Greek military dictatorship
Greek military dictatorship 1967 to 1974 or " The regime of the colonels " ( Greek Χούντα των Συνταγματαρχών ), in Greek also " The Junta " (" Η Χούντα "), are names for the military regime that modern Greece from April 1967 to July 1974 dominated.
On the morning of April 21, 1967, the military coup in Greece and its seizure of power. The regime was able to stabilize itself temporarily in connection with the Middle East conflict and the military importance of Greece for NATO and the USA , but its dissolution was characterized by internal conflicts and an internal change of power after unrest in the population in November 1973. After an attempted coup to take power in Cyprus in 1974, the junta lost all international tolerance and support in its own officer corps and was forced to resign.
prehistory
The Greek civil war began immediately after the end of the German occupation in World War II . The opposing parties received support from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the one hand, and Great Britain and the USA on the other . “The dictatorship of General Metaxas had led the country into the bloodiest epoch in its history, which only ended in 1949 with the defeat of the communist associations in the civil war. Right-wing forces dominated in the following years, supported by the military and the police. ”The USA, which in accordance with the“ Truman Doctrine ”wanted to prevent a further spread of Soviet influence, supported Greece militarily and financially. On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey were admitted to NATO ; At that time Greece was the only remaining non-communist state in the Balkans .
Under King Paul I , the prime ministers changed several times in the following years : Nikolaos Plastiras , Sophoklis Venizelos , Ioannis Theotokis , Dimitrios Kiousopoulos and Konstantinos Karamanlis . "Political power, however, lay outside the government and parliament with the king and his advisors, with the army, their CIA- controlled secret service , their secret societies, with the police and paramilitary militias that controlled rural Greece." Karamanlis, who was his founded ERE ( National Radical Union ) party , held the office from 1955 to 1963. He drove the industrialization of the country forward, brought it closer to Western Europe and was able to temporarily end the Cyprus conflict in 1959 (→ Zurich and London agreements ). His resignation due to differences with the king resulted in a new election on November 3, 1963 , from which the more left-wing Center Union ( Greek Ένωση Κέντρου , EK) emerged as the strongest party. Georgios Papandreou became the new Prime Minister . In the parliamentary elections on February 16, 1964, the EK received 52.72 percent of the vote and 171 of the 300 seats. On the Cyprus issue, he supported Archbishop Makarios' independent policy .
The government of Georgios Papandreou
“With a cautious reform policy, Papandreou aimed to liberalize the regime and create an expansive and social economy. The contracts, which are extremely advantageous for foreign investors, were z. T. renegotiated. This policy met resistance not only from the extreme right, but also from the oligarchy and the king, because the political and social development that had been initiated would have meant the end of their privileges in the long term. "
The situation came to a head when, after the disclosure of the “Aspida conspiracy”, an alleged association of left-wing army officers, by conservative newspapers and because of the revelations about the role of his son Andreas in this affair, “Papandreou made a serious face in July 1965, the army subject to the supervision of parliament and thus to the liberal majority. The young King Constantine II , who had followed his father, who died on March 6, 1964, forced Papandreou to resign and appointed a government of his choice regardless of the majority in parliament . ”This in turn was not confirmed by parliament.
Between mid-July and early September 1965, Athens and all the major Greek cities hosted daily rallies for Papandreou and democracy . The demonstrators' attempt to prevent the formation of a government loyal to the king by demanding new elections - as Papandreou demanded - was in vain. Finally, with the help of bribes and promises, the royalists succeeded in attracting enough MPs from the “center” to their camp, whereupon the third government proposed by the king had a majority of one vote in parliament. At the same time, the king and the generals loyal to him - the so-called "big junta" - with the knowledge of the US government, were working on a plan to establish a military dictatorship, should Georgios Papandreou not be able to return by "democratic means" the power to prevent.
Papandreou's fierce polemic against the king and the military “led to all right-wing forces joining forces”. When the political chaos worsened in the spring of 1967 and Constantine and the military leadership hesitated, the members of the little junta saw themselves as "saviors of the nation who acted - even without the Americans".
The coup
The plan
The "small group of conspirators around Colonel Papadopoulos , Lieutenant General Pattakos and General Zoitakis put on a coup on the night of April 21, 1967 and presented Constantine with a fait accompli."
The coup of the little junta came as a surprise to all sides. Pattakos' tanks occupied all strategically important points in Athens, but it was not until Chief of Staff Spandidakis defected to the putschists and also transmitted the Prometheus plan to the 3rd Army Corps in the north that the coup's success was assured.
Role of the USA and the CIA
The population and the public were faced with a coup d'état, of which no one knew the originator and the real scope; his organization appeared at this time as the joint work of the royal palace, the traditional right, the armed forces and the Americans (here in particular the CIA ). About 300 rebels were part of a NATO - Brigade , which had been trained in the US. They used the secret "Prometheus" command structure during the coup. According to the Swiss historian Daniele Ganser , an election victory for the left, which was predicted to be certain, would not have been in the interests of the USA. He describes the coup units as part of the Greek stay-behind organization , which he introduces as the “NATO secret army”. The German historian Heinz A. Richter denies that the Americans were directly involved. Although Washington knew about the plans of the king and the colonels, the concrete preparations had escaped them. It was expected that a coup would only begin at the signal of the king. In contrast, Ambassador Phillips Talbot had repeatedly made it clear that Washington opposed a dictatorship. When the colonels finally staged a coup on April 21, the US diplomacy and secret services were just as surprised as King Constantine and the other security forces in Greece. The American political scientist Louis Klarevas points to the surprise and indignation of the Johnson administration , which immediately discontinued military cooperation with Greece at the news of the coup. Only the Nixon government then cooperated closely with the colonel's regime in the 1970s. The thesis widespread in Greece that the United States had commissioned the coup is, however, a " conspiracy theory ".
King Constantine and the putschists
The putschists brought the king a letter at 6 a.m. with Spandidaki's declaration of support for the coup and two decrees to be signed. “The king did not sign the decree that abrogated freedoms and human rights and imposed the state of siege.” Then Constantine drove to Athens to the 'Greek Pentagon' and negotiated with the local military, first reluctantly, then consenting. In the trio of putschists, Makarezos replaced General Zoitakis. A cabinet was formed with Attorney General Konstantinos Kollias as Prime Minister and Spandidakis as his Deputy. Papadopoulos figured as minister in the prime minister's office, Pattakos as interior minister, Mazarekos as coordination minister and Ikonomu-Gouras remained foreign minister. "At 5:15 p.m. the government was sworn in by the king's confessor," as Archbishop Chrysostomos II withdrew from Athens.
Constantine then spoke to US Ambassador Talbot and conveyed the junta's promise to hold elections and ensure order. Talbot agreed to have the royal family evacuated, but not to intervene militarily. A shipload of weapons for Greece was rescheduled to Turkey so as not to signal support for the coup.
Later on April 21, the newspaper publisher Eleni Vlachou called the king and advised him "to keep your distance from the putschists and [...] not to be photographed with them." However, Constantine refused to adhere to that.
The first arrests
“On the night of April 21, 1967, the first wave of arrests passed through Greece. [... this] dragged on for several days. [...] How brutally the arrests were carried out depended on who carried them out. [...] According to the magazine Der Spiegel , 8,000 people are said to have been arrested. Prominent prisoners were detained in a hotel. […] 'Normal' arrested people were locked up in the football stadiums in the Athens suburbs of Karaiskakis and Nea Filadelfia and in the Faliron racecourse. ”Among the celebrities were the 79-year-old Georgios Papandreou, most of the ministers in the incumbent government, dozens of MPs, several senior administrators, numerous journalists, lawyers, writers and artists. Mikis Theodorakis was warned that night and managed to evade detention for the time being. The 'normal' were hundreds of functionaries and active members of all political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, clubs and many names on the 'general' list of all 'suspicious' citizens - some from the time of the civil war, so that themselves Veterans of partisan battles against the German occupation in World War II were arrested.
There were also exceptions:
“Mrs. Maria Svolos [FDFA MP], over eighty years old, was woken up at 2:30 in the morning by a group of soldiers by knocking. Although severely handicapped - she dragged herself to the door. When the young lieutenant saw you, he lowered his eyes and stuttered a few words: 'You are under arrest. Get ready and follow us. ' The old lady raised her cane and yelled at the soldiers to cut away. Without saying a word, they turned around. "
On April 28, Pattakos told US Ambassador Talbot that 6,500 arrests had been made by April 26. Of those arrested, they were released in 1701. Of the remaining prisoners, 1558 were taken to the island of Gyaros and 1727 were being transported there. 2152 are still in custody on the mainland. The inmates would be divided into three categories, the first two of which would be subjected to a re-education process to make them good citizens. The communists were among the 'uneducable'. In conclusion, he emphasized his desire to work closely with the US.
The attitude of the USA
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk , who initially relied on Constantine - “it should be left to the king to push for liberalization” - told Talbot on May 2, 1967, “he had the impression that the king was before the regime backing away too quickly. ”Rusk feared that pressure on the junta with a view to normalization could cause it to prevent any agreement in Cyprus on an independent Turkish base on the island (“ a sovereign Turkish base on the island ”).
“Rusk's fears were realistic and required Talbot to perform a diplomatic tightrope walk, which was roughly implemented over the next few months. But the Arab-Israeli war at the beginning of June 1967 ( Six Day War ) ruined this balancing act. ”Now the US was logistically dependent on Greece“ in the cloak of NATO ”and the junta could say:“ We are your allies, whether you like or not. "(" we are your allies whether you like us or not ").
The two royal edicts
As the first official measure, the first royal decree - as signed by him - was published even without the king's signature:
"According to Art. 91 of the Constitution, We, the King of the Greeks, determine the repeal of Art. 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, due to the threat to public safety and order in the country, 95 and 97 of the current constitution for the entire national territory. The Minister of the Interior is instructed to publish and implement this decree. Signed: Constantine, King of the Greeks. The Council of Ministers: President, the members. "
The so-called second royal decree was a supplement to the first and contained practical implementation provisions.
The establishment of the warehouse
"While the junta handled the members of the oligarchy with kid gloves, [...] the treatment of the 'communists' was inhuman." After 5 days in the stadiums, they were crammed onto car ferries and transported to Gyaros . The island is a storm-whipped bare rock, uninhabited except for rats. A third of the 6,500 prisoners were over 50 years old and most had to spend the night outdoors. The supply was minimal, and the water brought on tankers was barely drinkable .
At the beginning of August, the photographer Fred Ihrt flew with a Lebanese pilot in a single-engine Piper over Gyaros and took pictures that caused outrage and worldwide protests in the newspapers. "In September 1967 the junta gave way to global pressure and moved the prisoners to Leros and Crete."
“Constant political pressure from Europe, the visit of the camps by the International Red Cross (IRC) and Amnesty International led to the fact that the prison conditions were improved [...] and in March 1968 from the 6,500 prisoners from April 1967 to 2000 in The wool-dyed '(hardcore) communists were all fired, but they steadfastly refused to sign a declaration of repentance (Dilosis). "
A little later Pattakos admitted the existence of almost 2,500 prisoners.
"In contrast to the civil war, there were no systematic executions during the colonel's dictatorship, but torture on an unimaginable scale."
“Torture took place in Athens, Piraeus, Salonika, Patras and Crete. Around 200 members of the police and gendarmerie, the security police (Asfalia) and the military actively participated. The main torture center was the headquarters of the Asfalia at 21 Bouboulinas Street, directly behind the Archaeological Museum […] The torturers' imagination was unlimited. "
Pattakos announced: "Anyone who refuses to sign the declaration of repentance will only leave the camp as a rotting corpse."
In June 1968, the junta held a show trial at an Athens military tribunal to refute allegations of torture. Although the accused military members remained silent, the civilian co-defendants revoked statements that had been extorted. The court was so appalled that it acquitted 13 defendants. Other measures by which the junta wanted to 'wash itself clean' ran similarly.
Council of Europe reactions
Following a complaint by the Scandinavian governments and the Netherlands before the European Commission for Human Rights , the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution on September 26, 1967 accusing Greece of serious human rights violations. Another examination was announced and, if necessary, the exclusion from the Council of Europe threatened. Athens threatened to break off economic relations with the Scandinavian countries. However, as a result of various delay maneuvers and liberalization announcements by the regime with the exclusion decision, it lasted until December 12, 1969 - with the new Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis anticipating his exclusion from the Council of Europe by means of a declaration of resignation.
The establishment of the regime
The wave of arrests on the night of the coup on April 21, 1967, had taken the opposition in Greece completely unprepared and eliminated it. Further action by the junta was also planned and systematic. In addition to the military occupation of key positions and the arrests, immediate measures were taken to control radio, television and the press:
- “Media censorship began on April 21st. [...] The liberal Elefteria stopped its publication. The three EDA organs were banned. The publisher Eleni Vlachou refused to have her papers censored and ceased publication. “She remained insubordinate and, after interviewing the Italian newspaper La Stampa , she was tried in the Athens Military Tribunal. She escaped house arrest in mid-December 1967 by escaping to London using a forged passport.
- The next step (on April 22, 1967) was already a political legitimation through the publication of a constitutional decree. It announced a new constitution, which should be ratified by a plebiscite. A second decree imposed a state of siege and contained the announcement of further decrees by the government, which would have the character of a law "due to the absence of parliament".
- The following day, April 23, the new government spokesman Nikolaos Farmakis appeared and justified the coup as a preventive measure against a rally by G. Papandreou on that day in Thessaloniki, at which “well over 100,000 people were expected. Papandreou wanted to call for a people's revolution and there would certainly have been violence and bloodshed. "
- On April 27, 1967, Papadopoulos gave an international press conference, justified the coup with the threat of a communist takeover and describes Greece as a patient “who lies on the operating table” and whom the surgeon “straps and anesthetizes with leather straps for the duration of the operation ... “The“ Revolution to save the nation ”(“ Ethnosotirios Epanastasis ”) before a communist conspiracy was contrasted with the model of a“ Hellas Christian Hellenes ”( Greek Ελλάς Ελλήνων Χριστιανών ). The regime designated the phoenix rising from the flames - a symbol of the rebirth of Greece known from the time of the liberation war - with the silhouette of an armed soldier as the new state symbol.
The junta's assessment of the balance of power in Greece was shown by the fact that the next blow - before the judiciary - was aimed at the church:
- At the beginning of May the holy synod was dissolved, the number of its members reduced from 12 to 9, who were allowed to be elected, but the government reserved the right to confirm. By lowering the age limit for bishops to 80 years, the 87-year-old anti-regime Archbishop Chrysostomos of Athens lost his office. “The king's confessor, Archimandrite Ieronymos Kotsonis, was elected as the new archbishop on May 14th.” At the same time, the regime replaced bishops in the province.
- “On April 29, the EDA was banned. On May 4th the youth organizations of all parties, around 200 trade unions, sports and cultural associations were banned. [...] Mayoral elections and municipal council elections were abolished. The mayors of Piraeus and four other cities in Attica were ousted. […] Every family was obliged to report guests to the police within two hours. Anyone could be arrested without an arrest warrant and held for any length of time without a judgment. "
- May 1: In order to get the peasants behind it as a supporter, the junta implemented a law that had existed since 1958 and had never been applied: “Land belonging to towns and communities was distributed to landless peasants. […] The funds for medical care in rural areas were increased. In June 1967 the peasants' pensions were to be increased by 70%. But such rosy prospects had little to do with reality, as it soon became clear. "
- Foreign Greeks could easily be revoked - “The actress Melina Mercouri was revoked on July 12, 1967 by Pattakos, her Greek citizenship and her property in Greece was confiscated. Her reaction was characteristic: 'I was born a Greek and will die a Greek. Mr. Pattakos was born a fascist and will die a fascist. ' The junta church excommunicated Melina. "
- "On June 21, 1967, a law was passed that provided for a purge of the universities of all professors whose behavior did not show the necessary loyalty to the new order or the national ideals."
- Also in June 1967, a commission of experts tackled the new constitution announced by Prime Minister Kollias - for this there were “guidelines”: Above all, the executive branch should no longer be controlled by the legislature and should directly receive part of the legislative rights. The creation of a constitution should give democratically minded personalities and also the population the hope of an end to arbitrariness and a return to legally regulated conditions.
In the fall of 1967, however, a more explosive test of strength emerged for the junta, as it could only be endangered by resistance within the military. Only the king could take the key position.
The counter-coup of King Constantine II.
From the beginning the relationship between the king and colonel was strained. The junta was unwilling to share its power, while the young Constantine II wanted to play an active political role. He didn't just want to be a figurehead of the military government. It was also clear to him that a democratic order and constitution in Greece was the prerequisite for his reputation as regent in Europe.
The plan
"From mid-May 1967 the king began to consider how the junta could be overthrown to Ambassador Talbot." The troops in the north of the country were decisive for Constantine, since he counted on the greatest loyalty there. He planned to first get the royal family out of the country and then march to Athens from Thrace after a radio appeal to the nation. The 6th US fleet and a deployment of marines should accompany the company. After visiting the troops in June 1967, the king obtained a meeting with US President Johnson on September 11, 1967 in the USA . "When the King approached Johnson about military support in the event of a counter-attack, Johnson was very reserved."
In October 1967 the king tried to expand his contacts.
“Talbot reported to the State Department that Constantine was trying hard to get support for his counter-coup, including among politicians. G. Papandreou has already agreed. Anyone who knows the political world of Athens knows that with this kind of coup preparation, Constantine could have announced his plan on the street. Since October 28th, the junta expected the king to attempt a counter-coup. "
Although the commanders-in-chief of the navy and air force were on the king's side, loyalty in the army varied greatly.
Lieutenant General Konstantinos Kollias, who commanded the 2nd Corps in Larissa, told the king that it would take about a week to prepare for the coup, but Constantine refused this "for reasons of secrecy" and immediately decided to strike on December 13, 1967.
He wanted to run the company from the air force base in Kavala and informed Prime Minister Kollias the day before that he was ready to fly. “In the evening, Constantine asked US Ambassador Talbot to come to Tatoi [Royal Residence] the next morning . Around midnight the officers in northern Greece were informed that the counter-coup would take place the next day. "
The counter coup on December 13, 1967
In the morning, Constantine informed the US ambassador and asked him to influence the junta in such a way that there would be no civil war. He also gave him “a tape of a call to the Greek public with a request to broadcast it on Voice of America . Talbot accepted the tape, but in his report to the State Department he wrote that he would wait with the broadcast until it became clear that Constantine's coup had a chance of success. "
At 10.30 a.m. two planes flew north - the first was the royal family and the Prime Minister Kollias, the second was the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Antonakos, who landed in Larisa , contacted the Commander of the 2nd Corps and had all airfields closed.
At 11 o'clock a retired general in charge delivered a letter from Constantine to the Defense Ministry in Athens to the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Angelis , in which he learned of his dismissal and the assumption of supreme command by the king. Angelis had the messenger arrested, informed Papadopoulos and Makarezos and put the armed forces on alert. Immediately “they contacted the units loyal to the junta in northern Greece by radio. [...] Nobody took Constantine's announcement that he would take command of the Greek armed forces seriously. "
Constantine's plane landed in Kavala around noon. The king made contact with the 20th Panzer Division under General Andreas Erselman in Komotini . "In Thessaloniki , officers loyal to the king tried to take control of the city." They occupied the command building of the 3rd Corps and waited for reinforcements from Komotini. At 2 p.m. Constantine was of the opinion that “everything was going according to plan”.
At about noon, Admiral Dedes had given the order to the fleet to sail to aid the king. "The majority of the fleet left the Salamis roadstead at 3:30 pm , united with the units from Crete and the Aegean Sea and set course for Thessaloniki."
In the meantime, the junta had "made radio contact with many commanders who were actually loyal to the king in northern Greece, who were now wavering and at least did nothing." denied ". Papadopoulos now also asked him to “help prevent bloodshed”.
Now the reinforcements from Komotini did not arrive in Thessaloniki and Panzer General Erselman was placed under arrest by his own officers. In the afternoon Constantine tried to fly to Komotini in a helicopter, but bad weather forced him to turn back. The fleet was ordered back.
“Around midnight it became clear that the king's counter-coup had failed. At 1.30 a.m., commanders loyal to the Junta took control of the 3rd Corps. Constantine understood that if he did not want to become a prisoner of the junta, he would have to go to other western countries. A little later, Constantine flew to Rome with his family. "
The junta arrested 4,000 well-known royalists and assured them that the monarch had fallen victim to criminal elements. “On the evening of December 13th, the junta announced that the king had been deposed and would be replaced by General Georgios Zoitakis as viceroy. Papadoupulos took over the Prime Ministry and Defense Ministry. ”Kollias was in Rome and Spandidakis was at a NATO meeting abroad. The new government was announced on December 14th.
Karamanlis in Paris refused to meet with Constantine. On December 18, Pattakos said that the king could always return. "However, when it became clear that the king refused to return, the institutes [of the king's mother Friederike] and the entire property were transferred into state property with the decree no. 3 at the beginning of December 1968."
The new government purged the armed forces of all known royal supporters. “At the same time, the junta members released themselves from active military service in December 1967, which suddenly made the government consist of civilians. This step de facto made it easier for the previous colonels to control the armed forces, because it was now easier for them to issue orders to higher-ranking officers. "
The junta's domestic policy
In addition to the measures taken in the first months after the coup and the confrontation with the king's counter-coup and the subsequent disciplining of its unreliable military, the junta attached great importance to the creation and propagation of a 'new constitution'.
The 1968 Constitution
The colonels used the creation of a new constitution announced immediately after the coup in various ways: on the one hand, they were able to hold off the western governments and the public in western European countries, and on the other hand, they could calm their own, insecure citizens somewhat. Above all, and in comparison to the old constitution of 1952, they were able to disempower the monarchy and eliminate the political clientelism of the old parties.
The legal expert commission announced by Prime Minister Kollias in April 1967 began work in mid-June. Obviously, it could not be avoided or was even externally desirable that members of this commission were also highly respected or even junta-critical lawyers, such as Professor Themistoklis Tsatsos, who teaches at Heidelberg University . However, the presentation of the design was a long time coming.
"On March 15 [1968] Papadopoulos announced at a press conference that the draft of the new constitution would be published in the newspapers the next day." The population was asked to discuss the text and take a position. This became a farce because the text “was written in a very special legal version of Katharevousa [standard Greek ], which high school graduates, let alone common people, barely understood. "
And precisely at the time of the alleged discussion of the constitution, the regime eliminated its 'experts':
The disempowerment of the independent judiciary
The junta had taken its time with the hitherto independent civil justice system. Judges and prosecutors were state officials with civil servant status and pension entitlement.
“On May 28, 1968, the regime struck by enacting a law that suspended the unassailable position of judges and prosecutors for three days.” The chairman of the Supreme Court and five of his assessors, as well as 24 other judges, were dismissed Prosecutors. They lost their pension entitlements and were practically banned from working because they were no longer even allowed to work as lawyers. The lawyers remaining on duty were frightened and have functioned as the regime wanted ever since. [...] When the State Council, a kind of constitutional court, sided with the dismissed judges, it was ousted, which not even dictator Metaxas had done. "
The result
On July 11, 1968, Papadopoulos presented the revised text:
The king was largely disempowered in his political rights and no longer had any influence on the appointment of the prime minister or on the army. The number of MPs was reduced from 300 to 150 and attempts were made to end the system of “sponsored children” - clients who had previously received a large number of perks, concessions, permits and “salaries”: “An office of the Ministry of Commerce in Piraeus, eight posts had 800 salaried employees. Although the new constitution abolished the privileges of the political caste, there was no mention of the privileges of the military. ”It was not long before the colonels and their accomplices established their own system of corruption and clientelism .
In the new order, the constitutional court ruled over the parties. The government exercised command of the armed forces through the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief. In the internal regulations, a committee of senior officers was placed above the defense minister. “The armed forces formed a state within a state [...] the officer caste controlled the state, society and ethos. [...] The last article of the constitution suspended human rights until an unspecified later date (Art 138). "
The plebiscite
But many Greeks and also the European and American public were not deceived. "In September 1968, three top-class lawyers from Council of Europe states came to the conclusion that the constitution as a whole contradicted democratic principles."
On September 29, 1968, the vote on the constitution took place. Despite a huge amount of propaganda and “despite the compulsion to vote, 22 percent of Greeks eligible to vote should not have gone to the polls. [...] Those who did not want to leave risked prison [...] every 'no' could be punished as a hostile act. "The registered voters are said to have been reduced by half a million and" 403,829 (7.9 percent) [voters should] against have voted the constitution. Be that as it may, the information about the results was as wrong as is usual in dictatorships. "
Ideology, education, culture
Contemporaries and historians found it difficult to assess the character of the military dictatorship. Although the 'phenomenon of violence' was typical of dictatorships and anti-communism was typical of those in western power, there was no pronounced ideology that went beyond heroic nationalism and enthusiastic religious echoes. Ultimately, the colonels embodied a petty bourgeois philistinism, as it appeared everywhere in post-war Europe and which stood in the way of modern developments and, above all, their manifestations. In Greece, the Sauber men had come as a military caste to power and were able to Mini Mode, Beatle hairstyles , rock music act massively and any form of movement and also art and intelligence - as Sophocles and Aristophanes were banned, even Shakespeare and of course modern literature. Heinz Richter's conclusion: "The regime of April 21 was simply a primitive military dictatorship." His chance of existence lay in the use of the geostrategic position - as a guarantee of a consistently anti-communist power base in a troubled phase of the Cold War and as a NATO base in the flare-up Middle East conflict ( Six Day War ). The regime did everything to secure this chance of survival against the pressure from a western public interested in democratization and war avoidance.
education and Science
It was obvious that the “re-education” of the colonels began in the educational system. “About 250 civil servants and 50 officials from the Ministry of Education were fired from state schools. In the first four years of school (children between 6-9 years) classes were held in Dimotiki , which Law 129 of 1967 lists as 'mother tongue', while Katharevousa is referred to as 'Greek'. [...] With the transfer to grammar school at the age of 12 [...] the students had to learn the puristic Katharevousa, with their own vocabulary, their own orthography, their own grammar and their own syntax, a language that was previously used nobody spoke except in parliament and in court. [...] In the 7th grade, that is, at the age of 13, ancient Greek followed, which was taught as a dead language. When the students were finally taught French (2 hours per week) in the upper secondary school (Lykeio), the students no longer wanted to learn another language. "
“Just like the schools, the colleges and universities were also cleaned of the professors who were not loyal to the line. [...] For the junta, the universities were a kind of continuation of the schools, by no means a home of science or the spirit. Dismissed teachers were no longer allowed to teach, even in the private sector. ”But the students soon began to boycott the lectures of professors collaborating with the regime. Leaflets were distributed and anti-regime notices posted.
In Greece the intellectuals fell silent for over two years. It was their form of protest against the dictatorship:
“They also wanted to avoid their literary activity being seen as a sign of the regime's tolerance. No literary work of interest was published, no new play was staged, and even many scientific works remained in the drawer or were quickly brought back from the printing press. The 'Athens Spring' that blossomed just before the coup was suddenly interrupted. "
One place where the Greek authors had a certain freedom of speech was the Goethe Institute .
Professional training in the military was free; This benefited numerous young people from poor families and was used by them as an opportunity for social advancement.
Media censorship
On April 29, 1967, censorship measures had been defined; All newspaper editors received a "general instruction leaflet" which listed what was not allowed to be published. The editors were only allowed to use the Athens news agency as a source of information. “Constant pressure from abroad prompted Papadopoulos to announce certain liberalization measures at the beginning of October 1969. So the press should be free with few restrictions. "
In the end, the excessive efforts of censorship also flagged, and "when it affected tourism, the ban [on hairstyle and dress code] was silently dropped."
Harmonization of public life
Staged events became particularly important in the province when members of the government visited. Local military authorities, the gendarmerie, the clergy and the state teachers were mobilized - in the military sense of the word - to fill the emptiness that the indifference of the people had created. Sometimes the situation got tragicomic.
Below is the full text of the declaration of the Mayor of Agrinion on the reception of His Excellency the Viceroy (General Zoitakis ) (February 19, 1969), printed in the regional newspaper Panetoliki (Western Greece ):
“On the orders of our superior service authority, we are announcing the arrival of His Excellency the Viceroy at Agrinion civil airport on Thursday, February 20, 1969 at 10:30 am.
Then His Excellency will go to Jannina by land.
We therefore order that the entire Kalvionstrasse be flagged.
The following have to attend the reception and go to the airport for 10 am: the battalion commander of the Agrinion National Guard, the President and the Public Prosecutor of the Court of First Instance, the staff of the Mayor's Office, the commander of the Akarnie gendarmerie, the commander of the Agrinion gendarmerie , the director of the fire department, the president of the local council, the president of the bar association.
The following must also be present: all employees of the church, court, school and civil authorities, with the exception of those officials who are indispensable for maintaining the service. The Council. The medal bearers and those decorated, the students, the representatives of the press and other associations and organizations. "
Economic policy
Due to war, post-war turmoil, the continued internal political confrontation and due to its peripheral location in Europe until the 1960s, Greece was a very poor country with a traditional, small-scale economic structure. At best, capital had formed in connection with seafaring.
“The nine million people counted 250,000 unemployed . Around a million were chronically underemployed in archaic agriculture [...] The result was that almost 100,000 Greeks left their country every year and either went to Germany as guest workers or as emigrants to Australia. "
It is true that the colonels had "hardly a glimpse of economic matters - [...] in early 1968 the regime put a five-year plan into force, which, ironically, had been developed by Andreas Papandreou." - but after the junta had stabilized due to its importance for NATO, the domestic political paralysis had a 'confidence-building' effect on investors and corporations.
But immediately after the coup, the economy seemed close to collapse, because the European Investment Bank blocked a long-term, low-interest loan of DM 49 million. The Nordic countries reduced their trade in goods and the Eastern Bloc countries, which had always willingly accepted the surplus agricultural goods, took it nothing more from the "communist eaters". The export rate halved, capital imports fell from $ 155.5 million (1965) to $ 129 million in 1968. " Tourism fell by 40 percent - guest workers [...] now put their money in savings accounts in the host country." The junta reacted to the rising inflation rate with a price freeze. “By threatening draconian fines, [...] tax debts from the past were collected and 800,000 new taxpayers were recorded [...] and national tax revenues rose by 50 percent. [...] This primarily concerned the middle class. Richer taxpayers were treated mildly [...] income from registered ships was tax-free. "
When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson was critical of the junta and did not apologize, Makarezos let him know that the bilateral economic negotiations were considered over. As a result, “major German companies managed to land orders worth over DM 200 million. […] Even more important than these connections was the relationship with the American economic tycoon Thomas (Tom) Pappas, who had campaigned for the junta under President Johnson. “Pappas' companies were protected by high tariff walls in Greece and he was given a monopoly by Papadopoulos for Coca-Cola. "It was like a license to print money." The junta was now able to take out high-percentage short-term loans from private banks and so "Greece's foreign debt doubled between 1966 and 1971 to $ 2.3 billion."
New upswing
The development picked up again in 1969, as the forcibly enforced political "stability" now also promised sustainability and thus increasingly brought foreign capital into the country. The European Athletics Championships in Athens in 1969 played an important role in this, as they acted as political normality . According to DLV President Max Danz, the boycott of the German team should not look like criticism of the military government, so that at least the four seasons of the Federal Republic started. Income from tourism in 1970 was $ 194 million, double that of 1969, and getting used to the situation also caused the drastic collapse in foreign transfers by guest workers to swell to DM 350 million (1969). "The popular sport of tax fraud largely ended" and the income rose from 1966 to 1969 from 3.8 to 5.8 billion DM. "Now the rich [apart from the shipowners] were asked to pay."
Furthermore, the construction of energy supply and other infrastructure projects took place to a significant extent. The Vice-President Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos was known as the - always smiling - "first trowel in Greece" ( Greek Το πρώτο μυστρί της Ελλάδας ), as he was regularly seen in propaganda films in the opening programs of the cinemas with a trowel at the laying of the foundation stone and inaugurations.
The construction of large public and private buildings was facilitated and encouraged by laws, among other things. Pyrgos Athinon , the OTE building in Marousi, the Apollon residential tower.
In the last years of the dictatorship in particular, there were close economic and military ties between Germany and Greece. In 1973 alone, the exchange of goods increased by 44 percent.
“In 1973 inflation began to pick up again as workers demanded higher wages. The inability to carry out infrastructure projects efficiently caused foreign investment to decline. Greece's economy got into difficult weather again. "
Clientelism
As promised, the junta had smashed the politicians' clientele system . But instead she built her own, which could no longer find any criticism in parliament and the press.
“In addition, the political caste mostly came from the upper class and was wealthy and it was not absolutely necessary to make unrestrained use of the state treasury. The junta and its clique and most of the other officers, on the other hand, came from the lower classes and had a lot of catching up to do. "
All putschists brought their relatives into the state and the economy. Contracts for public works, permits, licenses - from taxis, gas stations to casinos - the military cashed everywhere. Retired officers ran the electricity company, the broadcasting company, the tobacco office, the employment agency and the state theater. “A truism for business people: All you need is an officer: 'A hotelier applies for a government loan. He receives a rejection. The next day he comes back with a major friend. The uniform makes it possible: the loan is approved. Fee 5 percent. '"An artillery colonel was known as Mister Ten percent for permits in the hotel industry. "When some scandals became public, they were covered up by a statute of limitations."
This had changed nothing in Greek clientelism, except for the group of people who benefited from it.
The junta and abroad
With the overwhelming opposition of the European nations and also of the EEC (see the credit cancellation), the survival of the junta depended on the attitude of the US government. Here, too, the American opposition exerted heavy pressure on the regime (and its own government), but ultimately the geostrategic interests of the USA gained the upper hand.
Relationship with the USA
After the US government stopped providing military aid to Greece immediately after the coup and Foreign Minister Dean Rusk was very reserved, this development took a new course as a result of the Middle East conflict, the Six Day War in June 1967: Greece appeared to be military Basis indispensable and so Papadopoulos was able to develop a clever tactic and present himself as a guarantor of the stability of the western positions.
“Washington recognized that the American military installations in Greece (as well as in Turkey and Iran) were too important to be called into question by boycott measures and demands for a return to democracy. [...] Greece must remain a functioning NATO member. "
Papadopoulos had a strong partner in the Greek-American 'economic tycoon' Tom Pappas, who in January 1968 - when the US government continued to hesitate to recognize it after the king's coup - brought President Johnson a personal letter from the colonel stating the Justified the “April 21st Revolution” with the “rescue from a communist takeover”.
However, the first state to recognize the new government was Turkey. Then the USA followed on January 23, 1968, the British two days later and shortly afterwards the Eastern Bloc countries. At the end of March, US Ambassador Talbot promised that after a return to constitutional conditions, US military aid could be resumed in full. The final decision of the Johnson administration was in October 1968, a 40 percent clearance. On November 5, 1968, Republican Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States. Tom Pappas was one of his most important sponsors and put the Greek-born Spiro T. Agnew through as a (later successful candidate) for the office of Vice President. To seal the friendship, Pattakos paid a visit to the White House on March 31, 1969.
In June 1969 Henry Kissinger , Nixon, Pappas as mediator and Papadopoulos held several conferences to enable arms deliveries without the colonels having to set times for a “roadmap to democracy”. When, on September 1, 1969, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi overthrew the monarchy in Libya and asked the Americans and British to close their bases in the country, political aspects receded into the background. Fearing that "the Soviets could spread themselves in Libya and Egypt under Nasser [...] the American government was mainly concerned that the activities of the junta gave the appearance of democratization to the outside world." In opposition, public and also however, massive criticism of the junta continued in the State Department.
The new US Ambassador Henry J. Tasca, who has been in office since January 1970, criticized the reduction in military aid as a weakening of NATO, but the US government now had to wait for the NATO meeting on June 11, 1970, as it was known that the representatives of the European NATO countries refused to resume arms deliveries. "After June 11th, deliveries will be resumed." Any request for advance work by the colonels in matters of democracy was dropped.
“On September 22, 1970, the State Department announced that President Nixon had decided to lift the May 1967 heavy arms embargo and resume shipments of fighter jets, tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery. There are also helicopters, mortars and tank ammunition. All in all, it would be worth $ 56 million. "
Papadopoulos promises to liberalize - this only meant the entry into force of the 1968 constitution - he was able to postpone himself again and again. Some of the measures were curious - a kind of election of a committee with an advisory function for the colonels on November 29, 1970. Ultimately, he said there would be elections "when the goals of the revolution have been achieved."
Critical reports of the junta continued, commissions were formed, MPs traveled to Athens, and discussions with exiles took place; the junta regularly vowed improvement: "Nixon found that very helpful."
The situation became particularly critical for the Americans when the US 6th Fleet expected its base to be closed in 1971 after a change of government in Malta and had to start looking for a new main base. “Since Turkey showed a reduced interest in homeporting of the US Navy in the wake of the military coup of March 1971 , only Greece remained as a possible alternative location . […] On February 17, 1972, Nixon agreed to homeporting. ”With that the decision was made - the colonels could no longer be forced to give in due to external pressure.
Relationship to Europe
“The attitudes of the governments and political parties of the European countries towards the Greek regime were quite different. Conservative governments and parties saw the regime in the context of the Cold War, and its undemocratic character was secondary. [...] Governments and parties oriented towards social democracy saw it differently. "
Above all, the Scandinavian countries and Denmark positioned themselves as consistently against the junta as public opinion in most countries. The Scandinavian states and the Netherlands sued the junta in September 1967 before the European Commission for Human Rights of the Council of Europe . Greece got ahead of a conviction by announcing on December 12th that it would leave the Council of Europe at the turn of the year. While the Council of Europe was also committed to upholding human rights, “NATO turned out to be a purely military alliance.” Demands by Norway and Denmark to withdraw in 1970 and 1971 were blocked by the British and Americans. Due to the strategic importance of Greece for the Western alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany also advocated remaining in the Council of Europe and NATO .
To polish up its image, the junta hired a British and an American advertising agency. Journalists, television teams and newspaper editors were bribed or sponsored, and positive reports were rewarded with free holidays in luxury hotels, for example.
In the FRG, the SPD took a clear stance towards the junta from the start. "SPD treasurer Alfred Rau called on the comrades to fundraising campaigns for the victims of the Greek military regime [...] higher six-figure sums are said to have flowed through secret channels to the oppressed comrades in Greece." SPD party conferences made massive demands on the federal government and also the NATO partners. Organizations, associations and institutions in Germany and also in other European countries increasingly got into discussions about 'the dictatorship on the doorstep'. There was an enormous boost from universities, educational institutions and trade unions as a result of the 1968 movement . Demonstrations against the regime took place in many cities.
In contrast, the conservative and right-wing parties supported the junta where they could. After the social-liberal coalition took over government in the Federal Republic of Germany in October 1969, “the State Secretary in the Bavarian Ministry of Economic Affairs , Franz Sackmann , appeared in Athens and informed the regime that Bavaria would pursue a policy independent of Bonn and promised the colonels Bavarian state loans. [...] Franz Josef Strauss praised the drachma as 'the most stable currency in the world today' "and certified that the putschists had brought Greece back to" stability ".
resistance
Almost all of the measures taken by the regime were linked to its retention of power and thus mostly had a repressive character. Only the peasants - a number of the colonels were of peasant origin - were promised benefits without any preconditions (increase in pensions), but then there was no money for them. The oligarchs were "handled with kid gloves" - e.g. B. the shipowners (ship owners) - because the junta could not fight against their economic and social means of power.
Various measures that were approved by the general public - such as cracking down on political clientelism or tax increases for the wealthy - quickly turned out to be ambivalent. Taxes were raised only for the middle class and not for the rich. Corruption and 'nepotism' shifted from politics to the military.
An underlying problem for the colonels was that they gradually lost all respect in the population - “So the resistance in the population began verbally by ridiculing the junta through jokes, for example about Papadopoulo's inability to speak correct Katharevousa. [...] Pattakos' drastic stupid sayings did the rest. The next level of resistance was graffiti and leaflets. "
Assassination attempt on Papadopoulos
On August 13, 1968, Alexandros Panagoulis committed an assassination attempt on Papadopoulos. When the coup d'état took place on April 21, 1967, he was doing his military service. He decided to do something against the junta, deserted and went into hiding in Athens. Politically, he was part of the middle, but he made contact with various groups or was supported by them. He hoped to get training in dealing with explosives in Cyprus. At the request of the junta there was an official search for him, but the Cypriot authorities realized that he could also be used by them and with the agreement of Makarios he was given a passport. The Cypriot interior minister, Georkatzis, organized the attack in the background, which was to lead to a general uprising, but Panagoulis arbitrarily submitted the scheduled date of August 17 to 13, 1968. The assassination attempt - a remote detonation bomb against the motorcade in Papadopoulos - failed, the dictator was unharmed and the assassin was arrested. He was sentenced to death by a military tribunal. “The result was massive international protests: The Pope, Bonn, Moscow and Vienna protested against the execution of the sentence. In Italy, workers stopped work for five minutes. [...] When on the night of November 20-21, 1969 [the Greek representatives] from Brussels reported from the NATO meeting that an execution would have catastrophic effects on the Alliance, Papadopoulos pardoned Panagoulis to life imprisonment. " After he was released in 1973 as part of a general amnesty, he met the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci and went with her to Italy.
Support from abroad
The resistance against the colonel's regime was supported in a variety of ways from abroad. The Federal Republic of Germany was an important basis for the resistance, as many Greeks lived here as exiles and the Greek guest workers had access to the ruling party SPD thanks to their relatively good representation in the trade unions . The SPD financed the establishment of an office for the Panhellenic liberation movement in the Federal Republic . As Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt personally campaigned for opponents of the colonel's regime, such as Andreas Papandreou , to receive a residence permit for the Federal Republic.
“The ' Deutsche Welle ' broadcast news and other information in Greek from Cologne to Greece every evening between 9:40 p.m. and 10:40 p.m. Greek time. The broadcasts were objective and critical and a nuisance to the regime as there was nothing they could do about it. [...] The editors [...] also received current information from Greece. “For the Greeks living in the FRG, the Greek program of the Bavarian Broadcasting Corporation (via the third radio programs of the ARD) with its critical reporting was of great importance.
The junta tried to silence the “free Greece” represented by the Greeks in the diaspora in two ways : directly through their task forces, the official services and agents of the secret service KYP and indirectly with the help of compliant foreign authorities. First and foremost, they were concerned with workers, students, intellectuals, journalists and politicians: men and women of post-war emigration and refugees.
The population and the resistance
“In contrast to the Second World War or the civil war, there was little inclination towards active resistance at the beginning of the dictatorship.” The civil war experiences after the war had shaped the Greek people and the population was not prepared to engage in violent confrontations or to support groups that appeared . “The enemy was the junta and their clique around them, but not the normal soldiers and officers. They could even be opponents of the junta. "
“The bulk of the population cared little about the junta's policy as long as it did not affect their lives. Their real attitude became clear on November 3, 1968, when the funeral service for Georgios Papandreou took place in the Athens Cathedral. Although participation was prohibited by the police, hundreds of thousands appeared in the city center to pay their last respects to the revered 'old man' (Geros). With him a hope for reform died. People just didn't care about the police, and they thought it advisable to let the people have their way and not provoke their anger. The Athens city center around the cathedral was black with people, as the photographs show, and they accompanied the funeral procession to the cemetery after the funeral. It was the only time that the Athenian people disregarded the orders of the junta. It was less a conscious act of resistance than an act of collective grief that broke out. yet it showed the potential power of the people. But it remained with this one-off rebellion, which was not followed by another. [...] Therefore, a political earthquake like the one in 1974 was needed to overthrow the regime. "
Resistance Movements
The only ones who were organizationally in a position to offer resistance were the communists and a few other leftists, and the resistance organizations also emerged from their ranks. The strongest group was the PAM (Patriotiko Metopo - Patriotic Front) with Mikis Theodorakis . It was also supported by the Communist Party KKE and from March 1968 worked with the DA (Dimokratiki Amyna - Democratic Defense), founded by EK people and social democrats. After his release from prison, Andreas Papandreou founded the PAK (Panellinio Apeleftherotiko Kinima - Panhellenic Liberation Movement) in Paris at the end of February, with headquarters in Stockholm. She received financial support from the Swedish government and was ideologically a forerunner of PASOK .
The composer Mikis Theodorakis went into hiding immediately after the coup and called for resistance. For four months he fought with the "Patriotic Front" underground against the junta. In August 1967 he was arrested, tortured, exiled to the mountain village of Zatouna, and later transferred to the Oropos concentration camp. Theodorakis' music had already been banned on June 1, 1967; those who heard them face a prison sentence.
Violent resistance
The Greek violent resistance also respected the wait-and-see attitude of the population - although there were numerous (bomb) attacks, it was embarrassingly and successfully ensured that no people were killed.
“Between May and August [1969] over ninety (bombs) exploded in Athens and Thessaloniki [...] There were bombings against cars of American officers and diplomats and against NATO facilities. [...] Infernal machines went off in the Prime Minister's building, in the General Directorate of Asfaleia and the KYP. [...] But it was still the case that the violence was only directed against things. Therefore, there were a few slightly injured, but no deaths. [...] (The attacks) showed the junta that it could be done seriously, and so unsettled them. "
Spring and summer 1973
In March and April 1973 the international opposition itself grew within NATO and the US ambassador Tasca warned his government against Dimitrios Ioannidis , the head of the ESA military police , who publicly called for a stricter course: “Only if he (Papadopoulos) approved the constitution from 1968 put in full force, he could save his position. "
On April 23, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis , who had been disempowered by the military in 1967, spoke up (in the Athens newspaper Vradyni, which was immediately confiscated), accused the junta and called for a return of the king and a strong government (which, of course, was under him should be formed).
Papadopoulos interpreted this as a call to the royalists and in May 1973 naval officers also attempted a coup, which was, however, uncovered shortly before and failed with severe consequences for the circles involved. The destroyer Velos , however, had already run out and his change of course to the Italian port of Fiumicino and the request from Commander Pappas for political asylum there caused a worldwide sensation. "In Washington, doubts were voiced as to whether the Greek armed forces were still operational." Papadopoulos tried to flee forward, officially abolished the monarchy on July 1, 1973, promised parliamentary elections, a vote on the (sham democratic) constitution that had been delayed since 1968 and a referendum on July 29, 1973: a vote on himself as the only presidential candidate.
The referendum took place and “despite gloomy threats [... and] although voting was compulsory in Greece, approx. 25 percent of the voters cast their votes. ”77% (3.8 million) voted for YES and 22% (1 million) for NO. "Despite numerous doubts, the Supreme Court declared the elections valid on August 13, 1973."
Papadopoulos was generous and announced an amnesty: “In fact, all political prisoners (350 more) have been released. Among them were Alexandros Panagoulis (assassin on Papadopoulos 1968) and Evangelos Averoff . "
But Papadopoulos could not find a prominent politician for the office of prime minister. On October 1, 1973, as President, he deposed all previous ministers, including the six members of the original junta. The appointment of a new government under Spyros Markezinis "was too small for the Democrats (as a measure of democratization) and too big for the hardliners in the military."
The uprising at the Polytechnic in November 1973
A youth and student movement comparable to the 1968 movement in many countries of western Europe could not develop in Greece, as the dictatorship also suppressed all forms of opposition at the universities. Over the years, however, displeasure at the major universities had been sparked again and again by the fact that students were not allowed to democratically choose their representation on university committees.
Start of the protests
In the 1972/73 winter semester, elections were again required and the students also wanted to discuss the content of the courses. After the rejection, there were the first protests, police operations and a law that made it possible to “draft insubordinate students immediately into military service.” On the other hand, there were further unrest and new drafts. Finally, on February 21, about 2,000 students barricaded themselves in the law school building. But the junta leadership remained tough - the 96 drafted students were supposed to do their military service. Riots in Thessaloniki and Patras followed. In Athens, the law school was again occupied and on March 20, 1973, the police stormed the building. Any legal assistance from Greek and international lawyers was denied to the arrested.
After the annual funeral service for Georgios Papandreou in Athens' cathedral on November 4th, there were rallies against the junta and street battles with the police who intervened immediately. Further drastic judgments against students led to protests again, initially at the University of Athens.
Occupation of the Polytechnio
On November 14th, several thousand students occupied the Polytechnio in Athens. Others gathered in other university institutes. All students demanded that they choose their own representation. The elections were to be held on December 4, 1973. Papadopoulos hesitated at first because the director and the senate of the Polytechnio stood behind the students and even the minister of education tried to mediate.
Over the next few days, thousands of workers and young people joined the students. On November 15, “around 8 p.m., the number rose to about 15,000. Two workers and one student were associated with the management committee. "
On November 16, around 1000 students occupied institutes at their universities in Thessaloniki and Patras . In the afternoon Papadopoulos ordered the army to be deployed in Athens.
Once the site of Polytechneio by the police had been sealed off, sat down at 22.30 military units with 10 tanks and three armored personnel carriers towards the center in motion. The forecourt of the Polytechneion was now full of students. There were desperate attempts to negotiate, but at one o'clock in the morning on November 17, a tank rolled down the entrance gate.
“There should have been deaths. The soldiers broke into the building. Radio Polytechneion's broadcasts ended at 2.45 a.m. The students on the premises and in the building tried to escape. Many managed to escape, but a large number were arrested. "
The information given about the victims in the later process varies. According to this, between 700 and 1,000 people were arrested, between 180 and 200 injured and 23 dead. The police reportedly had fewer than a dozen injured, none of whom were gunshot wounds. Only one policeman was seriously injured. The unrest is generally regarded as a “student revolt”, but an assignment of those arrested during the crackdown on the night of November 16-17 shows that the involvement was far greater: “Only 49 students came from the Polytechneion. 268 students were from other Athens university institutions. 74 were students and 475 workers. "
A memorial demonstration takes place every year on November 17th to this day.
The end of the regime
The fall of Papadopoulos
"The events around the Polytechneion accelerated another development:" The 1973 under the pressure of increasing dissatisfaction with the regime, declining economic success and foreign policy isolation of Papadopoulos in 1973 vaguely promised gradual return to democracy - the undeservedly already as "political turning point" ( Greek μεταπολίτευση metapolitefsi ) - aroused the displeasure of hardliners in the military, who accused him of betraying the ideals of the April 21 coup.
On November 23, 1973, when the universities were returned to their administration, "Papadopoulos Markezinis accepted the request that the elections take place in February 1974." This was to be announced at an upcoming meeting of the NATO Council. Now the group had to act around ESA boss Dimitrios Ioannidis . In the early hours of November 25, 1973, tanks again hit the center of Athens, the telecommunications center was occupied and Papadopoulos isolated in his residence. At lunchtime the new president appeared on television: Phaidon Gizikis . Adamantios Androutsopoulos became the new prime minister . The six-year rule of Georgios Papadopoulos was over.
The Ioannidis regime
The head of the ESA military police “was an ascetic fanatic in thought and action who did not believe in western-style democracy. [He was ...] responsible for and approved of the tortures perpetrated by his people. At the moment it was enough for him to steer the development from behind the scenes. ”The new administration again made many promises, but even US Ambassador Tasca stated that the 'honeymoon' was short and that disillusionment soon followed.
Politically, the US government was weakened by the Watergate scandal - US Secretary of State " Kissinger de facto took over the role of President [...] who had absolutely no idea about Greece." On March 20, 1974 a meeting was held in Washington postponed every decision - this meant "that he (Kissinger) interfered with his policy of non-interference in favor of Ioannidis, because non-interference meant approval." Warning voices in the US State Department could not prevail.
The Americans were concerned about the further dequalification of the army command through extensive replacement of officers in “highest command posts” by inexperienced but loyal supporters of the regime: “It is hardly surprising that nothing worked in such an army, neither the command nor the logistics. but could have catastrophic effects if an emergency should arise from an external threat. [... In addition] the new regime did not see itself as part of the western alliance system. "
In addition to a worsening economic and social situation, the conflict with Turkey has now expanded.
The Greco-Turkish Conflict
In 1973 - tellingly, in the year of the " oil price shock " - oil was discovered in the eastern Aegean and a dispute over the territorial waters of the two neighboring states was exacerbated by maritime law provisions on the respective " continental shelf " or the "shelf" between states: Classifications that are complicated and can be interpreted in many ways due to the Aegean island world. As early as the spring of 1974 there were incidents with aircraft, threats and appeasements, broken off and resumed negotiations and “on July 3, 1974 [the Greek] Foreign Minister Tetenes resigned because he [...] feared that there would be a violent confrontation could ensue. [...] The further development (however) got sucked in by the events in Cyprus. "
The Cyprus policy of the Ioannidis regime
Papadopoulos - according to Heinz Richter - "had become a realpolitician with regard to Cyprus [...] he knew that any attempt to enforce the enosis would mean war with Turkey, and this would mean a defeat for Greece [...] . ”Ioannidis, on the other hand,“ only lacked the reason for an intervention ”(p. 415).
In June 1974 Ioannidis spoke openly in the government circle that the Cypriot President Makarios III. , whom he had also described as a "Communist friend", had to be eliminated and even to US Ambassador Tasca he spoke of "switching off". Makarios himself did not take warnings seriously because he could not imagine such a provocation by Turkey. Ioannidis assured "on July 14th even the Athens CIA chief that the Greek government would do nothing against Makarios."
The coup in Cyprus
“The coup against Makarios began at 8:00 am on July 15, 1974, when rebel members of the National Guard attacked the presidential palace. Makarios managed to escape barely. [...] He was brought to London by plane via Malta via the British Akrotiri base . Strictly speaking, the coup against Makarios failed when the attack on his life failed. ”In the next few days, the coup plotters controlled the whole island and established a terror regime under the“ pathological killer ”Ioannidis loyalist Nikos Sampson .
A Turkish invasion fleet that had been on the way since the previous evening was misinterpreted as an "exercise" in Athens and the Turkish armed forces invaded Cyprus undisturbed on the morning of July 20, 1974.
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The junta's war council then proclaimed the mobilization of the army: "200,000 men [were] made available in Thrace for a counter-offensive on Istanbul [...] troops and tanks [moved] to the Aegean islands."
While US diplomacy had done nothing in the run-up to the coup: - "Unaware of the consequences [...] ( Henry Kissinger ) let things take their course" - his chief negotiator Joseph J. Sisco tried to appease both sides. However, Turkish President Bülent Ecevit and his military were not ready to give up their advantage and Ioannidis believed that "the only solution is a war with Turkey."
The collapse
Under American pressure, an armistice was agreed for July 22, 1974, but at 11 o'clock that day the second Turkish landing began, with whose forces the partition of the island was to be carried out. The commander-in-chief of the Greek army, General Bonamos, declared that there was "no way to support the struggle of the National Guard" and thus came into conflict with Ioannidis. But the opposition officers in northern Greece were more decisive:
“In Athens on July 22nd, rumors swarmed through the city. One of them said that 250 officers of the 3rd Corps in Macedonia had called for the resignation of the government and the return of the king, which was really true. The appeal was broadcast to Greece by Deutsche Welle and the BBC . "
“Ioannis Davos, commanding general of the 3rd Army Corps in Saloniki and a declared opponent of the Ioannidis clique, has commanded most of the armed forces since the mobilization against Turkey. He then led the decisive blow against the Athenians. "
In Athens, the naval chief Petros Arapakis was the driving force; on the morning of July 23, 1974, he declared the military government deposed. Junta ministers vacated their offices. “Ioannidis said goodbye and asked the army command for two days' leave. Then he left the room. "
“The concentration camp regime that for more than seven years had become a disgrace for the cradle of democracy, a nuisance for EC Europe and a burden for the Western alliance: a dictatorship that had no ideology, vanished overnight like a ghost , nor could show the people political perspectives, a hollow state that is oriented towards the sheer exercise of power and nothing else. "
At 2 p.m. the most important politicians of the pre-junta period were gathered, Evangelos Averoff proposed Karamanlis as head of government and after some back and forth, the previous president Phaidon Gizikis telephoned the ex-prime minister, who went into exile in Paris after his election defeat in 1964 was.
“The decision by the military to hand over government to a civilian government was announced over the radio on July 23, 1974 at 7:03 p.m. on the radio. This triggered the largest mass demonstration since the evacuation of Athens by the Wehrmacht in 1944. "
Konstantinos Karamanlis agreed to take over the office of Prime Minister. When he arrived in Athens on the night of Wednesday, July 24, 1974 at 2 o'clock in a plane belonging to French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing , a spontaneous folk festival took place. "While the crowds were noisy in the streets, 5,000 students [at the Technical University] gathered for a requiem [...] and read out a list of 42 boys and girls shot in November 1973." On July 24, 1974 the new cabinet was opened presented “and the government spokesman announced that all political prisoners [would] be released, [...] all political offenses would be pardoned. […] On July 25, 1974 the last 45 inmates […] came back from Gyaros . "
Mikis Theodorakis and Melina Mercouri returned home from exile.
Purges
In his cabinet , presented on July 26, Georgios Mavros became Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, and Averoff became Minister of Defense. He immediately stated that “the powers of the military police are limited to the military sector.” When asked to remove Ioannidis as commander of the military police, Averof refused and said, “There was no reason to take action against Ioannidis, after all, he was been one of the officers who would have made the return to democracy possible. Obviously, Averof didn't dare take action against Ioannidis yet. Papadopoulos was also still free. "
Karamanlis went to work very carefully and successively in clearing the state apparatus and the military from junta supporters. On August 19, ten generals were forced to retire and on August 26, “Ioannidis, too, at last.” Proceedings were initiated against 20 officers for abuse of their authority [torture]. "The decision to destroy all files of the military police with the exception of espionage cases was questionable." The state apparatus was cleaned up more consistently, and political crimes committed by members of the junta should never be amnestied. On August 28, an investigation into those responsible for the crackdown on the rioting at the Polytechneion was opened and on October 21, the report recommended indictments against Ioannidis and 29 army and police officers. “It was not until October 23 that Papadopoulos, Pattakos, Makarezos, Ladas and Rougofalias were arrested and exiled to the island of Kea in the Cyclades. But they still did not dare to take massive action against the junta and its collaborators. ”Three leaders of the military coup of April 21, 1967 - Papadopoulos, Pattakos and Makarezos - were sentenced to death in August 1975 for high treason, Dimitrios Ioannidis to life imprisonment. The sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment.
Transition to democracy
After the re-enactment of the constitution of 1952 , the declaration on the validity of the rule of law and the re-approval of political parties, the major parties of the pre-junta era were revived or re-established. In the elections of November 17, 1974 , Karamanlis ran with his party 'Nea Dimokratia (ND)' and the slogan “Ich oder die Panzer” and won 54.37% of the vote and 73.3% of the seats due to the increased proportional suffrage. Mavro's party 'Enosis Kentrou Nees Dynames (EK-ND)' won 20.42% and 20% of the seats.
The real problem in these months - which assumed a global political dimension - was the escalation of the Cyprus conflict through the initial support for the coup on Cyprus and the subsequent partition of the island.
Conflict over Cyprus
At the same time as Ioannidis and with it the military dictatorship began to withdraw, there was also a change of power in Nicosia on the initiative of UN representatives who urged constitutional conditions: the coup president Sampson resigned and was replaced by Kliridis, who quickly closed understood that he "still regards Makarios as the rightful president and only represents him."
In Athens on the same day, Karamanlis declared that he would “defend Cyprus’s independence and territorial integrity with all possible might”. The army from Thrace withdrew Karamanlis - "The military regime that had resigned on July 24 was responsible for the situation."
The new Foreign Minister Mavros traveled to the Geneva Conference (July 25-30, 1974) on Cyprus and met his Turkish colleague Güneş on a tough course. Turkey wanted to establish a large area for an autonomous Turkish ethnic group within an independent Cyprus, to which Karamanlis could not give his consent. Kissinger had previously mediated and so there was another conference in Geneva from August 8 to 14, 1974. The Turkish troops advanced systematically. As a result, Ecevit also turned British and Americans against himself, but they were not in agreement and Karamanlis and Makarios did not want to persuade each other to submit to the Turkish plans. Half an hour after the end of the conference, the second Turkish military action began, met with no resistance and triggered a great wave of refugees among the Greeks. "When the second armistice came into effect at 6:00 p.m. on August 16, 1974, the Turkish army had occupied almost 37% of the area of Cyprus." Already at the news of the Turkish attack, Karamanlis was "beside himself with anger at Ecevit's behavior." Ordered boat and air strikes on the invading forces, an idea that was rejected by his commanders and also by Averof. Greece could not afford a war or a defeat against Turkey. Karamanlis then declared Greece's exit from NATO, but politically the country should remain a member of the alliance. Richter describes this as "a major mistake in Greek foreign policy [... because] Karamanlis deprived himself of any possibility of exerting effective pressure on Turkey through NATO." Independently of this, hectic international activities developed, but Turkey had created a fait accompli Greece was not ready to accept this in this form. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung commented: "Cyprus is now apparently another country where the panacea for conflicts after the Second World War is being used, namely partition." On August 18, massive anti-American protests broke out in Athens because the population of the United States alleged favoring the Turks. The next few weeks passed with diplomatic contacts on all sides, including all over Europe, in order to reach a compromise between the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot sides. Without a doubt, the Turks had the strongest position, not even Kissinger as their adversary who “needed Turkey for the next Middle East war” and so it was foreseeable that the Turks would implement their “bizonal solution”. Karamanlis and Makarios could not agree on a common approach and so the Greek prime minister withdrew from the solution process: “From now on, negotiations on a solution to the Cyprus problem were a matter for the Cypriots among themselves. Athens was ready to accept any solution that Makarios or the Cypriots would agree to. [...] Morally, he left the Cypriots in the lurch, but out of the interests of Greece he had no other choice. ”The agreements that followed form the status quo to this day.
outlook
"A pragmatic economic policy, cautious democratization and rapprochement with Western Europe (resumption of membership in the Council of Europe in 1974 , full member of the EC in 1981) led Greece into a quieter phase of its recent history."
Quote
“It has often been said of the evils the dictatorship brought with it; worst of all is the irreparable damage to Cyprus. Without wanting to, the putschists also did something good, because they accelerated the course of history: the abolition of the monarchy, the introduction of modern Greek, the approval of all political parties ... - changes that would otherwise have lasted decades.
Dictatorships use violence and torture to exclude themselves from the sphere of politics. Therefore, under no circumstances should they be tolerated. A dictatorship must be rejected immediately, no ifs or buts. "
literature
- Athenians [Rodis Roufos] Inside the Colonel's Greece (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972)
- Aris Fioretos : Mary. Novel . Translation Paul Berf. Hanser Verlag, Munich 2016
- FRUS (Foreign Relation of the United States): 1964–1968 , XVI., Washington: Government Printing Office 1978.
- Keesings Contemporary Archives . Clogg & Yannopoulos.
- Periklis Korovessis: The guardians . Raith, Munich 1976. (Zweiausendeins, Frankfurt am Main 1981f) (autobiographical about torture)
- Marios Nikolinakos: The prevented democracy, model Greece. [Ed. from u. Kostas Nikolaou]. edition suhrkamp No. 302.Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1969.
- Nicos Poulantzas : The Dictatorship Crisis. Portugal, Greece, Spain . Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main 1977, ISBN 3-518-10888-3 .
- Heinz A. Richter : Greece 1950–1974. Between democracy and dictatorship . Verlag FP Rutzen, Mainz / Ruhpolding 2013, ISBN 978-3-447-06908-3 , pp. 418 and 432.
- Stephen Rousseas: Military coup in Greece or in the background of the CIA . Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg 1968.
- Ansgar Skriver: Soldiers against Democrats: Military Dictatorship in Greece . Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1968.
- Pavlos Tzermias: Modern Greek History. An introduction. 3rd edition, Francke, Tübingen 1999.
- Helen Vlachos : Greece. Documentation of a dictatorship. Verlag Jugend und Volk, 1972.
- Christopher Montague Woodhouse : The Rise and the Fall of the Greek Colonels . Franklin Watts, New York 1985.
Movies
- Z (film) by Constantin Costa-Gavras
Web links
Remarks
- ↑ 28 army officers were accused of belonging to the Aspida organization and an attempted coup and were brought before a military court. The son of Papandreou Sr., Andreas Papandreou , was originally supposed to be brought to justice, but this was not possible due to his parliamentary immunity . 15 defendants were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms.
- ↑ The coup took place "on the basis of the Prometheus plan with the precision of a clockwork." (HA Richter, p. 305) The plan was a measure "to save the Greek state and its identity", which focused on the Destabilized by a communist government, no matter how it came to power. Developed in accordance with the guidelines laid down in NATO since 1959, the Prometheus Plan was constantly updated to keep up with the latest developments. The file mainly contained the structured overview of the departments entrusted with the implementation of the plan and the code to be applied if necessary, under the sole responsibility of the Prime Minister.
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↑ The Second Royal Decree:
- From now on, all motor vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the city will be prohibited until further notice. Any civilian on the street must go home immediately. After sunset, fire is opened on anyone found in town. Traffic is only permitted to doctors and pharmacists in serious cases of illness and only with the permission of the responsible police authorities.
- From now on, the securities exchange and the commodity market will be closed until further notice.
- With immediate effect it is forbidden to withdraw from banks and savings banks until further notice. Starting today, April 21, the presentation period for bills of exchange will be extended by ten days.
- From now on, until further notice, the purchase of sterling and all other foreign currencies is prohibited. Any attempt by traders to set up food stores is considered sabotage; Offenders are brought before military special courts.
- All citizens are urged to notify the police immediately if they hear of a vendor trying to set up a grocery store.
- With immediate effect, lessons in elementary, secondary and higher education will be suspended until further notice.
- ^ Representation by Richter: Greece 1950–1974. S. 321. Against the assumption that Gyaros has been completely given up, argues u. a. an alleged statement by Georgios Papadopoulos on Radio Luxembourg on January 23, 1968: “We have excluded terrorist criminals from the amnesty. This question does not arise for the prisoners on Gyaros simply because they have neither been charged nor convicted at all. They are stubborn communists who are imprisoned for reasons of preventive security. "(Without exact source)
- ↑ The agreement was signed on January 8, 1973. The Greek government announced that military aid could be dispensed with in future. “It was, if you will, the climax of Papadopoulo's career as a dictator” (Richter, p. 368 f.).
- ^ Panagoulis became a member of the Center Union - New Forces (EK - ND) after democracy was restored. After he had announced that he would publish archives of the military police ESA, he was killed on May 1, 1976 in a traffic accident which was interpreted by large circles of the Greek public as an assassination attempt. Oriana Fallaci published Panagoulis' biography: Oriana Fallaci: A Man. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt 1982. Informal biography: Kostas Mardas: Alexandros Panagoulis. Proves thanatou. (Athens: Athenasiadis, 1997). Information from: Richter, p. 341.
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall , p. 137. "An investigation by the Greek Research Foundation (Ethniko Idryma Erevnon) from 2003 names 24 dead and 886 arrested, but does not differentiate between [the incidents] at the Polytechneion and the Ministry." A Day in History ", Athens News (November 28, 2012).
- ↑ Official communication from the Greek cabinet on Wednesday, August 14, 1974: “Since the Atlantic alliance has proven incapable of preventing Turkey from provoking a conflict situation, Prime Minister Karamanlis has ordered the Greek armed forces to withdraw from the NATO alliance . Greece will only remain a member of the alliance in the political sphere. ”(Der Spiegel, 34/1974, August 19, 1974, p. 45)
Individual evidence
- ↑ These colonels were mostly regimental commanders.
- ↑ Heiner Raulff: The military dictatorship in Greece. In: World History. Volume 35: Europe after World War II. Weltbild-Verlag, Augsburg 1998, ISBN 3-89350-989-5 , p. 344.
- ^ Norbert Wiggershaus , Winfried Heinemann (ed.): National foreign and alliance policy of the NATO member states. Military History Research Office , Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-486-56489-7 , p. 274 f.
- ↑ Heiner Raulff: The military dictatorship in Greece. P. 345.
- ↑ Heiner Raulff: The military dictatorship in Greece. P. 345.
- ^ Hermann Graml : Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean. In: World History. Volume 35: Europe after World War II. Weltbild-Verlag, Augsburg 1998, p. 206.
- ^ Heinz A. Richter : Greece 1950–1974. Between democracy and dictatorship . Verlag FP Rutzen, Mainz / Ruhpolding 2013, ISBN 978-3-447-06908-3 , p. 309.
- ↑ Heiner Raulff: The military dictatorship in Greece. P. 346.
- ^ Heinz A. Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 312 f. See also: Woodhouse, Rise and Fall. P. 25 ff.
- ^ J. Patrice McSherry: Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. Rowman & Littlefield, 2012 ISBN 9780742568709 p. 39 ( online at Google.Books, accessed January 7, 2017.)
- ^ Daniele Ganser: NATO secret armies in Europe: Staged terror and covert warfare. Orelli Füssli, Zurich 2008, p. 336 ff.
- ^ Heinz A. Richter: Greece 1950–1974. Between democracy and dictatorship. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 306 f.
- ↑ CM Woodhouse : The Rise and the Fall of the Greek Colonels. Franklin Watts, New York 1985, p. 26 f. Quoted in: Heinz A. Richter: Greece 1950–1974. Between democracy and dictatorship. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 2013, p. 313.
- ↑ Louis Klarevas: Were the Eagle and the Phoenix Birds of a Feather? The United States and the Greek Coup of 1967 . Discussion Paper No. 15, Hellenic Observatory-European Institute, London School of Economics 2004, pp. 1-44 (citation p. 2) (accessed January 6, 2017.
- ↑ Pavlos Bakojannis: military rule in Greece. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1972, p. 100 f. Quoted in: Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 314.
- ^ Judges: Greece 1950–1974. P. 314.
- ^ Judges: Greece 1950–1974. P. 315.
- ↑ Der Spiegel: Greece Dictatorship . 19/1967, May 1, 1967, p. 112. & Richter, p. 319.
- ↑ FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United States): 1964-1968. XVI., Government Printing Office, Washington 1978, pp. 594-597.
- ^ James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. History and Power, 1950-1974 . UP North Carolina, Chapel Hill 2009, p. 135. In: Richter, p. 320.
- ^ Richter, p. 320.
- ^ Athènes-Presses Libre: Black Book of the Dictatorship in Greece. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1970, p. 48.
- ↑ Der Stern, 32/1967, pp. 16-23.
- ^ Black Book . P. 162, lists some cases, including Woodhouse: Rise and Fall. P. 33.
- ↑ In detail: Ingmar Beckett: Barbarism in Greece . Walker, New York 1970.
- ^ Black Book . P. 136.
- ↑ Judge 323-327. See also: Edition Europa Verlag: Zeittafel der Rechtsgeschichte: 1969
- ↑ Why did they give a coup, General? The refugee publisher Heleni Vlachou on the dictators in Athens. Der Spiegel, 3/1968, January 15, 1968, p. 84 f.
- ^ Richter, p. 327 f.
- ↑ Keesing's Contemporary Archives . Clogg & Yannopoulos, p. 22.027. In: Richter, p. 329 f.
- ^ Judges: Greece 1950–1974. P. 328.
- ^ Richter, p. 352.
- ↑ FRUS 1969–1976, XXX, p. 3. In: Richter, p. 330.
- ^ Richter, p. 331.
- ↑ FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 534 f.
- ↑ Information from: FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, pp 700-702 and Woodhouse: Rise and Fall. P. 44.
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall. P. 43.
- ^ Richter, p. 333.
- ↑ FRUS 1964-1968, XVI, p. 703 f.
- ↑ Woodhouse, p. 46.
- ^ Richter, p. 334.
- ^ Richter, p. 334.
- ^ Richter, p. 335.
- ^ Richter, p. 336.
- ↑ Woodhouse, p. 50.
- ^ H. Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 336 f.
- ↑ Der Spiegel 21/67: Greece. Dictatorship. After the locomotives. May 15, 1967, p. 120. in: Richter, p. 339.
- ^ Richter, p. 339.
- ^ Richter, p. 340.
- ↑ Richter: Ideology, Education, Culture. In: Greece 1950–1974. P. 349.
- ^ Richter, p. 349 f. and: Athenians [Rodis Roufos] Inside the Colonel's Greece (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), pp. 94f.
- ^ Richter, p. 350.
- ↑ Alexander Straßner : Military dictatorships in the 20th century. A comparison of motivation, domination techniques and modernization. Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2013, ISBN 978-3-658-02155-9 , p. 147.
- ^ Keesing's Contemporary Archives . In: Richter, p. 350.
- ^ Richter, p. 349.
- ↑ All quotations, dates and figures - unless otherwise stated - from Richter, p. 352 ff.
- ↑ Athenian, op.cit., P. 109.
- ↑ Der Spiegel, 32/1968 and 38/1968.
- ^ Arnd Krüger : A Cultural Revolution? The Boycott of the European Athletics Championships by the West German Team in Athens 1969, in: CESH (Ed.): Proceedings Fourth Annual Conference . Volume 1. Florence 1999, 162-166.
- ↑ Kathimerini : Eντος Tων Tειχων ( memento of the original from September 30, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . January 22, 2006.
- ↑ Eckart Spoo: Memories of a military coup ( Memento of the original from January 31, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. . In: Ossietzky 01/2013.
- ↑ Der Spiegel , No. 28/1969, p. 77 and 49/1973, p. 118 f.
- ↑ FRUS 1964–1968, XVI. P. 719 f.
- ↑ after: Richter, p. 358 f. and reference to FRUS 1969-1976, XXIX. Pp. 616-619.
- ^ Richter, p. 360 f.
- ↑ Keesing's Contemporary Archives , p. 24.238.
- ↑ Der Spiegel 6/1977, p. 77.
- ^ Edition Europa Verlag: Zeittafel der Rechtsgeschichte: 1969
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall. P. 112. and FRUS, XXX, 2007, p. 1f.
- ↑ Philipp Rock: Power, Markets and Morals - On the role of human rights in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the sixties and seventies. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2010, ISBN 978-3-631-59705-7 , pp. 88f.
- ↑ Der Spiegel: Greece. Foreign policy. 17/1979, p. 177.
- ↑ Der Spiegel: 45/1976, p. 104, 106. in Richter, p. 374.
- ^ Richter, p. 344.
- ^ Richter, 341 ff. And a .: Woodhouse, Rise and Fall. P. 53.
- ↑ Philipp Rock: Power, Markets and Morals - On the role of human rights in the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the sixties and seventies. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 2010, ISBN 978-3-631-59705-7 , p. 67 f. and 92.
- ^ Richter, p. 381. On the history of Deutsche Welle : Kostas Nikolaou, Ora Ellados': 21.40–22.40. Athens, Kochlias, 1975.
- ^ Richter, p. 341.
- ↑ after: Richter, p. 344 f.
- ↑ Woodhouse, Rise and Fall. P. 38 and 51.
- ↑ FRUS 1969–1976, XXX, p. 4.
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall, p. 116.
- ↑ FRUS 1969-1976, XXX, p. 5 f.
- ^ Richter, p. 387 f.
- ^ Richter, p. 388.
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall . P. 122.
- ↑ A first comprehensive presentation was given in: Der Spiegel 28 (July 3, 1972), p. 89.
- ^ Richter, p. 383.
- ↑ On this: Keesing's Contemporary Archives , p. 26.325; FRUS 1969-1976, XXX, p. 3 .; Der Spiegel 9 (February 26, 1973): Greece. Spiritual death. , P. 74 f.
- ^ Richter, p. 389; Keesing's Temporary Archives , p. 26.235.
- ^ Filippos Kavvadia: Edo Polytechneio. (Athens: Sakkoulas, 1974), p. 35 f. In: Richter, p. 390.
- ↑ Woodhouse: Rise and Fall. P. 138.
- ^ Richter, p. 394.
- ↑ Pavlos Bakojannis: The events in Greece . In: Sheets for German and international politics . No. 12 . Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, Cologne 1973, p. 1274 .
- ^ Richter, p. 394.
- ^ Richter, p. 407.
- ↑ "The honeymoon quickly ended as the nature of the new regime became apparent." In: FRUS 1969–1976, XXX, p. 33.
- ^ Richter, p. 413.
- ↑ FRUS 1969-1976, XXX, pp. 52-54.
- ^ Richter, p. 409.
- ↑ Richter, 412 f. Richter also gives a detailed account of the “shelf issue”, the legal and diplomatic background and the mutual reactions.
- ^ Richter, p. 418.
- ^ Richter, p. 419 ff.
- ↑ The War for Cyprus In: Der Spiegel, 34/1974, August 19, 1974, p. 53.
- ^ Heinz A. Richter: Greece 1950–1974. Between democracy and dictatorship . Verlag FP Rutzen, Mainz / Ruhpolding 2013, ISBN 978-3-447-06908-3 , pp. 418 and 432.
- ↑ Der Spiegel No. 31, July 29, 1974, pp. 40–49: When will the stars shine again? (P. 43)
- ^ HA Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 442.
- ^ HA Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 446.
- ↑ Der Spiegel, 31/1974, July 29, 1974, p. 46.
- ^ HA Richter: Greece 1950–1974. P. 446.
- ^ Richter, p. 446.
- ^ Richter, p. 447 f. and Keesing's Contemporary Archives, p. 26.783.
- ↑ Interview with Ioannidis in: Der Spiegel 38/1975, p. 121.
- ^ Richter, p. 448 ff.
- ^ Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), July 25, 1974, p. 2.
- ^ Richter, p. 446.
- ↑ Der Spiegel, 34/1974, August 19, 1974, p. 53.
- ^ Richter, p. 458.
- ^ Richter, p. 460.
- ↑ NZZ, August 19, 1974, p. 3.
- ^ Richter, p. 465.
- ^ Richter, p. 477.
- ↑ Heiner Raulff: The military dictatorship in Greece. In: Weltgeschichte Volume 35 - Europe after the Second World War. Weltbild Verlag, Augsburg 1998, ISBN 3-89350-989-5 , p. 346 f.
- ^ Kathimerini : Greek politics forty years on ( Memento of December 12, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) April 23, 2007.
