Arms control

Arms control is a political response to arms dynamics in the international system. Arms control is usually carried out in the form of bilateral or multilateral diplomacy . The process of state accumulation of military capacities is to be regulated through arms control. Arms control can include regulations for the development, production, storage and dissemination or transfer of armaments.

In the East-West conflict , in which there was talk of an “arms race” or “ arms race ” between the USA and the USSR , arms control gained particular importance. In this context, it served the political control of a galloping armament dynamic, which in the field of nuclear weapons had become a threat to the existence and welfare of all humanity.

The term “control” means first of all the active political control of the armaments process fueled by the armament dynamics. It is also  to be understood in the sense of monitoring armaments processes - for example through verification measures.

Arms control aims to prevent war, limit damage in the event of war and, last but not least, reduce the costs that arise from armaments. However, these are not always compatible with one another and cannot be implemented to the same extent.

In the course of war prevention, the stability of the relations between the respective states is considered, which is why this becomes an important part of arms control. There are three different forms:

• Crisis stability: Motivation to be the first to act in order to obtain a decisive advantage or to avoid a decisive disadvantage.
• Strategic Stability: Military strategies that can preclude preventive operations to eliminate enemy arsenals.
• Arms race stability: Attention is paid to constant growth in armament on both sides. This results in security for both sides, which guarantees that neither of the actors has to fear breakthroughs by the other party.

In all three respects, the stabilization of military relations should help prevent wars.

Theories of arms control deal with how the three goals - war prevention, possibly damage limitation and cost reduction - can be achieved, which conditions must prevail for an effective implementation and which effects arms control measures produce. Dealing with arms control and arms dynamics therefore includes developing a sensorium of conflict and cooperation and exploring the incentives, means, inhibitions and disruptive factors of international cooperation.

Arms control is also a political instrument for shaping interstate relations in a broader sense. Verification measures associated with arms control can build trust between states and in this way defuse or even overcome the security dilemma .

Arms control theory

Arms control theory was developed in the 1950s and 1960s under the influence of the East-West conflict . The aim was to advance arms control policy and successfully implement it in political practice.

At its core, arms control is a normative endeavor. It is based on the assumption that it is desirable to gradually develop interstate hostility into cooperative relationships or even into a security community (see Arms control measures and problems ).

Arms control has three goals:

• War prevention and reducing the likelihood of conflict. The latter is often increased by an uncontrollably accelerating armament dynamics. Arms control agreements oppose this process with quantitative and qualitative limitations as well as measures to create transparency and the possibility of verification, whereby sustainable stability in international relations can be created and maintained.
• Damage limitation in the event of an armed conflict . In order to contain the extent of death and destruction, the probability of use of certain weapon systems or their number can be reduced or reduced to zero.
• Reduce armament costs. The funds released in this way can be used by states in other areas.

Arms control is not to be equated with disarmament . Disarmament can either be a desired end state or a means to achieve that state. In the context of arms control theory, disarmament is primarily understood as a possible means of achieving the three goals mentioned. This includes both quantitative disarmament, i.e. the reduction in the number of weapon systems , and qualitative disarmament, i.e. the abandonment of certain properties of weapon systems.

Arms control can, however, also mean temporarily controlled armament (both quantitative and qualitative), for example if upper limits are agreed for weapon systems that are higher than current stocks and thus limit the increase in the number of weapons arsenals only at a later point in time.

The three goals formulated in arms control (prevention of war and stabilization of relations in the international system, limitation of damage in the event of war and lowering of the costs caused by armaments) can, however, in specific cases contradict each other or hinder each other in their realization. Measures to limit damage in the event of war can lead to more wars instead of fewer , thus counteracting the goal of war prevention. The targeted disarmament of a weapon system may also cause instability in the international system, which could also increase the likelihood of war.

Arms control measures and problems

Arms control measures depend on the state of political relations between the states involved. With regard to the conflict situation, ideally five degrees of conflict can be distinguished - from acute hostility to a security community.

enmity

At this level it is important to end existing acts of war or to avoid an imminent war. Possible measures are to initiate first steps of communication and - in the case of neighboring conflict parties - to pacify the sensitive borders by setting up so-called disengagement zones. Since the cooperation between the warring states is very likely to be very low, the conflicting parties have to resort to the help of third parties (impartial state, international organization).

Chronic opposition

At first it is not a question of resolving the conflict, but rather of controlling the amount of weapons. Since the conflicting parties want to continue protecting themselves from each other, they endeavor to arm themselves in order not to be inferior if the conflict escalates again. This process should be counteracted. The core aspect here is again the improvement of communication between the states, whereby the first attempts at transparency efforts are to be sought.

Mixed conflicts

At this stage, the conflicting parties are usually ready to resolve the conflict and to contain the armaments dynamics that have arisen between them . The acceptance of arms control policy is accordingly much greater than at the level of the two preceding degrees of conflict.

Arms control can include a number of concrete measures. First of all, at the stage of mixed conflicts, the implementation of "confidence-building measures" should be aimed for.

Confidence-building measures

Confidence-building measures (VBM) are intended to help reduce the effects of various factors that can accelerate the armament dynamic. The two main objectives of VBM are:

• Stabilization of relations between states and lasting relaxation of the political climate
• Gradual reduction of distrust and promotion of cooperative politics (e.g. recognition of the interests of the other)

The VBM concept was prominently used in the context of the CSCE process in the 1970s and formed the basis for agreements such as the Vienna Document and the Stockholm Agreement.

The VBM can be categorized according to their range:

The weakest form is the agreement on common norms , which regulate the interaction with one another and reflect shared interests. These are set out in agreements which, however, are not politically binding. In other words, there is no control and sanctioning body that could ensure compliance with these agreements.

The next stage is the operational restriction . The main thing here is to prevent the opposing party from misunderstanding its own military actions and interpreting them as a threat. Therefore, for example, maneuvers should be registered in advance and limited in size.

The communication should be further improved. In this way, states should be given the opportunity to contact other states directly in an emergency. A prominent historical example is the “red telephone” set up between the USA and the Soviet Union after the Cuba crisis . Communication is also intended to prevent a maneuver from being misunderstood as preparation for an attack, as was the case with the NATO exercise Able Archer 83 , and war would "accidentally" break out.

Measures to create transparency and confidence building between states are given a higher quality through verification.

Verification measures

Through verification, compliance with contractual obligations should be checked either mutually by the contracting parties involved or by an international organization. Verification measures in the context of arms control are based on the simple principle: "Trust is good, control is better."

The interplay of control and trust can also be modeled with the prisoner's dilemma from game theory, according to which there is an incentive to cheat despite the agreed cooperation. To prevent this fraud, arms control uses verification measures, which are intended to ensure that

• Information about compliance is obtained,
• Violations are detected reliably and promptly,
• the attempt to breach the contract is made unattractive.

Verification measures should always, regardless of the method and organizational form chosen, meet certain conditions in order to achieve their goal: They should be expedient, adequate, effective and appropriate. This means that the verification measures must basically be suitable for promptly recognizing a rule violation as such. They should also be independent of external influences in order not to give any contract member the opportunity to circumvent the contract undetected. The appropriateness consists in the fact that the verification measures should represent the lowest means, which is promising and does not unnecessarily restrict the contract member.

A USAF OC-135B as a technical means of verification under the Open Skies contract

Verification instruments

• Exchange of information or data exchange
• Observation by technical means (e.g. satellites , sensors, surveillance cameras, seals, etc.)
• On-site inspections (registered or unannounced)
• Observation of military maneuvers

Establishing and strengthening mutual trust is to be defined as one of the goals of verification, especially with regard to the effectiveness of control measures, but also with regard to the quality of the entire intergovernmental relationship. Verification enables the early detection of rule violations. This means that the partner states of an agreement must fear that other states will quickly notice a breach of their own. On the other hand, it also means that they can rely on the fact that violations of the rules by others will be uncovered and thus they can trust the agreement and stick to it themselves. From the level of mixed conflicts, verification ideally becomes an integral part of arms control.

Compliance

The problem with verification is that it is not possible to finance a system that can absolutely and completely control compliance with the contracts. There is a risk of false information, especially when exchanging information, which would render it ineffective. The aim must therefore be to keep the probability of major rule violations being discovered as high as possible. But even if an effective verification system is ensured, an equally effective system of measures is needed to enforce compliance with control agreements.

Seal of the International Atomic Energy Agency , installed by IAEA inspectors that compliance with the by-the-spot inspections NPT monitor

This enforcement procedure, known as compliance , aims to put pressure on members who do not adhere to the relevant arms control treaty in order to force them to comply with the treaty. Ultimately, this can in some cases - depending on the treaty - extend to the possibility of military intervention.

The compliance policy is based on two pillars that guarantee the stability of all arms control regimes. For one, the vast majority of members must follow and support the principles, norms and rules. It does this by identifying with these rules and wanting to be safe. On the other hand, reliable procedures are developed which have the task of recognizing serious breaches of contract and, if necessary, taking action against them.

Such a compliance procedure consists of several steps. First of all, the rule violation must be determined in the collective. For this purpose, the information obtained through verification measures is evaluated by the contract members. Then it is determined whether it is a violation of the rules. It should be noted that the individual members are treated fairly and equally, as otherwise trust in the contract would be called into question. Measures can then be taken to sanction the member who violated the rules and to persuade them to give in. The problem that arises here is that in many contracts the sanctioning measures have to be decided unanimously, which means that the accused member can acquit himself by voting against. In practice, therefore, not all violations of an arms control treaty are rated equally. In the case of nuclear issues and violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty , for example, the UN Security Council always assesses individual cases, which also includes assessments of the motives of the rule-breaking state. Only if the breach of contract poses a threat to international security would compliance measures up to the last escalation stage, a military intervention, be initiated.

In summary, the problem of the compliance procedure in the context of arms control is the balance between, on the one hand, existing measures, which, however, may not be decisive enough, and, on the other hand, more promising measures, which would, however, represent a stronger interference with the sovereignty of the state concerned.

Arms restriction and disarmament

Further measures at the level of mixed conflicts are quantitative and qualitative restrictions, which do not always stop armament , but at least regulate and control it.

Quantitative means that the upgrade rate is limited. Qualitative restrictions include, on the one hand, the prohibition of individual weapon systems (such as the ban on anti-personnel mines within the framework of the Ottawa Convention ) and, on the other hand, the limitation of the further development of certain technologies (such as the limitation of the number of multiple warheads within the framework of SALT II ) meant. Compliance with these measures is in turn checked by verification.

Destroyed B-52G on the AMARG premises as part of the verification of START I

The contractually compliant disarmament of weapons systems , such as decommissioning and destruction of carrier systems such as ICBMs or long-range bombers in the nuclear sector using a contractually stipulated procedure , is also frequently controlled by verification measures . As part of SALT I , it was agreed, among other things, that heavy bombers such as the American B-52 had to be cut into five parts and placed in the open air so that they could be seen by Soviet satellites.

Mostly cooperative relationships

This type of relationship is largely based on collaboration, but a remnant of distrust remains. Nevertheless, there is almost complete transparency, especially in the military areas, and problems are often discussed and solved together - usually on the basis of agreements and treaties that have already been agreed and the associated negotiation forums.

Security community

As part of a security community (term after Karl W. Deutsch ) almost all areas that affect the military are regulated transparently and in cooperation with other states. The European Union offers numerous examples of this, for example in the form of the Eurocorps . In a security community there is also the possibility of joint training projects and exercises as well as multinational deployments in crisis areas. At the time when a security community emerged, the mistrust of the security dilemma gave way to the expectation that political changes of any kind would always take place peacefully and free from threats.

History of Arms Control

The following historical overview offers only a selection of the most important arms control efforts. For a more detailed listing, please refer to the list of international arms control treaties .

The beginnings of armaments limitation

Already 2000 years ago there were numerous attempts to control or limit state armaments. The peace treaty between Rome and Carthage after the Second Punic War in 201 BC is exemplary here . BC This obliged the Carthaginians to hand over almost the entire war fleet to the Romans. In the peace treaty after the Second Macedonian-Roman War in 196 BC The entire Macedonian navy was to be delivered to Rome and the Macedonians were to be driven out of Greece .

During the Middle Ages , one should think in particular of the so-called God's Peace . The term “God's Peace” summarizes a series of resolutions that, under threat of church penalties , wanted to prevent attacks against uninvolved persons, buildings and objects (cattle). The peace of God was realized by the church and the nobility. The aim was to control the frequent conflicts of the middle and lower nobility. At the beginning of the modern era there were documents for the first time which contained agreements on armistices. These were agreements in which the defeated (or both parties) provisions for further armament were imposed. For example, on the edge of the Thirty Years' War at the Armistice of Kötzschenbroda between Sweden and Saxony in 1645, it was decided that the Elector of Saxony would not raise any new troops or strengthen existing ones within a period of six months.

The most noteworthy developments in the history of arms control from the 19th century onwards are outlined below:

• Disarmament Initiative [1816]

As early as 1816, Alexander I , Tsar of Russia, asked the British statesman Lord Castlereagh to reduce the armed forces of all kinds in order to be able to guarantee a lasting peace .

• Rush-Bagot Treaty [1818]

In 1818, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the first arms control treaty of the modern industrial age. British diplomat Richard Rush and American Deputy Secretary of State Charles Bagot signed the treaty in April 1817, and the US Senate ratified the treaty the following year. The treaty mandated the demilitarization of the Great Lakes between America and Canada and allowed the naval forces of both countries only one ship with one hundred tons per lake.

• Disarmament Initiative [1898]

The circular drawn up by the Russian Foreign Minister Grad Mujawjew , based on the proposals of Tsar Nicholas II , contained a ban on increasing defense spending and freezing the armament dynamics of the current land and naval forces. As a result of the proposals of the Tsar, who recognized Russia's reserve in Europe's arms competition, the first multilateral disarmament conference took place in the following year: The 1st Hague Peace Conference in 1899. The declared goal of Russia was to achieve universal peace and a reduction in the excessive To ensure armaments dynamics. The proposals of the Russian tsarism thus resulted less from a pacifist will than from the threatening armaments advantage of the neighboring states.

• I. Hague Peace Conference [1899]

The peace conference, which took place in The Hague in July 1899 , was supposed to serve disarmament in addition to proposals for peaceful conflict management. It was one of the earliest forms of multilateral negotiations that did not occur during a war. The 26 participating states did not achieve far-reaching results in terms of disarmament or arms control, but were able to achieve a ban on the use of projectiles containing asphyxiating or toxic gases and other malicious weapons.

• II. Hague Peace Conference [1907]

As the successor to the conference of 1899, the Second Hague Peace Conference met in June 1907. The 44 participating states agreed to set up a permanent court of arbitration in The Hague, the main task of which should be the mediation of conflicts between competing states. In addition, the foundations for international law were laid with negotiations for rules of conduct in armed conflicts. So was z. B. declared the territory of neutral states as inviolable.

Arms control after the First World War

• Peace Treaty of Versailles (also: Versailles Treaty) [1919]

In the Versailles Peace Treaty, the Triple Entente , the Central Powers and their allies , imposed extensive disarmament and arms control ( Inter-Allied Military Control Commission ). These were regulated in Articles 159 to 213 of the Treaty. According to this, the German armed forces were to be made demobile, reduced (Article 159) and general conscription abolished (Article 173). Due to a lack of verification , but especially due to the lack of an internationally assertive authority , the Reichswehr armed itself with the help of the Soviet Union. In the Treaty of Rapallo , the two internationally isolated states also pledged military support. This support was implemented by institutions such as the Kama tank school or the secret Lipzek training air base . Even if many of the armaments measures taken by the Reichswehr were to be kept secret, they were known to the international public even before the National Socialists came to power. This illustrates the inability of the international community at the time to react to breaches of treaty. As a non-signatory to the Versailles Treaty and a non-member of the League of Nations, the Soviet Union was not bound by the specifications of the formal victorious powers and, for its part, was arming itself.

• League of Nations [1920]

The League of Nations Council in the League of Nations was responsible for security-related issues and is comparable in function to today's World Security Council . Together with the League of Nations assembly, he was supposed to control and limit global armaments, among other things. Through this institution, the goal set in the first chapter of the League of Nations, the maximum minimization of global armaments, was to be achieved. A permanent advisory commission was convened to monitor arms control, which consisted of one representative from each branch of the armed forces from each member nation. From 1925 a special commission was convened to prepare and advise on a disarmament conference. This commission had six meetings until it was disbanded in 1930 with no tangible results. The outbreak of the Second World War sealed the failure of the main task of the League of Nations. The League of Nations negotiated in most of its meetings with the aim of reducing arms or armaments. Some of the successes in arms control should be listed:

• The League of Nations formed the first international body entrusted with the supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition and the preventive prevention of the manufacture of ammunition for private use.
• The Yearbook of the League of Nations: From 1924 onwards, a statistical analysis of global armaments expenditure, the situation of paramilitary forces and the police force in each state was published every year. For this purpose, data on the international transfer of weapons and ammunition and their value were given. The data, however, were incomplete and in some cases only incorrect approximate values. This analysis made armaments available to the public in numbers for the first time.
• Geneva Protocol : After an agreement on the regulation of arms exports in St. Germain was not concluded in 1919, another conference was held in Geneva in 1925. This should regulate the global arms trade . A distinction was made between five types of weapons, which were only allowed to be traded under certain state controls and international requirements. One of the goals was to stop the black market. Since no verification measures for arms production could be established in the treaty, the document was not ratified. However, the ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons has been recognized internationally and permanently. The 1972 Biological Weapons Agreement followed on from the Geneva Protocol.
• Briand-Kellogg Pact : In the treaty that was legally valid from 1929, the nations undertook not to use force to enforce interests within international relations. The war of aggression should be banned. The treaty was not negotiated within the League of Nations, but through this it had a basis for discussion. However, there was a lack of verification and sanctioning measures against a violation. This idea was adopted and expanded in Art. 2 No. 4 of the UN Charter.
• Geneva Disarmament Conference : In the first conference on a global reduction and limitation of all armaments, 60 states were represented. The public and international organizations were heavily involved. In addition to disarmament, further goals were the establishment of a system of collective security, the prohibition of all chemical, biological and incendiary weapons, global control of arms production and the arms trade, and monitoring options and guarantees of compliance with obligations. After the withdrawal of the German Reich and the death of the chairman of the conference in 1935, the conference was ended. Only the codification of the use of gas weapons and the ban on biological weapons have been ratified.

• Washington Fleet Treaty (also: Washington Fleet Agreement) [1922]

The first major multilateral agreement to be signed in February 1922 was the Armaments Limitation Treaty between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan. Based on the voluntary nature of the states, the five maritime powers agreed in Washington, DC to limit their battleships. Maximum total tonnage limits could be set for each type of ship and each country. Destroyers and submarines were excluded from the treaty.

• London Agreement (also: London Conference; London Treaty) [1930]

The armament dynamics in the area of ​​so-called cruisers were to be contained and the conference, consisting of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, limited the number and caliber of guns and the tonnage and equipment of ships. The agreement expired in 1936.

• German-British fleet agreement [1935]

In the bilateral naval agreement with the United Kingdom in June 1935, the German Reich was allowed to expand the strength of the fleet to 35% of the strength of the British fleet.

Arms control after World War II

• Antarctic Treaty [1959]

In 1958, 11 nations accepted the invitation of the United States to conduct research in Antarctica to advise on the use of this area. The treaty represented the first multilateral arms control agreement after the Second World War and covered the entire Antarctic continent and smaller islands. It came into force in 1961 and banned nuclear weapon explosions, the establishment of military bases with nuclear weapons and the release of radioactive waste.

• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Space and Underwater (also: Teststoppabkommen , Limited Test Ban Treaty, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ) [1963]

With this nuclear test ban agreement, any attempt to detonate nuclear weapons in open terrain (atmosphere, space, underwater) was prohibited. Detonations in the underground were not recorded, so that test explosions continued to take place underground , with the condition that radioactivity outside the underground system was not allowed to occur. Because of this loophole, the agreement was also known as the Partial Test Ban (PTBT). With the treaty an enormous protection for the environment and the civil population was achieved. It also marked the first noticeable improvement in the relationship between the US and the Soviet Union. The treaty in its original form was signed between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Even states that did not take part in the treaty negotiations, such as France and China, adhered to them.

• Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (also: Space Treaty , Outer Space Treaty ) [1967]

The 98 signatory states to the treaty, which was signed in January 1967, undertook not to put any objects that carry nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction into space (Article IV). The demilitarization provision of Article IV is considered to be the most important clause of the multilateral treaty. The space contract was supplemented in 1979 by the so-called " moon contract ", the content of which was linked to the peaceful use of space. Only 13 states have ratified it.

• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT; Also: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , NPT) [1968]

The non-proliferation treaty, which came into force in 1970, divided the contracting states into nuclear weapon states on the one hand, which were prohibited from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. On the other hand, non-nuclear-armed states were banned from using this type of technology for military purposes. After ratification, the treaty is to be examined for loopholes every five years at review conferences. However, unofficial nuclear-weapon states such as India, Israel and Pakistan have refused to join to this day. North Korea terminated its membership in 2003. Further difficulties lie at the time of completion of the disarmament. It is not clearly defined by when all nuclear weapons should be dismantled. This leaves room for interpretation, because both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear states interpret the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty differently. The US, for example, is planning to downsize its nuclear arsenal by 2070, but all other weapons are to be modernized and future technology improved.

• Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Floor, the Floor of the Ocean and in the Corresponding Underground (also: Sea Floor Treaty ) [1971]

Following the Antarctic Treaty and the Space Treaty , the Seabed Treaty followed in February 1971 to keep areas in the common interests of mankind free from nuclear weapons. This treaty included 84 signatory states a. a. to the understanding that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must not be stationed or tested on the seabed.

• Bioweapons Convention [1972]

On April 10, 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention was signed. This came into force in 1975. The contracting states undertake not to develop, store, produce or otherwise obtain biological warfare agents. The fact that the agreed conditions can be circumvented relatively easily and that no regulation on the use of warfare agents has been made is seen as problematic.

Start a US intercontinental ballistic missile of the type Titan II . ICBMs were at the center of arms dynamics in the East-West conflict and were therefore the subject of arms control treaties.

• SALT-I ( Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty ) [1972]

In May 1972, SALT was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the long term, the US-Soviet relationship was to be stabilized by legally binding limits on the number and technical improvement of the respective strategic potential. Among other things, the number of fixed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) should be frozen for five years (from July 1, 1972). Due to the unequal number of legitimate missiles on each side, the conditions were refined through negotiations in 1973.

• ABM Treaty ( Anti-Ballistic-Missiles-Treaty ) [1972]

The ABM treaty stipulated strict limits on ballistic missile defense systems already deployed by the USA and the Soviet Union, only one of which was to be stationed near the capital. Both states were allowed to have two ABM bases each with 100 missiles, since 1974 only one base. Finally, under President Ford, the US dismantled its only ABM system. This treaty marked a milestone in arms control as it significantly reduced the immense cost of unreliable missile defense systems and the risk of escalation. He also created more room for negotiations by building trust. The US, under the Bush administration, terminated the treaty in 2001 on the grounds that it had to create a defense against ICBMs that could be used by third countries.

• SALT II Treaty [1979]

The SALT II treaty signed by the USA and the Soviet Union in June 1979 provided for a limit to the number of strategic systems to 2,400 (on both sides). This was intended to create quantitative equality of the missile systems for SALT I, but this was undermined by the variable number of warheads per missile. The treaty was not ratified by the US Congress. However, both superpowers kept to the limits. By the end of 1981, both committed themselves to reducing the number of missiles. The maximum limit was 1,320 bombers equipped with cruise missiles and sea- and land-based missiles equipped with multiple warheads.

• START I contract [1982/1991]

The negotiations on the START I ( Strategic Arms Reduction Talks ) treaty were initiated in 1982 by the USA and the Soviet Union. These sought to reduce and restructure the nuclear delivery systems of intercontinental range and nuclear warheads. This was signed by the USA and the USSR in July 1991 and came into force on December 5, 1994. START I set a maximum number for land- and sea-based ICBMs and heavy bombers at 1,600 systems. Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) were separately limited to 154 pieces. Furthermore, nuclear warheads have been restricted to 6,000. For warheads on ballistic missiles an upper limit of a maximum of 4900 was also set, with heavy warheads being limited to 1540 and mobile ICBM warheads to 1100. The rules set out in the START-I contract should be able to be checked directly by means of on-site inspections.

Mobile launch pad with RSD-10 , NATO code name SS-20 Saber, an example of a medium-range missile that was abolished by the INF treaty

• INF Treaty ( Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) [1987]

In the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, complete weapon categories were banned for the first time between the contracting parties. The treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. It was the strictest and most precise treaty for the control of nuclear weapons to date. He planned to completely destroy ground-based medium-range missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers. Systems that have already been stationed, the operational infrastructure and production base should also be destroyed within three years of coming into force. Furthermore, both the possession and the use of such weapons were strictly prohibited. In the following ten years there were a number of checks and verifications that the contract was being adhered to. In April and May 1991 the United States and Russia announced that they had destroyed all intermediate range nuclear weapons, a total of 2,692 cruise missiles. However, six successor states of the Soviet Union - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine - continued to have infrastructure for INFs. Four of these states, namely Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine continued to participate in the treaty. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were neglected as they each had only one operational infrastructure in the country. There are suspicions that Russia may have broken the INF treaty through missile tests in 2013 and 2014.

• Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (also: CFE Treaty ) [1990]

As the successor to the MBFR negotiations, the so-called CFE Treaty came into force in July 1992. The 30 contracting states agreed, among other things, to limit the categories of weapons: attack helicopters, artillery weapons, combat aircraft, battle tanks and armored combat vehicles on European soil. Through this and through increased transparency and cooperation, mutual trust is to be strengthened and the possibility of a surprise attack reduced.

• US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement [1990]

In the US-Soviet Chemical Weapons Agreement signed on June 1, 1990, both states undertook to destroy existing ordnance and to stop producing chemical weapons in the future . However, both states kept 500 tons of warfare agents each as a reserve. Nevertheless, this bilateral agreement represents an important waypoint in the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction.

• START II Treaty [1993]

On June 17, 1992, negotiations on the START II treaty were concluded. George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed it on January 3, 1993. The treaty stipulated that by January 1, 2003 the number of warheads installed on carrier systems would be reduced to 3500 each and all land-based strategic nuclear weapons with multiple warheads would be banned . That would have represented a third of the 1991 nuclear inventory. It was also stipulated that a maximum of 1750 multiple warheads may be mounted on ICBMs installed on submarines with nuclear carrier systems. Due to the SORT agreement of 2002, which was agreed between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the treaty never came into force.

• Chemical Weapons Convention [1993]
  

  Mustard gas shells of the US Army

The Chemical Weapons Convention was signed in January 1993 and came into force in 1997. The ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of supplies meant the abolition of an entire category of weapons. In contrast to the NPT, all signatory states are treated equally and there is no division into owner and non-owner.

• Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (also: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty ; CTBT) [1996]

This treaty is a treaty drawn up by the Geneva Disarmament Conference of the United Nations and adopted in September 1996 to ban all nuclear tests. This treaty can only come into force once it has been ratified by all those countries which, according to the IAEA, have nuclear weapons technologies or use nuclear power plants. As of 2002, only Great Britain, France and Russia of the nuclear powers had ratified the treaty.

• Ottawa Convention [1997]

M18 Claymore , an example of an anti-personnel mine that was banned by the Ottawa Convention

The 1997 Ottawa Convention is special because it regulates the first category of conventional weapons. In 1996, 50 states met in Ottawa with the aim of pursuing a long-term plan against landmines . Anti-personnel mines should be banned and the storage, production and purchase of this category of weapons should be prevented. On December 3, 1997, the Ottawa Convention was signed. This has been in force since March 1, 1999. The United States , the People's Republic of China and Russia are not signatories to and oppose this treaty . This means that the contract is not signed by all manufacturing states, users and exporters. Nevertheless, he is considered successful.

• Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement [2000/2010]

The US and Russia agreed to convert 34 tons of surplus weapons- grade plutonium each into MOX fuel .

• SORT Treaty (also: Moscow Treaty; Bush-Putin Agreement) [2002]

The SORT ( Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ) refers to a treaty signed by George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in May 2002 , which prescribes reducing the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. Only warheads that are ready for use should be disarmed. The contract did not provide for any verification measures.

• START III contract (also: New Start ) [2010/2011]

In April 2010, US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, which is valid until 2020. New START plans to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in both countries from 2,200 to 1,550 and to reduce the number of delivery systems to 800. After the START I treaty and its verification regime expired in December 2009, New START - unlike the SORT treaty - is the first verifiable arms control treaty between the USA and Russia since 1994.

Arms control in the field of conventional weapons

Due to the history of the East-West conflict, arms control is often equated with the control of weapons of mass destruction - primarily nuclear weapons  . Arms control, however, continues to this day in the area of ​​“traditional weapons of war”, which do not fall under the heading of weapons of mass destruction, for example battle tanks and combat aircraft , small arms and light weapons , but also anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions .

Another concern of conventional arms control is the conventional arms export policy.

Conventional arms control from the Cold War to the present day

Especially in the hot phase of the Cold War, with its strong focus on limiting nuclear weapons , the control and limitation of conventional weapons was not a topic of discussion among the superpowers . The issue did not move until Mikhail Gorbachev took office in the mid-1980s. In order to enable national reforms to be implemented, Gorbachev tried to slow down the arms competition between the USSR and the United States and therefore adopted the Western approach of conceivable control of conventional armaments. Important elements that the Western understanding of arms control included were above all confidence-building measures and the principles of transparency and parity. Towards the end of the East-West conflict, the negotiations led to a series of agreements on conventional arms control, particularly on the basis of confidence-building measures: For example, the Stockholm Agreement within the framework of the CSCE process , the CFE Treaty , the Vienna Document and the Open -Skies contract .

The break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union led to a stagnation in efforts to advance conventional arms control. Since the end of the East-West conflict, the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has also led to accelerated arms dynamics in the field of conventional weapons with increasing military spending. Especially for the USA, the pioneering nation in the field of RMA, the need to restrict conventional armaments to a greater extent has been lost with the elimination of the main arms counterpart. In Europe, too, there is no security framework that regulates the future goals and tasks of conventional arms control.

The changes within the international system after the end of the Warsaw Pact and the expansion of NATO make a revision of concluded treaties and agreements urgently necessary. Despite all approvals for such an adjustment, the international community has not yet been able to reach an agreement on this issue. A particularly good example of this is the attempt to modify what is probably the most important document of conventional arms control, the CFE Treaty . The agreement to adapt the CFE Treaty (AKSE), signed in November 1999 at a summit meeting of the CFE member states in Istanbul, was intended to provide an answer to the changed security situation in Europe. However, the AKSE process is currently stalling and the contract is suspended until further notice.

Control of conventional arms exports

At the time of the East-West confrontation, arms exports were mainly used by the conflict partners to win over states in the international power struggle and then to support them. This led to expected and unexpected consequences. In the Second Gulf War , for example, the western allies faced a technologically modern Iraq with the liberation of Kuwait , which had powerful weapons systems due to former Soviet arms exports. In the attack on Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , coalition forces were faced with Afghan fighters armed with Stinger missiles that the US itself had delivered to the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s . The destabilizing effect of the uncontrolled export of conventional weapons and weapon systems can be demonstrated to this day in many Third World countries that are armed with the weapons surpluses from the Cold War era .

According to the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , the largest exporters of conventional weapons are still the USA and Russia even after the end of the East-West conflict.

Major exporters of heavy conventional weapons 2009–2013

According to current figures (as of 2013), Russia accounts for 32% of total global trade, the USA for 24%. China follows in third place with a share of 7%. Germany is in 5th place with a share of 4%. In the case of heavy conventional weapons, Germany ranks third worldwide with its exports to the USA and Russia.

German arms and ammunition exports in 2007

Individual parts of the export list items from the armaments export report 2013

There are currently three main export control regimes in place to regulate conventional arms exports:

• UN Register of Conventional Arms ( UN Register of Conventional Arms 1991)
  • First comprehensive measure for the conventional regulation of arms exports at the level of the UN (see the role of the UN in the context of arms control )
  • Annual listing of all imports and exports in the field of conventional weapons by the members of the United Nations and made available within the register for all members to see
  • 1992–2001 Participation of 99 countries, from 2003 115 countries ( China left in 1998)
• Waasenaar Agreement (1996)
  • Improvement of the insight into the export movements of the 41 member states
  • Preventing the accumulation of certain weapon systems and dual-use goods in individual regions
• EU Code of Conduct CoC 1998
  • Uniform code of conduct of the EU members for the regulation of arms exports taking into account international embargoes, the situation of human rights in the destination country of the exports and the regional situation of the export destination
  • Transparency as the primary objective of the code, regular adjustment
  • Since 2003 expansion through a monitoring mechanism to prevent circumvention of arms embargoes imposed by the UN, the EU or the OSCE
  • Since 2008 provision of funds for advising third countries so that they can implement legal regulations on arms export control that comply with the EU Code of Conduct
  • Implementation through national foreign trade laws , in Germany the War Weapons Control Act

The regimes that regulate the export of conventional armaments have had positive effects in the past. Above all at the UN level, however, they are dependent on the “goodwill” and honesty of the respective participating states, for example a conscientious listing of the annual import and export movements. There is still no binding international treaty forcing the member states of the United Nations to view their trade in conventional armaments and to adhere to certain conventions in the handling of arms exports.

However, in response to efforts by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Control Arms organization that emerged from Oxfam , Amnesty International and IANSA, and with the support of numerous governments, a resolution (A / Res / 61/89) was passed in the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 2006. that a group of experts has commissioned to draw up a possible international agreement on the trade in conventional weapons ( Arms Trade Treaty ). The aim of this trade agreement is to harmonize export controls on an international level. At a treaty conference planned for 2012, a binding international agreement to restrict the global arms trade is then to be negotiated. This was also made possible by a change of course in the United States, which is now more actively involved and willing to compromise in international dialogue.

Conventional arms control for small arms, land mines and cluster munitions

Small arms such as the famous Awtomat Kalaschnikowa, obrasza 47 ( Kalaschnikow ) and their numerous copies are also referred to as “the real weapons of mass destruction”. 500,000 people are killed every year by small arms.

For small arms and light weapons ( Small Arms and Light Weapons SALW) is smaller weapons and weapons systems that are manufactured for use in war or agents may be modified for military use. In the European Union operated small arms are categorized by a person of prohibited firearms category A reportable up or other weapons of categories C and D . The arms trade in the EU is regulated accordingly.

Especially in the period shortly after the fall of the Warsaw Pact, small arms and light weapons were offered for sale almost uncontrollably on the world market and, like land mines, were used in third world countries. There they are still used in interstate and intra-state conflicts and represent an enormous risk potential, especially for the civilian population. Half a million people are killed every year by small arms.

With a view to the illicit trade in light weapons and small arms, the OZSE states committed themselves on November 24, 2000 to the implementation of domestic control measures for small arms, including with regard to their manufacture, appropriate labeling and precise and complete registration (both of which are possibilities to facilitate the tracing of small arms), efficient mechanisms for export control, border surveillance and customs clearance as well as through increased cooperation and more intensive information exchange between executive and customs authorities at international, regional and national level.

The UN is also active in the field of conventional arms control for small arms. For example, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali campaigned for the control of small arms as part of his Agenda for Peace . In the same year, UN resolution 50 / 70B was passed. It required the Secretary General to prepare a report on small arms and light weapons (SALW) for the 1st Small Arms Conference in 2001. This was followed by the so-called United Nations Small Arms Action Program . Its aim is to secure and manage public stocks of small arms and light weapons and to regulate the handling of conventional ammunition surplus. Uniform regulations on marking and a uniform UN register for conventional weapons (see below) are intended to facilitate the tracking of especially illegal arms deliveries and to prevent the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons.

The 20 largest export and import countries for small arms and light weapons ( SALW ) in the period 2000–2006

According to the Small Arms Survey of 2009, only 68% of global exports of war weapons are authorized, while hunting and sporting weapons, as well as pistols and revolvers, are exported to over 97% authorized. The exports of the EU states are even carried out up to 100% with authorization. Despite various efforts to control arms and exports, the undocumented trade in small arms in the same year is estimated by the Small Arms Survey at 100 million US dollars. Most deliveries to conflict areas begin legally and in accordance with the rules - but often only on paper. “Guns reach the illegal trade in a number of ways. Mostly they have the papers for a legitimate buyer, but never reach him. ”In this regard, the Small Arms Survey from the year concludes that the fundamental parts of export control systems exist for practically all major small arms exporters worldwide, enforcement and effectiveness of these regulations however vary.

Because of the dual-use character of small arms, hunting, shooting and gun collectors associations as well as the manufacturers of hunting, sporting and handguns criticize the control efforts. They are represented internationally by the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA), which as an NGO participates in all UN small arms conferences with the right to speak. According to the WFSA, hunting and sporting arms exports are well documented and are not used to violate human rights in crisis areas. Therefore, these civilian weapons should not be included in programs to prevent small arms and light arms proliferation.

In principle, arms control faces an enormous challenge in the area of ​​arms and export control for small arms - if only because, as critics object, control of weapons and ammunition does not eliminate the actual causes of the conflict and thus does not reduce the great demand for small arms (see also in The following The role of the United Nations in arms control and criticism of arms control ).

In the recent past, however, arms control was able to ban anti-personnel mines in the conventional area with the Ottawa Convention .

In 2010, the Convention on the Prohibition of Cluster Bombs also came into force.

Arms control in the field of chemical weapons

The first arms control treaty over chemical weapons was signed between France and the Holy Roman Empire in the Strasbourg Peace Treaty of 1675, which contained a ban on “poisonous bullets”. During the American Civil War, the War Ordinance of 1863 stated: “Whoever uses poisons is putting himself outside the law and any war practice.” The Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Brussels Land War Declaration of 1874 also prohibited the use of specific chemical weapons. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 also banned chemical weapons. Article 23 of the IV Hague Convention stated: “Apart from the prohibitions established by special treaties, the following are specifically prohibited: a) the use of poison or poisoned weapons; b) the use of weapons, projectiles or substances that are capable of causing unnecessary suffering ... "

In the absence of armaments dynamics after the First World War , no further controls in the field of chemical weapons were initially necessary. The Geneva Additional Protocol of 1925 again prohibited the use of chemical weapons, but not their development. It was only after the use of chemical weapons in the First Gulf War that an extensive convention was passed with the consensus of almost all states. With the ratification of this chemical weapons convention in 1997, an organization for the control and destruction of all chemical weapons, the "Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons" (OPCW) was founded . The aim of the organization is to end the development, production, storage and use of chemical weapons and to destroy the worldwide supply of chemical weapons. A current example is the destruction of the chemical weapons used by the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war, which remains problematic with regard to the control of production. The destruction of these weapons was decided by the OPCW and the UN and scientifically and financially supported by Germany.

Space arms control

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The military use of space since the 1950s, which was initially limited to the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the USA, also triggered a debate on arms control. The control of space has a preventive character well into the 21st century. Space arms control is characterized by three phases: the arms race between the two blocs in the East-West conflict, a time of relaxation and the renewed, active approach to the problem from 2001.

Space weapons are broadly defined as satellites that are capable of carrying weapons and other armed missiles that can linger in space. It does not matter whether your attack is aimed at a target on earth or in space itself. This also includes rockets that can be launched from the earth and have the ability to destroy a satellite. ICBMs are generally not referred to as space weapons, even though they do travel through space. Other systems, such as satellites, which serve military purposes, are not included in the definition.

In the period of the International Geophysical Year 1957/58, plans were started by the USA and Russia with the aim of launching satellites into space. At the same time, the US suggested that arms control should take place in space. This intention came about because the Soviet Union had already achieved fundamental superiority in space in 1957 by successfully launching a satellite into orbit and testing an ICBM. On the part of the USA through US President Eisenhower , the attempt was made to establish a general ban on the testing of military-equipped missiles. The Soviet Union only agreed to this with reservations. They saw medium-range missiles and the stationing of military equipment in foreign bases could pose a threat to them. Therefore the closure of foreign locations was requested. From the American side, however, this was refused in order not to have to restrict their "base system" in the world. Soon afterwards, America's will to ban ICBMs fell as they had gained a lead in space and technology. After the UN became increasingly involved in the discussion, it emerged that complete disarmament became an issue, which should also affect space and pursue its peaceful use. A ban on the stationing of weapons of mass destruction came into being in the following years, which culminated in the 1967 "Space Treaty". As a result, restrictions on the military use of space were only partially achieved. There were still gaps that allowed possibilities (e.g. crossing, detonations). Under international law, this treaty is the most important basis that deals with the problem of the militarization of space. The possibility of testing nuclear weapons in space was forbidden by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the USA by mutual agreement as early as 1963 (" nuclear test ban treaty ").

In 1967 a ban was obtained, which included tests, the development and also the deployment of space-based missile defense systems and their components. This was recorded in the "Anti Ballistic Missiles Treaty" ( ABM Treaty ). The Soviet Union dared to take another step and submitted a draft treaty to the UN, which was supposed to prevent any weapons from being stationed in space. With the start of the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), the American side showed no interest in such a ban, because the United States wanted to use SDI to develop weapons that could prevent an attack on their territory. This project failed because it would have exceeded the technological and financial framework. The situation became increasingly relaxed after the end of the confrontation between West and East. It was not until US President Bush left the ABM treaty that the occasion was given to deal again with space armament. It was argued, especially from the American side, that an arming of space and the crossing of it by military means would only take place to defend against "rogue states". Twelve states (Russia, USA, France, Japan, China, Great Britain, India, Israel, Ukraine, Iran, North Korea and South Korea) are currently given the opportunity to launch a rocket into space. China demonstrated its ability to destroy satellites in 2007 and the US in 2008. Ever since actors have been able to prove that they are able to damage existing systems in space, it has been hoped that new arms control negotiations will spark off. Russia and China are currently endeavoring to achieve a complete disarmament of space and also to stipulate by contract that space objects must be protected from violence by other states. In contrast to his predecessor, US President Barack Obama declared that he was ready to hold talks about rules of conduct in space and possibly to define them in a contract. To this end, the EU proposed a political code of conduct that relates to the peaceful use of space and places central importance on transparency and trust, which Russia and China as well as countries close to them reject.

Today there are around 1100 active systems in space, plus around 2000 defective systems that are still in space. Military satellites are counted 170. These are help with early warning, education. You control conventional armed forces and their weapon systems. Due to the enormous importance that satellites represent in today's communication, information management and navigation, they have gained in importance as a military target. That is why the discussion about the use of space and its protection continues to be a central topic.
In April 2018, Donald Trump announced that he wanted to build a " space army " for the USA.

The role of the United Nations in arms control

Arms control and disarmament ( Arms Control and Disarmament ) are among the main tasks of the established in 1945, United Nations , which, according to Art. 1 para. 1 UN Charter for World Peace and Security. The General Assembly of the United Nations realized very early on that the question of "complete disarmament is the most important question that the world is facing today."

View of the headquarters of the United Nations in New York

The General Assembly has several working committees, the first of which deals exclusively with the field of disarmament and international security. In addition to this first committee, the General Assembly established the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in 1952. This organization plays a key role in the UN's decision-making process on the issue of disarmament, as it provides recommendations and guidelines. However, resolutions of the General Assembly are lacking in enforcement because they are not binding on the member states. However, they often exert both political and moral pressure. The Security Council was paralyzed in the areas of disarmament and arms control mainly due to the blockade by the veto powers USA and USSR during the East-West conflict. Overall, the picture is therefore mixed with regard to the role of the United Nations in the areas of arms control and disarmament.

Nevertheless, after 1945 the United Nations served as an important international forum for the initiation of arms control agreements. For example, the Geneva-based UN Conference on Disarmament ( UNCD ) is formally not part of the UN, but is closely integrated into the UN system. It reports to the General Assembly and is entrusted with tasks by it. The situation is similar in the case of the IAEA , which monitors compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. The UN was also the linchpin for negotiating arms control treaties such as the Biological or Chemical Weapons Conventions . As a first step towards a nuclear weapons convention , negotiations on a nuclear weapons ban treaty began in March 2017, following a resolution by the UN General Assembly .

The UN is also active in the field of conventional weapons. For example, the result of the resolution on the transparency of armaments from 1991 is the UN register for conventional arms mentioned in the above section Control of conventional arms exports - a file with the aim of recording the scope and trade of so-called large-scale combat systems (armored combat vehicles, battle tanks , large-caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, warships and missiles including their launch and launch systems). In the area of ​​small arms, the UN operates what is known as the Small Arms Program Action Program , see above the section on Conventional Arms Control for Small Arms, Landmines and Cluster Munitions .

Criticism of arms control

Critics typically use two main arguments against arms control. On the one hand, they accuse arms controllers of interchanging the cause and effect of conflicts. According to the critics, people acquire weapons because there is conflict between them, not the other way around. However, the control and reduction of arsenals cannot permanently resolve conflicts and is therefore a naive and ultimately idle undertaking. On the other hand, the critics of arms control are convinced that verification does not work in practice and that agreements and treaties can always be broken.

Arms control advocates usually counter this criticism with two counter-arguments. They regard the first accusation of the critics as an allegation and also point out that even if the control and reduction of arsenals does not resolve conflicts sustainably, the associated effects - war prevention, damage limitation and cost reduction - are nevertheless valuable and useful in themselves. With regard to the second allegation, the inadequate verification and the ever lurking risk of breach of contract, proponents of arms control refer to the history of arms control . It is true that there cannot be an absolutely secure verification system in practice, but the sheer number of contracts and agreements that have been concluded and complied with in history shows that arms control is still a natural practice in international relations and that one hundred percent verification obviously works Arms control is not even necessary.

The influence of the critics in political practice can be illustrated using the example of US arms control in the area of nuclear weapons . The Bush administration, which was skeptical of any arms control, agreed the SORT treaty with Russia , but consequently completely renounced the verification agreements that were considered old-fashioned and useless. Arms control supporters vilified the treaty, which was unanimously ratified by the US Senate in 2003, as worthless due to the lack of a verification regime. With the move to the Obama administration and the negotiation of the NewSTART treaty , which was again equipped with extensive verification measures , the arms control proponents saw US policy back on the right track. Despite the investment of immense political capital by President Obama, the critics in the US Senate did not give the NewSTART treaty a benevolent reception, so that the two-thirds majority required for ratification at the end of 2010 with 71:26 votes only came about.

Arms control critics remain influential in the United States under President Obama. With Global Zero, the latter has made a clear commitment to complete nuclear disarmament worldwide, but the next step in this direction after NewStart is the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaty , which failed in the Senate in 1999 , due to the criticism of arms control in the US Senate until further notice with a question mark.

Challenges for Arms Control in the 21st Century

Armed drones like the MQ-9 Reaper : soon the subject of conventional arms control?

Arms control faces three trends in the 21st century:

• On the one hand, since the end of the East-West confrontation, conflicts have often no longer taken place between states, but with the participation of non-state actors. In this new situation, there is often simply no negotiating partner for the arms control procedures and mechanisms that stem from traditional international diplomacy.

The emblem of the US Cyber ​​Command responsible for cyberwar

• Secondly, starts to date as part of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs , a military dynamics in the field of unmanned weapons systems to develop. From an arms control perspective, this development is questionable because it is precisely the actors responsible for successful arms control at international level in the past - western democracies - that are fueling arms dynamics in this area.
• Thirdly, the arms dynamics between states and between states and non-state actors are increasingly beginning to expand into cyberspace . This process poses particular challenges for arms control efforts, since, among other things, attributing an effect to its originator in cyberspace can be difficult or even impossible. Evidence and punishment of breaches of contract through verification and compliance measures are made extremely difficult or impracticable. So far, the discussion in the range limit cyberwar therefore forced to appeals to States to use cyber weapons only for defense or certain areas of cyberspace - exempt from attacks - such as global financial transaction flows.

List of international arms control treaties

Prohibition or restriction of research, development and proliferation

agreement	signed (year)	Ratified (year)	content
Versailles Peace Treaty	1919	1919	Contract for the demobilization and degradation of the German armed forces.
Washington Naval Agreement	1922	1922	Limiting naval armaments between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan.
London Agreement	1930	1930	Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom limited the number and caliber of guns, tonnage, and equipment on their warships.
German-British fleet agreement	1935	1936 DR: 1937	The German Reich was allowed to expand the strength of the fleet to 35% of the strength of the British fleet.
Baruch plan	1946	never	The Baruch Plan provided for the US nuclear potential to be placed under the control of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. A subsequent counter-proposal by the Soviet Union was rejected by the USA.
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) also: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty also: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)	1968	1970	The Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed in July 1968, banned nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. These in turn undertake not to acquire or manufacture any nuclear weapons.
Biological Weapons Convention also: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)	1971	1972	The treaty prohibits the development, manufacture, storage or use of biological warfare agents and weapons systems for their transfer. The contract does not contain a ban on the use of biological weapons.
SALT - I	1972	1972	The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that began in 1969 led to the signing of the so-called SALT I Treaty in Moscow in May 1972. In the long term, the US-Soviet relationship was to be stabilized by legally binding limits on the number and technical improvement of the respective strategic potential.
ABM contract	1972	1972	As a result of the so-called SALT negotiations, the heads of state of the United States and the Soviet Union signed the ABM ( Anti-Ballistic Missiles ) Treaty in 1972 , which provided for strict limits on the ballistic missile defense weapons already stationed on both sides. In 2002 the United States terminated the ABM Treaty.
Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War (AVA)	1973	1973	In this international treaty signed in June 1973, the USSR and the United States of America undertook a. a. to prevent situations that could result in a military confrontation (Article I) and to enter into immediate consultations in the event of a risk of nuclear conflict (Article IV).
Negotiations on troop reduction in Europe also: Mutual Balance Force Reductions (MBFR)	Canceled in 1989	never	The MBFR ( Mutual Balance Force Reductions ) talks began in Vienna in October 1973 and were intended to reduce the number of conventional land and air forces and armaments in Central Europe.
SALT - II	1979	1979	The SALT II treaty signed by the USA and the Soviet Union provided for a limitation of the number of strategic systems to 2,400 (on both sides). In addition, the maximum limit of 1,320 bombers equipped with cruise missiles and sea- and land-based missiles equipped with multiple warheads could not be exceeded.
NATO double decision	Negotiations broken off in 1983	Stationed from 1983	The December resolution of NATO from 1979 offered the Warsaw Pact on the one hand an invitation to enter into arms control negotiations over long-range INF missiles and other INF systems and on the other hand contained a plan, in the event of an unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations, the deployment of 572 American long-range missiles Launch INF missiles in Western Europe. The Soviet Union broke off the arms control negotiations; in 1983 the missiles were deployed.
Convention on the prohibition of particularly inhumane weapons also: Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCCW)	1980	depending on the protocol	This convention allowed the creation of various protocols which provided for the regulation of certain weapon standards, such as blinding weapons, incendiary weapons or mines. These are always completed at the annual conferences.
START - I	1991	1994	The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty was signed between the USA and Russia. By means of on-site inspections, it was possible to directly check the established regulations, such as a reduction to 1,600 carrier systems with a maximum of 6,000 eligible nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union broke off negotiations in the autumn of 1983. These negotiations were resumed in 1994 and the START I treaty came into force.
Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons also: CWC	1992	1997	This convention prohibited the use, production, storage, possession and transfer of chemical weapons. In addition, the convention limits the production of chemicals that could be misused to create chemical warfare agents. The CWC has more than just a symbolic character, which is reflected in the list of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons ( OPCW ) in 1997. This carries out tasks of verification and the destruction of chemical weapons within the framework of compliance with and enforcement of the convention.
START - II	1993	never	George W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin signed the START II treaty on January 3, 1993. The treaty provided for the number of warheads installed on launchers to be reduced to 3,500 each by January 1, 2003, and all land-based strategic nuclear weapons to ban with multiple warheads. Due to the SORT agreement of 2002, which was agreed between George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, the treaty never came into force.
SORT Treaty ( Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ) also: Moscow Treaty also: Bush-Putin Agreement	2002	2003	The SORT treaty provided for a reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed to between 1,700 and 2,200 each and came into force in 2003. The contract did not include any verification measures.
START III contract also: New Start	2010	2010/2011	In April 2010, US President Barack Obama and Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed a treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, which is valid until 2020. New Start envisages reducing the number of nuclear warheads in both countries from 2,200 to 1,550 and reducing the number of delivery systems to 800. The verification regime that comes into force with the contract replaces the verification of START I that expired in December 2009 .

Nuclear Weapon Test Limitations and Bans

agreement	signed (year)	Ratified (year)	content
Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in space and under water also: Test ban agreement also: Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) also: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) also: Partial Test Ban (PTBT)	1963	1963	With this nuclear test ban agreement, nuclear weapons tests were banned in the atmosphere, in space and under water in order to prevent global radioactivity and to make it more difficult for signatory states to acquire nuclear weapons. Originally, the treaty was signed by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
Test Threshold Treaty also: Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)	1974	1990	In July 1974, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests with an explosive force of more than 150 kilotons of TNT.
Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes also: Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)	1976	1990	With this contract, signed in May 1976, the underground nuclear explosions were now also limited to 150 kilotons for single explosions and 1.5 megatons for group explosions.
INF contract	1987	1988	For the first time in history, two complete weapon categories, namely medium-range missiles and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,000 kilometers, were completely wiped out by means of a real disarmament treaty. Systems that had already been stationed, the operational infrastructure and production base were destroyed.
Nuclear test ban treaty also: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)	1996	never	The treaty is a treaty drawn up by the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and adopted in 1996, banning nuclear tests and explosions. It also provides for on-site inspections. This treaty can only come into force once it has been ratified by all those countries which, according to the IAEA, have nuclear weapons technologies or use nuclear power plants.

Treaties for the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones and for the protection of the earth and moon

agreement	signed (year)	Ratified (year)	content
Antarctic Treaty	1959	1961	A treaty that forbade the contracting parties on the Antarctic continent from explosions of nuclear weapons and the release of radioactive waste in Antarctica and only allowed activities of a peaceful nature there. In 1991 it was extended until 2041 (environmental protection protocol).
Treaty on the principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, also: Outer Space Treaty; Outer Space Treaty	1967	1967 FRG: 1971	The 98 signatory states undertook not to release any objects that carry nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction into space (Article IV) and to use space for peaceful purposes only. The space contract was supplemented in 1979 by the so-called "moon contract", the content of which was linked to the peaceful use of space. Only 13 states have ratified it.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America also: Treaty of Tlatelolco	1967	1968	The Latin American states agreed to use nuclear material and nuclear facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes and within their own sovereign territory.
Treaty on the Prohibition of Stationing Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the seabed, the bottom of the ocean and in the associated subsurface : Seabed Treaty	1971	1972	In this treaty, the 84 signatory states a. a. to the understanding that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must not be stationed or tested on the seabed. The contract was for an indefinite period.
ENMOD convention	1976	1978	The convention prohibits the use of environmentally changing technology in wars and armed conflicts.
Treaty on the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the South Pacific also: Treaty of Rarotonga	1985	1986	With the treaty, the 12 nuclear powers (from a total of 16 regional states) undertook to refrain from carrying out any nuclear explosions against other contracting parties. Furthermore, nuclear weapons tests were banned on the premises of other signatory states.
Mongolia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone	1992	2000	The self-declaration of the landlocked state of Mongolia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992 was unique. The treaty did not come into force until eight years later, in 2000.
Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Southeast Asia also: Treaty of Bangkok	1995	1997	In December 1995, the so-called ASEAN states signed the treaty on a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia. It came into force in 1997.
Treaty on the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Africa also: Treaty of Pelindaba	1996	2009	In the Treaty on the Africa Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone, Additional Protocols I and II are decisive, as they prohibit the contracting parties from carrying out nuclear tests and the threat or use of nuclear weapons against this zone.
Declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula	2005	still pending	In September 2005, North Korea agreed to a general denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and in return received a commitment for economic aid and the construction of a light water reactor.
Treaty of Semei	2006	2009	Signed in September 2006, a treaty regulating the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone came into force in 2009.

Conventional armed forces

agreement	signed (year)	Ratified (year)	content
Treaty on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe also: CFE Treaty	1990	1992	The 30 states parties agreed to limit the categories of weapons: attack helicopters, artillery weapons, combat aircraft, battle tanks and armored combat vehicles. Fixed inspections made it possible to monitor the respective limits.

Confidence-building measures

agreement	signed (year)	Ratified (year)	content
"Hot Wire Agreement"	1963	1963	The agreement on the so-called "red telephone" was intended to minimize the risk of an unintended outbreak of a nuclear war by facilitating communication between the USA and the Soviet Union by means of a direct communication link. The agreement contained a duty to notify the contracting parties in the event of unresolved nuclear incidents and planned rocket launches which affect the other contracting party (Art. IV).
Treaty on Open Skies also: Open Skies Treaty	1992	2002	The treaty signed in March 1992 and entered into force in 2002 allowed the contracting parties - the NATO states on the one hand and the former Warsaw Pact states on the other - to fly over the other contracting states and take photos / radar recordings (since 2006 also Infrared recordings).
Vienna Document of Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures	1990	1999	The participating States undertook to a. to exchange information on the one hand on the military organization, manpower and main weapon systems and on the other hand information on their military budgets annually.

List of arms control organizations

• United Nations (UN)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
• Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
• Organization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO)
• Germany: Center for Verification Tasks of the Bundeswehr (ZVBw)
• Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
• Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI)

literature

• Heinrich Böll Foundation (Ed.): The Future of Arms Control , Heinrich Böll Foundation, Berlin 2014 in cooperation with the IFSH Hamburg, ISBN 978-3-86928-121-6 , online edition: boell.de ( PDF)
• Sauer, Frank / Schörnig, Niklas: Armaments and arms control . In: Enskat, Sebastian / Masala, Carlo (ed.): International security: An introduction . SpringerVS, Wiesbaden 2014, ISBN 978-3-658-02369-0 .
• Heinz-Jürgen Beuter: From SALT to START. A system of antagonistic arms control (=  military, armaments, security . Band 14 ). Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1982, ISBN 3-7890-0790-0 .
• Maurizio Boni, Gagliano Giuseppe: Sicurezza Internazionale e controllo degli armamenti . Edizioni New Press, Como 2003.
• Jeffrey A. Larsen, Gregory J. Rattray (Eds.): Arms Control toward the 21st Century . Lynne Rienner Press, Boulder CO et al. a. 1996, ISBN 1-55587-584-X .
• Harald Müller , Niklas Schörnig: Arms Dynamics and Arms Control. An exemplary introduction to international relations . Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2006, ISBN 3-8329-1914-7 .
• Erwin Müller, Götz Neuneck (Hrsg.): Armaments modernization and arms control. New technologies, armaments dynamics and stability (=  military, armaments, security . Band 69 ). Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1992, ISBN 3-7890-2332-9 .
• Götz Neuneck, Christian Mölling: The future of arms control (=  democracy, security, peace . Volume 173 ). Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2005, ISBN 3-8329-1254-1 .
• Michael Paul: Disarmament through arms control? American reduction concepts in SALT and START. 1969–1989 (=  Nomos-Universitätsschriften. Politics . Volume 12 ). Nomos-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1990, ISBN 3-7890-2143-1 (At the same time: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss., 1989: American reduction concepts in the salt and start negotiations. ).

Web links

• Plowshares Fund
• Arms Control Association
• International Committee for Robot Arms Control
• Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg
• Hessian Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research
• Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
• United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
• United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b c d} Müller, Schörnig: Arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 125.
2. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 18.
3. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 123-125.
4. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 123.
5. ↑ ^{a b} Müller, Schörnig: Arms Dynamics and Arms Control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 126.
6. ↑ Müller . In: Meyer: One World or Chaos? 1996, pp. 405-408
7. ↑ Meier, Schirmeister, Zeimer: Building confidence in international politics . 1991, p. 160.
8. ↑ Meier, Schirmeister, Zeimer: Building confidence in international politics . 1991, p. 62.
9. ^ Krause: Structural change in non-proliferation policy , 1998, p. 180.
10. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 145–147.
11. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 141.
12. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 151.
13. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 153–156.
14. ↑ START I Treaty, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html
15. ↑ START I Treaty Conversion and Elimination Protocol, Art. VI, archived copy ( Memento of August 7, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
16. ^ Bergsdorf / Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 41.
17. ^ "British-American Exchange of Notes Relative to American Naval Forces on the American Lakes" The Avalon Project. Lillian Goldman Law Library. avalon.law.yale.edu, accessed December 5, 2012.
18. ^ Bergsdorf / Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 42.
19. ^ ^{A b} Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 43.
20. ↑ Theo Sommer : 1999: The Last Chance . In: Die Zeit , No. 20/1999
21. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 19
22. ^ ^{A b} Bergsdorf / Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 44.
23. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 20.
24. ↑ Peace Treaty of Versailles ("Versailles Treaty") . From June 28, 1919. documentarchiv.de; Retrieved November 4, 2010.
25. ^ Ian Johnson: The Secret School of War: The Soviet-German Tank Academy at Kama . MA thesis, Ohio State University, 2012, pp. 29-31.
26. ↑ Ian Johnson: The Secret School of War: The Soviet-German Tank Academy at Kama , MA-Thesis, Ohio State University, 2012, pp. 31–32.
27. ↑ ^{a b c} Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 21.
28. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 22-23
29. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 24-28
30. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 28
31. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 47.
32. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 174.
33. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 48.
34. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 49.
35. ↑ Legault, Lindsey: Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. Frankfurt am Main 1973, p. 150.
36. ^ ^{A b} Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Tübingen 2007, p. 26.
37. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 195.
38. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 48-51
39. ↑ Legault, Lindsey: Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. Frankfurt am Main 1973, p. 151.
40. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 65.
41. ^ Lunar contract . ( Memento from March 4, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Armscontrol.de, 2002; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
42. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 62.
43. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 101.
44. ^ ^{A b} Bilateral talks and negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons: 1972–2009. ( Memento from January 23, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) atomwaffena-z.info, 2010; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
45. ^ Treaty on the prohibition of the installation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and in the seabed. European University Viadrina; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
46. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 69.
47. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 137
48. ↑ Legault, Lindsey: Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance. Frankfurt am Main 1973, p. 175.
49. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 80-81
50. ↑ Yost: The future of nuclear arms control in Europe: From SALT to START and INF. Koblenz 1984, p. 71.
51. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 71, 79.
52. ^ Bergsdorf, Dettling: Arms control - a wrong path? Munich 1984, p. 77.
53. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 82ff.
54. ^ Rohde: The START negotiations. Objectives and status of negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. Wissenschaft-und-frieden.de, 1991; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
55. ^ Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). state.gov; accessed on November 23, 2014.
56. ^ ^{A b} SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Tübingen 2007, p. 28.
57. ^ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe . ( Memento of June 10, 2007 on the Internet Archive ) OSCE.org, 2010; Retrieved November 5, 2010
58. ↑ Herbergber: Bundesgesetzblatt 1991, Part II, page 1156. archiv.jura.uni-saarland.de Accessed November 5, 2010
59. ↑ Conventional weapons: CFE Treaty . ( Memento from January 1, 2017 in the Internet Archive ) 2009; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
60. ^ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) Federal Foreign Office; accessed on December 1, 2014.
61. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 147
62. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 150
63. ↑ Nuclear Arms Ban Treaty . ( Memento of May 5, 2005 in the Internet Archive ) 2010; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
64. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, pp. 58f, 68.
65. ^ Goldblat: ARMS CONTROL - The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Trowbridge 2002, p. 236ff
66. ^ SORT contract. ( Memento from January 23, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) atomwaffena-z.info, 2010; Retrieved November 5, 2010.
67. ↑ berie: The fisherman Weltalmanach 2011. Frankfurt 2010, p. 40
68. ^ New START at a Glance . Arms Control Association, accessed January 3, 2011
69. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 199.
70. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 201.
71. ↑ US is concerned about Stinger missiles in Afghanistan . Retrieved December 24, 2010.
72. ↑ SIPRI Arms Transfers Data, 2013, SIPRI Fact Sheet, November 2014, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/toplist.php
73. ^ SIPRI Yearbook , 2014, Section 5: International arms transfers . accessed November 28, 2014
74. ↑ Armaments Export Report Germany 2013 (PDF; 886 kB) BWMI.de; accessed November 22, 2014
75. ↑ Armaments Export Report Germany 2007 ( Memento from December 20, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 1.3 MB) BWMI.de; Retrieved November 20, 2010
76. ↑ ^{a b} GA Resolution A / RES / 46/36 (1991), General and complete disarmament, Transparency in armaments un.org
77. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 210.
78. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 212.
79. ↑ wassenaar.org ( Memento from May 27, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
80. ↑ Export controls of security-relevant goods and technologies II - military goods. Council of the EU; Retrieved November 17, 2010
81. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, p. 211.
82. ↑ § 12 , § 17 1.1., § 18 1., § 18a 1., § 20 1. KrWaffKontrG
83. ↑ Müller, Schörnig: arms dynamics and arms control . Baden-Baden 2006, pp. 210-213.
84. ↑ GA Resolution, Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms, http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/61 / 89 & Lang = E
85. ↑ Website of the Control Arms Campaign, Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), http://www.controlarms.org/
86. ^ SIPRI website: Arms Trade Treaty, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/controlling/att
87. ↑ Simone Wisotzki: Small arms in the wrong hands. Arms control after the failure of the United Nations Conference on Small Arms . (PDF) In: PRIF standpoints , No. 3/2006, Frankfurt / M.
88. ↑ Small arms and light weapons (PDF) OSZE.de; accessed November 15, 2010
89. ↑ Disarmament of light weapons and small arms. Federal Foreign Office, February 23, 2010, accessed on March 29, 2011 . 
90. ↑ General Assembly Resolution 50 / 70B ( Memento of February 22, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF) un.org; Retrieved September 17, 2010
91. ↑ Small Arms Survey Report 2009: Authorized Small Arms Transfers. (PDF; 2.53 MB) p. 29
92. ↑ ^{a b} Small Arms Survey: Small arms transfers, export controls and arms tracing (PDF; 213 kB) Short, German summary
93. ↑ International arms trade . ( Memento from August 3, 2012 in the web archive archive.today ) Financial Times Deutschland , July 31, 2010; Retrieved November 8, 2010
94. ↑ Dieter Wöhrle: The new chemical weapons convention: A comprehensive contract to outlaw a means of mass destruction . In: Wissenschaft und Frieden 1, 1993; Retrieved December 5, 2014.
95. ↑ opcw.org (PDF) December 1, 2014.
96. ↑ sueddeutsche.de December 9, 2014
97. ↑ erwaertiges-amt.de December 9, 2014
98. ↑ Arms control of space weapons and other arms control agreements . ( Memento from November 28, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Federal Agency for Political Education
99. ↑ Josef Holik: The arms control. Looking back on a short era . Berlin 2008, p. 100.
100. ↑ Military use of space and possibilities of arms control in space . Office for Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB)
101. ↑ A Brief History of Space Arms Control . ( Memento from November 28, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Federal Agency for Political Education
102. ↑ Christopher Coenen, Reinhard Grünewald, Thomas Petermann: Armament in space. Technological options and political control . (PDF) Berlin 2003.
103. ↑ https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/01/politics/trump-space-force-us-military/index.html
104. ↑ GA Resolution A / RES / 14/1378 (1959), General and Complete Disarmament un-documents.net
105. ↑ Resolution L.41 , adopted on 27 October 2016th
106. ^ US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements at a Glance . Armscontrol.org; Retrieved January 3, 2011.
107. ↑ Hans M. Kristensen: Senate Approval of New START Moves Nuclear Arms Control Forward Federation of American Scientists “Strategic Security Blog”, 2010; Retrieved January 3, 2011.
108. ^ The Next Treaties . New York Times Editorial, December 31, 2010; Retrieved January 3, 2011.
109. ^ Trends in Armed Conflicts, Conflict Description . ( Memento of February 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 23, 2010; Retrieved January 3, 2011.
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113. ↑ Frank Sauer: In byte thunderstorms? Questionable concepts of war and terror in cyberspace . In: Jan Helmig, Niklas Schörnig (ed.): The transformation of the armed forces in the 21st century. Military and political dimensions . Campus Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2008, studies by the Hessian Foundation for Peace and Conflict Research (PRIF), Volume 54, pp. 103–123
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115. ^ Bruce Schneier: Cyberwar and the Future of Cyber ​​Conflict . December 6, 2010; Retrieved January 3, 2011.
116. ↑ USA / USSR: Treaty text , June 22, 1973. Accessed November 19, 2010.
117. ↑ Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) - Federal Foreign Office . Federal Foreign Office website. Retrieved December 1, 2014.
118. ↑ OSCE: Treaty text (PDF) November 16, 1999. Accessed November 19, 2010.