German small state in the Balkans

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Simulation of a "southern German buffer state" located south of Hungary

In the ideas of the leadership of the German National Socialist state, a small German state in the Balkans was a buffer state between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia - a small state to be set up in the event of Hungary's refusal to join the German Reich in the war against in 1941 To pull Yugoslavia . As early as 1939, the plans drawn up by the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi) under Werner Lorenz envisaged the Danube valley on as part of a "smashing of Yugoslavia"To settle the Iron Gate with " ethnic Germans " from Southeast Europe and concentrate them above all in strategic key positions such as Belgrade and the Carpathian Passes.

Terms such as Prinz-Eugen-Gau , Reichsgau Banat , Donauprotektorat , Schwabenland , Danube Germany or Autonomous Transylvania were used to designate such an area . A Reichsgau would have extended with an area of ​​about 38,000 km² over the Batschka , the Baranja , the Serbian and Romanian Banat and parts of Transylvania , with a potential connection to the German Reich through a corridor to be established. The area of ​​the state structure would have exceeded that of Belgium . A significant part of the people of German ethnicity living on the Balkan Peninsula were concentrated in these regions . Of the total of around three million inhabitants, around a fifth would have been of German descent; Romanians , Serbs and Hungarians each had a similar share. An imperial fortress of Belgrade , which was later given the name Prinz-Eugen-Stadt , was intended to ensure the supremacy of the Third Reich over the Danube region . Resettlement of “ethnic Germans” in this Danube-German state structure would have been the consequence.

In addition to the general enthusiasm of the “Volksdeutsche” of the region for the victories of the German Wehrmacht and the SS , especially in the early days of the war, many of them also followed the development of the leaked ideas from Reich German agencies for a Reichsgau with great interest, which some speculation to flourish. Advanced ambitions of " ethnic group leadership " in " Hull Serbia " to establish a Banatstaates but were "stifled" by the German Reich.

history

Political situation

Tripartite division of the Banat from 1920

Situation after the "break-up of Yugoslavia"

With the Treaty of Trianon 1920 , the Kingdom of Hungary had to cede Croatia , Slavonia , Prekmurje (Mur region) as well as the regions Batschka , South Baranja and the western Banat to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes . Transylvania with the rest of the Banat and Partium fell to the Kingdom of Romania.

In the spring of 1941, Adolf Hitler promised the leadership of the country not only the Mur region, the southern Baranja and the southern Batschka, but also the Serbian Vojvodina with the western Banat to compensate for Hungary's necessary participation in the war against Yugoslavia . The ally met the German demands during the invasion of Yugoslavia, according to which the establishment of a small state was not carried out.

At the end of 1939, rumors about the state's future had been circulating among the Danube Swabians . The foreign organization of the National Socialist German Workers' Party reported that "a very large number of them believe that a German protectorate would be established from the ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia, for example in the Danube lowlands."

But only to the on " Hull Serbia reduced" area with the western Banat, which the German " military commanders Serbia " managed was that "ethnic Germans" a special position took, because here the German minority was favored striking. Other Yugoslav Germans found themselves after the division of the kingdom in different zones of interest with different constitutional status, because their settlement areas were now under Hungarian or Croatian sovereignty.

The Hungarian armed forces were denied the occupation of the West Banat, despite German assurances, as Romania ( already disapproved by the loss of Northern Transylvania to Hungary by the Second Vienna Arbitration on August 30, 1940) objected to a Hungarian occupation of the area. Hitler gave in here, trying to avoid an escalation of the hostilities between Romania and Hungary and thus a disruption of the preparations for the war against the Soviet Union . Hungary did not succeed in persuading Hitler to keep his promises. The German Reich finally occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944 in the Margarethe company .

Planning for a small German state in the Balkans

The language groups of Austria-Hungary in 1910

When Austria was "annexed" to the German Reich in 1938, the Austrian Reich Governor Arthur Seyß-Inquart had ideas of an autonomous role for the annexed country, which also included projects such as a Prince Eugene Gau and a Reich fortress of Belgrade in a circle around the National Socialist politician Hermann Neubacher which also provided for a large hydropower plant in its own Iron Gate territory on the lower Danube for the economic development of this area. Adolf Hitler rejected such a " kuk Reich Nazism" from, since "history and culture of the targeted Pangermanism disabled on Austrian territory."

In preparation for the Vienna Foreign Ministers' Conference of April 1941, where the division of the Yugoslav territory between Germany and Italy was negotiated with the participation of representatives from the Foreign Office under Joachim von Ribbentrop , the Reich Ministry of the Interior under Wilhelm Frick and the Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Volkstum Heinrich Himmler , a memorandum entitled “On the situation and the future fate of Germanness in the former Yugoslav state territory” had been drawn up, which was based in fundamental considerations on the policy of “the brilliant general and great statesman Prinz Eugen” ( Eugen von Savoyen ). Just like the latter, the conference participants from the Foreign Office came to the conclusion that the Third Reich's domination over the Danube area would only be possible through the expansion of Belgrade into a German imperial fortress, "because only those who open the Iron Gate and the Gate near Vienna [...] who holds Belgrade tightly in his hand ”.

Thereby, pseudo-scientifically legitimized “national political spatial planning plans” took up a large part. In order to bind as few German Wehrmacht units as possible in Serbia, “ethnic Germans” should take over the security of the area: “The idea of ​​a imperial fortress Belgrade can be realized all the easier as the hinterland of Belgrade consists of communities in which the Germans have an absolute or relative majority and the whole hinterland has been shaped solely by German cultural achievements. The Germans who settled there could do their military service in the German garrison in Belgrade and thus form the permanent team of the Reichsfestung, which was always ready, "the 'Führer people'". Croatia, Hungary and Romania should be controlled from here as semi-autonomous, economically and politically dependent states. In the summer of 1941, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Wilhelm Stuckart, was responsible for drawing up specific plans for a Reich fortress in the city.

Due to the military development in the Balkans, the Reich leadership refrained from implementing such expansionist spatial planning goals. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office stuck to the old Austrian objectives even during the occupation. In a lecture concept by the “Germany Department” from November 1942, the current importance of the Habsburg “spatial planning plans” for the Third Reich was again pointed out: “The importance of the former Austrian military border [...] cannot be overlooked in Reich policy. After the rebuilding of the Greater German Reich , the historical political measures of Reichsmarschall Prinz Eugen with regard to the integration of the southern European area into the central European greater area become more topical. "

The control of the transit route over the Danube from Vienna as the easternmost capital of the empire to the Black Sea also played an essential role from a war economy point of view . By breaking up Yugoslavia, "the Danube emerges from its neglect and can become the main traffic artery of the German and European south-east determined by Germany". In particular, the Romanian oil from the area around Ploieşti , which was important for the war effort , could now be transported to the German Reich on a more secure and considerably shorter route than before. Serbia was of great importance for the German food supply and armaments production, especially because of its agricultural products and ore deposits. The largest German copper mine was located in Bor with a monthly output of around 6,000 tons; in the antimony mines of Serbia forty percent of the total European production were promoted; when it came to mining silver, the country took second place. The labor potential of Serbia was also interesting for the exploitation by the German Empire, since three quarters of the population of the region consisted of farmers. By October 1941 alone, 25,000 people were brought to the German Reich, some as volunteers and some as compulsory workers.

Incorporation of the plans in the affected countries

Kingdom of Yugoslavia

Territory of the Military Commander in Serbia, 1941-1944

Not least because of the rather vague, individually still completely unexplained Imperial German concepts, the Serbian Germans in the German-occupied part of the Banat developed under " ethnic group leader " Josef Janko more or less concrete plans for a small German state, which in addition to the Banat also the Batschka and parts which should include Baraniah and Transylvania. As early as the end of 1939, “ethnic German circles” in the region had been discussing such a state structure on the lower Danube and also linked to plans from 1918, when Banat autonomy was within the short-lived Banat Republic of 15 days .

The German envoy in Zagreb reported from the "ethnic Germans" on the eastern, Syrmian periphery of the newly independent state of Croatia that there "apparently" a Jankos plan was in circulation to establish an "autonomous German area around Belgrade". The Banat independence efforts combined with a reference to the German Reich had also been heard by the Hungarian government, which now complained about it in Berlin.

In fact, at the end of April 1941, the ethnic group had planned the proclamation of an independent Banat as a first step towards realizing “our dream of Danube Germany”. Janko's proclamation in a celebratory act of founding the state scheduled for May 1, 1941, was supposed to be a present for Hitler's birthday , but was stopped by the head of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) Reinhard Heydrich , who had been informed by Waffen-SS recruiter Gustav Halwax . Heydrich's reply telegram read: "Nip the attempt in the bud - arrest those involved if necessary."

While Janko was present at the Fuehrer's headquarters , there was “an irritated mood” against the ethnic group at the moment, and Ribbentrop made reproaches to “the chairman of the Kulturbund ” Janko. The ethnic group must accept its role of being the recipient of imperial orders and not the initiator of political strategies. The episode had no further consequences for Janko.

In his memoirs, Janko stated: “In order to avoid the unfounded gossip and writings played up for propaganda purposes about an allegedly planned 'Prinz-Eugen-Staat', a 'Schwabenland', 'Danube protectorate' or whatever other such phantasies are named, To put an end to it, I would like to emphasize here that no higher Reich or party authority with decision-making authority had ever given me the slightest hint that they had dealt with such a project. "

Immediately after the end of the war against Yugoslavia and Greece, Berlin ministries thought about Wilhelm Stuckart's plans to reserve the right to the Reich "the continuous adoption of all Germans professing their nationality to German citizenship while retaining their rights and obligations" in the "states concerned. “This dual nationality could only be realized once only later, in April 1944, for the Hungarian-German members of the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS .

Kingdom of Hungary

On March 28, 1941, one day after General Dušan Simović's coup in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the head of the Hungarian minority there, Iván Nagy, sought contact with the representative of the Croatian Germans and later “ethnic group leader” Branimir Altgayer , who informed him that the Germans were there wanted to create the Prinz-Eugen-Gau in Vojvodina , “even if it cost blood”. This would also include the Batschka and the Baranja, should Hungary not take part in the campaign against Yugoslavia; German soldiers should not die for Hungarian interests.

Nagy informed Consul General László Bartók in Zagreb , who sent a report by secret courier to Ambassador Extraordinary Jenő Ghyczy , which reached Budapest on March 29th: “Nagy fears that if the German army advances and we remain passive, the German army move into the Batschka and create the Banat state that we have heard so much about before our eyes . It would therefore be good if we started our military action parallel to the Germans so as not to be confronted with a fait accompli. "

Hungary's participation in the war against Yugoslavia on the side of the German Reich seemed likely, but there were voices in Hungarian politics that rejected military intervention in the neighboring country, including those of Prime Minister Pál Teleki . He had learned “through indiscretion or in some other way” of a “Hermann Göring plan” which included the establishment of a buffer state between Hungary and Yugoslavia should Hungary refuse to participate. According to this, it was to be expected that German associations would occupy the Batschka, the Banat including its Romanian part and the areas of the Baranja inhabited by German-speaking people.

Teleki commissioned András Rónai (1906–1991), a professor, geographer and expert on nationality issues working in Budapest, with the hasty creation of maps of the possible state, which he wanted to present to representatives of the Vatican and the Western allies . On the morning of April 3, 1941, Rónai wanted to deliver his maps to the Prime Minister's palace, but the head of government had already taken his own life shortly before and was lying dead in his bedroom.

The day before, Teleki had in a letter to his friend, the Catholic Bishop Vilmos Apor , expressed his fears in the event that Hungary refused to create “a German state from the Batschka, the Banat, the ( Transylvanian ) Sachsenland and perhaps would form the Baranja ”- a Danube state , which should be constituted as an“ integral albeit external part ”of the empire.

Hungary in World War II

The campaign against Yugoslavia began on April 6 with the participation of Hungary and ended on April 17 with the signing of the unconditional surrender of the Yugoslav forces in Belgrade. The activist forces of the Germans in the Batschka and Baranja, which had just become Hungarian, continued to cling tenaciously to the ideal of a Prince Eugene country that, ideally , would have connected Baranja and Swabian Turkey to the Reich with a hose-like corridor. Broad “ethnic German” circles stuck to the opinion “that they were given a special territorial position”. The Hungarian-German "ethnic group leader" Franz Anton Basch reported with displeasure after a trip to these areas that for this reason they "in some places harshly refused all positions offered by the new Magyar authorities", since there the idea of ​​"autonomy with possible imperial citizenship [...] play a big role.

For the time after the Balkan campaign, Basch and his “ People's Association of Germans in Hungary ” (VDU) also propagated a return of the southern Hungarian territories lost by the First World War by annexation “into the [German] motherland”, under the names Swabian Turkey or Prinz-Eugen-Gau . Likewise, the cities of Osijek , Pécs , Timișoara and Orșova with their respective administrative areas, Tolna County and the mining districts of Transylvania were to become part of this Reichsgau.

The VDU spoke out against the resettlement of Hungarian Germans in occupied territories in Poland and wanted to fight the “national struggle [in Hungary itself]” as the hegemon of the Hungarian and other peoples living there. In the view of the federal government, the "Germanness of Hungary" formed a bridge between the Ostmark (Austria) and the German settlement areas in the southeast, which is why they called for a concentration of Hungarian Germans in Transdanubia .

In his memoirs, the Hungarian " Reichsverweser " Miklós Horthy mentioned that in December 1943 the Volksbund had again called for the establishment of a Prinz-Eugen-Gaus , for which Hungary should be divided according to ethnic criteria. The resulting “Hungarian-German federal state” was then to become a “National Socialist federal state” in the German Reich.

Kingdom of Romania

Settlement areas of the Banat Swabians and Transylvanian Saxons in the Kingdom of Romania.

The endeavor to form ethnically homogeneous units was widespread among the German minorities in south-eastern Europe. In the Romanian Banat, too, some National Socialists hoped that a Reichsgau Banat would now arise. In June 1939, the chairman of the Volksgemeinschaft der Deutschen in Romania , Fritz Fabritius , had pleaded for it in a lecture in Berlin before invited party members and representatives of the Volksbund for Germanness abroad (in the "worst milkmaid-imperialist demagogy", like the diplomat Ulrich von Hassell noted in his diary), "to connect the individual islands of the German nationality in the Danube basin with each other by means of resettlement". In 1940 the “ethnic group leader” of the Romanian Germans , Andreas Schmidt , drafted his own proposal for a Danube protectorate that would encompass all areas inhabited by ethnic Germans on the lower Danube, including parts of Hungary and Romania, “so that they would no longer be slavery in inferior armies with semi-Asian sergeants are delivered ". Equipped with all rights, the Germans could “re-Germanize” these areas on their own and “preserve” the space. Schmidt accepted that such action would have required a dissolution of the Kingdom of Romania. In the case of Transylvania, too, Schmidt repeatedly urged that the region “directly or indirectly” be made “Reich territory”.

In the light of the Yugoslav German ambitions for an independent Banat , Schmidt traveled through the Romanian Banat in 1941 with his deputy Andreas Rührig and "railed against rumors who propagated a Reichsgau Banat and spread dissension against the [Transylvanian] Saxons". The Südostdeutsche Tageszeitung published a “Call for Discipline in the People's Group” on May 25, 1941. As three alleged supporters of the establishment of a Gaus, Nikolaus Hans Hockl (Head of the Office for Art and Science in the Banat), Peter Anton (Gauführer in the Banat) and Hans Wendel (Head of the Propaganda Office in the Banat), rumors allegedly launched into the Banat German population Schmidt described them as “rebels” and “putschists” and had them removed from “all political and economic offices” on July 9 “because of severe indiscipline”. They were arrested and later released but not rehabilitated. A merger of the two parts of the Banat would have considerably reduced the influence of the “ethnic group leader”. Schmidt was therefore relieved when “this plan was rejected in Berlin, also out of consideration for [the Romanian“ leader ”] General Ion Antonescu ”.

The former Romanian Prime Minister Iuliu Maniu wrote to Foreign Minister Mihai Antonescu on February 22, 1942 : “Unfortunately, the Germans from the Banat and southern Transylvania already consider themselves to be part of Germany, in the sense of an“ Ostmark ”of the former Austria. Incidentally, the German minority group is openly talking about plans after the war to found a 'Danube land' with the provinces of Transylvania and Banat, which were torn from our country, under the protectorate of the Greater German Empire. "

In the same year, the chairman of the National Liberal Party of Romania , Constantin “Dinu” Brătianu , wrote to “State Leader” Ion Antonescu, in which he informed him “that outstanding German personalities were forging plans with Hungary for an autonomous Transylvania under a German protectorate. If the Germans remain the masters of Europe, then this will undoubtedly be the fate of Transylvania. ”In his reply, Ion Antonescu described such plans as“ figments of the mentally ill ”and“ tendentious rumors of enemy propaganda ”. "Who can take seriously the follies of some madmen who enjoy political adventures?" Antonescu also pointed out that "the German envoy Manfred von Killinger had been commissioned to teach the ethnic German troublemakers, intrigues and reckless people a proper lesson" . The historian Michael Kroner went on to explain: "If the Romanian head of state was reported to be dangerous escapades, he simply had Andreas Schmidt summoned to the Foreign Minister to 'bring him to the reality of the Romanian state', as it was literally said in a note to Mihai Antonescu."

reception

The historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler remarked: “[The] plans for the formation of German rule in the Danube Plain [are] remained half-baked and unfulfilled wishes without reaching a commitment that would have made them the basis of an action by the Reich. On the other hand, this memorandum was no longer in the raw state of the first concept, because Himmler, the Foreign Office and the Reich Ministry of the Interior had already agreed on their demands. Even if this most fully developed plan has not extended beyond the character of the draft, it will nevertheless be considered paradigmatic for the obvious excess and harmlessness of the approaches to a National Socialist "spatial planning" in Southeastern Europe. "

“What can be traced back to these not exactly controllable, probably as quickly as indefinitely rumored news on slogans of the Volksbund der Deutschen in Hungary or the Swabian-German Kulturbund , whether they represent hastily expressed dreams of ambitious ethnic group politicians or whether they also contain the fear of other nationalities before the unpredictable actions of the German minorities, behind which the Reich loomed more and more threateningly, cannot be determined with certainty or analyzed in a more differentiated manner. There is no doubt that in this restless time after the defeat of Yugoslavia, moved by a variety of hopes and claims, many speculations flourished among ethnic Germans. Here, Reich German agencies with more specific plans, some of which could find their way to the southeast via the widely ramified channels of the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle , could have helped to create a certain basis for such considerations. "

“It seems,” says Wehler, “that Hitler did not speak out personally against these plans and thus prevented their implementation. Probably general considerations for the Magyar allies [...] prevented the Reich leadership from carrying out this project or parts of it. ”His colleague Werner Röhr also suspects that the“ expectations in some 'Volksdeutsche' circles regarding the establishment of a 'Volksdeutsche' Danube state […] never seriously employed ”.

According to Michael Kroner, it was never “about official plans, but only about expressions of opinion by individual people”.

The Hungarist Johann Weidlein , who was controversial in the discussion about the documentation of the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Central Europe after the Second World War, called the idea of ​​a small German state in the Balkans a "map ghost" and stated: "The ghost of 'Danube Germany', [...] which was to be formed from the Yugoslav Batschka and the Banat, [...] combined with the old specter of the annexation of Transdanubia to the empire to form a real monster that not only made the Magyars, but also the Serbs and Romanians pale with fear. "

Walter Lipgens recognized that Hitler “in his post-war planning would tolerate all 'non-Germans' only as helping peoples”. “The southern Slavs and other south-eastern European peoples had no place in [its] racially defined Europe, they should be allowed to live semi-autonomously on the edge of the empire, controlled by the imperial fortress Belgrade , economically and politically dependent on it; in a satellite status that was ultimately also intended for Italy, Spain and Portugal. ”The full scope of documented 'planning' was only known to the Nazi leadership, but not to the awareness of the time.

literature

• Gyula Borbándi: Second World War. P. 254 f. In: Ungarn-Jahrbuch 21 (1993/1994), Verlag Ungarisches Institut, Munich 1995. ISBN 3-9803045-4-X , 346 pp.
• József Varga: guilty nation or unwilling vassal? Contributions to the contemporary history of Hungary and the Danube region. Volume 2, Deák 1989. p. 179.
• Ekkehard Völkl : The West Banat 1941–1944. The German, the Hungarian and other ethnic groups. Trofenik, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-87828-192-7 , p. 71.
• Hans-Ulrich Wehler : Nationality Policy in Yugoslavia. The German minority 1918–1978. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980, ISBN 3-525-01322-1 , pp. 51-53.
• Hans-Ulrich Wehler: "Imperial Fortress Belgrade." National Socialist "Spatial Planning" in Southeast Europe. In: Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte , Volume 11, Issue 1, 1963, pp. 72–84.

Web links

Commons : German small state in the Balkans  - collection of images, videos and audio files

• 224. Magyarország területi gyarapodása, 1938–1941 (German: Hungary's territorial growth, 1938–1941 ), Transindex, Cluj-Napoca, in Hungarian.
• A délnémet ütközőállam terve, 1941. (German: The Southern German Buffer State, map 1941. ) Transindex, Cluj-Napoca, in Hungarian.

Remarks

1. ↑ “At lunch [on June 29, 1942] Hitler mentioned that his compatriots in Vienna kept asking whether we wanted to give up Belgrade again this time? 'Now that we should have conquered it for the third time, we should finally keep it.' ”
   Source: Gerhard Ritter (Ed.): Table talks in the Fuehrer's headquarters, 1941-42. Athenäum-Verlag, 1951, p. 101.
2. ↑ For the importance of the oil deposits there for the warfare of the German Reich see also → Air raids on Ploiești .
3. ↑ The Transylvanian mines extracted salt, coal, iron ore and non-ferrous metals, and there were natural gas fields in the region.
   Source: Béla Köpeczi (ed.), Zoltán Szász (ed.): Brief history of Transylvania. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest 1989, section: Economic conditions. In: Magyar Elektronikus Könyvtár (MEK)
4. ↑ An autonomous Transylvania found the support of wide circles of the Transylvanian members of the Iron Guard ; however, the leadership of the fascist movement distanced itself from it.
   Source: Gerhard Köpernik : Fascists in the concentration camp: Romania's Iron Guard and the Third Reich. Frank & Timme, Berlin 2014, ISBN 3-73290-089-4 , p. 48.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Austrian Osthefte. Volume 11–12, Austrian Institute for East and Southeast Europe, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost, 1969, p. 22.
2. ↑ ^{a b c} Hans-Ulrich Wehler : "Reichsfestung Belgrad." P. 73.
3. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g} Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Nationality policy in Yugoslavia: the German minority 1918-1978. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980, ISBN 3-52501-322-1 , pp. 51-53f.
4. ↑ Aleksandar Lebl: Opasno neznanje ili nešto više. In: Danas of November 16, 2008.
5. ↑ Werner Conze , Adolf Diestelkamp , Rudolf Laun , Peter Rassow , Hans Rothfels and Theodor Schieder : Documentation of the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe. Volume V: The Fate of the Germans in Yugoslavia. In: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims , 1961, pp. 78E – 81E.
6. ↑ Thomas Casagrande : The 7th SS Mountain Infantry Division "Prinz Eugen". Campus-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2003, ISBN 3-59337-234-7 , p. 203.
7. ↑ ^{a b c} Klaus Olshausen : Interlude in the Balkans: the German policy towards Yugoslavia and Greece from March to July 1941. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1973, ISBN 3-42101-642-9 , p. 212.
8. ^ ^{A b} Gyula Borbándi: Second World War. P. 254 f. In: Ungarn-Jahrbuch 21 (1993/1994), Verlag Ungarisches Institut, Munich 1995. ISBN 3-9803045-4-X , 346 pp.
9. ^ Klaus Schmider : The Yugoslav theater of war. In: Karl-Heinz Frieser , Klaus Schmider, Klaus Schönherr , Gerhard Schreiber , Krisztián Ungváry , Bernd Wegner : The German Reich and the Second World War. Volume 8: The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. Edited by Karl-Heinz Frieser on behalf of the Military History Research Office . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 , p. 1043 ff.
10. ↑ Bernhard R. Kroener , Rolf-Dieter Müller , Hans Umbreit: Organization and mobilization of the German sphere of influence, part 2. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 1999, ISBN 3-42106-499-7 , p. 31.
11. ^ Friedrich Heer : The struggle for the Austrian identity. Böhlau, Vienna 1981, ISBN 3-20507-155-7 , p. 423.
12. ↑ Radomír Vaclav Luža : Austria and the Greater German Idea in the Nazi Era. H. Böhlaus Nachf., Vienna, Cologne, Graz 1977, p. 262.
13. ^ Modern Austrian Literature. Volume 32, Issue 4. International Arthur Schnitzler Research Association, State University of New York, Binghamton 1999, p. 178.
14. Jump up ↑ Robert von Dassanowsky : Phantom Empires: The Novels of Alexander Lernet-Holenia and the Question of Postimperial Austrian Identity Studies in Austrian literature, culture, and thought. Ariadne Press, 1996, ISBN 1-57241-030-2 , p. 91.
15. ^ ^{A b c d e} Walter Manoschek : "Serbia is Jew-Free": Military Occupation Policy and the Extermination of Jews in Serbia 1941/42. Walter de Gruyter, 2009, ISBN 3-48659-582-2 , pp. 27, 28.
16. ↑ Wolfgang Schumann , Gerhart Hass , Walter Bartel (eds.): Germany in the Second World War. From the attack on the Soviet Union to the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad (June 1941 to November 1942). Institute for Marxism-Leninism at the Central Committee of the SED . Academy of Sciences of the GDR . Central Institute for History, Military History Institute of the German Democratic Republic , Pahl-Rugenstein, Berlin 1974, ISBN 3-76090-170-0 , p. 142.
17. ↑ Frank-Rutger Hausmann : "Even in war the muses are not silent": the German Scientific Institutes in World War II. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2002, ISBN 3-52535-181-X , p. 180.
18. ↑ Carl Freytag , Oliver Rathkolb : Germany's "Drang nach Südosten": The Central European Business Day and the "Supplementary Area Southeast Europe" 1931-1945. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2012, ISBN 3-86234-992-6 , p. 168.
19. ↑ Gerhard Otto, Johannes Th. M. Houwink ten Cate: The organized chaos: “Ämterdarwinismus” and “Gesinnungsethik”. Determinants of National Socialist Occupation Rule. Metropol, 1999, ISBN 3-93248-206-9 , p. 58.
20. ↑ ^{a b c} Michael Kroner : History of the Transylvanian Saxons. From the settlement to the beginning of the 21st century. Verlag Haus der Heimat Nürnberg, 2007, ISBN 3-00021-583-2 , p. 208.
21. ↑ Lutz Klinkhammer: Stragi naziste in Italia: la Guerra contro i civili (1943-44) . Donzelli Verlag, Rome 1997, ISBN 88-7989-339-4 , p. 145 (Italian, limited preview in Google Book Search - Nazi massacre in Italy. The war against the civilian population (1943–44) ).
22. ^ ^{A b c} Ekkehard Völkl : Der Westbanat 1941-1944. P. 71.
23. ↑ Edmund Glaise-Horstenau , Peter Broucek : A general in the twilight: the memories of Edmund Glaise von Horstenau. Volume 3. Commission for Modern History of Austria, Böhlau Verlag, Vienna 1988, ISBN 3-20508-749-6 , p. 100.
24. ^ ^{A b c} Mariana Hausleitner : The Danube Swabians 1868-1948. Your role in the Romanian and Serbian Banat. Steiner, Stuttgart 2014, ISBN 978-3-515-10686-3 , pp. 196, 197.
25. ↑ Akiko Shimizu: The German occupation of the Serbian Banat 1941-1944 with special consideration of the German ethnic group in Yugoslavia. Lit Verlag, Münster 2003, p. 122.
26. ^ Johann Wüscht : Contribution to the history of the Germans in Yugoslavia for the period from 1934 to 1944. Self-published, Kehl am Rhein 1966, p. 264.
27. ↑ Josef Janko , Hans Diplich (ed.): Way and end of the German ethnic group in Yugoslavia. Stocker, 1982, ISBN 3-70200-415-7 , p. 88.
28. ↑ Josef Janko, Hans Diplich (ed.): Way and end of the German ethnic group in Yugoslavia. Stocker, 1982, ISBN 3-70200-415-7 , p. 90.
29. ^ Annals of the Italian-German Historical Institute, Trient. Volume 27. Italian-German Historical Institute [Istituto storico italo-germanico], Mulino, 2001, ISBN 8-81508-978-0 , p. 483.
30. ↑ ^{a b c} Harald Roth : Minority and nation state: Transylvania since the First World War. Böhlau, 1995, ISBN 3-41205-295-7 , p. 141.
31. ^ Carlile Aylmer Macartney: October Fifteenth. A History of Modern Hungary, 1929-1945, Part 1. University Press, 1956, p. 479.
32. ^ Rónai András: Egy meg nem született kisállam a Balkán előterében (1941). [A small state not established in the anteroom of the Balkans (1941)]. In: Új Látóhatár 39 (1988), pp. 174-178. Expanded reprint: Rónai András: A délvidéki krízis [The crisis in Vojvodina]. In: Rónai András: Térképezett történelem. Budapest 1989, pp. 283-291.
33. ^ Gabor Baross: Hungary and Hitler. Danubian Press, 1970, p. 111.
34. ↑ Loránt Tilkovszky: Nationality Political Directions in Hungary in the Counter-Revolutionary Epoch, 1919-1945. Akadémiai Kiadó, 1975, p. 17.
35. ↑ Miklós Horthy : A life for Hungary. Bonn 1953, p. 258.
36. ↑ ^{a b c d} Hans-Ulrich Wehler: "Reichsfestung Belgrad." P. 80.
37. ↑ Mariana Hausleitner: From Fascism to Stalinism. Germans and other minorities in East Central and Southeast Europe 1941-1953. IKGS, 2008, p. 41.
38. ^ Headquarters of the Danube Region Command, Garrison Administration Zemun, October 26, 1940, NARA, RG 242, T-120 Yugoslav Archives / 835 / no frame number.
39. ^ Klaus Popa : The aspirations to rule by the ethnic group leader Andreas Schmidt and the German ethnic group in Romania (1940-1944) as a prime example of Nazi fanatization and instrumentalization. P. 4.
40. ↑ Hans Wolfram Hockl : German than the Germans. Documentary study on Nazi engagement and resistance by Romanian German people's politicians. Southeast German Documentation, Verlag HW Hockl, 1987, pp. 71, 72.
41. ^ Oskar Feldtänzer : The Danube Swabians in the interwar period and their relationship to National Socialism. Felix Ermacora Institute, Research Center for the Peoples of the Danube Monarchy, 2003, p. 98.
42. ↑ Reports from the Reich No. 197. Berlin of July 26, 1941, p. 8f.
43. ↑ Klaus Popa: The irresponsible incapacitation and instrumentalization program of the "German ethnic group in Romania" 1940-1944, structured chronologically. In: zinnenwarte.de of November 18, 2004, changed on July 6, 2007.
44. ↑ Harald Roth : Minority and National State: Transylvania since the First World War. Böhlau, 1995, ISBN 3-41205-295-7 , p. 144.
45. ↑ Werner Röhr : Europe under the swastika: analyzes, sources, registers, 47 tables. Hüthig, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-32600-411-7 , p. 354.
46. ↑ Krisztina Kaltenecker: Solidarity and legalized arbitrariness. To the picture of Hungary in the Bonn documentation. In: europainstitut.hu, 2011.
47. ^ Johann Weidlein : Studies on the minority policy of Hungary from the beginnings to the present. Self-published, 1990, p. 133.
48. ^ Walter Lipgens : Europe Federation Plans of the Resistance Movements, 1940-1945: a documentation. German Society for Foreign Policy R. Oldenbourg, Munich 1968, p. 10.