Smer - sociálna demokracia

Smer - sociálna demokracia direction - social democracy
Party leader	Robert Fico
founding	November 8, 1999
Headquarters	Súmračná 25 82102 Bratislava
Alignment	Social democracy
Colours)	red
Parliament seats	38/150 ( National Council , 2020 )
International connections	Socialist International (SI)
MEPs	3/14
European party	Party of European Socialists (PES)
EP Group	Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&D)
Website	www.strana-smer.sk

Smer - sociálna demokracia (short name Smer-SD or Smer , German : direction - social democracy , before January 1, 2005 Smer - tretia cesta , German: direction - third way ) is a political party in Slovakia . She belongs to the Socialist International .

Political scientists locate the Smer-SD either as left-wing populist or as social democratic , but also certify that the party is nationally populist and socially conservative positions in social politics. Since the National Council election from 2006 to 2020, Smer-SD had emerged as the Slovakian party with the highest number of votes in all parliamentary and European elections. So far, she has been involved in government three times (2006–2010, 2012–2016, 2016–2020) and each time has been the prime minister with her party leader Robert Fico . In the 2020 National Council election , Smer-SD missed the election for the first time since 2006 and has to act as an opposition party after eight years of uninterrupted participation in the government. In June 2020 it became known that former Prime Minister and Deputy Chairman Peter Pellegrini and ten other members of parliament would leave the Smer-SD in order to found their own social democratic party called Hlas - sociálna demokracia (German: Voice - Social Democracy ).

classification

Old party logo until 2020

Scientists of various stripes such as Jane Oispuu (2006), Marianne Kneuer (2006), Miroslav Mareš (2007), Tom Thieme (2007/11), Cas Mudde (2008), Franz Schausberger (2008), Torsten Oppelland (2010) and Karl Magnus Johansson (2014) locate Smer in left- wing populism . It is occasionally referred to as “socially populist” , according to Kai-Olaf Lang (2004/05/09). Wolfgang Ismayr (2010) considers it to be " social democratic " in the meantime , and Hannes Hofbauer and David X. Noack (2013) also judge that the party had already "social democratized" before the 2012 elections . According to Dieter Segert (2009), it makes use of “ populist means”. Klaus Bachmann (2006) attested the party that it served feelings of "anti-establishment" and " law and order "; it also appears “ nationally ” and “ eurosceptic ” and in the recent past has endeavored to achieve a more social democratic image. Vladimir Bilcik and Juraj Buzalka (2012) recognize more of a socially conservative “national populism ”.

In the media, the Smer-SD is sometimes referred to as “ left national ” or “left nationalist” .

History of origin and ideological currents

The party emerged as Smer (Eng. "Direction") on November 8, 1999 around the politician Robert Fico , after he left the party of the democratic left (SDĽ). In the first months after its founding, Smer presented itself as a party not tied to any classical ideology. Three years later she began to use the name Smer - tretia cesta (Eng. "Direction - the third way") and named the German SPD and the British Labor Party with Tony Blair's concept of the Third Way as party models. At the same time, however, Smer refused to identify with the ideas of social democracy . Only after the party did not participate in the formation of the government in 2002 did it join the left-wing spectrum in terms of party ideology. In 2004 it was united with the party of the democratic left (SDĽ), the Social Democratic Alternative (SDA) and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), the old party of Alexander Dubček . In honor of Dubček's memory, the party was henceforth called Smer - sociálna demokracia (Eng. "Direction - Social Democracy").

In general, the dividing lines within the party run less along ideological convictions than along geographical regions. The most visible ideological gap is between the “patriotic-conservative current” and the “business-oriented-pragmatic current” . The unifying element of the party leader Robert Fico is able to integrate not only these two, but also smaller ideological marginal currents of cultural-liberal, euro-federalist or left-wing radical orientation.

In response to the accusation expressed in July 2016 by the European Smer MP Boris Zala that Robert Fico and the party executive were aligning the party in the direction of national conservatism, the Slovak culture minister and vice-chairman of the Smer party Marek Maďarič replied:

“Boris Zala is wrong about his programmatic disappointment. Since 2003, Smer has stood and developed on two programmatic pillars - the social and the national - and this gives her the opportunity to dominate the political scene. [...] It is true that Smer had no ambition to be a “Brussels Left”, which in itself not only implies a radical implementation of LBGT issues, but also an indifference in the implementation of Slovak national interests. If Boris Zala longs for such a party, Smer was never one and it would mean a quick marginalization of Smer. "

Program

Despite their anchoring in the socialist international and their own commitment to social democratic orientation, there are some fundamental differences between the program of the Smer-SD and Western European social democrats.

Domestic politics

The Smer-SD program aims to maintain economic growth through public investments (neo- Keynesianism ), solidarity and a strong welfare state. The party's slogans are traditionally geared towards economic insecurity and the common people's fear of losing their jobs, as well as a sense of community among the population. In contrast to numerous other Central and Western European social democratic parties, the Smer-SD refused neoliberal economic reforms.

Another difference to the Western European social democracy is the way in which the Smer-SD addressed the “ national question ”, as this was much more important in Slovak society and more present in politics than in Western European democracies. The Smer-SD practices socio-cultural conservatism or takes a neutral stance towards culturally liberal issues such as minority rights, sexual and environmental rights, support for cultural pluralism and the rejection of the “great ideologies” of the past. Ľuboš Blaha explains this with the fact that, in contrast to the social democratic parties in Western Europe, whose electorate is usually urban and cosmopolitan, the Smer-SD would have to reckon with massive slumps among its rather conservative rural electorate if it accepted one on postmodern issues would take a liberal stance. About half of the Smer voters are left-wing, about the other half are national conservative voters.

Immigration policy

In the area of ​​immigration, Smer - sociálna demokracia openly warned against "foreign infiltration" of Slovakia and the development of parallel societies, and in particular rejected Muslim refugees and immigrants. Furthermore, in cooperation with other EU states, efforts are being made to close and militarize the Macedonian-Greek border. Party leader and Prime Minister Robert Fico said that attacks like the one in Paris and Cologne can only be prevented if Muslim immigration is restricted. He generally describes Muslims as incapable of integration. He also caused a stir with his statement after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 that he wanted to monitor every single Muslim in Slovakia individually.

Foreign policy

The Smer-SD is in favor of Slovakia's membership in the EU and NATO , but at the same time emphasizes the need for good relations with Russia and China . Anti-Americanism also plays a role in election campaigns .

Election results in the overview

year	choice	Share of votes	Seats	space	position
2002	National Council election 2002	13.5%	25/150	3.	opposition
2004	2004 European elections	16.9%	3/14	3.	-
2006	National Council election 2006	29.1%	50/150	1.	Government participation
2009	European elections 2009	32.0%	5/14	1.	-
2010	National Council election 2010	34.8%	62/150	1.	opposition
2012	National Council election 2012	44.4%	83/150	1.	Sole government
2014	European elections 2014	24.1%	4/14	1.	-
2016	National Council election 2016	28.3%	49/150	1.	Government participation
2019	European elections 2019	15.7%	3/14	2.	-
2020	National Council election 2020	18.3%	38/150	2.	opposition

Web links

• Official website

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Jane Oispuu : The European parties. Between expansion and assertion . In: Integration 29 (2006) 1, pp. 69–75, here: p. 71.
2. ^ Marianne Kneuer : Democratization through the EU. South and East Central Europe in comparison . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2006, ISBN 978-3-531-15077-2 , p. 315.
3. ^ Miroslav Mareš : Country portrait Slovakia . In: Uwe Backes , Eckhard Jesse (Ed.): Yearbook Extremism & Democracy . 19th year (2007), Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-3168-1 , pp. 237–262, here: p. 253.
4. ↑ Tom Thieme : hammer, sickle, swastika. Party political extremism in Eastern Europe. Creation conditions and manifestations (= series of publications Extremism & Democracy . Volume 16). Nomos, Baden-Baden 2007, ISBN 978-3-8329-3036-3 , p. 177; ders .: Extremism in Slovakia . In: Eckhard Jesse , Tom Thieme (ed.): Extremism in the EU countries . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2011, ISBN 978-3-531-17065-7 , pp. 345–359, here: p. 339.
5. ^ Cas Mudde : Radical parties in Europe . In: From Politics and Contemporary History , 47/2008 ( online ).
6. ^ Franz Schausberger : The regional elections 2001 and 2005 in Slovakia . In: European Center for Federalism Research (Ed.): Yearbook of Federalism 2008. Federalism, Subsidiarity and Regions in Europe . Nomos, Baden-Baden 2008, ISBN 978-3-8329-3829-1 , pp. 407-421, here: p. 417.
7. ^ Torsten Oppelland : Institutional reorganization and democratization . In: Olaf Leiße (ed.): The European Union after the Lisbon Treaty . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2010, ISBN 978-3-531-16072-6 , pp. 79–96, here: p. 92.
8. ^ Karl Magnus Johansson : How Populist Parties Organize . PESO Research Report No. 2 (2014), p. 23.
9. ↑ Kai-Olaf Lang : Rebellion of the Impatient Populism in East Central Europe . In: Osteuropa 59 (2009) 2/3, pp. 333–348, here: p. 338; ders .: Political profiles of the new member states from East Central Europe and their significance for the European Union . In: Integration 27 (2004) 1, pp. 12–27, here: p. 21; ders .: Populism in East Central Europe. Forms of manifestation, peculiarities and opportunity structures . In: Rudolf von Thadden (Ed.): Populism in Europe. Democracy Crisis? (= Genshagener Talks . Vol. 7). Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen 2005, ISBN 3-89244-944-9 , pp. 137–153, here: p. 145.
10. ↑ Wolfgang Ismayr : The political systems of Eastern Europe in comparison . In the S. (Ed.): The political systems of Eastern Europe . 3rd updated and expanded edition, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2010, ISBN 978-3-531-16201-0 , pp. 9–78, here: p. 58.
11. ^ Hannes Hofbauer, David X. Noack: Slovakia: The arduous way to the west. Promedia Verlag, Vienna 2012, ISBN 978-3-85371-349-5 , p. 179.
12. ↑ Dieter Segert : The politics of the post-communist left in Central and Eastern Europe. the impact on the consolidation or threat to democracy . In: Uwe Backes , Tytus Jaskułowski, Abel Polese (eds.): Totalitarianism and Transformation: Deficits in the consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (= writings of the Hannah Arendt Institute for Research on Totalitarianism . Vol. 37). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2009, ISBN 978-3-525-36911-1 , pp. 119-134, here: p. 128.
13. ^ Klaus Bachmann : Populist parties and movements in Central Eastern Europe . In: Frank Decker (Ed.): Populism. Danger to Democracy or Useful Corrective? . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2006, ISBN 3-531-14537-1 , pp. 216–232, here: p. 228.
14. ↑ Vladimir Bilcik , Juraj Buzalka : Slovakia . In: Donnacha Ó Beacháin , Vera Sheridan , Sabina Stan (eds.): Life in Post-communist Eastern Europe After EU Membership. Happy Ever After? . Routledge, New York 2012, ISBN 978-0-415-68084-4 , pp. 55-72, here: p. 67.
15. ↑ Elections in Slovakia: Left nationalists lose absolute majority. In: de.euronews.com, March 6, 2016, accessed March 9, 2016, 1:06 pm; The voters put the fuse on the European idea. In: stern.de, January 13, 2016, accessed March 9, 2016, 1:10 p.m.
16. ^ Radoslav Štefančík: Christian-Democratic Parties in Slovakia. University of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, Trnava 2008, ISBN 978-80-8105-016-9 , p. 30.
17. ^ Radoslav Štefančík: Christian-Democratic Parties in Slovakia. University of Saints Cyril and Method in Trnava, Trnava 2008, p. 30; Hannes Hofbauer, David X. Noack: Slovakia: The arduous way to the west. Promedia Verlag, Vienna 2013, p. 178.
18. ↑ Ľuboš Blaha: The Slovak SMER. Europe's most successful center-left party? Published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2013, ISBN 978-3-86498-580-5 , p. 3.
19. ^ Boris Zala: Ak má Smer prežiť, Fico musí odísť. In: dennikn.sk, July 24, 2016, accessed on July 31, 2016, 8:48 pm.
20. ↑ Maďarič: Zala sa mýli, vedenie Smeru sa obmení výraznejšie ako obvykle. In: dennikn.sk, July 26, 2016, accessed on July 31, 2016, 8:29 pm.
21. ↑ Ľuboš Blaha: The Slovak SMER. Europe's most successful center-left party? Published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2013, ISBN 978-3-86498-580-5 , p. 6f.
22. ↑ Ľuboš Blaha: The Slovak SMER. Europe's most successful center-left party? Published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2013, ISBN 978-3-86498-580-5 , p. 3.
23. ↑ ^{a b} http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-03/slowakei-wahl-regierungspartei-robert-fico-favorit
24. ↑ https://www.wsws.org/de/articles/2016/02/24/slow-f24.html
25. ↑ whom: Response to incidents in Cologne: Slovakia refuses to accept Muslim refugees. In: Focus Online . January 7, 2016, accessed October 14, 2018 . 
26. ↑ Archived copy ( memento of the original from March 7, 2016 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
27. ↑ https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/slowakei-reagiert-auf-koeln-101.html
28. ^ Hofbauer, Noack: Slovakia , p. 176.