Munich Olympic assassination attempt

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Memorial plaque in front of the then quarters of the Israeli team in the Munich Olympic Village (2012)
Commemoration and wreath-laying in front of the Connollystrasse building. 31 in the Olympic Village on the 40th anniversary, September 5, 2012
Commemoration of the massacre , London 2012

The Munich Olympic attack on September 5, 1972 was an attack by the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September on the Israeli team at the Olympic Games . It started as a hostage-taking and ended with the murder of all 11 Israeli hostages and the deaths of five hostage-takers and one police officer.

overview

On the morning of September 5, eight armed Palestinian terrorists, who had been supported in advance by German neo-Nazis , attacked a residential area of ​​the Israeli team in the Olympic village . An Israeli athlete was killed during the attack and another died shortly afterwards from his wounds. The remaining nine crew members were taken hostage. The hostage-takers initially demanded the release of 232 Palestinians and the Japanese terrorist Kōzō Okamoto from Israeli custody, and RAF members Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof from German custody. The Israeli government under Golda Meir rejected the demand made on them. Attempts by German politicians to offer themselves as exchange hostages were rejected by the Palestinians. On the night of September 5th to 6th, the Bavarian police attempted a badly planned and executed rescue attempt at the Fürstenfeldbruck military airfield , which failed completely.

The three surviving terrorists were forced to hijack an airplane just a few weeks after their crime . As a result, the Olympics assassination was never the subject of due legal process. The Israeli government ordered retaliation "Wrath of God" by the special unit "Caesarea" of the Mossad at. In the years after 1972, it killed around twenty Palestinians who were directly or indirectly involved in the attack, as well as innocent people. After the disastrous outcome of the hostage drama, the German government set up the special anti-terrorist unit, Federal Border Guard Group 9 (GSG 9). The state police followed with special task forces (SEK).

Support in advance

The terrorists received support from German neo-Nazis in preparing for the attack and building the necessary infrastructure in Europe. Files of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) , which were released at the request of the Spiegel in June 2012, prove this presumption, which was cherished as early as 1972. According to this, the right-wing extremist Udo Albrecht brokered contacts between the PLO and neo-Nazis as early as 1970 , aimed at mutual support. The former neo-Nazi and later author Willi Pohl wrote: "We were given permission to set up a base on Fatah- controlled Jordanian territory, in return we offered support in the fight against Israel." In the run-up to the Olympic attack, Pohl met his own According to the Palestinian Abu Daoud, who was considered to be the mastermind in July 1972 in Dortmund , obtained vehicles for the organization and drove Daoud to conspiratorial meetings in Frankfurt and Cologne. The files of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution show that the Dortmund criminal police received information about the conspiratorial meetings between Pohl and Daoud as early as July 1972 and passed them on to the state criminal police offices , the Federal Criminal Police Office and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Pohl also established a connection with the passport forger Wolfgang Abramowski, who, like himself, is said to have had close contacts with the National Socialist Combat Group Greater Germany . In Cairo , the Fatah representative Abu Ijad Pohl gave a message for a man in Paris whom he later claims to have recognized as the leader of the Munich attacker Issa .

Pohl claims not to have known anything about the aim of the attacks. Nevertheless, he continued to work with the PLO organization on follow-up activities. At the end of October 1972, he and Abramowski were arrested. They found weapons that were identical to those used in the hostage-taking, as well as a threatening letter from Black September to the judge investigating the three surviving assassins. In the arrest warrant, Pohl was accused of having planned, together with Abu Daoud, the violent liberation of Udo Albrecht, who was then imprisoned. Despite these connections, "Pohl was sentenced to two years and two months' imprisonment in 1974 only for illegally possessing weapons."

Course of the assassination

Hostage-taking on the morning of September 5th

At 4:10 a.m. on the morning of September 5, 1972, eight members of the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September climbed over the fence at Gate 25A and entered the Olympic Village . Post fitters watched them, but thought they were athletes returning home.

At around 04:35 am they broke into the apartment of the Israeli Olympic team at Connollystrasse 31 (coordinates: 48 ° 10 ′ 47.28 ″  N , 11 ° 32 ′ 55.32 ″  E ). The hostage-takers armed with Kalashnikovs had no trouble overpowering the Israeli athletes, as they had not locked the doors. In general, the security conditions during the Olympic Games were deliberately kept relaxed in order to demonstrate the positive change that had taken place in Germany since the 1936 Olympic Games with "cheerful games" . Around 4,000 police officers from several federal states, unarmed and uniformly dressed in fashionable street suits, kept order.

The terrorists took eleven hostages: David Mark Berger (weightlifter), Zeev Friedman (weightlifter), Yossef Gutfreund (wrestler referee), Eliezer Halfin (wrestler), Josef Romano (weightlifter), André Spitzer (fencing trainer), Amitzur Schapira ( Athletics trainer), Kehat Shorr (shooting trainer), Mark Slavin (wrestler), Yakov Springer (weightlifting referee) and Mosche Weinberg (wrestling trainer).

Some Israeli athletes escaped from the ground floor windows , including the Chef de Mission , Shmuel Lalkin. Weinberg and Romano were killed right at the start of the action. Weinberg was shot through the door at 4:52 am while trying to escape. Romano succumbed to his injuries about two hours after he was shot because no doctor was allowed to see him.

The hostage-takers are said to have mistreated some of their hostages. This was made known by the widows of Josef Romano and André Spitzer in December 2015. They had only been given full access to the files by the German authorities after an anonymous tip in 1992. The then Federal Minister of the Interior, Hans-Dietrich Genscher , immediately contradicted this account of what had happened; even the autopsy reports give no evidence of this.

First ultimatum

At 5:21 am, the police, the organizing committee and the ambulance service were alerted. Ambulances arrived, and the blood-streaked vineyard that had been dropped by the terrorists in front of the house, and for which every rescue was too late, was salvaged. The assassins did not let anyone inside the second injured man, Romano. At 6:40 a.m., the mayor of the Olympic Village, Walther Tröger , and NOK President Willi Daume went to house number 31 to negotiate with the intruders. From then on, it was considered certain that they were holding Israeli athletes hostage. The area was cordoned off by the police.

The terrorists demanded the release and safe conduct of 232 Palestinians and the Japanese terrorist Kōzō Okamoto, who were serving their imprisonment in Israeli prisons, as well as the release of the German terrorists Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof by 9 a.m. The Israeli ambassador to Germany Eliashiv Ben-Horin said that the government of Golda Meir will hardly deviate from its principle of not releasing prisoners. According to Meir, Israel refused to blackmail so as not to risk the lives of its citizens abroad forever.

At 8:50 a.m., the terrorists issued an ultimatum. They demanded the release of 200 Palestinians captured in Israel, safe conduct for themselves and the hostages in an Arab capital with an airplane made available for this purpose. They threatened to shoot the hostages immediately if the police tried to storm the house. The ultimatum was limited to 12 noon.

At 9:30 a.m. there was a crowd in the press center, but the bizarre press conference was about the successes of swimming star Mark Spitz . Spitz, himself of Jewish origin, demanded escort and left Munich on the same day. At 10 a.m. the crisis team met with Federal Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk , Munich Police President Manfred Schreiber , State Secretary Erich Kiesl , NOK President Willi Daume and IOC President Avery Brundage ; the cabinets met in Tel Aviv and Bonn.

A quarter of an hour before the ultimatum expired , an extension of three hours, i.e. until 3 p.m., was negotiated with the terrorists. The mayor of the Olympic village Walther Tröger, plus Willi Daume, Manfred Schreiber, the security chief of the XX. Olympic Games, the Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk and also the Federal Interior Minister and Vice President of the NOK Hans-Dietrich Genscher offered the terrorists as substitute hostages in vain.

Negotiations and ultimatums in the afternoon

At 3:25 p.m. the ultimatum was postponed to 5 p.m. At 3:38 p.m. the Olympic Games were interrupted. The ongoing competitions could be brought to an end. The terrorists repeatedly changed their clothes and appeared on the balcony. Their number was estimated at five. At 5 p.m., the terrorists threatened hostage and suicide if their demands were not met. The house had meanwhile been surrounded by snipers .

When this ultimatum expired, the crisis team negotiated again with the German-speaking leader of the terrorists, who called himself "Issa", hid his face under a mask and wore a white hat. With the help of an envoy from the Arab League and the head of mission of the Egyptian delegation, the ultimatum was extended by a further five hours.

In the meantime, the terrorists had learned from radio and television that the police had planned a rescue operation. The terrorists had neglected to turn off the electricity and remove the press from the Olympic village. The liberation action therefore had to be suspended.

Apparent response to the demands in the evening

Thereafter, the terrorists demanded safe conduct with the hostages in a plane to Cairo by 9 p.m. and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the snipers. The German negotiating partners pretended to agree. Minister Genscher was allowed to the first floor of the building, where the nine hostages were tied up in a room. They agreed to fly to the Egyptian capital together with the terrorists. An agreement had been reached at 8:30 p.m. The terrorists were to be flown out by helicopter with their nine hostages ; the snipers were withdrawn.

Beginning of the rescue attempt at night

At 10:06 p.m., the assassins and the tied hostages boarded a waiting bus in the basement of Building 31. The vehicle then drove through the basement and stopped shortly after the exit near two waiting helicopters belonging to the Federal Border Police . Undisturbed by the police, the terrorists brought their hostages into the helicopters and took off at 10:18 p.m. for the nearby Fürstenfeldbruck air base . A Boeing 727 was waiting there with the engines running but almost empty tanks because the Bavarian police authorities were planning to attack the terrorists at the airport.

At 10:29 p.m. the helicopters landed under floodlights in Fürstenfeldbruck. Up to this point, only five instead of the actual eight hostage-takers were assumed, which is why there were only five police officers named as snipers on the roof of the airport building and the tarmac . However, these officers were only patrol officers and not trained as precision shooters, and they were only barely equipped with selected Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifles . The Munich police had indeed even then sniper rifles of the type Steyr SSG 69 formed in their portfolios, but it had no snipers.

There was also a police volunteer unit disguised as a crew on the plane. This command also consisted only of normal patrolmen who were inadequately armed with their standard service pistols. Since these officers saw no way of overpowering the heavily armed hostage-takers, they ended their mission on their own initiative and left the aircraft shortly before the helicopter touched down.

The provision of armored special vehicles had been completely neglected. These were only called in as reinforcements during the two-hour shooting that followed. However, due to the heavy traffic and the many onlookers, they arrived an hour late when the fighting was almost over.

Graves of five of the victims in the Kiryat Shaul cemetery in Tel Aviv / Israel

Two of the terrorists, who called themselves "Issa" and "Tony", briefly inspected the aircraft and found that there were no crew on board. At 10:35 p.m. the headlights on the control tower were switched off and the entire airport was now in the dark. At 10:38 p.m., as the two terrorists hurried back to the helicopters, Interior Minister Bruno Merk gave the police chief of operations the order to open fire. The snipers then opened fire. At that moment the police switched on large headlights and illuminated the runway with them. The terrorists, for their part, shot at the headlights. The snipers had no radio contact with each other and shot without targeting. In addition, they had no night vision devices . Only one terrorist was hit with the first volley , namely the deputy commanding officer who had previously checked the aircraft with "Issa". "Issa" left the injured man and got back to the other terrorists. Three of them began to return fire, hidden behind the helicopters and out of sight of the snipers.

At 10:39 p.m., the rifles of the police switched their rifles to continuous fire . Their fire was still answered by bursts of fire from the terrorists' assault rifles. The fight dragged on until the police armored vehicles requested from Munich arrived.

The two helicopters were supposed to land with the doors to the control tower so that all five police gunners had a clear field of fire. For unknown reasons, however, both helicopters landed with the nose to the control tower, which put the fifth sniper in the field of fire of shooters one, two and three. He had therefore not yet intervened in the fight. In addition, he was lying completely uncovered without a helmet and protective vest behind an ankle-high wall on the tarmac, the helicopters and the terrorists between himself and his colleagues. In order not to be mistakenly shot at by these, he did not fire a shot during the action. Only when a fleeing terrorist accidentally ran directly towards him did he kill him with a shot in the head. In doing so, however, he attracted the attention of the newly arrived police reinforcements, who did not know the positions of their own officers. Believed to be one of the kidnappers, he and a helicopter pilot seeking protection next to him were shot at and seriously injured.

At 11 p.m., Ludwig Pollack, a press employee of the NOK, appeared at the main entrance of the military airfield in Fürstenfeldbruck, which was besieged by thousands of onlookers. He announced to the press that the hostages had been released and four of the terrorists had been killed. When asked about his legitimacy, Pollack said, untruthfully, that he was the representative of Olympic press chief Hans Klein . As a source of information, he later named a senior police officer whose name he could not remember. At 11:31 p.m., the Reuters news agency broadcast a breaking global news story that all Israeli hostages had been freed. At 11:35 p.m., the television reported that all of the hostages had escaped and that most of the terrorists were dead. At 11:50 p.m. Police President Schreiber reported to the press center: “We are still on duty. The airfield has not yet been cleared. The whole area is hermetically sealed. "

Failure of the liberation in the early morning of September 6th

On September 6, 1972 at 12:05 am, Conrad Ahlers , the spokesman for the federal government, spoke of a “happy and well-run campaign”.

At that time there was still shooting at the airfield. Armored police vehicles did not arrive at Fürstenfeldbruck airfield until midnight to support the security forces on site. The sight of the armored vehicles made one of the terrorists aware of the hopelessness of the kidnapping. He opened fire on the defenseless hostages in the first helicopter at 12:10 a.m., giving two other terrorists the opportunity to emerge from cover. He then jumped out of the helicopter and threw a hand grenade into the machine, the explosion of which killed the hostages in the helicopter. All three terrorists died from sniper shots. The other five hostages in the second helicopter were also killed during the fight. The eyewitness and then Mossad boss Tzwi Zamir describes it differently in a report: A phosphorus shell detonated under the helicopter, which burned all occupants.

The action ended in a fiasco : all of the hostages died, and the Munich police chief Anton Fliegerbauer , who was not involved in the exchange of fire and who had observed what was happening from a window on the ground floor of the control tower, was fatally hit in the head by a stray bullet at 12:10 a.m. The pilot, captain in the BGS Gunnar Ebel, who, as the commanding officer, flew one of the two Bell UH-1 D helicopters , had to be hospitalized with serious gunshot wounds. It was only at 1:32 a.m. that the shooting and the search for fleeing terrorists stopped. Three terrorists had been overpowered, five were found dead, and all nine hostages were also dead. At 02:40 am, press spokesman Klein announced the terrible results of the unsuccessful liberation of Fürstenfeldbruck in the press center.

consequences

Interruption of the games

Federal President Heinemann during the funeral service in the Olympic Stadium

At the beginning of the hostage-taking, the games were initially continued and only interrupted after protests by numerous participants and visitors. After the death of the Israeli athletes, the games were suspended for half a day. After a memorial hour in the Olympic Stadium, IOC President Avery Brundage let it continue. Although approved by the Israeli government, the decision met with criticism from many. A few athletes left. The surviving members of the Israeli Olympic team also left Munich. Only the walker Shaul Ladany had spoken out against it, on the grounds that he did not want to bow to terrorism.

On the 12th day of the Games, a memorial service was held in the Olympic Stadium, attended by 80,000 people. The Olympic flag was flying at half mast . At the memorial event, Willi Daume, President of the Organizing Committee, Shmuel Lalkin, Israel's Chef de Mission, Ben Horin, Israeli Ambassador to the Federal Republic, Federal President Gustav Heinemann and IOC President Avery Brundage spoke. Willi Daume justified the decision to continue the games with the sentence: “So much has already been murdered - we didn't want to allow the terrorists to also murder the games.” Brundage's saying “ The games must go on ” also became famous ".

At all subsequent Olympic Games, the IOC refused to officially commemorate the attack, as this could offend other members of the Olympic community.

The surviving assassins were pressed free

The bodies of the five hostage-takers killed in the Fürstenfeldbruck firefight were transferred to Libya , where they received a hero's burial with military honors. The three surviving assassins Jamal Al-Gashey, Adnan Al-Gashey and Mohammed Safady, however, should be brought to justice. But that never happened. On October 29, 1972, a Palestinian commando hijacked the Lufthansa plane "Kiel" , which was carrying twelve passengers. The federal government gave in to the command's demand to release the three terrorists imprisoned, so that there was never a legal review of the attack in Germany. Adnan Al-Gashey and Mohammed Safady were later killed by the Caesarea special unit of the Israeli foreign intelligence service Mossad.

Retaliatory actions by Israel

Before it became clear that the perpetrators in Germany would not be prosecuted, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meïr and the security cabinet authorized the Mossad to track down and kill those responsible. The Mossad put together the special unit "Caesarea" under the command of the future Prime Minister Ehud Barak . Their mission later became publicly known as " Operation Wrath of God ". According to the then Mossad director Zvi Zamir, it should not be a campaign of revenge, but a targeted strike against the structures of Palestinian terrorism and an unmistakable signal to all terrorist groups that the State of Israel is punishing attacks on its citizens worldwide.

Over the next 20 years, Mossad commandos killed two of the three assassins who survived Munich and at least twelve Palestinians they suspected of being involved in planning the Olympic attack. However, bystanders also fell victim to the operation.

On October 16, 1972, Abdel Wael Zwaiter , the representative of the PLO in Italy, was shot. On December 8, 1972, Muhammad Hamschiri, PLO representative in Paris , died from a remote-controlled bomb. Other suspected terrorists were killed in Cyprus , Greece and again in Paris.

On April 10, 1973, the Israeli special unit Sayeret Matkal landed with several special units on the coast of Lebanon near Beirut as part of Operation Spring of Youth . There they shot Yusuf an-Najar (Abu Yusuf, allegedly Yasser Arafat's deputy and one of the leaders of the terrorist squad), Kamal Adwan (alleged Fatah commander) and PLO spokesman Kamal Nasir. More Israeli Special Forces Units groups destroyed the headquarters of the PFLP and explosives factory of Fatah . An uninvolved neighbor, a 70-year-old Italian woman, was also killed during the operation.

On June 28, 1973, Mohammed Boudia , the head of operations of the terrorist group "Black September", died in Paris from a car bomb .

On July 21, 1973, Mossad agents made a grave mistake when they murdered Ahmed Bouchiki , a Moroccan waiter who lived in Norway and had nothing to do with the Olympic assassination, in Lillehammer . Following the wrong tip from an informant, they mistook him for Ali Hasan Salameh , the head of Arafat's special force " Force 17 " and a member of "Black September". The Norwegian authorities captured six Mossad agents. They were sentenced to prison but pardoned and deported in 1975. It was not until 1996 that the Israeli government paid compensation to Bouchiki's survivors because of the Lillehammer affair . Salameh, in turn, died on January 22, 1979 in Beirut when a remote-controlled car bomb detonated.

On June 8, 1992, Atef Bseiso , one of the planners of the Olympic assassination attempt, was shot dead in Paris.

Today only the assassin Jamal Al-Gashey , who is hiding in Africa, is still alive . Mohammed Daoud Oudeh (Abu Daoud), who was responsible for the planning, died on July 3, 2010 in Damascus of kidney failure .

Combating Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany

The Bavarian police were not up to the events, which became visible through the live broadcasts of the media all over the world. The deployment of the Federal Border Guard would have been possible, but according to German constitutional law, police sovereignty rests in principle with the federal states. The sovereign, the Free State of Bavaria , had not requested the Federal Border Guard.

The German authorities, in particular Chancellor Willy Brandt ( SPD ) and Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher ( FDP ), are also said to have rejected the Israeli government's offer to send a special unit to provide support. Such unconfirmed reports have in part been interpreted to mean that the German authorities were of the opinion that they could settle the matter themselves. According to the then Bavarian interior minister, Bruno Merk, there was no such offer, and the Israeli special unit could not be deployed on the same day. The hostage-takers absolutely wanted to leave Munich on the same day in order not to give the Israeli special forces time to intervene, who had already prevented a Palestinian attack on a Sabena machine in Tel Aviv on May 9 of that year .

At the time of the failed access by regular police forces there were no specifically in the police services in Germany Anti-terrorist operations trained Spezialeinsatzkommando . As a result, the Border Guard Group 9 was set up on September 26, 1972, and in April 1973 it reported its operational readiness. For this purpose, Lieutenant Colonel in the BGS Ulrich Wegener was commissioned by the then Federal Minister of the Interior, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to set up the powerful anti-terrorist unit. The scenario of the liberation action was re-opened and played out by the newly founded GSG 9 under the supervision of Israeli anti-terror specialists.

Refurbishment in Germany

According to the authors of the 2011 feature film "Munich 72 - Das Attentat" , the victims' relatives were only paid 3 million euros in compensation for pain and suffering around 30 years after the attack. 2 million of them would have already devoured the court costs. The city of Munich, the Free State of Bavaria and the federal government have declared their willingness to do so within the framework of an out-of-court settlement. The payment was therefore made under the condition that the relatives did not appeal to the next higher legal instance , the Federal Court of Justice (BGH).

The events in Munich and Fürstenfeldbruck had consequences for domestic politics in Germany. One consequence was the largest wave of expulsions of Arabs in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. This expulsion, mostly of Palestinians, led to increasing protests at home and abroad. Potential Palestinian terrorists could be turned away and released without major investigations. The Arab mediators who had helped to free the hostages in Munich and Fürstenfeldbruck were also turned down after a few weeks. Many Palestinian organizations were banned after the incident, including student unions and workers' unions, showing that both highly educated Palestinians and lower-class Palestinians have faced the consequences.

Another consequence was stricter controls at the German borders and airports. There was also criticism of the police's investigative strategies. For example, the postal workers who watched the terrorists cross the fence to the Olympic Village were questioned far too late. As a result, the emergency services knew the actual number of hostage-takers too late.

The GDR had a close relationship with the PLO and supported Abu Daoud. After an attack was carried out on him in Warsaw, she had him treated at the Berlin-Buch hospital.

On June 7, 1973, Willy Brandt was the first German Chancellor to visit the State of Israel. The attack on the Israeli athletes in Munich was not an official topic of conversation.

In order to come to terms with the events, relatives of the murdered athletes have been calling for the authorities' files that are still under lock and key to be released. According to press reports, Chancellor Merkel declared in 2012 that all files still held by the federal authorities on the 1972 Olympic attack would be examined and released as far as possible. Files of the Bavarian state authorities are not affected by this.

Assumptions, theses, open questions

Memorial for the victims of the unsuccessful liberation of hostages in 1972 in front of the Fürstenfeldbruck air base. The names of the victims are engraved in bronze

Since the bodies of the Israeli hostages were badly burned, it was never possible to determine with absolute certainty whether all of them were shot by the terrorists or whether individuals were accidentally shot by the police. An investigation by the Bavarian police did not completely rule out the latter.

In the run-up to the Olympic Games, the Munich criminal psychologist Georg Sieber claims , among other things, to have developed the scenario of a PLO assassination attempt to which the later assassination attempt corresponded almost exactly. He reported this in the 1972 documentary . In it he also holds the Israeli state responsible for the failure of the hostage rescue. Its representatives had led the operations in the background, while the German authorities were mere orders.

The former Federal Intelligence Service employee Norbert Juretzko claimed in the ZDF documentation Munich '72 - the documentation that special forces of the BND had been ready to free the hostages. The journalist Wilfried Huismann confirms Juretzko's claim, invoking an unnamed member of this unit. This is said to have said: “We were sure that we could deal with the Palestinians. We were prepared for it and we wanted to do it. "

Whether the PLO leadership under Yasser Arafat was informed about the hostage-taking remains controversial. The leader of the hostage-takers, Abu Daoud, claimed in his 1991 memoir Palestine: De Jérusalem à Munich , that he had informed Arafat in advance of his plan, to which Arafat replied: “Allah protect you”. He also stated that the current Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas provided the money for the attack. In later interviews, however, Daoud contradicted these statements, but confirmed that his group was funded by the PLO.

Commemoration

Place of remembrance in the Olympiapark Munich (2017)
Brief profile of the victims at the place of remembrance

Yael Arad , the first Israeli to ever win a medal at the Olympic Games, dedicated her silver medal at the 1992 Barcelona Games to the murdered hostages of Munich. In a campaign leading up to the 2012 Games, Deputy Foreign Secretary Danny Ayalon attempted to persuade the IOC to observe a minute's silence for the victims at the opening ceremony in London in view of the 40th anniversary of the massacre . This request was refused.

The memorial for the victims of the 1972 Olympic attack by the German sculptor Fritz Koenig (1924–2017) was erected on September 27, 1995 in the Olympic Park. With the support of the City of Munich, the German Olympic Sports Confederation and the International Olympic Committee, the Free State of Bavaria set up the Olympic Assassination Site ( incision ), a multimedia pavilion on the lives of the victims and the course of events that took place on September 6, 2017 in the Olympic Park in one Ceremony with the families of the victims was opened. Before that, however, there was strong opposition from the residents of the Olympic village against the planned site of the memorial on the so-called Connollyberg. A former resident of the Olympic village, the Jewish journalist Daniel Zylbersztajn, had strongly criticized the opposition. It was also said that an attempt had been made to save costs at the opening ceremony.

Film adaptations

The Olympic assassination attempt and the subsequent Israeli retaliatory actions have been the subject of numerous documentaries as well as a number of feature films .

literature

  • Bernhard Blumenau: The United Nations and Terrorism. Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s. Chapter 2, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire 2014, ISBN 978-1-137-39196-4 .
  • Matthias Dahlke: The attack on Olympia '72. The political reactions to international terrorism in Germany. Martin Meidenbauer Verlag, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-89975-583-9 .
  • Simon Reeve : One day in September. Background report on the 21-hour hostage drama in Munich in 1972. Heyne Verlag, 2006, ISBN 3-453-50012-1 .
  • Ferdinand Kramer : The assassination attempt in Munich. In: Alois Schmid , Katharina Weigand: Bavaria by year and day. 24 days from Bavarian history. CH Beck Verlag, Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-56320-1 , pp. 400-414.
  • Wolfgang Kraushaar : “When will the fight against the holy cow Israel finally begin?” Munich 1970: on the anti-Semitic roots of German terrorism. Rowohlt, Reinbek 2013, ISBN 978-3-498-03411-5 (Chapter 37: “They're all gone”. The hostage-taking of the Israeli Olympic team and the disaster while attempting to liberate them. Pp. 496-528, and Chapter 38: “Who are the culprits for this crime?” The consequences of the Olympic attack. Pp. 529–573.)
  • Eva Maria Gajek: Image politics in the Olympic competition. The games of Rome 1960 and Munich 1972 , Göttingen 2013, Wallstein Verlag, ISBN 978-3-8353-1196-1 .
  • Sherko Fatah : Black September , Roman, Luchterhand, Munich 2019, ISBN 978-3-630-87475-3 .

Web links

Commons : Munich hostage-taking  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Review: From Dream to Terror. Documentary review, ARD online, July 15, 2012
  2. ^ Aaron J. Klein: Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response . Random House, New York 2007.
  3. ↑ a b Dr. Schreck and the Neo-Nazis , Der Spiegel, September 7, 1981 , accessed July 24, 2012.
  4. ↑ a b German neo-Nazis helped Olympic attackers , Der Spiegel, June 17, 2012 , accessed on July 27, 2012.
  5. ^ A b Jewish News Archive, April 4, 1974: Two Sentenced in Terrorist Trial , accessed July 27, 2012.
  6. ↑ Willi Pohl under the pseudonym EW Pless: Blinded. From the authentic papers of a terrorist Swiss publishing house, Zurich 1979. ISBN 3-7263-6217-7 ; quoted from Dr. Schreck and the Neo-Nazis , Der Spiegel, September 7, 1981
  7. ↑ Sven Felix Kellerhoff: Neo-Nazi trace during the 1972 Olympic attack , Die Welt from June 17, 2012 , accessed on July 24, 2012.
  8. ^ Assassination attempt on the 1972 Olympics "I wanted to win, as effectively as possible" , FAZ from July 21, 2012 , accessed on July 26, 2012.
  9. ↑ Sam Borden: Long-Hidden Details Reveal Cruelty of 1972 Munich Attackers. The New York Times , December 1, 2015.
  10. ↑ Olympic assassination attempt 1972: Israeli widows report on the atrocities of the terrorists. In: Spiegel Online , December 1, 2015.
  11. ↑ Olympia 1972: Genscher denies torture allegations against Palestinian terrorists. In: Spiegel Online , December 4, 2015.
  12. ↑ Bernhard Fischer: The XX. Olympic Games in Munich: The security concept and assassination attempt as reflected in the files of the security officer in the Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior and the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office. Diploma thesis 2006.
  13. ↑ Hans-Dietrich Genscher: Memories. Siedler Verlag, Berlin 1995, p. 148 ff.
  14. ↑ münchen-film.de ( Memento from March 21, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  15. ↑ www.archives.gov.il: (PDF; 2.6 MB) ( Memento from September 1, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
  16. ↑ Neil Amdur: Ladany, an Ultimate Survivor, Recalls Painful Memories , in NYT , July 13, 2008
  17. ^ Harvey W. Kushner: Munich Olympic Massacre . In: same: Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks / London / New Delhi 2003, p. 248.
  18. ↑ Death of a Terrorist. In: Time . 5th February 1979
  19. ↑ Interview with the then Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk on sueddeutsche.de
  20. ↑ ZDF: The Olympic Murder
  21. ↑ Abu Daoud in the ZDF documentary Der Olympia-Mord about his life in the GDR
  22. ↑ Merkel wants to release files on the Olympic attack ; Frankfurter Rundschau from October 5, 2012
  23. ↑ See also: “I will die for Palestine today”: Der Spiegel of September 11, 1972 , accessed on September 10, 2012.
  24. ↑ On files that have disappeared and memories that have returned, Susanne Härpfner in telepolis , 2008.
  25. ^ Critical to this, Deutschlandradio: Contemporary History from a Film Artistic Perspective (2008), accessed September 10, 2012
  26. ↑ On Tagesschau.de Sieber is not mentioned by name, it only says that, according to "Spiegel", the documents of "a police psychologist" have disappeared, "who had sketched an attack by a Palestinian terrorist command on the Olympic village when creating the security concept for the games . "( Current article from 2012 ( memento of July 24, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), accessed September 10, 2012.)
  27. ↑ See also the current article in "Stern", The Bloody Olympic Games of 1972 ( Memento from April 8, 2014 in the Internet Archive ), Stern from September 5, 2012
  28. ↑ Tina Angerer: Olympia 1972: The ZDF documentary was so gripping . In: Abendzeitung , March 19, 2012. Retrieved April 2, 2012.
  29. ↑ Video Uli Weidenbach: "Munich '72 - the Documentation" (from 18:30 min.)  In the ZDFmediathek , accessed on January 26, 2014. (offline)
  30. ^ Harvey W. Kushner: Munich Olympic Massacre . In: same: Encyclopedia of Terrorism. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks / London / New Delhi 2003, p. 249.
  31. ↑ Fatima Shihabi: "Of course violence creates counter-violence" . Interview with Abou Daoud, taz from February 3, 2006
  32. ↑ SPIEGEL TV: Olympia assassination 1972 - The Mossad's Revenge, 2006
  33. ↑ Newsletter of the Israeli embassy in Switzerland: Special newsletter 07: Sport in Israel of July 31, 2012, accessed on June 11, 2014.
  34. ↑ Michael Kubitza, Bayerischer Rundfunk: Remembrance of the "Olympics of the Blood." The Olympic Memorial is opened | BR.de . September 6, 2017 ( archive.org [accessed August 14, 2018]).
  35. ↑ muenchen.de: Memorial for the victims of the Olympic attack officially opened. Retrieved August 13, 2018 .
  36. ↑ "Games must go on: The world will remember this sentence in eternal shame" . In: sueddeutsche.de . September 6, 2017, ISSN  0174-4917 ( sueddeutsche.de [accessed on August 13, 2018]).
  37. ↑ Central Council of Jews in Germany Kdö.R .: Munich: Giving the victims a face | Jewish general. Retrieved September 4, 2017 .
  38. ^ Memorial Center to 1972 Olympic Terror. A reflection on its opening. In: dzx2.net - Daniel DZ Zylbersztajn . January 2, 2018 ( dzx2.net [accessed August 13, 2018]).
  39. ^ Nicole Graner, Kassian Stroh: Commemorative bickering in the Olympic village . In: sueddeutsche.de . 2015, ISSN  0174-4917 ( sueddeutsche.de [accessed on August 13, 2018]).
  40. ↑ Michael Kubitza, Bayerischer Rundfunk: 45 Years after the Terror Games in 1972: The Difficult Path to the Olympic Memorial | BR.de . September 6, 2017 ( br.de [accessed on August 13, 2018]).
  41. ^ Central Council of Jews in Germany Kdö.R .: Assassination attempt in 1972: Olympiapark stop | Jewish general. Retrieved August 13, 2018 .
  42. ↑ EdgeHist: On the Difficulties of Memorial Ising Jewish Victims in Europe: Munich, 1972. March 6, 2015, accessed on 13 August 2018 .
  43. ^ Rodelberg's understanding of democracy . In: dzx2.net - Daniel DZ Zylbersztajn . January 8, 2015 ( dzx2.net [accessed August 13, 2018]).
  44. ↑ Frederik Schindler: Column Is it still possible: Cheap commemoration . In: The daily newspaper: taz . August 26, 2017, ISSN  0931-9085 ( taz.de [accessed on August 13, 2018]).