Alfred von Tirpitz

Alfred Peter Friedrich Tirpitz , from 1900 from Tirpitz (born March 19, 1849 in Küstrin ; † March 6, 1930 in Ebenhausen in Upper Bavaria ), was a German Grand Admiral , from 1897 to 1916 State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt and later a politician of the German Nationalists .

Alfred von Tirpitz (1916)

Life

family

Alfred von Tirpitz leaving the Reich Naval Office

Alfred von Tirpitz, painting by Lovis Corinth (1917)

Tirpitz was the son of the royal Prussian Privy Councilor Rudolf Tirpitz (1811–1905) and his wife Malwine nee. Hartmann (1815-1890). He married Marie Auguste Lipke (1860–1948), daughter of the liberal politician Gustav Lipke (1819–1889), in Berlin on November 18, 1884 . The couple had four children, including Wolfgang von Tirpitz, who fell into English captivity after the SMS Mainz was sunk , and Ilse, who married Ulrich von Hassell , who later became a diplomat and resister, in 1912 . Alfred von Tirpitz was raised to the Prussian nobility on June 12, 1900 in Bad Homburg vor der Höhe . Tirpitz was a member of the Federation of Freemasons ( Lodge : To the honest heart ) in Frankfurt (Oder) .

Military career

Alfred Tirpitz began his military career on April 24, 1865 in the Prussian Navy with the rank of cadet , on June 24, 1866 he was appointed sea ​​cadet , and on August 1, 1866 he began his nautical training on the sailing training ship SMS Musquito , which after returned on a trip from Kiel to the western Mediterranean in June 1867. After joining the Navy of the North German Confederation on June 24, 1869, Tirpitz was promoted to sub-lieutenant on September 22, 1869 ; It was followed by the sea lieutenant on May 25, 1872, the lieutenant captain on November 18, 1875 , the corvette captain on September 17, 1881, and finally the sea captain on November 24, 1888 . On May 13, 1895 he reached the rank of Contreadmiral ; this title corresponded to the rear admiral after the Germanization at the beginning of 1899 . On 5 December 1899 he was appointed vice-admiral appointed on 14 November 1903 Admiral promoted.

With the Highest Cabinet Order (AKO) , Alfred von Tirpitz was awarded the rank and title of Grand Admiral on January 27, 1911, although he was not awarded a Grand Admiral's baton and instead of wearing the crossed marshal's baton on his shoulder pieces, he was instead allowed to wear four stars. The permission to use the rank of "Grand Admiral" was intended as an award for his services in building the Navy; the full regalia of a Grand Admiral, however, was denied to him due to the fact that he had never led a naval command as naval commander. He ended his military career on March 15, 1916 when he retired.

Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz is considered to be the founder of the German deep sea fleet . The aim was to create a fleet that, although not as strong as the British fleet, should at least represent a risk threat for the sea power Great Britain in the event of a war against the German Reich . This is how the German-British arms race came about . The fleet created in this way is sometimes referred to as the risk fleet , the existence of which was at least seen as a threat by Great Britain in the imperialist rivalry in the run-up to the First World War .

Differences of opinion with Wilhelm II about the use of the fleet in the war led to the departure of the Grand Admiral from military service. Wilhelm II himself reports, however, that the Reich Chancellor von Bethmann had demanded the dismissal of the Grand Admiral, since all state secretaries were subordinate to him and he was in charge as Chancellor.

"Tirpitz Plan"

Together with the appointment of Bernhard von Bülow as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Alfred von Tirpitz was appointed as the successor to Friedrich von Hollmann as State Secretary of the Reichsmarineamt in 1897 in order to realize Wilhelm II's favorite project, the expansion of the German deep sea fleet, as a decision-maker in the field of German foreign policy to help. This project is called the “Tirpitz Plan”. Tirpitz's head of propaganda was Ernst Levy von Halle .

Sea armament was not a specifically German matter. Great Britain had massively increased its fleet with large ships under the Naval Defense Act 1889 . The new paradigm of the two-power standard went back to Alfred Thayer Mahan and his epoch-making book The Influence of Sea Power upon History from 1890. “Thinking in terms of battleships” began.

In order to be able to implement this project, for which Tirpitz had estimated 20 years, in the long term, Bülow initially relied consistently on the maintenance of peace. For the time being, calm seemed necessary for the fleet to be built. Because it was a matter of "crossing a world political danger zone as undisturbed as possible until Germany could step forward with the sword sharpened in silence". Bülow ensured that the framework conditions were created so that Tirpitz's demand for a considerable expansion of the fleet could be realized.

The building of the navy was supposed to be a kind of substitute for an alliance and encourage the breakout from continental narrowness; At the same time, it was supposed to offer the solution to the phenomena of steady population growth, often referred to as the great problems of the time, and the need to create new markets to enable steadily advancing industrial expansion; In addition, it was supposed to satisfy the hunger for prestige that prevailed in many circles in the country and was often represented in the media. It was supposed to ensure independence in foreign policy and help to achieve global political magnitude, which in turn would then also permanently consolidate the domestic political situation.

Tirpitz believed that his naval construction plan would also have the effect of preventing parliamentarization and democratization of Prussian-German constitutionalism through a successful foreign policy. Industrialists, agrarians and the military were to become the basis for the politics of the empire on the basis of common interests. The rallying of these “state-maintaining forces” should be directed primarily against the threat posed by social democracy. The aim was to win the worker over to an economically and foreign-politically successful empire by appealing to his national sentiments, whereby the crown ultimately saw itself as the decisive integration factor. Therefore, the change to the personal regiment of the emperor with his Bonapartist features, which began at the same time as the naval construction, did not take place by accident. Wilhelm II, who at the turn of the century still believed that social democracy was only a temporary phenomenon, was informed by the election result of 1903 at the latest that this assumption was wrong and that the structural crisis of the empire had not seen any improvement. It became clear that naval politics and imperialism could never achieve the broad power base they were aiming for.

At the beginning of the fleet building program, the emperor hesitated between two structural alternatives when it came to implementing the fleet building program: should he build a cruiser fleet ( reconnaissance ships) that could demonstrate German presence on all oceans to protect the colonies, or should he opt for a battle fleet decide which was to be stationed in the North Sea against Great Britain?

On this question, Admiral von Tirpitz worked out a memorandum with the inconspicuous title “General aspects in determining our fleet according to ship classes and types”. Right at the beginning of the memorandum, he rejected the cruiser war as a hopeless strategy for Germany. In order to be able to strive for supremacy in the North Sea, it is necessary to build a large number of ships of the line (capital ships) that are suitable for fighting in the line and that would not be so quickly sunk in an emergency.

About the planned number of ships of the line Tirpitz said at this time that a number of two squadrons of eight ships of the line each with a reserve ship could be achieved by 1905. Wilhelm II agreed with the views of State Secretary Tirpitz and began, initially against the resistance of the Reichstag, to initiate the construction of the battle fleet. With the two naval laws of 1898 and in particular that of 1900, which essentially determined the future development of German naval armament, the foundation stone was laid for the construction of the battle fleet, which the German historian Volker R. Berghahn called the "Tirpitz Plan"; in the novellas of 1906, 1908 and 1912 he found consistently pursued and systematically adapted additions. Over a period of two decades a battle fleet of ships of the line was to be built that could stand up to Great Britain. Only then did one believe that Germany's great power status could be consolidated internationally.

Offensive and defensive elements were irrevocably included in the seemingly confusing risk concept that was at the center of the Tirpitz Plan. For the British, an attack on the German fleet should become an incalculable risk that they would not dare to take. Should it nevertheless come to a military conflict, a victory of the Royal Navy would only amount to a Pyrrhic victory, which, given its own high losses, would mean defeat. In any case, Great Britain would lose the already dubious "Two Power Standard", a maxim of the British Admiralty, which said that the British fleet must always be at least as strong as that of the two next great sea powers combined in order to be able to cope with the task to be sufficiently capable of securing the existing world empire. In the event of a conflict with Germany, for example, it could easily have fallen victim to the then superior naval forces of the French and Russians, who for many years were considered the Empire's most dangerous competitors.

There was something illusory about such a bold plan. A great power like the German Empire could hardly say goodbye to world politics for a few years in order to rearm in peace and quiet. Also, sooner or later Britain had to respond to the challenge. Since the autumn of 1902, individual British cabinet members became aware of the offensive character of Tirpitz's battle fleet construction concept. From 1904 onwards there was a British-French cooperation, so that the British naval forces could be strengthened in the North Sea. The arms race took on a completely new dimension when Great Britain began in 1906 with the construction of a new, qualitatively superior ship type, the " Dreadnought " class. Soon afterwards, the final failure of the Tirpitz Plan began to emerge. The only naval officer who publicly criticized the Tirpitz Plan from 1907 onwards was Vice Admiral Karl Galster , whose alternative ideas about small-scale warfare at sea did not prevail.

See also : Risk Theory (Military)

Political consequences of the Tirpitz Plan

• In terms of domestic politics, Tirpitz intended to legally stipulate the scope of the navy (similar to the army) in order to reduce the influence of the Reichstag on the navy. Through skillful handling of the Reichstag and well-organized propaganda campaigns, he succeeded in getting very close to this goal with the consent of the Reichstag.
• From the start, Tirpitz had in mind a fleet that should be 2/3 the strength of the British fleet. He did not publicly name this goal.
• Because of the enormous costs of building the fleet, savings had to be made in other areas. This particularly affected the army. Tirpitz had it relatively easy because there were strong forces in the army command who wanted to hold the army exclusively in order to prevent the intrusion of bourgeois and social democratic elements. One consequence of this, however, was that the land power Germany had fewer trained soldiers than France at the beginning of the First World War.
• The idea of ​​building the fleet inconspicuously and only using it as a means of power after its completion was in principle correct, but unrealistic given a construction period of 20 years. You can't propaganda for years about something that the people don't see. Of course, it was also not possible to hide the construction of such a large fleet from the outside world. In addition, the emperor tended to brag about "his" fleet at every opportunity . In any case, the fleet could only be used as a political threat if the potential opponents knew about it.
• By 1905 at the latest it was clear that Germany could not even win the arms race on the basis of 2/3 of British strength. Nevertheless, Tirpitz and the Kaiser strictly refused to even think about armaments limitation.
• The fact that Great Britain did not have to enter into the decisive battle aimed at by Tirpitz in the first days of the war, but could use its fleet to blockade at a distance beyond the reach of the German fleet , had already been discussed in simulation games in 1898. No political consequences were drawn from this. Tirpitz also made no effort to make this alternative really clear to the Kaiser.

Politics as State Secretary in the World War

Tirpitz, who saw the war goal question as the main question of the world war, pushed for annexations mainly in the west in order to “further develop Germany as a world power”. For Germany's "sea control" you need Belgium, the possession of Zeebrugge and Ostend , because the main enemy is Great Britain, so he pleaded for a separate Russian peace and even wanted to give Russia access to the free ocean. No matter how large a continental country Germany may be, it can only maintain and expand its position in the world through undisturbed world trade and in the fight against Great Britain. Tirpitz lamented Germany's "policy of uncertainty, indecision, the predominance of a humanitarian ideology over healthy self-preservation, the policy of overjustice for the neutrals at the expense of vital German interests, begging for peace and serving all around". He demanded energetic warfare regardless of diplomatic and commercial consequences and advocated the utmost use of all weapons (unrestricted submarine warfare ). The attitude of his group, which was generally oriented towards the west, towards the British Empire was based on envy and hatred on the one hand, but also on admiration and imitation at the same time.

During the World War and even before it, it came into conflict with the policy of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg , who pursued a policy of understanding with Great Britain and viewed the fleet as an instrument of the defensive. In the Chancellor's view, victory should be by land, not sea. He came into conflict with Tirpitz, who wanted to use the fleet offensively against the British Home Fleet before it could develop its greatest effectiveness in 1916. This was intended to tie up British forces and weaken their operations overseas, which contributed to relieving the burden on the neutral states and the German supply routes by sea. In addition, according to Tirpitz, the land forces should be relieved and the morale of the navy should be strengthened. A fleet that was idle in the port ( fleet-in-being ) was a potential source of unrest and would, in retrospect, reduce German naval construction policy before the war to absurdity. Unrestricted submarine warfare was also wrong, as it was initiated much too late. It had been neglected to bring it to its greatest effectiveness in 1916, as British naval policy and capacity could still be effectively combated.

In March 1916 there was strong criticism of the German naval leadership in the press and the Reichstag, which came to a head in a report on the (supposed) fleet numbers in the Bundesrat. Heinrich Löhlein , who was already in the criticism of von Bethmann Hollweg, had presented this on behalf of von Tirpitz. On March 12, 1916, Tirpitz submitted his resignation as State Secretary of the Naval Office, which was approved four days later. In a conversation with Paul Felisch on April 1, Tirpitz blames the Reich Chancellor's inept public relations for his resignation. Felisch, who was then head of the judicial department at the Naval Office, quotes his former superior as follows: “The intensified submarine war, as the Chancellor now puts it, is the submarine war that we have always had. [...] The Chancellor cannot make up his mind to enforce a firm will, and that is why the neutrals believe that we are weak. In this way, belief in our victory is undermined around the world. If we didn't want to follow the memorandum, we shouldn't have put it into the world. ”However, this statement was more of a justification, especially since Tirpitz only thought in purely military matters and not the foreign policy consequences of the submarine war considered.

According to British press reports, the empire was "at the end" in nine months in 1916. He also complained about the confusion of competencies in the fleet command , which was divided between the Emperor, Chancellor, Cabinet and General Staff . This prevents the naval forces from reacting flexibly. His demand for central authority based on the model of the British Admiralty fell on deaf ears with the aforementioned bodies and led to his resignation in 1916. From 1908 to 1918 Tirpitz was a member of the Prussian manor house .

Fatherland Party and German National

In 1917 Tirpitz was co-founder and chairman of the Pan-German and nationalist- oriented Fatherland Party . The right-wing radical Wolfgang Kapp was his deputy, who built the political apparatus together with Heinrich Claß and Conrad Freiherr von Wangenheim . This is where the opponents of a mutual agreement gathered , who in opposition to the majority in the Reichstag led the fight against the peace resolution . The Fatherland Party was an extra-parliamentary movement from the right, with the claim to the integration of all right-wing parties and associations. For the first time, the concept of extra-parliamentary mobilization from the right was implemented. At its peak, in the summer of 1918, the party had over 1.25 million members. The Fatherland Party was shaped by “Caesarist rule-thinking”, with Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg as “people's emperors” being built up propagandistically with the goal of a “plebiscite military state ”, whose legitimacy was based on war and war aims, as an alternative to the parliamentarization of the Reich. Internally, there were calls for a coup d'etat from the right under the leadership of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, if necessary also against the Kaiser. With the Naval Association , the coup plans of 1915 and the Fatherland Party, Tirpitz proved that he was ready for political agitation using the instrument of a mass party and the means of propaganda, as well as for a coup d'état against the Kaiser and a military dictatorship.

From 1924 Tirpitz was a member of the Reichstag as a member of the German National People's Party (DNVP) , from which he withdrew in 1928 and ended his political work. In the same year he moved into a villa built for him in Feldafing and died on March 6, 1930 in Ebenhausen near Munich. His grave is in the forest cemetery in Munich .

Honors

Postponed order of the Grand Admiral Tirpitz. Exhibited in the International Maritime Museum Hamburg .

Street sign of Tirpitzstrasse in Flensburg - Mürwik in 2015.

Tirpitz received numerous orders, honorary citizenships and honorary doctorates from the Georg-August University in Göttingen (1913, Dr. iur. Utr. Hc) and the Royal Technical University of Berlin (1916, Dr.-Ing. Eh).

• In the Imperial Navy, the outpost boat Großadmiral von Tirpitz was named after him.
• The battleship Tirpitz , sister ship of the Bismarck , was named after him.
• The main building of the torpedo station in Flensburg - Mürwik was named "Tirpitz barracks". The street leading to the torpedo station was also given the name Tirpitzstraße on January 9, 1914. This was officially renamed Osterallee (see there ) after the Second World War . Today, however, there are again some signs with the original name on the street.
• The naval base in Kiel includes the Tirpitz harbor and the Tirpitz pier.
• A pier area at the Wilhelmshaven naval base is called the Tirpitz Bridge.
• The Berlin Reichpietschufer (in front of the Reichsmarineamt) was called Tirpitzufer from 1933 to 1947.
• In many cities (Hamm, Oberhausen, Oldenburg, Plön and am) there is a Tirpitzstraße.
• The Tirpitz Mountains on Lavongai Island in Papua New Guinea are named after him.
• The plant genus Tirpitzia Hallier f. from the linaceae family is named after him.

Fonts (selection)

• Memories . KF Koehler, Berlin / Leipzig 1919; 6th revised and improved edition, by Hase & Koehler, Berlin / Leipzig 1942.
• The building of the German world power . Cotta Nachf., Stuttgart / Berlin 1924.
• Political documents. German powerlessness policy in the world war. Hanseatic Publishing House, Hamburg / Berlin 1926.

literature

• Volker R. Berghahn : The Tirpitz Plan. The genesis and decline of a domestic political crisis strategy under Wilhelm II. Droste, Düsseldorf 1971, ISBN 3-7700-0258-X .
• Michael Epkenhans : The Wilhelmine armor of the fleet 1908–1914. Striving for world power, industrial progress, social integration (= contributions to military history. Volume 32). Oldenbourg, Munich 1991, ISBN 3-486-55880-3 (At the same time: Münster, Universität, Dissertation, 1989).
• Michael Epkenhans: Tirpitz and the failure of the Imperial Navy in the First World War. In: Oliver von Mengersen (ed.): People - social movements - parties. Contributions to the latest history. Festschrift for Hartmut Soell. Manutius, Heidelberg 2004, ISBN 3-934877-32-X , pp. 15-36.
• Michael Epkenhans: Tirpitz. Architect of the German high sea fleet. Potomac, Washington DC 2008, ISBN 978-1-57488-444-9 .
• Michael Epkenhans, Jörg Hillmann and Frank Nägler: Skagerrakschlacht. Prehistory - event - processing (= contributions to military history . Volume 66). Oldenbourg, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-486-58803-3 .
• Holger H. Herwig : "Luxury" Fleet - The Imperial German Navy 1888–1918. Routledge Library Editons, Humanity Books, 1987.
• Rolf Hobson : Maritime Imperialism. Sea power ideology, sea strategy thinking and the Tirpitz plan 1875 to 1914 (= contributions to military history. Volume 61). Oldenbourg, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-486-56671-7 ( online ).
• Christian Jentzsch: From cadets to admirals. The British and German Naval Officer Corps 1871 to 1914 , Berlin / Boston (De Gruyter Oldenbourg) 2018. ISBN 978-3-11-060499-3 . ISBN 978-3-11-060897-7 . ISBN 978-3-11-060631-7
• Baldur Kaulisch: Alfred von Tirpitz and the imperialist German naval armor. A political biography. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1982; 3rd revised edition military publishing house of the GDR, Berlin 1988, ISBN 3-327-00651-2 .
• Patrick J. Kelly: Tirpitz and the Imperial German Navy. Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 2011, ISBN 0-253-35593-1 .
• Horst Dieter Reinhardt: Tirpitz and the German fleet idea in the years 1892–1898. Nolte, Marburg 1964 (at the same time: Marburg, university, philosophical faculty, dissertation, 1964).
• Christian Rödel: Warriors, thinkers, amateurs. Alfred von Tirpitz and the naval war picture before the First World War. Steiner, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-515-08360-X .
• Jan Rüger: The Great Naval Game. Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-87576-9 .
• Michael Salewski : Tirpitz. Rise, power, failure. Musterschmidt, Göttingen 1979, ISBN 3-7881-0103-2 .
• Lawrence Sondhaus: Preparing for World Politics. German sea power before the Tirpitz era. Naval Institute, Annapolis MD 1997, ISBN 1-55750-745-7 .

Web links

Commons : Alfred von Tirpitz  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Literature by and about Alfred von Tirpitz in the catalog of the German National Library
• Newspaper article about Alfred von Tirpitz in the 20th century press kit of the ZBW - Leibniz Information Center for Economics .
• Alfred von Tirpitz in the database of members of the Reichstag
• Lutz Walther: Alfred von Tirpitz. Tabular curriculum vitae in the LeMO ( DHM and HdG )
• Was Tirpitz planning a coup? Albert Hopman's Diaries . In: Die Zeit , No. 44/2004
• Alfred von Tirpitz's estate in the Federal Archives-Military Archives in Freiburg

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Eugen Lennhoff, Oskar Posner, Dieter A. Binder: Internationales Freemaurerlexikon . Revised and expanded new edition of the 1932 edition, Munich 2003, ISBN 3-7766-2161-3 .
   Famous Freemasons Alfred von Tirpitz. Grand Lodge of British Columbia and Yukon; Retrieved May 3, 2012
2. ^ Ernst Dietrich von Mirbach: Prince Heinrich of Prussia , Cologne, Weimar a. a. 2013, p. 311.
3. ^ Wilhelm II .: Events and Figures 1878-1918. Publishing house KF Koehler, Leipzig / Berlin, 1922, p. 205
4. ↑ Michael Salewski, Jürgen Elvert, Stefan Lippert: The Germans and the Sea. Studies on German naval history in the 19th and 20th centuries. Steiner, Stuttgart 1998, ISBN 3-515-07319-1 , p. 272.
5. ↑ Klaus Hildebrand : The past realm. German foreign policy from Bismarck to Hitler 1871–1945. Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58605-3 , p. 200.
6. ^ Alfred von Tirpitz: Political documents. German powerlessness policy in the world war . Hamburg / Berlin 1926. pp. 59 and 62 and 579.
7. ^ Alfred von Tirpitz: Political documents. German powerlessness policy in the world war . Hamburg / Berlin 1926. pp. 63, 400, 479 and 578.
8. ^ Egmont Zechlin: Problems of the war calculation and the end of the war in the First World War . In: Egmont Zechlin: War and War Risk. On German politics in the First World War '. Essays . Düsseldorf 1979. pp. 32-50, here: p. 44.
9. ^ Henry Cord Meyer: Central Europe in German Thought and Action 1815-1945. The Hague 1955, p. 134.
   Christian Graf von Krockow : Kaiser Wilhelm II and his time. Biography of an Era. Siedler, Berlin 1999, ISBN 3-88680-666-9 , p. 137.
10. ↑ Patrick J. Kelly: Tirpitz: And the Imperial German Navy . Indiana University Press, 2011, ISBN 978-0-253-00175-7 , pp. 408 ( google.de [accessed on May 6, 2020]).
11. ↑ Paul Felisch: Memoirs. A career in the empire . Eick, Kiel 2015, p. 131-132 .
12. ^ Tirpitz: Memories . 1919, p. 370 f.
13. ^ Gordon A. Craig: German History 1866-1945. Munich 1980, p. 339.
14. ↑ Dirk Stegmann: From neoconservatism to protofascism. Conservative party, clubs and associations 1893–1920. In: Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Peter-Christian Witt (eds.): German conservatism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Festschrift for Fritz Fischer on his 75th birthday. Bonn 1983, ISBN 3-87831-369-1 , pp. 199–230, here: p. 219.
15. ^ Karl Dietrich Erdmann: The First World War . Munich 1980. (= Gebhardt: Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte Volume 18). ISBN 3-423-04218-4 . P. 210f. And Dirk Stegmann: From neoconservatism to protofascism. Conservative party, clubs and associations 1893–1920. In: Dirk Stegmann, Bernd-Jürgen Wendt, Peter-Christian Witt (eds.): German conservatism in the 19th and 20th centuries. Festschrift for Fritz Fischer on his 75th birthday. Bonn 1983, ISBN 3-87831-369-1 , pp. 199–230, here: p. 219.
16. ^ Egmont Zechlin: Germany between cabinet war and economic war. Politics and Warfare in the First Months of the World War 1914 . In: Historische Zeitschrift (HZ) 199 (1964). Pp. 347–458, here p. 433 f.
17. ↑ Volker Giessler, Stephanie Jozwiak, Daniel Schuler: Alfred von Tirpitz estate. Federal Archives, archived from the original on October 31, 2014 ; accessed on May 12, 2020 . 
18. ↑ Villa colony on the Höhenberg. Feldafing municipality , accessed on April 15, 2020 . 
19. ^ Tirpitzufer . In: Street name lexicon of the Luisenstädtischer Bildungsverein
20. ↑ Lotte Burkhardt: Directory of eponymous plant names - Extended Edition. Part I and II. Botanic Garden and Botanical Museum Berlin , Freie Universität Berlin , Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-946292-26-5 doi: 10.3372 / epolist2018 .