Battle of the cauldron near Białystok and Minsk

Battle of the cauldron near Białystok and Minsk

Part of: German-Soviet War ( Second World War )

Minsk ruins (July 1941)

date	June 22 to July 9, 1941
place	Białystok / Minsk , Soviet Union
output	German victory
consequences	The advance of Army Group Center in the direction of Moscow was able to continue, and as a result there was the battle of the cauldron near Smolensk

Parties to the conflict
German Empire	Soviet Union
Commander
Fedor von Bock Army Group Center	Dmitri G. Pavlov Western Front
Troop strength
Army Group Center around 800,000 men 1,936 tanks	Western Front about 625,000 men over 4,000? tank
losses
?	420,000 men including 320,000 prisoners 3,332 tanks 1,809 guns

The Kesselschlacht near Białystok and Minsk was a battle between the German Wehrmacht and the Red Army during the Second World War in the German-Soviet War . It began on June 22, 1941 with the crossing of the demarcation line between the German Reich and the Soviet Union by the troops of the German Army Group Center , which met the Soviet Western Front under the command of Army General Dmitri Grigoryevich Pavlov . In the battle, the Wehrmacht was able to destroy large contingents of the Red Army, but the last defenders fought until July 9, 1941 in order to tie up as many German troops as possible on the orders of Stalin. After the German victory, the Wehrmacht was able to continue its offensive on Moscow and concentrate on Smolensk .

prehistory

On June 17, 1941, Hitler had announced the date for his attack on the Soviet Union to the German generals. The attack, beginning under the name Barbarossa , was scheduled for Sunday, June 22, 1941, at 3 a.m. To this end, three German army groups with 153 divisions - including 19 tank divisions and ten motorized divisions - took up position on the entire eastern front. The most powerful Army Group Center (with about 37 infantry, 9 tank, 1 cavalry and 3 security divisions) and its commander Field Marshal Fedor von Bock were assigned the general thrust on Minsk and, as the final destination, Moscow . With the penetration of the aviation units of Air Fleet 2 into Soviet airspace and the German artillery strike at around 3:15 a.m., the Bialystok-Minsk battle began.

German assessment of the Soviet forces

In an assessment of June 17, 1941, the German high command assumed three armies. The 3rd Army , the 4th Army and the 10th Army were available to the Stawka along the border area of ​​the Belarusian SSR . Further behind, the Western Front also had the 13th Army , which was available as a reserve in the Minsk area. According to the assessment of the OKW , numerous rifle divisions and cavalry units should be available in the area, but only one armored corps of motorized units. In fact, when the attack began, the Soviet 6th, 11th and 14th Mechanized Corps were immediately ready for defense at the border of the Belarusian SSR. Overall, the Soviet rifle forces were estimated to be around 40% more than were actually available. The armored forces were, however, much larger than assumed, because they were only estimated to be around 20–30% of their actual strength, with more units of cavalry expected than were actually available. The reason was the new undiscovered mobile divisions of the Red Army, which were based on cavalry.

Comparison of the two forces

Battle of June 22nd to 25th

Field Marshal Fedor von Bock , Commander in Chief of the German Army Group Center .

Field Marshal Fedor von Bock , the commander of Army Group Center , ordered Panzer Groups 2 and 3 to line up on both sides of the Soviet Western Front in the Białystok - Wolkowysk and Brest-Litowsk area . Regardless of the open flanks, both groups of tanks were supposed to penetrate about 250 kilometers east of both wings of the Soviet western front, reach the Berezina and, after the unification of the tank spikes , try to form a large pocket in the area east of Minsk . The air supremacy required for this in the central section of the Eastern Front was achieved by around 1,500 combat and fighter planes of Air Fleet 2 under General Field Marshal Albert Kesselring .

Attack of Panzer Group 3

Panzer Group 3 under Colonel General Hermann Hoth advanced north of Białystok . The attack was supported by the infantry of the 4th and 9th Armies , which followed behind the tank units and secured the flanks . The tip of the northern attack wedge of Army Group Center was the XXXIX. Army Corps (motorized) (7th and 20th Panzer Division , and 14th Infantry Division (motorized) ) and the LVII. Army Corps (motorized) (12th and 19th Panzer Division and 18th Infantry Division (motorized) ). Behind the Panzer Group 3 followed the infantry of the 9th Army (Colonel General Strauss ), which in forced marches with the VI. , VIII. And V Army Corps succeeded to tie up enemy infantry. The right wing of the 9th Army with the XX. Army corps under General of the Infantry Friedrich Materna supported the encircling forces of the 4th Army , which with the XIII. , IX. and VII Army Corps attracted the bulk of the Soviet 10th Army (General Konstantin D. Golubew ) and 4th Army (General Alexander A. Korobkow ).

From June 23, Panzer Group 3 carried out heavy fighting with the Soviet Boldin Panzer Group (6th and 11th Mechanized Corps and 6th Cavalry Corps), which was counterattacking from the Grodno area . Their defense was taken over by the units of the advancing 9th Army on June 24th, which enabled the armored group to march on. The 13th Army was concentrated in the Minsk area as a reserve of the Soviet Western Front , its 21st Rifle Corps (General VB Borisow) had already been subordinated to the beleaguered 3rd Army, the masses intervened in the defensive battles from the Novogrodek area on June 23 . The Panzer Group Boldin tried in vain the German LVII in the northern section of the Kesselschlacht . mot. Army Corps (Lieutenant General Adolf Kuntzen ) intercepted when breaching. In the Lida area , the 21st Rifle Corps tried to assist the Soviet 3rd Army and stop the wedges of the German 9th Army .

Attack of Panzer Group 2

The southern breakthrough was made by Panzer Group 2 under Colonel General Heinz Guderian on June 22nd from the Brest Litovsk area with two strong attack wedges. At the top was the XXXXVII. Army Corps (motorized) ( 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions and 29th Infantry Division (motorized) ), followed by the XXXXVI. Army Corps (motorized) ( 10th Panzer Division , the Inf.-Regiment Großdeutschland and the SS-Regiment Das Reich ). Protecting the southern flank took over at Pratulin and Wlodawa about the bug continuous (mot.) XXIV. Corps (3rd and 4th Panzer Division and 10th Infantry Division (mot.) ).

Against the Brest Fortress which was from 22 June XII. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Walter Schroth ) with the 45th Infantry Division (General Fritz Schlieper ) in the center. In a short time, the Soviet defense of the fortress, the 28th Rifle Corps under Lieutenant General Popov (with the 6th and 42nd Rifle Divisions, as well as half of the 22nd Panzer Division) was destroyed by German artillery and air attacks. The city of Brest was taken around 7 a.m., but the heavy fighting over the citadel and at the station continued until the surrender on June 29th.

The point of the wedge of Panzer Group 2 that had broken out of the Brest area led the XXXXVII. Army corps (motorized) under Lieutenant General Joachim Lemelsen . During the advance through Pruzana to Slonim , this unit was stopped on June 23 by the counter-attack of the Soviet 17th Mechanized Corps (General Michail P. Petrov). Reinforced from the Baranowitschi area with the 47th Rifle Corps, this corps attempted the advance of the German XXXXVII. Army Corps (mot.) To stop and to keep the retreat open for the already half-enclosed 10th and 3rd Armies. The southern attack wedge of the XXIV Army Corps (motorized) (General of the Panzer Troop Geyr von Schweppenburg ) led the 3rd Panzer Division (Lieutenant General Walter Model ), which had been advancing eastwards via Kobryn and Baranowitschi since June 23 . The Soviet 4th Army, whose 28th Rifle Corps (General WS Popow) had been cut off in the Brest area and whose 14th Mechanized Corps (General S. Oborin) had been defeated at Slonim, could at least manage its left wing, the 75th and 205th. Withdraw rifle division south towards Pinsk . In the looming battle of Bialystok, the bulk of the Russian 10th and 3rd Armies with the 1st, 4th and 5th Rifle Corps, the 6th Cavalry Corps and the 11th and 13th Mechanized Corps were cut off by June 25th .

The 2nd Army under Colonel General Maximilian von Weichs acted as the reserve of Army Group Center, which from June 25th with the LIII. , XXXV. and XXXXIII. Army Corps , a total of twelve divisions - following Panzer Group 2, was used to damm the southern boiler fronts.

Battle between June 25th and early July

The formation of a boiler in the west of Minsk at the end of June 1941

The Bialystok - Nowogrodek pocket was firmly closed until June 26, the heavy fighting of the German 4th and 9th armies in the Bialowieza forests continued for a week. The bulk of the Soviet western front was concentrated on the Nowogrodek - Wolkowysk - Slonim line . Until the beginning of July, the trapped tried to break out to the south and east, and the cauldron was split again into two smaller ones. In addition, the attempt by the Soviet 3rd Army of General Vasily I. Kuznetsov, pushed away in the Nowogrodek area, to break free of the breakout to the north, failed due to the resistance of the infantry corps of the German 9th Army.

The troops of Panzer Group 3 (Colonel General Hoth) advanced with the 20th Panzer Division via Molodetschno into the area east of Minsk to the Berezina . This also initiated the encirclement of the reserve Soviet 13th Army under General Pyotr M. Filatov from the north . The 47th Rifle Corps (General Alexander S. Powetkin) fought with the front facing south at Baranowitschi , the 44th Rifle Corps (General VA Yushkewitsch) and 2nd Rifle Corps (General AN Yermakov) secured the area northwest of Minsk without any enemy contact. According to Stalin's slogan “Hold or die”, the Red Army tied the German forces, whole armies had to be sacrificed in order to be able to rebuild new lines of defense. The German armored troops also had high losses of material, but the air force inflicted considerable losses on the desperately defending Soviets.

Narrowing of the basin between Bialystok and Wolkowysk

Care for a wounded German soldier in a forest near Augustowo

Field Marshal Fedor von Bock now ordered the deployment of the reserve units that had been withheld so far, on the one hand to free the tank divisions bound by fighting, on the other hand to relieve the tense situation on the boiler fronts. On June 26, which was the second army with the Zernierung already located far behind the front boiler sections at Bialystok and Nowogrodek - Wolkowysk entrusted. Colonel-General Maximilian von Weichs thereby freed the 9th and 4th Armies, which, following the armored units, caught up to the Berezina north and south of Minsk. On June 28th, the XXXXII. Army Corps (General of the Pioneers Walter Kuntze ) with the 23rd Infantry Division (Major General Hellmich) and parts of the 87th Infantry Division (Lieutenant General Bogislav von Studnitz ) the city of Białystok . The front around the great Bialystok basin meanwhile held from west to east - the 8th Army Corps (General of the Infantry Walter Heitz ) with 161st, 28th and 8th Infantry Divisions ; the XX. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Friedrich Materna ) with 256th, 162nd and 102nd Infantry Divisions ; the 87th and 23rd Infantry Divisions followed near Bialystok, then the VII. Army Corps (General of Infantry Wilhelm Fahrmbacher ) with 7th and 268th Infantry Divisions and the IX. Army corps (General of the Infantry Hermann Geyer ) with the 137th and 292nd Infantry Division enclosed. This was followed by the less manned front between the Szczara sector and Minsk, the 29th Infantry Division (motorized) and 34th Infantry Division of the XII. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Walter Schroth ) in action with the Soviet 47th Rifle Corps. The second smaller boiler near Wolkowysk held the divisions of the XIII. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Felber) with 17th and 78th Infantry Divisions and the XXXXIII. Army corps (General of the Infantry Gotthard Heinrici ) with the 31st, 45th, 131st and 134th Infantry Divisions enclosed. The LIII. Army Corps (General of the Infantry Karl Weisenberger ) with the 52nd and 167th Infantry Divisions and the XXXXVI, which is still fighting on the Kesselfront . Army Corps (motorized) (General of the Panzer Troop Heinrich von Vietinghoff ) was brought up to the Beresina as reinforcement of Panzer Group 2 .

Second boiler formation

When the armored spearheads of Panzer Groups 2 and 3 east of Minsk were reunited at the end of June, the armored wedges closed again, creating two separate pockets. Between Wolkowysk and Novogrodek the Soviet 3rd, 4th and 10th Army were already crowded together, and the bulk of the Soviet 13th Army was now also enclosed in the second pocket in the Minsk area.

As early as July 2, the German tank units were able to advance further east - at Borissow in the north and at Bobruisk in the south, strong German bridgeheads were formed on the east bank of the Beresina. From July 3, while the encircled Russian infantry continued to fight in the Wolkowysk and Minsk area, the next river crossings over the Dnieper were forced from the captured bridgeheads and the next battle for Smolensk was initiated. The last Red Army soldiers in Minsk only surrendered on July 9, although the city was already largely occupied by June 28.

consequences

Soviet soldiers captured in the Minsk pocket

Of 46 divisions on the Soviet Western Front, 11 were able to break out of the enclosure and break away via the Berezina - the mass of 28 divisions and 7 tank divisions with 325,000 men, 1,809 guns and 3,332 tanks were defeated or largely captured. The hapless leader of the Soviet Western Front, Dmitri Grigoryevich Pavlov , was blamed for the Minsk disaster. Stalin was now concerned with disguising the collapse of the fronts and making an example on the staff of the western front, which was encircled near Bialystok and Minsk and largely smashed, which is why, in addition to Pavlov as commander-in-chief of the front, his chief of staff, General Klimowskich , the commander of the 4th Army , General Korobkow and other generals were ordered to Moscow, tried before a court martial, sentenced to death and shot in July 1941.

Advance of the German troops

With the victory it had won, Army Group Center was able to continue its advance against Moscow and cross the Dnieper. After the cauldron was finally disbanded, several rapid divisions were freed up for further offensives, which had been bound by Soviet troops up to that point.

The advance on the next target Smolensk by the two tank groups 2 and 3 began on July 9th. After the inclusion of strong Soviet forces in the Kesselschlacht near Smolensk , the Red Army was able to launch a counter-offensive for the first time, but this was repulsed by Army Group Center. On July 30, 1941, Army Group received a stop order, with Panzer Group 2 with the 2nd Army turning south and participating in the Battle of Kiev , and Panzer Group 3 participating in the advance of Army Group North on Leningrad. This was done on Hitler's personal orders, which is why he came into conflict with the OKH, which had demanded that Moscow remain the focus of the attack. After his unauthorized action, Hitler issued directive No. 34 on August 12, 1941, which contained that the "State, Armaments and Transport Center" Moscow should be taken before the onset of winter. However, the battles in Leningrad and Ukraine still had priority, which is why they should be concluded before an offensive on Moscow. However, the battles in Ukraine dragged on until September 1941, and even before they were concluded, Hitler issued directive No. 35, which laid the basis for the future offensive:

“The initial successes against the enemy forces located between the inner wings of Army Groups South and Central [...] created the basis for a decision-seeking operation against the Army Group Tymoshenko, which was in offensive fighting in front of the Army Group. It must be crushed in the limited time available until the onset of winter weather. It is important to summarize all forces of the army and the air force that are dispensable on the wings and can be brought in on time. "

- Adolf Hitler :

literature

When looking at Soviet sources, with the exception of samizdat and tamizdat literature that was published up to 1987, the activities of the Soviet censorship authorities ( Glawlit , military censorship) in revising various contents in line with Soviet ideology must be taken into account. (→ Censorship in the Soviet Union ) Hermann Hoth's literature should also be used with caution, as it comes from a right-wing extremist publisher.

• Collective of authors: History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Vol. 2, Deutscher Militärverlag, Berlin (East) 1963. (translation from Russian).
• David M. Glantz : The Border Battles on the Białystok-Minsk Axis, June 22-28, 1941. In: David M. Glantz (Ed.): The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front. June 22 - August 1941 Frank Cass Pbl., London 1993, ISBN 0-7146-3375-5 , pp. 184-247.
• Volker Detlef Heydorn: The Soviet deployment in the Bialystoker balcony and the Wolkowysk boiler , Verlag für Wehrwissenschaften, Munich 1989.
• Hermann Hoth : Panzer Operations - Panzer Group 3 and the operational idea of ​​the German leadership in the summer of 1941. Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft , Heidelberg 1956.
• Ernst Klink : Army and Navy. In: Horst Boog , Jürgen Förster , Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union. (= Military History Research Office (ed.) The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt , Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 451-651.
• Григорий Ф. Кривошеев : Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века. Олма-Пресс, Москва 2001. (German: GF Krivošeev: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century. ) (Online)

Individual evidence

1. ↑ Piekałkiewicz : The Second World War , Econ Verlag , 1985, pp. 493–494.
2. ^ ^{A b} David M. Glantz: The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front. June 22 - August 1941 . Cass, New York 1993, ISBN 0-7146-4298-3 , pp. 184 .
3. ^ David M. Glantz: The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front. June 22 - August 1941 . Cass, New York 1993, ISBN 0-7146-4298-3 , pp. 187 .
4. ^ David M. Glantz: The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front. June 22 - August 1941 . Cass, New York 1993, ISBN 0-7146-4298-3 , pp. 187-189 .
5. ↑ Horst Boog , Jürgen Förster , Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 454 .
6. ^ Joachim Hoffmann: The war against the Soviet Union up to the turn of 1941/42. The conduct of the war from the perspective of the Soviet Union . In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The German Reich and the Second World War. Vol. 4. The attack on the Soviet Union . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 713-809, here p. 726.
7. ^ Ernst Klink: The war against the Soviet Union until the turn of 1941/42. The operation management. : In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller, Gerd R. Ueberschär: The German Reich and the Second World War. Vol. 4. The attack on the Soviet Union . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1983, p. 458.
8. ^ Ernst Klink: The war against the Soviet Union until the turn of 1941/42. The conduct of operations , pp. 486–502.
9. ^ Ernst Klink: The war against the Soviet Union until the turn of 1941/42. The Operation Guide, pp. 503–507.
10. ↑ Printed in: Walther Hubatsch (Ed.): Hitler's instructions for warfare 1939–1945 , Munich 1965, pp. 174–177.

Remarks

1. ↑ The 17th Mechanized Corps was not yet fully established, the commander Mikhail P. Petrow should not be confused with General Ivan Yefimowitsch Petrov, the commander of the 27th mechanical corps who later fought in the same section.
2. ↑ The name "Army Group Tymoshenko" did not officially exist, but Marshal of the Soviet Union SK Tymoshenko was at that time in command of the Soviet "Western Front".