Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów

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Battle of Gorlice and Tarnów
Part of: First World War
Eastern Front 1915
Eastern Front 1915
date May 1915
place Tarnów , Gorlice
output Russian defeat
Parties to the conflict

German EmpireThe German Imperium German Empire Austria-Hungary
Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary 

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Russia

Commander

German EmpireThe German Imperium August von Mackensen Hans von Seeckt Archduke Joseph Ferdinand
German EmpireThe German Imperium
Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary

Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire Radko Dimitriev

Troop strength
216,000 men: 11th Army 10 infantry divisions 634 guns 4th Army 8 infantry divisions 1 cavalry division 253 guns
German EmpireThe German Imperium



Austria-HungaryAustria-Hungary


Russian Empire 1914Russian Empire 3rd Army :
18.5 infantry divisions
5.5 cavalry divisions
680 guns
losses

40,000 dead and wounded

more than 100,000 dead and wounded
up to 250,000 prisoners

Major military operations on the
Eastern Front (1914-1918)

The battle (also breakthrough battle ) near Gorlice-Tarnów took place in the First World War at the beginning of May 1915 on the Eastern Front near the cities of Gorlice and Tarnów in the north of the then Austro-Hungarian crown land of Galicia . It marks a turning point on the Eastern Front. The armed forces of the Central Powers , d. H. of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary , achieved a decisive breakthrough through the positions of the Russian army . The result was a severe defeat for the Russian 3rd Army . This relieved the Danube Monarchy from the pressure of the Russian armies. In the subsequent offensive, Lemberg , the capital of Galicia, was recaptured on June 22, 1915 . As a result of the breakthrough, all of Russian Poland was occupied by the armies of the Central Powers by the end of the summer of 1915 .

background

Colonel General August von Mackensen, the Commander in Chief of the 11th Army

Although the Central Powers were able to bring Russia's strategic offensive - the Russian steamroller - to a halt on the Eastern Front in 1914 , the situation was by no means resolved. The Germans had pushed back two Russian armies from East Prussia near Tannenberg and on the Masurian Lakes , but the conquest of Poland in the autumn of the same year had failed due to Russian resistance. The Danube Monarchy , badly hit by the Battle of Lemberg , had averted the direct threat to its heartland by the Russian army through the battle of Limanowa-Lapanow , but Russian troops were still standing on its territory. The following winter offensive in the Carpathian Mountains had also shown no success, but weakened its own army so much that it was no longer able to carry out major attacks. This meant that the threat to their own heartland was rather postponed than lifted, and a Russian breakthrough on the Carpathian front into the Hungarian lowlands on Budapest could have brought about the collapse of Austria-Hungary. Due to the looming declaration of war by Italy , the Habsburg state was put even more under pressure, because a two-front war on its own borders would have been militarily intolerable for the fragile empire. The Germans, who had been confronted with such a strategic situation since the failure of the Schlieffen Plan , were also under pressure to create a buffer against Russia in order to take the initiative again on the western front .

Planning of the bars

On April 1, 1915, the German military plenipotentiary signaled to the Austro-Hungarian Army High Command that it was ready to deploy German troops for a relief offensive by the Austro-Hungarian ally on the Eastern Front. The Supreme Army Command (OHL) approved this idea on April 13th. However, there was by no means consensus among the highest military authorities of the Central Powers about the method by which such a liberation strike should be carried out . One faction was formed by the victors of the battle of Tannenberg, Ludendorff and Hindenburg . They advocated a broad, strategic, wrap-up operation. Two main thrusts, one from East Prussia and the other from Galicia , were intended to roll up the Russian front on its flanks and cut off the Russian troops in an encirclement encompassing all of Poland. The commanders-in-chief of both allied states, however, relied on more conventional strategies . The Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf had already drawn up a plan for a conventional breakthrough battle in the center of the front on the Russian front between Tarnów and the Gorlice region after the battle in the Carpathian Mountains . Of course, he did not want to let his plan take a back seat to the unconventional ideas of the two Prussians. However, the decisive factor was the highest officer in the German army. As head of the OHL, Erich von Falkenhayn endorsed the Austrian alternative that Hötzendorf had already sketched for him in January 1915. He feared that the large encirclement of the two officers subordinate to him would have required too many German troops and thus thinned out the western front too much. However, the German commander-in-chief did not want to allow the Austrian troops and their leadership to play an independent role in the planned advance. The decision was therefore made to carry out a strictly limited operation under German leadership. The Supreme Army Command sent Colonel-General August von Mackensen , who had distinguished himself in the fighting in East Prussia and near Lodz , and charged him with the leadership of the German 11th Army , which gathered in western Galicia on April 21. The army, which also included an Austro-Hungarian army corps, consisted of a total of ten divisions.

Operation goal and deployment

Kaiser Wilhelm II at the headquarters of the 11th Army, next to Kaiser General von Seeckt, on the right Colonel General von Mackensen

The operational goal of the 11th Army was between the IX. and X. Corps of the Russian 3rd Army under General Radko Dimitriew to drive a wedge, to throw the northern wing of this army back on Jaroslau and to push the southern wing off to the Carpathian front of the Austro-Hungarian 3rd and 2nd Armies and encircle it there. In the further course the river San should be reached in the main thrust and by threat to the rear lines of the Russian 8th Army under Alexei Brusilov the Russian southwest front should be forced to give up its positions in the area Lupkow- and Uschok-Pass .

The terrain conditions favored the operation: the flanks of the attack formations were covered in the north by the Vistula and in the south by the Beskids , and the existing railway network facilitated the approach and supply. The area, which sank to the north, offered good observation and overview conditions over the battlefield with an insight into the Russian positions, while one's own approach could be largely concealed. The problem, however, was that the numerous Vistula tributaries running across the attack axis in south-north direction had to be overcome and the network of roads in the operational area consisted of only a few main roads. The Army Group Mackensen was assumed for their attack next to the German 11th Army in the center, and the imperial 4th Army on the northern wing and the kuk 3rd Army on the southern wing.

Standing south of the Vistula along the Dunajec , the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand supported the attack in the direction of Tarnow with eight infantry divisions, one cavalry division and 253 guns.

The main attack in the center led the German 11th Army (August von Mackensen) on the Biala between Tuschow and Grybow with ten infantry divisions - 216,000 men and 634 guns - in the direction of Gorlice.

Otto von Emmich, Commanding General of the X Army Corps

The Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army ( Svetozar Boroević ) took part after the breakthrough on the southern wing in the Beskids between Duklapass and Sztropko with 10th divisions and 2nd cavalry divisions.

In the Laborcza valley in front of Mezölaborcz , the German Beskid Corps was under General von der Marwitz , then the Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army ( Eduard von Böhm-Ermolli ) with a further 12 divisions to the Uschok Pass , where the Austro- Hungarian Szurmay Corps finally connected to the German Southern Army ( Alexander von Linsingen ) produced.

course

German breakthrough

Breakthrough battle near Gorlice-Tarnow, early May 1915

The operation started with massive artillery preparation and the following disturbance fire on May 1, 1915. While the infantry forces on both sides were roughly the same, the attackers showed a considerable superiority in the artillery:

artillery Central Powers Russia
Heavy guns 334 4th
Field guns 1,272 675
Mortar 52 -

On May 2, 1915 at 6 a.m., with the best visibility for the artillery observers, the artillery opened fire on the Russian positions: a heavy field gun fired about every 130 meters, a field gun every 40 meters, plus the deep crater - the Most massive concentration of artillery of the war to date . German patrols, dressed in Austrian uniforms to camouflage the German approach, had been exploring no man's land for days. Colonel General Mackensen and his Chief of Staff Colonel i. G. Hans von Seeckt managed to bring four German infantry divisions close to the Russian lines in the main attack section, almost unnoticed. On the right flank of the Mackensen Army Group , the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army with the XIV. Corps (FML Roth ) had to break through at Tarnów , while the Austro-Hungarian VI. Corps (FML Arz) was deployed in the German-led through-racks. The Russian 3rd Army in the attack field defended about 80 km of the front, from the Vistula to the west of Zmigrod with 6 infantry and reserve divisions as well as 5 Landwehr brigades, behind them 1 further infantry and 5 cavalry divisions as reserves. Army commander General Radko Dimitriev reinforced the Xth Corps early on May 2nd with parts of the 63rd and 81st Reserve Divisions.

At 9.45 a.m. the flat fire began to flank the enemy positions, while the artillery moved its fire forward. At 10 o'clock the Prussian Guard Corps ( General Plettenberg ) and the XXXXI broke. Reserve Corps ( General Francois ), with the first wave a total of about 40,000 infantrymen, accompanied by machine-gun troops to the storm, overcame the approx. 3 km wide no man's land, tried to undermine the sometimes fierce enemy fire and then to close combat in the Russian positions throw, in which, according to eyewitness reports, piles of corpses piled up. The aviators also intervened in the artillery fight , because the OHL had also provided the 20 aircraft strong combat squadron operating under the code name carrier pigeon division Ostend .

Supported by the force of the massive artillery fire, the front of the X. Army Corps (General Protopopov) collapsed within a day. On the right wing, the Prussian Guard Corps was deployed against the protruding heights 437 (southwest of Staszkowka), 382 and 358 (east and northeast of Ciezkowice). Like many other units, two battalions of the reinforced guards regiment under Captain von Loebell moved unnoticed into their starting position for the attack. After the German artillery fire, following a precisely worked out fire plan, was moved further back around 10 a.m., von Loebell immediately pushed forward from his readiness to the Russian positions, the defenders of which were completely surprised, overcame the weakly developed trenches with only three consecutive trenches and poor barbed wire barriers Defensive system and made a 6 km drop with only a few casualties.

While in the center on the left the attack wing of the 82nd Reserve Division initially remained in front of the Russian positions at Mszanka and in the Kamieniec Forest, the 82nd Reserve Division (General Fabarius) managed to break through at Gorlice. General Dimitriev ordered the first counterattack with the 63rd Reserve Division, which failed because it was too weak. A promising counterattack could only be achieved after the III. Caucasian Army Corps, which had to be brought in via Przemyśl . The German XXXXI. Reserve Corps advance 14 kilometers deep, about 17,000 Russians were captured on the first day of the attack. The burning town of Gorlice with its petroleum plant and its exploding ammunition depots presented a picture of destruction. On the right wing of the kuk VI. Corps attacked the 12th Infantry Division (FML von Kestranek) their main attack against the mountain range at Pustki. The reserve of the German 11th Army, the X. Army Corps under General der Infanterie von Emmich, was pulled forward in the first hours of the afternoon, the 20th Division was assigned to Ropa and the 19th Division to Olszowa. On the right wing of the "Kneussl Corps" the attack halted until 2:00 p.m., only then did the 11th Bavarian Division (Major General von Schoch) manage to storm the heights of the Zamczysko massif. The 119th Division (General von Behr) now secured on the flank was able to advance east of the village of Sekowa and roll up the Russian position on the road to Kobylanka.

Unsuccessful Russian counterattacks

The Russian general Radko Dimitriew, whose army was defeated between Gorlice and Tarnow

The kuk 10th Corps, protecting the Carpathian ridge near Tylicz, distinguished itself on May 2nd when it stormed the heights of Malastów , where it reached Zmigród together with the troops of General Kneussl. General Dimitriev sent another infantry division and a cavalry division in an express march into the area of ​​the breakthrough. For lack of preparation, the troops were defeated by the Germans. They couldn't even get any message back to the army staff. From the perspective of the Russian commander, they simply “disappeared” from the scene. As a result, the X. Corps lost 30,000 in the first two days and the IX. Corps 10,000 men. Both had counted almost 40,000 soldiers each before the operation began.

After two days the Russian front broke up over a width of 35 km. On May 4th the right wing of the 11th Army, the Xth Army Corps south of Zmigrod, the XXXXI. Reserve corps was in the Dembowiec area, the kuk VI. Corps at Jaslo and the Guard Corps north of it between Jaslo and Kolaczyce. There were no downstream positions, and so the Russian troops had to retreat across open fields. As a result, they were exposed to artillery fire and air raids, and many Russian soldiers were captured by armed forces of the Central Powers advancing towards them.

The Russian Army Command Stawka forbade the withdrawal for political reasons. Italy and Romania were about to enter the war. They did not want to deter those nations from taking the side of the Entente by a Russian defeat. Another Carpathian offensive by the Russian 8th Army (General Brusilov ) was in preparation, this enterprise should not be endangered by troop deliveries.

The III arrived in the attack section. (Caucasian) Corps managed to stop the Germans until May 6th and then to withdraw in an orderly manner onto the Wisloka River . The troops of the German X. Army Corps (General von Emmich) had - through the gap between the X. and IX. advancing Russian corps - already reached Dukla and threatened the rear areas of the Russian front. The Russian Army Headquarters still forbade any retreat and ordered the front to be held on the Wisloka River. However, this did not take into account that there were no prepared positions for defense there and that half of the 3rd Army only insisted on the general staff cards.

General Dimitriev requested further reinforcements from the headquarters to consolidate his troops and led a counterattack with the III. (Caucasian) and XXIV Corps. He had high hopes for this maneuver, but it turned into a debacle. The XXIV Corps (General of the Infantry Zurikow) concentrated in the Dukla area was completely encircled following the action of the German X. Army Corps in cooperation with the Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army , on 7 May the entire Russian 48th Division under General Kornilov surrendered there . On May 8th the German troops managed to fight the remnants of the IX. and enforce X Corps; they drove them disorderly to retreat to Jaslo . The makeshift Russian front was finally broken after 48 hours. The losses already amounted to 210,000 men, 140,000 of them prisoners. Much material, including 160 artillery pieces and 400 machine guns, fell into the hands of the attackers. On May 9, Dimitriev announced that his army had "lost all its blood". The Russian front-line commander, General Nikolai Ivanov , had asked for permission to retreat for a few days. His request was granted on May 10th, after the total collapse, by the High Command (Stawka), at the same time he was removed from his post. The Russian army withdrew to the San River using scorched earth tactics , evacuating the population, setting fire to villages, killing cattle and destroying roads.

Reasons for the breakthrough

Tactical advantages of the German troops

The 11th Army was the first major German unit that was able to benefit from the experience of fighting on the Western Front on the Eastern Front . Their troops were detached from the Western Front itself from the end of 1914 and the Chief of Staff Hans von Seeckt had commanded the units since the summer of 1914. In contrast to the Russian troops, the cooperation between artillery and infantry was coordinated. The soldiers had also internalized the experience that the construction of positions could make enemy gun fire almost ineffective. As a result, the defense possibilities were improved on the German side in every spare minute, even if one was on the advance. The camouflage of one's own strength was strictly observed. In addition, field telephones were used in the advance, so that the German staff had completely different options for commanding troops than an army that was still fighting according to the old rules.

Tactical mistakes of the Russian army

The Russian position system, which opposed the Germans, had a depth of 6 km, but was not up to the demands of trench warfare . The Russian troops had failed to set up a sufficient number of advanced posts and were therefore unable to monitor the vast no-man's-land. This turned out to be decisive for the surprise element of the attack, because the Russians did not notice the massive deployment of German troops in their staging areas. In general it has to be said that the educational work of the Russian troops was inadequate. Up until the day of the offensive, the massive concentration of the four German attack divisions could not be determined by either conventional or aerial reconnaissance. As a result, Mackensen was able to use a strong concentration of troops against a weak point, following the type of Clausewitzian strategy, without the Russian army having taken countermeasures in advance (for example, bringing in reserves).

The trench system of the Russian armed forces was also a major factor in their defeat. Since all military staffs did not expect a German offensive, even though reports from agents had warned of an offensive by the Central Powers, the troops were not asked to do the necessary digging work, they were even on it hindered: The X. Corps, which hit the German main thrust, tried to dig positions for its rear area. However, when the army commander Dimitriev was informed, he forbade the action and withdrew additional troops from the association. General Radko Dimitriev was of the opinion that a corps that could raise positions for its reserves was overstaffed. He sent the detached troops to his Carpathian front. The Russian offensive planned for spring should be intensified. Therefore, General Bonch-Brujewitsch , who inspected the Russian front on behalf of the GHQ in the spring, described the defense arrangements of the 3rd Army as not being taken seriously.

Strategic mistakes made by the Russian leadership

After the failures in East Prussia, the Russian army command planned an offensive in the Carpathian Mountains along the southwestern front . Thus the Russian 3rd Army under General Radko Dimitriev was thinned out. Furthermore, she should be involved in this offensive herself. This caused the army commander to poorly cover his western section of the front. The Russian troops suffered in particular from the fact that not a single division of the first line, but only reserve formations were available to intercept the enemy attack. So it happened that at Gorlice-Tarnów five and a half Russian divisions, consisting of reservists, competed against ten German and eight Austro-Hungarian divisions. This made a breakthrough by the Central Powers almost inevitable.

A breach of the front line would have been a tactical defeat for the Russians , but the defeat at Gorlice reached a strategic dimension. The decisive factor here was the exploitation of the breakthrough, that is, the rapid advancement of the offensive on the German side. This could have been prevented by quickly bringing in reserves on the Russian side. However, this did not take place for two reasons. The central point here was the inadequacy of the railway system and the logistics of the staff of the Russian army. The rail network in Galicia was poorly developed. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that the mobility of the Russian army left something to be desired. For example, after the Battle of Tannenberg, Ludendorff succeeded in turning his entire 8th Army within two weeks against the still undefeated 1st Russian Army in East Prussia by means of train connections . In comparison, it took the Russian army command a few months later - without being affected by enemy action - more than four weeks to mobilize their 9th Army in Bukovina .

These logistical problems weren't the only factors that made the difference. The Russian army chief had two options. On the one hand, he was able to strengthen the front line and concentrate as many troops as possible in the vicinity of the enemy. On the other hand, he had the option of thinning out his front and staggering the defense in depth in order to be able to guarantee the creation of reserves. General Dimitriev chose the first option and thus surrendered his troops to the force of the enemy attack.

Lack of supplies and equipment in the Russian army

In Europe at the time, the Russian autocracy was regarded as a prime example of a dictatorial monarchy . However, it increasingly had to struggle with a liberal and also Marxist opposition . The government, which also suffered from frequent personnel changes, was unable to implement a militarization of industry against the opposition forces. In the course of 1915 all armies of the warring states suffered from the lack of supplies, but the supply difficulties in Russia were particularly serious. For example, 50,000 fewer rifles were manufactured every month than recruits were drafted; the Russian artillery could not be used or only to a limited extent due to a lack of ammunition.

Another disadvantage arose from mistakes made by the Russian General Staff in the pre-war period. The light artillery had been given preference over the heavy artillery because a war of movement was expected. While the Central Powers were only able to record a superiority of two to one with light guns in the attack area , there were over 300 German heavy guns compared to only four Russian ones. As a result, the Germans were able to fight the enemy artillery effectively, while counterfire on the enemy batteries was difficult due to the short range of the Russian light guns.

losses

The information on how many soldiers were killed and wounded or were taken prisoner is - as in all battles of the First World War - inaccurate, incomplete and contradicting also for the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów. What is certain is that the Russian losses were far higher than those on the German and Austro-Hungarian sides combined. Wolfgang Mommsen's statement that there were 820,000 casualties and 895,000 prisoners on the Russian side apparently relates not only to the battle of Gorlice-Tarnów mentioned in the previous half-sentence, but to the Russian front from May to July 1915 as a whole. The German Army Report of May 13, 1915 speaks of 143,000 Russian prisoners. The Austrian Army Report of May 12, 1915 estimates the Russian casualties at at least 150,000 men, including 100,000 prisoners. Hermann Stegemann puts the Russian losses at "nearly 250,000 men" without distinguishing between dead, wounded and prisoners. Ernst Müller-Meiningen mentions the same number . Richard DiNardo, who carried out the most detailed study of the Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów to date, estimates that up to 250,000 soldiers of the Russian army were captured and more than 100,000 were killed or wounded.

As far as the German 11th Army is concerned, the "Medical Report on the German Army" provides the following information about its own losses based on the 10-day reports from the individual units in the period from May 1st to May 10th 1915:

  • wounded: 11,470 soldiers
  • killed: 2,634 soldiers
  • sick: 1,353 soldiers
  • missing: 1,067 soldiers

This is a snapshot; it often became apparent afterwards that the provisional figures of the 10-day reports had not recorded all losses or could have recorded them at all. Much evidence suggests that the numbers in the “medical report” are too low. The Bavarian 3rd Infantry Regiment of the 11th Bavarian Infantry Division lost 20 officers and 700 men to dead and wounded in a single day. The losses of the 3rd Posen Infantry Regiment No. 58 of the 119th Division in the house-to-house war to capture the town of Gorlice were hardly less . Of the approximately 20,000 soldiers of the XXXXI. Reserve Corps of 11th Army fell 2,000 men on May 2, 1915 alone; at the end of the battle some regiments of the XXXXI. Reserve Corps lost every second man. Richard DiNardo estimates the losses of the 11th Army (fallen and wounded) in the battle of Gorlice-Tarnów at around 20,000 men. The Austrian VI. Corps lost 10,300 men, a third of its strength on the eve of the battle. The losses of the other Austrian units were hardly less.

consequences

Visit to Lemberg in August 1916: Hindenburg , Böhm-Ermolli and Ludendorff

Gorlice-Tarnów represented a decisive liberation blow for the Central Powers . The entire Carpathian front had been turned off its hinges. On June 6th, the important Austro-Hungarian fortress town of Przemyśl was regained , which had only surrendered to the Russians on March 22nd. The Russian south-western front, which was indented over a width of 160 km, had to be withdrawn by about 100 km on an unprepared line on the San. The Stawka tried to defend this with the thrown together remains of the 3rd Army. Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich said : ... hardly trained peasant boobies; for lack of weapons they have not even learned to shoot properly. Mackensen reported that he only fought against completely run-down troops. At first they offered brave resistance, but this soon collapsed. On June 14th alone another 15,000 men surrendered. On the 19th, Mackensen and his exhausted troops met a well-developed line of defense in front of Grodek , which he immediately stormed despite the inferiority of the forces. The front was broken through again and the city of Lemberg was recaptured on June 22nd . In these battles the Russian army lost as many soldiers as it had lost in the battle of Gorlice-Tarnow.

In view of the total defeat, the Russian leadership under Grand Duke Nikolai ordered the evacuation of Poland on June 17, which culminated in the Great Withdrawal. Thus the Russian Empire had to accept the first great losses of territory, not to mention the losses of people and material. In general, the confident war aims of the Russian leadership after Gorlice-Tarnów were taken ad absurdum. The intention, often admonished by the Western allies, to bring the war to German territory became an illusion. For the Central Powers, however, the operation was a complete success. The several hundred kilometers deep buffer against the Russian army, which was captured in the course of the year, enabled the OHL to prepare for the Verdun offensive and averted any territorial threat to the empire. The situation for Austria-Hungary had also eased. The dual monarchy was now able to turn almost entirely to the danger that Italy posed in the south as a new member of the Entente .

With the fall of Congress Poland to the Central Powers, the battle also changed the position of the Polish national movement. The pro-Russian faction under Roman Dmowski was weakened, while the legionary movement fighting on the pro-Austrian side in 1915 with 20,000 soldiers under Józef Piłsudski was strengthened.

literature

Web links

Commons : Battle of Gorlice-Tarnów  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Stefan Felleckner: Combat: a neglected area of ​​military history. Eyewitnesses from the Seven Years' War (1756–63) and the First World War (1914–18) report on battles . Berlin 2004, ISBN 3-938262-16-8 , p. 54.
  2. ^ Janusz Piekałkiewicz: The First World War . Econ-Verlag, Düsseldorf 1988, ISBN 3-430-17481-3 , p. 297.
  3. ↑ Detailed eyewitness reports by Hauptmann von Loebell u. a. can be found in: Wolfgang Foerster (Ed.): We fighters in the world war . Munich undated, p. 182ff.
  4. ^ Jean-Pierre Cartier: The First World War. Piper, Munich 1984. ISBN 3-492-02788-1 , p. 300, gives the depth of incursion on the evening of May 2nd as 16 km wide and 4 km deep.
  5. ^ A b Jean-Pierre Cartier: The First World War. Piper, Munich 1984. ISBN 3-492-02788-1 , p. 301.
  6. ↑ Wolfgang J. Mommsen: The Urkatastrophe Germany. The First World War 1914–1918 . Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2011 (= Bruno Gebhardt : Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte . 10th, completely revised edition, vol. 17). ISBN 3-608-60017-5 . P. 49.
  7. ^ Hermann Stegemann: History of the war . Vol. 3, Stuttgart 1919. p. 212.
  8. ↑ Ernst Müller-Meiningen: The World War 1914-1917 and the "collapse of international law" . Vol. 1, Berlin 1917. p. 390.
  9. ^ A b Richard L. DiNardo: Breakthrough. The Gorlice-Tarnów campaign, 1915 . Praeger, Santa Barbara 2010. p. 99.
  10. ^ Medical report on the German army in the world wars 1914/1918, III. Volume, Berlin 1934, p. 43.
  11. ^ A b Richard L. DiNardo: Breakthrough. The Gorlice-Tarnów campaign, 1915 . Praeger, Santa Barbara 2010. pp. 55 f.
  12. ^ A b Richard L. DiNardo: Breakthrough. The Gorlice-Tarnów campaign, 1915 . Praeger, Santa Barbara 2010. p. 67.
  13. ↑ The Austrian poet and medic Georg Trakl had reproduced his traumatic war experiences here six months earlier (see Battle of Gródek 1914 ) in the well-known poem Grodek .
  14. ↑ Piotr Szlanta: The First World War from 1914 to 1915 as an identity factor for the Polish nation . In: Gerhard P. Groß (Ed.): The forgotten front - The East 1914/1915. Event, effect, aftermath . Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, ISBN 3-506-75655-9 , pp. 153-164, here pp. 160 f.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on October 17, 2005 .