EU emissions trading

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The Werdohl-Elverlingsen coal-fired power plant is one of the plants whose CO 2 emissions are recorded by the EU ETS.

The EU emissions trading system ( European Union Emissions Trading System , EU ETS) is an instrument of EU climate policy with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (such as CO 2 ) at the lowest possible economic cost by issuing a limited number of emission rights and then on traded in a market. The EU ETS is the first cross-border and world's largest emissions trading system . It was decided in 2003 by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU and came into force on January 1, 2005. The European ETS also acts as a pioneer of a possible global system. The EU ETS currently includes and limits the carbon dioxide emissions of around 11,000 plants in 31 European countries (28 EU states plus Liechtenstein , Iceland and Norway ) in the field of electricity generation and some industrial sectors such as cement factories.

The system is based on the fact that an operator of a recorded system has to present a valid certificate for every tonne of CO 2 emitted and there is only a limited amount (a “cap”) of new certificates per year. Some of the certificates are allocated to plant operators free of charge, the rest of the amount is auctioned. Certificates are tradable, i. H. Operators can sell excess certificates or have to buy additional certificates that are required. Emissions are given a price and plant operators are given an incentive to reduce their emissions.

In 2013 the cap was 2,084 million certificates. This amount will decrease by 1.74% annually until 2020 and by 2.2% annually from 2021. The system currently covers around 45% of the greenhouse gas emissions generated in the EU. The free allocation of certificates takes place according to EU-wide principles. An increasing number of the certificates are auctioned (2013: 40%). The Clean Development Mechanism enables companies to purchase certificates by investing in emission reduction measures outside the EU.

The emissions trading takes place in multi-year trading periods (including allocation periods called) to compensate for fluctuations as a result of extreme weather conditions (mild winter, for example, lower emissions mean) and to create long-term investment security. So far, pilot phase I (2005–2007) and phase II (2008–2012) have been completed. Since phase III (2013–2020), emission certificates have been issued centrally by the European Commission instead of the states. The Commissioner for Climate Protection is responsible for this .

The environmental effectiveness of EU emissions trading is controversial. In particular, the oversupply of certificates, combined with a certificate price of sometimes less than five euros per ton of CO 2 in phase III, raised doubts as to whether emissions trading is able to stimulate the necessary long-term investments in climate-friendly technologies . After the price had been below 10 euros from 2012 to the end of 2017, it rose in 2018. At the beginning and the end of 2019 the price was between around 19 and 25 euros, in July at a record level of over 28 euros per ton of CO 2 .

overview

Background and history

The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has been increasing sharply for decades. Carbon dioxide is responsible for the majority of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect and thus for global warming .

The European emissions trading could only come about after a twofold failure: Originally, the European Commission wanted to introduce a carbon and energy tax in the early 1990s . However, the proposal failed due to the resistance of the member states, who saw it as the entry into the collection of taxes by the EU, which would have affected a core area of ​​their state sovereignty . The second failure concerns the considerable but ultimately unsuccessful resistance of the EU delegation in the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol between 1995 and 1997 against anchoring emissions trading. The Americans in particular had insisted on including " flexible mechanisms " in the Kyoto Protocol, including emissions trading, and were ultimately successful with it. Confronted with these developments, the opinion within the Commission changed and it began to work on the concept of the later EU ETS.

In the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the European Union committed itself to reducing average greenhouse gas emissions by eight percent compared to 1990 levels by the period 2008–2012 in order to counteract global warming . According to the principle of burden sharing , the EU member states have shared this average reduction target among themselves. For example , Germany has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 21 percent, Great Britain is to reduce its emissions by 12.5 percent, France is stabilizing its emissions at the 1990 level, and Spain can increase its emissions by another 15 percent. According to a unilateral voluntary commitment by the EU, emissions are to be reduced by 20 percent by 2020 (in the case of an international agreement, by 30 percent).

In order to achieve the climate protection target, the EU states agreed in 2003 within the framework of the European Climate Protection Program (ECCP), among other things, on the introduction of cross-border emissions trading as a central component of the European Union's climate policy .

Legal basis

The legal process to EU emissions trading

The European legal basis for emissions trading is the Emissions Trading Directive issued on October 13, 2003 (Directive 2003/87 / EC). This directive had to be transposed into national laws by the EU member states.

In Germany, the directive was implemented into German law with the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Act (TEHG), which came into force on July 15, 2004. In it, the German Emissions Trading Authority of the Federal Environment Agency is charged with issuing certificates and monitoring emissions. The allocation of emission allowances in the first two trading periods up to 2012 within the framework of the NAPs was regulated in the allocation laws ZuG 2007 and ZuG 2012.

In Austria, trading in emission allowances is regulated in the Emission Certificate Act.

functionality

The European emissions trading system ETS works on the principle of cap & trade - restrict and act. On the one hand, the amount of greenhouse gas emissions is limited; on the other hand, emission allowances can be freely traded. This should create an economic incentive to reduce emissions of harmful greenhouse gases where it is most efficient.

The system is system-based, which means that each of the approximately 11,000 factories and power plants currently covered is recorded individually, and not entire companies or countries. Each of these plants receives a certain amount of emission allowances ( European Union Allowance , EUA) for a certain period, the trading period, which takes into account the politically determined emission reduction target. An EUA entitles to the emission of one tonne of carbon dioxide (converted 0.27 tons of carbon ) or a comparable amount of greenhouse gases with the same global warming potential .

In order to introduce the emissions trading system with as little economic distortion as possible, the emission allowances were initially allocated free of charge. If a company's carbon dioxide emissions are lower than the allocated emission allowances, for example as a result of its own emission reductions, the company can sell the allowances that are not required on the market. Alternatively, it can also buy additional emission certificates if measures to reduce its own emissions would turn out to be more expensive. In this case, another market participant receives money (as an exchange for the emission allowance) in order to reduce greenhouse gases. The ton of carbon dioxide saved (1 EUA) is given a value that is determined on the market based on supply and demand. It ranged between € 13 and € 17 between 2009 and mid-2011, before falling to € 7 by the end of the year. By 2013, despite the German nuclear phase-out, the price fell to below 5 euros per ton.

On April 30 of each year, the plant operators must declare emission allowances in the amount of their actual emissions in the previous year. If a company cannot prove the required number of certificates, it must pay a fine of 100 euros for each missing EUA and also submit a certificate at a later date. In the first trading period from 2005 to 2007, the fine was 40 euros.

To ensure that emissions trading functions properly, the amount of emission allowances allocated must be lower than the forecast emissions. This is the only way to put pressure on the polluters to reduce their emissions. Accordingly, the European Union plans to gradually reduce the number of available emission allowances (and thus the emissions themselves) in the coming years.

scope

Large industrial plants such as this cement plant owned by the Swiss company Holcim in Höver , Lower Saxony, are also covered by EU emissions trading.

European emissions trading currently only covers part of all greenhouse gas emissions and polluters. The carbon dioxide emissions from power generation in thermal power plants from 20  MW output ( examples ) and from the five industrial sectors are included from the start:

  1. Iron and steel smelting ,
  2. Coking plants , refineries and crackers ,
  3. Cement and lime production ,
  4. Glass , ceramic and brick industries , as well
  5. Paper and cellulose production .

In 2013, emissions trading was expanded to include other sectors:

  1. Chemical industry ,
  2. Non-ferrous metals ,
  3. Other combustion, as well
  4. Mineral processing industry (in addition to cement, lime, glass and ceramic production, now also gypsum and mineral fiber production)

Together, these industries account for around 50 percent of Europe's carbon dioxide emissions and 40 percent of total greenhouse gas emissions in the participating countries. Other greenhouse gases such as methane are not recorded . In addition, the transport sector (24.2% of greenhouse gas emissions in 2007), private households (including services 12.4%), agriculture (8.6%) and other industries and trades are excluded. For most of these sectors, the 2009 burden-sharing decision stipulates differentiated national emission reductions.

With an emission volume of a good two billion tons of CO 2 , the ETS records around eight percent of all global CO 2 emissions. Since 2013, nitrous oxide ( laughing gas ) and perfluorinated hydrocarbons ( fluorocarbons ) have also been included, and since 2012 air traffic has also been participating in emissions trading.

Trade and technical process

Although there is talk of EU emissions certificates , these do not exist as documents in paper form. Trading takes place in a purely electronic system and takes place via stock exchanges, brokers or over the counter (OTC), i.e. directly between the parties involved. Market participants who want to buy or sell emissions certificates must open an electronic account, which is used to process the transactions.

There are several marketplaces for emission allowances, for example the European Climate Exchange (ECX) in London, the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig or the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA) in Vienna. In Leipzig, the EEX Carbon Index, or Carbix for short, serves as a reference price for emission allowances. The Carbix is ​​a spot market price that is determined by auction every trading day at 11 a.m. The outcome of the auction is usually announced ten minutes later on the EEX website. The transatlantic exchange company NYSE Euronext offers a global trading platform with the environmental exchange BlueNext . In 2005 at least 362 million certificates (tons of CO 2 ) with a value of approx. 7.2 billion euros were traded. In 2006, the trading volume rose to one billion, in 2007 to 1.6 billion and in 2008 to almost 3.1 billion certificates. European trade accounted for around 73 percent of global certificates trading, which in 2008 was worth 92.4 billion euros.

The EU emission certificates are compatible to a limited extent with the certificates of the Kyoto Protocol ( Assigned Amount Unit (AAU), Emission Reduction Units (ERU) from community reductions and Certified Emission Reduction (CER) from CDM projects). Emission rights from other countries that were acquired as part of the Clean Development Mechanism can be credited to a limited extent in the ETS under certain conditions (see phase II ). In addition to the ETS, there is a second trade in emission rights: Under the Kyoto Protocol, states can bilaterally trade their reduction commitments.

The extent of the emissions from the individual systems is usually determined by recording the energy sources burned. Burning one ton of hydrocarbons produces almost three tons of carbon dioxide. This value is slightly higher for coal than for oil and this in turn is higher than for natural gas.

National allocation plans

The distribution of the certificates is regulated by each participating country in so-called National Allocation Plans (NAP). These consist of two components: The macro plan defines how many emissions certificates are to be issued to the plants in a country in total. It shows how much of the savings specified in the Kyoto Protocol can be achieved through the ETS sector (power generation, refineries, steel production, etc.) and how much through the non-ETS sector (households, other businesses, transport, agriculture, etc.) should be. The European Commission is reviewing the attainability of the Kyoto targets. Germany, for example, applied for 482 million certificates annually for Phase II, but the Commission has cut this to 453 million.

In the second part of the NAP, the microplan , the distribution of the certificates to the individual plants is determined. So far, all states have primarily followed the principle of grandfathering . Accordingly, the plants receive free certificates based on their previous emissions. A small part of the certificates is also auctioned in some countries. In addition, many NAPs have special regulations to reward companies who have already taken measures to reduce emissions before the introduction of emissions trading ( early action ). There are further exceptions in Germany for cogeneration and the shutdown of nuclear power plants . The German industrial companies receive their initial equipment completely free of charge in phase II, the electricity producers only 91.2 percent. The remaining 8.8 percent will be sold by the state-owned KfW banking group on the stock exchange. This generates around 80 million euros per month. The microplan is also being examined by the Commission, particularly with regard to the equal treatment of domestic and foreign companies and compliance with EU competition law .

In economic terms, emission certificates are a new, scarce commodity that has been introduced on the market, which can be used as a production factor in the manufacture of products or sold on on the market. If the certificates are used to manufacture products, the manufacturer will usually take their market prices into account as opportunity costs in the calculation . Even if the climate protection target is achieved simply by capping emissions, from the systematic point of view of emissions trading it is desirable, as the resulting scarcity signals to consumers reinforce the steering effect in terms of efficient implementation of emissions trading. The extent to which a manufacturer can actually pass on costs related to emissions trading to the customer depends on the respective market situation. When the EU emissions trading scheme was introduced in 2005, the electricity price rose by 22 euros / MWh in just twelve months. At the same time, there was a very high correlation between the certificate price and the electricity price. Since large parts of emission allowances were allocated free of charge, this price development brought the German electricity producers in 2005, according to an estimate of the Industrial Energy and Power Industry Association called windfall profits (windfall profits) in the amount of five billion euros. According to empirical observations, the share of opportunity costs that was passed on to the consumer in phase I varied between 60 and 100% depending on the state, market structure, elasticity of demand and price range.

Criticism of the implementation in Germany

The emission reductions set by Germany are well below the commitment made by the Kyoto Protocol and earlier, more far-reaching reduction targets. The German Ministry of the Environment under Jürgen Trittin ( Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen ) originally planned a limit of 488 or 480 million tons, i.e. a reduction of around five percent, but these specifications failed due to resistance from the Ministry of Economics under Wolfgang Clement ( SPD ). After a long and media-effective conflict, the ministers finally agreed in a coalition agreement on March 30, 2004 to limit carbon dioxide emissions for industry and the energy sector to 503 million tons per year by 2007 and to 495.5 million tons by 2012. This corresponds to a reduction of two percent. In order to achieve the Kyoto target of a maximum of 962 million t of CO 2 equivalents in total emissions, a reduction of around four percent would have been necessary. The goal can only be achieved through additional efforts in other areas.

It is also criticized that when the emission certificates are allocated, the particularly CO 2 -intensive coal-fired power plants , including new ones, are preferred to the much more efficient gas-fired power plants ( CCGT power plants ) because they were allocated twice as many CO 2 certificates as gas-fired power plants with the same Power.

The WWF has selected companies in a published 2014 study by the example that in the past, energy-intensive companies received so many free emissions allowances that they achieved through the sale of substantial additional profits. It showed that the nine companies examined from the iron and steel, refineries, chemical and cement industries had received free certificates worth EUR 8 billion since 2005. By the end of 2012, these companies had unused certificates worth over EUR 1 billion - with which they can freely trade.

Criticism of the implementation in Austria

Austria has committed itself to reducing its CO 2 equivalent emissions by 13 percent to 68.8 million tons between 2008 and 2012 . The emissions reductions set in the course of the EU emissions trading scheme are not sufficient to achieve these goals. Due to the dominant generation of electricity from renewable energies (around 60 percent) and the already comparatively efficient industrial plants, the desired savings cannot be achieved in these sectors. In 2006 the output was already 15 percent above the initial value. The transport sector is primarily responsible for the bad numbers. Here, greenhouse gas emissions increased by 54 percent from 1990 to the end of 2009, although they decreased slightly by 0.9 million tons from 2008 to 2009. For 2010, due to the better economic situation, a further increase in greenhouse gas emissions is expected. In 2006, transit traffic was responsible for a maximum of eight million tonnes or 30 percent of emissions in the transport sector. Thus, at the end of 2007 Austria was already 8.1 million tons of CO 2 equivalents behind its obligation, even though the mild winter of 2006 dampened the CO 2 emissions in the area of ​​room heating. If you add in the emissions for which precautions were taken in the form of certificates for low-greenhouse gas projects, Austria missed the target in 2007 by almost 20 million tons. In 2008 Austria was able to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions slightly compared to the previous year by 0.4 million to 86.6 million tons. In 2009 the value dropped to 80.1 million tons. In particular, the company's greenhouse gas emissions fell by 14.5 percent from the originally assumed 31.8 million tons to 27.3 million tons due to the financial and economic crisis . For 2010, however, in view of the better economic situation, an increase in emissions to the level of 2008 is expected.

Since 2008, Austria has bought 3.5 million CO 2 certificates from Latvia in two tranches , the purchase price has remained a secret. Since the start of emissions trading, Austria is said to have bought 45 million certificates for one tonne of CO 2 each from countries such as Spain, Japan, the Netherlands, Estonia, Latvia and the Czech Republic. The average price is given as 9 euros per ton. In November 2011, the Austrian Environment Minister Nikolaus Berlakovich expected spending of 600 million euros to purchase missing CO 2 certificates from abroad and thus to meet international obligations in 2014. In total, Austria is likely to have to pay an additional EUR 1.1 billion due to the likely failure of the climate targets. Around 530 million euros of this go to JI / CDM projects, in which the state finances climate protection projects abroad and can credit itself with the CO 2 savings.

Economic impact

Emissions trading does not pose a threat to the competitiveness of energy-intensive companies in Germany, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW). Job losses are also not to be expected on a large scale. In contrast, significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are possible.

Environmental effectiveness

The environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency of emissions trading are controversial. While it is considered the most efficient form of emissions avoidance in economic theory, according to Jesse D. Jenkins this does not apply in realpolitical practice because of external restrictions such as enforceable prices. The cap is chosen differently than would be necessary for the cost-effective achievement of actually intended goals. Therefore, the combination of emissions trading with other instruments according to the theory of the second-best can improve efficiency or even be necessary to adhere to the medium- and long-term target emission limits at all.

The effectiveness of emissions trading with regard to the goal of stimulating long-term investments in climate-friendly technologies is currently not given due to the very low certificate price triggered by an oversupply of certificates. Currently (October 7, 2016) the price is - contrary to the original expectations - according to the laws of supply and demand at 5.62 euros / ton. According to Selder, these prices offer little incentive to reduce emissions. According to Rockström, a minimum price of> $ 50 per tonne would have to be introduced in order to meet the goal set internationally in the Paris Agreement in 2015 of keeping global warming well below 2 ° C. This price would have to rise significantly by 2050. Joachim Weimann points out that investments in new technologies are based on price expectations and are therefore difficult to determine empirically. Ultimately, this argument does not point to a failure of the emissions trading instrument itself, but to a politically too high cap . Low investments indicate that market players do not expect a significant shortage of certificates in the long term either.

The cause of the drop in prices is largely unknown. The recession in the EU countries and the expansion of renewable energies were often assumed to be the main reasons, but have now been refuted. In order to avoid potentially negative interactions with other climate protection instruments such as support measures for renewable energies , it is recommended to reduce the certificates issued in line with the increase in green electricity production. On the other hand, stricter national climate protection measures due to the already existing certificate surplus do not currently lead to emissions being shifted to other EU countries, as would normally be the case, but only further increase the certificate surplus.

Development of the ETS

Phase I (2005-2007)

In phase I, the nation states had to surrender 95 percent of the certificates free of charge. Five percent could be auctioned. Few Member States made use of their leeway. Thus almost all emission allowances were given away.

Price development of EU emission certificates in phase I.

Phase I was marked by massive overallocation of authorizations. A total of around 2,150 million certificates were issued each year. In fact, only 2,012 million tonnes (2005), 2,034 million tonnes (2006) and 2,050 million tonnes (2007) of CO 2 were emitted by the recorded systems, i.e. a good 100 million tonnes less annually than would have been permitted by certificates. The energy sector in particular received too many emission allowances. Overall, the 15 old EU states had not fewer, but 4.3 percent more emission certificates available in phase I than in the base year 1990. Only Great Britain and Germany committed themselves to a CO 2 reduction in phase I.

After it became known at the end of April 2006 that French companies were emitting almost 12 percent less carbon dioxide in 2005 than they should actually be, the price of emissions trading certificates collapsed from the historic high of 30 euros to 9.13 euros (see graphic). Those responsible speak of a "test phase" for the system. The continuous drop in prices at the end of 2007 is due to the fact that the certificates could not be carried over into the next period. Accordingly, its value approached zero.

Scientific evaluation

In order to be able to assess and evaluate the success of the emissions trading system, a simple comparison of the allocation of certificates and actual emissions is not sufficient. If the greenhouse gas emitters are allocated more emission allowances than they need, this could indicate, on the one hand, an excessively high limit of the allowances (overallocation), but just as well indicate unexpected savings on the part of the industry.

Environmental economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimate the reduction in CO 2 -equivalent emissions as a result of the establishment of the EU emissions trading scheme in 2005 and 2006 to be 50 to 100 million tons per year. After all, this would correspond to between 2.5 and 5 percent of total emissions in the EU emissions trading sector. The result rather indicates unexpected savings on the part of the industry, which equates to an - at least small - success of the emissions trading in this phase. However, the researchers point out that some of the underlying data (emissions from 2000 to 2002, which were also used for the preparation of the national allocation plans) are not very reliable because they were made available by industry and under time pressure.

Change in greenhouse gas emissions of the ETS sector in phase I (2005–2007)

Researchers at the Catholic University of Leuven come to the conclusion that the EU emissions trading system saved 88 million tonnes of carbon dioxide in the field of electricity production in 2005 and around 59 million tonnes in 2006. According to this, Germany is responsible for 35.3 million tons (2005) and 27.4 million tons (2006), which corresponds to around 40 percent (or around 47 percent for 2006) of the EU-wide emission reduction. According to the authors of the study, this is due to the disproportionately high share of electricity from coal-fired power plants, which are particularly affected by emissions trading.

According to calculations by the European Commission (as of October 2008), greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-15 (ETS and non-ETS sector) in 2006 were 2.7 percent below the initial value in 1990, even though the economy of these countries was in the same period grew by 40 percent. The emissions of the EU-27 fell 10.8 percent below the base value. According to its own forecasts, the EU is likely to achieve or even exceed the goal it has set itself (see section Background and History ). However, at least the most recent successes are based on savings outside of emissions trading. After all, emissions from the ETS sector did not fall between 2005 and 2007, but increased by 1.9 percent (see graph).

Phase II (2008–2012)

The second phase ran from 2008 to 2012 and thus coincided with the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, to which the emission targets refer. The states of Romania and Bulgaria , which joined the EU in 2007, are now taking part, as are the EEA states of Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway.

After the approval of the 27 national allocation plans by the EU Commission, since 2008 only emission allowances for 2.08 billion t CO 2 per year have been available. This corresponds to a shortage of 40 million t CO 2 (–1.9 percent) compared to the emissions in 2005.

In contrast to the first trading period, a lack of CO 2 emission allowances can also be offset by emission reductions in third countries from so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation Projects (JI). Both mechanisms enable industrialized countries in particular to meet their reduction commitments to a certain extent outside their own national territory (e.g. in developing countries), with the exception of reforestation projects. On the one hand, this should keep the costs of reducing emissions as low as possible. On the other hand, the transfer of money and technology should enable developing countries to achieve ecologically sustainable economic development. Each state can independently determine the permissible level of emissions balanced in this way; in Germany it was limited to 22 percent of the emission certificates allocated to each individual installation.

In addition, slightly more systems are recorded than in the first period, such as crackers in chemical plants (a total of 52 million tons per year).

With regard to the allocation of certificates, the federal states have more freedom in their NAPs: They can auction up to ten percent of their certificates. Germany currently sells 8.8 percent of the certificates on the stock exchange. This is handled by the state-owned KfW banking group .

Phase III (2013-2020)

EU emissions trading rate (per tonne of CO 2 equivalent) Jan. 2013 - Feb. 2017

With the third trading phase resolved by the EU on April 23, 2009, further substances that have an impact on the climate were included in emissions trading, including nitrous oxide and fully halogenated fluorocarbons . However, there are exceptions for energy-intensive and export-oriented companies.

Europe-wide cap instead of national allocation plans

The regulations for awarding the certificates underwent significant changes. The national allocation plans have been replaced by an EU-wide overall upper limit ( cap ) for CO 2 emissions. In 2013, this amounted to 2.08 billion t CO 2 . The amount is reduced annually - starting in 2014 - by the fixed value of 1.74 percent of the average certificates issued in the second trading period (corresponds to 38.3 million t CO 2 ).

Allocation of certificates

While the emission certificates were largely distributed free of charge in the first and second phases, at the beginning of the third trading period they were increasingly awarded by auction. In 2013, the share of auctioned certificates was 20 percent (previously up to ten percent). In the following years, the proportion is expected to increase (depending on the development of the 'Carbon Leakage List') to 70 percent in 2020 and finally to 100 percent (2027). According to the original Commission proposal, all emissions certificates should be auctioned as early as 2020. However, the Council of the EU finally prevailed with the less ambitious goal. Electricity producers have had to pay for all the certificates they need since 2013, with the exception of Member States - especially Eastern European - whose power plants have a comparatively high proportion of coal. The operators of these power plants initially received up to 70 percent of the certificates free of charge, but must also bid for them in full by 2020 at the latest.

In addition, there was a new regulation for the award of free certificates. Those certificates, which remain free, are no longer under the grandfathering awarded (the orientation of historical emissions from the plant), but on the principle of best available technology ( best available technology , BAT, orientation to the technical standard of the asset class as a benchmark ). A steelworks, for example, is no longer assigned certificates based on how much CO 2 it has emitted so far, but rather based on the standard of how high the emissions of a modern and efficient steelworks of the same range are. The starting point for determining the benchmarks is the average performance of the ten percent most efficient plants in a sector or sub-sector in the Community in 2007 and 2008. The benchmarks are then determined for the individual products and take into account the "most efficient technologies, substitutes, alternative manufacturing processes, highly efficient cogeneration, efficient energetic utilization of residual gases, the use of biomass as well as the separation and storage of CO 2 , provided that the appropriate systems are available. "Those energy-intensive companies that are among the ten percent most environmentally friendly in their sector in Europe, are rewarded with free emission certificates.

95 percent of industrial emissions receive free allocations [as of 2013], because in these industries the production costs would increase by more than five percent due to a (theoretical) CO 2 tax of 30 euros / certificate and more than ten percent of their sales would be exported redeem outside the EU or if one of these two criteria is 30 percent. This is to prevent competitive disadvantages compared to competitors who operate in countries that do not participate in global climate protection. Which sectors will benefit from this so-called “carbon leakage” in the future has been determined by the EU Commission since 2009 and redefined every five years.

Use of revenue

The income in the high double-digit billion euro amount is partly distributed to the member states and partly fed to a climate fund. Rich EU states have to surrender 12 percent of the emission rights to which they are entitled to poorer states in order to cushion their costs through emissions trading. In detail, the emission allowances intended for auctioning are distributed to the member states as follows:

  • 88 percent go to the member states according to their share of emissions in 2005.
  • 10 percent will be distributed to 19 poorer or low-growth member states in accordance with the Commission's redistribution proposal (Annex 2).
  • 2 percent go to those nine new EU member states whose greenhouse gas emissions fell by 20 percent between 1990 and 2005. Romania receives a share of 29 percent, Poland 27 percent and Bulgaria 15 percent.

Backloading and market stability reserve

On July 3, 2013, the European Parliament voted in favor of a shortage of certificates in order to prevent their further decline in prices (see section # Certificate surplus and price decline ). On January 9, 2014, the long negotiated backloading was finally decided by the EU ( Regulation (EU) No. 176/2014 ). The auctioning of a total of 900 million certificates should be postponed from 2014–2016 to 2019 and 2020. After the decision, prices rose moderately, but were still well below the political target until 2018.

With Decision (EU) 2015/1814 and Directive (EU) 2018/410, the EU established a “Market Stability Reserve ” (MSR), which began to take effect on January 1, 2019: The 900 million certificates from backloading were removed from the market taken and transferred to a newly formed reserve. All certificates that have not been allocated, for example leftovers from auctions, have also been included in this reserve since 2019. The regulation also defines a corridor of 400–833 million certificates that should be in circulation every year. Outside the corridor, the EU has to intervene in the market with the next auction: If it falls below this limit, up to 200 million certificates (from 2023: up to 100 million) from the reserve will also be brought onto the market. If it is exceeded, the certificates that are actually to be auctioned are put in the reserve in the following year, in a number that corresponds to 24% of the previous year's circulation (from 2023: 12%).

Phase IV (2021-2030)

In July 2015 the European Commission submitted a proposal for the 4th trading period. From 2017, negotiations on this took place within the framework of the so-called “trialogue” discussions between the Commission, Council and Parliament. The reform finally came into force in March 2018.

As a major change, it was decided to increase the linear reduction factor from 1.74% to 2.2%, i.e. the maximum emissions should be reduced by 2.2% annually. This reduction factor should not be adjusted until 2024 at the earliest. The German Federal Environment Agency, however, considers an annual reduction of 2.6% to be necessary in order to achieve the EU's long-term climate goals.

Changes to the market stability reserve will take effect from 2023: If fewer than 400 million certificates are in circulation, 100 million instead of 200 million will be brought onto the market from the reserve. If more than 833 million certificates are in circulation, the number of certificates withdrawn from the market in the following year is only 12% instead of 24% of the circulation. The reserve is also limited to the volume of certificates from the previous year's auction, all other certificates become invalid.

air traffic

Air traffic in the EU-25 causes a good 130 million t of CO 2 each year , around three percent of all emissions.

On December 20, 2007, the EU environment ministers agreed to include aviation in EU emissions trading from 2012 onwards . This means that all airlines that take off from or land in the EU should in future buy emission certificates regardless of their origin - including for intercontinental flights. This should reduce the CO 2 emissions from air traffic, which has grown by 87 percent since 1990 . The price of a ticket for a return flight within the EU will be up to nine euros more expensive, according to a study by the EU Commission. For long-haul flights, price increases of up to 40 euros can be expected.

In contrast to the industrial and electricity companies, there are no NAPs for air traffic. Instead, the certificates are distributed directly by the Commission. In addition, not a maximum of ten, but 15 percent of the certificates are auctioned and the free distribution does not take place according to grandfathering rules, but based on a technological benchmark ( best available technology , BAT). Numerous proposals from the EU Commission for phase III are thus already anticipated (see previous section).

The European Parliament was an advocate of stricter rules in the negotiations. Air traffic should be included as early as 2011, fewer allowances should be allocated and a larger share (namely 25 percent) should be auctioned.

Non-EU states then spoke out against the inclusion of “their” airlines in the EU emissions trading scheme. India , Russia , the United States and the People's Republic of China have partially banned their airlines from complying with the rules; The People's Republic of China forbade airlines registered in their country from spending funds on the certificates. The opponents of the project criticize that the EU is thereby exceeding its competence, especially since the fee should be based on the length of the entire flight and not just on the distance covered by the EU member states. However , in a ruling of December 21, 2011, the ECJ approved the EU's approach and rejected claims by US airlines.

On November 12, 2012, the EU Commission suspended the obligation to submit greenhouse gas certificates for flights across EU borders for one year until the conference of the international aviation organization ICAO in 2013. Since then only flights within the EU have been covered by emissions trading, which is around 40 percent of all flights taking off or landing in the EU.

In October 2013 the ICAO agreed on a roadmap for a global climate protection agreement in aviation. By 2016, it wants to develop a market-based system for limiting emissions, which will come into force in 2020. Starting from the level then reached, aviation emissions should only grow in a CO 2 -neutral manner from now on . However, the USA and the major emerging countries succeeded in preventing the states from making a binding commitment. In addition, there should be relief for developing countries and for countries with a difficult economic situation. The ICAO General Assembly refused to include flights between EU and non-EU airports in EU emissions trading. The EU compromise proposal that only the kilometers flown over Europe should be taken into account ("airspace approach") was also rejected.

Excess certificates and falling prices

Around 2 billion certificates are required every year. Because 200 million more certificates are issued each year than are structurally required and at the same time only 40 to 50 million tonnes of certificates are deleted each year, there is a certificate surplus that is currently increasing. As of February 2017, there was a surplus of around 3 billion allowances. As a result of these framework conditions, contrary to the original expectations, the certificate price was at a very low level of approx. 5 euros / ton in accordance with the laws of supply and demand . The reason for this very low price is unknown. While the recession in the EU countries and the increased feed-in of renewable energies were initially identified as the cause, a more recent study came to the conclusion that these can only explain 10% of the price decline, while 90% of the price decline has not yet been clarified. The aim is a higher price level, as this is the only way to ensure the effectiveness of emissions trading.

Despite the low price, it has been shown for Germany that companies not exempted from the compulsory certificate reduced their emissions faster than the average without losing jobs or exports.

According to the opinion of the Ifo Institute from February 2012, the emissions avoided by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in Germany in power generation reduce the demand for emissions trading certificates and thus their price in Europe. The lower price would make fossil energies cheaper and thus direct investments in fossil energy production in countries without comparable subsidies. The coal and gas power plants would then be in Poland or Italy, while solar systems would be prevented in Estremadura. Due to the collision with the EEG, the EU emissions trading could therefore not fulfill its task of reducing emissions at the lowest possible economic cost.

The drop in prices made calls for reforms from numerous organizations.

The German Federal Environment Agency pushed for stronger incentives for climate protection through emissions trading and a corresponding adjustment of the certificate budget. This is the only way to give the energy sector and industry enough incentive to invest more in climate protection. Overall, the European climate protection target must be increased from 20 percent to 30 percent. It is also worrying that emissions from the transport sector that are not included in emissions trading are increasing.

In February 2013, Germanwatch , together with six large companies, published an appeal to the federal government to repair the EU emissions trading system. Alstom , EnBW , E.ON , Otto , Puma , Shell and Germanwatch are calling for more security for climate protection investments by the economy. To do this, the federal government must support the EU Commission's proposals to reform emissions trading. A survey by the TNS Emnid institute was also published, according to which 73 percent of Germans are in favor of the EU raising its emissions target for 2020 from the low 20 to 30 percent below the 1990 level. ¾ of those questioned also wanted Chancellor Angela Merkel to get involved personally in intensive negotiations with the Polish government to achieve the 30 percent target. Poland was the main blocker of higher climate targets. The Federal Association for Renewable Energy also appealed several times to revive European emissions trading in order to create fairer competitive conditions for renewable energies .

According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) from March 2013, a large excess of emission certificates had accumulated. The reasons for this were "primarily unexpected reductions in emissions due to the economic crisis and a strong influx of international emissions credits". The institute estimates that the cumulative surplus could rise to 2.6 billion tons by 2015. In order for emissions trading to fulfill its steering effect, the surplus of certificates must be permanently reduced. An analysis by the institute shows that part of the surplus can be absorbed by the hedging demand of electricity producers. The remaining surplus could be reduced by the postponement of certificate auctions (backloading) within the current trading period as proposed by the EU Commission. At the same time, a consultation process for a structural reform of emissions trading had been initiated. With these measures, the EU emissions trading could again fulfill its role. Otherwise, the credibility of European climate policy is at stake.

The annual report on energy consumption in Germany in 2013 by the AG Energiebilanzen also concludes that “the incentives intended with emissions trading for emission-reducing behavior at such certificate prices [of approx. 5 euros / ton] are not to be expected”.

According to the Renewable Energy Agency of June 2013, the price development in the EU emissions trading favored electricity generation from coal at the expense of flexible gas-fired power plants. That contradicts the climate protection and energy transition goals of the EU and the German federal government. In view of the low CO 2 prices , the competitiveness of natural gas compared to coal-fired power plants is deteriorating and the utilization of gas power plants is decreasing.

With the introduction of the market stability reserve decided in 2015, which has been in effect since 2019 (see section #Backloading and market stability reserve ), the EU tried to stabilize prices and increase them to an effective level. In 2017 the prices started to rise, in 2019 they were around 20 EUR / t. According to a report by the Wegener Center and other institutions, this price is nowhere near enough to promote the large-scale commissioning of climate-friendly technologies.

Discussion about reforming the system

duties

In November 2010, the chief economist of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Research, Ottmar Edenhofer, spoke out in favor of the introduction of tariffs that correspond to the CO 2 pollution caused by the imported products. Such tariffs are intended to prevent Western countries from relocating the manufacture of energy-intensive products to third countries in order to reduce their emissions. According to a study by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research , it is unclear whether such tariffs could reduce overall CO 2 emissions.

Expansion of coverage

In May 2014, Ottmar Edenhofer proposed three main reform measures, one of which is the compulsory certification for emissions in the building and transport sector.

Minimum price of the certificates

Various institutions and people suggested the introduction of a minimum price for certificates. So Ottmar Edenhofer from PIK with a price level of 20 € / t.

A contribution by Anita Engels and Sonja Peterson from the German Climate Consortium (DKK) goes in the same direction. They are discussing keeping the certificates that have not been sold at a minimum price and selling them later if the certificate price is higher. In this case, the minimum price for the foreseeable future would also be a maximum price, namely until all excess certificates have been used up.

Linking: Linking with other emissions trading systems

Different regional emissions trading systems can be linked by recognizing emissions credits from the other system for their reduction commitments. This so-called “linking” of emissions trading systems creates a larger carbon market, can reduce costs and improve the liquidity and stability of the market. There are also risks, so problems in one system can spread to others.

In 2004 the EU decided to link its emissions trading system with the offset markets from the Clean Development Mechanism and the Joint Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This brought certificates to the EU market from projects that had not resulted in any additional emission reductions. As a result, the EU tightened the requirements for emission reduction certificates from these offset markets.

Since 2010, the EU has been negotiating a link with Switzerland's emissions trading system . In November 2017, the European Union and Switzerland finally agreed to connect their systems and began technical preparations for implementation. The two systems were connected on January 1, 2020.

EU emissions trading scams

Carousel fraud

In connection with the EU emissions trading, so-called carousel deals took place in 2008 and 2009 . Emission rights were sold several times across EU national borders in a fraudulent system and the resulting VAT was illegally reimbursed by the tax office to the dealer. The peculiarities and different deadlines for the payment and reimbursement of VAT and sales tax applicable to domestic and international trade in the EU are exploited. The European police authority Europol announced in December 2009 that in some countries up to 90% of the volume in the pollution rights market could be due to fraud . The EU states Great Britain, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany have already suffered financial damage of 5 billion euros as a result of the tax loss . According to the Frankfurt Public Prosecutor's Office, the total damage in Germany amounts to 850 million euros. As a first consequence, the VAT on emissions certificates was suspended in Great Britain and France; In the Netherlands and Spain, the tax liability for sales was shifted from the seller to the buyer under the reverse charge procedure . As a result of the law for the implementation of European legal requirements, starting July 1, 2010, there will also be a reversal of tax liability in Germany when trading emissions certificates.

The system that the fraudsters use to swindle tax money has nothing to do with emissions trading itself and therefore has no direct consequences for climate protection. Still, Rob Wainwright , director of Europol , warned that these criminal activities would jeopardize the credibility of EU emissions trading. The then French Minister for Economic Affairs, Christine Lagarde , called for emissions trading to be subjected to suitable capital market supervision. The search for individual perpetrators by name is still ongoing (08/2014).

Theft of electronic emissions certificates

On January 20, 2011, it became known that unknown hackers had stolen up to two million emission allowances worth 28 million euros. The EU Commission then suspended all spot trading in pollution rights (around a fifth of all market activities) until further notice. Only the allocation and assignment of pollution rights remain permitted. The Parisian CO 2 exchange BlueNext and the registration offices of the affected countries of the Czech Republic, Greece, Estonia, Poland and Austria had previously ceased operations. According to a market participant, 470,000 EUAs worth 6.7 million euros were stolen in the Czech Republic. According to the Vienna Federal Police Directorate , the damage in Austria is 7.5 million euros. It is the biggest incident to date in European trade in pollution rights.

On February 4, 2011, EU emissions trading started again. The European Commission announced that the national commercial registers of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia and the United Kingdom have started operating again. The five states had previously demonstrated to the Commission that their national trading systems meet all the necessary security requirements.

Experts blame the incident on the lax security rules of individual countries. So the query of the identity was inadequate. According to the EU Commission, 14 countries across Europe are suspected of failing to meet the safety requirements. The Director General for Climate Protection , Jos Delbeke , announced that he would ask all member states about their security measures to protect against hacker attacks and theft. The head of the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt), Hans-Jürgen Nantke, spoke out in favor of harmonizing European safety standards. At the end of November 2010, 1.6 million certificates had already disappeared in Romania.

CDM and JI certificate scams

The aforementioned flexible mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), allow industrialized countries to carry out projects abroad to reduce emissions and to have themselves credited to their own carbon footprint. There were repeated allegations of fraud in connection with these mechanisms. In some cases, the emissions are deliberately driven upwards in order to then reduce them again and have the effect credited to you. NGOs and scientific institutes therefore criticize the practical implementation of the flexible mechanisms and demand more precise controls and a limitation of the permitted credits.

literature

Manuals

  • European Commission (Ed.): EU ETS Handbook . 2015 ( europa.eu [PDF; 3.3 MB ]).

Monographs and compilations

  • Michael Angrick , Christoph Kühleis, Jürgen Landgrebe, Jan Weiß (Eds.): 12 Years of European Emissions Trading in Germany, Metropolis-Verlag, Marburg, 2nd edition, 2019, ISBN 978-3-7316-1362-6
  • Wolfgang Gründinger : lobbying in climate protection. The national structure of the European emissions trading system. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2012, ISBN 978-3-531-18348-0 .
  • FutureCamp Climate GmbH: Emissions trading and climate strategies . Weka Media, Kissing 2010, ISBN 978-3-8111-1938-3 .
  • Walter Frenz: Emissions trading law. Commentary on the TEHG and ZuG . Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2005, ISBN 3-540-22818-7 .
  • Ines Zenke, Thomas Fuhr: Trading with CO 2 certificates . CH Beck Verlag, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-406-55245-5 .
  • Timo Hohmuth: Emissions trading and German plant law . Carl Heymanns, Cologne 2006, ISBN 3-452-26471-8 .
  • Yvonne Kerth: Emissions Trading in Community Law. The EC emissions trading directive as a new instrument for European climate protection policy. (= Jus Europaeum. Volume 29). Nomos-Verlag, Baden-Baden 2004, ISBN 3-8329-0709-2 .
  • Michael Lucht, Gorden Spangardt: Emissions trading . Springer Verlag., Heidelberg 2004, ISBN 3-540-21005-9 .
  • Ines Zenke, Ralf Schäfer (Ed.): Energy trading in Europe - oil, gas, electricity, derivatives, certificates . CH Beck Verlag, Munich, 3rd edition. 2012, ISBN 978-3-406-63237-2 .
  • Raimund Körner, Hans-Peter Vierhaus: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Act and Allocation Act 2007 . Comment. Beck, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-406-52551-2 .
  • Energy institute at the Johannes Kepler University Linz (ed.): Legal problems of the emission certificate law. 2006, ISBN 3-902460-27-X .
  • Ines Zenke, Thomas Fuhr, Malte Bornkamm (eds.): CO 2 -Handel aktuell. VWEW Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2009, ISBN 978-3-8022-0903-1 .

Technical article

Web links

Wiktionary: Emissions trading  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

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This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on November 24, 2009 .