust in the USA as a strategic protective and regulatory power in the region. The main arenas for the attempts at influence are Syria (Saudi Arabia supports the Sunni opposition, Iran supports Assad ), Lebanon (Iran supports Hezbollah ) as well as Bahrain (the protests from 2011 were suppressed with the help of Saudi Arabia) and Iraq, each with a Shiite majority. In the Houthi conflict , Saudi Arabia is ready to take military and political risks with its military operation in Yemen since 2015 , the first since 1932.

The Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran, protected by wire fences and police, after the mass panic in Mecca in 2015

On the occasion of the mass panic in Mecca on September 24, 2015 , in which, according to official information, around 1,500, unofficially more than 2,400 people, including hundreds of Iranians and Shiites, the religious leader and the head of state of Iran Ali Khamene'i made serious allegations against Saudi -Arabia and threatened retaliation.

After the execution of Shiite cleric Nimr Bāqir al-Nimrs by Saudi Arabia as part of a mass execution of 47 people on January 2, 2016, diplomatic relations between the two countries deteriorated abruptly. On the same day, the Saudi embassy in Tehran was stormed by an angry crowd and partly set on fire. The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamene'i , threatened the Saudi Arabian leadership for “the unjustly shed blood of this martyr very soon” with consequences and “God's vengeance”.

As a result, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with Iran on January 3, 2016. All Iranian diplomats were asked to leave the country within 48 hours. On January 4th, Bahrain and Sudan followed suit . The United Arab Emirates withdrew parts of their diplomatic mission in Iran - especially their ambassador - and Kuwait responded in protest against the attack on the Saudi Arabian embassy on January 5th. At a summit meeting of the Arab League in Cairo on January 10, 2016, almost all the Arab states represented there (membership of Syria is currently suspended) supported Saudi Arabia and issued a joint statement condemning the storming of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Tehran. Only the representatives of Lebanon did not sign the declaration out of consideration for the Shiite militia Hezbollah, which is represented in the Lebanese government .

Individual evidence

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