German Peace Union

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The German Peace Union (DFU) was a small party founded in 1960 in the Federal Republic of Germany , the election results of which were insufficient for entry into a parliament. In 1984 she gave up her party status. On June 6, 1990, the last union day of the DFU, after the end of financial support from the SED, decided to dissolve the federal organization. Individual regional associations, however, continued to work for a few years.

History and program of the DFU

founding

In the October 1960 issue of the Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik , a “call for collection” appeared for the first time, dated October 15, which called for a union of all friends of German-German understanding and opponents of nuclear armament, regardless of their ideological direction. The call came from groups such as the Franconian Circle , in which opponents of the plans for a European Defense Community had organized in 1953 , and the German Club in 1954 . The initiative apparently came from the Würzburg political scientist Franz Paul Schneider . In the same issue an appeal from representatives of the ecclesiastical brotherhoods of the Evangelical Church in Germany (“Heidelberg Conference”) with a similar thrust was printed.

In response to these calls, 36 people met in Frankfurt am Main on October 29, 1960 and decided to found a party that was to agree on a “political emergency program”. Viktor Agartz had invited for the "Central Committee of the excluded and resigned Social Democrats ", Renate Riemeck for the International of the war opponents , Wilhelm Elfes for the Bund der Deutschen , Franz Paul Schneider for the Franconian District, Karl Graf von Westphalen for the German Club 1954 and Hans Wirtz , a Catholic writer. They decided on a founding appeal, which was then signed by 158 people. The spectrum consisted of socialist and “more left-wing bourgeois” circles, but was also explicitly aimed at members of the KPD, which was banned in 1956 . The appeal was a reaction to political developments in the Federal Republic of Germany, which the signatories considered to be “a ruin”, in particular rearmament and integration into the West . It was important for the founding of the party that on the one hand the SPD with its commitment to national defense and the Godesberg program as a parliamentary contact person for pacifist and neutralist positions failed in practice, on the other hand there were international signs in John F. Kennedy's politics of overcoming the Cold War in favor of one Recognize détente.

The party was finally founded on December 17, 1960 in Stuttgart . Even at this point, however, it became clear that it had not been possible to form a broad collection movement. The new party was more of an alliance "of communists and socialists, left Christians [...] from various pacifist organizations and some bourgeois- conservative personalities". Among other things, Agartz resigned at this stage because he considered an explicitly socialist party to be necessary that was not compatible with the collection concept that the majority wanted. But even bourgeois activists such as Alexander Graf Schenk von Stauffenberg and Robert Scholl withdrew because the emphasis on neutralist ideas was not strong enough for them, and oriented themselves in the direction of national-neutralist endeavors, which later led to the Action Community of Independent Germans . On the other hand, the party was successful in trying to win Protestant Christians from the tradition of the Confessing Church . Among other things, the Darmstadt student pastor Herbert Mochalski , who had been managing director of the Brotherhood Council of the EKD from 1948 to 1951 and later belonged to the All-German People's Party , stood for this. Evangelical Christians and pastors in particular had a long-term, significant share in DFU activities.

When the party was founded, regardless of whether everyone involved was aware of this, the strategy of the SED played an important role. After the KPD ban , for example, the KPD leadership, which had evaded to East Berlin, oriented in 1958 to create a gathering movement “from all parties and strata of the population” that could take part in the 1961 federal election. In the years that followed, the SED observed the development of oppositional associations in the Federal Republic and issued the tactical motto of “advancing such an alliance into the ranks of the bourgeoisie” and “influencing” it politically, as can be seen from a meeting of the SED Politburo from 1960 emerged. Hubertus Knabe interpreted the relationship between the founders and the SED in such a way that the DFU was founded “at the background of the SED and the GDR State Security ”. However, this has been put into perspective several times. Rolf Schönfeldt points out that although the alliance strategy of the illegal KPD leadership in East Berlin was important for the founding and development of the party, the currents within the DFU were very heterogeneous in character. Manfred Rowold also states that there were massive clashes between communist and “bourgeois” forces in the DFU, which by no means went entirely in favor of the communist side.

Founding program and first election campaign

The first program of the DFU (1960) aimed at a minimal consensus in accordance with the founding history; socio-political and ideological determinations were largely dispensed with. It defined the reunification of Germany as the main goal, which would be opposed by the bloc confrontation and armament. The demands were derived from this: strict rejection of nuclear weapons, disarmament in Central Europe in accordance with the Rapacki Plan , neutrality of all of Germany in the bloc confrontation and direct negotiations between the Federal Republic and the GDR . Another part of the consensus was that these goals could not be achieved without cooperation with communists and against the Soviet Union . The most important domestic political goal was to oppose the emergency laws planned by the federal government . In other policy areas, there were only very general demands, for example for “social security and intellectual development opportunities”, which would be made possible by reducing the defense budget.

The party's first board of directors consisted of three people: Renate Riemeck , Karl von Westphalen and Lorenz Knorr . The only noteworthy activity in the first few months of its existence was an intense campaign for the 1961 federal election . The election campaign management was in the hands of Klaus Rainer Röhl , the editor of the magazine concrete , who was close to the illegal KPD. Riemeck managed to get Albert Schweitzer 's permission to use his name to advertise the election of the DFU. The election posters showed the pictures of Schweitzer, who enjoyed great popularity as a Nobel Peace Prize laureate , and Riemeck. The Federal President Theodor Heuss received the answer to his letter to Schweitzer that he had allowed the DFU to use his name, but not his picture, but would not do anything about it.

The election campaign was initially quite promising; Election forecasts indicated that four to seven percent of the vote could be expected. The electoral success of the German Democratic Union , which was very close to the DFU and later became its Saarland state association, in the state elections in Saarland in December 1960 also had an encouraging effect : 5.0 percent of the votes and thus entry into the Saarland state parliament . The SPD publicly demanded a ban on the DFU, which it called the front organization of the banned KPD; However, the CDU did not join this demand for reasons of election tactics, because it trusted the DFU to win votes at the expense of the SPD. However, the construction of the Berlin Wall , which fell in the middle of the hot phase of the election campaign, had an extremely negative effect on the election prospects of the DFU . After this event, a policy of reunification under the auspices of neutrality no longer seemed realistic. In addition, the federal office of the DFU announced immediately after the construction of the wall that this (referred to in the declaration as the “new control measures in Berlin”) was due to the “anti-negotiation policy in Germany” of the West German politicians, an assessment that by no means in the DFU was generally shared and led, among other things, to the resignation of the Bremen regional association chairman, Robert Hartke . The DFU only received about 600,000 votes (1.9 percent) and thus failed very clearly at the 5 percent hurdle .

Wing fights and further parliamentary candidates

Poster for the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 1964

After the election defeat in 1961, violent wing battles followed. In the relatively weak state association of Lower Saxony , a national-neutralist wing was able to establish itself under the leadership of state chairman Gerhard Bednarski , who came from the League of Expelled Germans , but also had connections to the right-wing German Reich Party . With his draft of a new party program, he tried to follow up on the militant peasant demonstrations, which were relatively frequent at the time, in order to open up new potential for the DFU, especially in the countryside in the agriculturally dominated Lower Saxony. Bednarski's conservative orientation also led him to attempt to force the communist members and the Bund der Deutschen out of the DFU. In this trial of strength with the party headquarters, he pulled the short straw and was expelled from the party in 1963, along with a group of right-wing exponents within the DFU. The result in the state elections in Lower Saxony in 1963 was extremely weak after these disputes (0.6 percent compared to 1.3 percent in the state of Lower Saxony in the 1961 federal election); but also other state elections brought only slightly better results (best of all, the state elections in Hamburg in 1961 with 2.9 percent of the vote).

There were further internal party conflicts in the run-up to the 1965 Bundestag election . The bourgeois forces received a clear majority in the federal executive committee of 1965, of 60 executive committee members only three were communists. Before the election, there were attempts from East Berlin to prevent the DFU from running independently for the Bundestag, as it was considered more tactically more promising to support the SPD in order to prevent the CDU from winning again. Nevertheless, in June 1965 , KPD chairman Max Reimann called for the election of the DFU from East Berlin, but then had to put up with being publicly referred to as an “uninvited election worker”. At the beginning of August, Walter Ulbricht again publicly indicated that a voting decision could make sense for the SPD. Despite these uncertainties, the DFU ran for the Bundestag election in September, with a list of candidates that consisted of around a quarter of former KPD or FDJ functionaries, but suffered another heavy defeat with only 1.3 percent of the votes.

The DFU committees then took into account the urgent requests from East Berlin and waived a candidacy in the state elections of 1966 in favor of an election call for the SPD. With the formation of the grand coalition in November 1966, however, the political situation changed fundamentally, and the SPD came under government responsibility. The DFU then took part in the state elections of 1967 and achieved its absolute best result in Bremen with 4.2 percent. This year's elections were the last parliamentary elections in which the DFU took part across the board with independent candidacies. As a DFU, the party only put up “counting candidates” in individual constituencies in state elections or in individual local elections, presumably so as not to lose their party status.

Extra-parliamentary work and electoral alliances

The DFU was now more involved in extra-parliamentary initiatives, in particular the Easter march movement and the fight against the emergency laws. In doing so, however, she repeatedly encountered criticism on the part of these initiatives, which were actually benevolent towards her. In 1965, for example, Andreas Buro protested in a letter to the federal executive committee of the DFU against attempts to use the Easter marchers for candidacies of the DFU and insisted on the party-political neutrality of the peace initiatives. The DFU was also viewed with skepticism among the New Left , particularly because of its character as an alliance party. However, her organizational competence and the many years of experience of her functionaries earned her a certain status.

This change in strategy was also associated with a programmatic reorientation. While the election program of 1965 still envisaged reunification via a German confederation as a goal, the Hanau program of 1968 dropped this apparently unrealistic goal and now demanded recognition of the GDR by the German government. In the domestic political field, too, the party was now more committed than in its first years: the socialization of key industries and the democratization of society were among the Hanau demands. Nevertheless, all noteworthy activities of the party continued to focus on peace and Germany policy as well as the emergency laws.

As early as the end of 1966, individual DFU politicians, such as Lorenz Knorr, had considered creating a new broad left alliance for the 1969 Bundestag election. This plan, which was pursued outside the DFU mainly by Professors Wolfgang Abendroth , Werner Hofmann and Helmut Ridder ( Gießener Kreis ), however, led to a much narrower alliance than intended, which barely went beyond the boundaries of the DFU and the later DKP. The electoral alliance Democratic Left , which was formed for the Baden-Württemberg state elections in 1968 , and which the DFU helped to establish in 1967, achieved only 2.3 percent; In addition, there was considerable resistance to this alliance in the DFU, because former KPD functionaries appeared there in far greater numbers than in the DFU. Among other things, the second state chairman of the DFU in Baden-Württemberg resigned in protest against the alliance. The DFU also took part in the campaign for democratic progress in the 1969 Bundestag election; Of course, apart from the DFU, it was only able to collect the Bund der Deutschen, the Democratic Left and the newly founded German Communist Party and experienced a downright fiasco in the election with not even 200,000 votes, i.e. a third of the votes that the DFU alone had achieved in 1961 .

The failures of these alliances, both with their supporters and with the voters, were and are mainly attributed to the participation of the DKP, which among other things unreservedly supported the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Prague in 1968 . The DFU was far more ambivalent on this topic. Arno Behrisch also publicly welcomed the intervention at a federal executive committee meeting on August 31, 1968, but received severe headwinds. On the following day, a board resolution was passed and published which explicitly expressed regret about the invasion and spoke somewhat vaguely of "different opinions". Nevertheless, the DFU stuck to the alliance with the DKP and remained closely linked to it in the long term. However, the re-establishment of a legal communist party also meant that the DFU lost numerous members who switched to the DKP. Rolf Schönfeldt summed up: "With the founding of the DKP, the DFU lost its communist wing."

The Krefeld appeal

Since 1972, the DFU has been heavily involved in a new topic, namely the fight against the so-called radical decree . Your board members Horst Bethge and Erich Roßmann were among the founders of the initiative Weg mit den Berufsverbot! . From the mid-1970s, disarmament policy turned again. The reason was initially the discussion about the neutron bomb and later, above all, the decision by NATO to set up Pershing rockets and cruise missiles in Europe and especially on German soil, the so-called NATO double decision .

In the dispute over this NATO decision, the DFU achieved its “greatest success in mobilization”, namely the Krefeld appeal , which was drafted in 1980 by Gert Bastian and DFU board member Josef Weber . It gave the impetus to a large-scale signature campaign against the NATO decision, in the course of which, according to the initiators, more than five million signatures were collected. Whether this number was correct is uncertain; However, the campaign had an impact far beyond the DFU environment and, via Bastian and Petra Kelly, reached the spectrum of the emerging party The Greens and large parts of the SPD.

Cooperation with communists had been one of the publicly represented principles of the DFU since it was founded. The cooperation with the DKP in particular remained close. Nevertheless, there were also public differences at exposed points. This was especially true for Wolf Biermann's expatriation from the GDR in 1976 . The DFU board member Arno Behrisch called this act in sharp contrast to the official line of the DKP as a "violation of human rights", and the DFU -affiliated Deutsche Volkszeitung also opened its columns to prominent DKP members who protested against Biermann's expatriation, such as the Munich Professor Horst Holzer . However, these differences could not endanger the close relationship with the DKP in the long term.

Abandonment of party status and dissolution

After the peace movement subsided, the DFU gave up the status of a political party in 1984 and called itself a "political association". In the following years she participated in the peace list , which also put up numerous candidates coming from the DFU in elections, but without achieving success. When there was no financial support from the GDR in 1989, the DFU began to disintegrate. In 1990 the federal organization resolved to dissolve itself, and individual regional associations continued to work for a while without having any notable effect.

financing

From the beginning, the DFU was confronted with allegations that it was financially supported by the GDR. Officially, she had always denied this, but it turned out to be correct in the course of its dissolution and after the end of the GDR. She received hidden funds from the traffic department of the Central Committee of the SED. There is only sporadic information on the amount of this funding, but it must have been considerable. In a note dated February 20, 1973, which Heinz Geggel wrote for Albert Norden and which has been preserved in the SAPMO , it was said: "The DFU receives DM 277,000 a month from us  ", and in the value date budget of the SED Central Committee of December 31. January 1989, 3.1 million DM were earmarked for 31 full-time positions at DFU for the coming budget year; Erich Honecker approved the financial plan two days before his fall, on October 15, 1989, with the handwritten note “I agree”. On November 29, 1989, Federal Managing Director Willi van Ooyen stated in an interview with taz Bremen that the “development in the GDR” meant that a “decisive source of finance had surprisingly dried up”. The executive state board of the DFU Bremen stated in a letter to the members that it had "come to the day that the DFU was about 80 percent dependent on funds from the GDR". The organization, which feels “radically committed to democracy and peace”, “has been discredited by conspiratorial external financing”.

There is sporadic information about the type of conspiratorial support by the traffic department at the Central Committee of the SED in the 1960s, when there was no legal communist party in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is documented that sums of money were brought by courier to France ( Metz ) and picked up there, in the documented case by a former KPD city councilor.

From 1969 onwards, the DFU has provided annual reports in accordance with the Political Parties Act of 1967. As a result, the DFU financed around 5 to 10 percent of its income from membership fees, the remaining 90 to 95 percent of the income was declared as donations. Statutory reports were published in the Bundestag printed paper for 1982 and 1983; they indicated around 15 percent membership fees, a good 80 percent donations and a small amount of “other income”.

Characterization and political classification

According to a common division by Richard Stöss , the DFU belonged to the type of partially opposed parties. It has also been referred to as a gathering party. It therefore renounced a fundamental, for example, system-opposition ideological definition and a comprehensive program in order to achieve a collection of very heterogeneous groups that jointly advocated a “neutralist-pacifist” opposition to the federal government's policy of binding ties to the West and armaments. The programmatic goal in the first few years was the solution of the German question through a rapprochement and finally reunification of the two German states. The united Germany should not belong to either of the two power blocs of the Cold War (neutralization) and should be largely disarmed, in particular should not harbor any nuclear weapons.

In the founding phase, a very broad alliance of communists, socialists, Christians, conservatives, neutralists and nationalists was targeted, "from left to right", which in individual cases could reach right-wing extremists. However, it was not possible to achieve this breadth. Rolf Schönfeldt describes three phases of party development based on the target groups of the DFU policy: first the orientation towards this broad alliance (until about the exclusion of the right wing in 1963), then an orientation towards left-wing target groups in the area of APO , SPD and trade unions (until about 1968) and finally, after the founding of the DKP, a very close relationship with it, but without adopting the ideological foundation of the communists. In summarizing these phases, Manfred Rowold assumes a “left collection”.

Since it was founded, the DFU has been accused by political opponents, especially the SPD, of being dominated by communists, indeed a puppet of the SED or the GDR. A brochure published by the Hamburg SPD in 1961, for example, replaced the abbreviation DFU as "The Friends of Ulbricht ". Right from the start, the DFU had openly stated that it welcomed the participation of communists despite the KPD ban and that its members and committees held official talks with representatives of the GDR and the Soviet Union, but had never admitted the financial contributions from the SED. Today it is undisputed that the SED exercised considerable influence in the DFU simply through the financial support and guidance of KPD members. How far this influence went, however, remained a matter of dispute in both the political and scientific debates.

Especially for the phase up to 1968, political scientists assume that the DFU is highly independent. Rolf Schönfeldt states that the conflicts within the very heterogeneous party "are by no means adequately portrayed as disputes between communists and non-communists" and therefore rejects the thesis that the DFU is a popular front organization or even a "communist aid organization". Manfred Rowold and Stefan Immerfall, on the other hand, describe internal disputes especially for this phase, above all about the influence of the communists, which by no means ended in favor of the latter. Christoph Stamm also points to these disputes and their changing results. The South Korean contemporary historian Dong-Ki Lee argues that "a general assessment of the DFU, namely that the infiltration work and remote control by the SED has prevailed in its political activities and actions from A to Z," should be opposed, and this is supported by the plans the DFU to a German confederation, which differed significantly from that of the SED.

After the founding of the German Communist Party (DKP) in 1968, it was very close to its politics and has been described, for example, by the political scientist Armin Pfahl-Traughber as the DKP preliminary organization .

elections

Poster for the state election in Baden-Württemberg in 1972
Poster for the state elections in Baden-Württemberg in 1976

Bundestag elections

State elections

1964 : 49,191 votes; 1.4%
1972 : 587 votes; 0.0% (only single candidates)
1976 : 557 votes; 0.0% (only single candidates)
1962 : 84,879 votes; 0.9%
1963 : 10,607 votes; 2.7%
1967 : 17,240 votes; 4.2% (+ 1.5%)
1961 : 28,511 votes; 2.9%
1962 : 64,956 votes; 2.5%
1963 : 19,749 votes; 0.6%
1967 : 29,273 votes; 0.8% (+ 0.2%)
1982 : 425 votes; 0.0% (only single candidates)
1962 : 164,333 votes; 2.0%
1963 : 23,585 votes; 1.3%
1967 : 22,871 votes; 1.2% (- 0.1%)
On March 3, 1961, the German Democratic Union (DDU) , which has been represented in the Saarland state parliament since 1960, joined the DFU as the Saarland state association. Under the name DDU, this regional association entered the state election in 1965.
1965 : 18585 votes; 3.1% (- 1.9%)
1962 : 13,758 votes; 1.2%
1967 : 11,517 votes; 0.9% (- 0.3%)

Local elections

Depending on its local roots, the DFU also ran for local elections . In individual cases she achieved success, for example in the old KPD stronghold of Ueberau , where she received 38 percent of the votes in the local elections in 1968 .

MPs

Arno Behrisch : Bundestag (elected for the SPD, conversion to the DFU: 1961)

Membership numbers

No reliable information is available on the number of members. A five-digit number of members in the 1960s is considered likely, but this decreased after the DKP was founded. The political scientists Richard Stöss and Horst W. Schmollinger estimated that the party had around 10,000 to 12,000 members in 1963, but that this number had fallen to around 3,000 by 1972. In a secret in-house communication for Albert Norden , a member of the SED Central Committee, Heinz Geggel estimated the number of members of the DFU at 5,000 to 6,000.

Press products

Auseg, Cologne (1962–1964); DFU-Information, Giessen (1962); DFU-Korrespondenz, Cologne (1961–1962); DFU State Press Service, Frankfurt am Main (1963); DFU news for the press, Frankfurt am Main (1965–1966); DFU press service, Cologne (1961-?); DFU Political Commentaries, Cologne, (1962); Der Neue Ruf, Hanover (1961–1964); noted, Cologne (1962–1963).

The Westdeutsche Tageblatt (Dortmund) and the Deutsche Volkszeitung, originally founded in 1953 as an organ of the BdD, were considered to be closely related to the DFU .

literature

  • Peter William Edgington: The German Peace Union: Origin and Support . Thesis, McMaster University , Hamilton, Canada, 1968. Accessed online via the University's Digital Commons .
  • Dong Ki-Lee: Confederation as a party program - the German Peace Union. In: ders .: Option or Illusion? The idea of ​​a national confederation in divided Germany 1949–1990 . Christoph Links Verlag, Berlin 2010, pp. 187–193.
  • Dirk Mellies: Trojan horses of the GDR? The neutralist-pacifist network of the early Federal Republic and the Deutsche Volkszeitung, 1953–1973. Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 2006, ISBN 3-631-55825-2 , pp. 51-63 ( European university publications . Series 3: History and its auxiliary sciences, 1039).
  • Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union. In: Richard Stöss (Ed.): Parties Handbook. The parties of the Federal Republic of Germany 1945–1980. Volume 1: AUD-EFP. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1983, ISBN 3-531-11570-7 , pp. 848-876 ( publications of the Central Institute for Social Science Research of the Free University of Berlin, 38).
  • Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union (DFU) 1960–1990. “Peace Party” or “The Friends of Ulbricht”? In: Mitteilungen aus dem Bundesarchiv , Vol. 20 (2012), Issue 1, pp. 44–55. Online (PDF; 6.8 MB)

Web links

Commons : Deutsche Friedensunion  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union , p. 52.
  2. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , pp. 849–851; Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , pp. 45–47.
  3. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 45.
  4. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , pp. 849-850.
  5. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 45.
  6. ↑ From the appeal, quoted by Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 45
  7. ↑ DFU. A piece together . In: Der Spiegel . No. 30 , 1961, pp. 16 ( online ).
  8. ^ For example: Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 45.
  9. ↑ See for example Rolf Schönfeldt: Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 849.
  10. ^ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , pp. 45–47.
  11. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , p. 851.
  12. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , p. 854.
  13. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union , p. 44.
  14. ^ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , pp. 44–45.
  15. ^ Hubertus Knabe : Left politician Willi van Ooyen - Honecker's millions for a Trojan horse . In: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung , October 9, 2008
  16. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , p. 875.
  17. ↑ Manfred Rowold, Stefan Immerfall: In the shadow of power. Not established small parties. In: Alf Mintzel, Heinrich Oberreuter (ed.) Political parties in the Federal Republic of Germany , 2nd edition, Opladen 1992, pp. 362–420; here: p. 408f.
  18. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , p. 863f.
  19. ↑ Thomas Suermann: Albert Schweitzer as "homo politicus". A biographical study of the political thoughts and actions of the Nobel Peace Prize winner. Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, Berlin 2012, p. 294.
  20. ↑ Red and Pink . In: Der Spiegel 35/1961, pp. 20-29, here: p. 20. Online .
  21. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 47.
  22. ^ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union , p. 48; see. also Hendrik Bunke: The Bremen KPD 1956–1968. Prohibition, organization, politics. In: Bremisches Jahrbuch , 73 (1994), pp. 202-279, here: pp. 258f.
  23. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: German Peace Union, pp. 860f .; see. to Bednarski too: red and pink. In: Der Spiegel, 35/1961, online .
  24. ↑ Manfred Rowold, Stefan Immerfall: In the shadow of power, p. 409.
  25. ↑ Manfred Rowold, Stefan Immerfall: Im Schatten der Macht, p. 408f. On Ulbricht's statement, see the “Sunday Conversation” on GDR television with Walter Ulbricht, reproduced in ZEIT on August 6, 1965 under the title A certain skepticism ... , online .
  26. ↑ Manfred Rowold, Stefan Immerfall: In the shadow of power, p. 409.
  27. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: German Peace Union, p. 869.
  28. ↑ Christoph Stamm: Inventory B422 The German Peace Union, p. 48.
  29. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union, p. 862.
  30. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union, p. 864f.
  31. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union, pp. 862f and 873; Christoph Stamm: inventory B422 The German Peace Union, p. 48f .; Rowold / Immerfall: In the shadow of power, p. 409f.
  32. ↑ For example Christoph Stamm: Inventory B422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union, p. 49.
  33. ↑ Detailed in Schönfeldt: Die Deutsche Friedens-Union, p. 873: cf. also Rowold / Immerfall: Im Schatten der Macht, p. 409, who say that the reactions of the DFU were "not at all CP-conform".
  34. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union, p. 875.
  35. ↑ Stamm, p. 49f.
  36. ↑ Stamm, p. 50
  37. ↑ Stamm, p. 50.
  38. ↑ Comrade Shell . In: Der Spiegel, 52/1976. On-line
  39. ^ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 50.
  40. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union , p. 48.
  41. ↑ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 The German Peace Union , p. 48.
  42. ↑ Quoted from Mellies 2007, p. 72.
  43. ↑ Heike Amos: Die SED-Deutschlandpolitik 1961 to 1989: Goals, Activities and Conflicts , Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, Göttingen 2015, p. 228. Amos cited after the negotiations of the German Bundestag , Volume 502 (1994, 12th electoral period), Document 537 , Pp. 2167-2171.
  44. ↑ Michael Roik: The DKP and the democratic parties 1968–1984 , Schöningh, Paderborn 2006, p. 105; Roik cites a published cover sheet of the financial plan. See also Hubertus Knabe : Honecker's heirs. The truth about DIE LINKE . Propylaen Verlag, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-549-07329-2 . P. 356f.
  45. ^ Christoph Stamm: inventory B 422 Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 50/51.
  46. ^ Wilhelm Mensing: SED Help for Western Comrades , BstU, Berlin 2010, p. 143, [1] . Mensing refers to memos from 1966 and 1967 that are with the BStU .
  47. ^ Rolf Schönfeldt: The German Peace Union , p. 871.
  48. ^ German Bundestag, 10th electoral term: Printed matter 10/3235 of April 23, 1985. Online (PDF; 308 kB)
  49. ↑ See Richard Stöss: Introduction. In: Richard Stöss (Ed.): Parties Handbook. The parties of the Federal Republic of Germany 1945–1980. Volume 1: AUD-EFP. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1983, ISBN 3-531-11570-7 , p. 298. See also Mellies 2007, p. 17f.
  50. ↑ Schönfeldt 1983, p. 848.
  51. ↑ Mellies 2007, pp. 17f.
  52. ↑ Schönfeldt, p. 851.
  53. ↑ Schönfeldt, p. 852.
  54. ^ Stamm, p. 47.
  55. ↑ Schönfeldt, p. 860.
  56. ^ Rowold / Immerfall, p. 407.
  57. ^ Social Democratic Party of Germany / State Organization Hamburg (ed.): DFU - the friends of Ulbricht. Hamburg 1961.
  58. ↑ Schönfeldt, p. 875.
  59. ↑ Rowold / Immerfall 1991, pp. 408f.
  60. ↑ Stamm, p. 48.
  61. ↑ Dong-Ki Lee 2010, pp. 190ff.
  62. ^ The "German Communist Party" (DKP) . - Federal Agency for Political Education
  63. ↑ Horst W. Schmollinger / Richard Stöss: The parties and the press of the parties and trade unions in the Federal Republic of Germany 1945–1974, Munich 1975, p. 66. Here cited from: Rolf Schönfeldt: Die Deutsche Friedens-Union , p. 871.
  64. ↑ Mellies 2007, p. 53. Mellies refers to a note dated February 20, 1973 in SAPMO .