Air raid near Kunduz

This article describes the airstrike in 2009. For the airstrike in 2015, see bombing of the Doctors Without Borders clinic in Kunduz .

Wrecks of the two tankers destroyed by an air raid on September 4, 2009 in the Kunduz River

Location of attack

Situation in Afghanistan

During the air attack near Kunduz (also: Kunduz ) on September 4, 2009 at around 2 a.m. local time, about fifteen kilometers south of the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan, two tank trucks hijacked by the Taliban and people in the immediate vicinity were bombed. Georg Klein , at that time a colonel in a federal armed forces unit stationed near Kunduz , requested the bombing, sometimes unknowingly providing false information; it was carried out by two US aircraft.

The attack probably killed or injured around 100 people, including children (the number of victims varies depending on the source), which is by far the largest number of casualties in the history of both the Bundeswehr and ISAF forces means. The attack and the subsequent reactions by the Bundeswehr leadership were heavily criticized both from within Germany and abroad. When it became clear that the then Federal Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung had delayed, incomplete or incorrectly informed parliament and the public about the killing of civilians, he resigned as Federal Labor Minister on November 27, 2009 . The day before, his successor as Federal Defense Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg had removed the Federal Armed Forces Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan and State Secretary Peter Wichert from their offices on the grounds that they had withheld information about the attack from him. Since January 21, 2010, the Defense Committee tried to clear up the proceedings as a parliamentary committee of inquiry . The final report was submitted to the German Bundestag on October 25, 2011 and finally debated in plenary on December 1, 2011. On April 19, 2010, the Federal Prosecutor's Office announced that they had discontinued the investigation into the air attack because neither the provisions of the International Criminal Code nor the provisions of the Criminal Code had been violated.

General situation

→ Main articles : War in Afghanistan since 2001  and ISAF operations management in the Kunduz area since 2009

In the days and weeks before the air strike, the situation in the Kunduz area was extremely tense, and the ISAF troops in the Kunduz area were repeatedly involved in fierce fighting. In 2009, several German soldiers were killed or wounded in firefights. For a long time there have been indications that vehicles filled with fuel should be used as rolling bombs against the Kunduz camp. Such an attack had already taken place in Kandahar in the previous weeks. The day before the air strike, four German soldiers were again wounded and one vehicle was destroyed when the Taliban attacked the Bundeswehr with small arms and bazookas.

At the time of the tank truck hijacking, one of three infantry companies of the Bundeswehr's Quick Reaction Force was involved in heavy fighting as part of the NATO operation Aragon far away in the Archi area . The Marder armored personnel carriers were not available during the night in question because they were used against Taliban fighters far away from Kunduz. Heavy artillery was not available in northern Afghanistan (the self-propelled howitzer 2000 was only moved north in May 2010), which is why Colonel Klein's only option was an air strike in order to respond militarily. The other two infantry companies of the Kunduz PRT were bound by routine tasks.

procedure

Two F-15E jets dropped from JDAM over Afghanistan in 2009

On September 3, 2009 at 3:30 p.m. local time, one civilian tanker truck loaded with gasoline and one with diesel were kidnapped by the Taliban after a flat tire on a highway near Aliabad, about eight kilometers from the Bundeswehr camp near Kunduz. One of the two drivers was killed, the other survived imprisonment and an air raid. The trucks initially left the area of ​​the German camp on the road. When trying to cross the Kunduz River, about 7 kilometers as the crow flies from the Kunduz PRT camp , they were unable to maneuver in a ford .

The kidnappers then used cell phones to request support from other Taliban in the area to free the stolen vehicles.

The governor of Kunduz, Mohammad Omer, informed his police chief about the hijacked tankers at around 7.15 p.m. Shortly afterwards, the Afghan police passed the information on to the contact officer of the EU police mission in the Bundeswehr field camp in Kunduz . The news included that the tank trucks were to be moved from the Kunduz PRT area to the Chahar Darah district, for which they would have to cross the Kunduz River. According to AP reports and information in the Feldjäger report (see below), the PRT KDZ is said to have followed the hijacked tankers with drones , which the Bundeswehr had had there for several weeks, to the Kunduz River and “counted 67 Taliban fighters”. Meanwhile, other Taliban fighters called in a mosque to help them. Residents from 16 villages made their way to the sandbank in vehicles or on foot. The commander of the PRT, Colonel Georg Klein , was informed of the events around 8:30 p.m. (according to other sources, only at 9:12 p.m.). He had the drone monitoring stopped due to working time limits and instead requested a US B-1B bomber , which was equipped with a sniper-ATP reconnaissance device at that time by Task Force 47 (TF47) of the German Armed Forces to investigate an attack on theirs Troops were deployed 60 km from the Bundeswehr camp. Due to incorrect coordinates, the aircraft did not find the two vehicles until around 00:15 and then transmitted its recordings live to the control center of the TF47. There the intelligence officer of the TF47 was indirectly connected to an Afghan informant via a chain of other people, who reported the situation around the tanker truck via mobile phone without his own visual contact. Colonel Klein was called back to the command post. A forward air controller (FAC) carried out radio communications for him. Contrary to initial press reports, Colonel Klein was not the commander of the TF47, but, as the commander of the Reconstruction Team (PRT) Kunduz, was regularly dependent on working with it. Half of the TF47 consisted of KSK soldiers, the other half of long-range reconnaissance personnel, and was subordinate to the German command for command of special operations and the ISAF headquarters special forces. The plane had to return to its base due to lack of fuel.

In the meantime, the radio reconnaissance of the Bundeswehr and the BND and information from the informant had shown that the Taliban commanders Mullah Siah, Mullah Nasruddin, Mullah Abdul Rahman and Maulawi Naim, who at that time led the majority of the insurgents in the Aliabad district, were with the tank trucks. At 12:49 a.m., the air traffic control officer again asked the NATO air center in Kabul about air support and, when asked , reported that there was troops in contact (TIC), even though, according to various reports later submitted, there were no NATO soldiers or Afghan forces in the immediate vicinity Near the two tankers. Two F-15E fighter planes then arrived over the operational area at around 01:08 a.m. They once again provided the Germans with live images from the scene. Although no information was available about the fate of the second truck driver, the pilots (radio nicknames Dude 15 and Dude 16) were assured that there were no friendly forces near the tanker. When one of the crew members asked the Germans to clarify the situation further, the air traffic control officer refused and gave his superior Klein the order to drop bombs. Dude 15 suggested that a higher authority be involved in the decision "so that we are both covered". The flight control officer refused, the clearance came from the commander of the German reconstruction team, "who is sitting next to me". The five-time offer by the crew members to evict the people from the tankers before the bombing by flying low ("show of force") was also rejected by the Germans. When asked by one of the crew members “Do you want to meet the vehicles or the people?” The air traffic control officer replied: “We want to try to hit the people”, so the bombs should be placed between the tank trucks, where there were many people. When a crew member asked whether the people around the tanker vehicles represented an imminent threat , this - a controversial statement - was confirmed. The bombing was thus formally legitimized for the bomber crew according to the ISAF rules .

The air traffic control officer Red Baron demanded the use of six bombs. This was contradicted by the crew members, who considered dropping two bombs to be sufficient. Ultimately, the two crew members dropped two GBU-38 bombs on September 4, 2009 at 1:49 a.m. local time , made overflights over the area as part of the Battle Damage Assessment until 02:28 a.m., reported 56 dead and 11 to 14 survivors who fled northeast and turned towards their base. The Kunduz PRT did not inform the North Regional Command until 3:13 a.m. about the incident, with 54 insurgents killed and fourteen able to flee. There were no casualties among the civilians. Mullah Abdul Rahman and another Taliban commander are said to have survived.

Messages and reports on the event from Afghanistan

Ten military and civilian reports were listed by November 6, 2009; later, other data, some not intended for publication, became known from other sources:

U.S. Forces Diary

On July 25, 2010 WikiLeaks put the Afghan War Diary , an excerpt from a collection of more than 91,000 internal documents of the US armed forces on the Afghanistan mission from 2004 to 2009, online. In relation to the air strike, it is first reported that on September 3, 2009, “insurgents” stole two fuel tankers and now intended to take them across the Kunduz River to the Char Darah province . At around 5:30 p.m. it was found that the tankers had got stuck in the mud and were surrounded by up to 70 insurgents. After the commander of the PRT had ensured that no civilians were in the vicinity ("after ensuring that no civilians were in the vicinity"), he authorized an air strike. After two bombs were dropped at 9:19 p.m., at 9:58 p.m., aerial reconnaissance revealed that 56 people were killed and 14 people were fleeing to the northeast.

Report of the regional command of the Bundeswehr

Just a few hours after the air strike had the German Regional Command in Camp Marmal in Mazār-i-Sharif to the Operational Command of the Armed Forces in Geltow at Potsdam reported clear evidence of civilian casualties. This should emerge , for example, from Annex 23 of the military police report (see below): In the Kunduz hospital, six patients between the ages of ten and twenty were treated in connection with the air strike. The regional command also immediately reported, citing NATO allies, that Taliban fighters had stormed a mosque before the bombing and forced several villagers to use tractors to help retrieve the gasoline. 14 of them have since disappeared. On September 4, 2009, the regional command had already reported two “teenage-age” bodies to Potsdam, citing NATO allies. A little later on the same day, however, the commander of the regional command, Brigadier General Jörg Vollmer , advised the operational command staff in Potsdam not to use statements made by Colonel Klein within the Bundeswehr: "As things stand, it is not recommended to pass them on to the operational command staff [underlined]". He referred to the fact that a report to the ISAF had also been subsequently amended (see below).

Report from the BND to the Federal Chancellery

On September 4, 2009 at 8:06 am, Department 6 of the Federal Chancellery, which is responsible for intelligence services, received an email from the Federal Intelligence Service , which reported under the subject line “Crowds die in explosion in Afghanistan” with reference to a report by the BBC about the air attack: “That What is devastating is that numerous civilians were killed in the process (numbers vary from around 50 to 100) ”After the press and television published excerpts on 25 March 2010, the Federal Press Office confirmed this email, but described it as merely“ non-binding Initial information from the BND ”.

Report from the Bundeswehr base to ISAF

On September 4, at around 3:30 p.m., the Kunduz military base posted the usual intelligence summary (INTSUM) in the ISAF network. This time it said that it was possible that the insurgents had distributed the fuel from the tanker trucks to the local population, and: "It cannot be excluded that civilians were among the casualties". This message also reached the commander of the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam, Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz . He noted on the printout: “If this is correct and should be confirmed by COMPRT [the commander of the Kunduz PRT, Colonel Klein], it is a violation of the COMISAF Tactical Directive. Then in the worst case one would have accepted CIVCAS [death and wounding of civilians]. ”Glatz telephoned General Vollmer in Mazar-i Sharif. He then had the previous version of the report deleted from the ISAF network and instead posted a new report at around 8 p.m. that no longer contained the aforementioned passages on the involvement of civilians. Glatz justified this with the fact that "details had not yet been validly checked". After these events were published by the media on March 4, 2010, shortly before the planned questioning of Glatz and Vollmer by the investigative committee, this was postponed to March 15, 2010. On the one hand, there was an allegation of a cover-up by the Bundeswehr leadership and, on the other hand, a joint decision to investigate for treason.

Report from a senior physician

A German colonel in the regional command in Mazar-e Sharif ( Camp Marmal ) also reported on the evening of the air attack to the Bundeswehr command and control command in Potsdam, first of a child and later of two 14-year-old boys with an open fracture and shrapnel injuries.

Preliminary investigations by the ISAF Initial Action Team (IAT)

On September 4, 2009 at 5:20 p.m., on behalf of the ISAF commander, General Stanley A. McChrystal met an ISAF preliminary investigation team ( Initial Action Team , IAT) led by the British Air Commodore Paddy Teakle (Director for Air Operations at ISAF Headquarters) and of the US Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith (Director of Communication, Strategic Communication Directorate International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces Afghanistan) accompanied by journalists from the Washington Post (including Rajiv Chandrasekaran ) in Kunduz. There, the commander of the German military camp prevented them from going to the site of the air strike or the Kunduz hospital, because it was too dangerous because of the annoyance of the residents. However, the investigators were later surprised that locals praised the airstrike as a success and claimed that only insurgents or thieves were harmed. At first the events were only discussed in the camp . According to the journalists' impression, the result was worrying. The video recordings of the bomber pilots would have shown that around 100 people could be seen as black dots on the tank trucks before the attack. Then only a few left, who ran away, that is, survived, while most of the 100 or so points had disappeared.

On the morning of September 5, 2009, the Initial Action Team (IAT) flew over the scene of the accident and still visited the hospital and found children and young people there with splinters and burns. On the afternoon of September 5, 2009, McChrystal arrived at the encampment, where from 10 a.m. there were now additional members of a government commission sent by President Karzai. From 12.30 p.m. the commander of the Bundeswehr in Mazar-i Scharif and Regional Commander North, Brigadier General Jörg Vollmer, also arrived at the Kunduz PRT and took part in all McChrystal's discussions about the incident. McChrystal drove to the site of the airstrike from 4:00 p.m., despite another warning from the Germans, where no bodies were found. He also visited the hospital, accompanied by a German television team, and had an injured young person describe the air attack to him in front of the camera. These recordings were broadcast on September 6, 2009 by several German broadcasters. Based on the video comparison and the visits to the hospital, the commission announced in a 27-page report on the same day that around 125 people had been killed in the air strike, including at least two dozen who were not classified as insurgents.

Report from Colonel Klein

On September 5, 2009, Colonel Klein wrote a two-page report to Inspector General Schneiderhan, who received it on September 6, 2009. It should read: "On September 4th at 1:51 am I decided to use air forces to destroy two tankers hijacked on the evening of September 3rd, as well as INS on the vehicles" - INS stands for insurgents. He ordered the bombing "in order to avert danger to my soldiers at an early stage and, on the other hand, with the highest probability of only meeting enemies of the reconstruction of Afghanistan." It should be noted that the phrase “destroy” is a precisely defined military term (see type of effect ), and therefore not a particularly martial expression that was only used by Colonel Klein.

Report of the Governor of Kunduz Province

The German Defense Minister Jung also received an Afghan report on the events of September 4, 2009, which was signed by Mohammed Omar and the police chief of the Kunduz province, the NDS chief of the Kunduz province, the provincial council chairman of the Kunduz province and the commander of the 2009 new established 2nd Brigade of the 209th Corps of the Afghan National Army (ANA) . It said: “The explosion killed 56 armed people and injured 12 people. The injured had burns and were taken to the hospital in Kunduz, where one of the injured died on September 4, 2009 […] After discussions with villagers and eyewitnesses, it was proven that all those killed belonged to the Taliban and its allies. In an interview in September 2009, Omar added that Klein had “made the right decision at the right time and acted very prudently”. The “Germans have the full support of the population. We have not received any complaints about civilian victims, as is usually the case in such cases. ”Anyone who stayed with the tankers late at night must have been a criminal or a supporter of the Taliban. The criticism of the Americans is more likely to come from the gut, "the Americans probably didn't eat well and had bad dreams". However, the statements made by the governor must be assessed against the background that, although in 2008 he had promised the then Interior Secretary August Hanning to cooperate closely with the German authorities, the BND had repeatedly listened to phone calls made by the governor, which showed that Omar ISAF -Information immediately passed on to insurgents.

Commission of Inquiry on behalf of the President of Afghanistan

Another commission of inquiry was set up by order of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai . It included representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defense, the NDS and a representative from the President. On November 13, 2009, the commission announced that the bombing had killed and injured 119 people, including 30 civilians and 20 unarmed Taliban dead, a total of 69 Taliban fighters killed, and nine civilians and 11 insurgents injured.

Feldjäger report, investigation report on the Close Air Support KUNDUZ

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This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

On September 14, 2009, the Bundeswehr near Potsdam received from a courier a collection of reports and annexes comprising around 100 pages according to press reports, which had been compiled by Lieutenant Colonel Brenner , the police officer responsible for Kunduz and supplemented by a CD and DVD. The content has not yet been officially published. At WikiLeaks , however, a facsimile is available with the first 8 pages on informal paper containing an “Investigation report on Close Air Support KUNDUZ” from September 9, 2009 by “Lieutenant Colonel Brenner, FjgFhr iE, 20th German ISAF contingent, Mazar-e-Sharif “, And is supplemented by a further 32 pages. Some of these show military letterheads. The most recent paper is a report from November 26th, 2009. Several German media published texts that are identical to the WikiLeaks documents. Both texts say: “The documents do not reveal which group of people [...] contributed to the decision of the Kdr PRT KDZ during the night. Legal advisor StOffz [...] was not involved in this. […] The clarification of the […] possible omissions is of particular importance, as the results of the reconnaissance at the Kunduz PRT made it clear that the bombing would lead to numerous deaths and injuries, without adequate action being taken immediately before and after the incident. "

The texts published by WikiLeaks (hereinafter cited as WL) result:

An immediate damage investigation on site was not carried out, although this “on scene battle damage assessment (BDA)” according to ISAF specifications should have been initiated up to two hours after the incident (WL 3-4). The TOC protocol (calendar) does report “of confirmed [confirmed underlined in print] death information […], but a source for this is not mentioned anywhere. The question therefore arises whether this confirmation was only seen on the basis of the [aircraft videos] or whether there were other forces in the area of ​​the incident whose observations were the basis for these confirmations ”(WL 4, 39).

However, references to a previously unknown on-scene BDA are given in the annex on page 39 of the military police report. This page is obviously part of a lengthy, unknown document, has neither the sender nor the name in the Feldjäger report. After that, the commander in Kunduz created a damage report in an email to the North Regional Command at 3:16, in which the number of victims of the F-15 pilot was "confirmed". "Confirming" is the task of an "on-scene BDA". This comment also apparently reinforces the assumption made on page 3 of the report that, hours after the bombing, ground units visited the site.

The stationary all-round observation system (RBA) in the Kunduz military camp recorded the approach and removal of around 40 people about 2 hours after the incident. But "to the best of our knowledge, the location of the incident is not visible to the RBA due to the geography". When the mandatory BDA was finally rescheduled at noon after the bombing, “an obviously clearly changed location of the incident [showed], which leaves an almost clean impression. Only minimal traces of human material can be found, neither dead nor injured are on site. […] The TPT staff deployed […] reports […] that around 14 civilians were probably killed and 4 civilians injured (recorded by name in Annex 25) ”. In the afternoon the military police carried out an investigation into the Kunduz hospital. "6 injured and 2 dead AFG [Afghan] people were found (some also between the ages of 11 and 15 years), almost all of whom had typical burn injuries." This is followed by (WL 6-8) "Conclusions and suggestions for the next steps".

Extensive appendices were attached to the actual police report:

First of all (WL 10-12) the above mentioned. Legal advisor staff officer of the Bundeswehr expressly does not determine whether Colonel Klein was allowed to order the bombing without asking the ISAF High Command in accordance with the relevant ISAF rule ROE 429: "Whether the requirements of ROE 429 were present depends on whether sufficient INTEL There were findings that the people in the vicinity were INS. "

The other documents attached to the police report justified the airstrike with arguments that a day later proved to be questionable or refuted, for example by the wounded child who was hospitalized on September 5, 2009 by the ISAF commander in chief US-General Stanley A. McChrystal was interviewed on camera. They also ignored several important questions: Why did it seem necessary to forego the usual warning overflights? Why didn't you limit yourself to destroying the pickups that were considered a threat? Why was the high command not involved even though several hours were available?

The questionnaire of a lieutenant colonel from the Federal Ministry of Defense (WL 23) and the answer to this letter, signed by Brigadier General Vollmer, who at the time of the attack was the commander of the German contingent and thus superior Klein and at the same time regional commander North (RC North) (WL 24-25): An Afghan contact person ("HUMINT contact") was near the tanker truck to clarify the situation. Although she had no eye contact herself, she was in constant telephone contact with the Taliban. "His telephone reports to TF47 were 100% confirmed by the LFz". The observation possibilities were good and a clear picture of the situation could be obtained. The Taliban were mainly in the immediate vicinity of the tank trucks. There were lively transport activities with security guards. When asked how they came to the conclusion that everyone on the scene was Taliban and whether everyone had carried weapons, the commander said that this was evident from the location, time and report of the informant. "Not all" would have carried weapons, but this "probably also because they would have interfered with the activities." Vollmer added: "There were no children and women on site". When asked how uninvolved victims should be avoided as much as possible, the commander referred on the one hand to the informant's report and on the other hand to the measurement by one of the pilots that there were no civilian buildings nearby. In order to assess the threat situation, he stated that the tanker trucks had been verifiably stolen by the Taliban, that several pickups had been on site for reloading operations and that weapons had been stowed on one of the pickups. This led to the assessment that the fuel had been loaded for further terrorist operations. Colonel Klein assumed that the pickups should be used as rolling bombs against the camp. The air attack had been appropriate to ward off a clear immediate danger to the Kunduz Bundeswehr camp. Several handguns were recovered on site after the air strike. Regarding the assessment of the air strike by the Afghan side and the statement by the governor that there were rural people on the spot who wanted to draw fuel, the commander said that the governor has now stated that he had been misquoted. The Afghan side said it was a great success and that it had "not hit any innocent civilians" and that around 60 Taliban had been killed.

Attached to the Feldjäger report are also the police officers' minutes of "evaluation talks" with Bundeswehr officers (WL 26-27), representatives of the regional administration (district managers, WL 28-29), representatives of the provincial council and the Afghan investigation team from Kabul (WL 30 -31) and a delegation from the American and British armed forces (WL 34-35). In several of these protocols it is recorded that research by the Bundeswehr and the ISAF revealed numerous civilian deaths, including children and young people, as a result of the bombing.

The police report carried the note "Only Germans for knowledge". When the NATO Joint Investigation Board (JIB) asked him in early October 2009, his informative value was called into question by an accompanying letter from the ministry in which “incomplete and superficial findings” from investigations to which the author was “not authorized” was were objected. Contrary to the report, the German side is assuming a "decision free of discretionary error" from Klein. After his arrival at NATO, the German member of the JIB, legal advisor Björn Voigt, checked him for new findings for NATO. He summarized “that there were no new findings that could have been of interest to the JIB at that time or were not yet known”.

COMISAF report

On September 8, 2009, after the preliminary investigation by the IAT, ISAF commander McChrystal set up an ISAF commission of inquiry under the leadership of Major General Charles S. Sullivan. On October 29, 2009, ISAF forwarded the almost 600-page long “COMISAF investigation report on the air raid on September 4 in Afghanistan” to the Bundeswehr. On the same day, Inspector General Schneiderhan publicly commented on him: “According to my assessment, this led to the correct assessment of the situation, that the air attack was militarily appropriate at the time. The report shows that the number of people killed and injured in the air strike can no longer be determined. The report merely cites various sources, with the number of dead and wounded varying between 17 and 142. The NATO report only states that local leaders on the ground reported possibly 30 to 40 dead and injured - as the report states - “ civilians ”. Schneiderhan declined questions about further details, referring to the secret status of the report. ”However, quotes from several national daily newspapers and a weekly magazine revealed that Schneiderhan had reproduced the content of the COMISAF report in a very one-sided manner. General Vollmer is said to have testified that he had no explanation for why Colonel Klein did not involve him: "It is unacceptable that I received notice of it so late." The ISAF report also states that Klein in a personal Report to ISAF made it clear that he primarily wanted to hit the people around the tank trucks, not the tank trucks. Klein is said to have described the then flight control officer Wilhelm as one of the best employees on his staff. Wilhelm, on the other hand, is said to have testified that the whole time that night he was in the dark about whether he and his commander were working on the same basis. He did not believe that there were only insurgents on the sandbank, nor did he see an "imminent threat" looming. In his opinion, all elements taken together were not enough to really explain “troops in contact”. Colonel Klein's decision to attack had already been made at the moment the F-15 arrived. But "the commander remains the commander and I am a soldier". Captain Nordhausen is said to have testified that although the informant who gave information about the events around the tanker trucks without his own visual contact was usually very reliable, he had repeatedly pointed out to the commander that a mistake could never be completely ruled out and that it was also in the The realm of the conceivable is that “the informant plays his own game”. The report summarized that Klein had violated the ISAF rules of engagement because he arbitrarily ordered the air strike. The ISAF assumes that Klein did not violate the international law of war.

Amnesty International report

On October 30, 2009, Amnesty International's Asia-Pacific Program released a report. It is based on statements from survivors, village elders, the local police chief and staff from the UN and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. Attached is a list of names of 83 presumably civilian casualties, including several less than 16 years of age. Some of the names on this list match those from official German sources. People died unnecessarily because the usual warning overflights had not taken place. The investigation am suggesting (Suggests) that in the incident martial law has been violated.

Red Cross report

On November 5, 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) wrote a report that is said to be classified as strictly confidential and has not yet been made public. According to sources, 74 dead civilians are said to be listed by name. Immediate danger for the Bundeswehr was unlikely; there were disproportionately many deaths. This report was received at the ministry a few hours before Guttenberg's press conference on November 6, 2009. This referred to him as follows: “At this point I want to say again - although the reports are contradicting as far as the civilian victims are concerned - that I personally assume that there were civilian victims. Today we got another report from the Red Cross. "

Information policy of the federal government

This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

The then incumbent German Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung initially completely denied civilian victims. Up to and including September 6, 2009, he announced that “exclusively terrorist Taliban” had been hit and that the local commander had “clear indications” that the people in the tank trucks were “exclusively insurgents”. It was only when details leaked that Jung claimed that by civilian victims he only meant civilian deaths. Until the end of his tenure as Defense Minister, Jung emphasized the unclear information situation about civilian victims. He did not receive the police report himself until October 5th or 6th and then forwarded it to the NATO commission of inquiry on October 7th without his own knowledge. Jung later admitted that this report had already been forwarded to the operational command of his ministry on September 14, 2009 .

Other politicians of the governing parties at the time, including Chancellor Angela Merkel , initially only hinted at the civilian casualty figures that had now leaked. On September 6, 2009, Chancellor Merkel formulated more cautiously than Jung: “If there have been civilian victims, then of course I will deeply regret it”. In a government statement on September 8, 2009, she added: “The complete clarification of the incident last Friday and its consequences is a matter of course for me and the entire federal government.” However, she refuses to prejudice, “by whoever, at home as well as abroad ”. Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared on the same day:

“We still don't know exactly how many people were killed in the air strike last Friday in Afghanistan. We do not yet know how many civilians were among the victims. (…) I not only telephoned my European colleagues, but above all the day before yesterday with my Afghan colleague, Mr Spanta . On behalf of the Federal Government, I expressed my sympathy for the possibly innocent victims that there have been. "

Overall, until at least November 6, 2009, politicians from the governing parties, the German Armed Forces and the German Armed Forces Association asserted in public that the air attack had been appropriate and that there were no civilian deaths or that there were no known small numbers of deaths. Internally, however, the Federal Chancellery is said to have come to the conclusion before September 27, 2009 that the deployment was not appropriate.

The media and politicians initially spoke of “information gaps”, reinforced by reports from the Ministry of Defense and the justification of the release of the civil servant State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defense Peter Wichert from his duties and the dismissal of the Federal Armed Forces Inspector General Wolfgang Schneiderhan on November 26, 2009.

Against the background of the election campaign for the Bundestag election on September 27, 2009, the majority rejection of the Bundeswehr's ISAF mission in public opinion, increasing criticism of former government members of the ISAF mission, for example from former Defense Minister and former Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and from Ex Defense Minister Rühe , and details of the air attack and the information policy of the federal government that have gradually become known, however, increasingly different interpretations of the "information spans" were put forward by parts of the press, the public and parliament. The Bundeswehr, the Federal Ministry of Defense or the federal government as a whole could have deliberately informed the public and parliament incorrectly or too late, despite the information they already had. A broad public discussion about civilian victims of the ISAF mission in the election campaign should be prevented. Against the background of the unpopularity of the mission among the electorate, this could have led to votes for some opposition parties, especially Die Linke .

In favor of the assumption of information routing, what only became known through a press release of March 17, 2010: On September 9, 2009, State Secretary Wichert set up a "Group 85" in the Ministry of Defense. On March 18, 2010, Wichert asserted before the committee of inquiry that this group was merely intended to prevent “a unilateral NATO investigation from being launched, which we would then have chased”. In the press report, on the other hand, with reference to internal documents, it is suspected that the group's aim was to present the decision to bomb the NATO, the German public and the investigating public prosecutor's office in Dresden as “free of discretion”. The office manager of the defense minister recommended to the press and information staff at the ministry that the stolen trucks had been stuck in a river bed for hours at the time of the bombing and therefore no longer posed a threat "for the time being". In addition, Wichert advised his Minister Jung on September 10, 2009 not to make the report of the IAT of NATO itself available to the Bundestag. Group 85 was disbanded before Guttenberg took office.

The publication of excerpts from official texts and a video by a national newspaper on November 26, 2009 then reactivated the question of how the German government's announcements about the real events of the air strike, which had been criticized as insufficient and belated, had come about.

In the response of the federal government to a parliamentary question on October 6, 2009, it was first admitted, “Estimates vary between 56 killed Taliban and 120 killed people with a high proportion of civilians. The air strike is massively criticized by allies ”. Steinmeier added on December 5, 2009 that the government had anticipated possible victims early on, "We all knew that there were many victims". He asserted that he himself “did not appear before parliament or in public with the certainty that civilians had not died”.

Guttenberg was accused of having justified Schneiderhans and Wichert's dismissal on November 26, 2009 by stating that they had withheld information from him on November 25, 2009 when he was asked. However, on December 12, 2009, it was reported from the circle of Schneiderhans and Wichert that both of them had contradicted the reasons given by Guttenberg for their release. They both informed him fully and correctly about the incident and the reports made about it. As regards the allegation Guttenberg, he had reports embezzled been so deprived specifically expressed Schneiderhan: "As for this 25 afternoon, he tells the truth." It was only on 9 March 2010, eight days before the scheduled testimony of Schneiderhan and Wichert ago the committee of inquiry, Guttenberg withdrew the accusation of embezzlement: “I never had the impression that General Schneiderhan or Dr. Wichert was acted willfully or maliciously ”.

Another allegation against Guttenberg related to the fact that on December 3, 2009 he had publicly rated the airstrike as "militarily appropriate", even though he was already fully aware of the secret ISAF investigation report. As of December 11, 2009, the media cited from this report, and Schneiderhan and Wichert added shortly thereafter that Guttenberg had also been informed of further reports through them. Guttenberg was therefore also accused of deliberately failing to inform parliament and the public about that part of the report, in spite of this knowledge, in which it was found that Klein had violated the ISAF rules of engagement and that Klein was specifically targeting the killing of people and not primarily about switching off the trucks. Guttenberg only commented on the last point: on November 6, 2009, he informed the parliamentary groups in the Bundestag that the Taliban had also been the target of the attack. He returned the allegation of failure to provide the other information to his critics: as early as November 3, 2009, leading opposition politicians and members of the Defense Committee had access to the ISAF investigation report. However, they were bound to secrecy.

Furthermore, the press and the opposition asked to what extent the Chancellor's Office had knowingly withheld information about the background to the air strike. This primarily concerns the question of whether an escalation of military means has been agreed that goes beyond the framework known to the public and the mandate of the Bundestag. In July 2009, the then General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, in the presence of his minister, declared the Bundeswehr's biggest offensive to date before the elections in Afghanistan that it was "now time to undertake this escalation". But on November 8, 2009 Steinmeier had stated that he had assured the Afghan Foreign Minister “that our philosophy and our understanding of the mission will remain in place (...) If it is necessary to take action against terrorist forces, civilian victims must be avoided . ”In mid-December 2009, however, a newspaper reported that the Chancellery, Jung, Schneiderhan, KSK contact persons and government representatives tasked with coordinating the secret services had agreed on an escalation of the military operation before and after the air strike near Kunduz in coordination with the US secret service CIA. In doing so, it should be “in accordance with the mandate, also, if necessary, for the targeted liquidation of the Taliban's management structure”. Colonel Klein "should have felt really encouraged, according to these government guidelines, to take forceful action once". A day later Sigmar Gabriel also spoke of a secret meeting allegedly held on September 4th in the Chancellery, in which a new "escalation strategy" had been agreed with the participation of the Defense Ministry and the secret services. In this context, Klein's order to specifically kill the Taliban could appear as part of this politically agreed strategy.

Assessment of legality and appropriateness

It was initially disputed whether and, if so, to what extent the German Commander Klein's actions were lawful, in accordance with the rules of engagement and militarily appropriate.

On April 19, 2010, the Federal Prosecutor's Office announced that it had stopped the investigation against Colonel Klein and Sergeant Wilhelm Wilhelm because of the air attack, "because as a result neither the provisions of the International Criminal Code [...] nor the provisions of the Criminal Code [...] had been met". In addition, Klein was allowed to assume that “there were no civilians on site. Therefore, he was not obliged to give warnings before the military attack. "

According to the reports published so far, there were several incorrect statements made when the bomb was requested. For example, German soldiers and their camps were exposed to an “immediate danger”, there was enemy contact on the ground and they were all insurgents. Without going into the fact that Klein had allowed the bombing to be legitimized to the pilots with knowingly false information, Guttenberg stated on December 3, 2009 that Klein had “undoubtedly acted to the best of his knowledge and belief”. In the days that followed he repeated this view.

In addition, Klein had reported that he had specifically wanted to kill the rebels around the tank trucks. Regarding the question of targeted killing, however, Major General Rainer Glatz, deputy commander of the operational command, had already restricted in 2007: "ISAF violence may be used (...) according to the principle of the proportionality of the means. This does not exclude emergency aid and self-defense ”. This corresponds to the information provided by the Federal Government in January 2008 that targeted killing is only permitted in the event of an actual or imminent attack. It should be "established that German soldiers do not carry out such liquidations". Accordingly, the department in the Federal Chancellery responsible for defense policy is said to have come to the internal assessment by the end of September 2009 that the order to air strike the tank trucks was not militarily  appropriate and that legal proceedings would therefore be initiated.

In its investigation report, the ISAF ruled that Klein had violated the ISAF rules of engagement and exceeded his competencies. This concerned binding instructions from the commander-in-chief on how to proceed in the event of bombing in August 2009 and July 2009 and could trigger disciplinary consequences (see below). However, Klein did not violate international law. The then Defense Minister Jung also described Klein's action as legitimate, and his successor in the Merkel II cabinet , Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg , referred to the bombing of the tanker trucks on November 6, 2009, knowing the ISAF report, referring to a “special threat in the Kunduz region "as" militarily appropriate. (...) Even if the whole thing had gone off without errors, I also come to the conclusion that the air strike should have taken place. (…) Even if there had been no procedural error, there should have been an air strike. ”The minister obviously admitted that formal errors had occurred, but asserted that, in his opinion, the attack was necessary from a military point of view. At that time, however, Guttenberg had already received the report of the International Red Cross, which judged the attack to be inconsistent with international law. The Minister did not comment on this contradiction. General Klaus Naumann , 1991–1996 General Inspector of the German Armed Forces and 1996–1999 Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, asserted on September 7, 2009 in favor of the commander that he had to “make decisions on site in seconds and minutes”. However, the German Armed Forces in Potsdam had known since September 4, 2009 that the commander had almost six hours between reporting the hijacked tanker truck and being ordered to bomb. On November 27, 2009, Colonel Ulrich Kirsch , chairman of the German Armed Forces Association , reduced the commander's behavior to the fact that he felt "threatened by the tanker trucks". Colonel Klein, however, did not see the two stuck tank trucks, but rather several pickups as a potential danger.

On December 3, 2009, Defense Minister zu Guttenberg gave the announced reassessment to the Bundestag. He did not reserve the result of the military and judicial proceedings that were already ongoing at the time and of an investigative committee called for by the opposition. Instead he declared: “Although Colonel Klein - I also call this to the officers who are here today - undoubtedly acted to the best of his knowledge and belief and to protect his soldiers, from today's objective point of view, it was in the light of everyone, including me Documents withheld at the time were not militarily appropriate. After I - without a legal assessment, this is important to me - correct my assessment in retrospect with regret, I do not, however, correct my assessment regarding my understanding of Colonel Klein ”. The former Inspector General Harald Kujat then criticized: "It is not enough to say that it was militarily appropriate or inappropriate".

Regarding the limits of the German mission in Afghanistan under the Basic Law (GG), Helmut Schmidt said in 2008 when recruits took a pledge in front of the Reichstag building : "If we participate in military interventions in Afghanistan today, it will be in accordance with our Basic Law (...) in the future too the Bundestag and the federal government will only use our armed forces in obedience to the Basic Law and only in obedience to international law ”. Article 2 (2) of the Basic Law obliges German soldiers, including the members of the KSK in Afghanistan, not to injure or kill bystanders or civilians when using military force as far as possible. Within the framework of the ISAF mandate to implement the resolution of the UN Security Council of December 21, 2001, German soldiers are allowed to “take all necessary measures including the use of military force”. In the opinion of the Ministry of Defense, the soldiers must adhere to the requirements of international humanitarian law and the Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions . For the assessment of the air attack it is important that non-governmental organized groups lose protection as civilians "if and as long as they take part directly in the hostilities". However, in practice the distinction between on the one hand bystanders or civilians and on the other hand "insurgents" (INS, insurgents), hostile forces (OMF, opposing militant forces, also opposing military forces), Taliban, al-Qaida forces or simply " Terrorists “difficult, if not impossible - as the large number of terms already indicates. General Egon Ramms , commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum of NATO and thus of the ISAF operations, described that: “Local farmers (...) are busy with their families or the like at the moment when they have to do agricultural work, for example more, put your AK-47 aside in order to possibly get it out again next year after the drug season and rejoin the Taliban in the fight. "Specifically for the area of ​​air strikes, the police report quoted the responsible representatives of the Afghan administration:" It is difficult to distinguish between Taliban and locals. What does a Taliban look like? (…) The Omar Khel tribe itself is the problem. About 80 percent of the tribesmen belong to the INS (...) Even the children / adolescents among the injured were not bystanders. ”On December 18, 2009, Ernst-Reinhard Beck , defense policy spokesman for the Union parliamentary group , and Hans-Peter Uhl , domestic policy spokesman, declared the Union parliamentary group that the Basic Law must be changed, since it has not taken into account the “changed realities of the 21st century” such as the asymmetrical threat in Afghanistan. “We are legally, mentally and politically not prepared for acts of war. We want to be the most pacifist pacifists . That will not do."

The historian Sönke Neitzel assesses the incident as a tragic error.

Consequences

For those who do immediately

The pilot sergeant was temporarily released from his duties. A little later he was promoted to sergeant major.

The recall of Colonel Klein demanded by McChrystal for violating the rules is said to have failed due to the resistance of the German Defense Ministry. Instead, Klein was routinely replaced as commander of the PRT by Colonel Kai Rohrschneider on September 28, 2009 as part of the contingent change and is again deployed in Germany. On September 5, 2009, the Potsdam public prosecutor began a preliminary examination of whether a criminal investigation should be initiated against the commander of the German field camp. Via the public prosecutor's office in Leipzig, the case came to the federal prosecutor's office in Karlsruhe on November 6, 2009. On March 19, 2010, this confirmed that the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan was a party to a non-international armed conflict ( civil war ) and was now against Colonel Klein and Sergeant Wilhelm Wilhelm on suspicion of violating Section 11, Paragraph 1, No. 3 of the Code of International Crimes (war crimes of Use of prohibited methods of warfare) initiated an investigation in order to be able to hear witnesses and give those involved a legal hearing. Criminal liability exists if the persons concerned had "expected to be certain" that "the attack will cause the killing or injury of civilians [...] to an extent that is disproportionate to the concrete and immediate military advantage expected overall". On April 19, 2010, the Federal Prosecutor's Office announced that it had discontinued the investigation against Colonel Klein and Sergeant Wilhelm Wilhelm because of the air attack in accordance with Section 170 (2) StPO , “because the result was neither the provisions of the International Criminal Code […] nor the provisions of the Criminal Code [...] fulfilled ”. Because of the obligation to comply with the security protection one can only give some reasons for the decision. Klein was allowed to assume that “there were no civilians on site. Therefore he was not obliged to give warnings before the military attack. [...] Violations of internal service guidelines, especially against individual rules of engagement, are not suitable for restricting actions permitted under international law, because such rules of engagement apply purely internally and they do not have any legally binding external effect ”. In June 2010 a news magazine quoted from the secret final report of the Federal Prosecutor's Office of April 16, 2010: Even if “the killing of several dozen protected civilians should have been expected”, this would “not have been out of proportion to the expected military in a tactical-military perspective Advantages ”. Both “the destruction of the tanker trucks and the elimination of high-ranking Taliban” would have had a “military significance that should not be underestimated”, so Klein's “excess”, contrary to international law, is ruled out. However, the Federal Prosecutor's Office is subject to instructions from the Federal Government, and the presentation of the facts by the Federal Prosecutor's Office did not agree in significant points with information that has become public from the ISAF and the Bundeswehr. A complaint was therefore announced against the decision on behalf of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR). Criticism came from other organizations such as the German section of the Association of International Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Organization of Lawyers Against Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons . The Ministry of Defense declared on August 19, 2010 that Colonel Klein, currently Chief of Staff of the 13th Panzer Grenadier Division in Leipzig, would no longer be investigated under disciplinary law because of suspected violations of service under the Defense Disciplinary Code. One of the victim lawyers at ECCHR said that this decision to hire was "obviously politically motivated and not guided by a legal analysis".

In 2013, Klein was appointed head of department in the new Federal Office for Personnel Management in the Bundeswehr . This was linked to a promotion to brigadier general on March 27, 2013. The Ministry of Defense also confirmed that Klein was "well suited" for the future job and that he met all professional requirements.

A few days after the airstrike, the two US pilots are said to have been recalled from the mission at the instigation of Commander-in-Chief McChrystal for violating operational rules and transferred to prison.

For the German Ministry of Defense

On November 26, 2009, a few hours after the newspaper was published, Defense Minister zu Guttenberg relieved Peter Wichert, State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defense, from his duties, pointing to the ministry's withholding of information. The Inspector General of the Bundeswehr Wolfgang Schneiderhan went with him on the same accusation, formally after he himself had submitted his resignation. Schneiderhan and Wichert later contradicted the reasons for their dismissal; they had informed the minister fully and correctly. On November 27, 2009, Jung, meanwhile in the new Cabinet of Labor Minister , took over the political responsibility for the wrong or belated information of parliament and the public and offered his resignation, which was accepted by the Chancellor.

For the victims and their families

The Bremen lawyer Karim Popal stated on November 27, 2009 that he had found 179 civilian casualties, including 134 dead, in the course of two trips to the area of ​​the air strike. Together with other lawyers, referring to the mandates given to him, he demanded compensation from the federal government. The Ministry of Defense confirmed that it wanted to provide “quick” and “unbureaucratic” aid to the civilian victims and their bereaved families. Back in 2008, when an Afghan woman and her two children were shot dead by German soldiers at a checkpoint, the Bundeswehr paid their family $ 20,000. The sum of 3 million euros given by German newspapers is, however, pure speculation.

On January 11, 2010, a newspaper reported that Popal and representatives of the federal government were still negotiating the amount of compensation on site. So far, it has been agreed to only pay out small amounts to individual people. The mass should be used for the construction of regional projects, which should be supervised by the society for technical cooperation and protected by the armed forces. On February 4, 2010, the German Armed Forces stated that PRT Kunduz had handed over 1,400 aid packages worth around 150,000 euros to Afghan distributors. The packages are intended “for families in need who live in the area that was affected by the air strike on September 4, 2009”, not just for victims and relatives of the air strike. Each package for families with up to five people contains 50 kilograms of flour, 10 kilograms of rice, 4 kilograms of beans, 2 kilograms of sugar and 5 liters of cooking oil, plus some firewood or a gas heater with a five-kilogram cartridge. In addition, each family member receives a blanket. The families were chosen by the governor of the district, village elders and representatives of the Bremen lawyer Popal. In the course of time, several lawyers withdrew from the collaboration with Popal, including the Frankfurt lawyer Oliver Wallasch , who volunteered for the non-governmental organization Fair Trials International . There remained Popal and the lawyer Bernhard Docke, who also worked in Bremen. At the end of February 2010, they increased the compensation required for victims and their relatives to 7 million euros and derived a fee of 178,500 euros plus travel expenses of 25,000 euros. The ministry rejected this as dubious in mid-March 2010; the planned project aid may now be realized without the help of lawyers. In March 2010, 30 heads of families called for compensation for 66 deaths through the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The Ministry of Defense therefore contacted the AIHRC. The journalist Christoph Reuter and the photographer Marcel Mettelsiefen researched on site from December 2009 to March 2010 and, with the help of local people, identified 91 fatalities. From April 2010 they presented the result with photos of many victims in a traveling exhibition in Berlin. In August 2010 the Bundeswehr confirmed that the families of these 91 dead and 11 seriously injured people each received US $ 5,000 as humanitarian aid in the sense of "voluntary ex -Gratia support benefits "without acknowledgment of a debt. Waiver of legal claims is not a condition. The amounts should go to bank accounts that are to be set up for the male heads of families. The previously planned project aid, however, will be given up.

Bundestag

debate

Signs action of the left

On February 26, 2010, an incident occurred in the German Bundestag during a debate on the new Afghanistan mandate. Members of the left-wing faction had to leave the plenary after holding up signs with obituary notices for the victims of the air strike. According to deputy group leader Jan van Aken , the MPs wanted to commemorate the victims. The MPs were again allowed to vote on the mandate.

Committee of Inquiry

In Parliament, some details demanded especially opposition politicians after the announcement of the air strike a committee to clarify the question of whether the constitutional body German Bundestag by the constitutional body federal government has violated his or her rights to information, whether the federal government or the then Defense Minister Jung, the then Vice Chancellor Frank- Walter Steinmeier and other people were knowingly involved, and what Defense Minister Guttenberg was informed about and when. The chairmen of the parliamentary groups agreed on December 2, 2009 that the Defense Committee should be constituted as a committee of inquiry on December 16, 2009 in accordance with Article 45a of the Basic Law. Its meetings, unlike those of a “normal” parliamentary committee of inquiry, are usually not open to the public. At its first meeting on January 21, 2010, the committee agreed to examine the military details over the next three days and, from the beginning of March 2010, political communication. The public hearing of the investigative committee ended on February 10 with the questioning of Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier . The final report was submitted to the German Bundestag on October 25, 2011 and finally debated in plenary on December 1, 2011.

Processes

overview

Overall, various legal systems overlap during the German mission in Afghanistan, which experts have described in detail and in their interaction with little consideration. Accordingly, various parties complained about an unreasonably unclear legal situation for the soldiers. The long and controversial discussions about the appropriateness of the bombing have revealed the many ambiguities in the legal understanding. The investigative committee of the German Bundestag also found that the persons involved had considerable uncertainties with regard to dealing with national and international rules of engagement. The Federal Republic made voluntary compensation payments , but a claim for damages was dismissed.

Civil litigation

In March 2013, the hearing began before the first civil division of the Bonn Regional Court after two relatives had sued the Federal Republic for a total of 90,000 euros in damages (file number: 1 O 460/11). The hearing continued on April 17, 2013. In addition to media attention, it also led to renewed open hostility against Georg Klein. In a judgment of December 11, 2013, the Bonn Regional Court dismissed the action, as the judges did not believe that there was a culpable breach of duty that could result in state liability for the Federal Republic of Germany. The plaintiff appealed the judgment. This was heard on March 12, 2015 before the Cologne Higher Regional Court (file number: 7 U 4/14). On April 30, 2015, the 7th Civil Senate of the Cologne Higher Regional Court rejected the appeal. At the same time, the Senate allowed the appeal to the Federal Court of Justice . In response to the plaintiffs' appeal, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed the decision of the Cologne Higher Regional Court on October 6, 2016 (file number: III ZR 140/15). The III responsible for state liability law gave the reason . Civil Senate from the fact that the then Bundeswehr Colonel Georg Klein "after exhausting all available reconnaissance possibilities" could not have recognized that civilians were in the target area of ​​the air attack. In November 2020, the Federal Constitutional Court did not accept a constitutional complaint against the refusal of official liability claims for decision.

Administrative process

The complaint by one of the two truck drivers, who had sought the illegality of Colonel Klein's order , was dismissed by the Cologne Administrative Court.

Criminal trial

On September 8, 2009, a Hamburg lawyer filed a criminal complaint against the then Federal Defense Minister Jung. Similar criminal charges were also issued by the Die Linke parliamentary group in the Hessian state parliament , by a retired judge from the Braunschweig Higher Regional Court and by other individuals. All criminal investigations against the accused, especially against Colonel Klein, ended at the national level with the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 19, 2015. However, with its decision of May 19, 2015, the Federal Constitutional Court again confirmed the right to prosecute third parties . With an on 13 January 2016 the European Court of Human Rights ( ECHR ) in Strasbourg filed human rights complaints tried a father of two victims to force the action against Georg Klein on. After the ECHR summarized the facts relevant to the decision by order of September 2, 2016 and directed specific questions to the parties to further clarify the facts, the court finally contradicted the action with a judgment on February 16, 2021.

Cinema and television

• Documentary fiction by ZDF , One day in Kunduz - The deadly order, first broadcast on September 7, 2011
• “ A murderous decision ” , NDR , first broadcast in August 2013.
• “Who wakes the dogs” - a thriller by Achim Zons
• Kunduz: The Incident at Hadji Ghafur , film by Simona and Stefan Gieren (2012)

literature

• Order of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 19, 2015, 2 BvR 987/11, NJW 2015, 3500 ( full text )
• Marcel Bohnert : On the need for situation-specific rules of engagement for soldiers on missions abroad . In: Fabian Forster, Sascha Vugrin, Leonard Wessendorff (eds.): The age of the Einsatzarmee. Challenges to Law and Ethics . Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014, pp. 131–140, ISBN 978-3-8305-3380-1
• Christoph Reuter , Marcel Mettelsiefen : Kunduz, September 4, 2009 . Rogner & Bernhard, 2010, ISBN 3-8077-1063-9
• Stefanie Schmahl : No official liability for culpable violations of international law in armed conflicts? Critical considerations on the Kunduz judgment of the BGH . In: NJW 2017, 128

Web links

• Amnesty International with a list of 83 victims of the air strike. Status: October 30, 2009 (PDF; 67 kB)
• Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission / Einsatzführungsstab BMVg with a list of names of 102 victims. Status: August 27, 2010 (PDF; 620 kB)
• Final report of the Bundestag committee of inquiry into the Kunduz affair of October 20, 2011 (PDF; 9 MB)
• Christian Richter: Deadly military violence and criminal responsibility . hrr-strafrecht.de
• Overview of the legal process

Individual evidence

1. ^ ^{A b c} Matthias Gebauer: Protocol of the nightmare night of Kunduz. In: Spiegel Online . November 26, 2009. Retrieved December 10, 2009 . 
2. ↑ Bundestag debates final report on Kunduz
3. ↑ ^{a b c} Federal Prosecutor General stops preliminary proceedings against Klein and Wilhelm for lack of evidence for a criminal act
4. ↑ ^{a b} faz.net, War-like conditions in Kundus and Berlin
5. ↑ aixpaix.de, German victims of the Afghanistan war ( memento from October 1, 2016 Internet Archive )
6. ↑ ^{a b c d} welt.de, The most dangerous hour of the German soldiers
7. Jump up ↑ Afghanistan: Bundeswehr soldiers injured in combat . In: Die Zeit , No. 37/2009
8. ↑ ^{a b} dipbt.bundestag.de, preliminary report (PDF)
9. ↑ ^{a b} haz.de, German soldiers defend the air strike
10. ↑ ^{a b} justiz.nrw.de, Administrative Court Cologne, 26 K 5534/10
11. ^ Berliner Zeitung: Chronology according to COMISAF report
12. ^ Death in the riverbed: graphic reconstruction of the Taliban attack and NATO air strike near Kunduz. In: Spiegel Online . November 26, 2009. Retrieved December 4, 2009 . 
13. ^ AP: Bundeswehr pursued tanker hijacking with drones
14. ↑ Bundeswehr: With the KZO drone, the picture of the situation in action has improved
15. ^ Minutes as reported by McChrystal
16. ↑ ^{a b} The lonely decision of Colonel Klein. Zeit Online, December 13, 2009, accessed December 14, 2009 . 
17. ↑ Klein had drone surveillance terminated due to working time regulations
18. ↑ What role did the KSK elite troops play? BILD digital, December 10, 2009, accessed December 10, 2009 . 
19. ^ ^{A b} Reinhard Müller: Air strike from Kundus. The opponent may be fought. FAZ.net. December 11, 2009. Retrieved December 13, 2009.
20. ↑ ^{a b} US fighter pilots warned more sharply than previously known about air raids. In: Spiegel Online . December 5, 2009, accessed December 7, 2009 . 
21. ↑ In a speech to the German Bundestag, Eckart von Klaeden had claimed the opposite, in accordance with reports that were initially published: the choice of a weaker weapon was the decision of the German officer. Parliamentary television 233rd meeting, time: 12:09 pm. German Bundestag, September 8, 2009, accessed December 21, 2009 . 
22. ↑ Stephan Löwenstein: New picture from old facts. FAZ.net, December 4, 2009, accessed December 21, 2009 . 
23. ↑ The Afghan War Diary 2004-2010 . WikiLeaks
24. ↑ Jung allegedly kept silent about civilian victims. Zeit Online, November 26, 2009, accessed December 4, 2009 . 
25. ↑ Matthias Gebauer: BND informed the Chancellery quickly about civilian victims Spiegel online, March 25, 2010
26. ^ The Chancellery knew early on of the victims in Kunduz, Der Tagesspiegel, March 26, 2010
27. ↑ General Glatz had the report to ISAF amended on possible civilian casualties . Mirror online
28. ^ Investigations into treason . Southgerman newspaper
29. ↑ The video of the tank truck bombing - Did Minister Jung hide the truth? , Picture, September 26, 2009
30. ^ Rajiv Chandrasekaran: Sole Informant Guided Decision On Afghan Strike. The Washington Post, September 6, 2009, accessed December 8, 2009 . 
31. ↑ Colonel Klein wanted to “meet the enemies of the reconstruction” Spiegel Online, December 12, 2009
32. ↑ Link to the final report of the Committee of Inquiry of the Defense Committee (PDF; 9 MB), page 98
33. ^ Franz Josef Jung: Speech by the Federal Minister for Labor and Social Affairs, Dr. Franz Josef Jung, in the agreed debate on the Federal Minister Dr. Franz Josef Jung promised declaration before the German Bundestag (PDF) November 26, 2009
34. ↑ Afghan governor praises the Bundeswehr . Spiegel Online , September 7, 2009
35. ↑ ^{a b} A German crime . In: Der Spiegel . No. 5 , 2010 ( online ).
36. ^ President Karzai ordered investigation into Kunduz incident ( Memento of December 3, 2009 in the Internet Archive ), Press Release, Office of the President, September 4, 2009
37. ^ Kai Küstner: 30 civilians and 20 unarmed people killed. ARD radio studio South Asia, September 13, 2009, archived from the original on September 22, 2009 ; Retrieved December 10, 2009 (Karzai Commission presents report on NATO attack).  tagesschau.de
38. ↑ NATO report on attack on tanker trucks - Bundeswehr feels relieved. In: taz.de. October 29, 2009, accessed August 15, 2016 . 
39. ↑ ^{a b} Bundeswehr feels relieved. sueddeutsche.de, May 17, 2010, accessed on August 15, 2016 . 
40. ↑ Investigation report on "Close Air Support KUNDUZ" from September 4, 2009 (PDF; 3.9 MB)
41. ↑ Quotation from the police report of September 9, 2009 Image , November 27, 2009
42. ^ ^{A b c} Ministry of Defense wanted to cover up the truth deliberately . Mirror online
43. ^ NATO considered the police report to be meaningless. In: Spiegel Online . January 9, 2010, accessed January 11, 2010 . 
44. ↑ Wolfgang Schneiderhan: Press statement by the inspector general on the COMISAF investigation report. BMVg, October 29, 2008, accessed on December 14, 2009 . 
45. ↑ Susanne Lichte: General Inspector informs: Status of the ISAF investigation report. Bundeswehr, November 3, 2009.
46. ^ Kunduz affair. Guttenberg defends himself against accusations of fraud. Sueddeutsche.de. December 14, 2009.
47. ^ ^{A b} Stefan Kornelius: Air strike near Kundus. Bundeswehr wanted to kill the Taliban. Süddeutsche Zeitung , December 11, 2009.
48. ^ Afghanistan: German government must investigate deadly Kunduz airstrikes. Amnesty International, October 30, 2009, accessed December 19, 2020 . 
49. ↑ ^{a b} Matthias Gebauer: The difficult way to compensation. In: Spiegel Online . December 8, 2009, accessed January 12, 2010 . 
50. ^ Red Cross report increases pressure on Guttenberg. stern.de, December 10, 2009, accessed on February 17, 2010 . 
51. ^ Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung in a BamS interview. September 6, 2009
52. ^ Press statements by Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on September 6, 2009 in Berlin ( Memento from January 3, 2012 in the Internet Archive )
53. ^ Government statement by Chancellor Merkel on the current events in Afghanistan ( Memento from January 3, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) September 8, 2009
54. ↑ Speech by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on the current events in Afghanistan in front of the German Bundestag on September 8, 2009 in Berlin ( Memento from January 3, 2012 in the Internet Archive ), government online
55. ↑ ^{a b} Markus Decker: Air attack "not appropriate". In: Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger. November 30, 2009, archived from the original on April 26, 2010 ; Retrieved April 23, 2010 . 
56. ↑ Personnel consequences, since information was withheld from the Minister by the leadership of the Bundeswehr and the Inspector General. ( Memento from November 29, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Tagesschau
57. ^ German for deduction - and for young. stern.de, September 16, 2009, accessed on December 3, 2009 (stern survey on Afghanistan). 
58. ↑ emnid: At the end of November 2009, 65% of Germans are for the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan before 2013
59. ↑ Helmut Schmidt criticizes the Afghanistan mission. In: Zeit Online . Retrieved September 23, 2009. Retrieved 2011 . 
60. ↑ The mission is a disaster . In: Der Spiegel . No. 34 , 2009 ( online ).
61. ↑ Secret Matter 85 . Southgerman newspaper
62. ↑ J. Meyer, J. Reichelt: Did Minister Jung withhold the truth? In: BILD digital. November 26, 2009, accessed December 3, 2009 . 
63. ↑ annotated video about the air raid on 3rd / 4th September 2009. PICTURE
64. ↑ Answer of the Federal Government to the minor question from the MPs Winfried Nachtwei, Ute Koczy, Kerstin Müller (Cologne) and others
65. ^ Daniel Friedrich Sturm: Ex-Foreign Minister Steinmeier: We all knew about many victims . Welt Online , December 5, 2009
66. ↑ ^{a b c d} Doubts about the reasons for Schneiderhan's dismissal. In: Welt Online . December 12, 2009. Retrieved December 14, 2009 . 
67. ↑ ^{a b} Guttenberg has to explain because of Schneiderhan dismissal. In: Spiegel Online . December 12, 2009. Retrieved December 14, 2009 . 
68. ↑ ^{a b} S. Kornelius; P. Blechschmidt: Testimony against testimony. Kunduz affair. Southgerman newspaper. December 14, 2009. Online December 13, 2009
69. ↑ Schneiderhan accuses Guttenberg of being untruthful. In: Zeit Online . December 16, 2009. Retrieved December 21, 2009 . 
70. ↑ Reuters: Guttenberg withdraws allegation of embezzlement
71. ↑ Patrick Bahners: Guttenberg's information policy. Suddenly this overview. In: FAZ.net. December 14, 2009. Retrieved December 14, 2009 . 
72. ↑ Guttenberg defends himself against accusations of fraud . Sueddeutsche.de. December 14, 2009.
73. ↑ Christoph Schwennicke: Merkel and the Kunduz affair. Chancellor's war. December 15, 2009, accessed December 15, 2009 . 
74. ↑ Bundeswehr: "It is time for escalation". In: Focus.de. July 22, 2009. Retrieved October 13, 2013 . 
75. ↑ Speech by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, on the current events in Afghanistan in front of the German Bundestag on September 8, 2009 in Berlin. Government online, September 8, 2009, accessed on December 14, 2009 : "Above all, I assured him that our philosophy and our understanding of the mission would remain." 
76. ↑ New references to targeted and government-approved killing in the Kunduz case, backing for Colonel Klein. Leipziger Volkszeitung, December 12, 2009, archived from the original on December 19, 2009 ; Retrieved December 21, 2009 . 
77. ↑ Gabriel suggests Guttenberg resign. Afghanistan. Southgerman newspaper. December 13, 2009.
78. ↑ Can the Bundeswehr kill in a targeted manner? taz, December 14, 2009
79. ↑ An attack, an affair and many explosive questions. In: Spiegel Online . December 1, 2009, accessed December 8, 2009 . 
80. ↑ Guttenberg refuses to resign. In: Spiegel Online . December 14, 2009. Retrieved December 14, 2009 . 
81. ↑ The Colonel Klein case. In: Tagesspiegel. December 13, 2009. Retrieved December 14, 2009 . 
82. ↑ ^{a b} Speech by Minister zu Guttenberg on the occasion of the ISAF mandate extension. BMVg, December 3, 2009, accessed on December 11, 2009 : “And I repeat again, although Colonel Klein - and I also call this out to the officers who are here today - undoubtedly to the best of my knowledge and belief and to protect his soldiers acted, from today's, objective point of view, in the light of all documents, including those withheld from me at the time, it was not militarily appropriate. " 
83. ↑ Guttenberg on Dec. 10, 2009: Commander acted to the best of his knowledge and belief ( Memento of December 14, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
84. ↑ Guttenberg on December 11, 2009: Commander acted to the best of his knowledge and belief
85. ↑ Interview with the deputy commander of the operational command, Major General Rainer Glatz, International Magazine for Security, November 2007, ISSN  1866-6736
86. ↑ Written questions with the answers of the Federal Government received in the week of January 14, 2008 (German Bundestag - printed matter 16/7794 of January 18, 2008) (PDF; 427 kB)
87. ↑ We need legal security for our soldiers. In: sueddeutsche.de. November 6, 2009, accessed on December 15, 2009 (interview by zu Guttenberg with Nico Fried and Peter Blechschmidt). 
88. ↑ Guttenberg remains under pressure in the Kunduz affair. In: Spiegel Online . December 9, 2009, accessed December 10, 2009 . 
89. ↑ Colonel had to decide within seconds. Deutschlandfunk, September 7, 2009, accessed on December 14, 2009 (Ex-General defends the Bundeswehr, Klaus Naumann in conversation with Silvia Engels). 
90. ↑ Bundeswehr association chief Kirsch calls for clarification. (Video, text) ARD Mediathek, November 27, 2009, accessed on December 8, 2009 : "Colonel Klein felt threatened by the tanker truck"  (Note: The ARD media library is only available to a limited extent according to the State Broadcasting Treaty)
91. ↑ Guttenberg corrects assessment of the tank truck attack. In: Spiegel Online . December 3, 2009, accessed December 4, 2009 . 
92. ^ Schmidt: Afghanistan mission according to GG
93. ^ Schmidt: videocast pledge speech
94. ^ BMVg: Powers in ISAF operations: What are soldiers allowed to do in Afghanistan and what are they not allowed to do? , December 18, 2009
95. ↑ General Ramms: Peasants join the Taliban at times .
96. ↑ New Kunduz video appeared. In: Spiegel Online . December 18, 2009, accessed on December 21, 2009 : "Union politicians demand more robust mandate" 
97. ^ Sönke Neitzel : German warriors. From the Empire to the Berlin Republic - a military story. Propylaea, Berlin 2020, ISBN 978-3-549-07647-7 , pp. 521-522 .
98. ↑ Hidden knowledge . ( Memento from December 20, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) Frankfurter Rundschau, November 27, 2009
99. ↑ ^{a b c} US pilots postponed for rule violation, Colonel Klein's recall failed due to German resistance, international law
100. ↑ Afghanistan: Federal Prosecutor's Office to investigate the air strike
101. ↑ General Federal Prosecutor announces examination of the allegations against Colonel Klein
102. ↑ Ex-Inspector General Kujat: Preliminary proceedings by the Federal Prosecutor's Office were inevitable
103. ^ Spiegel: Federal Prosecutor's Office considers bombing to be proportionate
104. ↑ Complaint against employment by the federal prosecutor's office
105. ^ Ministry of Defense is not investigating Colonel Klein
106. ^ Colonel Georg Klein promoted to Brigadier General
107. ^ Majid Sattar: Colonel Georg Klein becomes Brigadier General. In: faz.net. August 8, 2012, accessed December 11, 2014 . 
108. ↑ Guttenberg dismisses Schneiderhan. In: sueddeutsche.de. November 26, 2009. Retrieved December 8, 2009 . 
109. ↑ Minister Jung resigns. In: Spiegel Online . November 27, 2009, accessed December 3, 2009 . 
110. ^ Lawyer speaks of 179 civilian victims. In: Spiegel Online . November 27, 2009, accessed December 4, 2009 . 
111. ↑ In 2008, the Bundeswehr compensated the family with $ 20,000 . FAZ
112. ↑ Bundeswehr should plan 3 million euros in compensation . Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung
113. ↑ Compensation for civilian victims presumably in the form of projects . weser-kurier.de
114. ↑ Bundeswehr: Aid packages worth 150,000 euros are distributed to 1,200 families in need
115. ↑ Distribution to selected families in need . n-tv
116. ↑ Ministry rejects claims as dubious, project help without lawyers possible . Mirror online
117. ↑ AIHRC supports the demands of 30 Afghan families
118. ↑ Kunstraum Potsdam ( Memento from June 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Reuter and Mettelsiefen 2010: Traveling exhibition on the air raid on Kunduz.
119. ↑ Compensation for the Kunduz victims is available . star
120. ↑ The Left parliamentary group expelled from the Bundestag for plaques with Kunduz dead . ( Memento from March 5, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Frankfurter Rundschau
121. ↑ Reuters: Opposition calls for a committee of inquiry
122. ↑ Ströbele reiterates the call for a committee of inquiry into Afghanistan. Deutschlandfunk, November 28, 2009, accessed December 14, 2009 . 
123. ↑ Steffen Hebestreit: Behind closed doors. In: Frankfurter Rundschau online. Retrieved December 6, 2009 . 
124. ^ Political groups agree on the timetable of the U Committee . star
125. ^ German Bundestag: Merkel and Steinmeier in front of the Kunduz Committee . bundestag.de; Retrieved February 3, 2011
126. ↑ Bundestag debates final report on Kunduz
127. ↑ Michael Bothe : What the Bundeswehr is allowed to do , sueddeutsche.de, December 15, 2009
128. ↑ Questions & Answers: Can the Bundeswehr kill the Taliban? FR-online.de, December 14, 2009
129. ↑ Marcel Bohnert : On the need for situation-specific rules of engagement for soldiers in missions abroad . In: Fabian Forster, Sascha Vugrin, Leonard Wessendorff (eds.): The age of the Einsatzarmee. Challenges for Law and Ethics . Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014, p. 139, ISBN 978-3-8305-3380-1
130. ↑ Trial of the Kunduz affair: Victims demand compensation . sueddeutsche.de, March 20, 2013, accessed on March 24, 2013
131. ↑ Marcel Bohnert: On the need for situation-specific rules of engagement for soldiers in missions abroad . In: Fabian Forster, Sascha Vugrin, Leonard Wessendorff (Ed.): The age of the Einsatzarmee. Challenges to Law and Ethics . Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014, p. 140
132. ^ Bonn Regional Court, judgment of December 11, 2013, file number 1 O 460/11
133. ↑ No compensation for surviving dependents . ( Memento from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Tagesschau.de
134. ↑ Press release plaintiff lawyer Popal dated March 11, 2015 Archived copy ( Memento dated April 25, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
135. ↑ Cologne Higher Regional Court, judgment of April 30, 2015, file number 7 U 4/14
136. ↑ NJW 2016, 3656 Press release of the Federal Court of Justice No. 176/2016 of October 6, 2016
137. ↑ Federal Court of Justice: Germany is not liable for Kunduz bombing . Spiegel Online , October 6, 2016.
138. ↑ Unsuccessful constitutional complaint against the refusal of official liability claims due to a foreign deployment of the Bundeswehr. Retrieved December 17, 2020 . 
139. ^ VG Köln, judgment of February 9, 2012 , Az. 26 K 5534/10, full text.
140. ^ Criminal charges against the Federal Government and the Bundeswehr ( Memento from December 20, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 201 kB)
141. ^ Criminal charges by the Left parliamentary group of the Hessian state parliament
142. ↑ Retired judge files a criminal complaint ( memento of the original from January 10, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. 
143. ↑ Order of the Federal Constitutional Court of May 19, 2015, 2 BvR 987/11, NJW 2015, 3500 ( full text )
144. ↑ Constitutional complaint regarding the air attack near Kunduz in September 2009
145. ↑ Complaint No. 4871/16 in the Abdul Hanan v. Germany case
146. ^ Human rights court relieves Germany. FAZ , February 16, 2021, accessed on February 16, 2021 . 
147. ↑ Thomas Wiegold : ZDF Kundus docufiction on September 7th on TV. In: eyes straight ahead! August 10, 2011, accessed August 10, 2011 . 

Coordinates: 36 ° 36 '52.4 "  N , 68 ° 52' 40.2"  E